• Daniel T. O’Hara – “There Will Be No Peace”: Edward Mendelson’s “Early Auden, Later Auden”

    Daniel T. O’Hara – “There Will Be No Peace”: Edward Mendelson’s “Early Auden, Later Auden”

    Edward Mendelson, Early Auden, Later Auden: A Critical Biography (Princeton UP, 2017)

    Reviewed by Daniel T. O’Hara

    This essay has been peer-reviewed by the boundary 2 editorial collective. 

    Edward Mendelson’s Early Auden, Later Auden: A Critical Biography combines with minor revisions, as its author notes in the new preface, the two earlier separate volumes published eighteen years apart in 1981 and 1999, respectively. Of specific revisions, the most important is the addition of a postscript about Auden’s “secret life.” This does not consist of sensational or lurid adventures, but of Auden’s selfless, quiet giving and other acts of unannounced and otherwise unremembered charity. However, although updating scholarship where needed, including references to a recently discovered journal (2004) from August-November 1939 and eliminating as much repetition as possible, this one volume edition contains the earlier ones pretty much as they were. This includes introductions overviewing each volume to come, hefty numbered parts delineating and subdividing periods into chapters in Auden’s life and career of his English and then American affiliations. Auden spent his summers after World War II first in Ischia, an island off the coast of Naples, and then beginning in 1958 in Kirchstetten, a village that is forty kilometers from Vienna. He would winter usually in New York City, unless he was teaching around the USA at different universities and colleges for a term or two (one up to three years), from the University of Michigan to Swarthmore College. For five years in the second half of the 1950s he was the Professor of Poetry at Oxford, for three-week periods in the fall semesters. Oxford made allowances for Auden’s needing to be in New York to make money with his many and diverse prose projects of reviews, articles, prefaces, essays, editorial and anthology work. Mendelson’s separate biographies ended with epilogues wrapping up each of the original installments, and as the reader notes, they remain in place here. This all makes for a monumental, not to say magisterial 895-page tome by the literary executor of the Auden estate.

    Of Mendelson’s many remarkable accomplishments, it is the shift he makes in how we view and value the divide in the career between early English and later American Auden that stands out. When in 1981 the first volume appeared, it was the early English modernist Auden who was still loudly celebrated, with the later American Auden as progressively never quite measuring up, whether seen as a Christian existentialist humanist or postmodernist poet. To be sure, there were recognized rare virtuoso exceptions in the later work, such as a handful of lyrics (“The Shield of Achilles” [1955] being one famous instance) and perhaps Caliban’s final prose poetry address to the audience in “The Sea and the Mirror” (1944), done in the late most baroque style of Henry James’ The Golden Bowl and The American Scene. But also, then the later Auden was seen as progressively becoming lost both in the quixotic quest for creating a truly modern epic poem (his “For the Time Being” and “the Age of Anxiety” being viewed at that time as being wholly abstract and prolix failures); and in the la-la-land of Californian or more generally American popular culture, with all those lax poetic lines in the loose verse of the final five years of his life so filled with obviously narcissistic self-references. Mendelson, ever the smart partisan of the later Auden, has now won the battle, and reading this one-volume compilation makes the reader feel its rightness even more. Just as he had demonstrated in Early Auden (1981) that the English modernist “masterpieces,” however delightful or provocative at the time, such as “The Watershed” (as later named by Auden), were in fact more gamesmanship and puzzles than they needed to be, conflating Conradian spies and “secret sharers” with cruising gay lovers in Laura Riding/Thomas Hardy-like lines and enjambments; so, too, he revealed in Later Auden (1999) that the American Auden contained not only some of his greatest poetry, in original innovations in traditional styles of the canzone, the sestina, and the Italian sonnet, but simply some of the greatest poetry created in the twentieth-century, concerned like no other poets in the West were at the time with the worldly history and possible global future of the city, of citizenship, and of civilization itself.  This is not to say that Mendelson presents his critical perspective polemically, but in fact, he presents it as modulating, in response to the process of reading the poems themselves, so that he can say in his new Preface honestly: “If I were to rewrite the two books today, they would be even more admiring of their subject than they already are” ( ix).

    To see his achievement on behalf of the later “American” Auden, we must turn to “The Murderous Birth,” Chapter VIII in Part One “Vision and After” of the “Later Auden,” which is largely an elaborate original reading of “The Sea and the Mirror: A Commentary on Shakespeare’s The Tempest” (1944). I realize some of the irony using the nationalizing descriptors, of course, but as I hope to show, in tweaking a bit Mendelson’s reading of Caliban as Jamesian, the American label holds even truer than it at first appears.

    The kernel of Mendelson’s reading arises amid summarizing what Auden did for himself in writing “The Sea and the Mirror”:

    By writing “The Sea and the Mirror” as a series of monologues for fictional characters borrowed from Shakespeare, Auden could write autobiographically in a deeper and more comprehensive way than ni his first-person lyrics. He expressed a different aspect of himself in each character, without masking that aspect behind a self-consciously public face. . . . To think his death I thought myself alive. The murder that never quite occurs in “The Sea and the Mirror” [as Sebastian notes], was [really not in the play but] a murder that repeatedly did not quite occur in the thirty-five years of Auden’s life (534; author’s italics).

    What Mendelson means, and he supports this nugget of evidence by a prior step-by-step presentation and elucidation of supporting imagery from other poems, criticism, letters, notes, and so on, is suddenly and finally revealed in a brief rather blurted out note of intended consolation to Beata Wachstein, one of Elizabeth Mayer’s two daughters, who had recently suffered a miscarriage. Mendelson describes the note as “commiserating on her miscarriage in a blithe tone that concealed the private depths of his theme” (534). He then cites the note itself, linking it to one of Caliban’s most diabolic formulations addressed to the audience for this imagined performance of Shakespeare’s play, after which we the readers listen to the actors still apparently in character making sense of their magical experiences:

    “‘Just a note to say how sorry I am about your misfortune, and to wish you better luck next time. My mother had a miscarriage before me, for which I cannot be sorry, because if she hadn’t, perhaps I shouldn’t exist.’ Or, as he has Caliban say [as Mendelson interpolates here]: ‘We should not be sitting here now, washed, warm, well-fed . . . unless there were others who are not here . . . others who have not been so fortunate, others who did not succeed in navigating the narrow passage’” (535).

    For Mendelson, Auden confesses in this note to the final piece of the fateful nightmare scenario in which, somehow even before his conception, Auden, as Sebastian does with his living brother in the play, thought his unborn sibling’s death in order “to think myself alive.” This murderous cogito explains, Mendelson concludes, the presence of the life-long phantasm of obsessive guilt and ironic self-consciousness haunting the life and the work, taking the form in “The Sea and the Mirror” as Prospero’s cursed slave, Caliban. Auden’s own original sin is then this murderous birth because his very conception required the displacement into a miscarriage of the lost completely innocent child that was thus not to have been born.

    This bizarre paradox of repressed unconscious thinking is actually a now rare but once more familiar rhetorical figure, that of metalepsis or transumption. Harold Bloom brought it to critical attention in his theory of the anxiety of influence more than forty years ago, but it has now largely faded from discussion. Basically, it is the revisionary trope of displacing a prior reality, even as a later reality thereby may assume the imaginary position of creating and revising this prior reality. Just as Auden by giving Shakespeare’s Caliban the image of the late James’ voice, his style of speaking in his writing, so, too, Auden would displace both James thereby and at least Shakespeare’s original invention in this instance, albeit not Shakespeare himself, though certainly surpassing Browning’s revision in “Caliban on Setebos.”

    The cost of such flagrant lying against time is guilt primarily at the strongly violent, transgressive, even homicidal wishes involved in such post-romantic or modern revisionism in which the belated poet imprisons the precursor in the former’s chosen invention, thereby making the precursor over into the later poet’s creature. Mendelson sees such guilt in terms of the consequences of these transgressive or murderous wishes, following Auden’s lead, even as he recognizes it as delusional in actuality, except when it comes to Auden’s ambivalence about his own homosexuality. Mendelson concludes that Auden’s negative feelings about being gay arise from and compound the guilt he assumes for his impossible murder of his miscarried potential sibling, as if this extreme negativity proved he was divine or demonic, after all:

    In his darkest imaginings about himself, [Auden] connected his illusory sense of guilt about his own birth with his inescapable sense of guilt about his homosexuality, his sense of it as criminal and isolating. The crime was that his sexuality was itself a punishment for an earlier crime. The obscure offense against childbirth that he had committed by being born was now punished . . . by another obscure offense against childbirth. (535)

    Caliban, of course, becomes Auden’s revisionary vehicle for this transumptive metaphoric transformation. He is an instance of what I would more specifically call the revisionary phantasm. This is the autobiographical fiction representing the wish for divine power vis a vis others, known and unknown, in everyone, anyone. This mega-personification or giant form and the scenario accompanying it stands for the power of art to influence and determine the identities of others, those known personally or otherwise.

    Whether Mendelson’s reading is entirely fair to Auden—is the revisionary autobiographical phantasm and its scenario throughout the critical commentary Auden’s or Mendelson’s?–it does point (on the poet’s part) to a system of belief in daemons (a la Yeats and Goethe—or Plutarch?), spirits of genius with feelings for or, more likely against, the poet, as in “There Will Be No Peace” (1956):

         Though mild clear weather

                                   Smile again on the shore of your esteem

                                   And its colours come back, the storm has changed you:

                                   You will not forget, ever,

                                   The darkness blotting out hope, the gale

                                   Prophesying your downfall.

     

                                   You must live with your knowledge.

                                   Way back, beyond, outside of you are others,

                                   In moonless absences you never heard of,

                                   Who have certainly heard of you,

                                   Beings of unknown number and gender:

                                   And they do not like you.

     

                                   What have you done to them?

                                   Nothing? Nothing is not an answer:

                                   You will come to believe – how can you help it? –

                                   That you did, you did do something;

                                   You will find yourself wishing you could make them laugh,

                                   You will long for their friendship.

     

                                   There will be no peace.

                                   Fight back, then, with such courage as you have

                                   And every unchivalrous dodge you know of,

                                   Clear on your conscience on this:

                                   Their cause, if they had one, is no thing to them now;

                                   They hate for hate’s sake (Auden: Collected Poems [1991], 617).

    This is a remarkably lucid presentation of the nameless, faceless sources of guilt that so often in the poet’s life—or even prior to his birth–can be given something of a local habitation and a name, an embryonic figuration of personhood (at least), which then serves repeatedly as stand-in for the driven nature of the career. When we combine this belief in the daemonic, in daemons—as part of whichever psychologizing system or allegorizing psychomachia we follow Auden into reformulating this visionary belief in genius—we just may begin to hear another more familiar American voice than James’ reverberating now on Auden’s moonless night—rather than under the original “pale sagging moon”—that is flooding the shore with reiterations of “the sea”:

    Delaying not, hurrying not, 

    Whisper’d me through the night, and very plainly before day-break, 

    Lisp’d to me the low and delicious word death, 

    And again death, death, death, death, 

    Hissing melodious, neither like the bird nor like my arous’d child’s heart, 

    But edging near as privately for me rustling at my feet, 

    Creeping thence steadily up to my ears and laving me softly all over, 

    Death, death, death, death, death. 

    Which I do not forget, 

    But fuse the song of my dusky demon and brother, 

    That he sang to me . . . on Paumanok’s gray beach, 

    With the thousand responsive songs at random, 

    My own songs awaked from that hour, 

    And with them the key, the word up from the waves, 

    The word of the sweetest song and all songs, 

    That strong and delicious word which, creeping to my feet, 

    (Or like some old crone rocking the cradle, swathed in sweet garments, bending aside,) 

    The sea whisper’d me (Whitman [2002]: 253).

    Auden, as a radical anti-romantic modernist, was to be sure no fan of Whitman’s, just as he was not fond of the other romantics (American or British); but then, given Whitman’s large embrace of his “brother” Death, whose proper name or “word,” Whitman eagerly speaks as himself, and Auden’s dread of the specter of the potential sibling he “murdered” so he could be born originally–if one credits Mendelson’s argument fully—how could one expect otherwise? In the land of the id, Mendelson shows us learning so well from Freud and some of his most maverick followers, all contradictions are possible, equally true or false, at any one time.

    Beyond this familiar point (to Auden), however, there is a more salient one. Auden, seventy or more years before our time with its post-colonialist sensitivities, underscores via Caliban’s address to the audience–to the readers—how the liberal minded benefactors of those impoverished and sacrificed in wars and other preventable events must be held publicly accountable as any rabid imperialist, is also guilty up to the hilt: “We should not be sitting here now, washed, warm, well-fed, in seats we have paid for, unless there were others who have not here; our liveliness and good humour, such as they are, are those of survivors, conscious that there are others who have not been so fortunate, others who did not succeed in navigating the narrow passage . . . .” (Auden, Collected Poems 1991, p. 428). Why? Perhaps, as we have learned, thanks to Mendelson’s monumental achievement, because there is no peace. Or, so Antonio, Prospero’s Iago-like brother, would confirm as he sings to himself at the end of the speeches of the other characters, who don’t know they are actors right before Caliban, who does know, begins his address to the imagined audience of actual readers (us):

    One link is missing, Prospero,

    My magic is my own;

    Happy Miranda does not know

    The figure that Antonio,

    The Only One, Creation’s O

    Dances for Death alone

    (Auden [1991]: 422)

    Condescending mercy ever breeds no justice, as Prospero will ever discover, it appears, and no justice means for sure no peace can be forthcoming from any of our demons.

    References

    Auden, W. H. 1991. Collected Poems. Ed. Edward Mendelson. London: Faber and Faber.

