• Essays

    A tribute to Katia Bengana, assassinated by a young Islamist on 28 February 1994 in Meftah, Algeria.

    Wassyla Tamzali

    I. In “Women’s Bravery” –

    Those were the days of lawlessness and faithlessness; the country plunged into strife and bloodshed as the Islamists who had been deprived of their leaders spread into the cities and the mountains like a metastatic disease, frenziedly sowing death. Under the pretext of their submission to God, they slowly turned into unrecognisable monsters before our incredulous eyes. They formed death squads, imposed their own authority and spread terror. Deprived of their electoral victory, the Islamic Front of Salvation (FIS) and its partisans set about slowly but surely unveiling their hideous disposition.

    The country was plunging into civil war, neighbours and brothers killing each other. The pain and the fear overpowered the gaze of our mothers and our lives headed towards barbarism to the sound of heavy boots and the cries of “Allahu Akbar”. Death spread in every corner and the stench of gloomy clouds filled the air.

    It was 1994; the walls were littered with posters released by the GIA, the armed wing of the FIS, threatening young girls and women with death if they failed to wear the headscarf in the streets, schools, offices, hospitals, parks, homes, in front of the mirrors and even in bed if they could. The GIA would only tolerate women, from the age of puberty to menopause, in service of their fantasies.

    1994 culminated the horror and the unspeakable. Women became the target of collective violence exacerbated by their fragile bodies and panicky gazes. The inebriated sexual instincts of the assassins gave free rein to human barbarism ensued by a long list of unspeakable crimes with the stench of femicide.

    We all lived under this menace simply because we were women, or even children and adolescent girls. Up until then, the Islamists would pick their victims for what they did, be it writing, filmmaking, thinking, or singing, and women had already been assassinated for such an ostensible reason.

    However, in 1994, the religious fanatics set about assassinating, raping and enslaving women and young girls indiscriminately, veiled or otherwise. Had those women, girls and young girls in these villages, where serial acts of barbarism were perpetrated, including rape, kidnapping, torture and disembowelment, not all been veiled?

    Those barbarians found in the religion that nurtured our childhood under the benevolent guardianship of our fathers what made their hatred of women sacred; or their hatred of the female gender should we say, since they denied us any act of compassion. They wanted to force us to wear a distinctive and segregationist sign, namely a headscarf to cover our hair; in other words a veil to unveil, mark and designate our gender before all and sundry, in a manner that reduced women to their erotic bodies and dehumanised them. Dehumanisation is the first step towards barbarism.

    But every woman who has her head uncovered while praying or prophesying disgraces her head, for she is one and the same as the woman whose head is shaved. For if a woman does not cover her head, let her also have her hair cut off; but if it is disgraceful for a woman to have her hair cut off or her head shaved, let her cover her head. For a man ought not to have his head covered, since he is the image and glory of God; but the woman is the glory of man…

    Saint-Paul Apôtre, Letter to the Corinthians.

    Those who dished out the orders sunk to the dark abyss of time. They blindly embraced the dogmas of the most reclusive sects. Acting like disciples of Saint Paul rather than their prophet Mohammed, they would erect their hair as a totem, drone out and issue fatwas on women’s hairs and secretions in order to subvert the most natural laws and allow their predatory and bestial sexuality to run riot.

    At the entrance to the opulent Mitidja Valley, Blida, the city of Roses, turned into a hotbed of barbarism. God’s madmen spread their dominion over the surrounding areas they claimed they had liberated. This is where Meftah was, so far a trouble-free small town less than 100 km from Algiers.

    However, on 28 February 1994, it was a very young Islamist, surrounded without a doubt by a mob that looked alike in every aspect, hardly older than yourself Katia, who shot you and then fled…

    You refused to wear the headscarf and you used to shout out loud and clear why. Those creatures with a deranged spirit and a barbaric soul had been convinced of their right to dictate your way of life Katia and the way of life of all those who came under their control. They were shamed by this unqualified truth that glorified their archaic sexual instincts and their rapacious desire in the name of a bloodthirsty and ruthless god, a god who would loathe women, and yet they alleged him to be the God of Islam.

    All it took was for one woman to stand up to them to make them plunge into a world of infernal ideas with the reek of blood and death that came from the hereafter, from under the living world. They were tightly knit with same the obsession, blindly serving a reinvented god and drawing from a book they did not perceive. They have sacrificed you according to their demented order.

    You defended until death the way you dressed despite the delirium of these creatures. You knew them; you used to come across them in the streets, outside the school and the shops where they would harass you. These young men had been roaming the streets for days, getting more and more persistent and menacing. “Hooligans” your dad would say. Alas, they were more than that; they were monsters indoctrinated to kill and they were biding their time to ensure the total success of their chore by starting to instil fear among the masses. They invented and imposed laws on the city and the locals chose to believe that this state of affairs would soon come to an end and all they had to do was wait and keep a low profile.

    In all the cities and all the districts, people kept a low profile. The whole country kept a low profile. Thousands and thousands kept a low profile, while those who refused to give in were soon dealt with. They would be slain as they tried to stand up and pass on to us a bit of their courage and their hopes. In Meftah, like elsewhere, men chose to lie low and leave the field clear for barbarism. In the small town of this huge country, which was known as “the country of freemen”, where did the claimed courage stop after it had made its escape? On your childlike face and your slender shoulders Katia; and in your eyes, which looked danger straight in the face and which will stay wide open as if they were a perpetual castigation for those who had seen nothing coming, who had chosen not to see and not to do anything to stop the tragedy that had been long before heading towards that town and all the other similar towns. Meftah, an inconsequential town, which your death threw into our faces on 28 February 1994.

    I have never been to Meftah and I will never go to Meftah lest I should see nothing, lest I should be once again witness of the work of time, which bit by bit smoothes our daily life, turning it into a slack sea and making us fall again into a grim and hideous “normality”, whereas we ought to keep the episode of barbarism seared into our memories, lest we should relapse.

    Your assassin shot you at point blank range with a sawn-off shotgun. I do not exactly know what sawn-off really means; nevertheless, he fired and fled, leaving you lying on the pavement in a pool of blood, red like the carnations of the wreath of carnations and white daisies that the four young men sombrely laid at your grave. They walked close to your father in this BBC documentary that circled the world and which I watched on a TV screen in the corridors of the United Nations where the diplomats were lost for words in attempting to condemn the crimes perpetrated in the name of Islam. It was the wretchedness of politics, the subjection before the inextinguishable sorrow and the victory of barbarism.

     

    “Prayer for Disaster”: Chapter from Fadhila Al Farouq’s novel Taa Al Khajal

    Translated by Anissa Daoudi

    “Time is the Arab’s wound, they would retreat to the past” and Constantine speak only the language of the past.

    I cross the street of Abanne Ramdane and the past is dispersed around me with the call for the Duhur prayer.

    Minerets seem in a dream, hugging the violets in the sky, like they were in love, people shouting: “Allah Akbar”

    People here do not disagree with what the Minarets say, even when these said:

    “Please God, prostitute their daughters”.

    People said: Amen

    Even when they said:

    “Please God make the children orphans”

    People said: Amen

    And even when minarets said:

    “Please God widow their wives”.

    They said: Amen

    They were all struck down with FIS fever, they all sang with blinded eyes the Prayer for Disaster.

    And that’s why Amina sleeps, bleeding at the University Hospital, carrying traces of change.

    And that’s why hundreds of flowers are raped, blessed by the people prayers. It should befall the people…and no one else!

    Lethal stupidity…!

    I noticed that the car nearly ran me down, and I’m trying to cut.

    Retreated back horrified, as for the driver’s insult, it had penetrated my ear sharp like a knife.

    I was almost angry, but my journey of sadness is in its early days, gazing towards the driver with a look of indifference, and merely echoing something between me and myself “poor thing. He is without moral. ”

    We can’t be poor unless we were without moral.

    Minarets subsided.

    Reduced traffic from the road.

    Two birds flying in the sky hugged each other, and Yamina’s singing in my head with her breath, she’s tired, and dreaming of seeing her family.

    And I’m all her family for now! And what a strait that caught me?

    Here’s the surprise that I didn’t wait for her, to enter the world of victims of rape not as a journalist, but as a family member, what am I going to write about Yamina? Her, laying down on a hope called ‘me’. Sleeping in the hope of receiving no more than a radio, which I will get her, for I am the family, and I am the relatives, the daughter of the tongue that united us in unexpected, and in unforeseen circumstances.

    I was thinking all the way about how to write about the topic, in which way, with which heart, in what language, with what pen? The Pens of kin don’t like to transgress.

    Pens the same blood, don’t cheat!

    So how could I betray those happy breaths of my presence? How could I betray those eyes filled with confidence?

    How can one write about a female whose virginity was stolen from her by force?

    I don’t know how to write, I no longer know colors

    I don’t know the color of the paper.

    Everything became like delirium “a novel” and “bleeding” of Yamina.

    Everything turned red. Blood. Blood. Blood.

    -I won’t write it. It’s over.

    Two leaves flew off.

    Two friends split up: Bye, Rasheed…

    Bye my dear. See you later my dear.

    I noticed that in her eyes a glimmer of hope.

    I noticed that Constantine became more beautiful.

    And the pine trees started babbling, and the air flirting with the girls’ hair. Stories here and there, among school children jogging to their homes.

    All I wanted was to be a kid. To be carried by the wind the girls’ school in Ariss, to run on that small bridge, to listen to the whispers of willows, to throw a paper airplane off the bridge and to clap when it goes higher and higher, while avoiding branches.

    My favorite game was to make pretty things with paper.

    The paper is still necessary in my life, I still make from it my beautiful stuff, and that’s why I won’t write on Yamina and won’t allow the photographer to take a picture of her grief, and covers her eyes so that nobody knows.

    There are issues that are not resolved by the cries of the newspaper.

    Issues which can only be solved through Justice, law and conscience.

    Here, … Justice is made through men’s narrow perceptions. Article 336 of the Algerian Penal Code for defilement “punish anyone who commits rape crime with imprisonment from five to ten years, and if the indecent assault against a minor who is under sixteen years old, then the penalty would be temporary imprisonment from ten to twenty years” law is not strict enough, compared with French law, which provides stricter circumstances lies in infringing on the victim of sexual assault, the penalty is 20 years. Men here, tailor Islam to their tastes.

    So, who among those know the mercy of Islam?

    No one…!

    Some rape women in his name. And some ostracize from his name too.

    And some give women compensation “trivial” from the municipality, which equates 2000 dinars ($ 20)

    And some deny that they are victims in his name, and women’s associations denounce and scream. And associations of victims of terrorism also condemn and scream.

    Only raped women know what it means to violate the body, to violate the self/ego.

    Only they know shame, homelessness and prostitution

    and suicide; only they know fatwas which have permitted ‘rape’.

    The ‘Amir’ is the one to offer her.

    Only the one to whom she was offered, who can kiss her and with the Amir’s permission.

    She would not be naked in front of brothers.

    Not be viewed with lust. Not to be hit by the brothers but only the one who to whom she was offered to, he can do as he pleases, within God’s limits.

    If a captive (sabiyya) and her mother, and you have intercourse with the mother, then it is not permissible to have intercourse with her daughter.

    If there was a sexual intercourse with a woman, it is not permissible to have an intercourse with her until she has her period. Flirting and caressing are permitted.

    Father and son cannot have sexual intercourse with the same sabiyya.

    It is not permissible to combine a sabiyya with her sister with the same with Mujahid”

    (This document was found after Bentalha and after the arrival of the army to the region of Ouled Allal, a document that regulates the rules of sexual intercourse, delivered on the 5th Muharram 1418 Hijri and the source is anonymous.

    Somehow I knew all these things, following a previous investigation. And people know, and law enforcement people know, but who knows the horror of the experience, except those flowers, living today among thorns of shame and madness?

    Will I expose Amina? Will I expose myself?

    Tomorrow, family and relatives and everyone who knows my name will say: this is Abdul Hafeez Mokran’s daughter who exposes one of us. ”

    How did things have gotten me here? How did I think this way?

    I chased all those thoughts away from my head and sat in front of the editor silent, him speaking and I don’t hear it, then approached and shouted at me:

    What’s wrong with you today?

    I stormed off and nearly said:

    How did I get here?

    Since I no longer remember how I came all the way from downtown to the press.

    I looked at him with eyes missing, he told me, pulling out a cigarette and trying to start one:

    Where are you with the investigation?

    I came back to my reality and I asked him: why don’t people pray as they used to pray before the days of “FIS” and ask for forgiveness and mercy and peace?

    (FIS: acronym for Islamic Salvation Front Party)

    He stopped moving around a little, blew out his cigarette before smoking it, and returned to his place and then said:

    What happened at the hospital?

    I came back to a more realistic world and I answered: It is a tragedy!

    -Write it then.

    -No.

    -Yes?

    -No. I won’t write anything about them?

    -You are not yourself, apparently, are you sick today? I smiled and said to him:

    -No, not sick.

    Shook his shoulders wondering:

    -Then?

    -I’ll write about prayer.

    -Which prayer?

    -Frayer of ‘FIS”, do you remember it? It was echoed in every mosque during days of strikes. The one that says “Please God, prostitute their daughters, Please God make the children orphans, widow their wives to the end of the prayer”. I will ask the people that repeated it, I will ask their conscience, I want to know their level, and did they know what they were saying? Why were they led behind the “FIS” Immams and altogether they asked a strange request as that of Allah.

    The editor interrupted me:

    Khalida, I want you to write about the experience of these girls?

    But I wrote previously, provided statistics, five thousand raped woman since 1994, said that a thousand and seven hundred woman raped outside the circle of terrorism, said that the Ministry doesn’t care, said that the law doesn’t care, said that parents don’t care, they have not accepted their daughters after their return, said they contracted madness, turned to prostitution, committed suicide. Has anyone acted, except Khalida Messoudi and her like (Khalida Messoudi is a feminist militant in Algeria has a book in French entitled “standing woman”?

    He interrupted me loudly:

    We are not the law. We are the press. I interrupted him too shouting:

    We are ridiculous.

    Hitting his fist on the table:

    -What happened to you today?

    Imagine that your daughter was kidnapped one night, raped and she conceived and gave birth to shame, and is now at the University Hospital, bleeding, and I come in as a journalist to say that this happened to so and so daughter, will you accept?

    With a Mocking laughter, he approached me:

    Since when did we mention people’s names in such cases?

    -The truth is to reveal names and surnames, nobody will believe us if we don’t write the whole truth.

    -Khalida, be brief, he said angrily.

    And I replied quietly: I won’t write about them, I’ll write about the prayer.

    He took a deep breath to restore calm and then told me, pressing on every word he says:

    -Kidnapping and rapes have become a military strategy since 1995 and an instrument of armed conflict between armed Islamic groups and the defenseless community how will the world understand what is happening here, if we don’t write about?

    I laughed with all my heart:

    You look funny. (Continued sarcastically) the world will read our newspaper which doesn’t distribute ten thousand copies at home, and does not reach up to our neighbors in Morocco and Tunisia, and doesn’t enter the Internet “come on man, focus with me,” I said it in an Egyptian accent, more sarcastic and left.

    Unpublished Poem by Iman Bioud

    She (Feminine ‘She’)

    On my lips
    sorrow dried up
    Not unlike a breach
    On a petal of rose.
    The petal slept on the breach And the breach prevailed. From night dawn
    Till dawnset,
    I wriggle
    Staring in a face I know
    I scatter like agate seeds
    Their land they forgot.
    Lost their way
    Land is deserted.
    You, Emerging lies
    Uttering a wriggled letter From a suspected lips ;
    That’s what you are.
    You, a linguistic perfection Be fluent.
    Here is a woman, here is she With a painful stress on the ‘e’ Conjugated as a weakened
    A crucified noun.
    Crucifix tool of which

    تاء التأنيث

    يبس الحزن على شفتي

    كالثلمة في بتل الورد

    نام البتل على ثلمته

    سئد الثلم

    أتلوى من فجر الليل

    إلى عصر الفجر

    أتفرس وجها أعرفه

    انفرط كحبات عقيق

    نسيت موطنها

    ضاع الحب

    وبات الموطن مهجورا

    يا أنت…

    إفك يتمخض

    يلفظ حرفا ملويا

    مشبوه المخرج

    هذا أنت

    يا ذاك الإعجاز اللغوي تفصح

    هذي امرأة

    تتوجع همزتها فوق الألف

    هذي امرأة إعربها

    (اسم ناقص مصلوب)

    وعلامة صلبه

    تاء التأنيث بآخره

    تاء التأنيث بداخله

    تقطر مزجا شهديا

    لزجا.
  • Sahar Mediha Al-Naas – Violences Sexuelles et Exclusion des femmes : Politiques du genre du Nouvel Etat Libyen

    Sahar Mediha Al-Naas – Violences Sexuelles et Exclusion des femmes : Politiques du genre du Nouvel Etat Libyen

    Sahar Mediha Al-Naas

    Englishالعربية

    Les femmes en Libye sont aujourd’hui confrontées à de nombreux défis qui entravent leur participation et leur représentation politique et civile. La néo-patriarchie, la guerre et le conflit fournissent un terrain propice  pour la violence sexiste et la violence sexuelle qui se prolongent dans les suites post-conflit (Al-Ali, 2014, Jurasz, 2013). Six ans après le soulèvement,  la situation actuelle indique que la Libye se dirige vers la déformation de l’État (Rolf Schwarz, 2004), les droits des femmes libyennes sont à la limite de l’effondrement. Les liens institutionnels entre l’état et la religion, renforcés par l’instabilité et la violence depuis 2011 et démontrés dans le discours de Libération de Mustafa Abdul Jalil, ont un impact dévastateur sur les femmes. Un tel impact se reflète dans la rechute systématique des droits des femmes sous une forme religieuse. En outre, la néo-patriarchie renforce et maintient les valeurs patriarcales qui placent les femmes dans une position subordonnée, créant ainsi des systèmes d’oppression à travers des liens institutionnels religieux et de parenté. Dans un tel système, les femmes, leurs corps et leurs comportements sexuels sont souvent considérés comme les marqueurs de l’identité religieuse et culturelle de l’État. Une telle structure a existé dans la période avant Gaddafi et a été conservée et renforcée par Gaddafi à des fins politiques.

    Dans cet article, j’explore la corrélation entre les différents aspects de la structure de l’État qui caractérisent un état néo-patriarcal et ses liens institutionnels avec la religion et la parenté, la position des femmes libyennes, leur participation politique et civique et leur représentation et l’effondrement rapide de leurs droits Depuis 2011. Je prétends que l’appropriation de la religion, de la parenté et du patriarcat par l’État néo-patriarcal joue un rôle important dans la régression des droits des femmes libyennes. Je mettrai l’accent  sur les liens institutionnels entre l’état et la religion ainsi que  l’impact de ceux-ci sur les droits des femmes, dans le contexte des conflits et un état néo-patriarcal; Je discuterai la violence sexuelle comme une arme de guerre, le lien entre la militarisation de la masculinité et la structure néo patriarcal qui a servi au fondement de la violence sexiste à travers la subjectivation des femmes et le renforcement de la hiérarchie du genre. Je vais aussi souligner la participation des femmes libyennes au soulèvement contre Gaddafi en 2011 et montrer le lien entre l’exclusion des femmes et la nature de l’insurrection en tant que lutte armée contre le pouvoir et les ressources dans un contexte néo-patriarcal.  Je vais explorer comment les femmes libyennes –  à travers leur participation et représentation civiles et politiques – ont pu  construire un discours féministe,  poser un agenda féministe sur la table politique et surmonter l’obstacle de la «priorité de sécurité».

    Néo-patriarchie

    Définition

    La néo-patriarchie est la forme moderne du système patriarcal dans la modernisation qui est limitée à certains aspects bureaucratiques de l’État.  La société néo-patriarcale, Sharabi la décrit comme étant : « l’hybride, les structures traditionnelles et semi-rationnelles et de la conscience ». Sharabi identifie deux types de sociétés néo-patriarcales : conservatrice  et progressiste. Les deux partagent l’élément central psychologique qui est la domination du père (patriarche) Que ce soit le père de la nation ou le père  de la famille, et dont les relations avec la nation ou l’enfant sont verticales.   Les  relations hiérarchisées du pouvoir ” médiés consensus par la force et la contrainte.” (Sharabi, 1988).

    Néo-patriarchie et Modernité

    Un facteur crucial dans la formation de la modernité est l’autonomie transformative du capitalisme et l’industrialisation, selon les  révolutionnaires, comme  Marx, qui aspire à l’élimination de la division des classes sociales, et crée des relations sociales horizontales qui constituent le fondement de la démocratie.  Dans la région MENA, le capitalisme était ni autonome, ni révolutionnaire à forme de modernité.  En outre, l’absence de véritable industrialisation et de capitalisme indépendant ainsi que  la relation subalterne asymétrique entre l’Occident comme la puissance coloniale de la domination et la région colonisée caractérisent  la formation des Etats Néo-patriarcaux à l’époque postcoloniale, que Sharabi décrit comme : « le mariage de l’impérialisme et le patriarcat ».

    États Néo-patriarcaux dans la région MENA

    Sharabi a affirmé que la formation des États Néo-patriarcaux dans la région MENA a été façonnée par la rencontre avec la modernité occidentale, au début du XXe siècle.  La modernité occidentale a été fondée sur l’effacement de l’ancien système de la tradition et le patriarcat en Europe, provoquée par l’industrialisation et le capitalisme.  Le capitalisme autonome, dans l’analyse de Marx, l’émergence de la bourgeoisie comme un facteur révolutionnaire, construit de nouvelles relations sociales horizontales qui ont marqué la formation de la modernité Européenne.  La nouvelle société moderne est régie par l’humeur laïque et scientifique de la pensée qui a remplacé la structure religieuse de directeur allégorique spirituelle caractéristique des Feudales Européens pré-modernes.  Certains chercheurs soutiennent que la modernité est  un phénomène uniquement  européen.  Cette notion est fondée sur les discours essentialistes dichotomiques qui divise le monde à l’Europe  « Civilisée » et  les autre   *Barbares*.  Dans ce discours, des facteurs historiques, géopolitiques et socio-économiques cruciaux sont obscurcies.

    Néo-patriarchie en Libye

    L’état  Néo-patriarcal tire sa légitimité de la possession du pouvoir (Sharabi, 1988), dans le cas où le pouvoir a cessée  ou a été donnée. Dans le cas de la région MENA, le pouvoir et la survie de l’état  Néo-patriarcal s’appuie fortement sur les facteurs internes et externes. 

    Facteurs externes

    Dans la région du MENA post-coloniale et au cours de la période de la guerre froide, la survie des États s’est fondée sur leurs liens avec les deux superpuissances et a été façonnée par la compétition entre eux.  Par exemple,  l’Egypte (sous la domination de Jamal Abdel ‎Nasser), l’Algérie, la Syrie, l’ex-Yémen du Sud et la Libye avaient des liens étroits avec ‎l’ancienne Union soviétique qui leur fournissaient de l’aide et du soutien ‎technologique, militaire et politique. D’autre part, l’Arabie saoudite, la Jordanie, le ‎Maroc,l’ Egypte (post-Nasser) et les  autre pays du Golfe rentiers qui  avaient  des liens avec ‎les États-Unis et l’Europe occidentale; des pays ayant fourni leur aide économique (dans le cas des États non-rentier), militaire, technologique et un soutien politique.  ‎ Ainsi, aucun des États MENA pourrait être décrit comme un État moderne et ce  pour leur dépendance des superpuissances pour la survie, par conséquent, les étapes essentielles et les éléments de formation de l’État étaient absents dans le cas de la région MENA. Van Creveld (1999) montre qu’en Europe occidentale, la formation de l’État a été façonnée par la guerre et la préparation de la guerre qui a joué un rôle central et essentiel.  En outre, plusieurs chercheurs ont montré que le processus de préparation à la guerre implique l’extraction efficace des ressources à travers un mécanisme bureaucratique, administratif et institutionnel nécessaire à l’édification de l’État, qui fait que les droits politiques et les droits de représentation au sein du gouvernement font dorénavant partie intégrante de la citoyenneté qui comprenait des payeurs de taxes de différentes classes sociales et pas seulement le monarque ou les élites dirigeantes. Dans ce contexte, la notion de nationalisme et de  citoyenneté ont formé et façonné l’identité et la force de l’État, dans lequel l’individu est citoyen, avec les droits et devoirs et pas un sujet avec des obligations contraignantes et sans droits, comme dans le cas de la région du MENA.

    La formation d’État postcolonial au MENA, comme beaucoup de chercheurs  l’affirment, est façonnée par le  Rentierism.  Ce dernier a un effet profond sur de l’État et « ses politiques étrangères, les droits de l’homme politique ou les aspects de la succession politique ».  Ce qui  crée une citoyenneté hiérarchique, dans laquelle, la  richesse et le pouvoir politique sont centralisées et accessibles exclusivement aux  élites dirigeantes, ce qui marginalise les autres.  Cette structure politique autoritaire domine la scène politique dans la région du MENA postcoloniale.  En Libye, à titre d’exemple, des rentiers Néo patriarcaux et autoritaires sont les relations étrangères de Kadhafi avec l’ex-Union soviétique.  Non seulement les Etas Unis et d’autre pays Européen, comme l’Italie, l’Allemagne et France lui ont fourni de l’aide militaire, mais ont joué un rôle crucial dans la referment du pétrole, sa production, son transport et son commerce. Ainsi, ils lui ont  permis  d’accumuler du capital qui est crucial pour sa persistance  au pouvoir pendant quatre décennies  avec une poigne de fer.  Kadhafi a utilisé les revenus pétroliers, non pas pour  construire des infrastructures de la Libye ou des institutions publiques comme l’éducation, la santé et le bien-être du peuple, mais il a fait créer des institutions de sécurité d’État avec la seule tâche de protéger son régime et d’assurer sa survie au pouvoir. L’effroyable bilan et la politique des droits de l’homme sous le régime de Kadhafi, sont bien que connus par la communauté internationale, mais tout était largement ignorés. Les relations de Kadhafi avec les compagnies pétrolières ont été la clé de son pouvoir ; Kadhafi a exigé de gros bonus et  des modalités de contrat strict. Il a aussi exigé une grosse  part des revenus et a menacé d’arrêter la production si les compagnies pétrolières refuseraient. Un bon nombre des grands champs de pétrole étaient gérés par des petites entreprises, afin de pouvoir manipuler au moment de négocier les termes du contrat et pour briser la mainmise des grandes compagnies pétrolières.  La Libye est devenue le premier pays en développement pour garantir une part de la majorité des revenus de sa propre production de pétrole. Pour restaurer la relation rompue avec les Etats-Unis, Kadhafi a utilisé son pouvoir pour faire pression sur les compagnies pétrolières américaines pour influencer la politique Américaine. Après le renversement de Kadhafi en 2011, les détenteurs du pouvoir libyen sont incapables d’obtenir un contrôle total sur les revenus pétroliers. Ce qui  est devenu l’un des principaux facteurs qui ont façonné le conflit en Libye.

    Facteurs internes 

    La religion, les traditions, les liens familiaux  et le tribalisme sont des facteurs internes sur lesquelles l’état  Neo patriarcal s’appuie pour survivre ou pour confronter les défis. La définition de Sharabi de Neo patriarchie englobe plusieurs formes de régimes politiques dans le Moyen-Orient et l’Afrique du Nord. Par exemple : la Libye (jusqu’en 2011), l’Algérie,l’ Irak (jusqu’en 2003), la Syrie et l’ancien Yémen du Sud sont des socialistes autoritaires ; L’Iran et  le Soudan sont des islamistes radicaux ; l’Arabie saoudite et le  Maroc sont patriarcaux-conservateurs ; la Tunisie, l’Egypte et la  Turquie sont autoritaires en voie de privatisation. Tous ces États partagent l’influence culturelle et religieuse globale sur le Code personnel qui est profondément ancré dans les valeurs patriarcales. Et beaucoup partagent l’influence profonde de la parenté et de la culture tribale dans la vie sociale. En outre, les droits des femmes sont souvent compromis et utilisés comme une monnaie d’échange par l’État Néo- patriarcal pour consolider son pouvoir ;  les corps des femmes et leur conduite sont à l’état de surveillance et de contrôle pour maintenir l’ordre social. Le pouvoir possédait par  Gaddafi comme  chef d’Etat, dominant les deux sphères privée et publique par le biais de sa manipulation et du contrôle tribal total, des liens de parenté et des  institutions religieuses. Sous son règne, les revenus pétroliers ont été monopolisés pour tenir compte ‎de l’intérêt politique de son régime.‎ En outre, l’absence de suffisamment des services publics et les taux de salaire bas, ont pousser  les libyens à se sentir  privés et appauvries et ce qui explique leur  retour vers la structure sociale primaire de tribu, de parenté, de religion et de famille pour la survie et la sécurité. Cependant, Gaddafi a manipulé les pouvoirs des institutions religieuses pour conserver son pouvoir, en donnant à  des tribus spécifiques des pouvoirs et en démoralisant d’autres afin de garantir la fidélité grâce à sa stratégie de récompense et de punition. En outre, après avoir déclaré la charia comme la seule constitution et après ‎avoir introduit la loi ‘Hudud’ en 1972, la dynamique de Gaddafi avec ‎l’establishment religieux ont assisté à un grand virage après la déclaration de ‎Florence de 1976 dans laquelle il dépouille  le clergé religieux de son immunité ‎et son pouvoir et il a lancé une campagne contre eux.‎ Cependant, le code de la famille libyen reste fortement influencé par la Loi de ‎la charia, comme un aspect des liens institutionnels entre l’Etat et la religion.‎ L’introduction de la charia de Hudud selon la loi en 1970 a marqué le début ‎de la forme de radicaux islamistes de Neo-patriarchie. Gaddafi a utilisé un discours conservateur religieux pour servir sa ‎revendication du « Imam des musulmans », une position de pouvoir ultime.‎

    Le Néo-patriarcat et l’identité de l’État

    L’état et la structure néo-patriarcale, hérités du régime de Kadhafi, caractérisent la Libye post-Kadhafi. La montée de l’Islam politique associée a des valeurs patriarcales profondément enracinées limite la participation politique et civile et la représentation des femmes libyennes. L’état et la structure néo patriarcale en Libye, pendant et après Kadhafi, l’appropriation du religieux, du discours tribal et culturel qui sert à conserver le pouvoir ont créé une dynamique selon laquelle tout progrès ou bien régression dans la position des femmes dans les législations est décidée par son impact politique sur ceux qui détiennent le pouvoir  dans les états neo patriarcaux. Mustafa Abdul-Jalil, le chef du Conseil provisoire (2011-2012) a fait une déclaration controversée le 23 octobre 2011, en ce qui concerne la levée de toutes les restrictions juridiques sur la polygamie. Sa déclaration est une indication des liens institutionnels entre l’Etat et la religion, caractéristiques de l’état  neo-patriarcal, qui auraient une incidence sur les droits des femmes en Libye dans l’ère post-Kadhafi. Comme dans d’autres situations, le contrôle  à  la fois discursif et physique sur le corps de la femme est crucial dans la lutte pour le  pouvoir (Al-Ali et Pratt 2009:93). En effet, la discipline des femmes et de leurs corps est instrumentalisée par les deux acteurs, étatique et non-étatique pour  affirmer la nouvelle identité islamique de l’Etat libyen et pour afficher leurs qualifications islamiques pour une  légitimité politique dans la nouvelle Libye. Les corps des femmes et leurs conduites sont utilisés comme marqueurs de la nouvelle Libye par l’ancienne Libye.