    Mendelson, Edward. 2017.Early Auden, Later Auden: A Critical Biography.  New Preface.

    Princeton: Princeton University Press.

    Whitman, Walt. 2002. Leaves of Grass and Other Writings. Norton Critical Editions. Ed.

    Michael Moon. New York: W.W. Norton.

  • Pierre Joris – A Nomad Poetics Revisited: Poetry and Translation in a Global Age

    Pierre Joris – A Nomad Poetics Revisited: Poetry and Translation in a Global Age

    by Pierre Joris

    [presented as keynote address at the International Poetry Seminar

    Moving Back and Forth between Poetry as/and Translation:  Nomadic Travels and Travails with Alice Notley and Pierre Joris

    on 7-8 November 2013, Université Libre de Bruxelles, convened by Franca Bellarsi & Peter Cockelbergh.]

     

    1. “Who among us has not had his promised land, his day of ecstasy and his end in exile?” — signed: Amiel (with one “m” — the one with 2 “m”s will come in later). Thus begins or rather pre-begins Joseph Conrad’s novel Almayer’s Folly: A Story of an Eastern River (1895). The epigraph comes from Henri-Frédéric Amiel’s collection of poems & prose meditations Grains de Mil (Grains of Millet) (Paris 1854). This exergue stands at the head of, or, more accurately, stands before his first novel, thus before the vast oeuvre to come. Introïbo ad altarem Conradi.

    The world-weary and wandering sailor from Poland I often confuse with my own grandfather, Joseph Joris, also a sailor, though in the early parts of his life & of the 20C when Conrad had already abandoned ship to take up the pen. Joseph Joris’ writings — mainly a large correspondence with major scientists & politicians of his era, or so my father told me, and some notations of which only one 3 by 4 scrap of astrological calculations remains — went up in flames during the Rundstedt offensive when his house in Ettelbruck, Luxembourg — living quarters plus confiserie fine plus the ineptly, for its time, named Cinéma de la Paix — was shelled & burned out by advancing US troops liberating us from the Germans. Joseph didn’t live to see this: he had died 2 years earlier from an infected throat — but that is another story.

    So why do I begin here? Because this epigraph I came across a few days ago as I sat down to redact this “keynote” (more on that word in a minute) came into my mind — maybe because as I was thinking about what to say today I was looking out of my window, idly, and through the red & falling autumn leaves saw the flowing waters of the Narrows, where Hudson river and East river (tho not Conrad’s “Eastern River” — & yet?) mingle with the encroaching ocean in a daily tug-of-war, ebb & flood, riverrun riverrun — if I wanted to link elsewhere in modernism, but I don’t want to right now.

    So, Conrad’s epigraph was suddenly there & I saw it not as something that stands before one book, but as something that stands before, above, in front of a whole oeuvre, a life’s work. A door all of a sudden — a gate, as in Kafka’s story. (Though Kafka, remember, couldn’t go to sea as my two Josephs did, but maybe he didn’t need to do so, for as he puts it in his Journals, he had the experience of being “seasick on firm land.”) This door or gate is not one to be waited in front of, as it is open & indeed meant for who is in front of it, & thus meant to be walked, strode through, though the crossing of this door’s threshold is something fierce & fearsome because as Amiel points out, the promised land is in the past. (“n’a pas eu…:” in the original, even if Ian Watt in his excellent comment on the novel translates — or uses someone’s version who translates this as — “who among us does not have a promised land…” present tense. Even Conrad in the 1895 first edition misquoted the lines from memory as “Le quel de nous n’a sa terre de promission, son jour d’extase et sa fin dans l’exil,” though he corrected it for the 1914 edition).

    Thus: promised land in the past, while ecstasy may be back there too or in the present — let’s keep that ambiguity going & locate ecstasy also in the present day’s labor leading (after the promised land has long vanished) into the exilic future — through the gate, the door, the pre-text, that is the text — yes, I’ll own up to it — through writing, the act thereof. Writing is this exile, h.j.r, hejr, hejira, Hagar, she, me, wandering in desert or city, that nomadicity. I am certainly staying with that concept, or better, that process.

    And so I’m home again, in the present-future (thus not the future perfect or futur antérieur of the French), no, in the present-future that is the tense of writing, an ecstatic-exilic tense. I am formulating it this way now & wouldn’t mind leaving it at that, but this is a keynote, so let me go there now.

    1. A note on “keynote,” and then a look at 10 years after. A keynote, says my wikipedia, “is a talk that establishes the main underlying theme… (&) lays the framework for the following programme of events or convention agenda; frequently the role of keynote speaker will include the role of convention moderator. (No way, Josè!) It will also flag up a larger idea – a literary story, an individual musical piece or event.” Okay, I’ve already told a “literary story,” & the events I’d like to flag are the poetry readings, which is where the work comes most alive for me. As to “an individual musical piece,” well, my love for etymologies immediately drove me to locate the origin of “keynote” in the practice of a cappella, often barbershop singers, & the playing of a single note before singing, that determines the key in which the song will be performed. I know that Ornette Coleman wrote & once told me face to face that “there is no wrong note,” but as I do not like the concept of one note setting the agenda, I will not play any such note; happily Alice Notley will also give a keynote, which will thus already make it at least two notes, maybe already a chord, & then I’ll leave the singing of many notes arranged in what they call music up to Nicole Peyrafitte later on in the program.

    But I can’t resist to play a bit more with this notion of “key” — what does a key do, as it can do at least two things, something & its opposite, open or close? Of course at the beginning of an occasion the image will be of opening the proceedings, the door, maybe the gate mentioned earlier. And yet, a key does both open and close — maybe it does both at the same time! Who knows? My time is measured today, so let me just open-close this specific Pandora’s box via a poem by, you guessed it, Paul Celan:

    WITH A VARIABLE KEY

    With a variable key
    you unlock the house, in it
    drifts the snow of the unsaid.
    Depending on the blood that gushes
    from your eye or mouth or ear,
    your key varies.

    Varies your key so varies your word
    that’s allowed to drift with the flakes.
    Depending on the wind that pushes you away,
    the snow cakes around the word.

    So the word is there, variable, but needs to be spoken & I’ll take a further suggestion on how to go about this from Celan who writes:

    Speak —
    But do not separate the no from the yes.
    Give your saying also meaning:
    give it its shadow.

    Give it enough shadow,
    give it as much
    as you know to be parceled out between
    midnight and midday and midnight.

    Look around:
    see how alive it gets all around —
    At death! Alive!
    Speaks true, who speaks shadows.

    1. And so it is now “ten years after.” After what? One of the rock groups I liked in the 60s supposedly took that name from an event that had taken place ten years earlier, namely Elvis Presley’s breakthrough year of ’56. Lines from one of their songs still play in my mind from time to time: “Tax the rich, feed the poor / Till there are no rich no more.” And then the defeatist refrain: “I’d love to change the world / But I don’t know what to do / I’ll leave it up to you.” Has anything changed?

    Ten years ago I published a volume of essays under the title A Nomad Poetics, core to which was the piece of writing called “Notes Toward a Nomad Poetics,” which — though the central concern had been with me even longer, much longer — I had started giving expression to even before 1993 & which had been published in an earlier form as a chapbook called Towards a Nomad Poetics by Allen Fisher’s Spanner Books. Note the tentative titles: “towards a…” & for the final version even just “Notes towards a Nomadic Poetics.” I said “piece of writing” purposefully just now, because one of the small misunderstandings regarding A Nomad Poetics I have encountered from time to time is that this piece of writing has been called a “manifesto” — with all the stern-brow seriousness & raised fist ardor the term suggests. I would like, 10 years after, to nuance this take a bit.

    The manifesto, I’ve written elsewhere, is indeed one, if not the only new literary genre of the 20C, & I do draw on it to some extent — but I am very conscious of the fact that what I am trying to do is to write propositions for the 21C & to find a form that is both open & collaborative, that is culturally & politically critical, but not ideologically over-determined, as manifestos tend to be. It is neither an anonymous revolutionary pamphlet (as many of the Situationist manifestos were at a certain time), nor a synthetic piece with a number of signatures attached to it (from Marx & Engels, via the Surrealists, say, to the Manifeste des 120, for example, no matter how much I may like these). The proposition is different: it is a piece of writing I take full responsibility for, but to which I invite people to contribute — few have bothered to do so, though the 1993 text has at least the exemplary contribution of Brian Massumi, the excellent Deleuzian scholar & thinker.

    But — & I can only briefly mention it in this context — the idea of collaboration has opened up since then in a different manner & place,  namely as what Nicole Peyrafitte & I call “Domopoetics” & which finds its expression in performances that involve the two of us, in a combination of poetry, reflection (with it’s propositional moves, such as extensions of my rhizomatic moves & Nicole’s more “seepage” based processes), music & visuals, a project that also touches on something I will come to a bit later, ecology, be it as in Domopoetics, centered on the “household,” or in a wider in- & out-side sweep.

    Now, in that core essay I do make “manifestish” moves, like the über-title, THE MILLENNIUM WILL BE NOMADIC OR IT WILL NOT BE, a tournement of a well-known citation leading back to Foucault & Deleuze; then there are the various definitions of concepts & the oracular pronouncements… but if you take these together with the willed heteroclite manner of the piece that ends with the (possibly incongruous) inclusion and commentary on a translation of a pre-Islamic ode, you may also note the tongue-in-cheek, not to say cheekiness of the collage (more dada than surrealist manifesto, playfulness is meant to trump, no not trump, that’s wargame talk, — is meant to poke fun at and possibly deflate dour revolutionary literary ardor). What I wanted was in fact to create a new genre, post-manifesto, something I did then call the “manifessay.” I don’t know if I succeeded beyond giving expression to my own poetics, i.e., if it, the form, has become available or is of any possible use beyond me. I’ll return to the notion of a new genre or of post-genre writing toward the end of this talk.

    1. I now want to address two or three points that I opened up but probably not enough in the 2003 manifessay, & that, it seems to me, need either clarification or extension. The first one of these arises from a quote by Muriel Rukeyser who writes: “The relations of poetry are, for our period, very close to the relations of science. It is not a matter of using the results of science, but of seeing that there is a meeting place between all the kinds of imagination. Poetry can provide that meeting place.” So, this notion that science & poetry can, have to connect, that, in fact, “open-field” poetry may be the ground where those two discourses can enrich each other. Unhappily that was the only occasion “science” came up in the 2003 version to which I had given the version number 4.0. In a 4.1 version I would insert more reflections concerning this matter, as it seems to me to be getting more & more urgent (see the next section). To begin with I would quote Robert Kelly’s take of:

                                                 a scientist of the whole
    the Poet
              be aware from inside comes
                     the poet, scientist of totality,
                            specifically,
              to whom all data whatsoever are of use,
    world-scholar

    Which means that all data not only can but should enter the arena of the poem. Each poet can of course only bring her own knowledges & experiences into that field —  though the understanding that such a wide open field of possibilities does exist, right there in front of us, on the page or screen, with no restrictions imposed by pre-existing notions of form or content,  an understanding that has to function as a major incentive & goad.

    Scientific data as such, & in suspension with other information, would be central here as unhappily we have returned to an area where science is not only rightfully questioned for its excesses (in medicine, food-“science,” or its 19C underlying ideology of “progress,” etc.) but is also challenged in totally asinine but extremely dangerous ways by what may be the most disastrous unfolding event, namely the violent return of the religious (from the various US evangelical Christian fascisms to the Islamic totalitarianism of its Fundamentalist movements & beyond) & its denials of any scientific data, be that Darwinian evolution, the genetic egalitarianism of races, or what have you. This “return of the repressed” can however not be addressed by the same pious & self-righteous means used by positivist 19C determinism & traditional “atheistic” formulas.

    An investigative poetics (& that is one mode of a nomadic poetics) addressing this problem could well start with thinking through the rather odd but useful book by Peter Sloterdijk, You Must Change Your Life (note that the title is a quote from a poem!). For example, one may have to rethink certain poetic practices after reflecting on the following from early on in the book, where Sloterdijk has been talking about Rilke’s poem “Archaic torso of Apollo:”

    That this energized Apollo embodies a manifestation of Dionysus is indicated by the statement that the stone glistens ‘like wild beasts’ fur’: Rilke had read his Nietzsche. Here we encounter the second micro-religious or proto-musical module: the notorious ‘this stands for that,’ ‘the one appears in the other’ or ‘the deep layer is present in the surface‘ — figures without which no religious discourse would ever have come about. They tell us that religiosity is a form of hermeneutical flexibility and can be trained.

    Unhappily there have been rather few poets who have worked along those lines, i.e. bringing scientific discourse into the field of poetry to test & extend its possibilities. Of my generation, except for the use of scientific, mainly mathematical concepts in formal decisions, such as the great oeuvre of Jackson MacLow, or the OULIPO poets or, say, Inger Christensen or Ron Silliman using the Fibonacci series as formal compositional procedures,  I can only think of two poets deeply involved in that way & bringing actual scientific data into the work: Allen Fisher & Christopher Dewdney. The latter has put his relation to science very clearly. “My poetry,” he says, “is warped out of science. I think I’m a frustrated scientist in poetry and a frustrated poet in science. A lot of poets have an anti-science bias, a vision of themselves as romantics in a tower, but I don’t. I’m a naturalist, I believe that science and nature are one, that science is a perceptual tool which allows us to define nature more specifically. Science has to incorporate and mythologize as it happens. All poetry deals with information, finally.”