    Neo-patriarcat et pouvoir politique en Libye

    La relation intime entre la religion et l’État est évidente dans l’histoire libyenne depuis la monarchie Sanussi (1949-1969), (Martin, 1986; Sammut, 1994; Takeyh, 2000).  L’identité Islamique constituait la légitimité politique de tous les acteurs ‎politiques et façonnait la culture politique dans l’état d’Afrique du Nord ‎(Brown, 1973; Pargeter, 2012;)avant et après le renversement de 2011 de Gaddafi. L’état  Neo patriarcal tire sa légitimité de la possession du pouvoir (Sharabi, 1988), ainsi, les discours culturels, tribaux, religieux ou traditionnels peuvent être manipulés pour tenir compte de l’intérêt politique de la force au pouvoir. Dans ce contexte, la personne ordinaire est un sujet pas un citoyen, exclus de l’arène politique et le processus décisionnel. Par conséquent, pour sa survie,  il cherche la sécurité de structures sociales primaires : famille, tribu, secte religieuse. En outre, parmi les aspects caractéristiques des États  Neo patriarcaux, il y’a  le renforcement des valeurs patriarcales et des structures sociales par le système juridique paralysant, façonné par la tribu, la parenté et les discours religieux de la suprématie masculine.  Ainsi, les corps des femmes et leur conduite sont mis en état de surveillance et un contrôle sous couverture  religieuse et culturelle de la famille, la communauté ou l’honneur de la société.  En Libye, Kadhafi, comme  chef de l’Etat  Neo patriarcal, possédait le pouvoir ultime et dominait les deux les sphères privée et publique à travers sa manipulation et son contrôle tribal total, contrôle aussi de la parenté, des institutions religieuses et des ressources naturelles. En outre, les politiques d’ouverture (Sammut, 1994 ; Takeyh, 2000 ; Ashour, 2011) adoptés par Gaddafi pour sa  survie, sous la pression internationale après dix ans de sanctions et d’isolement, a offert une bonne occasion à la diffusion du discours de la renaissance islamique conservateur en Libye. Gaddafi a permis le retour des dissidents de l’Islam politiques d’exil et a relâché leurs prisonniers comme décision stratégique afin de maintenir son pouvoir après l’accord de 2008 entre Saif Al-Islam et le group libyen Islamique Armé (Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG), dans lequel, (LIFG) a dénoncé la violence et le Jihad armé en retour de la liberté contre les poursuites. Ces discours conservateurs  sont devenus fermement ancré dans les mosquées depuis l’accord de 2008, en mettant l’accent sur la reconstruction des mœurs sociales et des normes. Comme le mouvement de la mosquée en Égypte, le discours de la renaissance ‎Islamique visant à remplacer l’Islam modéré du grand public avec une forme ‎conservatrice de l’Islam fortement dépendant Islamique orthodoxe ‎d’enseignement comme un cadre de référence. (Mahmood, 2005 ; Ahmed, ‎‎2011 ; El-Kholy, 2002).‎  Ces discours placent  les femmes dans une position très subalterne dans la société et renforcent  les valeurs patriarcales. 

    Les femmes et l’état Neo-patriarcal

     L’état Néo-patriarcale renforce et maintient les valeurs patriarcales et l’hiérarchie entre les sexes par le biais de ses liens institutionnels avec la religion, les liens de parenté et les  droits coutumiers (Charrad, 2001).     Malgré cela et malgré  les expressions traditionnels qui mettent les femmes dans une position subordonnée,  beaucoup de femmes dans la région du MENA ont accès à l’éducation et l’emploi. En outre, les liens institutionnels entre l’État neo-patriarcal et la religion sont ‎dissuasifs des positions et des droits des femmes.  Dans les pays à majorité ‎musulmane, l’impact des liens institutionnels entre l’Etat et la religion sur les ‎droits des femmes sont mesurés par la légitimité politique de la religion.‎ Par ailleurs, la charia en tant que concept est vague et peut être interprétée dans une multitude de façons ; l’utilisation de la charia comme la seule source de législation dans le code de la famille donne à l’Etat le pouvoir d’exercer une puissance  sur les femmes, leur corps et leur sexualité sous une couverture religieuse (Hosseini, 1996 ; 2006 ; 2009 ; Hariz & Hosseini, 2010). Les liens de parenté et les relations  entre les sexes façonnent la Loi de la charia, comme l’explique Charrad : « L’aspect le plus explicite du droit de la famille Islamique concerne les relations entre les sexes. Le Droit de la famille Islamique place les femmes dans un statut subalterne en donnant pouvoir sur les femmes aux hommes comme mari et comme parent mâle. »  Le système de tutelle, mis encore en œuvre dans certains pays à majorité musulmane, donne au tuteur de sexe masculin  le droit et le pouvoir de contrôler les femmes, droit de contrôle de leur sexualité, droit de reproduction ainsi que  des choix importants dans leur vie. Sous le régime de Gaddafi, l’accès à l’éducation et l’emploi était illimité pour les femmes.  Cependant, dans le domaine du droit de la famille et leur statut personnel, elles  ne pouvaient pas profiter  d’un bon nombre de leurs droits, même après la réforme introduite dans l’article 10 de la Loi de 1984, ou un mâle gardien n’a aucun pouvoir de refuser le mariage d’une femme de 20 ans, ou de l’article 21 de la charte verte (Refworld, 2011). dans le mariage forcé qui est interdit, le mariage peut être légalement mené par le tuteur de sexe masculin même  l’absence  de la mariée. En ce qui concerne l’entrée et la dissolution du mariage, les femmes n’ont pas ‎les mêmes droits que les hommes, surtout les droits économiques et surtout ‎n’ont pas les même droits et obligations comme citoyens égaux.‎ En tant que citoyens, les femmes n’ont pas les droits fondamentaux comme le droit de transmettre leur nationalité à leurs enfants et le droit de se remarier sans perdre la garde des enfants. Ces deux lois, qui sont  le droit de tutelle et le droit interdisant aux femmes de transmettre leur nationalité à leurs enfants, démontrent comment Gaddafi a renforcé des valeurs patriarcales, comme autorité masculine et  patrilinéaire. Malgré cela, la tutelle masculine a été restreinte par l’âge et parle  consentement, il laisse un grand espace pour la manipulation et expose les femmes et les filles à diverses formes de violations. Les femmes n’étaient pas protégées contre la violence fondée sur le sexe et ‎n’avaient pas les mêmes droits que leurs homologues masculins.‎

    Représentation politique des femmes en Post-Gaddafi

    Dans la première élection parlementaire en Libye en 2012, les femmes ont acquis plus de 16 % de tous les sièges dans le Congrès National général (GNC). C’était sans précédent dans l’histoire Libyenne.  Cependant, la représentation politique des femmes a été façonnée par la lutte de pouvoir entre des groupes rivaux, ce qui présentait un défi aux femmes dans le GNC. Le GNC a été divisé entre les deux forces politiques : les frères musulmans et leur alias des députés indépendants, beaucoup d’entre eux sont des anciens membres de LIFG, d’une part, et d’une autre avec la Coalition de la partie (CNF) des Forces nationales.  Les intimidations  et les menaces ont été utilisées par les membres masculins contre les  femmes pour les faire dans le GNC.  La représentation politique des femmes est normalement de lutter  pour défendre  leurs  besoins (Celis et Childs, 2011, p. 3). Par ailleurs, les questions féminines  n’étaient pas discutées ou débattues dans le GNC ou des sous-comités ; dans le GNC, il y a 15 sous-comités ; chaque sous-Comité traite un domaine législatif, et toutes sont attribuées aux différents ministères. Cependant, il n’y a aucun sous-comité pour la femme ; une femme est alloué à la Sous-commission des droits de l’homme. Ce sous-comité a 8 femmes sur ses 15 membres. Aucune des questions clées concernant les femmes n’a  été  traitée ou suggérée par les 8 femmes pour en discuter ; Parmi les principales questions telles que : la violence domestique, la violence sexuelle contre les femmes et les filles, le droit de la famille discriminatoire, l’enlèvement des femmes activistes ou le désavantage économique des femmes, ont été discutées ni soulevées.  Le sous-comité avait traité avec d’autres fichiers tels qu’une compensation pour les blessés des révolutionnaires combattants, les familles des martyrs et des cas de torture dans les prisons des groupes armés. La plupart des membres de la GNC que j’ai interrogé sur l’absence d’intérêt des femmes dans leur sous-comité des droits de l’homme ont blâmé la société civile pour ne pas communiquer leurs questions féministes et leur besoins. En revanche, les associations féministes et les organisations se plaignent de l’accès limité au GNC et elles ont indiqué que leur suggestion d’observateur des sièges à la GNC a été refusée.

    Cent pour cent des femmes membres du parti des frères musulmans partagent les mêmes croyances au sujet de la position des femmes par rapport à la relation de pouvoir entre les sexes dans le GNC libyen. En outre, dans les pays gouvernés par des partis islamiques,  les femmes avec un sens du féminisme sont exclues de l’arène politique. Par exemple, les femmes membres du Parlement Egyptien au cours de la règle de Mourci étaient celles  des frères Musulmans partis et étaient connus pour leurs déclarations antiféministes et misogynes, comme la déclaration d’ Aza Al-Garf contre l’égalité des sexes et CEDAW (Mahatit Masr, 2012 ; Al Balad News, 2012).  Les 21femmes  membres du NFC  du GNC libyen que j’ai interviewé entre 2012 et 2013 montrent une diversité.  Il ya celles qui sont totalement contre l’égalité des sexes et qui donnent l’exemple Soudanais et Somaliens qui  refusent le CEDAW, et d’autres qui pensent le contraire et qui appuient toutes les conventions des Nations Unies sur les droits des femmes. Cela montre la diversité des opinions politiques et idéologique dans le même parti.     Dans les questions liées aux femmes et l’égalité des sexes, les membres féminins de MB dans le GNC suivent  strictement la politique de leur parti, donc, leur représentation politique a été façonnée par leur affiliation à leur parti.

    Toutefois, les membres féminins du FCN n’affichent pas un seul discours concernant les questions relatives aux femmes ; leurs stands sur les mêmes questions étaient différents et en contradiction dans certains cas. Dans l’ensemble, la performance féminine dans le GNC est admirable, gardant à l’esprit les défis qu’elles rencontrent.  Les femmes dans le GNC ont plus de courage pour défier des questions controversées telles que la torture dans les prison, le conflit entre des milices armées qui sont inculpes dans des cas de mort de civils, le vote pour la loi de l’isolement.  Il  convient de mentionner le fait que le seul membre de la GNC libyen qui a refusé l’allocation de logement 45 Dinar libyen était Fariha Albrqawi, une femme membre de Derna.

    La Constitution de gendre

    De plus, les femmes en Libye font face à des discriminations constitutionnelles et institutionnelles.    Le 24 décembre 2014, le 63e anniversaire de l’indépendance de la Libye, l’ACD a publié la première ébauche de la nouvelle constitution. Le projet reflète et le neo patriarcal (Sharabi, 1988) qui est la nature de l’État et la faible représentation des femmes dans l’ADC ; des questions telles que la citoyenneté, la  violence et l’égalité ont été négligées, marginalisées ou totalement ignorées dans le projet. L’article 8 (1  2) stipule que la charia est la seule source de la législation et l’État est obligé de promulguer des lois qui empêchent la diffusion des doctrines contraires à l’Islam (cdalibya, 2014), en tenant compte que de nombreuses forces conservatrices en Libye qui voient que les conventions du UN veuillent éliminer toutes les formes de discrimination à l’égard des femmes contre l’Islam.  L’ article 32 affirme  que l’État est chargé de soutenir et de parrainer le droit de maternité et les droits d’enfance, et d’assurer l’équilibre   pour la femme qui travaille, entre sa famille  et ses tâches. En  d’autres termes, les responsabilités professionnelles féminines sont étudiées  pour ne pas outrepasser leur famille et leur responsabilité maternelle .comme l’a soutenu Deniz Kaniyoti : « la participation des femmes dans la sphère publique a été restreinte par les limites du comportement féminin culturellement accepté,  et qui est une pression exercée sur les femmes pour exprimer leurs intérêts dans les conditions fixées par le discours nationaliste» (1996 : 6). Dans le cas de femmes libyennes, les termes sont fixés par l’état  Neo patriarcal et en forme de discours religieux. Toutefois, dans le dernier projet, publié le 16 avril 2017, l’article 32 a été supprimé ; en outre, l’article 50 stipule que : « l’État est obligé et est engagé à soutenir et parrainer les  femmes, adopter des lois pour les protéger, améliorer leur statut dans la société et éliminer la culture négative et les normes sociales qui portent atteinte à leur dignité, interdisant la discrimination à leur égard et  garantissant  leur droit à la représentation aux élections et à leur  offrir des possibilités dans tous les domaines, en guise  pour soutenir leurs droits acquis ».

     Liberte de movement

    L’article 14 de la déclaration constitutionnelle provisoire pour l’année 2011 : « l’Etat garantit la liberté d’opinion et la liberté de l’expression individuelle et collective, la liberté de recherche scientifique,  la liberté de communication,  la liberté de la presse et des médias, l’impression et les  éditions, la libre circulation, la liberté de réunion et de manifestation pacifique, qui ne sont pas  contraire à la Loi. ». La circulation libre  des femmes libyennes a été contestée en février 2017, quand le gouverneur militaire d’ Albaida, une petite ville dans le nord-est de la Libye, le général Abdul Razek al-Nadori, a publié une loi interdisant aux femmes de moins de 60 ans de voyager sans tuteur de sexe masculin (muhram). L’utilisation du terme religieux tels que (Muhram) donne la Loi sur la légitimité religieuse et la puissance. Le général  al-Nadori dans une interview à la télévision Libyenne  sur la raison de la délivrance de l’acte, il a déclaré que c’est une question de sécurité nationale et a affirmé que de nombreuses jeunes femmes libyennes recevaient des invitations d’organisations internationales à participer à des conférences et ateliers et pouvaint être recrutées par des agences internationales comme des espions. Le général Al-Nadori  a du  reporter l’application de la loi en raison de la vaste campagne contre lui.  Ceci illustre comment les droits de la femme sont affaiblis par des liens institutionnels entre la religion et l’État et comment l’appropriation de l’état et de la religion sert comme un outil politique pour les femmes témoins.  Les guerres et la militarisation de la masculinité renforcent les rôles de genre traditionnel et patriarcal ainsi que  l’identité et la subjectivation de la femme. Pendant la révolution du 17 février 2011 et  malgré la participation cruciale des femmes dans la révolution, le viol comme arme de guerre a été féminisée par l’accent mis sur les femmes victimes de viol, en conséquence, elles ont été dépeintes comme faibles et vulnérables, étant  victimes de violences sexuelles et ayant besoin de « protection des masculine » (Young, 2003) par le militant mâle libyen.  L’agression masculine militarisée, caractéristique de la révolution libyenne, crée et renforce la bipolarisation des identités de genre : les protecteurs mâles masculins, forts et agressifs contre la victime féminine, faible, femelle. Le genre de la subjectivité et la déshumanisation de la femme victime, souvent de formes entre les sexes des relations en période de post-conflit (Mama, 2014).  La hiérarchie entre les sexes a été renforcée par la montée d’un discours religieux conservateur et ses liens institutionnels de l’état  neo patriarcal. La déclaration controversée de Mustafa Abdul-Jalil en 2011 et l’interdiction de voyage par le gouverneur militaire en février 2017, les deux reflètent la conception sexiste d’un État dans lequel les femmes sont systématiquement appropriées, objectivées et exclues de l’espace publique. Cette subjectivation de femmes libyennes a ses racines dans la structure Neo patriarcale de l’État libyen et ses liens institutionnels avec le discours religieux tout au long de l’histoire postcoloniale de la Libye.

    La Violence sexuelle et l’exclusion des femmes : la nouvelle Libye  (Etat de gendre)

    Les six mois de combats en 2011 en Libye pour renverser un des dictateurs les plus brutaux dans la région a été marqué par la violence sexuelle. Les violences sexuelles systématiques, qui sont à vrai dire commises  par les forces de Gaddafi pendant les combats de 2011, ont été politiquement instrumentalisées pour forcer la chute du régime de Gaddafi. La preuve de la violence sexuelle de masse systématique était rare ; Néanmoins, le déploiement du viol comme moyen de guerre de Gaddafi a été porté à l’attention de la Cour pénale internationale (CPI) par Luis Moreno-Ocampo, le procureur en chef, en juin 2011, quand il a déclaré qu’il y avait des preuves que Gaddafi avait ordonné ses soldats pour violer des femmes. Le 27 juin 2011, un mandat d’arrêt contre Gaddafi a été délivré par la ICC.

    Cela a joué un rôle important  à mettre fin au  régime de Gaddafi, et à  renforcer son isolement et   aussi encouragé les tribus et les villes  libyennesà changer d’allégeance.  Luis Moreno-Ocampo, dans un rapport présenté au Conseil de sécurité des Nations Unies (CSNU) en novembre 2011, a déclaré que « en Libye, le viol est considéré comme un des crimes les plus graves, qui touchent non seulement la victime, mais aussi la famille et la communauté et peut déclencher une violence fondée sur l’honneur» (Wueger, 2012).  Toutefois, l’ampleur des violences sexuelles durant le conflit demeure inconnu et le mystère qui entoure les faits et les mythes des viols en Libye ont été presque impossible à résoudre, en raison du conflit armé en cours, le manque de sécurité et de la culture de la honte associé aux  viols en Libye ; la peur de dissuader beaucoup de femmes et d’hommes à signaler  de tels crimes ou de demander de  l’aide et du  soutien que dont ils ont désespérément besoin. Néanmoins, certains cas de viols commis par les forces de Gaddafi ont été documentés et des enregistrements audiovisuels de viol, utilisé par les forces de Kadhafi pour semer la terreur parmi les communautés et les tribus, ont été trouvés par les  rebels  de Gaddafi.  Toutefois, la violence sexuelle et l’exclusion des femmes libyennes n’a pas connu  fin après le renversement de Gaddafi, au contraire, se venger des attaques contre des villes réputées qui ont soutenu Gaddafi, tels que Tawirgha, Bin Waleed et Almshashia, ont donné lieu à l’ arrestation arbitraire de centaines ou même des milliers de personnes, dont la plupart sont encore dans les centres de détention à travers le pays.  La concentration la plus élevée des détenus liés au conflit d’environ 2700, y compris les femmes, est à certaines  installations à Misrata, avec aucun gouvernement contrôle, où la torture, le viol et la  mort sont Prétendument commis. (HRW, 2014).

    Dans la Libye Post-Gaddafi, la violence contre les femmes a augmenté et a pris différentes formes. De plus, les femmes ont  perdu leurs  peu de droits, qu’elles ont acquis pendant  le règne  de Gaddafi. Les femmes libyennes aujourd’hui ne bénéficient pas des mêmes droits constitutionnels  que les hommes, ni de la même citoyenneté.   En outre, les femmes activistes et politiciennes font face à une campagne systématique de peur d’assassinats et de déplacements forcés pour les réduire en silence. Plusieurs facteurs ont joué un rôle différent dans l’exclusion des femmes, tels que la hausse du discours religieux conservateur, la propagation des milices armées et l’éparpillement au pouvoir et des ressources entre les différents centres de pouvoir qui a créé le chaos et l’instabilité qui  a marqué le soulèvement libyen. Cette instabilité a eu un impact sur les femmes, en particulier les militantes et les politiciennes. En conséquence, la vie des femmes libyennes, leur sécurité, leur dignité, leur liberté et de nombreux autres droits constitutionnels, sont compromis et poussés dans la marge à cause du discours de « priorité de la stabilité ».

    Le viol comme arme de guerre en 2011 

    Dans les sociétés patriarcales, les femmes sont les porteurs et les marqueurs de l’identité culturelle, religieuse et collective authentique de la nation ou de la Communauté (Kandiyoti, 1991 a ; 1991 ; 1992 ; 1998) et les reproductrices de la nation (Yuval Davis 1997).  Leurs corps et leurs droits de reproduction sont contrôlés et appropriée par la communauté et l’État et perçus comme propriété communale.  Leur sexualité et le comportement sexuel devient le marqueur de l’honneur communal.   Dans ce discours, les femmes violées portent l’étiquète comme marchandise variée, besoin d’être corrigées ou « fixe».  En décembre 2011, j’ai rencontré une jeune femme libyenne qui a été arrêtée par l’armé de Gaddafi et détenue pendant des semaines avant qu’elle fut libérée par les rebelles en Août 2011 après la libération de Tripoli.  Elle m’a dit qu’elle n’a pas été violée, mais parce qu’elle est apparue sur TV et a parlé de son expérience dans la prison de Gaddafi, où elle a été torturée, les gens ont supposé qu’elle avait été violée. Elle ajoute qu’elle a été bombardée par des appels téléphoniques des organisations de la société civile dans le but de la convaincre de se marier avec  un amputé « frère » pour rétablir son honneur et celui de sa famille. Elle a décrit comment ils ont utilisé des intimidations et des menaces pour la forcer à accepter  le mariage.  Elle prétend qu’ils ont mis une pression intense sur elle et sur les filles célibataires violées à accepter un tel mariage et ils ont utilisé des menaces dans de nombreux cas.  Ils disent qu’ils veulent  protéger les femmes, surtout celles qui ont été violées pour qu’elles ne soient pas mal vues après avoir perdu leur virginité. De nombreux cas de viols signalés pendant les six mois de guerre et les histoires de pilules et de Viagra qui ont été trouvés avec les militants  de Gaddafi, répartis à l’échelle mondiale.  La honte  et la stigmatisation dissuadée de nombreux hommes, des femmes et des filles de dénoncent  le viol.  Human Rights Watch a documenté 10 cas de viols apparents et l’agression sexuelle des hommes et des femmes par les forces de Gaddafi.  Tous ces cas montrent la brutalité extrême du viol lorsqu’il est utilisé comme une arme de guerre. (HRW, 2011).

    La menace de viol a été utilisée pour semer la terreur pour empêcher les villes de se joindre à la révolution et les forcer à changer d’allégeance.  Jusqu’à aujourd’hui, pas un seul cas de viol n’a été porté à la Cour en Libye depuis 2011.  Par ailleurs, le 2 mai, le Conseil National de transition (CNT) a adopté la Loi 38 de 2012 dans laquelle, l’article quatre exempte les rebelles de la révolution du 17 février 2011 de toute responsabilité pénale ou juridique pour leurs crimes pendant ou après la guerre.  Toutefois, l’Observatoire sur le genre en situation de crise, un  NGO libyen, fait pression pour faire du viol pendant le conflit un crime de guerre en Libye.  Le projet a été élaboré et présenté à la GNC en novembre 2013 par le ministre de la Justice, mais ne fut jamais ratifié. J’ai interviewé Souad Whaida, la directrice de l’Observatoire sur le genre en situation de crise, qui a expliqué comment le projet de loi met le viol comme arme de guerre visant  la société dans son ensemble, pas seulement les femmes.  Elle croit que la féminisation des viols dans les conflits réduit les femmes dans le statut de victimes et minimise l’importance des faits cruciaux de viol comme arme de guerre ; les dommages irréversibles et la distraction sur, non seulement les victimes et leurs familles, mais leurs communautés et les sociétés la rend la moins chère et la plus efficace des armes de guerre. L’utilisation de caméras de téléphone portable pour les crimes de viol commis par les forces de Gaddafi n’était pas seulement pour le rappel visuel de ce triomphe, mais pour émasculer l’ennemi ainsi  que pour   l’affirmation du pouvoir sur leurs « propriétés », en identifiant les victimes de viol pour humilier publiquement leurs familles, leurs villes et leur collectivités.   Les femmes, filles et garçons sont perçus comme des vaincus des propriétés qui peuvent être acquises par le défait  (Jurasz, 2011:134).

     

  • Dermot Ryan – In Defense of Principles: A Response to Joseph North

    Dermot Ryan – In Defense of Principles: A Response to Joseph North

    by Dermot Ryan

    This essay is part of a dossier on Joseph North’s Literary Criticism: A Concise Political History. Dermot Ryan reviewed North’s volume in January 2018. North responded here. This essay is Ryan’s reply to North’s response. 

    I am grateful to b2o: An Online Journal for providing a venue where Joseph North and I can discuss Literary Criticism: A Concise Political History (2017), North’s account of the history and future of literary studies. Like North, I consider disciplinary histories invaluable: not only to account for where we stand as a discipline and how we got here, but also to discern and propose new directions for our field. I share with him an interest in how we relate institutional and disciplinary histories to other historical narratives. For instance, I too am exercised by the question of how we might relate recent changes in universities generally (and in literature departments particularly) to the latest phase of capitalism analyzed by commentators under the moniker of neoliberalism. That said, I reviewed Literary Criticism because I think that its history of our discipline is flawed: it offers an inaccurate account that relies on a reductive historiographical model. Moreover, I am concerned that North’s account and the historical assumptions that undergird it do not serve the kind of left politics that North and I would appear to share.

    North’s response to my review reminded me that schoolboy errors (whether in the form of inadequate citation, vague attribution, or sloppy quotations) should be avoided as avidly in book reviews as in the books they are reviewing. North concludes his response by stating that he hopes for “critiques that engage with the arguments [he] actually make[s] – critiques that then offer, in response to those arguments, a rigorous and principled defense of the existing paradigm.” While I suspect that North was more concerned with discrediting me as a reader than engaging me as an interlocutor, I will take him at his word. Rather than get into the weeds (or in this case, the footnotes) with North, I will use this response to reengage with his book’s arguments. But I will disappoint North in one respect. I will not defend the “existing paradigm” because the paradigm as it is described by North is one hardly worth defending. Who would champion a straw man? Instead, I will take this opportunity to highlight my disagreements with him about how literary texts work, what literary scholars do, and how we tell the history of our discipline.

    Conscious of North’s claim that I have misunderstood and misrepresented his main argument, let me briefly restate it here. Literary Criticism: A Concise Political History is “an introduction to the lost ‘critical’ paradigm in literary studies, as well as an overview of the historicist/contextualist paradigm that has replaced it” (3). Since the discipline’s inception, North argues, the field’s central axis of dispute has been between critics and scholars, the key distinction being that the former treated the study of literature as an opportunity to intervene in culture, while the latter treated it as a means by which to analyze it (1-2). At some point in the late 1970s or early 1980s, North argues, the literary scholarship became the dominant mode (2). Since this “scholarly turn,” the majority of practitioners in the field have tended to “treat literary texts chiefly as opportunities for cultural and historical analysis,” replacing critical approaches, which tended to “treat literary texts as a means of cultivating readers’ aesthetic sensibilities” (2). While criticism developed close reading as “a tool with which to cultivate readers’ aesthetic sensibilities in something approaching a materialist sense” with the goal of more general cultural and political change, close reading under the historicist/contextualist paradigm entails a “focus on small units of text for the purposes of understanding what the text has to teach us about histories and cultures” (105-6).

    I want to pause here to note that in North’s schema, both paradigms and their attendant reading methods deploy the literary text as an instrument: the critic uses it as a means of fostering “new ranges of sensibility, new modes of subjectivity, new capacities for experience” (6); the scholar uses it as a means of analyzing history and culture. Neither approaches literary texts as ends in themselves. North never entertains the idea that the role of literary criticism and scholarship might be to figure out the way a text works—not as an instrument to facilitate the development of a reader’s aesthetic sensibility, not as evidence of the culture within which they were written and read (7)—but as a material event in its own right, whose constitutive powers we need to analyze. North thinks that the work of critics and scholars has been to figure out how to make a literary text work, not to figure out how it is working.

    For the sake of brevity, I will focus on his characterization of the ways scholars historicize. According to North, the majority of today’s scholars treat literary texts chiefly “as opportunities for producing knowledge about the cultural contexts in which they were written and read” (7). “In contrast to the nonspecialist reader,” North claims, “the majority of today’s literary scholarship is most interested in Woolf for what she can teach us about her time and place” (7). I genuinely don’t recognize these as descriptions of what literary scholars do. Rather than treat literary texts as records of a historical moment, historically-informed scholarship of any value makes visible the ways texts produce new values and meanings, new affects, new uses of language, new worlds, new practices, new ways of seeing, and new subjectivities. Scholars historicize in order to better see the complex and historically variable way a text, a genre, or a mode works. For instance, Kurt Heinzelman and Raymond Williams don’t analyze country house poetry as a more or less accurate record of the rural worlds they purport to represent. Rather, their work shows the manner in which the genre and its conventions make the notion of the country count by using the country to articulate new values or ratify existing ones, to produce actions, to foster and reproduce social relationships.

    Now obviously texts don’t read themselves. Texts get cooked up in and react with the bodies and minds of readers. Readers encounter texts in historically and geographically variable ways. Texts remain culturally active by being connected with other texts and mobilized in different ways, and these types of renewals will often involve educational institutions and disciplinary formations. So, literary historians also consider the history of a text’s reception: the concrete and historically variable ways it has been received and produced as a culturally active text. Indeed, we could think of North’s book as contributing to this work. Far from being in any tension with the kind of aesthetic education North is advocating, this kind of historically informed scholarship is a prerequisite to a robust and sensitive encounter with a text’s full complexity. When North characterizes the purpose of historical scholarship of the last thirsty years, he fails to acknowledge the necessary and multifaceted ways scholars historicize literary texts for the purpose of reading them better.

    Having noted the manner in which North characterizes the majority of today’s literary scholarship, I want to turn to his historical account of the demise of criticism and the rise to dominance of scholarship. As I describe at some length in my review, North proposes an alternative tripartite historical narrative to the “pre- and post-Theory” narrative that he believes characterizes most accounts of literary studies. In his model, three periods in the history of literary criticism—I.A. Richards and his incipiently materialist account of the aesthetic; the New Critical project which replaced the materialist with an idealist aesthetic; and the current historicist/contextualist paradigm—map onto three moments in the history of capitalism (a crisis in capitalism between the wars; a Keynesian period of relative stability; and our moment in which the establishment of a neoliberal order followed the crisis of Keynesianism). North summarizes this insight in the following manner:

    When we track these three lines of thinking as they develop through the century, treating them as central to the discipline, something rather surprising emerges: it begins to look as though the history of literary studies since the 1920s falls roughly into three periods—three periods that match rather closely those of what I have called the “new periodization.” (14)

    In my review, I had some fun at North’s expense for his coining of the phrase the “new periodization.” North correctly points out that his coinage designates the division of the twentieth century into three periods, a division proposed by scholars across many disciplines, and not his own proposal for periodizing literary studies. Fair enough. As his response indicates, his book does propose a new way of periodizing the history of literary studies, one that maps his three periods in literary studies onto the aforementioned moments in the history of global capitalism. And North is silent on my critique of his model, which I think I am right in concluding posits that shifts in the social order determine shifts in the discipline. I read evidence of this “base/superstructure” historiographical model in his book’s claim that the “two paradigms of ‘criticism’ and ‘scholarship’ both serv[ed] real superstructural functions within Keynesianism” (17). Or again when he asks “what would one expect to find except that the history of the disciplines marches more or less in step with the underlying transformations of the social order?” (17). And finally, I see proof of a base/superstructure model in this formulation: “on a larger scale the discipline has stepped out its fundamental movement from paradigm to paradigm in close synchronization with the broader advance of the social order itself from phase to phase. This has always of course been the historical materialist line in theory, but to my mind it has not often been taken seriously enough on the ground” (196).

    Those of us on the ground might respond that the “historical materialist line” has itself a history, and North’s model of a set of cultural practices shifting from paradigm to paradigm in synchronization with the broader advance of the social order is just one version of Marxist historiography, one that has been subjected to a robust critique by Williams and many others. When North quarantines literary studies outside “the social order” and then claims that this field is determined by “the broader advance of [that] social order,” the constellation of social and material practices that actually constitute the field become epiphenomenal and cannot be investigated as active elements in a larger material social process. Nor can we recognize that these practices possess their own dynamics; dynamics that extend far beyond the ability to speed up, slow down, resist, or accommodate the “underlying transformations in the social order” (17). Let me be clear here that I am not proposing anything like “the relative autonomy” of universities understood as part of the social order’s superstructure with respect to the base. Universities are not only integral parts of the knowledge economy; they are also central to the reproduction of capital’s value-producing commodity: skilled and disciplined labor power. Rather, I am suggesting that all models of determination that identify and prioritize a reified “social order” and then confine whole bodies of social and material practice to a superstructure will always account for changes in those social and material practices by reference to dynamics in another realm (the economy; the social order).

    There are real hegemonic struggles taking place over a wide range of social and material practices in universities: we might consider the manner in which the extension of “learning outcomes” disciplines not only students but also faculty; or the increasing role of assessment in driving educational priorities; or the role student debt plays in producing a submissive labor force; or the ways in which the outsourcing of literacy instruction to graduate and adjunct labor is restructuring the political economy of the humanities; or the impact true cost accounting and data-driven decision making is having on the curricula of majors within the humanities. Each item in this list can be investigated as an instance of neoliberalism, defined as the shifting of the state and public institutions from sites of social provision to sites of monetization, surveillance, and control. At a disciplinary level, we could discuss the manner in which big data, digital humanities, the cognitive turn, the science/humanities partnerships undertaken by the environmental humanities, the discourse of the anthropocene, and big history might become sites of neoliberal revenue generation or cost sharing. But you wouldn’t gain insight into any of these practices and their potential to be recoded according to the logic of neoliberalism by prioritizing the transformation of a social order outside the political economy of the university. On the contrary, North’s approach leads to abstract “bird’s eye” formulations like the following:

    Williams’ sweeping critique of the project of “criticism” and of the associated categories of “literature” and the “aesthetic,” which at least in its early stages had been directed at a genuine target to the right, was turned to quite different ends when it was taken up in the very different environment of the United States in the 1980s and 1990s, at a moment when neoliberal forces within the university were systematically favoring the scholarly over the critical model of literary studies. In this newly professionalized and scientized context, the scholarly model of intellectual inquiry—intellectual work as knowledge-production, now usually conceived of within the discipline as the production of historical knowledge—was simply assumed to constitute the central task of literary study (99/100).

    I am not persuaded by North’s suggestion that neoliberalism favors scholarship because it treats “intellectual work as knowledge production” and that “in this newly professionalized and scientized context,” scholarship as knowledge production “was simply assumed to constitute the central task of literary study.”

    In my review, I objected to this claim by North on the grounds that critics and scholars alike have held that the production of knowledge is the central task of literary study since the discipline’s foundation. In his response, North takes exception to this part of my argument, pointing out that his opening chapter acknowledges as much. North adds that his “claim is certainly not that the neoliberal period saw the birth of literary scholarship” (a claim I never suggested he was making), but “that the neoliberal period saw the death of literary criticism.” Rather than clarify his argument, North uses his response as an opportunity to suggest I didn’t read the “first few pages of the first chapter” of his book. He spurns the opportunity to explain why neoliberal forces would favor the knowledge produced by scholars when we both agree that the commitment to professionalism and the scientific model of knowledge stretches back to the origin of the discipline and when we both accept that critics successfully argued that close reading was a method that produced new knowledge. This being the case, how did the demise of literary criticism impact neoliberalism’s elevation of scholarship? Was criticism somehow holding the disciplinary commitment to intellectual work as knowledge production in check (even as it claimed it was itself a kind of knowledge production)? If both scholars and critics framed the mission of literary studies as the production of knowledge, what was new about the knowledge production of the “historicist/contextualist” paradigm? Because he has chosen to impugn my abilities as a reader rather than clarify his own position, I will offer my own interpretation. I would suggest that the “historical materialist line,” as North understands it, requires that scholarship is dominant because it performs some kind of superstructural function. After all, the historicist/contextualist paradigm has been “pushed into position by more general political, economic, and institutional forces of a much harsher kind” (20). Why was this paradigm pushed into this dominant position? The only explanation I can find in North’s book is that the scholarship produced under the auspices of the historicist/contextualist paradigm “fits hand in glove with the model of specialized knowledge production that the thoroughly scientized neoliberal university assumes as the default” (188). In short, the “scientized neoliberal university” privileges “specialized knowledge production.” If North has a more persuasive reason for why neoliberal forces favor scholarship, he did not use his response to enlighten me.

    North claims that I have fundamentally misunderstood what he describes as “a fairly simple argument.” As I draw my own response to a close—having restated North’s position and my concern with it—I have a sinking feeling that North will remain unpersuaded of the fact that I understand his account and, as a result, won’t consider my objections to it. At this stage, if North and I disagree so fundamentally about the argument his book actually makes, I can only invite interested parties to read his book and decide for themselves.

     

  • Joseph North – Still Hoping: A Response to Dermot Ryan

    Joseph North – Still Hoping: A Response to Dermot Ryan

    by Joseph North

    This essay is part of a dossier on Joseph North’s Literary Criticism: A Concise Political History. Dermot Ryan reviewed North’s volume in January 2018. This essay is North’s response to Ryan’s review. b2o also published Ryan’s reply to this response. 

    I am not a big believer in the wisdom of responding to negative reviews – what is to be gained?  perhaps very little – but Dermot Ryan’s recent account of my book Literary Criticism: A Concise Political History is based on a number of misreadings that seem to me worth trying to clear up (Ryan 2018, North 2017).

    Ryan’s primary claim is that I am a kind of throwback to the bad old days of mid-century humanism – a revenant of the “old-school model of criticism,” as he puts it.  Accordingly, he goes on to charge me with anti-feminism, dismissiveness towards both queer theory and postcolonial studies, and even a kind of antipathy or indifference to union drives.  But this is odd.  To mention just one reason: a reader who judged Literary Criticism: A Concise Political History by Ryan’s review would get little sense of the fact that majority of the living figures celebrated by the book are feminists and/or queer theorists.[1]  In my wilder utopian moments, I had thought that no-one who really read the book (still less anyone who knows my politics!) could have mistaken it for anything except an attempt to radicalize – specifically, to radicalize by mobilizing – the discipline’s existing commitments to feminism, queer theory, and the critique of empire (just to stick with Ryan’s chosen examples; in the book I am concerned also with others, anti-capitalism being perhaps the central case).  At any rate, it seems to me that I am an odd target at which to level these kinds of charges.

    But I ought to check my starry-eyed optimism here, for really the charges Ryan levels at me are not so surprising – in fact, I addressed them in the first few pages of the book itself, a fact to which I shall return at the end of this piece.  For now, let me simply note that in order to make the book resemble a proper target for this kind of critique, Ryan has to twist it into some very odd shapes.  Take, for instance, the charge that Ryan offers as a “stand in” for many of the other charges: the charge that the book is somehow anti-feminist.  I take this charge to heart, not least because I was a feminist before I was any other sort of radical.  It is a serious charge (at least among leftists), and one that ought not to be made lightly.  Ryan makes it as follows:

    The following swipe at feminism must stand in for a long list of North’s leading questions directed at the legacy of feminist, queer, and postcolonial criticism: ‘To what extent were second-wave feminist critiques of the welfare state likely to secure basic structural changes, and to what extent were they working to replace a material politics with a mere politics of recognition, thereby serving, albeit often inadvertently, as the hand-maidens of neoliberalism?’ (58). In a historical narrative that repeatedly understands literary studies as being reshaped by economic forces outside the academy, feminist scholars are accorded a striking degree of agency here as midwives of the new neoliberal order. North’s choice of hand-maiden to characterize the work of his feminist colleagues is particularly unwelcome.

    Let me begin by wholeheartedly endorsing Ryan’s general position here: he is encountering what he takes to be an instance of haughty dismissiveness toward the achievements of feminist criticism – in effect, an instance of misogyny – and he is resolved to call it out and critique it.  This seems to me a good thing.  He winces especially at that “particularly unwelcome” term “hand-maiden,” which he reads as a snide attack on the work of my “feminist colleagues.”  All this goes to show my deeper conservatism, or at least the implicit conservatism of my argument: thus, for Ryan, my “swipe at feminism” “stands in for a long list” of swipes at other progressive forces within the discipline.  Having read me in this way, he quite naturally concludes that I am “wrong in ways that are damaging to the discipline and give ammunition to reactionary forces within and beyond it.”  Excellent.  It’s no fun to be the target, of course, but Ryan is firing his big guns for all the right reasons here, and I can certainly cheer for that.

    But let us go back and read the line that Ryan identifies as my “swipe at feminism”:

    To what extent were second-wave feminist critiques of the welfare state likely to secure basic structural changes, and to what extent were they working to replace a material politics with a mere politics of recognition, thereby serving, albeit often inadvertently, as the hand-maidens of neoliberalism?  

    There are two differences between Ryan’s version of the line and the line I wrote.  First, the original version includes a footnote that Ryan does not seem to have noticed.  That footnote – as some readers surely have guessed already – is to the work of the prominent Marxist/Feminist Nancy Fraser, and specifically to her book Fortunes of Feminism, in which she articulates the most well-known version of the argument to which my line refers (Fraser 2013a).  Now, I hasten to add that my single-sentence summary of her work here is not as precise as it could be, and indeed I would re-write this sentence today.  But even taking this into account, I had thought the reference to Fraser unmistakable, most obviously because of the footnote, but also because I had thought that the argument itself, with that key term “politics of recognition,” was well-known to anyone familiar with contemporary debates within left and marxist feminism.

    The second difference: in the original text there are scare quotes around the phrase “hand-maidens of neoliberalism,” whereas in Ryan’s version, the phrase is simply run into the text.    Now, I do not think that Ryan has omitted the scare quotes on purpose – that would be a serious charge.  It is surely an innocent oversight.  But, after all, the omission is not ideal, especially since this is the very phrase that Ryan calls out as “particularly unfortunate,” and reads as an act of misogynistic aggression on my part.  Once one has noticed the quotation marks, one perhaps begins to wonder why they are there.  Why did I place the offending phrase in scare quotes?  Is the term “hand-maidens” really my “particularly unfortunate” way of taking a tone-deaf “swipe” at the work of my “feminist colleagues?”  Is it even mine?  At this point I hope that at least a couple of readers are nodding with recognition, as it were, since the phrase is in fact a reference to Nancy Fraser’s 2013 article “How Feminism Became Capitalism’s Handmaiden – And How to Reclaim It,” which I had thought fairly well-known, at least among those who follow debates within feminism on the left, precisely because of the provocativeness of the term “handmaiden” (Fraser 2013b).  Admittedly, this reference might be thought obscure, and perhaps I was wrong in assuming that readers would catch it (though again, I would have thought the scare quotes would cause a reviewer at least to pause before calling out this particular phrase).  But surely even a reviewer who had missed the reference, and had failed to recognize the argument itself, and had also overlooked the fact that many of the most important feminist arguments in recent history have been critiques of the “second wave,” would nevertheless think to read the footnote to Fraser before rushing to the conclusion that this line represents a “swipe at feminism” on my part?  In any event, the argument that Ryan calls out, in a peer-reviewed article, as a telling example of my supposed “anti-feminism” is in fact a feminist argument, and a rather famous one.  It’s at times like this that I find myself oddly pleased that Ryan thinks my work is “exactly wrong,” since he is reading it exactly backwards.  We could find ourselves in a kind of broad agreement if only he would stop reading me upside-down.

    This would seem to me a fairly egregious example of misreading by anyone’s lights.  Is it an isolated case?  Of course I am uniquely placed to be oversensitive here, but it seems to me that it is not an isolated case.  In fact, Ryan does this often.  Despite my fairly loud (I had thought perhaps even obnoxiously loud) declarations of radical intent, his conviction that I am a closet reactionary is so strong that he repeatedly misreads my summaries of others’ views as if they were my views, and then objects to them.  Take, for example, his main objection to my tone:

    North complacently opines that “actual political struggle—the kind that involve a group, or class ‘forcing’ its way into something—does not take place within the world of scholarship” (88). Here as elsewhere, North’s discussion of the efforts by marginalized groups to challenge the academy’s exclusionary culture is not aided by his clubby tone, which comes off as privileged, tweedy, and smug.

    Again, I can endorse Ryan’s general position here: I, too, would want to argue against anyone who claimed that “actual political struggle—the kind that involve a group, or class ‘forcing’ its way into something—does not take place within the world of scholarship.”  Inconveniently, though, I was in fact arguing against that claim in the very line Ryan quotes.  The line is drawn from my account of some of the problematic assumptions that seem to me to underpin Greenblatt and Gallagher’s Practicing New Historicism – assumptions that I subject to a fairly blunt critique.  In passing, I’ll note that I keep being confronted by scholars who want to defend Greenblatt and Gallagher on this score (or else defend New Historicism more generally, minus those two): many people in the discipline (particularly of a certain generation) seem to think that I was too critical of them here, or else simply too blunt.  But to my knowledge Ryan is the first to misread me as endorsing the very view that I critique so bluntly, and he is certainly the first to critique me for “complacently opining” it.

    The specific examples Ryan cites here are all, I believe, based on demonstrable misreadings.  Another case: when summarizing my account of the discipline’s history, Ryan writes that North “labels his own version rather grandly as ‘the new periodization.’” As it happened, I didn’t label my own work “the new periodization,” and I believe that this is fairly obvious on the page (the whole discussion is on pp12-14, for those who want to check).  Where it originally appears, the phrase refers not to some great innovation on my part, but to a view now held by many scholars across many disciplines, the view being that the 20th century ought to be considered a three-period century, rather than a two-period century, as was once widely assumed.  I cite Piketty as an example of a prominent scholar who takes roughly this view, but I am really talking about a view held much more widely.  In any event, on this point my own contribution, such as it is, is simply to show how the history of Anglo-American literary studies fits into a larger puzzle put together by others; there is certainly no question of my labeling my own work “the new periodization” in this “grand” manner.

    Ryan also has an odd tendency to critique me (and in such strident terms!) for neglecting to say things that in fact I say quite clearly.  His language suggests that he places quite a lot of confidence in the following observation:

    One example can stand synecdochically for a series of unpersuasive historical claims and moves. According to North, during the eighties and nineties, neoliberal forces within the university systematically favored the scholarly over the critical model of literary studies. In this “professionalized and scientized context, the scholarly model of intellectual inquiry—intellectual work as knowledge production” became the central task of literary study (100). It’s a compelling story. And it’s completely inaccurate. Literary Studies has benefited enormously from the disciplinary histories of Gerald Graff, Louis Menand, Chris Baldick, Bill Readings and many others. […] North references many of these scholars. But, having read them, he should know that the disciplinary commitment to professionalism and the scientific model of knowledge production in literary studies predates neoliberalism. It stretches back to the origin of English as a discipline. […] No matter. Let’s return to North’s convenient morality play.

    If this claim truly “stands synecdochically” for many of my “unpersuasive historical claims and moves,” then I think I am in pretty good shape, for Ryan’s historical observations here easily could have been lifted directly from the first chapter of my book.  For of course the “disciplinary commitment to professionalism and the scientific model of knowledge production in literary studies predates neoliberalism.”  Who would deny it?  Not me.  Literary scholarship has involved a “commitment to professionalism and the scientific model of knowledge production” at least since the fin de siècle.  I began the first chapter of the book by pointing out precisely this, and I even made the point by referring to two of the scholars Ryan mentions, Graff and Baldick (though I set them alongside Guillory, rather than Menand or Readings).  Moreover, the rest of my argument simply assumes the truth of this, because, well, it’s so obvious: thus, throughout the book, my claim is certainly not that the neoliberal period saw the birth of literary scholarship –  that would be a very silly claim indeed.  Rather my claim, in part, is that the neoliberal period saw the death of literary criticism, for a certain important meaning of that phrase. That is quite a different thing.

    I could go on, but let me instead draw to a close by making a single more general point.  Before making it, I would like to emphasize once again that, in my optimism, I still think that Ryan and I could be in sympathy with one another here – pretty much all of his critiques of my work seem to me decent in principle.  Nevertheless, those critiques seem to me quite misplaced; he is engaging with something, I am certain, but it is not me.  At this point I am going to risk going a step further by observing that all the claims we have seen Ryan making so far are not just false, but trivially false, by which I mean that they are false in such a way that they could easily be dispelled by, say, reading a footnote, or noticing some quotation marks, or reading a line in relation to its immediate context, or reading the first few pages of the first chapter – not even familiarity with recent debates within feminism would be required.  Why is a professional reader who is intelligent, principled, and well-informed, as Ryan clearly is, nevertheless lapsing repeatedly into trivial misreadings when confronted by what is, after all, a fairly simple argument?  The answer, I think, is that he has begun with such a strong set of assumptions about what I must have written, that it has often prevented him from reading what I actually wrote.

    What is this troubling set of assumptions, and where does it come from?  People who quote themselves quickly become tiresome, but I’ll risk doing so just once to close.  In the introduction to the book, I wrote:

    Over the last three decades, the discipline has tended to assume that any attack on the historicist/contextualist paradigm must originate in cultural conservatism, particularly if the offending party makes use of such terms as “criticism,” “aesthetic,” “sensibility,” and similar.  This assumption has allowed much to pass for progressivism, even for radicalism, that under other circumstances would have been seen much more clearly for what it was.  (4)

    Ryan’s argument strikes me as a good example of just this kind: hearing that I have doubts about the usual historicist/contextualist priorities, he has assumed that my argument must be such as to “give ammunition to reactionary forces,” and he has thus proceeded to condemn it on that basis.  Now, in a way it is pleasing to see someone coming out with precisely the critique I had expected, since it gives me an opportunity to show how much in the book has to be misread, or simply elided, in order to make that critique sound plausible.  But what one really hopes for are critiques that manage to get past those old assumptions – critiques that engage with the arguments I actually make – critiques that then offer, in response to those arguments, a rigorous and principled defense of the existing paradigm.  I’m still hoping.

    Joseph North is an assistant professor of English at Yale University.  He is the author of Literary Criticism: A Concise Political History (2018).

    References

    Fraser, Nancy. 2013a.  Fortunes of Feminism: From State-Managed Capitalism to Neoliberal Crisis.  London: Verso.

    Fraser, Nancy. 2013b. “How Feminism Became Capitalism’s Handmaiden – And How to Reclaim It.”  The Guardian, October 14.

    North, Joseph. 2017. Literary Criticism: A Concise Political History. Cambridge: Harvard

    Roth, Marco. 2017. “Tokens of Ruined Method: Does Literary Studies Have a Future?” n+1, no. 29: 179-189.

    Ryan, Dermot. 2018. “Review of Joseph North’s Literary Criticism: A Concise Political History. boundary 2 online, January 29.

    [1] In passing, I’ll note that readers don’t have to take my word for this: in lieu of reading the book itself, they can simply consult other reviews of it, many of which have pointed out precisely this.  Thus Marco Roth at n+1: “The catalog of critics covered in [the final, most positive chapter, is] almost exclusively female or queer: the late Eve Sedgwick, Isobel Armstrong […], Lauren Berlant, and D. A. Miller” (Roth 2017).

  • Meriem Bedjaoui – Words Are the Root of the Language / Pains Are the Predilection of the Man

    Meriem Bedjaoui – Words Are the Root of the Language / Pains Are the Predilection of the Man

    Meriem Bedjaoui

    العربية | Français

    « If you want to rule the ignorant, cover your

    harmful and pernicious intentions with a religious

    envelope. »

    Ibn Khaldoun (Prolegomena, 1377)[1]

     I.      Introduction

    The theme of this special issue — sexual violence against women in wartime — is not a new phenomenon. In times of war, conflict or terrorism, women have always been the principal victims. Indeed, the sexual violence inflicted upon women is not linked to a particular race, religion, or group; global history has provided so many cases of women who have been subjugated to sexual violence. For instance, history has recorded a series of human tragedies where women’s bodies endured acts of violence, mutilation and rape at the hands of the French Army in Algeria during the Liberation War, and also in Liberia, Rwanda, Congo, Bosnia, and more recently in Syria. This is not to normalise sexual violence towards women, but to remind us that it is a global, historical phenomenon.

    Algerian literature in French, whether the work of male or female writers, has always focused on the living conditions of women in Algeria, who are viewed as targets, victims or simply war trophies. This negative perception of women results from the chauvinistic attitudes of men and iniquitous traditions of segregation which are at the heart of Algerian society, in addition to interpretations of Islamic exegesis (Tafsir of the Qur’an, deemed unfounded by some Muslim schools of thought for its exaggerated and inauthentic narratives). This manipulated view of Islamic principles helps to explain the aforementioned quotation which provides the ultimate argument of the persecutors/violators and their ill deeds in the Land of Islam, still relevant to this day. Indeed, indiscriminate terrorism that plunged Algeria into mourning for over a decade between 1990 and 2002 has paved the way for the proliferation of fictional narratives as well as political and journalistic works. The horror and barbarism that prevailed in that period left no one indifferent, and prominent writers paid the price of denouncing this murderous folly with their lives, including Tahar Djaout, Youcef Sebti, and Said Mekbel, Others, such as Rachid Boudjedra, one of the most outspoken opponents of Islamic fundamentalists, had to flee the country to publish his denouncing works. Yasmina Khadra is another Algerian writer whose avant-garde work has denounced the many contradictions and paradoxes within Algerian society and the Muslim world in general.

    This paper is based on the works of Maïssa Bey (real name Samia Benameur) and Assia Djebar (Fatma-Zohra Imaleyene), examining the moral, psychological and physical violence inflicted on women and the subsequent silence which accompanies this violence them. These two novelists have both used pseudonyms to express themselves in an oppressive and often misogynistic country. While Djebar was a well-known and well-established author and a member of the Académie française since 2005, Bey has made her way onto the literary scene as a reaction to the tragedies that have shaken her country. The paper will examine the socio-historical conditions of Algeria’s gendered violence and will analyse the ‘bloody years’ in two collections of short stories, Sous le Jasmin, la nuit (2004)[2] and Oran, langue morte (2001),[3] by Bey and Djebar respectively.

    Both collections are devoted to women, or more precisely to their silenced voices.

    II.      Gender and Violence in Algeria

    In her doctoral thesis completed in 2012, entitled ‘The Writing of Assia Djebar: A Translation of Female Speech’, F.Z. Ferchouli presents an unflattering summary of the status of the Algerian woman, and gives examples of texts which confine her to the role of a minor subject, always at the mercy of a ‘guardian male’.[4] This gives men all the more temptation, as Lucie Pruvost argues, who finds in ‘the patriarchal interpretations of the normative verses of the Qur’an and the Sharia’ evidence which explains their pervasive conduct.[5] A striking example is the ignominy which has been happening before the world’s eyes regarding the ‘Jihad al nikah’ (jihad marriage) of the Tunisian female jihadists; Western countries did not react at all, frightened by terrorist groups in Africa and the Middle East.

    In addition to these fallacious arguments that have been unfairly attributed to Islam, a Family Code (Law No. 84-11 of June 9, 1984), to which Algerian people refer as the Code of disgrace, was issued. This code is a real regression.  Moreover, it is in total contradiction with the Algerian constitution (both of 1964 and 1996).

    Thus, once again, voices were raised against what seemed to be an injustice against women. These were voices of intellectuals, journalists and writers who reported the forgotten horrors of the ‘Dirty War’ of 1992 and the continuing subjugation of Algerian women. 

    Maïssa Bey and Assia Djebar

    If Bey has dedicated all her work to the women of her country, who have been confined in a silence imposed on them by society, it is through the collection Sous le Jasmin, la nuit, and particularly the short story ‘Nuit et silence’, that she depicts their unspeakable reality through language. Here, she attempts to find the appropriate words to describe the violent acts of rape committed by those who were identified as terrorists or Islamic fundamentalists. The narrative describes the nightmare of a fifteen-year-old teenage girl who is kidnapped and then raped by an armed group. The author manipulates the intricacies of the verb and the adjective to describe the indescribable, to name the unnamable: “They dance around me an infernal dance, all these names that my dictionary describes as common: carnage, massacre, killing, slaughter, as if to dig deeper into our wounds, come to append the adjectives; dreadful, terrible, horrible, unbearable, inhuman, and many more…. Erasing the words to make the fact disappear will not do” (p. 56). In a climatic and tragic scene, the young girl becomes pregnant and rejects her unborn child: ‘I do not want this being moving within me. I cannot give birth to a being that might look like them….. Let him grow up to hate, to kill or be killed’ (pp. 108-109).

    Although she was abused in her very being, the heroine resists.  She confronts the religious fanaticism and the damage it causes her with bravery and boldness.  Throughout this poignant witness narrative, the author meticulously describes (in a ‘Balzacian’ way) the event and, somewhat cynically, gives details about the barbarism that plunged Algeria into mourning and made women eternally responsible for all evils.  Victimized and gagged, Bey breaks the silence (a recurring term in all her writings), creating places and spaces for women’s expression: ‘The night and silence weighed heavily on my eyelids and my aching forehead. I can’t even move. Yet tonight I’m not afraid, I’m not hungry, nor am I cold. I just want to sleep but I cannot. Too much night, too much silence’ (p. 101).

    Using multiple female voices and writing a literature of ‘urgency’, Bey is devoted to denouncing the scourges hindering women’s empowerment, as she points out in the following statement: “Then, it took me one day to feel the urge to say, to carry the words as one might carry a torch”.  The torch of freedom has been taken away from the women of her country for so long. Thus, writing will allow the author to exorcise her pains, her fears and her revolts, and those of her fellow Algerian women.  By deliberately choosing to write in an outspoken style and manipulating syntactic forms which challenge the linearity of narration, such as the use of recurring typographical characters, the author subjects her text to the challenges of memory, suggesting that amnesia and silence can only be offset by literature.

    Although the collection is composed of eleven short stories, each with different plots, settings, time frames and characters, they all work towards the same objective: laying bare the social ills which undermine Algerian society because of women, the root of all evil. Thus, women are, and will remain, the focal point in the romantic discourse of both Bey and Djebar. Their writing represents an‘infringement’, a ‘sign of the forbidden’, which only becomes possible through the adoption of a pseudonym and the use of this “foster and fostered language” that is French. The problem of the language of the Other, the conqueror, the colonizer, has often been raised by the Algerian authors writing in French. Although Algerian literature has been strongly marked by one hundred and thirty two years of linguistic and cultural imposition, it has accommodated the language of Molière primarily out of necessity. Imposed, yet tamed, the French initially served as a language of struggle and rebellion, (Feraoun, Mammeri, Dib. etc.), in order to recover a stifled identity. The succeeding generations of writers then emerged, using this “foreign” language, this “stepmother” language without any difficulty. They renewed its standards regarding creative aesthetic research and dynamic narrative forms. Nourished and imbued with French culture, the two novelists, Assia Djebar and Maisa Bey, exceed the problem of language inherited from a troubled history to create a unique sort of writing; an unveiling writing, denouncing, saying the unsayable, giving voice to those who have been deprived since the earliest times. Also, for both authors, regardless of the language in which they write, the fundamental issue is to break the silences that freeze Muslim women in general, and the Algerian women in particular, in the eternal status of inferiority, afflicted with all ills of society. In interviews Bay explains her reasons for choosing to write in French; her decision seems to be less associated with a desire to reclaim the colonial language as pragmatism. She explains that:

    I have no problem with the French language, because it is part of my personal history. I was born in a territory, which at the time of my birth and during my childhood was considered French. So I naturally learned French, encouraged by my father, a schoolteacher, who was one of the first Algerians to engage in the war of independence. He disappeared; killed by the people whom he was teaching the language. It was him who taught me to read and write in French. And later, I discovered the French literature. I can therefore say, as Boudjedra put it, that “I have not chosen the French language; it was French who chose me.” I do not feel concerned with all controversies on language, because what is important for me now is to say what I want to say (interview Joha, 2008). [6]

    Bey’s relationship with language thus differs from that of Djebar who claims to actively use the French language to gain a freedom that is denied to her through Arabic. She describes this complex relationship in L’Amour, la fantasia (1985) as follows:

    As if the French language suddenly had eyes, and lent them to me to see into liberty; as if the French language blinded the peeping-toms of my clan and, at this price, I could move freely, run headlong down every street, annex the outdoors for my cloistered companions, for the matriarchs of my family who endured a living death. As it . . . Derision! I know that every language is a dark depository for piled-up corpses, refuse, sewage, but faced with the language of the former conqueror, which offers me its ornaments, its jewels, its flowers, I find they are flowers of death- chrysanthemums on tombs![7]

    Bey’s Sous le Jasmin, la nuit can be read alongside Djebar’s collection of short stories, Oran, langue morte (2001) which, like Bey’s novel, centres around the violence of religious fanaticism that scarred Algerian society in the 1990s. Djebar, who died in February 2015, enjoyed a very successful literary and academic career: she was the author of many novels, short stories, poetry collections, plays and film scripts. She was awarded the International Critics Prize at the Venice Biennale in 1979 for La Nouba des femmes du Mont Chenoua (1977) and Best Historical Film at the Berlin Film Festival in 1989 for La Zerda ou les chants de l’oubli (1979). Her texts have been translated into twenty-three languages. In her quest to restore women’s voices from silence and oppression, Assia Djebar uses the spoken language by integrating witnesses’ voices, recalling families’ traditions and revisiting sacred texts of Islam and the Prophet, most notably in Loin de Médine (1991). Furthermore, the violence of barbarism, which mainly targeted women, is omnipresent in all seven texts of Oran, langue morte, underscored by the fourth cover of the novel.