    Concerning Allen Fisher, I did say enough, I believe, in version 4.00, but let me re-quote a bit from his Introduction of Brixton Fractals::

    Imagination and action. My knowledge of the world exists validly only in the moment when I am transforming it. In this moment, in action, the imagination functions, unblocks passivity, refuses an overview. Discontinuities, wave breaks, cell divisions, collapsed structures, boundaries between tissue kinds: where inner workings are unknown, the only reliable participations are imaginative. The complex of state and control variables. The number of configurations depends on the latter: properties typical of cusp catastrophes: sudden jumps; hysteresis; divergence; inaccessibility. Boiling water’s phase change where the potential is the same as condensing steam. Random motion of particles in phase space allows a process to find a minimum potential. What is this all about? It’s a matter of rage and fear, where the moving grass or built suburbia frontier is a wave prison; where depth perception reverses; caged flight. With ambiguous vases it’s as if part of the brain is unable to reach a firm conclusion and passes alternatives along for a decision on other grounds. The goblet-and-face contour moves as it forms in your seeing.

    The result of which is a poetry of use, though the uses be not your usual aesthetic jouissance and/or socio-political alibis:

    Brixton Fractals provides a technique of memory and perception analysis. It can be used to sharpen out-of-focus photographs; to make maps of the radio sky; to generate images from human energy; to calculate spectra; to reconstruct densities; to provide probability factors from local depression climates. It becomes applicable to reading; to estimate a vector of survival from seriously incomplete or hidden data, and select the different structures needed. It can provide a participatory invention different from that which most persists.

    Among a younger generation, I fear I have not come across much work incorporating the discourse of science. This may be my own lack, the fact that I can no longer keep up with the incredible avalanche of poetry coming down on us. But I do want to mention at least one of the younger poets, namely James Belflower, who after a brilliant first book, Commuter, has just published a second book The Posture of Contour, rich in exactly those materials & thinking involving science & scientific discourse. This is excellent explorative work that is truly experimental without being gimmicky or surface “avant-gardist.” Belflower, by the way, is also presently at work on a translation of a book by our next presenter, Jan Baetens’s rewriting of a Jean-Luc Godard’s script, for which he has also corralled  Peter Cockelbergh help. But let me move on.

     

    1. The one word or concept I now see as most grievously underdeveloped is that of ecology. I do think of it as present in version 4.00, however, in that it is inherent if unspoken in the vision of a nomadic figure: the nomad’s life is based on a clear and sharp perception and discrimination of environmental factures. (I had first written “fractures” — which might be the right word). For the desert inhabitant it is of course a matter of survival. In the same way nomadic art is an eminently environment-conscious art: portable, spare, it clings to or arises from the everyday objects of perusal: embroidered & engraved saddles or bridles, painted portable utensils or inscribed, i.e. tattooed parts of the body; the core elements of the dwelling: rugs and carpets — all these are pure expressions of art, & the most formal and richest artifact is also the lightest as behoves a continuous traveler: the poem, no matter it’s size or weight, carried in mind or, as they say, by heart. A nomadic poetry was thus, for me, an obviously highly environment-conscious art.

    My own sense of the ecological question goes back to the late sixties  and, in poetry, the discovery of Gary Snyder’s work as poet and essayist.  It was clear back then already that environmental problems needed to be thought & written about, & indeed they were, even if as yet mainly or only  in the underground press, & entered into one’s daily practice in terms of food (first organic food movements, macrobiotic diets & restaurants, etc.) clothing, and as a political direction to be incorporated into any progressive ideology.

    But it is now clear, “ideology” or rather ideology-critique, though necessary, also became a hindrance later on. During those years (70s into 90s) of the “postmodern”, that stance entailed the deconstruction of what Jean-François Lyotard & others called the “grand narratives,” from Christianity to Communism, i.e. all single-centered soteriological utopian systems. The fervent yet cool-headed desire was: never again such eschatological, transcendental movements in the pursuance of whose aims all means are justified and thus all crimes permissible, from the grand medieval inquisitions to the Stalinist & Nazi exterminations. Politics, we now thought, have to become local, momentary, situationist, etc. What Félix Guattari & others called Micropolitics. Under this premise, one angle, one line of flight, one momentary territorialization of our space would be or could concern itself with the environmental problem.

    I’m putting all this very schematically as I don’t have the time to develop it in detail, but it now seems clear to me that the time has come to make ecology (oeco-logos, the logic of the house, of our house earth, of our earth-house-hold, to use Snyder’s term), to make ecology the engine of a new grand narrative. Such a grand narrative would differ from the old ones (& thus hopefully avoid the disasters provoked by human hubris that thought of this world as, or tried to force it into a scheme of the anthropocentric). It would not be anthropocentric, human-centered (as the Christian or Communist one were) but anchored, or come from, outside the human sphere, the earth, & thus restate, refocus,  the human in relation to the world it lives in. A world in a new age, an age that has come to be called the “anthropocene” to point to the overwhelming influence human actions now have on the earth. A non-transcendental, immanentist situation that does not have future perfection (paradise in heaven or on earth) as its aim but survival of life in all its rich & diverse forms (with the human only one such, and important only as the major danger to survival) in the contingent environment of this planet. Which also entails, despite the fact that the name of us, “anthropos” now glows radioactively in the age’s name, to start from the realization that homo sapiens (that misnomer!) is not outside, beyond creation; there is not a “nature” outside or surrounding us nature is us & the rest, the world with us included. “Nature” is everywhere, as Spinoza said of god.

     

    One way into this would be through a book I’d like to draw your attention to, namely Michel Deguy’s Écologiques, the quatrième de couverture of which states: “Geocide is in process; not “a” geocide, but “the geocide:” there will not be two. Ecology, a ‘logie’ [thought, word, saying] of the oikos [house, dwelling, terre des hommes] is not optional. If it is not radical, it is nothing.” This book, a series of small essays, notations, reflections, he himself calls it “a sort of witnessing,” is also formally fascinating in that the urgency & radicalness demanded eschew the scriptural “manifesto” form of the old grand narratives, but belongs exactly to the extrême contemporain in its assemblage form (& contains reflections on that form). Here are a few hints (in my translation):

    Another romantic leitmotiv, and thus to be transposed for us, come down to us from Hölderlin through Heidegerrian conduit — can it help — for a long time translated as “What remains is what the poets create.” [“Was bleibet aber stiften die Dichter”] and that our era (this mutation of “the crisis,” if you want) forces us to read thus: “the remains, art plays them again.” Even better to understand it thus: the remains we are left with, the relics, is it possible that the artists, those who work in language, philosophers and writers together with all those who work in other “arts,” including those that technique has added, will relaunch them. …Is a last chance called ecology?

    The poet Edward Dorn pointed out some few years back that one of our problems is that “we do not even yet / know what a crisis is.” Interestingly, Deguy in this books develops a notion of “crisis” that may answer Dorn’s slight, when he writes “this exercise in thinking (this ‘experience in thought’) has to rise to ‘its last consequences,’ in its hyperbolic paradoxical amplification,” where it will risk this: “…what is called the crisis offers the chance of a parabolic ‘rebroussement,’ a parabolic turning back. [Note that “rebroussement” is a term also used in geology where it means the ‘Torsion localisée des couches, due au frottement le long d’un contact anormal et montrant le sens du mouvement /torsion localized in the strata, caused by friction along an anormal contact and showing the direction of the movement/’ (Fouc.-Raoult Géol. 1980). Further in math it refers to the point where a curve changes direction; you also speak of an ‘Arête de rebroussement.’”

    How to translate this last phrase? “Arête” immediately rhymes for me with the Greek “arete” — & I’ll come to that soon enough. But interesting to note how problematic the translation from natural language to another, French to English here, a concept in mathematics, a so-called “universal” language can be. As a footnote on page 435 of Augustus de Morgan’s The Differential and Integral Calculus puts it:

    One sound writer on this subject (and perhaps more) has attempted to translate the words arête de rebroussement into English by edge of regression, which seems to me a closer imitation of the words than of the meaning. Many words might be suggested, such as the ligature of the normals, or their osculatrix, or their omnitangential curve. Also with reference to the developable surface, the arête, &c. might be called the generatrix, or the curve of greatest density, &c.

    Deguy concludes by defining it as “la ligne formée par les points d’intersection des génératrices rectilignes consécutives de la surface / the line formed by the intersection points of successive rectilinear generatrices of the surface.”

    So Deguy’s rebroussement is not a simple turning back on itself, not a return to the past, but another, a further, torque. He goes on: “A politician is someone who cannot understand, admit, that the crisis, from Hesiod to Husserl, from Sophocles to Valéry, names historicity itself. It is crisis forever. The ‘solution’ of the crisis is a new critical phase, of sharing — of the relation in general, of societies among themselves, of one society in relation to itself, of one subject to himself.”

    Deguy sees three movements in the overcoming, the coming out of the crisis: “an uprising, a revolution, reforms.” Which he then calls “by one of its great names, utopia.” And to suggest that “précisément l’utopie aujourd’hui, c’est l’écologie. / Utopia today is precisely ecology. There is no other one.” Fascinating too, how Deguy begins usefully to think through other rebarbative aspects of our relation to world. He thus suggests that “ecology does not concern the environment, literally what environs, what surrounds, (the “Umwelt” of the ethnologues) but the “world” (the “Welt” of the thinkers). It is the difference between those two that needs to be rethought from the bottom up, he suggests, because of the profound oblivion into which the world and its things (les choses), or “the oecumene” have fallen. Thus globalisation (in French la “mondialisation”) would be in truth an end of or to “le monde,” the world, a loss of world, because “the world worlds in things and its ‘worlding’ has to be entrusted not to technoscience, but to the philosophers and the artists — to all the humans in the arts (les hommes de l’art), and, specifically to the poetics of the works.”

    These formulations not only show the importance of Deguy’s writings in Ecologiques and thus the need for its translation — but also the difficulty this translation entails given the nomadicity between his philosophical logos & the poetics, which you can glimpse in the needed and relished neologisms above. And now, beginning to run out of time, let me turn to certain questions in regard to translation that have been haunting me since the publication of version 4.00 of the manifessay.

    1. And thus to the second Ammiel — but this one with two m’s — I mean Ammiel Alcalay and some parallel thinking we have been doing on the subject of translation. In the Nomad Poetics manifesto, the work of translation is only liminally mentioned when in fact it has been central to my endeavors from the beginning — though obviously it gets more thought & analysis in other essays in the Nomad Poetics volume. What I would like to add in a putative 4.1 version (why putative? — this is that version, probably) is an exploration of the limits of translation.

    Why limits? A strange term to use for someone who has always equated translation & writing itself, who has claimed (& stays with this claim) that all writing is translation & that therefore the traditional differences between the two have to be abolished as they are false “class” barriers. Over the last 10 years, I have been involved in two major but very different translation projects: first, the translation of the historico-critical edition of Paul Celan’s The Meridian, a volume that gathers all the various drafts, versions, notes, scraps, letters, even a radio-play, with all the (carefully reproduced) strike-outs, inserts, marginal marks & so on, that we have between the moment Celan was informed that he had been given the Georg Büchner prize and the date on which he had to give his acceptance speech.  The original editors, Bernard Böschenstein and Heino Schmull did an incredible job gathering these materials & devising a book structure to contain them. If I have one doubt about the book, it is this one: the book opens with the 18-page essay in its final, definite form, then proceeds backwards through the various drafts to the earliest scrap of paper. This makes for a very attractive book, though I now wonder if it wouldn’t have been more instructive to build the volume in the genetic sense, i.e. from the first idea to the final essay, so that a reader would be able to witness the creation of context & text in its / as a historical process. Be that as it may, the essential thing this translation taught me was the importance for a deeper textual understanding of involvement with and thus knowledge of its contexts, its process.

    During the years I put together Poems for Millennium vol 4: The UCP book of North African Literature, or Diwan Ifrikiya as I prefer to call it, the question of how to present over 2000 years of a literature to a major part unknown to Western readers (I first wrote “raiders” — which is also an accurate way of describing what the West did & still does to the Maghreb), that question came up, of course. Happily the “grand collage” format elaborated by Jerome Rothenberg & myself in the early volumes of the Poems for the Millennium series — chronological galleries, thematic “books,” individual commentaries, intros to all the sections, etc. — allowed for a presentation of actual contextual matters, from maps to alphabets, from images to amulets, that serve as a matrix for the poems. For example, the second diwan, El Adab or the invention of prose, endeavors to gather texts from historical literary treatises, history & geography manuals, philosophical meditations, erotic manuals etc.

    Despite what I think of as a rather successful if incomplete handling of these matters of context, I do agree with Ammiel Alcalay when he writes, after bringing up such different events as 9/11 & the ensuing sudden interest in Arab matters & translating from that language, followed by the Iraq war & the ‘official’ writing that has ensued from that catastrophe:

    How are those of us involved in transference and translation to respond to such circumstances? What is our role in the politics of imagination and transmission? Have we reached a point where NOT translating, providing access to, handing down works from the Arab world might be more legitimate? When we decide to participate, how do we insulate and protect such works and ourselves, not merely from assimilation, but from collaboration… Writers and translators often wind up playing someone else’s game, and become complicit, perpetuating the same rules with new players.

    Which leads Alcalay to conclude that no act of transmission is innocent and therefore demands utmost vigilance, a kind of vigilance, he goes on, “that recognizes, as the American poet Jack Spicer once put it, that ‘there are bosses in poetry as well as in the industrial empire.” As writers, translators, commentators in the area of what Michel Deguy called “le culturel,” — to be differentiated from “la culture,” but inescapable as the sphere in which we as ‘travailleurs du symbolique’ labor today — we have to be aware that, for example, translating a major novel by a third world author wrenches that work out of its natural habitat, plops it into an environment where it can only be read according to the latter’s rules (say, Kateb Yacine’s Nedjma, in relation to William Faulkner’s narrative universe, etc.) Or, more viciously as in the case of my translation of Abdelwahab Meddeb’s essay THE MALDAY OF ISLAM which was nearly hijacked by DC rightwing think tank people when Daniel Pipes asked the NY publisher for first serialization rights and the right to “subedit” the extracts — I managed to fight this off after investigating who those people were.