    Between murderous craziness and fierce resistance, women try to survive the daily bloodshed in Algeria over the last decades.  As the seven texts of this collection unfold, we discover a country shattered by violence to which Assia Djebar gives a voice in a tragic work, where the aesthetic and reality intertwine.

    Through the voices of the humiliated, disgraced, beaten, raped or repudiated women, Djebar seeks to bring to mind the tragedies that ravaged Algeria; a country that was a cultural backwater. In the short story ‘Wife into pieces’ within the collection, the title already revealing a great deal about the violent and degrading treatment to which Algeria subjects women, the protagonist is fighting death generated by a “vampire-like” fundamentalism and is forced to endure a devastating ideology. Djebar is known for being the first Algerian novelist to focus on female protagonists in her writing and to bring back the voice of women through her female characters in her novels such as Loin de Médine, L’Amour, la fantasia (1985), Ces voix qui m’assiègent (1999), in addition to the text in focus in this paper, Oran, langue morte. These are texts in which the status of women, from the ancestral silence to the sweeping wave of terrorism, is the central point of the narrative: ‘Thus, where to find the right words to speak out these griefs and bereavements that could not be uttered, these emotions that slip into the very details of everyday life? Where to find the words when violence and history leave the human beings voiceless, imprisoned by their silence?’(p. 43).

    Djebar’s originality lies in her ability to weave fictions within multidisciplinary genres, delving into an infinite number of documentary resources and historical landmarks. Throughout her oeuvre she desires to reveal women’s voices in French, the language of the other, as she points out in ‘Writing Took Me Back to the Cries of Women Silently Revolted’. It is in this collection of short stories that she formulated her total commitment to those women: grandmothers, mothers, sisters, neighbours or friends, who were forever marked by the ancestral silence and had to endure the attempts of religious fundamentalism to gag them.  In the afterword to the book, Djebar summarises the anxiety that runs through her writings and the hope that her narrative instils in Algerian women:

    A narrative of women of the Algeria dark era and the new women of Algiers today. Fragments of life, conveyed, reported in a back and forth journey of the travelers, the passengers, in a relay, a haven where one can rest and reminisce. These are not the stages of an escape but of a mobility process; They are dialogues exchanged between Algerians from here and there. Suddenly, some aspects of life are highlighted then shattered: Then follow the images of the chase, the escape and the death. Of a glimpse of hope, sometimes, in this long night.

    Djebar thus offers the reader a text of transgression and unveiling through the different textual forms constituting the collection (narratives, short stories, tales) and the multiplicity of voices that interweave to underscore the rejection of women. Their marginalization is underscored in the following quotation: ‘I dropped the rough headscarf of my mother (Khalti) and I screamed … It’s me then who revives the scene, who writes it, so that I can finally annihilate it’, said the orphan of Oran (p. 40).

    As P. Martini (Loxias 32) says:

    Silence is not on the outside part of the narrative discourse, in fact, it is an integral part of it: The pauses in speech, the hesitations in the story, and the typographic elements (the ellipsis or blanks) constitute the discourse and reflect the difficulties and traps of the storytelling’. It is even more complex as silence and speech collide to express and assert the freedom to say. Indeed, much is at stake, because: ‘in the current sweeping turmoil, women are questing for a language: where to put, hide, and foster the power of their rebellion and life in this faltering setting. [8]

    Finally, in the continuum of the two writers’ texts, the «issue» of the woman remains, and always will, a persistent problem that haunting the obscurantist and backward minds, that undermine the society.

    However, a new fact is worth noting; after years of terror, the government has just passed a law that acknowledges the suffering of the victims of rape during the national tragedy by granting them a compensation which ranges from 16000DA to 35OOODA. This decree (No. 14-26 of 02/02/2014), was issued after more than a decade, unlike the The Amnesty Law which allowed thousands of executioners to live next to their victims. As for the code of “disgrace”, it is still debated within the framework of the legislative bodies.

    Bibliography  

    Batalha, MC (2012) : Mémoire individuelle et mémoire collective dans la fiction de Maissa Bey. Etudes romanes N° 33.

    Belarouci L., Ferhat S. (2001) : Les femmes victimes de violences sexuelles en Algérie : autopsie d’un traumatisme, Magazine de l’action humanitaire et du droit international humanitaire.

    Belloula N   (2008) : Visa pour la haine. Alger, Editions Alpha.

    Benchikh F (1998) : La symbolique de l’acte criminel : approche psychanalytique. Paris, l’Harmattan.

    Bessoles Ph (1997) : Le meurtre au féminin : clinique du viol. Collection Témoignage/transmission, Threetete.

    Bonn C, Boualit F, (1999) : Paysages littéraires algériens des années 90 : Témoigner d’une tragédie ? Paris, l’Harmattan

    Boudaréne M (2001) : Violence terroriste en Algérie et traumatisme psychique. Alger,Stress et trauma 1.

    Djebar A. (2001) : Oran, langue morte. Paris, Actes Sud.

    (1999) : Ces voix qui m’assiègent. Paris, Albin Michel.

    Ferchouli F Zohra (2012) : Statut de la femme algérienne : entre le code de la famille, la Charte d’Alger de 1964 et la constitution de 1996.

    Gruber M (2001) : Assia Djebar ou la résistance de l’écriture. Paris, Maisonneuve et Larose.

    Gruber M (2005) : Assia Djebar, Nomade entre les murs. Paris, Maisonneuve et la rose.

    Guenivet K (2001) : Violences sexuelles : la nouvelle arme de guerre. Paris, Michalon.

    Hammadi N (2012) : Femmes violées par les terroristes. La non-reconnaissance amplifie la tragédie. Le Quotidien Liberté.

    Hubie S (2003): Littérature intimes : les expressions du moi, de l’autobiographie à l’autofiction. Paris, A. Colin

    Maissa Bey

    – (1998) : Nouvelles d’Algérie. Paris, Grasset.

    – (2008) : Entendez-vous dans la montagne. Paris, Ed de l’Aube.

    – (2005) : Surtout, ne te retourne pas.  Alger/Paris,Ed Barzakh/Aube.

    – (2006) : Sous le jasmin la nuit. L’aube : La tour d’aigues.

    – (2008) : Pierre sang papier ou cendre. L’aube : La tour d’aigues.

    Mohammedi Tabti B (2007) : Maissa Bey, L’Ecriture des silences. Blida, Editions du Tell.

    Mokhtari R (2002) : La graphie de l’horreur. SL, Chihab.

    Nahoum-Grappe V (1997) : Guerre et différence des sexes : les viols systématiques (ex-Yougoslavie 1991-1995), in C. Dauphin et A Farge (dir.), De la violence et des femmes. Paris, Albin Michel.

    Pruvost L (2002) : Femmes d’Algérie. Société, famille et citoyenneté. Alger, Casbah Editions.

    Samrakandi, H (2009) : Littératures féminines francophones N° 60, Presse Universitaire du Mirail.

    Stienne A  (2011) : Viols en temps de guerre, le silence et l’impunité. Le Monde diplomatique.

    [1] Reference?

    [2] Maïssa Bey, Sous le jasmin, la nuit (La Tour d’Aigues: Éditions de l’Aube, 2004).

    [3] Assia Djebar, Oran, langue morte (Arles: Actes Sud, 2001).

    [4] F. Z. Ferchouli, ‘The Writing of Assia Djebar: A Translation of Female Speech’, (unpublished doctoral thesis, University of Algiers, 2012)- check this reference.

    [5] Lucie Pruvost, Femmes d’Algérie: société, famille et citoyenneté (Alger : Casbhah Éditions, 2002), p.

    [6] Reference?

    [7] Assia Djebar, L’Amour, la fantasia (Paris: J.C. Lattès, 1985), p. 181.

     

  • Amel Grami – Narrating “Jihad al Nikah” in Post-Revolution Tunisia

    Amel Grami – Narrating “Jihad al Nikah” in Post-Revolution Tunisia

    Amel Grami

    العربية | Français

    Women in Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen, Libya and other counties of the region played active roles in the uprisings claiming their social and political rights. They formulated their demands using modern terms based on human rights concepts of justice, freedom, equality and democracy, but the aftermath of revolutionary activi­ty brought about changes that ran against the ideals and visions of the original change-seeking forces. In 2013, among the impacts of the ‘wind of change’, media reported that the number of Tunisian women travelling to Syria increased. Those women wanted to support Islamist fighters emotionally and physically by offering sexual services to the fighters, or what has become known as ‘Jihad al-nikah’, or sex jihad.

    ‘Jihad al-nikah’ has been a very controversial issue in Tunisia. Some members of the Islamist party En-nahda have denied it entirely. They maintain that the Syrian regime and local counter revolution forces created this propaganda against Syrian opposition and the Troika government. Others argued that a few groups of young women have been either under religious indoctrination or misled. They were in fact victims of ignorance. However, official statements of the ministry of interior declared that groups of young Tunisian women travelled  to Syria with the purpose of Jihad al-nikah. At the same time some journalists succeeded to do report on specific cases emphasizing the complexity of the issue. TV reports and newspaper articles reported now and then the concerns of families whose young daughters were reported having joined jihadists in Syria. The purpose of this article is to define the meaning of Jihad al-nikah and analyze its different narratives in Tunisia: the official one, and the one summed up in the media reports as well as a third one related to the testimonies of the families of victims.

    Keywords: Jihad, women, sexuality, ideology,

    I.       What is Jihad al-nikah?

    a) Definition of Nikah

    Muslims are familiar with the term Nikah/marriage. Aisha the spouse of the prophet Mohammed described many forms of Nikah spread in the region before the rise of Islam.[1] Later on many historical and religious texts reported the controversy around ‘Nikah Al Mut”a’)Temporary Marriage, which would last a few hours, days, weeks, or months depending on the agreement). Sunni Ulema agree that mut’a was permitted by the Prophet at certain points during his lifetime, but they confirm that he later banned it. The Shi’I, however, maintain that the Prophet did not prohibit temporary marriage, and they mention numerous hadith (saying of the Prophet) from Sunni as well as Shi’i sources to prove this. The following passage in Sahih Muslim says that Muslims were practicing Mut’a well beyond the lifetime of the prophet Muhammad:

    Ibn Uraij reported: ‘Ati’ reported that Jabir b. Abdullah came to perform ‘Umra, and we came to his abode, and the people asked him about different things, and then they made a mention of temporary marriage, where upon he said: Yes, we had been benefiting ourselves by this temporary marriage during the lifetime of the Holy Prophet and during the time of Abu Bakr and ‘Umar. (Sahih Muslim 3248)

    There are even arguments that it was Omar,(the third Caliphate) rather than the Prophet Muhammad, who outlawed Mut’a:

    Abu Nadra reported: While I was in the company of Jabir b. Abdullah, a person came to him and said that Ibn ‘Abbas and Ibn Zubair differed on the two types of Mut’a (Tamattu’ of Hajj 1846 and Tamattu’ with women), whereupon Jabir said: We used to do these two during the lifetime of Allah’s Messenger. Umar then forbade us to do them, and so we did not revert to them.(Sahih Muslim 3250)

    Having established its legality, Shi’i Ulema devoted tremendous attention to define the legal status of temporary marriage and all the rules and regulations related to it.Meanwhile, the temporary marriage remains a controversial topic showing the divide between different Islamic ideologies and both schools of thought (Sunni and Shi’i). We should stress that the debate on temporary marriage highlights the status of women in patriarchal societies and reflects how the Ulema have defended male interests. By protecting social structure and regulating sexual relationships, the Ulema confirm their right to control women ‘s bodies.

    In contemporary history, new forms of marriage contracted for sexual purposes emerged such as ‘Nikah ‘urfi’ (marriage contract or customary marriage) or ‘Nikah Misyar’ (traveler’s ambulant or visiting marriage), conducted during the summer vacation by older men from wealthy Gulf States with young girls from poorer families in countries such as Egypt, Morocco, India and Indonesia…. or ‘friend marriage’.  These new forms of marriage have been reported as commonly practiced in countries such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Yemen, and recently in Tunisia after the revolution because they attracted both men and women for many reasons. For young people, ‘Urfi marriage’ (customary marriage) is considered as a means of making sexual relations permissible and legitimate. Such unregistered “Islamic marriages” are usually kept hidden from the couple’s families and are only known to a small circle of friends.

    Although temporary marriage does not oblige man to cohabit with and provide accommodation and maintenance to his wife, many young women believe that temporary marriage is a solution to their everyday problem. Young people seek to satisfy their sexual needs but they are not able to conclude a permanent marriage because of longer periods of study mainly in the West or for economic reasons. In this case temporary marriage allows youth to live their sexuality. Moreover, religious authorities in different countries legitimize the practice. In 1990 former Iranian president Hashemi Rafsanjani recognized women’s sexual desire and argued that it is legitimate for women to take the initiative in concluding temporary marriages. Similarly in 2006, the Saudi Arabian Fiqh Council ruled that “misyar marriages” and the so-called ‘friend marriages’ were  licit.

    However, many women activists and feminists in the Islamic world see such marriages as instruments to regulate male sexuality. By consenting to contract this type of marriage, women lose their rights. Although a man needs to pay a dower to his wife, he is not obliged to pay maintenance and the partners do not inherit each other. In that sense, the practice is not only a relic of the past, but also a threat to the family and to women in particular. Some even argue that it is an institution that encourages prostitution. Feminists also argue that such practices confirm that men are mostly sexual subjects and women are mostly sexual objects.

    b)       Jihad

    Jihad is often translated as “holy war.” The Ulema distinguish between two forms of jihad:

    1. Peaceful jihad :it can refer to internal as well as external efforts to be a good Muslim or believer, as well as working to inform people about the faith of Islam. In this sense Jihad is the struggle to do good on earth for the sake of God.
    2. qital, which means fighting. It is known that Islam allows the use of force,military jihad in case of war.It is part of defending the Islamic faith against belligerent others, but there are strict rules of engagement. Innocents or vulnerable people such as women, children, people with disabilities and the elderly must never be harmed. Many scholars reported that the Prophet Mohammed told his followers returning from a military campaign: “This day we have returned from the minor jihad to the major jihad,” which meant returning from armed battle to the peaceful battle for self-control and betterment.

    We should bear in mind that the meanings of jihad diversified in the course of recent decades[2]. Radical groups such as “Salafia Jihadiyya” (Jihadist Salafism), in particular, succeeded to resurrect jihad as an essential component of religious duty. According to them, jihad is the only alternative for Muslims in order to build and maintain the Islamic State.In this sense, jihad is a struggle not only for the triumph of faith but also to get power. Since the war in Afghanistan, Iraq and recently in Syria, the call to jihad attracted thousands of volunteers from the Islamic world, many Muslims form different parts of the occidental world also joined the cause. It is conceived as an act of liberation throughout the globe requiring the dutiful contribution of all Muslims.

    c)       Jihad al-nikah

    If we look at the definition and significance of the term Jihad al-nikah, we find that it has no roots or origins in the history of Islam or its literature. Entries provided by a large number of people interested in this topic in Wikipedia for instance often translated as Sex jihad or Sexual jihad (pleasure marriage). It is a controversial concept that refers to Sunni women allegedly offering themselves in sexual comfort roles to fighters for the establishment of Islamic rule.[3]

    It is important to emphasize that the practice of Jihad al-nikah is based on the fatwa, (religious jurisprudential opinions) issued around 2012 and attributed to a Saudi Wahhabi cleric: Sheikh Mohamad al-Arife . He asked Sunni women to offer themselves as comfort women “to boost the morale of fighters” in Syria. The religious argument presented is that “the Law of    necessity allows forbidden things in exceptional circumstances”. Despite the fact that Sheikh Mohamad al-Arife denied that he is the author of this fatwa, the impact of this religious opinion was important.

    Issuing such a fatwa is in fact not surprising. It is important to remind that fatwas issued during the last decade about women reflected the growing power and influence of religious men and their misogyny.  Also, the body texts of fatwas explain how religion can be used to justify all the practices aimed at establishing a new gender order and imposing new relationships. In this case violence gender-based becomes more and more tolerated and legitimized by such religious discourses.

    Looking at the current situation in Syria, the jihad action has just consolidated the inherited pattern if male domination. In this new battlefront, men that have been swarming from every corner of the world have bene motivated by an archetypal male image and role of rough fighters, engaged in a form of heroic self-sacrifice while women are sought to attend to their daily needs including becoming sex slaves.  But what is this role attributed to women in time of jihad?

    Historically speaking, classical authorities did not allow women to fight except in the most extraordinary circumstances yet did not expressly forbid that. According to the classical interpretation, women are not permitted to fight in jihad, but were told that their jihad was a righteous pilgrimage to Mecca (hajj). The duty of a Muslim woman, they argue, is to obey her husband and take care of her family. In addition, Shii scholars consider that the jihad of women is in enduring suffering at the hands of her husband and his jealousy.

    Despite the will of historians to marginalize the role played by women in the public sphere, Muslim feminists involved in writing the history of women like ‘Aliyya Mustafa Mubarak in her collection “Sahabiyyat Mujahidat”  succeeded to gather more than 67 names of women who participated in battles in a supporting role, usually by accompanying the fighters, encouraging the men, or by providing medical care and assistance. They are recognized as role model and admired by Muslims and they never offer their bodies to fighters.

    What can we conclude from the historical background?

    • Controlling the self is the moral duty of each Muslim, and this contradicts with the new link or connection between the action of jihad and sexuality.
    • The community should protect women since they are seen as vulnerable. Because women are weak they should be under the control of both the family and the community.
    • Performing the jihad is a gendered action. Man’s jihad is to sacrifice his wealth and his blood until he is killed in the path of Allah, but the jihad of the woman is to help her husband and her community. This vision maintains the established cultural dichotomies: men/public space, woman/private space, Woman /life, man /death.
    • Misogynic literature highlights why men want to keep women away from the battlefield. For the male fighter, the Houris (women of paradise) were a major attractant. On the contrary women on earth represent a tie that relatesthem to this world, whereas the whole focus of the fighter is supposed to be on the day after and the better world.
    • Reading the historical texts, particularly the jihad literature, confirms that this is not the first time that the concept of jihad is hijacked by political and religious groups over the ages in a bid to justify various forms of violence. In most cases, Islamic splinter groups invoked jihad to fight against the established Islamic order. Some reformist scholars, however, see this as an abusive interpretation of jihad that contradicts Islamic percepts.
    • In one of his first political speeches about the development of the country, Bourguiba pointed out that the real meaning of Jihad is struggling in everyday life in order to change social conditions and contribute to progress and development. Bearing in mind this aim, the jihad of women would therefore be against poverty and illiteracy. Nobody would imagine that 50 years after of the promulgation of the Code of Personal Status(1956), a group of Tunisian women would travel to a battlefield to serve as sexual slaves to fighters dreaming of a dark past. Is it due to lack of religious knowledge or is it a quest for new identity?

    II.       Different narrations, different interpretations

    a) The official narrative

    Allegations of this practice of jihad al-Nikah is related to the Tunisian government’s war effort against Al Qaida-linked Islamic terrorism in the mountainous Jebel Ech (center west of Tunisia bordering Algeria). The Tunisian coalition government”Troika” alleges that the practice began with Tunisian girls who showed sympathy to the Islamic jihad movement there, and then spread with Tunisian girls volunteering to join the Syrian jihadists.[4]

    It was on 19 September 2013 that the veracity of the alleged practice became the subject of heated debate in September 2013 after the Interior Minister made a public statement about Tunisian young women joining Syrian fighters. He stated in the National Constituent Assembly that a group of Tunisian women traveling to Syria for sex jihad were having sex with 20, 30 and even up to 100 rebels, and that some of the women had returned home pregnant. On 6October 2013, a Tunisian official downplayed this prior claim, affirming that the number of these young women who traveled to Syria did not exceed15, and that some were reported to have been forced to have sex with several Islamist militants.[5]This has been widely the consequence of the Arab Spring and the transition marked by the overt emergence of radicalism and active networks for recruitment of jihadists to join the Syrian opposition initially and ISIS front later, as well as trafficking in women.

    b) Stories of Mujahidat Al-nikah and testimonies reported on the Media:

    On 30 May 2013 ‘Tounesna’, a private Tunisian TV Channel,invited a Tunisian girl to tell her story on the program ا(وعليها الكلام امرا), a TV program that invites women for their positive reputations. She confessed being deceived to go to Syria under the name of Jihad al-nikah to marry the terrorists in a bid to support them in their fight against the Syrian government forces. Twenty-year old Aisha said she had met a woman who had been involved in luring girls at universities to recruit them for Jihad al-nikah in Syria. There is even a process of temptation as there is a promise that the fallen ones will be “martyrs holding up the banner of Islam”.  Aisha was among a group of 14 girls who had been deceived to get married as Jihad al-Nikah in Syria.  But Aisha’s father found out about her intention and convinced her not to go Syria by asking all their relatives to make her understand about Islam’s strong opposition to such moves.[6]

    On 23-7-2014, The Tunisian Jihadist Abu Qusay was interviewed by Tunisian TV in the programلاباس (Are you Ok?), after his return from Syria. He confirmed that stories about “Jihad al-Nikah” were true.[7]At the same time Interviews of worried parents and statements by Anis Koubaji, president of the Association of Assistance to Tunisian Expatriates (l’association d’aide aux tunisiens à l’étranger) were published on the Internet highlighting the recruitment of women, the role played by some charity associations to facilitate the departure of Tunisians to Syria and the reasons behind the will to support Syrian fighters.[8]

    Tunisian newspapers also reported that a young Tunisian man divorced his wife, and that they both headed to Syria almost a month ago to ‘allow her to engage in sexual jihad with the jihadists there. Another video widely circulated on the Internet and social websites in Tunisia shows the parents of a veiled girl called Rahmah, 17 years old. They said Rahma had disappeared from home one morning and they ‘later learned that she had headed to Syria to carry out sexual jihad.’  The young girl has since returned to her family, who have kept her out of sight, and said that their daughter is not a religious fanatic ‘but was influenced by her fellow students who are known for their affiliation with the Salafist jihadists.’ Her parents said these fellow students may have brainwashed her and convinced her to travel to Syria ‘to support the jihadists there.’ Such stories have become more common in Tunisia and parents have become concerned about the influence charismatic Islamic leaders in other Arab countries can wield over their children.[9]It should be noted that media played an important role in the new context of terrorism in Tunisia.Many stories about women helping radical Salafists in different regions of the country by offering them their bodies highlight the support and solidarity of some groups with those Salafists. However, stories related by the media often reported victims and no woman convinced of jihad al Nikah was among the interviewed.  The testimonies of young women broadcast on TV or published in newspapers or on the Internet showed their weakness and vulnerability. These girls have often been portrayed as easily manipulated, suffering from some emotional crises and lacking religious knowledge.

    c)       Narrating Jihad al-nikah

    Narrating Jihad al-nikah in the context of polarization between Islamists and secularists in post revolution Tunisia reflects the tension,anger, accusation and mutual mistrust.On the one hand, Islamist leaders from En-nahda party deliberately denied the issue;while others argued that it is a secular propaganda. Some of En-nahda’s comments adopted the point of view of International media.  On 7October 2013, the German magazine Der Spiegel reported that “sex jihad” to Syria was “an elaborate disinformation campaign by the Assad regime to distract international attention from its own crimes. Maher Nana, the president of the Human Rights Alliance for Syria reportedly said that it was pure propaganda: “Maybe the Tunisians have some evidence but I think these are just some false claims from the interior minister that might be linked to a political agenda”,[10] he commented.

    Another perspective was that of democrats, or secularists, who criticized policies adopted by En-nahda during the transnational process and accused Islamist leaders and Salafist groups of creating charity associations   for the purpose of arranging the travel of many Tunisian to Syria. Victims of radical Islamist parties or ideologies are constructed as people who need “our” help and protection from “others” in order to become emancipated and equal to other modern Tunisian women. The issue of Jihad al-nikah or violence against women has become a political issue.  Each party tried to defend itself and at the same time to accuse the other party.

    It is evident that the woman as victim of patriarchy and men’s violence is not a new issue in the public debate and popular discourse and has accompanied women’s and human rights movements for several centuries. However, this category’s content has varied, and during the last two years the category has increasingly become occupied by the figures of the Muslim woman assuming the job of the sex worker/prostitute. For this reason En-nahda party denied the existence of this “phenomena” because it was deemed harmful for Muslims in general and particularly for Islamic parties ruling the country. We should bear in mind that En-nahdha spent time and money developing a new image for itself, specifically in the West, and lobbying in order to be seen as a “moderate Islamic political party” working hard to build a new environment where people can live together.

    Although the minister of religious affairs (close to Salafists and overtly preached support of jihad in Syria) declared that the ministry would control preachers encouraging youth to travel to Syria, people were worried about the official position of the government. Othman Battikh the mufti of the state said in April that 13 Tunisian girls “were fooled” into traveling to Syria to provide sex to fighters. “For jihad in Syria, they are now pushing girls to go there,” Battikh angrily protested: “What is this? This is called prostitution. It is moral educational corruption.” He was dismissed from his position a few days later.

    Sheikh Fareed Elbaji, a young religious leader, told the BBC he personally knew families who had discovered that their daughters had gone to Chaambi or to Syria to offer sex in support of the militants, apparently in obedience to fatwas or religious edicts issued on the battlefields of Syria. [11]

    Similarly to this confused official position, feminists and women’s rights activists did not adopt the same position. Some took this issue as a proof of the regressive policies of Islamists while others focused their work on women suffering from socio-psychological disorders. They included this group of victims in their programs to protect women victims of violence. Their statements reflect human rights views and all the strategies used to empower victims. Feminists talked about challenges that Tunisian women are facing after the revolution and criticized how a few Tunisian women have become the object of display for males in a country reputed for promoting women’s rights and giving the chance to Tunisian to be a model in the region. Obviously, the Tunisian society experienced a paradigm shift from modern values to conservative rules.

    It is interesting to analyze few testimonies by some fighters who returned to Tunisia after joining the battle front in Syria. Few of them accepted to talk about their lives in the battlefield. According to them, Tunisian women are no more an exception and a model for Arab societies promoting rights and full emancipation. Tunisian women were among other women engaged in Jihad al-nikah in Syria. Moreover, some men confess that they had sexual relationship with an important number of women. There is no doubt that seeing women passive and in need of protection reinforces the strength and potency of the male fighter. If we analyze some male narratives, we see that most of them used exaggerated expressions and talk about performances. This way of reporting is a part and parcel to the discourse of becoming a hero after a long time of marginalization.

    If we consider that the basic value of Militarism is “power over the other” we are not surprised to see that fighters men are defending strict division of proper masculine and feminine roles and the binary oppositions (active/passive; logical/intuitive; rational/irrational; etc.) In this sense, war is “men’s work,” while taking care of men is the duty of women. Jihadists are constructing narrow definitions of masculine and feminine characteristics and establishing rigid gender roles. By imposing their rules, jihadists defend a certain ideology, which provides a context and justification for institutionalized discrimination and violence against women. Women exist only in relation to men–as victims in need of protection, or as sexual objects deserving exploitation. As Colleen Burke argues,

    Militarism needs a gender ideology as much as it needs soldiers and weapons. It needs men who accept and believe in their role as “warrior” so much that they are willing to obey orders even unto death and women who accept their “proper” role in relation to men and will sacrifice their sons to their country’s interests and exhort them to fight and submissively fulfill the sexual needs of men in the military.[12]

    Although women who engage in jihad al-nikah have been considered mostly as the victims of men, which is true in some cases, we think that women have a wide variety of motivations for entering into and consenting to jihad al-nikah: the pleasure of adventure was probably a factor particularly appealing to teenagers, but it does not explain the choice of this particular activity. From the available material shared on few blogs by Salafist girls, it seems that some girls believe in an ideology and are convinced of the afterlife rewards. They refuse to be paid for their services because they want to support men in their struggle as a duty and sacrifice for Allah. Taking into account that the recruitment message on internet relies not primarily on complex theological arguments, but on simple, visceral appeals to people’s sense of solidarity and altruism, we can argue that young women believe that their duty is to help fighters. Moreover, if we know that one meaning of the verb in Arabic ‘nakaha’.( نكح المرأة اعتمد عليها )is being supported by woman, we can understand the argument presented  by some young women.The material Jihadists are using internet to construct a pan-Islamic identity discourse emphasizing the unity of the Muslim nation and focusing on outside threats. Like many other identity discourses, what appears from the jihadist body of writings is a victim narrative that highlighted cases of Muslims suffering around the world. Considering Jihad al Nikah as an attempt to develop a parallel society based on what they believe to be the Sharia, young women are presenting themselves as “activists” supporting the Islamic State project rather than representing themselves in the position of passive victims.

    Obliviously, the different narratives/testimonies of young Tunisian women, official speech of the minister of interior at the NCA (september2013), and the media covering of the issue show this distinction between two categories of women:

    A first group of young women who were kidnapped, recruited or forced by their partners to go to Syria and to have sexual intercourse with fighters.  They are represented as victims of radical groups as well as men willing to make money by exploiting women. Indeed, poverty, illiteracy and marginalization of some regions has contributedto this factor and can be considered as a form of sex trafficking. A second group of women convinced about the utility of playing a role in the war. They believe that offering their bodies will enable them to become Mujahidat. For this reason they use this lexicon:

    أخوات الفراش» ومؤازرات و«مؤازرات الإخوان» و«مجاهدات النكاح

    Also different narrations pointed that some women were volunteers. They were willing to ‘offer’ their bodies to the fighters inside and outside the country. We should stress that the practice of offering one’s self,not the body is highly recognized by the community. Scholars mentioned that many women offered themselves to the prophet Mohammed willingly, hoping that the prophet would marry them. Moreover the practice was mentioned in the Quran.

    ﴿وَامْرَأَةً مُّؤْمِنَةً إِن وَهَبَتْ نَفْسَهَا لِلنَّبِىِّ إِنْ أَرَادَ النَّبِىُّ أَن يَسْتَنكِحَهَا خَالِصَةً لَّكَ﴾

    And a believing woman if she offers herself to the Prophet, and the Prophet wishes to marry her — a privilege for you only,” means, `also lawful for you, O Prophet, is a believing woman if she offers herself to you, to marry her without a dowry, if you wish to do so.” (Ibn Kathir) [13]

    These literal readings of the Quran verse, misunderstanding its percepts and principles or misinterpretation are not new in Islamic societies. But willing to offer one’s body to fighters (pleasure marriage) raised an important question: Who will get the pleasure?