    So, there is also a need, a duty to provide contextual materials, to try to change the very framework of the translation activity, so that the act of translating can be “an act, a way of erecting a picket line against the bosses,  to reclaim some part of our suppressed and isolated humanity and participate in it in new ways.” Alcalay concludes that “ to protect against assimilation and collaboration requires more than fitting newly introduced and revived texts into existing frameworks. Defining what information is for us, where it comes from, and where to find it becomes an essential survival kit.”

    Thus part of such a watchful & critical process of translation is also what I like to call an ‘investigative nomad poetics,’ because ideological cons can go so far as to actually corrupt the very language. Take the example of the so-called “Confucius Institutes” which are under the supervision of the Chinese Language Council International (known as Hanban). These Institutes teach Chinese language and culture after setting up shop in Universities in the West. I’m drawing on an excellent investigative article by Marshall Sahlins that appeared in this week’s Nation. Hanban is an instrument of the PRC’s party apparatus operating as an international pedagogical organization. This means that its agreements with the foreign, including many American, institutions of higher learning, include non-disclosure clauses, making the terms of the agreement secret. US universities sign on to this— which is most likely totally illegal under US law — eager as they are to get an all-paid for “Confucius Institute” & the ensuing prestige. Besides such basic no-nos as being prohibited to mention the Tiannamen Square massacre, or Tibet, the Dalai Lama, or human rights, etc. the actual core problem, if you look closer, are the language teaching methods, in fact the very language taught. This looks innocent enough according to the bylaws, which state: “The Confucius Institutes conduct Chinese language instructions in Mandarin using Standard Chinese characters.” But, as Sahlin details, this is the “simplified script officially promulgated by the PRC as a more easily learned alternative…” This means that what is available in this script & thus what the CI students are taught to read are only those texts or revised texts the PRC allows you to read & has prepared & altered, and thus for example no Chinese texts from other parts of the world, Taiwan, or even Hong-Kong can be deciphered by people trained in the CI’s! Totalitarian censorship effected via creating & imposing a new language allowing for the rewriting of all cultural documents… 

    1. Finally, I’d like to speak to my current practice: what I want to do from now on is continue to some extent with nomadizing my writing as much as nomadizing in my writing, while moving toward some new trajectories, other complex meandering orbitals. You see, when I sit down & let the process of writing happen, it tends to come out as a recognizable “poem,” & I am by now somewhat bored by this. Ah, I say to myself, here’s another poem — couldn’t it be some another critter, somealien, unknown form? I guess the familiarity of recognizing the poem under hand has some comforting sides (it is comforting to recognize your own face in the mirror when you get up in the morning), & I enjoy detecting a new move, or rhythm or color or line or sound in the poem-matrix, and yet, and yet. (Thinking here of a poet I admire tremendously, John Ashbery, whose production into old age — John is 86 — has gone unabated, but whose yearly new volume seems to me to have the same poem rearranged again & again, a tremendous life-long flow, flood, or maybe better ribbon of writing Ashbery snips off bits to make into books & cuts those into smaller bits to make poems — it’s tremendous & astounding & a true feat, but I have to confess that my pleasure in the work by now has become mainly aesthetic recognition rather than discovery of anything new, thought, rhythm, music, form — or maybe better, it is absolutely wonderful comfort food I can cuddle up with in my armchair when the umpteenth rerun of my fav TV series, Law & Order, is too boring. And comfort is something we absolutely need in our lives, for sure. But.)

    A more serious reason to escape “the poem” (between quotation marks) is something I have to plead guilty to, that Frankenstein monster called “creative writing” which for part of my life provided the income that permitted me to read & write. But in the US we now create something like 3 to 6000 professional diploma’ed “poets” a year who are turning out hundreds of thousand “poems” day in day out — there are now at rough glance something close to half a million published poets in the US. Now, I prefer that to be the case rather than those kids having wandered off & joined the military or the evangelical troops. At the risk of sounding elitist, I want to suggest however that most of this work does not have what my third grandfather of the day, grand-pa Ezra called the “arete,”  which he translated as “virtue”, though for the Greeks the word actually probably meant something closer to “being the best you can be”, or “reaching your highest human potential”, & which I like to mistranslate further as “arête,” as in a French fish, though not as a French stop sign, or, better even, as the arresting quality of something with spine.

    So, what do I want? In my notebooks I found this entry, as I was preparing to envisage the writing to be done now, after I stopped teaching, & with several major projects out of the way:

    “…write something that is unrecognizable as a poem, write ‘books’ [never a, one, book, always the plural] but so that they are not beholden to that late 19C form of the book so elegantly proclaimed by Mallarmé & taken up under various guises by the 20C avant-garde. This here now is the 21C. Everything — pace Mallarmé — is not meant to end up in a book, even if as we screw up the planet more & more everything that will be left of us may end up in a book if one as heat resistant as the new climate requires can be devised, once we have become extinct on this gone planet veering from blue to red. No. The books or the writing I envisage are open books that have their prolongations, their links, within the ever more tenuous world that surrounds us, but not a writing that mimetically reflects the outside (which would only increase the heat by mirror-effect & in the cave of this non-platonic book we cannot have fires heating up) but one that proposes a range of coolants —”

    To put it another way, work seems to leak — out of the book and into the world, and from the world into the book. Nicole Peyrafitte’s notion of “seepage” (see her recent writings in her book bi-valve ) enters here to play with & off & extend the rhizomes & lines of flight of my nomadics. What is at stake here is circulation: of reading that turns into writing and vice-versa, but also of people, of words, of love, of blood — printer’s bleed but also terrorists’ victims’ blood, terrorists everywhere, from the US Congress & my gun-crazed co-citoyens, to the mad mujahiddin of Daech & AQIM. These books of multiple narratives & troubled typographies, which “may be incompletely / confused” (as the young poet James Belflower puts it), asks you to be a (not so innocent) active performer as much as a reader. Take the risk —

    How to come to this writing beyond genre is of course the question I have been groping with for some time now. I can only start from what I know, i.e. from the grand-collage century I come from, some specific realizations of that century, those for example I have spent years gathering with Jerome Rothenberg & Habib Tengour in our Millennium anthologies, others too. Here is a 20C quote to go forth with into our already quite entamé (nicked, gouged out, gored, gashed, i.e. wounded) 21C. It is a quote you will know as it is well-known, often used, that I would like to put again at the head of any such new writings, thus as an epigraph here, to bring to a close the keynote that started with a 19C epigraph that led into our 20C. It comes from Robert Duncan’s HD Book, from the chapter “Rites of Participation,” a chapter that begins “The drama of our time is the coming of all men (and women) into one fate, ‘the dream of everyone, everywhere.’”  First published in Caterpillar # 1 in fall of 1967 (a month after I first set foot on the American continent) it was written a few years earlier, I believe, so dates from the mid-sixties. Half a century later it holds a more ominous, less optimistic note, given the ecologistic aspects of the new grand narrative of that “single fate.” But here is the quote I was thinking of exactly, which happens a page or so later in Duncan’s ‘book,’ after he has been talking about Plato’s Symposium:

    The Symposium of Plato was restricted to a community of Athenians, gathered in the common creation of an arete [ah, that word again!], an aristocracy of spirit, inspired by the homoEros, taking its stand against lower or foreign orders, not only of men but of nature itself. The intense yearning, the desire for something else, of which we too have only a dark and doubtful presentiment, remains, but our arete, our ideal of vital being [ah! there’s another good definition!], rises not in our identification in a hierarchy of higher forms but in our identification with the universe. To compose such a symposium of the whole, such a totality, all the old excluded orders must be included. The female, the proletariat, the foreign; the animal and vegetative; the unconscious and the unknown; the criminal and failure — all that had been outcast and vagabond must return to be admitted in the creation of what we consider we are.

    I would only like to add to Duncan’s list the orders of geology and water & air, and to amend ever so slightly the last sentence to read: “all that had been outcast and vagabond must be joined by us out there to help in the nomadic creation of what we consider we are.”

     

    SOURCES

    Conrad, Joseph. Almayer’s Folly: A Story of an Eastern River (T. Fisher Unwin, London 1895).

    Amiel, Henri-Frédéric. Grains de Mil (Joël Cherbuliez, libraire-éditeur, Paris 1854).

    Watt, Ian. Conrad in the Nineteenth Century. Vol. 1, footnote #6 p.66 (University of California Press, 1979.

    Celan, Paul. “With a Variable Key” & “Speak, You Too,” in Paul Celan, Selections, edited by Pierre Joris, p. 51 & 54. (University of California Press, 2005.)

    _________. The Meridian. Final VersionDrafts—Materials. Translated by Pierre Joris. (Stanford University Press, 2011)

    Joris, Pierre. A Nomad Poetics (Wesleyan University Press, 2003.)

    _________, editor (with Habib Tengour). The University of California Book of North African Literature (vol. 4 in the Poems for the Millennium series, UCP, November 2012)

    Rukeyser, Muriel. The Life of Poetry. p. XI (Ashfield, Mass.  Paris Press 1996.)

    Kelly, Robert. In Time, p. 25 (Frontier Press, 1971)

    Sloterdijk, Peter. You Must Change Your Life (Polity, 2014)

    Fisher, Allen. Brixton Fractals. (Aloes Books, London 1985)

    Belflower, James. The Posture of Contour. (Springgun Press, 2013)

    Deguy, Michel. Écologiques, p.23. (Hermann, Editeur, 2012)

    Dorn, Edward, Recollections of Gran Apachería, n.p. (Turtle island                      Foundation, 1974)

    De Morgan, Augustus. The Differential and Integral Calculus. (Baldwin and           Cradock, London, 1842)

    Alcalay, Ammiel. “Politics & Translation,” in: towards a foreign likeness bent : translation, durationpress.com e-books series. http://www.durationpress.com, n.d.

    Sahlins, Marshall. China U. Confucius Institutes censor political discussion and restrain the free exchange of ideas. The Nation, October 30, 2013  https://www.thenation.com/article/china-u/

    Snyder, Gary. Earth House Hold. (New Directions, 1969)

    Lyotard, Jean-François. The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge. (University Of Minnesota Press, 1984.)

    Guattari, Félix & Deleuze, Gilles.  Guattari. A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia. (University of Minnesota Press, 1987)

    Meddeb, Abdelwahab. The Malady of Islam. Translated by Pierre Joris. ( Basic Books,2003.)

    Peyrafitte, Nicole. Bi-Valve: Vulvic Space / Vulvic Knowledge. (Stockport Flats, 2013).

    Duncan, Robert. The H.D. Book. (University of California Press, 2011.)

  • Richard Hill — States, Governance, and Internet Fragmentation (Review of Mueller, Will the Internet Fragment?)

    Richard Hill — States, Governance, and Internet Fragmentation (Review of Mueller, Will the Internet Fragment?)

    a review of Milton Mueller, Will the Internet Fragment? Sovereignty, Globalization and Cyberspace (Polity, 2017)

    by Richard Hill

    ~

    Like other books by Milton Mueller, Will the Internet Fragment? is a must-read for anybody who is seriously interested in the development of Internet governance and its likely effects on other walks of life.  This is true because, and not despite, the fact that it is a tract that does not present an unbiased view. On the contrary, it advocates a certain approach, namely a utopian form of governance which Mueller refers to as “popular sovereignty in cyberspace”.

    Mueller, Professor of Information Security and Privacy at Georgia Tech, is an internationally prominent scholar specializing in the political economy of information and communication.  The author of seven books and scores of journal articles, his work informs not only public policy but also science and technology studies, law, economics, communications, and international studies.  His books Networks and States: The Global Politics of Internet Governance (MIT Press, 2010) and Ruling the Root: Internet Governance and the Taming of Cyberspace (MIT Press, 2002) are acclaimed scholarly accounts of the global governance regime emerging around the Internet.

    Most of Will the Internet Fragment? consists of a rigorous analysis of what has been commonly referred to as “fragmentation,” showing that very different technological and legal phenomena have been conflated in ways that do not favour productive discussions.  That so-called “fragmentation” is usually defined as the contrary of the desired situation in which “every device on the Internet should be able to exchange data packets with any other device that is was willing to receive them” (p. 6 of the book, citing Vint Cerf).  But. as Mueller correctly points out, not all end-points of the Internet can reach all other end-points at all times, and there may be very good reasons for that (e.g. corporate firewalls, temporary network outages, etc.).  Mueller then shows how network effects (the fact that the usefulness of a network increases as it becomes larger) will tend to prevent or counter fragmentation: a subset of the network is less useful than is the whole.  He also shows how network effects can prevent the creation of alternative networks: once everybody is using a given network, why switch to an alternative that few are using?  As Mueller aptly points out (pp. 63-66), the slowness of the transition to IPv6 is due to this type of network effect.

    The key contribution of this book is that it clearly identifies the real question of interest to whose who are concerned about the governance of the Internet and its impact on much of our lives.  That question (which might have been a better subtitle) is: “to what extent, if any, should Internet policies be aligned with national borders?”  (See in particular pp. 71, 73, 107, 126 and 145).  Mueller’s answer is basically “as little as possible, because supra-national governance by the Internet community is preferable”.  This answer is presumably motivated by Mueller’s view that “ institutions shift power from states to society” (p. 116), which implies that “society” has little power in modern states.  But (at least ideally) states should be the expression of a society (as Mueller acknowledges on pp. 124 and 136), so it would have been helpful if Mueller had elaborated on the ways (and there are many) in which he believes states do not reflect society and in the ways in which so-called multi-stakeholder models would not be worse and would not result in a denial of democracy.