    Undoubtedly, we are witnessing a redefinition of self-identity. Female bodies in the public sphere defying police forces at the beginning of the revolution have become in the imaginary of some radical groups docile bodies. This new construction of femininity (domesticity, dependency, fragility, lack of power…)in Tunisia known as the first country in the Arab world to implement women’s right and to ban polygamy highlights the ability of radicals to brainwash women and illuminates at the same time the crises of masculinity in Arab countries in the aftermath or the revolutions. By exploiting few groups of women for their pleasure, men have perpetuated the problem of sexual objectification of women’s bodies and project their fears and hatred onto women’s flesh. The fact that Tunisian men decide to take part in the Syrian war offers an alternative form of masculinity for them. These groups (criminals, Salafists, violent jihadists…) represented an idealized image of a new Tunisian style of masculinity as muscular, violent, independent, arrogant, and victorious in the war against others.

    III.       Conclusion

    The topic of Jihad al-nikah was an unexpected one because people were in the streets voicing their demands for political, economic and social changes but in time of war anything is possible. Indeed, the so called Arab Spring caused major shifts in Arab as well Western discourses and imaginaries of the self and the other. By accepting to assume the classical  role of women, this group of Tunisian  women are reinforcing patriarchy within both the private and the public spheres; also they are reinforcing the dominant position of men and the subordination of women. They reproduce the perception of public spaces as sites of masculinity, performance and practice. In this case we can understand the wave of violence against women in the transitional process. Deniz Kandiyoti (2013) defined this post-revolutionary violence against women as masculine restoration, defined as the use of manipulation and coercion against women as a result of the increased female presence in the public sphere. It is a tool men use to return to the traditional religion-based roles.[14]

    In order to understand why a group of Tunisian young women are attracted by this practice of sexual jihad and how “women mujahidat or muazirat (supporters)’ perceive their bodies and constitute themselves, it is interesting to analyze some face book pages and some blogs of Salafist young women. They choose pseudonames from classical repertory like Oum Al Bara, AlKhanssa, or openly praise themselves as being “terrorist and proud of it”.The topic mostly discussed on these pages is the war against infidels: police forces called ‘Atta’rut’ (despots), and political regimes that did not establish sharia law. The Salafist young women identify themselves with Kamikaze women in Palestine(Hamas), Chechen and other places where women sacrificed themselves as part of Jihad. They want to be honoured like fighters. Some of those young women joined the terrorists in Tunisia while others are more interested in sexual activities as form of rewarding fighters. In both cases, young women are moving  from ‘equal ‘roles and visibility in the public space to  classical ‘gender roles’ and the harem -private space. They are confirming their alterity within inherited cultural and religiously sanctioned patterns of identity politics as subordinate and supplements to masculine roles in the great holy war to restore the past glory of Islam. Whether Jihad al-nikah is a reality or a fabrication matters little as it has become an established and accepted action. It has proven that Tunisian society accepted to open a public debate and to analyze a phenomenon that many have never expected. The most important question here is that despite the horrors experienced by those who joined the front and the broad condemnation it brought, some women from Arab as well as European countries are fascinated by this practice

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    [1] Arabia before Islam, http://www.al-islam.org/restatement-history-islam-and-muslims-sayyid-ali-ashgar-razwy/arabia-islam(accesed 12-2-2015) A man betroths his ward or his daughter to another man, and the latter assigns a dower (bride wealth) to her and then marries her, we have also nikah al-istibda, the man who asks his wife  to have intercourse with another partner in order to get a child   ….)

    [2] Ben Salem Myriam, “Jihad As A Progressive Concept: The Case of The Tunisian Islamic Movement Al-Nahda”, in, La Violence Politique enTunisie, published by Association Tunisienne D ‘Etudes Politiques, Tunis, June 2013, pp53-68.

    [3] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sexual_jihad,(accessed 12-2-2015)

    [4] Sara Daniel, TUNISIE. La vérité sur le “djihad sexuel”

    http://tempsreel.nouvelobs.com/l-enquete-de-l-obs/20131107.OBS4614/tunisie-la-verite-sur-le-djihad-sexuel.html(accessed 7-2-2015)

    [5] Abid Zohra, Tunisie : Le «jihad nikah» oppose les imams au gouvernement

    http://www.kapitalis.com/politique/18333-tunisie-le-jihad-nikah-oppose-les-imams-au-gouvernement.html(accessed 4-2-2015) see also

    http://tunisie14.tn/article/detail/jihad-nikah-au-maximum-une-quinzaine-de-tunisiennes-sont-allees-en-syrie-selon-le-mi

    [6]http://www.tuniscope.com/article/25864/actualites/tunisie/t-t-confessions-545112

    3www.youtube.com/watch?v=onWv66_PrQs

    http://directinfo.webmanagercenter.com/2013/09/28/video-jihad-nikah-6-tunisiennes-detenues-par-hezbollah-au-liban/

    [8]1.000 Tunisiennes vouées au jihad nikah dans les camps d’Edleb en Syrie

    http://www.kapitalis.com/societe/17848-1-000-tunisiennes-vouees-au-jihad-nikah-dans-les-camps-d-edleb-en-syrie.html(8-2-2015)

    [9]http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2304128/Tunisian-girls-head-Syria-offer-Islamic-fighters-sexual-jihad.html

    http://ar.webmanagercenter.com/2013/09/25/19088/%

    [10]Avraham  Rachel,Sexual Jihad is a reality in Syria,

    http://www.portmir.org.uk/articles/wahhabism-s-sex-jihad.htm(accessed 9-2-2015)

    [11]Tunisie : Le « jihad nikah» oppose les imams au gouvernement;

    http://www.kapitalis.com/politique/18333-tunisie-le-jihad-nikah-oppose-les-imams-au-gouvernement.html

    [12]Burke Colleen, Women and Militarism

    http://wilpf.smilla.li/wpcontent/uploads/2012/10/Unknownyear_Women_and_Militarism.pdf (accessed 9-2-2015)

    [13] http://www.qtafsir.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1839&Itemid=89

    [14] Kandiyoti, Deniz, Fear and fury: women and post-revolutionary violence

    https://www.opendemocracy.net/5050/deniz-kandiyoti/fear-and-fury-women-and-post-revolutionary-violence (accessed 3-2-2015)

     

  • Sahar Mediha Al-Naas – Sexual Violence and the Women’s Exclusion: The New Libyan Gendered State

    Sahar Mediha Al-Naas – Sexual Violence and the Women’s Exclusion: The New Libyan Gendered State

    Sahar Mediha Al-Naas

    العربية | Français

    Women in Libya today face many challenges that hinder their political and civil participation and representation.  Neopatriarchy, war and conflict provide the ground for gender-based violence and sexualised violence that prolong in post-conflict aftermath (Al-Ali, 2014; Jurasz, 2013). Six years since the uprising and the current situation indicates that Libya is heading towards state de-formation (Rolf Schwarz, 2004).   Libyan women’s rights are on the edge of collapse.  The institutional ties between the state and religion, strengthened by the instability and violence since the 2011, and demonstrated in the Liberation speech by Mustafa Abdul Jalil , are having a devastating impact on women. Such impact is reflected in the systematic relapse of women’s rights under religious guise. Moreover, neopatriarchy reinforces and maintains patriarchal values that put women in a subordinate position, thus creates systems of oppression through religious and kinship institutional ties. In such system women, their bodies and sexual conducts are often held as the markers of the state’s religious and cultural identity. Such structure existed in the pre-Gaddafi period and was preserved and strengthened by Gaddafi for political purposes.

    In this paper, I explore the correlation between various aspects of state structure that characterise a Neopatriarchal state and its institutional ties with religion, and kinship, the position of Libyan women, their political and civic participation and representation, and the rapid collapse of their rights since 2011. I argue that the neopatriarchal state’s appropriation of religion, kinship and patriarchy, play a significant role in the regression of Libyan women’s rights. My focus will be on the institutional ties between the state and religion and the impact of these on women’s rights, in the context of conflict and a neopatriarchal state; I will discuss sexual violence as a weapon of war, the link between the militarisation of masculinity and Neopatriarchal structure that provided a foundation for gender based violence through the subjectification of women and the reinforcement of gender hierarchy.  I will shed light on the Libyan women’s participation in the uprising against Gaddafi in 2011 and the link between the exclusion of women and the nature of the uprising as an armed struggle over power and resources in a Neopatriarchal context.  I will explore how Libyan women – through civil and political participation and representation – can construct a feminist discourse, push a feminist agenda onto the political table, and overcome the “security priority” obstacle.

    Neopatriarchy

    Definition:

    Neopatriarchy is the modern form of patriarchy in which modernisation is limited to some bureaucratic aspects of the state. Neopatriarchal society, as Sharabi  described: “the hybrid, traditional and semi-rational structures and consciousness”. Sharabi identifies two types of neopatriarchal societies: conservative and progressive. Both share central psychological feature that is the dominance of the father figure(patriarch) whether the father of the nation or the family, and whose relations with the nation or the child is vertical. A hierarchal relation of power “mediated through force consensus and coercion.”    (Sharabi, 1988)

    Neo-patriarchy and Modernity

    A crucial factor in the formation of Modernity is an autonomous transformative capitalism and industrialization, in Marx’s revolutionary term, that leads to the eraser of class division, and creates horizontal social relations that is the foundation of democracy. In the MENA region, Capitalism was neither autonomous nor revolutionary to form Modernity. Moreover, the absence of real industrialization and independent Capitalism , and the subordinate asymmetrical relation between the west as the dominate colonial power and the colonised region characterised the formation of the Neopatriarchal states in post-colonial era, which Sharabi described as: “the marriage of imperialism and patriarchy” .

    Neopatriarchal States in MENA:

    Sharabi argued that the formation of Neopatriarchal states in MENA region was shaped by the encounter with the western Modernity early 20th century . Western Modernity was founded on the obliteration of the old system of tradition and Patriarchy in Europe, brought about by industrialization and Capitalism. Autonomous Capitalism, in Marx’s analysis of the emergence of the bourgeois as a revolutionary factor, constructed new horizontal social relations  that marked the formation of the European Modernity. The new modern society is governed by secular scientific mood of thought that replaced the religious spiritual allegorical governing structure characteristic of pre-modern Feudalist Europe. Some scholars argue that Modernity is uniquely European phenomena. Such notion is founded on dichotomous essentialist discourse that divides the world to the “Civilised” Europe and “Uncivilised” other . In such discourse, crucial historical, geopolitical, and socioeconomic factors are obscured.

    Neopatriarchy in Libya

    The Neopatriarchal state derives its legitimacy from the possession of power (Sharabi, 1988), whether the power was ceased or given. In the case of the MENA, Neopatriarchal state’s power and survival relies heavily on external and internal actors.

    External Factors:

    In post-colonial MENA, and during the Cold War period, the survival of varies states relied on their ties with the two superpowers and shaped by the competition between them : for example, but not limited to, Egypt (during Jamal Abdel Nasser rule), Algeria, Syria, Former South Yemen, and Libya had close ties with the former Soviet Union that provided them with technological, military and political support and assistance. On the other hand, Saudi Arabia, Jordon, Morocco, Egypt(post-Nasser), and other Gulf rentier states had/have ties with U.S. and Western European countries that provided them with economic aid (in the case of the non-rentier states), military, technological and political support. Thus, none of the MENA states could be described as strong modern state for their dependency on the superpowers for survival, therefore, the essential stages and elements in state formation were absent in the case of MENA. Van Creveld (1999) argues that in Western Europe state formation was shaped by warfare and the preparation of war that played a central and essential role .  Moreover, several scholars argued that the process of preparing for war involves the effective extraction of resources through sufficient bureaucratic, administrative and institutional mechanism needed for state-building, thus political rights and the rights of representation in government became integral to citizenship that included taxes payers from different social classes and not limited only to the monarch or the ruling elites. In such context, the notion of nationalism and citizenship formed and shaped the identity and strength of the state, in which the individual is a citizen, with rights and duties, and not a subject with constraining duties and without rights, as in the case of the MENA states.

    State formation in post-colonial MENA, as many scholars argue, is shaped by Rentierism. Rentierism has a profound effect on the state’s “foreign policies, human rights policy or aspects of political succession” . It creates a hierarchal citizenship, in which, wealth and political power are centralised and accessed exclusively by the ruling elites, thus marginalising and disfranchising the mass. This authoritarian political structure dominated the political scene in the post-colonial MENA. In Libya, as an example of rentier authoritarian Neopatriarchal state, Gaddafi’s foreign relations with the former Soviet Union, . U.S. and West European countries, such as Italy, Germany and France not only provided him with the military aid, but played a crucial role in the Oil referment, production, transportation and trade. Thus, enabling him to accumulate capital that was crucial to his survival in power for four decades while ruling Libya with an iron fist. Gaddafi used the oil revenue, not to build Libya’s infrastructure or state institutions such as education, health, and welfare, but to create state security institutions with the sole task of protecting his regime and ensuring his survival in power. The appalling human rights record and policy during Gaddafi’s rule, notwithstanding known to the international community, were largely ignored. Gaddafi’s relations with Oil companies were the key to his power; Gaddafi demanded big bonus, tough contract terms, and majority share of the revenues, and threatened to shut off production if the oil companies refused. Many of the big oil fields were run by smaller companies, to ensure power is fragmented when negotiating contract terms and to break the stranglehold of the oil major companies . Libya became the first developing country to secure a majority share of the revenues from its own oil production. To restore the severed relation with U.S., Gaddafi used his position of power to pressure the American oil companies to influence U.S. policies.

    After the overthrow of Gaddafi in 2011, Libyan power holders are unable to secure total control over the oil revenue. It became one of the major factors that shaped the conflict in Libya.

    Internal Factors:

     Religion, Tradition, kinship and Tribalism are internal factors on which the Neopatriarchal state rely for survival, or face as challenges.  Sharabi’s definition of Neopatriarchy encompasses several forms of political regimes in the Middle East and North Africa. For example: Libya (until 2011), Algeria, Iraq (until 2003), Syria, and former South Yemen are authoritarian-socialist; Iran, Sudan are radical- Islamist; Saudi Arabia, Morocco are Patriarchal-conservative; Tunisia, Egypt, Turkey are authoritarian-privatizing . All these states share the overarching cultural and religious influence on the Personal-Code that is deeply entrenched in patriarchal values. And many share the deep influence of kinship and triable culture in social life. Moreover, women’s rights are often compromised and used as a bargaining chip by the Neopatriarchal state to consolidate its power; women’s bodies and conduct are subjected to state Surveillance and scrutiny to maintain social order . The power Gaddafi possessed as the head of the state, dominated both the private and public spheres through his manipulation and total control of triable, kinship and religious institutions. Under his rule, oil revenue was monopolised to accommodate the political interest of his regime. Moreover, in the absence of sufficient public services and reasonable salary rate, Libyans, disfranchised and impoverished turned to the primary social structure of tribe, kinship, religion and family for survival and security. However, Gaddafi manipulated the tribble and religious institutions and structures to maintain his power, by empowering specific tribes and disempowering others to guarantee allegiance through his reward and punishment strategy. Moreover, after declaring Shari’a as the only constitution and after introducing Hudud law in 1972, Gaddafi’s dynamic with the religious establishment witnessed a big shift after the 1976 Zawar declaration in which Gaddafi stripped the religious clergy of their immunity and power and launched a campaign against them . Nevertheless, the Libyan family code, remained heavily influenced by Shari’a law, as an aspect of the institutional ties between the state and religion. The introduction of Hudud Shari’a based law in 1970  marked the beginning of the radical-Islamist form of Neopatriarchy . Gaddafi utilised religious conservative discourse to serve his claim as the “Imam of the Muslims” , a position of ultimate power.

    Neo-patriarchy and the State’s Identity

    Neopatriarchal state and structure, inherited from Gaddafi’s regime, characterised the post-Gaddafi Libya. The rise of political Islam coupled with the deeply entrenched patriarchal values limits Libyan women’s political and civil participation and representation. The Neopatriarchal state and structure in Libya, during and post-Gaddafi, appropriation of religious, triable and cultural discourses to maintain power created a dynamic in which any progress or regress in women’s position in legislations is decided by its political impact on the power holder in Neopatriarchal states. Mustafa Abdul-Jalil, the Head of the Interim Council (2011-2012) made a controversial statement on 23 October 2011, in relation to lifting all legal restrictions on polygamy.  His statement came as an indication of the institutional ties between the state and religion, characteristic of neopatriarchal state,  that would impact on women’s rights in Libya in the post-Gaddafi era.   As in other situations, both, discursive and physical control over women’s bodies are crucial in the struggle over power (Al-Ali and Pratt 2009: 93). In effect, the disciplining of women and their bodies are instrumentalized by both, state and none state actors to assert the new Islamic identity of the Libyan state and to display their Islamic credentials for political legitimacy in the New Libya. Women’s bodies and conducts are used as markers of the new Libya from the old Libya .

    Neo-patriarchy and Political Power in Libya

    The intimate relationship between religion and the state has been evident in Libyan history since the Sanussi monarchy (1949-1969)  (Martin, 1986; Sammut, 1994; Takeyh, 2000). Islamic identity constituted the political legitimacy of all political actors and shaped the political culture in the North African state (Brown, 1973; Pargeter, 2012;), before and after the 2011 overthrow of Gaddafi.  The Neopatriarchal state derives its legitimacy from the possession of power (Sharabi, 1988), thus, cultural, triable, religious, or traditional discourses can be manipulated to accommodate the political interest of the ruling force. In such context, the ordinary individual is a subject not a citizen, excluded from the political arena and decision making. Consequently, for survival, seeks security from primary social structures: family, tribe, religious sect. Moreover, among Neopatriarchal states’ characteristic aspects is the reinforcement of patriarchal values and social structures through the crippling legal system shaped by tribal, kinship and religious discourse of male supremacy. Thus, women’s bodies and conduct are subjected to state Surveillance   and scrutiny under religious and cultural guise, as the bearer of the family, community, or society’s honour. In Libya, Gaddafi, as the head of the Neopatriarchal state, possessed the ultimate power and dominated both the private and public spheres through his manipulation and total control of triable, kinship, religious institutions and natural resources. Moreover, the open-door policies (Sammut, 1994; Takeyh, 2000; Ashour, 2011) adopted by Gaddafi for survival, under international pressure after ten years of sanctions and isolation, provided a good opportunity for the spread of conservative Islamic revival discourse in Libya. Gaddafi Allowed the return of political Islam dissidents from exile and released their prisoners as a strategic move to maintain his power after the 2008 agreement between Saif Al-Islam and the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG), in which, LIFG denounced violence and armed Jihad in return of freedom from prosecution .  Such conservative discourse became firmly grounded in mosques since the 2008 agreement, focusing on the reconstruction of social morals and norms. Like the mosque movement in Egypt, the Islamic revival discourse aimed to replace mainstream moderate Islam with a conservative form of Islam heavily reliant upon Islamic orthodox teaching as a frame of reference. (Mahmood, 2005; Ahmed, 2011; El-Kholy, 2002). Such discourse placed women in a very subordinate position in society and reinforced patriarchal values.

    Women and Neo-patriarchy

    Neo-patriarchal state reinforces and maintains patriarchal values and gender hierarchy through its institutional ties with religion, kinship and customary law (Charrad, 2001) .  Notwithstanding, many women in MENA have access to education and employment, traditional gender roles and expressions put women in a subordinate position. Moreover, the institutional ties between neo-patriarchal state and religion determent women’s position and rights.  In Muslim majority countries, the impact of institutional ties between the state and religion on women’s rights are measured by the political legitimacy of religion. In other words the more the state encourages religious teaching to be integrated in constitutions and legislations the less rights women have. Such dynamic is manifested in sharia based family code .  Moreover, Sharia as a concept is vague and can be interpreted in a multitude of ways; the use of Sharia as the only source of legislation in family code gives the state unlimited power to control women, their bodies and their sexuality under a religious guise (Hosseini, 1996; 2006; 2009; Hamzic & Hosseini, 2010). Kinship and gender relation shape sharia law, as Charrad explains:

    “The most explicit aspect of Islamic family law concerns gender relations. Islamic family law places women in a subordinate status by giving power over women to men as husbands and as male kin. 

    The guardianship system, still implemented in some Muslim majority countries, gives the male guardian the right and the power to control women’s right of movement, sexual and reproductive rights, and any major choices in their lives.

    Under Gaddafi’s rule women’s access to education and employment, were unlimited, however, in the realm of family law and Personal Status women could not exercise many of their rights, even after reform introduced in article 10 of the 1984 law, under which a male guardian has no authority to refuse the marriage of a 20-year-old woman, or article 21 of the Green Charter (Refworld, 2011)  in which forced marriage is prohibited, marriage can be lawfully conducted by the male guardian in the absent of the bride. With respect to entry into and dissolution of marriage women don’t enjoy the same rights as men, especially economic rights and equal rights and obligations. As citizens, women lack fundamental rights such as the right to pass their nationality to their children and the right to remarry without losing the custody of her children. Both, the guardianship law and prohibiting women from passing their nationality to their children, demonstrate how Gaddafi reinforced patriarchal values, such as male authority and patrilineality.  Notwithstanding, male guardianship was restricted by the age and consent, it leaves a big gap for manipulation and exposes women and girls to various forms of violations. Women were not protected from gender-based violence and did not enjoy the same rights as their male counterparts. Libyan women’s political participation and representation did not exceed 2% (al-Obeidi, 2007) and for Gaddafi’s purposes was influenced by women’s proximity to the regime thus carried social stigma.

    Women’s Political Representation in Post-Gaddafi Libya

    In the first parliamentarian election in Libya in 2012, women gained over 16% of all seats in the General National Congress (GNC). This was unprecedented in the Libyan history. However, women’s political representation was shaped by the struggle over power between rival groups, thus antagonistic political claimant presented a challenge to women in the GNC. The GNC was divided between two political forces: the Muslim Brotherhood and their alias of independent members, many of whom are former members of LIFG, on one hand, on the other the Coalition of the National Forces party(CNF) .  Intimidation and threats were used by male members to silence women in the GNC .

    Women’s substantive political representation is representing women’s interests and needs (Celis and Childs, 2011, p. 3). Moreover, women’s issues were not discussed or debated in the GNC or in the sub-committees; within the GNC there are 15 sub-committees; each sub-committee deals with a legislative area and all are allocated to different government ministries. However, there is no sub-committee for women; a women’s file is allocated to the Human Rights Sub-Committee. This Sub-Committee had 8 women out of its 15 members. None of the key issues concerning women were dealt with or suggested by any of the 8 women for discussion; key issues such as: domestic violence, sexual violence against women and girls, discriminatory family law, the abduction of women activists or the economic disadvantage of women, were neither discussed nor raised for debate. The Sub-Committee had dealt with other files such as compensation for the wounded from the revolutionary fighters, families of martyrs and torture cases in prisons of armed groups. Most women members of the GNC I interviewed, when asked about the absence of women’s interest in the Human Rights Sub-Committee’s agenda, blamed civil society for failing to communicate women’s issues and needs to them. On the other hand, women’s groups and organizations complain of the limited access they had to the GNC and state that their suggestion to have observer seats at the GNC was refused.

    One hundred percent of women members of the Muslim Brotherhood party shared the same beliefs regarding women’s position in the gender power relation in the Libyan GNC. Moreover, in countries governed by political Islam parties, women with a sense of feminism are excluded from the political arena.  For example, female members of Egyptian Parliament during Murcy’s rule were those of the Muslim Brotherhood party and were known for their anti-feminist and misogynistic statements, such as Aza Al-Garf’s statement against gender equality and CEDAW (Mahatit Masr, 2012; Al Balad News, 2012)  .

    The 21 female NFC members of the Libyan GNC whom I interviewed between 2012 and 2013 demonstrate some diversity. From standing totally against gender equality and praising the Sudanese and Somali example of refusing CEDAW to the extreme contrast of full support for all UN conventions on human and women’s rights, these were all opinions and principles held by female members of the same political party. Thus, demonstrate nuances of independent and personal political views rather than uniformed their party’s ideology.

    In issues related to gender equality and women, the MB female members in the GNC rigidly followed party policy, thus their political representation was shaped by their party affiliation. However, the NCF female members did not display a uniformed discourse concerning women’s issues; their stands on the same issues were different and in contradiction in some cases.

    Overall women’s performance in the GNC was admirable, bearing in mind the challenges they faced; women in the GNC had more courage to challenge controversial issues such as the prison torture, the conflict between armed militias that resulted in the killing of civilians, and the vote for the Isolation Act .  It is worth mentioning the fact that the only member of the Libyan GNC who refused the 45 Libyan Dinar housing allowance was Fariha Albrqawi, a female member for Derna.

    The Gendered Constitution

    In addition to the ongoing conflict in their society, women in Libya face constitutional and institutional discriminations.  On 24th  December 2014, the 63rd anniversary of Libya’s independence, the CDA published the first draft of the new constitution. The draft reflected both the neopatriarchal (Sharabi, 1988) nature of the state and the poor representation of women in the CDA; issues such as citizenship, violence and equality were either overlooked, marginalised or completely ignored in the draft. Article 8 (1&2) states that Sharia is the only source of legislation and the state is obliged to enact legislations that prevent the dissemination of doctrines contrary to Islam (cdalibya, 2014), bearing in mind that many conservative forces in Libya see the UN conventions to eliminate all forms of discrimination against women as against Islam.  Article 32 outlines that the state is responsible for supporting and sponsoring motherhood and childhood, ensuring the reconciliation between women’s family and work duties; in other words, ensuring women’s work responsibilities do not overstep their family and motherly responsibilities (ibid.). as Deniz Kaniyoti‘s argued: ‘women’s participation in the public sphere has been limited by the boundaries of culturally acceptable feminine conduct and that a pressure has been exerted on women to articulate their gender interests within the terms set by nationalist discourse’ (1996: 6). In the case of Libyan women, the terms are set by the Neopatriarchal state and shaped by religious discourse. However, in the last draft published on 16 April 2017, article 32 was removed; furthermore, article 50 states that:” The State is obligated and committed to supporting and sponsoring women, enacting laws to protect them, raise their status in society, and eliminate negative culture and social norms that detract from their dignity, prohibit discrimination against them, guarantee their right to representation in elections and provide opportunities for them in all fields. Crisis to support their acquired rights”.

    Freedom of Movement

    Article 14 of the interim constitutional declaration for the year 2011: “The State shall guarantee freedom of opinion and freedom of the individual and collective expression, freedom of scientific research, freedom of communication, freedom of the press, the media, printing and publishing, freedom of movement, freedom of assembly and peaceful demonstration, and that is not contrary to the law.” Libyan women’s freedom of movement was challenged in February 2017 when the military governor of Albaida, a little town in the north east of Libya, General Abdul Razek al-Nadori, issued an Act prohibiting women under 60 from traveling without male guardian (muhram). The use of religious term such as (Muhram) gives the act religious legitimacy and power. When General al-Nadori was asked, in an interview on Libya TV, about the reason of issuing the act, he stated that it’s a national security matter, and claimed that many young Libyan women receive invitations from international organisations to attend conferences and workshops and can be recruited by international agencies as spies. General al-Nadori was later forced to postpone the implementation of the act due to wide campaign against it.  This illustrates how women’s rights are weakened by institutional ties between religion and the state and how the state appropriation of religion serves as a political tool to control women.

    Gendered War

    “Mustering troops is all about the mobilization of men into aggressive expressions of hypermasculinity – they are ‘pumped up’ and as it were to facilitate their most murderous and pornographic capabilities.”  (Mama, 2014)

    Wars and the militarisation of masculinity reinforce the patriarchal and traditional gender roles and identities and the subjectification of women.  Moreover, during the 17 February 2011 Revolution, despite Libyan women’s crucial and full participation in the revolution, rape as a weapon of war was feminised through the focus on women victims of rape, consequently, they were portraited as weak and vulnerable victims of sexual violence and in need of ‘masculinist protection’ (Young, 2003) by the militant Libyan male. The militarised masculine aggression, characteristic of the Libyan revolution, created and reinforced the bipolarisation of gender identities: the masculine, strong, aggressive male protectors against the feminine, weak, female victim. The gendering of subjectivity and the dehumanisation of the female victim, often shapes gender relations in post-conflict period (Mama, 2014). Gender hierarchy was further reinforced through the rise of a conservative religious discourse and its institutional ties to the neopatriarchal state. Mustafa Abdul-Jalil’s controversial statement in 2011, and the travel ban issued by the military governor in February 2017, both reflected the gendered conception of a state in which women are systematically appropriated, objectified and excluded from the public space. Such subjectification of Libyan women has its roots in the Neopatriarchal structure of the Libyan state and its institutional ties with the religious discourse throughout Libya’s post-colonial history.

    Sexual Violence and the Women’s Exclusion: The New Libyan Gendered State

    The six months of fighting in 2011 in Libya to overthrow one of the most brutal dictators in the region was marked by sexual violence. The systematic sexual violence, allegedly perpetrated by Gaddafi’s forces during the 2011 fighting, was politically instrumentalised to force the fall of Gaddafi’s regime. Evidence of systematic mass sexual violence was scarce, nonetheless, the deployment of rape as means of war by Gaddafi was brought to the attention of the International Criminal Court (ICC) by Luis Moreno-Ocampo the Chief Prosecutor, in June 2011, when he declared that there was evidence that Gaddafi had ordered his soldiers to rape women. On 27th June 2011, a warrant of arrest against Gaddafi was issued by the ICC.  This played a significant role in bringing Gaddafi’s regime to an end, as it forced his isolation and encouraged Libyan tribes and towns to switch allegiance.  Moreno-Ocampo, in a report presented to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) in November 2011, stated that “in Libya, rape is considered to be one of the most serious crimes, affecting not just the victim, but also the family and the community, and can trigger retaliation and honour-based violence” (Wueger,2012).  However, the full extent of sexual violence during the conflict remains unknown, and the mystery surrounding facts and myths of rape cases in Libya has been almost impossible to solve, due to the ongoing armed conflict, the lack of security and the culture of shame associated with rape in Libya; fear has deterred many women and men from reporting such crimes or accessing the help and support they desperately need.

    Nonetheless, some cases of rape committed by Gaddafi’s forces were documented and video recordings of rape, used by Gaddafi’s forces to spread fear among communities and tribes, were found by anti Gaddafi rebel .  However, sexual violence and the exclusion of Libyan women did not seize an end after the overthrow of Gaddafi, in the contrary, revenge attacks against towns deemed to have supported Gaddafi, such as Tawirgha, Bin Waleed, and Almshashia, have resulted in the arbitrary arrest of hundreds or even thousands of people, most of whom are still in detention centres across the country.  The highest concentration of conflict-related detainees of around 2700, including women, is in some seven facilities in Misrata with no government control, where torture, rape and death allegedly occur. (HRW, 2014)

    In Post-Gaddafi Libya, violence against women increased and took different forms; in addition to losing their very few rights they gained under Gaddafi’s rule, Libyan women today do not enjoy the same constitutional and citizenship rights as men. Moreover, Libyan women politicians and activists face a systematic campaign of fear, assassinations and forced displacement to silence them. Many factors played different roles in the exclusion of women, such as the rise of the conservative religious discourse, the spread of armed militias and the straggle over power and resources between different centres of power that created a chaos and instability by which the Libyan uprising has been marked. Such instability impacted on women, particularly women activists and politicians. Consequently, Libyan Women’s lives, safety, dignity, freedom and many other constitutional and human rights are being compromised and pushed into the margin because of the “stability priority” discourse.

    Rape as a Weapon of War in 2011 War

    In patriarchal s societies, women are the bearers and markers of the authentic cultural, religious and collective identity of the nation or community (Kandiyoti, 1991a; 1991b; 1992; 1998)   and the reproducers of the nation (Yuval Davis, 1997).  Their bodies and reproductive rights are controlled and appropriated by the community and the state, and perceived as communal property.  Their sexuality and sexual conduct becomes the marker of the communal honour.  In such discourse, raped women are labelled as damaged goods, need to be either eliminated or ‘fixed’.  In December 2011, I met a young Libyan woman who was arrested by Gaddafi’s police and detained for weeks before she was freed by the rebels in August 2011 after the liberation of Tripoli from Gaddafi’s forces. She told me that she was not raped, but because she appeared on TV talking about her experience in Gaddafi’s prison, where she was tortured, people assumed that she was raped and consequently labelled her as one. She adds that she was bombarded by phone calls from civil society organisations with the intention to convince her to marry any of the amputated ‘brothers’ to restore her honour and the honour of her family. She described how they stalked her and used intimidation and threats to force her to agree to the marriage.  She claims that they put intense pressure on raped single girls to agree to such marriage and they use threats in many cases.  They say they want to protect women, particularly raped ones, from becoming immoral after losing their virginities.

    Many cases of rape reported during the 6 months of war and stories of Viagra bill been found with Gaddafi’s militias, spread on a global scale.  Shame and stigma deterred many men, women and girls from reporting rape.  Human Rights Watch documented 10 cases of apparent gang rape and sexual assault of men and women by Gaddafi forces during the conflict, including detainees in custody.  All these cases show the extreme brutality of rape when used as a weapon of war. (HRW, 2011)

    The threat of rape has been used to spread fear to prevent towns from joining the revolution and to force them to switch allegiance.  Until today, not one case of rape has been brought to court in Libya since 2011.  Moreover, On 2 May, the National Transitional Council (NTC) adopted Law 38 of 2012  in which, article four exempts the rebels of 17 February 2011 revolution of any criminal or legal responsibility for their crimes during or after the war.  However, the Observatory on Gender in Crisis, a Libyan NGO, lobbied to make rape during conflict a war crime in Libya.  The bill was drafted and presented to the GNC in November 2013 by the minister of Justice, but was never ratified. I interviewed Souad Whaida, the director of the Observatory on Gender in Crisis, who explained how the bill puts rape as a weapon of war aimed at society as a whole, not only women.  She believes that feminising rape in conflict further victimises women and downplay crucial facts about rape as a weapon of war; the irreversible damage and distraction it conflicts on, not only the victims and their families, but their communities and societies makes it the cheapest and more effective weapon of war. The use of cell phone cameras to film rape crimes committed by Gaddafi’s forces was not only for the visual reminder of such triumph, but to emasculate the enemy though assertion  power over their “properties”, by identifying rape victims publicly to humiliate their families, towns and communities. Women, girls and boys are perceived as properties of the defeated that can be acquired by the defeater (Jurasz, 2011: 134).

    The Impact of Conflict on Women in Libya

    The condition of women in many conflict affected societies – such as Iraq, Afghanistan, Sudan, Syria and Libya – shows just how women can lose many, if not all, of their constitutional and social rights during and/or after conflict at the hands of both old and new rulers (Al-Ali, 2005; Al-Ali&  Pratt, 2007; Hale, 2000).  Conflict and war, coupled with the rise of political Islam in the so called “Arab Spring” countries, further encouraged the prevalence and prolonging of sexualised and gender based violence to post-conflict periods. In addition to rape, sex-trafficking and forced-prostitution, the constitutionalisation or attempts to constitutionalise gender based violence against women and girls under religious guise, are characteristics of the conflict and post-conflict periods in Libya, Egypt, Syria and Tunisia. They are the less visible forms of sexualised and gender based abuse and violence. The constitutionalisation of marital rape, child marriage and denying women their sexual and reproductive rights, the confinement of women to the private sphere, the restriction of their movement, the mandatory dress code, and the diminishing of women’s, economic and political rights, these are all different forms of the gender based violence women and girls face under the militarised and theocratic rule.

    The case of Afghanistan after the defeat of the Soviet Union at the hands of the Mujahidin and their American allies demonstrates how violence against women can take many forms, including constitutional gender discrimination, as Kandiyoti describes:

    “The damage inflicted by Taliban decrees was extensive; whereas previously 70 per cent of teachers, almost half of civil servants and 40 per cent of doctors had been women, they were altogether banned from paid employment, including trade, and prohibited from leaving their homes without a mahram (an immediate male relative). For war widows who had become the sole breadwinners of their families, this meant levels of destitution that reduced many to begging or prostitution.” (Kandiyoti, 2005).

    Armed conflicts and wars not only create a suitable climate for the continuation of sexual violence in transitional periods, but also encourage and create different forms of sexualised and gender based violence against women and girls.

    The militarisation of the Libyan revolution was an indication of increase violence against women and men during and after the six months of the uprising. Sexual harassment in the streets, universities and workplace was/is accompanied by a widespread advocatory campaign for an Islamic dress-code mandate; publications and leaflets of images of what is claimed to be the Islamic dress for women have been disseminated in public offices, universities, hospitals and on the Internet.  Moreover, since the Islamic State (IS; ISIS; ISIL) declared its existence in Libya, the campaign of violence against women, and particularly women activists, has intensified.

    On the 25th  June 2014 Salwa Bugaighis was assassinated in her home in Banghazi after she had participated in Libya’s general election; at the time Banghazi was a stronghold of Jihadist militants groups, Ansar Alsharia (an offshoot of Alqaida who pledged allegiance to ISIS in November 2014), claims responsibility for the killing campaign targeting the army, judges and activists. It is worth noting  that Salwa participated in many demonstrations against the armed militias and extremism in Banghazi and particularly, Ansar Alsharia.

    On 18 July, Fariha Elbairkawi, a former member of the General National Congress was assassinated in her car in her home town Derna. Derna since 2011 became a strong hold of Ansar Alsharia.

    S E, a third year medical student , was gunned down on 20th November 2014 in the Hay Alandalous area in Tripoli; eye witnesses said she was chased by a black car before five bullets were fired at her while driving. One bullet hit her head and consequently she lost control of her car and drove in to a wall. The same day, another woman was gunned down in the same area in Tripoli; both young women were driving their cars at the time of the shooting and had no head cover. These incidences came days after Ansar Alsharia, in Derna and Tripoli, pledged their allegiance to Islamic State (IS; ISIS; ISIL) Caliphate Albaghdadi; one cannot see such incident as  a coincidence when calls to prohibit women from driving in Derna were issued by Islamists since they declared Derna as an Islamic state back in May 2014, as activists from Darna confirmed .

    The targeting of women and the campaign of terror launched by extremist to silence them has confined them to their homes and deprive them from basic human rights. This has been further encouraged by the situation in Tripoli today where the city became under the control of militias and their affiliates from the expired and dismantled GNC and their illegitimate government since July 2014. Such situation can be described as catastrophic with the outbreak of fighting, spread of killings and the brutal repression of human rights defenders and women.  Many activist, especially women, fled to neighbouring countries such as Tunisia and Egypt, where they face the unknown with no resources.

    Conclusion

    Gaddafi’s appropriation of religion and patriarchy deprived women from enjoying full and equal citizenship, and limited their participation and representation in the public sphere, thus created system of oppression Libyan women today are battling against its legacy. Four decades of systematic objectification of women during Gaddafi’s rule, whether as “emancipated” militarised sex objects, or broken victims of social patriarchal stigma and imprisoned in rehabilitation house elbate elegetimaa’i   with no rights and dignity, such systematic subjectification has its profound impact on women’s status today in post-Gaddafi Libya. To dismantle such system, women need to deconstruct Neo-patriarchy and its roots that are deeply entrenched in patriarchal values.

    In February 2011, Libyan women risen against Gaddafi’s dictatorship hopping for a transformation that will bring the democracy and prosperity they long aspired. The sought of transformation that will end repression, poverty and inequality. What came after the over through of Gaddafi was far from what they aspired. In addition to violence and conflict, they witnessed the systematic relapse of their rights under religious guise. Today they face the same system of oppression if not worst.

    Libyan women’s bodies and conducts became the marker of the new religious identity of the state. The appropriation of religion and kinship by the new forces for political gains compromised women’s rights. Conflict and war pushed women’s interest and right to the margin as less important than stability. Women activists today face exile or assassination. However, since 2011 Libyan women entered the public space and formed civil society groups in unprecedented number.  Throughout the uprising many women’s groups began to emerge in the form of charities. Their objectives were limited to relief work aimed at raising money for Libyan refugees in Tunisia and the fighters on the frontline.  However, after liberation in October 2011, these groups started to take shape and both their interests and identities began to form and crystallize.

    During the four decades of Gaddafi’s rule, Libyan women did not enjoy any of their fundamental rights such as freedom of expression, the freedom to demonstrate, freedom of assembly, political parties and associations, or any of the elements that encompass civil society. This was due to the absence of the constitutional reference, in which the civil rights of the individual are defined and protected; Gaddafi demolished the old Libyan constitution after he seized power in 1969. Thus an autonomous civil society did not exist during Gaddafi’s rule and is still not unreservedly autonomous after the 2011 uprising.

    Since the 2012 election and in spite of the 33 women in the GNC, women in Libya have lost much of what they gained under Gaddafi’s rule. Polygamy now is free of all the restrictions previously placed upon it, Libyan women are prohibited from marring non-Libyan men, the public sphere has become very hostile to women and the very few services for victims of gender-based violence have disappeared altogether. Women’s interests and needs have not been represented in the GNC and policy initiatives concerning family law and violence against women have not been debated or brought to the GNC’s attention by female members. Thus, the political representation of the GNC female members can be described as descriptive but not substantive representation. The factors by which such representation is shaped are related heavily to political Islam and the Islamization of Libyan society since the spread of the Islamic revival in the region in the last two decades of the last century. Ideologically, most women interviewed share the same religious beliefs regardless of their party affiliation. Furthermore, the majority of women in the GNC are in favour of complementarity (takamul) and not total equality (muswat) between men and women, mainly because of their particular understanding of Islam. They firmly believe that total equality is not Islamic and are thus reluctant to accept UN conventions such as CEDAW. This, however, has come about as a result of the fierce campaign against gender equality and the UN conventions initiated by political Islam forces since the 2012 election. None of the women members of the GNC lack agency, however the general attitude towards feminism and gender equality is shaped by the political Islam discourse. The emphasis on gender complementarity (takamul) in lieu of total gender equality (muswat) is central to political Islam’s gender discourse. Thus, women’s political representation is limited by Islamic orthodoxy as a frame of reference. This frame of reference has been reinforced through the Islamization of the collective consciousness of the whole society since the late eighties, but also by force of arms and terror in post-Gaddafi era. Moreover, the political Islam forces since the overthrow of Gaddafi are benefiting from their control of the armed groups. They silence their opponents by the use of violence, especially against women. Civil society and women’s NGOs received no help or support from the NTC or both interim governments, thus the help of the international development agencies was significant to their work prior to the election. The hard work and determination of women in civil society and the international pressure to include women in the political arena resulted in the unprecedented participation of Libyan women in the 2012 GNC election. The agenda of the international funders and development agencies is not clear and more research is needed in this area; their help after the election can be perceived as distracting to the effort to unite women, by causing a rivalry and a competitive attitude among women’s NGOs when they enter bids for funds. Moreover, many of the projects funded after the election did not reflect the urgent need of Libyan women at this stage of their struggle for equality. The outcome of the partnership between Libyan NGOs and international partners varies and depends on the level of awareness of Libyan women themselves. However, a strong and autonomist women’s movement is absent in the Libyan case and the climate created by the international development agencies’ involvement in Libya is one of the obstacles preventing the formation of an autonomous women’s movement.

    Party affiliation is strongly noticeable in the political representation of the female members of the MB party. The identical answers of seven female members to all of my questions indicate a strong party affiliation. On the other hand, the 27 female NFC members of the GNC whom I interviewed demonstrate some diversity. From standing totally against gender equality and praising the Sudanese and Somali example of refusing CEDAW to the extreme contrast of full support for all UN conventions on human and women’s rights, these are all opinions and principles held by female members of the same political party. However, social conservatism has a profound impact on women’s political representation and notion of equality at the legislative level. Moreover, a secular feminist approach is widely rejected and, as evidenced by my findings, would divide women when unity is of the essence; any attempt to improve women’s condition in Libya today will only be successful through one path: a new Islamic discourse, which will challenge the traditional jurisprudence fiqh and remove its sacredness to allow a contemporary and egalitarian interpretation of Islam. In the Libyan case, only Islamic feminism holds the key to defeating the gendered dominant discourse of political Islamic. Moreover, Islamic feminist discourse rejects the male dominated and misogynistic interpretation of the Qur’an and argues that true Islam is compatible with gender equality (muswat). Such discourse will have an impact on women’s political representation in post-Gaddafi Libya if combined with an autonomous women’s movement, political opportunities and political will.

    References

    Al-Ali, N., 2012. ‘Gendering the Arab Spring’, Middle East Journal of Culture and Communication 5 (1). pp. 26-31.

    Al-Ali, N. 2005. ‘Reconstructing Gender: Iraqi Women between Dictatorship, War, Sanctions and Occupation’, Third World Quarterly 26: 4: 733-752.

    Al-Ali, N. and N. Pratt. 2009. What Kind of Liberation? Women and the Occupation of Iraq. University of California Press, Berkeley.

    Cdalibya, 2014,  Constitution Drafting Assembly, Available at: http://www.cdalibya.org/assets/files/9_1_1419437993.pdf [Accessed 24 December 2014]

    Hamzic, V. Mir-Hosseini, Z., 2010, Control and Sexuality: The Revival of Zina Law in Muslim Contexts, London: Women Living Under Muslim Laws.

    HRW, 2012,  World Report: Libya, (Human Rights Watch: New York, January 2012), available at: http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/related_material/libya_2012.pdf [Accessed 20 April 2014]

    HRW, 2011. Libya: Transitional Government Should Support Victims. HRW. Available at: http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/09/19/libya-transitional-government-should-support-victims [Accessed 20 August 2013]

    Hosseini, Z., 1996. ‘Stretching the Limits: A Feminist Reading of the Shari’a in Post-Khomeini Iran’. In M. Yamani (ed.) Feminism and Islam: Legal and Literary Perspectives. Reading: London, Ithaca Press.

    Hosseini. Z., 2009, Islam and Gender: the Religious Debate in Contemporary Iran, New York: I. B. Tauris & Co Ltd.

    Kandiyoti, D. ed., 1991a, Women, Islam and the State, Philadelphia: Temple University Press.

    Kandiyoti, D., 1991b, ‘Identity and its Discontents: Women and the Nation’, Millennium: Journal of International Studies 20: 3: 429-433.

    Kandiyoti, D. ed., 1992. Introduction. Women, Islam and the State. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.

    Kandiyoti, D . 1988. ‘Bargaining with Patriarchy’, Gender and Society. Vol. 2, No. 3, September.

    Kandiyoti, D., 2005. The Politics of Gender and Reconstruction in Afghanistan. UNRISD Publication. Available at: www.unrisd.org/publications/opgp4 [Accessed 20 November 2012]

    Jurasz, O., 2013, Women of the Revolution: The Future of Women’s Rights in Post-Gaddafi Libya. In: Panara, C., and Wilson, G., ed. 2013. The Arab Spring: New Patterns for Democracy and International Law. Nijhoff . Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, pp. 123–144.

    Report of the International Commission of Inquiry to investigate all alleged violations of international human rights law in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, (UN Human Rights Council: 1 June 2011), UN Doc. A/HRC/17/44, available at: http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/docs/17session/A.HRC.17.44_AUV.pdf (accessed 28 August 2014)

    Tanasuh Foundation, 2013. Mo’atamar almara’a ila ien.Kalimat d Alsadiq Alghriani. Available at: <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DyJAet2-1sI> [Accessed 9 March 2013]

    Wueger, D. (2012). “Libya: Women Under Siege Project”, available at: http://www.womenundersiegeproject.org/conflicts/profile/libya [Accessed 2 September 2014]

    Young, I. M. 2003. ‘The Logic of Masculinist Protection: Reflections on the Current Security State’, Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society, vol. 29, no. 1, pp. 1-25.

    Yuval-Davis, N. 1997. Gender and Nation. Sage, London.

  • Rym Quartsi – Does Language Matter?: Surveying Language, Gender, and Violence in Rachida, The Harem of Madame Osmane, and Barakat!

    Rym Quartsi – Does Language Matter?: Surveying Language, Gender, and Violence in Rachida, The Harem of Madame Osmane, and Barakat!

    Rym Quartsi

    العربية | Français

    The aim of this essay is to explore how women experienced violence in Algeria during the black decade (1992-1999)––a time of political and social turmoil––through the lens of the films that have emerged in the period since. The black decade designates the period of violence that took place in Algeria after the dissolution of parliament and cancellation of elections in 1991. The conflict between armed Islamist groups and the Algerian army led to the assassination of civilians, intellectuals, and the displacement and exile of the population.  More specifically, this essay is an attempt to explore how these Algerian films depict violence in relation to gender and how they utilise language as a symbol of ideology.

    Although films are shaped by a director’s subjectivity and by constraints of materials and time, they are also determined by the culture that produces them. Films often form part of the social narrative of a given period in history and offer a lens through which to analyse the impact of significant events. The dismantlement of state structures that financed filmmaking, coupled with the unstable situation––violence in Algeria, death threats towards filmmakers and actors–– resulted in a dearth of film production during the 1990s. So few images of the conflict were presented in the Algerian media, that the historian Benjamin Stora described it as a ‘war without images’.[1] However, the resurgence of Algerian cinema after the black decade has coincided with the emergence of female filmmakers and films that pay more attention to the situation of women, contemporary issues and post-war trauma.

    From the films produced after the black decade, I have selected three that range in both period and cultural setting: Le Harem de Madame Osmane (2000, Dir. Nadir Moknèche), Rachida (2002, Dir. Yamina Bachir Chouikh) and Barakat! (2006, Dir. Djamila Sahraoui). Co-produced by French production companies, Rachida and Barakat! received Algerian state funding, and all feature women as protagonists. Each film is written and spoken in a different language: French, colloquial Arabic (darija) and a mixture of darija and French. My questions are: what is the role of language in each film? Does the use of language shape the way the film engages with gender, violence, and power relations? What does language bring to the characterization of the protagonists in each of these films?

    Importantly, these films not only deal with the 1990s but in the cases of Le Harem de Madame Osmane and Barakat!, they also draw on the nation’s colonial past through the figures of the mujahidates––women who took part in the Algerian liberation movement against French colonial power (1954-1962).[2]  I shall question how these events are remembered and expressed and the role language plays in doing so. Scholar Abdelkader Cheref observes that women’s movements were the only ones that could challenge both Islamists and the governing power during the black decade.[3] I will explore how they are seen to do this as both writers and protagonists in the films I have chosen and, in doing so, how they use language to respond to their situations. Before I am able to do so, however, it is necessary briefly to outline the on-going debates around language in Algeria.

    Language became a means of constructing national identity in post-independence Algeria. The politics of nation-building introduced after independence (1962) drew on the pre-colonial history of Algeria as an Arab and Muslim country: Modern Standard Arabic (a modern variant of Classical Arabic) became the official language, and Islam the state’s religion. The aim of promoting Arabic and Islam was twofold: to inscribe Algeria within the pan-Arabic nation––a political alliance of Arab nations––and demonstrate that Algerians had regained power over the French colonial rule when the Arabic language was marginalized––although there were moments in history where French schools taught Arabic (as a foreign language).[4] The politics of enforcing Modern Standard Arabic in public administration, schools and the media was known as Arabisation and was intensified over the decades through official texts. Arabisation also became an act of political expedience. For sociolinguist Mohamed Benrabah, Arabisation was furthered by various Algerian governments who sought alliances from pro-Arabisation hardliners to counter the politically influential Francophone elite.[5]

    Establishing a unified language, as a core preoccupation of nationalism, also went beyond expelling traces of colonialism. Sociolinguist Catherine Miller argues that Algerian governments, post-independence, set more importance on annihilating local languages than foreign, colonial languages.[6] Non-Arabic languages were not considered part of the post-independent national identity.Even film directors had to conform to Arabisation and post-independence films, in the 1970s, used Modern Standard Arabic. Cultural artists, particularly Algerian novelists––such as Kateb Yacine, Assia Djebar, Rachid Boudjedra––made use of the diversity of languages to challenge the monolithic state authority, monolinguism, and the myths of nation-building. Similarly, Algerian filmmakers used language to investigate national identity and cinema, therefore asserting that nationhood is not linked to one language. In view of the ties between language and national identity, the survey of the three films will expose how language was used in films to resist violence during the black decade.

    I.       Rachida: Darija and National Identity 

    Rachida is the first feature film of Bachir-Chouikh who wrote and edited the film. Rachida received both national and international attention as it documented the era of the 1990s when bomb attacks had increased in frequency and the population lived in terror. Rachida circulated in international film festivals such as Cannes and won the Satyajit Ray award at the London Film Festival in 2002.  The film was released in 2002, in Algeria and France, and attracted approximately 60,000 spectators in Algeria and 125,000 in France.[7] The number of 60, 000 is quite high, given that fewer than ten cinemas were open in 2002. Bachir-Chouikh stated that Algerian audiences were moved by the Rachida because it described the events they had lived through, something that had not happened since The Battle of Algiers (1966).

    Bachir-Chouikh, born in 1954, attended the short-lived Algerian National School of Cinema and began her career as a script supervisor on two Algerian features: the big hit Omar Gatlato (1976, Dir. Merzak Allouache) and Wind of the South (1982, Dir. Mohammed Lakhdar-Hamina).[8] It is worth noting that Omar Gatlato is one of the first films in darija; the film did not use Standard Arabic, thus going against the practice recommended by the State authorities. Rachida too is mainly in darija.

    The story is inspired by a real-life event: the death in the Algiers Casbah of a teacher, Zakia Guessab, who was assassinated after she refused to place a bomb in her school.[9] The protagonist, Rachida, lives in a working class area of Algiers, with her divorced mother. One scene illustrates that she has no money to buy imported shoes; nonetheless we see that she does not lack nationalist moral fibre, as she aims to buy only Algerian shoes! On her way to the elementary school where she is a teacher, Rachida is threatened with a gun by a group of adolescents. The group asks her to place a bomb in the school. Rachida categorically refuses and is then shot, leaving her almost dead on the street. Amongst her attackers she recognized a former pupil. After she recovers, Rachida leaves Algiers and hides with her mother in a remote village where she eventually obtains a job at the neighbouring school. Once in the village, Rachida has to recover from the traumatic event she experienced: she often sits and rocks her head, listens to music, and has nightmares involving terrorist attacks. At the end of the film, the events repeat themselves; the terrorists raid a wedding, women are kidnapped, and people are killed.

    Bachir-Couikh struggled to arrange financing, and spent five years gathering the necessary funds. The film was in the end largely funded by French-German television Arte, the Gan Insurance foundation and received some funding from the Algerian Ministry of Culture and Communication.[10] Bachir-Chouikh stressed that the same script was both presented to the Algerian committee for funding and to foreign funding bodies, which is to say, the script was neither censored nor modified to conform to particular funders’ expectations.

    Bachir-Chouikh presented her film as an attempt to depict the violence ordinary women lived through. She meant to portray the life of the ‘simple and poor’, those who experienced terrorism but were not acknowledged in the media. She chose women to be the protagonist on the ground that: ‘women are the ones who give life, not death’.[11]  Rachida was criticised by Algerian journalists such as Yacine Idjer, who considered the film to bear an over-simplified, stereotyped view of the Algerian situation at the time of the events.[12] Arabic-language Algerian newspaper Al Hiwar also criticized Chouikh’s film on the grounds that it depicted a distorted image of Algeria: the unemployment and marginalization of the youth, the failure of the state to protect the poor and vulnerable, and the situation of women who are seen as victims of the patriarchy.[13] Al Hiwar journalist argued that Chouikh is influenced by a ‘Western’ vision of the woman and disrespects Algerian values.[14] Nonetheless, the events presented within the village delineate the ways in which women and men endured violence during the black decade and gained international attention.

    I shall now focus on two scenes that illustrate the use of language, and I shall offer further insights into how Rachida uses language to negotiate her way out of the violence she lived and the trauma she continues to endure. The first scene shows Rachida being asked by her pupils whether Algiers really is the ‘white city’ [in Arabic and in French Algiers is referred to by names which translate literally as Alger la Blanche]. She replies––presumably thinking of the association of whiteness with purity––that a country or a city will be white the day the people can live freely, fearlessly and with dignity.[15] Rachida addresses her pupils dynamically; the camera follows her as she moves and talks. The long shot embraces the classroom, and she is filmed from behind, focusing the audience on the rapt expression of the pupils as they listen to her. The camera movement enhances the feeling of intimate dialogue: she is sharing her thoughts and moves physically as her ideas are imparted. When the camera stops, Rachida resumes her activity as a teacher and begin asking for her pupil’s names in the usual manner of teacher taking a class register.

    Scholar Abdulkafi Albirini argues that Standard Arabic is the language that brings ‘seriousness and importance to a topic’ whereas darija is the language that is ‘used for narration and giving concrete examples’.[16] However, Rachida reverses this statement and uses darija to convey ideological views. Prior to this scene, Rachida is introduced by a male schoolteacher. He clearly makes use of Modern Standard Arabic to warn the children that they will be punished if Rachida is given cause to complain about them. The association of Modern Standard Arabic with punishment and masculine authority contrasts with the way in which Rachida addresses her pupils and invites them to ask questions in the following scene. An association is made between darija and a gentler more sympathetic approach to education. The use of darija also brings to the scene a sense of verisimilitude since it is the everyday language used at home and outside school. The use of darija therefore creates proximity not only with the pupils but also with the Algerian viewer, and makes it clear that Rachida’s use of darija is an active choice.

    The second scene contrasts Rachida with another female teacher. The teacher is filmed approaching Rachida and kneels to face her. A medium reverse-shot brings more intensity to the discussion they have. The teacher asks Rachida in darija whether she is married. A close up enhances the severe expression of the teacher as she asks: ‘why don’t you wear the hijab (the veil)?’. Rachida replies humorously that the doctor did not recommend it. The teacher is outraged that a doctor is given more authority than God, and cites a Koranic holy expression. Rachida replies with another Koranic verse thus demonstrating her mastery of Classical Arabic and Islamic precepts.

    The use of darija in the scene initiates the dialogue with Rachida and gives a ‘natural’ turn to the discussion, though one nonetheless ideologically charged. However, when her use of darija fails to achieve the desired effect on Rachida, the colleague attempt to assert superiority by using Modern Standard Arabic instead, to quote religious verses at her. Rachida is conscious of the assertions implicit in her colleague’s use of Modern Standard Arabic and replies to her, in turn, using Modern Standard Arabic. The second scene is highly contentious and was criticised by the Arabic newspaper Al Hiwar for illustrating through Rachida’s rejection of the veil Bachir-Chouikh’s attachment to Western values.

    The veiling of women was a political and religious stance taken by both the Islamic parties and, later, the armed Islamist parties: un-veiled women were associated with a lack of moral values and ‘real Muslim’ women had to veil in order to abide by Islamic laws and protect themselves from men’s gaze.[18] Rachida’s female colleague associates marriage and veiling with good morals and the preservation of female honour. She confirms that veiling corresponds to ‘modesty, obedience, sexual probity, conformity’ and that all these ‘qualities’ are ‘expressed publicly and overtly when [the veil is] worn’.[19] The female colleague interiorized and reproduced a discourse about the hijab. She also uses a rhetorical discourse to pressure Rachida and mixes darija with Modern Standard Arabic. The scene illustrates ideological antagonisms between women, who may nonetheless be fellow darija-speakers. There is no clear linguistic division, therefore, between representatives of opposing political ideologies. The discussion in this scene highlights the moral views of the female teacher and is informative of the village life. The depiction of village life brings under scrutiny gender relations, sexual tensions and patriarchal values: women need to preserve their virginity before marriage, almost all women are veiled, and a segregation of space between men and women is enforced.

    Fatma, Rachida’s mother, who is also veiled, does not pressure Rachida into veiling. Fatma uses language and music to reassure her daughter and live through terror. While the actress who played Rachida (Ibtissem Djaoudi) was unknown to the Algerian public––she was still a student at the National Drama Centre––the actress who played her mother Fatma (Bahia Rachedi) was, to Algerian audiences, well known. Rachedi appeared in numerous popular television series and films, presented a famous cooking program, and was also part of the National Television Orchestra, as a singer, for thirty years. Journalist Yasmine Ben even named her ‘la gentille maman’ (the kind mother) because she was often cast in the role of loving, devoted mother.[20]

    Rachedi is primarily a television star and conforms to James Bennett’s description of the television ‘personality’ as someone who cultivates a “televisual” image.[21] Bennett points to the ‘authenticity and ordinariness’ of the television star that produces ‘the confusion between the television personality-as-person and the televisual image’.[22] The character of Fatma is what one might call a classic Rachedi role and exemplifies many features of the actress’s own public persona. Fatma is pious to the point that she never misses prayer, and she questions how Islamist terrorists could really be Muslims. She uses humor, proverbs in darija and traditional Algerian popular wisdom to reassure and comfort her daughter.

    Fatma often sings popular music that would be immediately recognizable to an Algerian audience. Her songs are derived from chaabi (Algerian traditional popular music) and hawzi music. Hawzi is soft music often characterized by lyrics that express suffering. It originates from northwest Algeria (Tlemcen) and is sung in its native dialect. Rachida often listens to Cheb Hasni, a popular rai singer who was assassinated during the black decade. Rai makes use of code switching between darija and French, and the songs often mix erotic content with stories of life’s dissatisfactions. Rai was first banned by the Algerian state media in the 1980s then condemned as amoral by the Islamists.[23]

    Darija and music become the healing balm through which the mother’s love is communicated. Music allows Rachida and Fatma to escape the present and the situation they live in and opens moments of breathing space for them. Music also brings emotional resonance. The choice of diegetic and non-diegetic music that both refer to, or evoke, Algerian dialect(s), combined with the use of darija, root the film in the everyday landscape and customs of Algeria. Moreover, it aims at building upon cultural practices of Algerians who use darija, and resist the political and religious discourse of fundamentalism.