    Before commenting on Mueller’s proposal for supra-national governance, it is worth commenting on some areas where a more extensive discussion would have been warranted.  We note, however, that the book the book is part of a series that is deliberately intended to be short and accessible to a lay public.  So Mueller had a 30,000 word limit and tried to keep things written in a way that non-specialists and non-scholars could access.  This no doubt largely explains why he didn’t cover certain topics in more depth.

    Be that as it may, the discussion would have been improved by being placed in the long-term context of the steady decrease in national sovereignty that started in 1648, when sovereigns agreed in the Treaty of Westphalia to refrain from interfering in the religious affairs of foreign states, , and that accelerated in the 20th century.  And by being placed in the short-term context of the dominance by the USA as a state (which Mueller acknowledges in passing on p. 12), and US companies, of key aspects of the Internet and its governance.  Mueller is deeply aware of the issues and has discussed them in his other books, in particular Ruling the Root and Networks and States, so it would have been nice to see the topic treated here, with references to the end of the Cold War and what appears to be re-emergence of some sort of equivalent international tension (albeit not for the same reasons and with different effects at least for what concerns cyberspace).  It would also have been preferable to include at least some mention of the literature on the negative economic and social effects of current Internet governance arrangements.

     Will the Internet Fragment? Sovereignty, Globalization and Cyberspace (Polity, 2017)It is telling that, in Will the Internet Fragment?, Mueller starts his account with the 2014 NetMundial event, without mentioning that it took place in the context of the outcomes of the World Summit of the Information Society (WSIS, whose genesis, dynamics, and outcomes Mueller well analyzed in Networks and States), and without mentioning that the outcome document of the 2015 UN WSIS+10 Review reaffirmed the WSIS outcomes and merely noted that Brazil had organized NetMundial, which was, in context, an explicit refusal to note (much less to endorse) the NetMundial outcome document.

    The UN’s reaffirmation of the WSIS outcomes is significant because, as Mueller correctly notes, the real question that underpins all current discussions of Internet governance is “what is the role of states?,” and the Tunis Agenda states: “Policy authority for Internet-related public policy issues is the sovereign right of States. They have rights and responsibilities for international Internet-related public policy issues.”

    Mueller correctly identifies and discusses the positive externalities created by the Internet (pp. 44-48).  It would have been better if he had noted that there are also negative externalities, in particular regarding security (see section 2.8 of my June 2017 submission to ITU’s CWG-Internet), and that the role of states includes internalizing such externalities, as well as preventing anti-competitive behavior.

    It is also telling the Mueller never explicitly mentions a principle that is no longer seriously disputed, and that was explicitly enunciated in the formal outcome of the WSIS+10 Review, namely that offline law applies equally online.  Mueller does mention some issues related to jurisdiction, but he does not place those in the context of the fundamental principle that cyberspace is subject to the same laws as the rest of the world: as Mueller himself acknowledges (p. 145), allegations of cybercrime are judged by regular courts, not cyber-courts, and if you are convicted you will pay a real fine or be sent to a real prison, not to a cyber-prison.  But national jurisdiction is not just about security (p. 74 ff.), it is also about legal certainty for commercial dealings, such as enforcement of contracts.  There are an increasing number of activities that depend on the Internet, but that also depend on the existence of known legal regimes that can be enforced in national courts.

    And what about the tension between globalization and other values such as solidarity and cultural diversity?  As Mueller correctly notes (p. 10), the Internet is globalization on steroids.  Yet cultural values differ around the world (p. 125).  How can we get the benefits of both an unfragmented Internet and local cultural diversity (as opposed to the current trend to impose US values on the rest of the world)?

    While dealing with these issues in more depth would have complicated the discussion, it also would have made it more valuable, because the call for direct rule of the Internet by and for Internet users must either be reconciled with the principle that offline law applies equally online, or be combined with a reasoned argument for the abandonment of that principle.  As Mueller so aptly puts it (p. 11): “Internet governance is hard … also because of the mismatch between its global scope and the political and legal institutions for responding to societal problems.”

    Since most laws, and almost all enforcement mechanisms are national, the influence of states on the Internet is inevitable.  Recall that the idea of enforceable rules (laws) dates back to at least 1700 BC and has formed an essential part of all civilizations in history.  Mueller correctly posits on p. 125 that a justification for territorial sovereignty is to restrict violence (only the state can legitimately exercise it), and wonders why, in that case, the entire world does not have a single government.  But he fails to note that, historically, at times much of the world was subject to a single government (think of the Roman Empire, the Mongol Empire, the Holy Roman Empire, the British Empire), and he does not explore the possibility of expanding the existing international order (treaties, UN agencies, etc.) to become a legitimate democratic world governance (which of course it is not, in part because the US does not want it to become one).  For example, a concrete step in the direction of using existing governance systems has recently been proposed by Microsoft: a Digital Geneva Convention.

    Mueller explains why national borders interfere with certain aspects of certain Internet activities (pp. 104, 106), but national borders interfere with many activities.  Yet we accept them because there doesn’t appear to be any “least worst” alternative.  Mueller does acknowledge that states have power, and rightly calls for states to limit their exercise of power to their own jurisdiction (p. 148).  But he posits that such power “carries much less weight than one would think” (p. 150), without justifying that far-reaching statement.  Indeed, Mueller admits that “it is difficult to conceive of an alternative” (p. 73), but does not delve into the details sufficiently to show convincingly how the solution that he sketches would not result in greater power by dominant private companies (and even corpotocracy or corporatism), increasing income inequality, and a denial of democracy.  For example, without the power of state in the form of consumer protection measures, how can one ensure that private intermediaries would “moderate content based on user preferences and reports” (p. 147) as opposed to moderating content so as to maximize their profits?  Mueller assumes that there would be a sufficient level of competition, resulting in self-correcting forces and accountability (p. 129); but current trends are just the opposite: we see increasing concentration and domination in many aspects of the Internet (see section 2.11 of my June 2017 submission to ITU’s CWG-Internet) and some competition law authorities have found that some abuse of dominance has taken place.

    It seems to me that Mueller too easily concludes that “a state-centric approach to global governance cannot easily co-exist with a multistakeholder regime” (p. 117), without first exploring the nuances of multi-stakeholder regimes and the ways that they could interface with existing institutions, which include intergovernmental bodies as well as states.  As I have stated elsewhere: “The current arrangement for global governance is arguably similar to that of feudal Europe, whereby multiple arrangements of decision-making, including the Church, cities ruled by merchant-citizens, kingdoms, empires and guilds co-existed with little agreement as to which actor was actually in charge over a given territory or subject matter.  It was in this tangled system that the nation-state system gained legitimacy precisely because it offered a clear hierarchy of authority for addressing issues of the commons and provision of public goods.”

    Which brings us to another key point that Mueller does not consider in any depth: if the Internet is a global public good, then its governance must take into account the views and needs of all the world’s citizens, not just those that are privileged enough to have access at present.  But Mueller’s solution would restrict policy-making to those who are willing and able to participate in various so-called multi-stakeholder forums (apparently Mueller does not envisage a vast increase in participation and representation in these; p. 120).  Apart from the fact that that group is not a community in any real sense (a point acknowledged on p. 139), it comprises, at present, only about half of humanity, and even much of that half would not be able to participate because discussions take place primarily in English, and require significant technical knowledge and significant time commitments.

    Mueller’s path for the future appears to me to be a modern version of the International Ad Hoc Committee (IAHC), but Mueller would probably disagree, since he is of the view that the IAHC was driven by intergovernmental organizations.  In any case, the IAHC work failed to be seminal because of the unilateral intervention of the US government, well described in Ruling the Root, which resulted in the creation of ICANN, thus sparking discussions of Internet governance in WSIS and elsewhere.  While Mueller is surely correct when he states that new governance methods are needed (p. 127), it seems a bit facile to conclude that “the nation-state is the wrong unit” and that it would be better to rely largely on “global Internet governance institutions rooted in non-state actors” (p. 129), without explaining how such institutions would be democratic and representative of all of the word’s citizens.

    Mueller correctly notes (p. 150) that, historically, there have major changes in sovereignty: emergence and falls of empires, creation of new nations, changes in national borders, etc.  But he fails to note that most of those changes were the result of significant violence and use of force.  If, as he hopes, the “Internet community” is to assert sovereignty and displace the existing sovereignty of states, how will it do so?  Through real violence?  Through cyber-violence?  Through civil disobedience (e.g. migrating to bitcoin, or implementing strong encryption no matter what governments think)?  By resisting efforts to move discussions into the World Trade Organization? Or by persuading states to relinquish power willingly?  It would have been good if Mueller had addressed, at least summarily, such questions.

    Before concluding, I note a number of more-or-less minor errors that might lead readers to imprecise understandings of important events and issues.  For example, p. 37 states that “the US and the Internet technical community created a global institution, ICANN”: in reality, the leaders of the Internet technical community obeyed the unilateral diktat of the US government (at first somewhat reluctantly and later willingly) and created a California non-profit company, ICANN.  And ICANN is not insulated from jurisdictional differences; it is fully subject to US laws and US courts.  The discussion on pp. 37-41 fails to take into account the fact that a significant portion of the DNS, the ccTLDs, is already aligned with national borders, and that there are non-national telephone numbers; the real differences between the DNS and telephone numbers are that most URLs are non-national, whereas few telephone numbers are non-national; that national telephone numbers are given only to residents of the corresponding country; and that there is an international real-time mechanism for resolving URLs that everybody uses, whereas each telephone operator has to set up its own resolving mechanism for telephone numbers.  Page 47 states that OSI was “developed by Europe-centered international organizations”, whereas actually it was developed by private companies from both the USA (including AT&T, Digital Equipment Corporation, Hewlett-Packard, etc.) and Europe working within global standards organizations (IEC, ISO, and ITU), who all happen to have secretariats in Geneva, Switzerland; whereas the Internet was initially developed and funded by an arm of the US Department of Defence and the foundation of the WWW was initially developed in a European intergovernmental organization.  Page 100 states that “The ITU has been trying to displace or replace ICANN since its inception in 1998”; whereas a correct statement would be “While some states have called for the ITU to displace or replace ICANN since its inception in 1998, such proposals have never gained significant support and appear to have faded away recently.”  Not everybody thinks that the IANA transition was a success (p. 117), nor that it is an appropriate model for the future (pp. 132-135; 136-137), and it is worth noting that ICANN successfully withstood many challenges (p. 100) while it had a formal link to the US government; it remains to be seen how ICANN will fare now that it is independent of the US government.  ICANN and the RIR’s do not have a “‘transnational’ jurisdiction created through private contracts” (p. 117); they are private entities subject to national law and the private contracts in question are also subject to national law (and enforced by national authorities, even if disputes are resolved by international arbitration).  I doubt that it is a “small step from community to nation” (p. 142), and it is not obvious why anti-capitalist movements (which tend to be internationalist) would “end up empowering territorial states and reinforcing alignment” (p. 147), when it is capitalist movements that rely on the power of territorial states to enforce national laws, for example regarding intellectual property rights.

    Despite these minor quibbles, this book, and its references (albeit not as extensive as one would have hoped), will be a valuable starting point for future discussions of internet alignment and/or “fragmentation.” Surely there will be much future discussion, and many more analyses and calls for action, regarding what may well be one of the most important issues that humanity now faces: the transition from the industrial era to the information era and the disruptions arising from that transition.

    _____

    Richard Hill is President of the Association for Proper internet Governance, and was formerly a senior official at the International Telecommunication Union (ITU). He has been involved in internet governance issues since the inception of the internet and is now an activist in that area, speaking, publishing, and contributing to discussions in various forums. Among other works he is the author of The New International Telecommunication Regulations and the Internet: A Commentary and Legislative History (Springer, 2014). He writes frequently about internet governance issues for The b2 Review Digital Studies magazine.

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  • Joseph S. O’Leary – Steve Bannon’s Ghostly Triumph

    Joseph S. O’Leary – Steve Bannon’s Ghostly Triumph

    by Joseph S. O’Leary

    This essay has been peer-reviewed by the b2o editorial collective

    Now that Stephen K. Bannon has been removed from the White House (August 18, 2017), it has become possible to consider his six months’ presence there as a unified, substantial whole. One stumbles already at the words “unified” and “substantial,” for though Bannon is more “all of a piece” than President Trump, the unity seems to reduce to vacuous slogans or vague ideologies such as “nationalism” and “populism,” supposedly pitted against the “globalism” of others in the White House. Trump, as Slavoj Žižek says, using a mathematical term sported by Alain Badiou, is an “inconsistent assemblage”; his very inconsistency is his strength, frustrating efforts to pin him down, as he instinctively changes tack in opportunistic response to audiences and situations—racist, or pretending to be, on the campaign trail, but stoutly declaring he hasn’t a racist bone in his body when challenged. In contrast, Bannon sticks to his ideological guns pertinaciously, but there is an emptiness to his consistency and a frustrating lack of substance to his presence. So he too, like Trump, is “as the air, invulnerable, / And our vain blows malicious mockery.”