    Rachida awakens into political consciousness as the film progresses. She angrily accuses the state of hogra: a politically charged common North African word, in darija, used to express resentment towards institutional power. Rachida also rejects the project of national reconciliation: she questions ‘how [one is] to forgive if those who tried to kill you did not ask for your forgiveness’.  By the end of the film, Rachida is more the symbol or mouthpiece of an ‘idea’ than she is a fully formed human being. The way the character is filmed, through medium and long shots, with few close-ups, and few scenes filmed from her point of view, creates a distance between the viewer and Rachida. Indeed the scenes in which she appears most angry or traumatised are shot from another protagonist’s point of view. The last scene however is a close up on Rachida’s face: following a terrorist massacre of local people, she returns to school and writes ‘today’s lesson’ on the blackboard before looking defiantly into the camera. In this moment she completes her symbolic journey, finding a new home––and sense of purpose––in the school itself. The film does not challenge linguistic policies in Algeria but implies that the Algerian situation will change through women, education and schooling.

    II.       Barakat! Can we (women) speak to them (terrorists)?

    Barakat! is Sahraoui’s first fiction drama. Sahraoui (born in 1950) studied filmmaking and editing at IDHEC (the French Film Institute) and produced six documentaries, some of which dealt with life in Algeria during and after the black decade: La Moitié du ciel d’Allah (1995), which is a feminist documentary about mujahidates and other women resisting terrorism; Algérie, la vie quand même (1998), which is concerned with youth unemployment in a Kabyle village and contains interviews with young people in the Berber language Amazigh; and Algérie, la vie toujours (2001), which explores life in a Kabyle village following the black decade.[25] Sahraoui co-wrote Barakat! with Cécile Vargaftig, a French script-writer and author. The film was mainly funded by French-German television Arte, and received little funding from the National Algerian Television. Sahraoui, like Bachir-Chouikh, intended the film to dispel image of Algerian women as ‘imprisoned, subservient women, as one sees so often in Algerian films’.[26]

    The title Barakat! ––meaning ‘enough!’in darija–– is closely associated with two different protest movements. One of these (Sebaa Snine Barakat! Seven years are enough!) emerged soon after independence in 1962 and was a response to a period of murderous political conflict.[27] The other known simply as Barakat was the protest movement led by a female doctor that opposed the re-election of President Abdelaaziz Bouteflika in 2014. To add yet more resonance to the name, 20 Ans Barakat is also a women’s association in France and Algeria that calls for an ending to the Algerian family Code (1984).

    Barakat! recounts the journey of Amel (actress Rachida Brakni) who is searching for her kidnapped husband. Amel is a doctor who lives on the outskirts of Algiers by the coast. Discussions at the hospital indicate that he had written a remarkable article on the Islamist terrorists. Amel embarks on her journey with the nurse Khadija (actress Fettouma Bouamari) after her neighbour, a mechanic, has indicated that her husband is to be found in the nearby maquis (bush terrain).[28] A former mujahida, Khadija takes with her a gun and a haïk––a traditional outfit that veils the body and recalls the disguises used by women and men during the Algerian war. Both Amel and Khadija set out walking into the maquis but are soon kidnapped by terrorists. Khadija recognizes one of the terrorists, with whom she converses in French and darija. He was a mujahid––male combatant during the Algeria war of liberation–– whose life she saved by nursing him after an attack by the French in which he was severely wounded. The mujahid became a pious man, but also part of the terrorist group. After the terrorists release Amel and Khadija, the women continue walking until they encounter an old man living in an isolated house who gives them a lift home on his horse-drawn carriage. The old man who lives on his own had his sons disappeared. Back at her house, Amel and Khadija suspect the neighbour and find Amel’s husband in his garage. At the end of the film Khadija and the old man are by the sea and enjoy a sense of freedom, both shouting ‘Barakat!’ after the old man has thrown Amel’s gun into the sea.

    The film presents an encounter between two women who overcome violence and learn to know each other while venting their fear, anger and thoughts about the situation they face. It is also a cross-generational encounter between two actresses notorious for their political commitments: Rachida Brakni a young French star with Algerian origins and Fettouma Bouamari, an Algerian actress who moved to France during the terrorist era. Barakat! circulated in international festivals and won the best film award at Dubai Film Festival in 2007, and multiple awards such as best first feature, best music and best screenplay at the Pan African Film and Television Festival in Ougadougou (FESPACO) in 2007. The international awards did not coincide with the press reception in Algeria. Algerian Arabic-speaking and French speaking journalists generally agreed that Barakat! was a technically mediocre film and that the awards were given in virtue of its intellectual audacity rather than the artistic accomplishment of the work.[29] The debate in the Algerian newspapers was concerned with the image of the nation that the film presented. French and Arabic speaking newspapers vehemently attacked the film because it tarnishes the image of the mujahidin by linking them to terrorists. [30] Algeria’s national narrative relies on the events of the glorious war and the actions of the mujahidin in defeating the colonial power. It is interesting to notice that these press reviews ignored the role played by the mujahidates during the war. For journalist Fatiha Bourouina the film distorts the image of the Algerian nation by suggesting that the state was incapable of protecting the population.[31] The film also undermines the state’s image by asking the question ‘qui-tue-qui?’ (who kills who?). [32] This question recurred during the black decade in the French media because the Algerian army was suspected of taking part in terrorist acts.

    Arabic-speaking Algerian newspapers did not discuss the use of French language in the film. Journalist Hind O, writing in a Francophone newspaper, argued that French funding imposed the use of French language otherwise how one can explain that a young thug speaks French.[33] In an interview, Sahraoui justified the use of French and darija since it reflects Algerian reality.[34] French-writing journalist Yacin Idjer, argued that having 80 percent of the dialogue in French damaged the authenticity of the film.[35] In his view, the narrative distorts reality by depicting two women walking on their own without fear of terrorists, Khadija smoking freely in the street, and Amel fearlessly threatening men with a gun in a coffee place.[36] Algerian journalists persistently criticized Khadija’s smoking on the street as if women’s smoking was an emancipatory act.[37] Although smoking may not be emancipatory, and Barakat! is a fiction, it is still striking the extent to which journalists reproduced in their writing a set of orthodox moral judgments about women smoking.

    Amel and Khadija’s journey is visually enhanced by the film’s sound track and long shots that depict the beauty of nature: the sea, the maquis, and the mountainous roads. The contrast between the beauty of the landscape and the tragic events is heightened by the music. Throughout the film the oud (luth) of Alla is heard. Alla is an Algerian musician who was rediscovered in the 1970s when Algerian television broadcast his tunes. Alla invented hybrid music, the ‘foundou’ mixing Arabic and African rhythms.[38] Foundou expresses the suffering of the poor. In the film, Alla’s music is used to enhance moments of anxiety and doubt when Khadija and Amel are on their journey.

    When Amel and Khadija are exploring the maquis they converse by means of code-switching, mixing darija and French. Code switching allows Amel and Khadija a certain freedom of speech: they resist the violence that is inflicted on them by terrorists instead speaking freely and crudely. Monica Heller considers code switching as one of the usual modes of speaking as it becomes adopted and practised by speakers, so code switching becomes a ‘normal way to talk’. [39] Furthermore, code switching, in Heller’s view, allows the speaker to access ‘multiple roles and relationships’.[40] I shall analyse how the protagonists use code switching to reverse power roles, and how code switching transcends generations, as we see when it becomes a common language between Amel the doctor who was raised in post-independence Algeria and Khadija who fought the French and uses darija and French language.

    In one scene where Amel and Khadija are walking, code switching enables a change in their power relations. Amel expresses her anger towards Khadija in French, using the word ‘bricolage’ to suggest, critically, that the work done by Khadija’s generation during the war was just hastily thrown together. Khadija replies that without the ‘bricolage’, Amel’s generation would still be shining the shoes of the French (coloniser). However, Amel feels that, considering the escalation in terrorist activity, it might be better still to be a French colony. She describes the two situations as a choice between cholera and the plague.

    One other scene allows Khadija to freely express, using darija and French, her views on gender relations impregnated with fundamentalist views. Khadija mentions to Amel that Amel’s neighbor never looks directly at her. He considers Amel as ‘aaryana’ (naked in darija) because she is not veiled, a dualistic view of the female body shared by both men and women in Algeria. As the scholar Anne-Emmanuelle Berger writes, a study conducted amongst female Algerian students showed that to most of them the female body only exists in two possible states: ‘naked’ or ‘veiled’.[41] She comments that, for these girls, the ‘Islamist garment being instituted as the criterion of resemblance and difference between women’.[42] Khadija’s disapproval of the neighbour’s views is to be understood in relation to her past as a mujahida. The neighbor posits himself as a moral authority but the name mujahida itself infused with religious meaning: it is an Arabic name derived from jihad associated with a war in the name of God. Khadija’s use of the haïk in a previous scene also confirms her awareness of the use of the veil as a disguise and not only as a guarantor of moral behaviors, stating, while dressing with the haïk: ‘ils veulent de la respectabilité, eh bien ils vont l’avoir’ (‘they [the terrorists] want respectability, then they will have it’). She therefore denounces, through the use of crude language, society’s hypocrisy towards unveiled women, although she is a mujahida.

    The haïk is also symbolic of the anti-colonial struggle, being the very means by which, as Frantz Fanon argued, women resisted colonial power.[43] However, not all Algerian women accept the haïk as a ‘proper’ traditional veil. Berger remarks that girls wearing the hijab disregarded the haïk as a symbol of pre-colonial Algeria and of the Turkish presence.[44] The hijab was perceived as more compliant with the girls’ aspirations to be authentic Muslims because it was imported from the Middle East and had no connection to Algeria’s pre-colonial history.[45]

    The film indicates also that terrorists were not only Islamists with strong religious ideology but encompassed mujahidin and  ‘ordinary’ people, such as the mechanic. The description of the terrorists echoes also that of Rachida: they are described as young adolescents dressed in western outfits who do not seem aware of their goals, or the ideologies they support. Standard Arabic is absent from the vocabulary of the terrorists. In this way, the film implies that it would be a mistake to see the conflict of the black decade as one between Islamists Arabophones and secular Francophones. The use of code witching therefore becomes a common language between women and the terrorists, but is ideologically used in different ways.

    The film suggests that code switching is the sole ‘language’ spoken in Algeria and understood by all protagonists, and as such the legitimate language of Algeria that is also able to encompass antagonistic ideologies. Code switching thus points more to different socio-political affiliations. The film, however, implies that the use of the French language was the reason why Amel’s husband was kidnapped. Amel cannot understand why the Islamists would kidnap her husband, since they do not read French.

    The symbolism of the French language became a recurring theme of the Islamists’ discourse, even before violence erupted. Gilles Kepel states that Ali Benhadj, one of the FIS (Front Islamique du Salut) political leaders, wanted to remove the French presence ‘intellectually and ideologically’, and that the state itself was a ‘Westernized entity’.[46] Amel’s husband seems to be an opponent of the Islamists, as he is a Francophone journalist, although the content of his article is not disclosed. Amel’s husband conforms to the idea of the Francophone intellectual who fights Islamists’ views. The film accentuates the dichotomy between Arabophone––Arabic speaking–– and Francophone intellectuals.[47] Scholar Lahouari Addi suggests that Francophone intellectuals aim to attack the traditional structures of society while Arabophones are more critical of the state and less so of society. Arabophones aim at ‘extracting the cultural and political perversions introduced by the West’.[48] Addi notes that the involvement of Francophone elites in political life only resulted in a disconnection form the people.[49] Addi indicates that the assassination of Francophone intellectuals during the black decade did not lead to anger or despair amongst the population, and this indicates how little impact Francophone intellectuals had in public life.[50]

    Sahraoui has inscribed Barakat! in the continuity of her previous documentary works where she explored the situation Algerian women lived. Barakat! is concerned with more than merely the actions of intellectuals; it questions the disconnection between men and women in society and plausibly suggests that women are the only ones who are resisting Islamists. However, not all women are capable of resisting Islamists, only determined, independent idealists such as Khadija and Amel, who value their freedom. The disconnection, however, between the old and new generation of women is visible in the way Khadija still defends her national ideals while Amel doubts the state’s actions and language does not act as a unifier in this instance.

    III.       Le Harem de Madame Osmane, gender, French language and power: a “natural” link?

    The film is conceived as a huis clos of women and Moknèche makes distinctive use of space by confining the protagonists to only a few locations within a limited area.[52] The title of the film even alludes to the space in which Madame Osmane controls the women of the house, the harem.[53] The film, shot on location in Morocco making use of the natural lightening, multiplies the use of close-ups: it enhances the protagonists’ emotions and accentuates the closeness of on-screen visual space. Only one long shot by the sea, brings a space of breathing for the protagonists, they can dance and move freely.

    While these women live under the curfew and the surveillance of Madame Osmane, Sakina (Madame Osmane’s daughter) escapes with the tenant Yasmine to go out and vent their frustrations after tensions occurred during a wedding attended by all the women of the house. At the wedding, Madame Osmane met the mother of Sakina’s fiancé and cancelled the engagement because the mother is part of a lower social class. Yasmine, a French-born Algerian, has discovered at the wedding that her husband has a second wife and a son. At the end of the film Sakina dies, shot at a faux barrage–– a checkpoint established by terrorists. However Madame Osmane believes that her daughter was in fact shot by the military at the checkpoint. Madame Osmane’s husband, who left for France, comes back to bury his daughter.

    As a mujahida, Madame Osmane does not conform to the nationally constructed myth of mujahidates. Historian Ryme Seferdjeli describes how the mujahidates are portrayed as a ‘monolithic group in contrast to male combatants and reduced to the status of a single female figure who is defined almost exclusively by her gender and nationalist identity’.[54] Madame Osmane is a bourgeois figure who trades on her status and privileges as a mujahida to acquire wealth. She is only concerned with money, property, and seems to be far removed from national concerns.[55] Madame Osmane’s husband, a mujahid, a man she chose to marry while she was fighting, leaves her and chooses France, the nation that they were fighting against. The husband’s betrayal is twofold: he betrays Madame Osmane, his wife, and also his nation in order to join his mistress––France. He also represents the elite who were able to leave for France when terrorism erupted and were granted a visa, which was difficult at that time since France restricted the access to its territory only favouring business men and members of the nomenklatura.[56]

    Madame Osmane perceives herself as being from a higher social class and this is reflected in the way she talks about the mother of her daughter’s fiancé. She speaks about her with contempt because she is a traditional woman, in a traditional outfit, and has a washm––a traditional tattoo that old women used to have.[57] The irony is that the tattoo is dismissed, both by Islamists as not complying with Islamic precepts that forbid any symbols (many of the tattoos are crosses), and by modernists, who view it as inscribed in old traditions. It cannot be said that Madame Osmane is a modernist. She is a conservative figure who disapproves of inter-class marriage. She even warns Yasmine against returning to France where she would have a lower social status than in Algeria: ‘tu vas faire quoi? Caissière?’ (What will you do? Cashier?).

    French, in the film, is therefore associated with urban upper-middle class women who use it for socialisation and as a social marker.[58]

    The final scene, that I will discuss, is a pertinent illustration of the relationships between gender, language and violence. Army officials bring Sakina’s coffin to the house. The shot is positioned from outside the house, from the location where the coffin is laid on the ground. The bright sun is juxtaposed with the tragic situation. One of the officials asks if this is Bouchama’s house (Bouchama is Madame Osmane’s husband’s name), and the maid Meriem replies: ‘non, ici c’est la maison Osmane’ (no, this is Osmane’s house). The official reads the statement about Sakina’s death, as a medium long shot displays the characters: the inhabitants of the house are gathered on one side, standing by the door; Madame Osmane’s husband stands on the other side, on the road, with the military officials––which implies that he is on ‘their side’. This is confirmed when Madame Osmane’s husband signs the death certificate of his daughter, which validates the official version of Sakina’s death: that the terrorists murdered her. Madame Osmane dismisses this version and accuses her husband of cowardice. She suggests that the military have the power to re-construct the facts to which her husband is subservient. The aforementioned panning is the only medium close-up in which Moknèche privileges male presence. In subsequent shots, men are disregarded, relegated to a second plane and are gradually removed from the frame space, pushed to its margins. Madame Osmane decides she wants to open the coffin but the State representatives refuse to let her; she threatens them with her gun, shouting in French: ‘vous êtes des bourricots’ (you are donkeys), and then fires her gun into the air.[59]

    In this final scene Madame Osmane users language to impose her authority, accompanied by her act of firing the gun. Moknèche gives Madame Osmane total control of the space outside the house, and she rallies her tenants to her side. Madame Osmane resurrects her mujahida past in an unexpected way: both the gun and the French language are left over from the colonial period, which is also the anti-colonial period; and she uses both to liberate herself from the power of the Algerian authorities and from the diktat of her husband. And of course, Moknèche may be said to use French in the same way: the film has almost no trace of Standard Arabic or darija, and the film uses French as a common language that reconnects the present with the colonial past.

    IV.       Conclusion: what did our ‘mothers’ do?

     The three films analysed in this essay expose contrasting experiences, perceptions and subjectivities in relation to the violence women endured during the black decade. Sociolinguist Reem Bassiouney remarks that in times of conflict linguistic ideologies are used as ‘political, religious or social weapons’.[60] Bassiouney’s remark is key to the study of these films: the use of language carries ideological implications in relation to the black decade narrative. The exclusion of Modern Standard Arabic in the films marks an ideological posture: these films distance themselves from the official language and also from the official narrative. The three films construct an alternative narrative that is grounded in their use of different languages: French, darija and combinations of the two, are deployed in such a way as to communicate the particular experiences of women dealing with violence.

    The use of French by women corresponds with greater power for women and freedom from both state and patriarchal power, while the use of darija leaves women subject to the situation in which they live. In Le Harem de Madame Osmane French allows Madame Osmane to assert power––Arabic is absent from the film. French is also associated with higher social status and more liberal, western manners. However, exclusive use of French also serves as a marker of cultural and ideological separateness as Le Harem de Madame Osmane depicts the division of Algeria along parallel lines of class and language. Violence is not acknowledged at the beginning of Le Harem de Madame Osmane; it is only at the end that Madame Osmane becomes conscious of the situation and rejects the official state account of her daughter’s death. The use of French paradoxically reinforces the mujahida figure, which, in Le Harem de Madame Osmane and Barakat!, is presented as a strong, determined, and independent woman.

    The use of darija anchors the film in authenticity, as if the use of darija alone were a guarantee of the truthfulness of the film’s events. However, Rachida is barred from asserting power: darija only allows her to assert her identity, her ideology and her Algerian-ness. Code switching––the mixing of the two un-official languages, darija and French––becomes a language in itself, one that is capable of encompassing antagonistic ideologies and transcending social classes. Just as Moknèche observed that French is an Algerian language, so the same can be said about code switching.

    The three films construct an image of the Algerian woman who has stood against Islamists, an image which, prior to these films, the French media was primarily responsible for disseminating. French publishers edited books that described women’s experiences with Islamists and debates and TV channels organized discussions with Algerian women about their experiences during the black decade. The films indicate that women criticized the state’s actions and accentuate the idea that women and Islamists were in ‘diametric opposition’, but the reality was and is more complex.[61] Fériel Lalami-Fatès posits that, in resisting the Islamists, women’s associations were co-opted by the state and made to renounce their ideals, becoming less critical of the state’s actions.[62] An Islamic feminist movement has risen in the 1990s, and women supported the political ideologies of the Islamic Party. These films scarcely recognise that some women were favourably disposed towards Islamist views. Only perhaps the woman of the hijab in Rachida is seen to represent this point of view.

    The three films also question the future of Algeria and ask what did the ‘mothers’ leave to their ‘daughters’? In Le Harem de Madame Osmane, the daughter dies and this is only the beginning of the tragedy to come for Algeria. As such Le Harem de Madame Osmane suggests a dim future for Algeria. Rachida recovers an identity and makes use of her mother’s past experiences, but she is the one who will reconstruct the future while her mother remains marginalized. In Barakat!, however, the mother figure is still present and she is the one who will continue the fight and inspire her daughter figure, Amel, suggesting perhaps that the situation will improve if the younger generation of women is able

    [1] Benjamin Stora, La Guerre invisible: Algérie, années 90 (Paris: Presses de Sciences Po: 2001), p. 7.

    [2] Mujahidates were nurses, messengers or posed bombs in urban areas such as cafes.

    [3] Abdelkader Cheref, ‘Engendering or Endangering Politics in Algeria? Salima Ghezali, Louisa Hanoune, and Khalida Messaoudi’, Journal of Middle East Women’s Studies, 2 (2006), 60-85 (p. 68).

    [4] Pan-Arabism was a cultural and political project aimed at unifying the Arab countries. The project was furthered by Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser in the 1950s who equated pan Arabism with Arab nationalism, and promoted the political union of Arab states.

    [5] Mohamed Benrabah, Language Conflict in Algeria: From colonialism to post-independence (Bristol: Multilingual Matters, 2013), p. 383.

    [6] Catherine Miller, ‘Linguistic Policies and the Issue of Ethno-Linguistic Minorities in the Middle East’, in Islam in the Middle East Studies: Muslims and Minorities, ed. by Akira, Usuki and Hiroshi Kato (Osaka: National Museum of Ethnology, 2003), pp. 149–174 (p.150).

    [7] Cheira Belguellaoui, ‘Contemporary Algerian Filmmaking: From ‘Cinéma National’ to ‘Cinéma De L’urgence'(Mohamed Chouikh, Merzak Allouache, Yamina Bachir-Chouikh, Nadir Moknèche)’ (unpublished doctoral thesis, Florida State University, 2007), p. 134.

    [8] Both films were popular successes upon their release in Algeria, particularly Omar Gatlato since it described the everyday life of a group of young men, and the film used the specific dialect of Algiers. Omar Gatlato attracted over a million of viewers in 1976. Director Lahkhdar Hamina won the Cannes film festival in 1975 and his second feature received international awards.

    [9] During the black decade the Casbah of Algiers was the place of many terrorist attacks but also the place where Islamists were hiding. This is reminiscent of the anti-colonial struggle when the combatants hid in the Casbah, especially during the ‘Battle of Algiers’.

    [10] <http://www.euromedcafe.org/interview.asp?lang=ing&documentID=696 > [accessed 12 December 2014], < http://ar.qantara.de/content/mqbl-m-lmkhrj-ymyn-bshyr-shwykh-lkl-tryqth-lkhs-fy-ltml-m-lkhsr-wlhzn> [accessed 12 December 2014].

    [11] Olivier Barlet, ‘Interview with Yamina Bachir-Chouikh’, Africultures, 26 September 2002, <http://www.africultures.com/php/index.php?nav=article&no=5607#sthash.UGA9WMCm.dpuf> [accessed 12 December 2014].

    [12] Yacine Idjer, ‘Cinémathèque  Rachida, un autre regard sur le film’, Info Soir, 05 August 2003 <http://www.djazairess.com/fr/infosoir/1751> [accessed 25 January 2015]

    [13] ‘Sourat’ Al Maraa fi film Rachida  dalala similogia’ (The image of the woman in the film Rachida: semiology of a symbol’),  Al Hiwar, 05 December 2008  <http://www.djazairess.com/elhiwar/7550> [accessed 25 January 2015].

    [14] ‘Sourat’ Al Maraa fi film Rachida dalala similoogia j 3’ (The image of the woman in the film Rachida: semiology of a symbol- third part’, Al Hiwar, 19 December 2008 < http://www. djazairess.com.elhiwar/80 73>  [accessed 25 January 2015].

    [15] Alger la Blanche is the name given to Algiers for the white colour of the buildings of the Casbah––the Muslim quarter of Algiers under French colonial rule.

    [16] Abdulkafi Albirini, ‘The Sociolinguistic Functions of Codeswitching between Standard Arabic and Dialectal Arabic’, Language in Society, 40 (2011), 537–562 (p. 539).

    [17] Farida Abu-Haidar, ‘Arabization in Algeria’, International Journal of Francophone Studies, 3 (2000), 151-163 (p. 161).

    [18] Susan Slyomovics, ‘”Hassiba Ben Bouali, If You Could See Our Algeria”: Women and Public Space in Algeria’, Middle East Report, 92 (1995), 8-13 (p. 10).

    [19] Rod Skilbeck, ‘The Shroud Over Algeria: Femicide, Islamism and the Hijab’, Journal of Arabic, Islamic and Middle Eastern Studies, 2(1995), 43-54 <https://www.library. cornell.edu/colldev/mideast /shroud.htm> [accessed 25 January 2015].

    [20] Yasmine Ben, ‘Bahia Rachedi, Elle fera le rituel de la Omra, portera le voile et se consacrera à l’humanitaire’, Le Maghreb, 02 July 2011.

    [21] James Bennett, ‘The Television Personality System: Televisual Stardom Revisited after Film Theory’, Screen, 1 (2008), 32-50 (p. 35).

    [22] Ibid., p. 35.

    [23] Benrabah, p. 147.

    [24] National reconciliation identifies the laws and process launched in1999. It aimed at reintegrating into civilian life those who have renounced armed violence or were involved in network support to terrorist groups, but were not charged with blood crimes.

    [25] Sahraoui’s documentaries were mainly funded by by French-German television Arte, and were subtitled in French, when interviews were conducted in Berber language.

    [26]Melbroune International Film Festival website <http://miff.com.au/festival-archive/film/12306> [accessed 11 November 2014].

    [27] The slogan used by demonstrators in the street to end the cycle of killings between two political factions of the GPRA (Gouvernement Provisoire de la Révolution Algérienne) and the FLN (Front de Libération Nationale).

    [28] maquis designates the French word for the bush, as utilized by underground or guerilla fighters. During the Algerian war the fighters used to hide in the maquis where military camps were established. The technique was adopted by the Islamic armed factions.

    [29] See articles of Hind O, ‘Deux femmes dans la tourmente. Projection de Barakat! de Djamila Sahraoui à El Mougar’, L’Expression, 11 November 2006, Yasmine Ben, ‘Une légèreté à vous couper le souffle! Sortie de Barakat! de Djamila Sahraoui’, Le Maghreb, 14 November 2006 http: //www.djazairess.com /fr/lemaghreb/173> [accessed 02 February 2015].

    [30] Zahia Mancer, ‘Al Mahzila tataoucel Number One al yaoum bil Jazair wa Barakat! youtouaj bi dhahb fi Dubai’ (‘The farce continues: Number One today in Algeria, and Barakat! crowned with gold in Dubai’, Achourouk , 18 December 2006 <http://www.echoroukonline.com/ara/?news=9900> [accessed 02 February 2015].

    [31] Fatiha Bourouina, ‘Film Barakat! Youajihou ashrass intiqadat fi El Jazair baa’da tasnifihi fi khanet ‘al cinema ‘al coulounialiya’’ (‘The movie “Barakat” facing the fiercest criticism in Algeria after coined as a ‘colonial cinema’’), Al Riyadh, 25 December 2006,  <http://www.alriyadh.com/211850> [accessed 02 February 2015].

    [32] Mancer, Ben, O.

    [33] Hind O, ‘Deux femmes dans la tourmente. Projection de Barakat! de Djamila Sahraoui à El Mougar’, L’Expression, 11 November 2006.

    [34] Walid Mebarek, ‘Djamila Sahraoui. Réalisatrice de Barakat: ‘Les choses ressortent’’, El Watan, 15 November 2006.

    [35] Yacine Idjer, ‘Cinéma  «Barakat» en avant-première: deux femmes chez les terroristes’, Info Soir, 10 November 2006< http://www.djazairess.com/fr/infosoir/55698> [accessed 05 February 2015].

    [36] Ibid.

    [37] Ben, Le Maghreb.

    [38] Foundou is an arabized name of French ‘Fond deux’ that refers to the mine where Alla’s father worked under French colonial rule.

    [39] Monica Heller, Code switching: Anthropological and Sociolinguistic Perspectives (New York, London, Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter: 1988), p. 8.

    [40] Ibid., p. 8.

    [41] Anne-Emmanuelle Berger, ‘The Newly Veiled Woman: Irigaray, Specularity, and the Islamic Veil’, Diacritics, 1 (1998), 93-119 (p. 106). Berger makes use in her article of Djamila Saadi’s work : ‘Des Femmes à mots voilés’, Penser l’Algérie Intersignes, 10 (1995), 169-80.

    [42] Ibid.,  p. 106.

    [43] Frantz Fanon, ‘L’Algérie se dévoile’, L’an V de la révolution algérienne (Paris: Maspéro, 1960). For a complete analysis of Fanon’s discussion of the haïk, see Berger, pp.106-109.

    [44] Berger, p. 106.

    [45] Ibid.

    [46] Gilles, Kepel, ‘Islamism and the State in Algeria and Egypt’, Daedelus, 124 (1995), 109-127

    (p. 121).

    [47] Lahouari Addi, ‘Les Intellectuels qu’on assassine’, Esprit, 208 (1995), 130-138 (p. 131).

    [48] Ibid.

    [49] Ibid.

    [50] Ibid, p. 137.

    [51] Gérard Le Fort, ‘Avec Viva Laldjérie, Nadir Moknèche regarde son pays droit dans les yeux’,  Libération, 7 April 2004.

    [52] Huis clos is a French expression that could be translated as ‘behind closed doors’. It is used here in a sense intended to transmit the closeness of the action.

    [53] The word harem is derived from Arabic harem which means women and designates the space where women and concubines live. It has been later associated can also mean ‘haram’, ‘forbidden’.

    [54] Ryme Seferdjeli, ‘Rethiking the history of the mujahidat during the Algerian war’, Interventions: International Journal of Postcolonial Studies, 2 (2012), 238-255 (p. 246).

    [55] The status of mujahidin allowed privileges in post-independence Algeria such as housing, medical care, and tax reductions on imported goods. A Ministry of Mujahidin was established after independence.

    [56] Esprit, ‘La Politique française de coopération vis-à-vis de l’Algérie: un quiproquo tragique’, Esprit, 208 (1995), 153-161 (p. 160).

    [57] Although the significance of the tattoos is not known, as a tradition women wear it on their forehead, allegedly as a marker for femininity. It may also have been encouraged by men who were also protective of women during the colonial era, or used to mark who the tribe women belonged to, to protect them or to differentiate social classes. T. Rivière and J. Faublée, ‘Les Tatouages des Chaouia de l’Aurès’, Journal de la société des Africanistes, 12  (1942), 67-80 <http://www.persee.fr/web/revues/home/prescript/article/jafr_0037-9166_1942_num_12_1_2525#> [accessed 11 November 2014].

    [58] Reem Bassiouney, Arabic languages and linguistics (Washington DC: Georgetown University Press, 2012), p. 124.