    Now Bannon is yesterday’s man, and however he may rage, unshackled, against his former boss from his Breitbart pulpit, his words will be “but a spume that plays / Upon a ghostly paradigm of things.” Even his recital of his palmy days—“I said, ‘Look, I’ll focus on going after the establishment.’ He [Trump] said, ‘Good, I need that.’ I said, ‘Look, I’ll always be here covering for you’”—is destined to become an old wives’ tale, perhaps to share over an ebbing fire with Sarah Palin, about whom he once made a hagiographical movie. It is hard to write of these people without falling into the key of ridicule. But Noam Chomsky might approve: “The performances are so utterly absurd regarding the ‘post-truth’ moment that the proper response might best be ridicule. For example, Stephen Colbert’s recent comment is apropos: When the Republican legislature of North Carolina responded to a scientific study predicting a threatening rise in sea level by barring state and local agencies from developing regulations or planning documents to address the problem, Colbert responded: ‘This is a brilliant solution. If your science gives you a result that you don’t like, pass a law saying the result is illegal. Problem solved’” (Yancy and Chomsky, 2017).

    Looking back, one recognizes that Bannon’s brief career at the pinnacle of power must be deemed a triumph, since he achieved to an astonishing degree just what he aimed at. His boast in The Hollywood Reporter, “I am Thomas Cromwell in the court of the Tudors,” the power behind the throne and the real agent of revolutionary change, was not a vain one (Wolff, 2016). Like Cromwell, he sometimes failed to steer his monarch, who axed him in the end, but he did succeed in changing beyond recognition the State he served. Bannon modeled himself on Lenin as well: “Lenin wanted to destroy the state, and that’s my goal too. I want to bring everything crashing down, and destroy all of today’s establishment” (Radosh, 2016). In pursuit of this goal he had encouraged Sarah Palin, Lou Dobbs, and Jeff Sessions to run for President, sighting in them likely instruments of his revolutionary aim. Under normal circumstances such a sophomoric scheme would get nowhere, but Bannon knew the man of destiny when he saw him and adroitly won his confidence. As the world contemplates the shambles of American government today, surely Bannon can justly take some credit?

    A Slippery Customer

    To measure the difficulty of finding an effective critical perspective on Bannon and Trump, one need look no farther than to an article in Civiltà Cattolica titled “Fondamentalismo evangelicale e integralismo cattolico” and penned by editor Antonio Spadaro, SJ, along with Marcelo Figueroa, editor of LOsservatore Romano in Argentina. This authoritative piece takes the ideological stand-off between Pope Francis and President Trump beyond cartoonish slogans—“Care for the poor. Care for the earth, Embrace the immigrant. Strive for peace,” on one side, “Scrap benefits. Bring back coal. Build a wall. ‘I love war,’” on the other—and offers a more detailed hermeneutic of Francis’s allusions and frowns (such as the one that, quite deliberately, spoiled his photograph with the Trump family). But the article’s focus on a “mingling of politics, morals and religion” that “divides reality between absolute Good and absolute Evil,” seems rather beside the point. George W. Bush talked about an “axis of evil” and claimed that it was the USA’s duty to “free the world from evil,” but such language has little real purchase in the Trump world, any more than the language of truth and falsehood; such terms have become a thoroughly debased currency.  However, it is true that Bannon seems to have an entrenched view of apocalyptic warfare between good and evil: journalist James Ulmer claimed that Bannon “hoped to destroy the Hollywood establishment” and would say: “We’re the peasants with the pitchforks storming the lord’s manor.” Bannon “was always making these grand, hyperbolic analogies between good and evil, the culture of life versus the scourge of death that, in his view, Hollywood had become. Hollywood was the great Satan” (Bruck, 2017).

    When Spadaro and Figueroa decry the “dominionism” that sees ecologists as “people who are against the Christian faith” and sees “natural disasters, dramatic climate change and the global ecological crisis” as confirming “their non-allegorical understanding of the final figures of the Book of Revelation and their apocalyptic hope in a ‘new heaven and a new earth,’” their remarks are again off-key. Biblical references have a merely occasional and tactical function in the Trumpian regime of truth. The ideology behind Trump’s ecological recklessness may well be nothing more than dislike of liberal fads espoused by Obama and Hillary Clinton and belief that they are bad for American business.

    When the Civiltà Cattolica authors recite elements of the alleged Trumpian creed—“Theirs is a prophetic formula: fight the threats to American Christian values and prepare for the imminent justice of an Armageddon”—and offer a theological diagnosis—“Such a unidirectional reading of the biblical texts can anesthetize consciences or actively support the most atrocious and dramatic portrayals of a world that is living beyond the frontiers of its own ‘promised land’”—they seem to be floundering. They identify the “dominionism” of Rousas John Rushdoony as “the doctrine that feeds political organizations and networks such as the Council for National Policy and the thoughts of their exponents such as Steve Bannon, currently chief strategist at the White House and supporter of an apocalyptic geopolitics. … Rushdoony’s doctrine maintains a theocratic necessity: submit the state to the Bible with a logic that is no different from the one that inspires Islamic fundamentalism.” Most people have never heard of Rushdoony—perhaps Bannon and Trump haven’t either—and Bannon’s name does not figure on the leaked membership list of the secretive Council for National Policy. So the claim made here looks less like a brilliant piece of detection than a tilting at windmills.

    “Appealing to the values of fundamentalism, a strange form of surprising ecumenism is developing between Evangelical fundamentalists and Catholic Integralists,” an “ecumenism of hate” marked by a “xenophobic and Islamophobic vision that wants walls and purifying deportations.” Does this grasp the mind of Donald Trump? Probably not, since he does not work with a consistent ideology. Does it reflect the views of Stephen Bannon? Who can say, since Bannon remains quite discreet about his actual beliefs. The authors then turn on some noisy American bloggers, no doubt to their great delight: “There is a shocking rhetoric used, for example, by the writers of Church Militant, a successful US-based digital platform that is openly in favor of a political ultraconservatism and uses Christian symbols to impose itself. … It has created a close analogy between Donald Trump and Emperor Constantine, and between Hillary Clinton and Diocletian.” For some fundamentalist supporters, it’s true, Trump is the equivalent of King David, chosen by God as his anointed, and who can be forgiven anything, including adultery and murder, because of his status as the Lord’s instrument. But these are a fringe element. In general the article may comment correctly on troubling developments in the American religious landscape, but it does not close in on Bannon and Trump themselves. I would add it to the honorable list of failed attacks on Trumpism, on all of which Trump has thrived, from his rhetorical massacre of his fellow-contestants in the Republican primaries in 2016 down to the broad approval his reactions to the Nazi rally in Charlottesville secured despite condemnation from politicians and the media. For his supporters the New York Times and the Washington Post are every bit as biased and vicious as Fox News is in liberal eyes, and Trump knows he has nothing to lose by lashing out at “lying media.”

    Bannon has a previous history with the Vatican, as contributor to a conference of the Human Dignity Institute held there in 2014. The chairman of this Institute, Cardinal Raymond Burke, is Pope Francis’s foremost critic and an icon for diehard Catholic traditionalists. He holds that “Islam wants to govern the world”; “Islam is a religion that, according to its own interpretation, must also become the State. The Koran, and the authentic interpretations of it given by various experts in Koranic law, is destined to govern the world” (Catholic Herald, 2016). Bannon’s speech referred to a coming “brutal and bloody conflict” with “this new barbarity that’s starting.” The barbarity has two faces: soulless capitalism, and “a global war against Islamic fascism.” “It’s very difficult to know what Bannon is saying, because he’s so fuzzy,” commented theologian Matthew Fox: “His definition of Christianity is very archaic”; “it’s peculiar that he never uses the word ‘justice’” (Fox, 2017). But here again the trail peters out, for I do not know of any indication of further substantial links between Burke and Bannon, though they are said to have exchanged emails. Catholicism does not appear to have had any marked presence in the White House during Bannon’s tenure. 

    The Silent Sage

     Bannon is a simpler figure than Trump, yet a more elusive target, because of his silence and invisibility, based on his policy that “darkness is good” and “I am not doing media,” which, along with his reputation as an intellectual and a cogent thinker, lends him inscrutable dignity. The White House, a “dump” according to its present occupant, is said to be haunted, and Bannon loomed there rather spectrally. He did not provide the Trump presidency with a backbone or a secure framework, a task that has defeated even the “axis of adults” now surrounding the incumbent—Generals John Kelly, James Mattis, Joseph Dunford, and H. R. McMaster, along with Secretary of State Rex Tillerson. An opportunistic ectoplasm, Bannon made his influence felt as occasion offered. One can imagine him overawing his presidential protégé by a pregnant silence, or dropping laconic counsels at well-chosen moments into the depths of the presidential mind. Flourishing amid the insubstantiality and surreal evanescence of a White House that had become a reality show, that is, an unreality show, Bannon could inject a series of reactionary prompts on such matters as ecology, immigration, the transgender ban, the Iran nuclear agreement, the war in Afghanistan. One wonders how he would guide the unsteady finger that hovers over the nuclear button.

    This dignified eminence began to be punctured toward the end of his tenure, when Bannon flickered into eerie prominence in Anthony Scaramucci’s job-ending interview with a reporter he later compared with Linda Tripp. Scaramucci’s fantastical image of an auto-fellator exploiting the president’s strength to boost his own brand, and his gangster-style threats: “The president knows what he’s going to do” and “has a very good idea of the people that are undermining his agenda,” were good for a laugh, but the threats turned out not to be idle ones, though Scaramucci’s own head rolled before Bannon’s. Then came a second lurid flare: Bannon’s own astonishing interview with The American Prospect, seemingly a hasty effort to express his views forcefully while he still had the White House position he knew he was doomed to lose within days. He used the opportunity to focus not on Islam, but on Asia, now apparently a more real threat: “We’re at economic war with China. It’s in all their literature. They’re not shy about saying what they’re doing. One of us is going to be a hegemon in 25 or 30 years and it’s gonna be them if we go down this path.” Contrary to Trump’s threat of “fire and fury” to North Korea, Bannon said: “There’s no military solution, forget it. Until somebody solves the part of the equation that shows me that ten million people in Seoul don’t die in the first 30 minutes from conventional weapons, I don’t know what you’re talking about, there’s no military solution here, they got us.” When Bannon actually speaks, he is emphatic and grandiose; but when his words are no longer backed by the title of Chief Strategist they will lose most of their weight.

    Does Bannon write? Does he even tweet? One solid text by him would provide something to chew on, instead of having to speculate about the influences that feed his rhetoric. According to James Hohmann (2017) these include Sun Tzu’s The Art of War, David Halberstam’s The Best and the Brightest (a critique of J. F. Kennedy’s advisers), William Strauss and Neil Howe’s The Fourth Turning (an absurd theory of historical cycles), Steven Emerson’s American Jihad, and Nassim Taleb’s Antifragile (polemic against big government). This somewhat nerdy list does not yield a satisfyingly sharp profile, and in the absence of such the entertainment industry and even leading politicians have resorted to crude caricature (on Saturday Night Live) and ineffectual name-calling (“Nazi,” “white supremacist,” “Rasputin”). Bannon has also expressed himself in agitprop movies that are far outclassed by those of Michael Moore. One of them, Generation Zero, orchestrates a tale of cultural decline dating from Woodstock in 1969 with over-wrought images of an apocalyptic abyss. Its sees the USA as gripped in a fore-doomed “fourth turning,” which must lead to a big war. As Micah L. Sifry (2017) writes: “Bannon doesn’t just believe that we are in an existential conflict with Islam or with China.  It seems he wants to exacerbate those conflicts into a new world war.  As a believer in Strauss and Howe’s theory of history, Bannon fantasizes that he can use that cataclysm to forge a completely new order.”

    That a man in thrall to such a tawdry and dangerous ideology was allowed to attend the Principals Committee of the National Security Council from January to April 2017 troubled people greatly. Far from acting to restrain the president’s belligerent attitude towards the media, the judiciary, environmental protection, Obamacare, and the rights of immigrants and gender minorities, Bannon was suspected of acerbating it and feeding the president a fascist script. The contempt that Bannon expressed in his American Prospect interview for “ethno-nationalism” as a “fringe element”—“we gotta help crush it”—does not extend to his own economic nationalism; nor does it quite dispel the suspicion that he advised the president to spread the blame for Charlottesville equally between right and left (Kuttner, 2017). Yet it is clear that Trump needed no one’s advice for that, as shown in the pugnacious press conference of 15 August 2017. This press conference eerily echoed a CNN interview recorded, but not aired, two hours earlier with Jared Taylor, editor of the neonazi American Renaissance. “Same ideas, same ideology, same talking points,” noted Uygur (2017) on “The Young Turks;” but that does not necessarily make Trump anything as substantial as a white supremacist; he merely parrots the memes of the Charlottesville apologists who sprang up across the social media in the days preceding his press conference. In any case it remains possible that the chaos in the White House is entirely Trump’s doing, and that Bannon’s ministrations have had only atmospheric effect, so that even his claimed triumph in reshaping US politics may turn out to be yet another mere illusion.

    The Inaugural Address

    Bannon’s most glorious moment was Trump’s Inaugural Address of January 20, 2017, if it is true that he contributed to its composition, to the point that it offers an undiluted expression of Bannonism. Both in its picture of American decline and its promise of a glowing future, the speech had a hollow unreality that was far from the norm of US political discourse but that reflected the essence of Trumpism as Bannon would define it, namely the hollowing out of democratic values and their replacement by populist pap: “January 20th 2017, will be remembered as the day the people became the rulers of this nation again. The forgotten men and women of our country will be forgotten no longer. Everyone is listening to you now. You came by the tens of millions to become part of a historic movement the likes of which the world has never seen before” (Time, 2017). Trump embodies a revolt of the masses, and has a visceral bond of mutual loyalty with the people who have thrust him to supreme power. But he is likely to redeem them from the burden of too much government and regulation not by inaugurating any new deal that would end poverty and inequality, but by casting them loose to fend for themselves. He paints this disempowerment as empowerment: “For too long, a small group in our nation’s Capital has reaped the rewards of government while the people have borne the cost. … This American carnage stops right here and stops right now.” The willfully constructed scenario is mendacious on both sides: the negative picture bears no relation to actual achievements and efforts of previous administrations, and the promise of sudden, radical change is of a piece with Trump’s long history of false advertisement and unpaid wages. As a speech-act it is a salesman’s dazzling spiel, not a concrete commitment likely to be soberly enacted. It offers a blank check for unabashed plutocracy and kleptocracy, all covered by the assurance that this is what the people want.

    But above all its apocalyptic scenario is fantastically unreal, bearing the stamp of Bannon’s fanaticism. Before Trump, America was a scene of utmost desolation; but now a golden age has suddenly dawned. Before Trump we saw “mothers and children trapped in poverty in our inner cities; rusted-out factories scattered like tombstones across the landscape of our nation; an education system, flush with cash, but which leaves our young and beautiful students deprived of knowledge; and the crime and gangs and drugs that have stolen too many lives and robbed our country of so much unrealized potential.” He does not mention the mass incarceration of Americans by the prison industry, on racist premises, with massive use of solitary confinement; nor the huge inequality between the plutocrats and the poor; nor the relative success of the USA in protecting the environment, reducing crime, providing health care, ensuring civil rights of minorities, all of which Trump seeks in practice to reverse.

    The gap between glowing promise and mean practice is astronomical, yet the faith of Trump’s supporters is great enough to wing that abyss. The speech uses literary tropes to appeal to an apocalyptic imagination, and to dull the civic imagination traditional in America. Its use of the language of royal edicts underscores its tangentiality to sober reality: “So to all Americans, in every city near and far, small and large, from mountain to mountain, and from ocean to ocean, hear these words: You will never be ignored again.” Or the language may sound like the diktat of a revolutionary elite: “We assembled here today are issuing a new decree to be heard in every city, in every foreign capital, and in every hall of power.” The actual content of the grandiose decree turns out to be petty: Americans will no longer be pushed around, but will give priority to their own interests.

    Understanding the Post-Truth Ideology

     We are now seeing daily how an entire population can sleepwalk into the clutch of an authoritarian regime, and how fragile are the ideals and structures of modern liberal democracy. Even the famed checks and balances of the US system are proving ineffectual, and some suggest that the only effective action is a coup of some sort. Much of what is afoot is standard fare—attacks on freedom of the press, academic freedom, freedom of opinion, and independence of the judicial branch—but something eerily new is also emerging. We are beyond Neoconservativism, and beyond the “moderate right.” We are moving into the territory of the “reactionary right,” the “radical right,” the “extreme right” (see Eatwell and O’Sullivan, 1989).

    Trump’s new form of populist rightism draws elements from all these categories, but it also introduces an original twist that is principally located in the realm of epistemology. The reckless and compulsive lying of the President is a pathology, but one that has enabled him to sail to victory again and again. His claims that the head of the Boy Scouts of America phoned him to praise his deplorable speech to them as the greatest ever, and that the President of Mexico had phoned to compliment him on the wall, were so blatant and so easily refuted that one must wonder if “pathological” is a strong enough word; such a disconnect invites the label “psychotic.” But in the world of showmanship, business wheeling and dealing, and confidence trickstership, reality is what works, and the confident liar will feel he is more tuned in to things than the scrupulous fussers about veracity whom he scorns as losers. Reviewing three books titled Post-Truth, Leith (2017) writes: “Whereas the liar has a direct relationship with the truth value of what he or she is saying, and implicitly honours the truth by denying it, the bullshitter simply doesn’t care about whether his or her statement is true, half-true or outright false: he or she cares only about what it achieves. Here we are in the territory not of logic but of rhetoric.” Trump dismisses discomforting truth-tellers as liars, since truth and falsehood in his mind are reducible to what boosts the ego and what does not; he is presented with flattering reports twice a day by his excruciatingly servile staff. Truth holds no weight in his thought and rhetoric, as the language of “alternative facts” and the use of lying as a rhetorical method indicate. In contrast, Bannon is something of a true believer, asserting his tawdry ideology with real conviction. That is why Trump is President and Bannon is not.

    “Before mass leaders seize the power to fit reality to their lies, their propaganda is marked by its extreme contempt for facts as such, for in their opinion fact depends entirely on the power of man who can fabricate it” (Arendt, 1966, p. 350). For the Nazis, as the 1947 US War Department film Dont Be a Sucker says, truth was “their oldest and most persistent enemy” so “they decided to abolish truth,” via book burnings, propaganda, censorship, discouraging education, etc. This background lends gravity to the core scandal of Trumpism—its disregard for truth. But with Trump, this is not the cold calculation of a budding totalitarian leader. Rather it is inherent in his cultural milieu. Its matrix is a corruption of conservative culture. Ironically, though conservative critics of modernity frequently rail against relativism and cynicism, as conservatism has increasingly taken a postmodern turn this battle line has become blurred; those who originally stepped forward as champions of unchanging Truth have strangely morphed into intellectual opportunists who wave the banner of Truth as a weapon in their changing ideological battles.

    But there has been a treason of the clerks on the other side too, among clever postmodern intellectuals, who can find their own distorted image in Trump’s parody. Our endless delicate talk about the contextuality, historicity, culture-boundedness, conventionality, socio-political determination, and endless deferral of the “truth-effect,” has been orchestrated by Trump with a vengeance, while Bannon flaunts the fateful word “deconstruction.” If postmodern attitudes to truth secrete any poisons, they have materialized in the deadliest form in the Trump ideology. Not a subtle and refined relativism, but a blanket discrediting of experts, eggheads, science, journalism, facts, and truth itself, is the staple of Trump epistemics. Building on old resentments, this tactic has so far been astonishingly successful.

    One of Trump’s favorite locutions is “It’s true!” and he postures as the scourge of mendacity, be it that of the “lying media,” “lying Ted,” or “crooked Hillary.” But this is truth as ammunition for the will to power. When Trump finds a truth that works, it is raised to the status of a meme or a dogma to be intoned on all occasions. Sometimes the truth actually is true, as in his excoriation of the USA’s interventions in the Middle East. But it is not the true truths that are most to his taste or that he most often repeats. In a world where conspiracy theories flourish in proportion to their unbelievable strangeness, Trump’s weapon of choice is the untrue truth, proclaimed as a revelation that can be immediately sloganized, and stamped with his trademark “Believe me!” that recalls the “Amen, Amen, I say unto you” of the Gospels. As if challenging his supporters to ever braver acts of faith and loyalty, he not only advances implausible claims without a shred of evidence (as in the claim that millions voted fraudulently in the presidential election) but proclaims as fact matters that the simplest inspection of the empirical data shows to be false. One example of this “gaslighting” (from Patrick Hamilton’s play Gaslight about a husband who undercuts his wife’s perceptions, driving her mad) is Trump’s claim to have had a huge crowd at his inauguration, despite photographic proof to the contrary.

    The incredible power of someone who can thus disable truth and fact must be very exciting, and indeed many addicts of such media as Fox News and Breitbart have known this excitement for years. Bannon, in his Breitbart career, has both shaped and been shaped by the culture of round-the-clock slander, fear-mongering, and lurid speculation, but in some ways he is more reminiscent of the Bush era neo-cons such as Paul Wolfowitz and Donald Rumsfeld. He builds up an image of the ideological enemy, first Islamic terrorism and more recently China’s bid for world hegemony, but he does not subscribe to the fashionably postmodern claim that there are no facts, only interpretations.

    “The nature of reality is an open question in the age of Donald Trump. As the president regularly decries ‘the Fake News Media’ and journalists catalogue his many lies, the battles of our time seem not just political but philosophical, indeed epistemological” (Heer, 2017). But this “postmodern” twist to presidential politics goes back to Bill Clinton’s famous parsing of the meaning of “is” and Donald Rumsfeld’s sophistries. The denial of anthropogenic climate disruption by a host of specious arguments (whether advanced in good faith or as paid propaganda) was one of the earliest and most widespread manifestations of the turn to post-truth. Despite the clearest evidence of recent and sudden disruption, the post-truth apologists simply declared that climate change has always been happening (while ignoring the contrast between the this long-duration change and the suddenness of what has happened over the last century); some added a religious twist by denouncing the presumption and faithlessness of humans who usurped the Lord’s job of being the steward of creation and failed to trust him to make everything work out all right. Here the ludic attitude to truth has catastrophic impact in the real. Trump may turn out to be the most expensive joke of all time.

    Jeet Heer’s quotations from Fredric Jameson do not quite capture what is new in the Trump phenomenon: “a society of the image or the simulacrum and a transformation of the ‘real’ into so many pseudoevents;” “a new kind of flatness or depthlessness, a new kind of superficiality in the most literal sense” where “depth is replaced by surface.” Trump thrusts his all too solid or sullied flesh on the world’s attention daily—no subtle play of depth and surface here. When Trump is Trump, holding a crowd in the palm of his hand or fiercely confronting the press, he grabs attention; only when he is scripted is he an utter fake, as in his nauseous “let us love one another” rhetoric after Charlottesville.

    “For Baudrillard, ‘the perfect crime’ was the murder of reality, which has been covered up with decoys (‘virtual reality’ and ‘reality shows’) that are mistaken for what has been destroyed. ‘Our culture of meaning is collapsing beneath our excess of meaning, the culture of reality collapsing beneath the excess of reality, the information culture collapsing beneath the excess of information—the sign and reality sharing a single shroud,’ Baudrillard wrote in The Perfect Crime (1995). The Trump era is rich in such unreality” (Heer, 2017). That’s not entirely true, for there is an anemic or skeletal form that shows up through the frenetic flimflam of the Trump show, a pathetic reality—sad!—that stares back at us whenever we fix our eyes on the abyss, as in one act of blinding showmanship Trump fixed his own eagle eyes on the eclipsed sun.

    A boy sobs alone in the corner of an empty room, not for any “excess of meaning” but for its absence. Unlike The Truman Show, in which the “excess of reality” is stunningly unmasked as unreal, this show is known to be mere show from the start. Its harking back to the 1950s, or the 1930s, or even the “good old days” of the 1850s, when blacks who protested would be “ripped from their chairs” or “carried out on stretchers,” may launch a thousand rallies, a thousand golf weekends or expensive shopping expeditions, but cannot take a single step forward in real historical time. In the time of his imagination Trump is a king, but in 2017 no such matter. He does not belong to the real 2017 at all. A time-traveling stray from a dream past, he cannot grasp the first thing about the “brave new world” of today nor exclaim with Miranda “How many goodly creatures are there here!” Generic praise—“doing a great job” (even in speaking of the long dead Frederick Douglass) or “fine people” (even in speaking of the white supremacists of Charlottesville)—is the most articulate response he can manage; and when that world rises before him in its unpleasant facticity, all he can do is shriek “It’s a lie! it’s fake!”  No, this is not Baudrillard’s “information culture collapsing beneath the excess of information” but an extreme exinanition of real information. The social media, held in thrall for two years already by one man’s pathology, battens on his empty soundbites, stunts, and gags. It’s a roller coaster, with lots of thrills, but always ending where it began.  Or is this the new real? Are we just entering the Age of Trump? Has our entire culture prepared this ghastly moment, when it implodes on its own unsuspected hollowness?

    The Ghost of Ayn Rand

    The effort to pin down Bannon’s outlook by studying his sources leads to strange destinations. Perhaps a catalogue of the things to which he is virulently opposed is more revealing. Generation Zero, his 2010 documentary, shows how the “capitalist system” was undermined by spoilt baby boomers and socialist policies that sapped the spirit of enterprise. In a lecture for the Liberty Restoration Foundation he accused baby boomers of “abandoning the tried-and-true values of their parents (nationalism, modesty, patriarchy, religion) in favor of new abstractions (pluralism, sexuality, egalitarianism, secularism).” “Unmoored from a Judeo-Christian moral framework, capitalism can be a force of harm and injustice—exemplified by the US’s economic decline” (Guilford and Sonnad, 2017). Bannon wants to reform America and he proceeds about his task with moral earnestness.

    If the disruptive and unpredictable Trump is the Luther of this reform, a man who speaks from the gut and to the gut, and whose twitterstorms trouble the world’s ear as Luther’s printing avalanche did, then Bannon could be cast as his steady if shadowy Melanchthon, brooding on the principles of the movement and clarifying them. The President is a businessman and Bannon is an intellectual, a line-up that would gratify Ayn Rand, for it is exactly the combination she saw as replacing the ancient collusion of Throne and Altar: “Capitalism wiped out slavery in matter and in spirit. It replaced Attila and the Witch Doctor, the looter of wealth and the purveyor of revelations, with two new types of man: the producer of wealth and the purveyor of knowledge—the businessman and the intellectual” (Rand, 1961, p. 21). Ironically, Trump bids fair to rival all Attilas as looter, while Bannon purveys not knowledge but rather rigid formulas. A businessman unrestrained by business ethics (though he may see his presidency as fulfilling his social responsibility) and an intellectual hobbled by ideological fixation make a strange couple as they tread the halls of supreme power.

    Does Rand haunt those halls? Ray Dalio, a hedge fund billionaire, declared: “Her books pretty well capture the mindset. This new administration hates weak, unproductive, socialist people and policies, and it admires strong, can-do, profit makers” (Dalio, 2016). Rand’s influence is strong in the world of business, especially in Silicon Valley. “Her overarching philosophy that ‘man exists for his own sake, that the pursuit of his own happiness is his highest moral purpose, that he must not sacrifice himself to others, nor sacrifice others to himself,’ as she described it in a 1964 Playboy interview, has an obvious appeal for self-made entrepreneurs” (Stewart, 2017).

    Her appeal for Republican politicians seems just as strong. Her name keeps coming up, since she is probably the most convenient source for legitimizing their ideas. An article denying her influence nonetheless provides ample evidence of it:

    The Washington Posts James Hohmann recently devoted many column inches to trying, and failing, to paint the Trump administration as somehow Randian. His headline notwithstanding there’s virtually no evidence that Donald Trump is an Ayn Rand “acolyte.” Hohmann notes a report by USA Todays Kirsten Powers, which, in full goes: “Trump described himself as an Ayn Rand fan. He said of her novel The Fountainhead, ‘It relates to business (and) beauty (and) life and inner emotions. That book relates to … everything.’ He identified with Howard Roark, the novel’s idealistic protagonist who designs skyscrapers and rages against the establishment.” Hohmann’s article goes on to note that three of Trump’s cabinet appointees show appreciation of Rand’s works. Rex Tillerson called Atlas Shrugged his favorite book in a 2008 feature for Scouting Magazine. Andy Puzder named his private equity fund in honor of a Rand hero, one of whose friends stated that he reads Rand in his spare time, and he recommended to his six children that they read Fountainhead first and Atlas Shrugged later. Rep. Mike Pompeo told Human Events, in 2011, “One of the very first serious books I read when I was growing up was Atlas Shrugged, and it really had an impact on me….” (Benko, 2016).

    “In a 2005 speech, [Paul] Ryan said that Rand was required reading for his office staff and interns. ‘The reason I got involved in public service, by and large, if I had to credit one thinker, one person, it would be Ayn Rand,’ he told a group called the Atlas Society” (Benko, 2016). In a 2009 campaign video, prompted by soaring sales of Rand’s novels, Ryan acclaimed her as “sorely needed right now” when “we are living in an Ayn Rand novel, metaphorically speaking,” due to President Obama’s “attack on the moral foundation of America.” Rand “did a fantastic job in explaining the morality of capitalism, the morality of individualism.” Three years later he embraced Aquinas, dismissing as “an urban legend” the idea he was inspired by Rand. “‘I reject her philosophy. … It’s an atheist philosophy. It reduces human interactions down to mere contracts and it is antithetical to my worldview. If somebody is going to try to paste a person’s view on epistemology to me, then give me Thomas Aquinas. … Don’t give me Ayn Rand!’” (quoted by Costa, 2012). All of this suggests that Rand has been officially banished from GOP circles, but the need of exorcism suggests that her ghost does linger. Indeed, some might say that authentic Randism would be preferable to the parody of it offered by Trump and Bannon.

    But here Bannon eludes us again, for like his fellow-Catholic Ryan he is sharply critical of Rand in his speech to the 2014 conference in the Vatican; yet he speaks of her with a lingering sympathy, and treats her as an authoritative reference for understanding contemporary capitalist culture:

    There’s a strand of capitalism today—two strands of it, that are very disturbing. One is state-sponsored capitalism. And that’s the capitalism you see in China and Russia. … The second form of capitalism that I feel is almost as disturbing, is what I call the Ayn Rand or the Objectivist School of libertarian capitalism. And, look, I’m a big believer in a lot of libertarianism. I have many many friends that’s a very big part of the conservative movement—whether it’s the UKIP movement in England, it’s many of the underpinnings of the populist movement in Europe, and particularly in the United States. However, that form of capitalism is quite different when you really look at it to what I call the “enlightened capitalism” of the Judeo-Christian West. It is a capitalism that really looks to make people commodities, and to objectify people … and that is a form of capitalism, particularly to a younger generation [that] they’re really finding quite attractive. And if they don’t see another alternative, it’s going to be an alternative that they gravitate to under this kind of rubric of “personal freedom.” (Feder, 2016)

    The heroine of Rand’s first novel, We the Living (1936), indulges a violent Nietzscheanism: “What is the people but millions of puny, shrivelled, helpless souls that have no thoughts of their own, no dreams of their own, no will of their own, who eat and sleep and chew helplessly the words that others put into their mildewed brains? And for those you would sacrifice the few who know life, who are life? I loathe your ideals because I know no worse injustice than justice for all” (quoted in Merrill, 1991, p. 38) Robert E. Merrill believes that minor stylistic alterations in this passage in the second edition (1959), such as the replacement of “justice for all” with “the giving of the undeserved” and “men are not born equal” with “men are not equal in ability,” show how Rand kept Nietzsche’s “emphasis on achievement, on aspiration, on pursuing supremely important values” while “she was able to clear away the debris of his ethical monstrosities” (Merrill, 1991, 40). Nietzsche is caricatured for the purpose of this argument, and even so it seems clear that Rand remained a pop pseudo-Nietzschean in 1959 as in 1936. Merrill speaks of Rand in cultic tones: “A hundred years from now, if civilization survives its present crises, Rand will be seen as a giant among twentieth-century thinkers. Not only will Objectivism be recognized as a major contribution to philosophical thought; not only will Rand’s ideas be accepted as correct; but very likely our whole way of thinking about philosophy will have changed” (163). The grandiosity here and the awed expectation of radical change bear a resemblance to the Inaugural Address. This middle-brow philosophizing is matched by equally tawdry esthetic judgment: “Strictly as a writer, Rand will certainly be classed among the top ten of her century. Her novels are already classics by any sensible definition.… Our descendants will envy us that we were her contemporaries” (163). At a time when academics teach Star Wars as a classic epic, and when Bob Dylan is widely regarded as an exemplary Nobel Prize for Literature, this sophomoric, nay, adolescent level of thought has wide purchase. The semi-intellectual Bannon has sponged up such half-baked notions, which allow him to project wisdom and depth to the shallow and impressionable Trump.

    For another Rand scholar, she opposed “a statist society in which there is a deadly alliance between government, science, and big business” (Sciabarra, 1995, 339) and in the passage quoted by Merrill “Kira may not be expressing a Nietzschean contempt for the masses as much as she is expressing a desire to break free of a system that crushes the individual under the weight of an undifferentiated collective” (105). Bannon aimed to smash up government in favor of individualistic libertarianism, and Trump projected the charms of such an ethos; but in reality that is another bait and switch, for the winners will be the faceless capitalist and militaristic institutions that increasingly force citizens into a collectivist lifestyle. Had Trump been a truly charismatic great leader after Rand’s heart, who would raise the masses from their hebetude, the danger to democracy would be much greater than that posed by the actual farce his administration has become. Democracy faces a double threat: from economic liberalism, deregulation, and unbridled capitalism on one hand, and from right-wing populism on the other. But the two forces collude: the liberals need the rightists either to maintain order (Weimar and Hitler) or as a bogey man to get themselves elected (Hillary Clinton and Trump, Macron and Marine Le Pen). Their candidate may alienate support on the left, who “lack all conviction” about his or her merits, thus leaving the door open to the rightist candidate, sustained by the “passionate intensity” or his or her gung-ho supporters. Yeats’s “The Second Coming,” written just after the Great War, is more and more on our lips as a new season of convulsions opens. “The centre cannot hold” and makes way for a “rough beast, its hour come round at last.”

    The Ghost of Julius Evola

    America for Bannon is an empty signifier, provided with an unreal paradisal past, an unreal apocalyptic present—the “crisis”—and an unreal future, blank and undefined. An anonymous article at summeroflove85.wordpress.com (2017), titled “The Unhappy Ghost of American Identity: Hauerwas, Bannon and the ‘Emptiness’ of National Promise,” notes that “most of Bannon’s claims are less to do with cultural essence and more to do with economic freedom of the nation ‘to do things’ (‘sovereignty’, ‘bringing back jobs, and ‘supporting deregulation’);” “That’s all a story-less politics can really do. It can only talk about conditions of action, it has no account of what actions should be preferred and why. Beyond the defense of doing and choosing, it has little substance.” Should we think of the fascist hyper-activism, energeticism, decisionism cultivated in the age of Gabriele d’Annunzio, F. T. Marinetti, Ernst Jünger, and Carl Schmitt? Perhaps, but Bannon lacks their wit and their power to grip; his preachy prescriptions are banal and deathly dull.

    Still Bannon, playing Mephistopheles to Trump’s Faust and Rasputin to his Nicholas II, invites comparison with Baron Julius Evola who played, briefly, a comparable role for Mussolini. Here again connections are elusive. “While Bannon’s references to Evola don’t prove he sees eye to eye with the philosopher, the openness with which he mentioned the Italian philosopher suggests that Evola’s name is not only circulating in Bannon’s circles, but that Bannon does not consider Evola’s thinking particularly problematic” (Merelli, 2017). Bannon’s actual words, in response to a question about Russia, were: “When Vladimir Putin, when you really look at some of the underpinnings of some of his beliefs today, a lot of those come from what I call Eurasianism; he’s got an adviser who harkens back to Julius Evola and different writers of the early 20th century who are really the supporters of what’s called the traditionalist movement, which really eventually metastasized into Italian fascism” (quoted by Liverant, 2017). As in the case of Rand, Evola is put at a distance but his name keeps recurring. It is true, however, that his critics have been too quick to put Bannon in the same basket as these two thinkers.

    When Mussolini came to power with his amorphous and flexible fascist ideology, many stepped forward to give it shape: “Like Gentile, all the most articulate hierarchs or ideologues who served the regime nurtured the illusion that they could be the mid-wives of a new Italy reborn in their image” (Griffin, 1991, p. 69). Evola, a Dadaist painter who believed that civilization was entering the “black age” or Kali Yuga of Hinduism (Griffin, 2007, p. 6), bears a resemblance to the composer of the Inaugural Address. Evola was a similar literary attitudinist, and Mussolini “early decided that Evola was an hysteric—but that his views might serve to convey, to equally hysterical fanatics in National Socialist Germany, Fascism’s seriousness of purpose” (Gregor, 2005, 218). Meanwhile, “Evola clearly held Mussolini and Fascism to have been nothing other than a ‘hypnotic’ side show that might be conveniently employed as a means of communicating the profound realities of a transcendent world to those capable of understanding” (219). It would not be surprising if Bannon had an equally cynical attitude to Trump, for his own apocalyptic world-view is far more sublime than what any ordinary politician can begin to comprehend.

    Mussolini rued his use of Evola, who started an independent right wing movement that through its influence on Mussolini’s rump Republic of Salò rendered Fascism for the first time “complicit in the murder of Jews” (220).  Trump should have learnt from Mussolini’s mistake in “burdening Fascism with an ill-contrived and immoral racism” (221). Ideologists may look lightweight, but if given a hold on power they can swing things in a sinister direction. “Montini [the future Paul VI] identified Evola as suffering from ‘those strange forms of cerebralism and neurasthenia, of intensive cultivation of incomprehensibility, of the metaphysic of obscurity, of cryptology of expression, of pseudo-mystical preciosity, of cabalistic fascinations magically evaporated by the refined drugs of Oriental erudition’” (198). How many have trashed with equal flamboyance the intellectual misery of Trump and his supporters. But their kind of power is not measurable in those terms, and in fact is better secured by the intellectually mediocre who are adroit communicators. “The wholly Fascist intellectuals … were for the most part middle-notch figures, among whom one could distinguish the delirious Julius Evola or a dilettante in the vein of grandeur such as G. A. Fanelli, who defined Fascism as ‘integral monarchy.’ No one took them seriously” (Bobbio, 1973, 230-31). The doctrine of these thinkers had little consistent positive content beyond its opposition to democracy and socialism (232). Trump has found no major intellectual to lean on, no one like what Giovanni Gentile (Mussolini’s first education minister) was for Fascism or Carl Schmitt was for Nazism. Bannon may have seemed a lucky catch to him for a few months, but disappointment set in, for Bannon did not have the capacious and realistic political intelligence of figures in previous administrations who starred as the “brain of the president.” “The fact that totalitarian government, its open criminality notwithstanding, rests on mass support is very disquieting” (Arendt, 1961, vii). Trump enjoys the solid support of at least a third of the American population, and if he were called upon to be the leader in a terrorist or military crisis that support would shoot up. So it is perhaps fortunate that his charism is not of a higher order and that he has not found collaborators of genius.

    One difference from Evola is that neither Bannon nor Trump are traditionalist in the European style. They would not say, with Evola in his defense statement of October 1951, “My principles are only those that before the French Revolution every well-born person considered healthy and normal” (quoted in Furlong, 2011, p. 9). Also missing among Trumpists is the mystic exaltation that Evola experienced and that led him to study Buddhism (see Furlong, pp. 2-12). Yet their contempt for empirical fact and their faith in instinct (“my temperament” as Trump calls it) does suggest a quasi-religious assurance, a belief in an alternative source of truth, a gnosis.

    At the end of our brief inquiry, Bannon remains not so much an enigma as something of a blob. The alleged brain of Trumpism turns out to be a disappointing blank. There is nothing as substantial here as the neocon ideology of a previous deplorable regime. When the show ends, we will be left with a sense of empty exhaustion, for the sound and fury of this tale told by an idiot indeed signifies nothing. The morning after will be bleak and cheerless, but it will be a blessed relief to return to the light of common day, freed of all the ghostly ghastliness.

     References

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    Bobbio, Norberto. 1973. “La cultura e il fascismo.” In Fascismo e società italiana, edited by Guido Quazza. Turin: Einaudi, 209-46.

    Bruck, Connie. 2017. “How Hollywood Remembers Steve Bannon.” The New Yorker, May 1. www.newyorker.com/magazine/2017/05/01/how-hollywood-remembers-steve-bannon

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    Fox, Mathew. 2017. “Steve Bannon on the Crisis of Capitalism and the Divine Right of Billionaires.” The Real News Network, 5 April 2017.

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