    [59] Bourricot is a common word in Algeria: a translation of donkey (hmar), it is used as an insult for dumb people.

    [60] Reem Bassiouney, Arabic languages and linguistics (Washington DC: Georgetown University Press, 2012), p. 203.

    [61] Constance N. Stadler, ‘Democratisation Reconsidered: the Transformation of Political Culture in Algeria’, The Journal of North African Studies, 3 (1998), 25-45 (p. 34).

    [62] Fériel Lalami-Fatès, ‘Les Associations de femmes algériennes face à la menace islamiste’, Esprit, 208 (1995), 126-129 (p. 127).

     

    Bibliography

    Abu-Haidar, Farida, ‘Arabization in Algeria’, International Journal of Francophone Studies, 3 (2000), 151-163

    Addi, Lahouari, ‘Les Intellectuels qu’on assassine’, Esprit, 208 (1995), 130-138

    Albirini, Abdulkafi, ‘The sociolinguistic Functions of Code switching between Standard Arabic and Dialectal Arabic’, Language in Society, 40 (2011), 537–562

    Barlet, Olivier, ‘Interview with Yamina Bachir-Chouikh’, Africultures, 26 September 2002, <http://www.africultures.com/php/index.php?nav=article&no=5607#sthash.UGA9WMCm.dpuf> [accessed 12 December 2014]

    ____________, ‘Le Harem de Mme Osmane de Nadir Moknèche’, Africultures, 01 September 2009 <http://www.africultures.com/php/?nav=article&no=1507> [accessed 28 December 2014]

    Belguellaoui, Cheira,‘ Contemporary Algerian Filmmaking: From “Cinéma National” to “Cinéma De L’urgence”(Mohamed Chouikh, Merzak Allouache, YaminaBachir- Chouikh, Nadir Moknèche)’ (unpublished doctoral thesis, Florida State University, 2007)

    Ben, Yasmine, ‘Bahia Rachedi, Elle fera le rituel de la Omra, portera le voile et se consacrera à l’humanitaire’, Le Maghreb, 02 July 2011.

    Bennett, James ‘The Television Personality System: Televisual Stardom Revisited after Film Theory’, Screen, 1 (2008), 32-50

    Benrabah, Mohamed, Language Conflict in Algeria: From colonialism to post-independence (Bristol: Multilingual Matters, 2013).

    Berger, Anne-Emmanuelle, ‘The Newly Veiled Woman: Irigaray, Specularity, and the Islamic Veil’, Diacritics, 1 (1998), 93-119

    Bourouina, Fatiha ‘Film Barakat! Youajihou ashrass intiqadat fi El Jazair baa’da tasnifihi fi khanet ‘al cinema ‘al coulounialiya’’ (‘The movie “Barakat” facing the fiercest criticism in Algeria after coined as a ‘colonial cinema’’), Al Riyadh, 25 December 2006 <http://www.alriyad h.com/211850> [accessed 02 February 2015].

    Cheref, Abdelkader, ‘Engendering or Endangering Politics in Algeria? Salima Ghezali, Louisa Hanoune, and Khalida Messaoudi’, Journal of Middle East Women’s Studies, 2 (2006), 60-85

    Esprit, ‘La Politique française de coopération vis-à-vis de l’Algérie: un quiproquo tragique’, Esprit, 208 (1995), 153-161

    Fanon, Frantz ‘L’Algérie se dévoile’, L’an V de la révolution algérienne (Paris: Maspéro, 1960)

    H, G, ‘Yasin Temlali: «Les œuvres traitées dans cet ouvrage alimentent le débat politique actuel»’, La Tribune, 10 July 2011, < http://www.djazairess.com/fr/latribune/54603> [accessed 12 December 2014]

    Heller, Monica, Code switching: Anthropological and Sociolinguistic Perspectives (New York, London, Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter, 1988)

    Idjer, Yacine, ‘Cinémathèque  Rachida, un autre regard sur le film’, Info Soir, 05 August 2003 <http://www.djazairess.com/fr/infosoir/1751> [accessed 25 January 2015]

    –––––––––––, ‘Cinéma  «Barakat» en avant-première: deux femmes chez les terroristes’, Info Soir, 10 November 2006 < http://www.djazairess.com/fr/infosoir/55698> [accessed 05 February 2015].

    Kepel, Gilles, ‘Islamism and the State in Algeria and Egypt’, Daedelus, 124 (1995), 109-127

    Lalami-Fatès, Fériel, ‘Les Associations de femmes algériennes face à la menace islamiste’, Esprit, 208 (1995), 126-129

    Le Fort, Gérard, ‘Avec Viva Laldjérie, Nadir Moknèche regarde son pays droit dans les yeux’,  Libération, 7 April 2004.

    Mancer, Zahia, ‘Al Mahzila tataoucel Number One al yaoum bil Jazair wa Barakat! youtouaj bi dhahb fi Dubai’ (‘The farce continues: Number One today in Algeria, and Barakat! crowned with gold in Dubai’), Achourouk , 18 December 2006 <http://www. echoroukonline.com/ara/? news=9900> [accessed 02 February 2015]

    Mebarek, Walid, ‘Djamila Sahraoui. Réalisatrice de Barakat: ‘Les choses ressortent’’, El Watan, 15 November 2006.

    O, Hind, ‘Deux femmes dans la tourmente. Projection de Barakat! de Djamila Sahraoui à El Mougar’, L’Expression, 11 November 2006

    Rivière T. and Faublée J., ‘Les Tatouages des Chaouia de l’Aurès’, Journal de la Société des Africanistes, 12 (1942), 67- 80 <http://www.persee.fr/web/revues/home/prescript/article/Jafr_0037-9166_1942_num_12_1_2525#>  [accessed 11 November 2014]

    Skilbeck, Rod, ‘The Shroud Over Algeria: Femicide, Islamism and the Hijab’, Journal of Arabic, Islamic and Middle Eastern Studies, 2(1995), 43-54 <https://www.library. cornell.edu/colldev/mideast /shroud.htm> [accessed 25 January 2015].

    Soltane, Amira, ‘Pourquoi la chaîne 2M a diffusé le film Harragas?’, L’Expression, 9 October 2010

    Stadler, Constance N., ‘Democratisation reconsidered: the transformation of political culture in Algeria’, The Journal of North African Studies, 3 (1998), 25-45

    Seferdjeli, Ryme ‘Rethiking the history of the mujahidat during the Algerian war’, Interventions: International Journal of Postcolonial Studies, 2 (2012), 238-255

    Stora, BenjaminLa Guerre invisible: Algérie, années 90 (Paris : Presse de Sciences Po, 2001)

    Slyomovics, Susan, ‘”Hassiba Ben Bouali, If You Could See Our Algeria”: Women and Public Space in Algeria’, Middle East Report, 92 (1995), 8-13

     

    Websites

    Melbroune International Film Festival website http://miff.com.au/festival-archive/film/12306 [accessed 11 November 2014]

    Sourat’ Al Maraa fi film Rachida  dalala similogia’ (The image of the woman in the film Rachida: semiology of a symbol ),  Al Hiwar, 05 December 2008  http://www.djazairess.com/elhiwar/7550 [accessed 25 January 2015].

    ‘Sourat’ Al Maraa fi film Rachida dalala similoogia j 3’ (The image of the woman in the film Rachida: semiology of a symbol third part’, Al Hiwar, 19 December 2008 < http://www. djazairess.com.elhiwar/80 73>  [accessed 25 January 2015].

    < http://www.babelmed.net/letteratura/236-algeria/6091-litt-rature-alg-rienne-la-proximit-du-drame.html> [accessed 12 November 2014]

     

    < http://www.babelmed.net/arte-e-spettacolo/116-algeria/2930-chronique-de-braises-du-cin-ma-alg-rien-entretien-avec-salim-aggar.html>[accessed 12 November 2014]

    http://www.euromedcafe.org/interview.asp?lang=ing&documentID=696

    [accessed 12 December 2014]

  • Imen Cozzo – A Post/Colonial Feminist Reading of Assia Djebar’s Women of Algiers in their Apartment and Malika Mokeddem’s Je Dois Tout a Ton Oubli

    Imen Cozzo – A Post/Colonial Feminist Reading of Assia Djebar’s Women of Algiers in their Apartment and Malika Mokeddem’s Je Dois Tout a Ton Oubli

    Imen Cozzo

    العربية | Français

    “Only when you drink from the river of silence shall you indeed sing. And when you have reached the mountain top, then you shall begin to climb. And when the earth shall claim your limbs, then shall you truly dance.”

    Khalil Gibran, The Prophet. 

    In the present tradition/modernity war that unsettles the social and the political life in Algeria, violence, silence and war continue the scenario of the colonial period.[1] Algerian women’s silence is perhaps an involuntary social, cultural and ideological act of resistance, a way to bury the atrocious truth and to seal it into a forgotten tomb, shutting it out of world gaze. Silence was imposed by a colonial reality and continues to be enforced by a postcolonial tradition and society. It is sometimes a voluntary refusal to speak as a sign of virtue and humility, in other times it is a weapon of resisting evil.

    During colonial time, silence was a refusal to speak the language of the oppressor, as an act of resisting the loss of identity. After independence, many Algerian writers use the same coloniser’s language to resist their assimilation into a backward process or the fight over “outer” and “inner” spaces.[2] Therefore, silence becomes a political act through which women subvert the oppressors’ discourse, by retaining their secret world/word.

    The idea of the struggle over space covers the dilemma these states faced after gaining independence. Space is divided into public and domestic spheres, forcing after-war politics to decide whether to agree on women’s presence in the outer space that used to be the arena of militancy against the coloniser; or to send women back to the traditional role of mothering and serving the family. It seems that the Algerian government opted for the latter. Nevertheless, women had participated in the struggle for Independence, fighting in the same way men did, learning the different ways of torture and resistance, hence becoming different from the pre-war portraits. Women proved to be equal to men in war; and so, they sought a better condition of peace after the birth of the State for which they had fought. Yet, peace was utopic, as the country entered in an internal war, against extremism and against modernity as the model imported by the coloniser. Algeria, where the historical situation of colonization and decolonization was more complex than the ones in Morocco and Tunisia, shows slower social transformation (for example the family code/code de la famille). In fact, women are marginalised by law, tradition and society when the texts put women secondary to men in decision making, or by allowing polygamy for instance. The new war to fight is the one of emancipation-liberation. The gaze at a silent/secret woman enhances its exotic being in European representation of the harem. These vague expectations of women are kept in motionless silence on Delacroix’ canvas, produced in 1834 and 1849. For Assia Djebar, Delacroix’ depiction reveals a Western conception of Maghrebian women and by analogy of the Maghreb.

    The conclusions about violence and silencing women in the colonial period are extended over the present. Malika Mokeddem belongs to the post-colonial Algerian generation for whom colonisation is perhaps a memory mystified by a harsh present. In her autobiographical novel published in 2008, Je Dois Tout a Ton Oubli/ I Owe Everything to your Oblivion, Mokeddem alternates between France and Algeria that is compared to the mythical Medea. This paper expounds the two writers’ premises about “silence and violence,” “silencing as rape,” and the way their protagonists cope with such agonies.

    *****

    In Women of Algiers in Their Apartment, Djebar tells of the agonies and the massacres committed Algerian women bear after the Algerian war against French colonization during the “civil war” of the 1990’s. The collected feminine voices and the writer’s reflections on the paintings are the main focus of Djebar’s work which is presented as the “fragmented… murmurings” that the writer puts together as pieces of a broken mirror that reflects an “underground” reality, heavily veiled by a mainstream discourse. The writer opens her book by a long overture to sum up her approach, themes and techniques,

    These stories, a few frames of reference on a journey of listening, from 1958 to 1978. Fragmented, remembered, reconstituted conversations […]. I could have listened to these voices in no matter what language, non-written, non-recorded, transmitted only by chains of echoes and sighs. […]. An excoriated language, from never having appeared in the sunlight, from having sometimes been intoned, declaimed, howled, dramatized, but always mouth and eyes in the dark […] tones of voice still suspended in the silences of yesterday’s seraglio […] Words of the veiled body, language that in turn has taken the veil for so long a time.[3]

    The stories depict women from different backgrounds: the intellectual, the rifi (country women), the young, the old, the fighter and the silent. Djebar’s protagonists live in Algeria or France and struggle daily with their scars left from the independence war, the civil war and the social and political oppression. There is the educated surgeon’s wife seeking to help her French childhood friend and the old woman who carries water at the public bath recalling what she has endured and lost in the course of her life. Although different, these women share the experience of rape, imprisonment, exile, widowhood, prostitution and silence. Their silencing by a harsh law and society is furthered by the silence of their male mates, brothers and fathers, who, according to the interviews and narratives of these women, usually kill them, beg their assailants to kill them or exile them and deny them family and name; and by doing so selling them to prostitution. The collection of stories from 1958 to 1978 conveys how war ravages women.

    Algerian women today are observed in the water-carrier of the bathhouse’s depiction. In a solo first-person stream of consciousness, the labourer unveils her ‘underground’ burden as she narrates how she had been sold into marriage at the age of thirteen and how her life has been torn away in perpetual servitude with the innumerate joys she is denied. She cries out in silence: “Where are you, you fire carriers, you my sisters, who should have liberated the city… Barbed wire no longer obstructs the alleys, now it decorates windows, balconies, anything at all that opens onto an outside space.”[4] The Carrier of water in the bathhouse goes on to speak of other abuses, always expressing the sense of space and its striking fluctuation between inside and outside.[5]

    The work of Djebar seeks cultural identity through the reconstruction of a female identity by the writing and narrating the stories of women that passed from one generation to the other orally, in dialect, or by using the language of the Other. For centuries, women have been locked in a confined and separate space; taking their stories from behind the closed doors is an emancipating act of revealing secrets and hearing the previously silenced voices. Here are the words of the French Anne, one of the protagonists of Women of Algiers in their Apartment, to describe Algiers:

    […] In this strange city, drunk with the sun, but full of prisons that close from above every street, every woman lives for herself or, above all, for the long chain of women that have been locked in the past, generation after generation, while outside it poured the same light as an unchanging blue, rarely clouded?[6]

    In Anne’s words, one feels the difficulty to find the authentic voice of women, beyond silence and isolation. By being able to speak and to recreate, these women regain possession of the space and take control of their own glance, steer freely in space where their desires for liberation and creation are possible. The freedom of the eye corresponds to its liberation of body and mind, independently of the space where the person dwells.

    Djebar’s effort then becomes not to “speak on behalf of” or “about”, but “Near”[7] women, in a gesture of solidarity to which Djebar calls on all women. This act brings the writer to move always in the field of “underground” voices and to oscillate between memory and its transcription through first hand witnesses. These silenced voices are meant to conquest the public space through the possibility of writing as an expression of freedom and movement, also, through the revelation of secrets and the inner life of characters, as an act of re-appropriation of the image and an exposure to worldview.

    The artistic experimentation of Djebar in polyphonic writing perhaps corresponds to the attempt to destabilize the status of representation and is therefore a way to give back the image its fluctuating nature, its relationship with fantasy, and with originality. She plays on the boundaries between visible and invisible, spoken and the unspoken, and between reality and imagination. Through the work of recreation or rewriting, Djebar tries to reconstruct a clear image of the hidden and to give voice to the previously silenced by the cultural and the political systems that rejoice their power in silencing and rendering women invisible.[8]

    Through the gaze of the Other, caught in an outer public space, in which women appear veiled and marginal, Djebar introduces her readers to a reflection on the gaze. The analysis then becomes more specific, highlighting the Western gaze in the East as a woman. A voyeuristic or inquisitive look reflects the whole experience of colonization. Through silencing and imprisoning women or the colonised, the West exercises its powers in interpreting Algeria.

    This same idea is elaborated by Rania Kabbani’s Europe’s Myth of the Orient that traces the possible common features of Western travellers in the Middle-East as a space of possibilities,

    Europe was charmed by an Orient that shimmered with possibilities that promised a sexual space from the dictates of the bourgeois morality of the metropolis. The European reacted to the encounter as a man might react to a woman, by manifesting strong attraction or strong repulsion. E. W. Lane described his first sight of Egypt, the Egypt he had dreamed of since boyhood, thus: “as I approached the shore, I felt like an eastern bridegroom, about to lift the veil of his bride […].[9]

     In confronting the Orient, the traveller perhaps unconsciously, as Kabbani puts it, ‘discloses his preconception of the territory’. However, the Orient and its derivative concepts are used in the following analysis as inclusive of the North African region, which is often depicted as completely different from the rest of the Arab world from a Berber, African and Mediterranean perspective.

    The many possibilities that the Orient offers to the colonial voyeur seem to include liberating Western inhibitions rather than observing the real space. This means that the Orient is already depicted in the traveller’s mind by his tradition of writing on the Other rather than a discovery from scratch. The interplay of identity and difference is often the controversy that the writer on the Orient faces. The “mysterious and exotic” space becomes the Other, who offers what the proper place denies. Nevertheless, the perplexed space resists the image of the colonising culture and its power to define and diffuse. The Western concept of the Orient is based, as Abdul JanMohamed argues, on the Manichean allegory (seeing the world as divided into mutually excluding opposites): “if the West is ordered, rational, masculine, good, then the Orient is chaotic, irrational, feminine, and evil. Simply to reverse this polarizing is to be complicit in its totalizing and identity-destroying power (all is reduced to a set of dichotomies, black or white, etc.).”[10]

    Colonised peoples are depicted as diverse in their nature and in their traditions, and their world is often explained by a geographical division of the planet, in which people are “totalised” or “essentialised” — through such concepts as a black consciousness, Indian soul, aboriginal culture and so forth. In fact, it is no coincidence that the two literary works considered most representative of the “colonial encounter,” The Tempest (1623) and Robinson Crusoe (1719), enact the arrival of Europeans in uninhabited territories, which are not really uninhabited, and of which they declare themselves the masters, depriving the native peoples of their right to their land. In the Orient the first impact is different in that the territories are partially emptied, but completely silenced. In silencing their subjects, the travellers in North Africa fill into a linguistic void and speak on behalf of the native inhabitants.

    Therefore, the construction of specific images of the Other was functional in the support and implementation of the various projects that made up the program of the colonial enterprise. The colonial theory has been primarily built upon the pioneering work of Edward Said. In Orientalism (1978), Said examines a range of literary, anthropological and historical texts in order to illuminate how the West attempted to represent the Orient as a silent Other. By portraying the East as culturally and intellectually inferior, the West was simultaneously able to construct an image of western superiority. In order to sustain these beliefs, purportedly objective statements were produced in a manner claiming realism.

    Said’s work is configured as a critical theory on the representation of the Other that has most influenced the post-colonial criticism, establishing itself as one of its founding texts. It laid the groundwork for the emergence of the critical current. In Orientalism (1978), Said believes that the Orientalist discourse should not be understood as a product of colonialism, because the first precedes the latter. Said repeatedly stresses that Orientalism is not, by itself, caused by colonialism, but also states that the complex ideological apparatus and representation of the East by part of Europe has been one of the major thrusts of the colonial experience. Said offers one main definition of Orientalism. It refers to the possibility of considering Orientalism as “a Western style for dominating, restructuring, and having authority over the Orient.”[11] Said implies that Orientalism is a cultural fabric rather than a natural or geographical fact. In fact, the space is not only created but also “Orientalized” by the West, and hence he tries to debunk and depict the spurious claim on otherness.

    An important interpretation of Said’s concept of Orientalism comes from Homi Bhabha. Referring to Said’s ideas concerning the way the West intervenes within that system of representation by calling for a scrutiny of the varied European discourses, which represent “’the Orient’ as a unified racial, geographical, political and cultural zone of the world,”[12] Bhabha agrees with Said’s designation

    Orientalism very generally is a form of radical realism; anyone employing orientalism, which is the habit for dealing with questions, objects, qualities and regions deemed Oriental, will designate, name, point to, fix what he is talking or thinking about with a word or phrase, which then is considered either to have acquired, or more simply to be reality…. The tense they employ is the timeless eternal; they convey an impression of repetition and strength.[13]

    The realism generated by the colonial discourse is one of the key ideas in Djebar’s work. Djebar expresses the desire to rewrite Algeria, considering that the atrocities that the space experienced were thrice amplified when the subject is the Algerian woman. These women of Algeria are silenced and marginalised by tradition, colonisation and patriarchy.

    In her Women of Algiers in their Apartment, Djebar dedicates a whole section to speak of the arrival of the French painter Delacroix in Algiers in 1832, where he had the opportunity to contemplate and pierce, for the first time in his life, in a harem or the space where women and children are gathered “lying in the middle of a pile of silk and gold.”[14] This unexpected and shocking experience will ensure that, after his return to Paris, the painter works for a few years on “the image of his memory,”[15] supported by some notes made at the time of his visit to the harem. He realises his tableau of “Women of Algiers in their Apartments” in 1834 and another in 1849. Djebar analyses and compares the two works with the subsequent paintings created by Picasso between 1954 and 1955.

    Pablo Picasso, ‘Les femmes d’Alger, version H’, 1955 <http://search.it.online.fr/covers/?m=1849>

    In his paintings, Delacroix depicts three women half-lying, absent, looking at the void, wrapped in an aura of mystery and sensuality; they are surprised by the gaze of the viewer and supervised by that of a black servant. In their luxurious prison, these women are suspended or “Frozen” in an eerie silence. The enigmatic silence of their gaze, shown on the canvases of the French painter, becomes the index of the male domination perpetrated over the centuries on the body of women, and was accentuated during the period of colonial rule, as a form of defence and preservation of culture and tradition with the arrival of the stranger/intruder.

    Djebar reacts to the fixity that the theft gaze at Algerian women in their suspended and postponed presence epitomises in the tableau. Her reaction is against the intellectual closure and the oppressive act to make of the colonised sub-culture “closed, fixed in the colonial status, caught in the yolk of oppression. Both present and mummified, it testifies against its members. The cultural mummification leads to a mummification of individual thinking.”[16] In the core of the postcolonial Algerian thinking, silence is crucial in the construction of “otherness.” In the making of the colonial history, women are relegated to a greater silence and invisibility. The harem becomes a prison that enhances the Orientalist voyeuristic play on the exoticised feminine. This gaze metaphorically strips these Women of their traditional veil and so they become “naked” and defenceless. After independence, a past perceived as irretrievably lost, in which the woman was not only allowed to watch and encourage with her screams the men in their battle, but to join the fight in a heroic manner, the Algerian male took over the same strategy of the coloniser. As Djebar argues, for a woman to remove her veil used to be tantamount to “going naked.”[17] Women who tried to join public spaces were socially repudiated because they refused to be veiled. “Public life and public discourse can easily be compared to entering a hostile, almost exclusively male enemy territory,”[18] where Algerian men and “even women’s defensive discourse about themselves often provides the voyeur with additional weapons so women must avoid displaying their innermost selves (and their femininity) in order to avoid being vulnerable to reductionism and physical and verbal aggression.”[19]

    Outside the harem, the veil is both an opportunity for women to move freely in public places through the subtraction of the body to the gaze of others, and a form of control, a sign of belonging and domain. Veiled women seem to be a danger, “a possible thief in the male space”[20] and, at the same time, an object of male honour and dignity. In Delacroix’ “Women of Algiers in their apartment,” the silent or absent look is generalised to cover Algerian women during the period of colonisation and after.

    On the other hand, the stolen gaze of the painter is the prohibited gaze of the Other. The frame of the tableau and the space as beheld by the eye become then the image of imprisonment, which Picasso will explore in his paintings, creating flying lines, cancelling the door of the harem, illuminating the room with light and portraying the body in motion. As for women, the different versions gave them freedom to be covered and to be naked, to face their painter with an alluring smile or to be a face without specific features. The absent features and identity put the painter into a silent position, it is Picasso who silences his brushes and gives free rein to infinite faces and fantasies. Picasso declares a radical shift in perspective; he calls his tableaux by alphabetic letters in disorder so that his audience reads the letters inside the movements and features of the Algerian women who write different words every time one looks at them. By giving infinite verbal interpretations in his tableaux, Picasso breaks their silence and creates a response.

    Yossi Waxman, ‘Femmes d’Alger dans leur appartement,’ 2009. <http://www.newmasterartist.com/artist/yossi-waxman/artworks>

    In 2009, Yossi Waxman interprets ‘Femmes d’Alger dans leur appartement’ giving them universal attires by mixing their physical features so one can hardly see them as Algerian, mixing their colours and finally dissolving them as if washed away by their momentousness.

    The liberation from the condition of imprisonment, however, does not pass through the conquest of space and the possibility of movement, but through the introduction of speech and dialogue between women. Djebar comments,

    New Women of Algiers which, starting from the last few years, they can freely circular […] these women are (we are) completely free from the shadowy relationship maintained for centuries with their body? They speak truly, dancing, or thinking…[21]

    *****

    In Malika Mokeddem’s Je Dois Tout a Ton Oubli/ I Owe Everything to your Oblivion, the image of women’s silence and rape is extended to the French space. Rape is the physical, moral, psychological and symbolical weapon of war. By physical I mean usurping one’s authority over her body. By moral I pinpoint to the association of women’s body to family or tribal honour. In the act of rape, mainly the ones committed by the coloniser, there is a psychological feeling of supremacy and putting hand on the desired territory. This leads to the symbol of the land by a woman’s bodies. By impregnating these women with the ‘enemy’, the land will be peopled by the enemy’s offspring. This is why, in time of war, raped women are killed by their families, sent back to her abuser to be killed or sold into prostitution. These destructive aspects of rape make of it the most degrading weapon.

    Published in 2008, Je dois tout à ton oubli of Malika Mokeddem highlights the situation of women in Algeria after the wars the country survived in the Twentieth Century. In this novel, the protagonist Selma is a paediatrician in France. She is tormented by her past, mainly when a man came with the urgency to save the life of his son. For the first time, Selma has a flashback that freezes her and makes her decide to go back to her hometown and face her torments. In the process, she decides to face her mother and Algeria. She rediscovers rape, silence and perpetual violence against Algerian women.

    The theme of women’s condition as marked by difficulties and suffering is represented by two distinct figures. The narrator fluctuates between two extremes. On the one hand, one sees the traditional woman, represented particularly by the mother, as the best role that Algerian society accepts and esteems in women. The mother represents the tradition that links the virtual woman to her submission to the dictates of patriarchy. On the other side, there is the rebellious woman, the “different,” who is mainly active and participant in social life, and who fights for dignity and emancipation, as seen for example in the character of Selma.

    To Malika Mokeddem, the maternal figure is fundamental and the symbol of an Algeria gripped by a pernicious inaction that undermines the new generations’ striving to achieve a proper psychic and cultural development. Selma’s mother is illiterate, constantly silent, an idolizer of silence. Mokaddem explains the clash between generations of women by the absence of education as one of the main reasons behind the conflict between Selma her mother and the women who live with her:

    Elles [les femmes de la famille de Selma] ne travaillent pas. Elles vivent avec leurs enfants chez leur mère. […] Soudain Selma a l’étrange impression de traverser un cimetière pour vivants à mille lieues de toute conscience humaine. […] Le manque d’instruction les maintient ensembles, démunies.[22]

    In the extract, ignorance and illiteracy hinder the revival of women. Confined in their houses, as perceived by Mokaddem’s protagonist Selma, Maghrebian women do not know the historical evolution and therefore tend to believe in the immutability of the times and customs.[23] Prisoners of an era parallel, Selma’s mother is unable of developing a divergent thinking because she does not have access to an alternative thought to the one she seems to live through for centuries.

    In her novel, Malika Mokeddem shows that ignorance is the cause of the general backwardness of Algeria. Ignorance, a harbinger of a generalized poverty, descends silence that characterizes the childhood memories of the protagonist. Silence is prevailing on the lives of these women. These women teach tradition to their daughters and avoid talking about their feelings, as though things should be the same for any woman.[24] Things should happen in silence; yet, Mokaddem depicts Algerian women’s position in the fighting winds of revolution, independence, nationalism, extremism and modernity, as central in setting future parameters and values of the Algerian society.

    The novel shows the presence of a common attitude of silence that characterizes women’s behaviour and the more general context of Algeria. The conspiratorial silence and secrecy of Selma’s mother is emblematic of a widespread Algerian attitude designed to conceal, even the most heinous crimes. Only silence guarantees the refuge from the danger of change. In fact, the narrator describes Selma, her mother and Algeria, in a relationship governed by silence

    Quand avaient-elles passé du temps ensemble? Toute leur vie, elles n’avaient fait que croiser leur silence. Un silence si vertigineux qu’il les maintenait à distance. S’il lui fallait trouver un mot, un seul, qui puisse définir la mère, ce serait: jamais. Du reste, la mère resterait muette devant elle. Il en a toujours été ainsi. N’en a-t-elle pas eu la plus évidente démonstration cette nuit?[25]

    Tant de violences ont été commises ici sans que jamais justice soit rendue. Tant de traumatismes toujours niés, toujours mis sous le boisseau.[26]

    Selma’s mother tends to distance herself from the rational conversation that favours questioning. She refuses to have a contact with her daughter, who already feels distant, critical to those centuries-long established family behaviours.

    Silence is not a solution; it only paves the way to chaos and misunderstandings. Indeed, Mokeddem highlights the parallels between her mother and Algeria. The country is torn between Selma with her Occidental philosophical ideals and the mother or tradition that threatens renovation. In fact, Selma feels threatened by her mother’s repudiating words and considers that between her and her mother, “il y a toujours eu un obstacle d’autant plus inquiétant [qui] ne s’exprimait que par le sentiment d’une vague menace.”[27] Violent towards difference, Selma’s mother is described as the immovable protector of all those pillars of the Algerian culture. Indeed Selma recognises Algeria in her mother: “C’est elle [l’Algérie] qui a fomenté des violences, des exactions avec cette sorte de jouissance destructrice.”[28]

    In the event, the rift that separates Selma from her mother is foregrounded as the clash between Selma and her past. Among the virtues that a good mother must necessarily possess is to defend honour: the preservation of the marriage bond and the diligent observance of religious dictates are to be strenuously protected. If they are threatened even the most heinous crimes can be done to ensure their protection. Selma’s mother will kill her new-born nephew because he was the fruit of an extramarital affair. The revelation is hard on Selma, it is her uncle who raped his sister. In fact, the mother continues to repeat a particularly emblematic sentence: “Qu’est-ce que tu voulais qu’on fasse? On était bien obligés de tout étouffer! ”[29]

    Selma’s mother is unable to understand the questions her daughter raises because the two women refer to incompatible beliefs. Selma chose not to live in her home land and to escape from the abuse and the violence. The mother, however, has to defend tradition and to fight modernity or reasonable thinking in the matters of women and sexuality. It is interesting to note that Selma’s mother does not use the first personal pronoun ‘je’ during her confession. She prefers the impersonal pronoun ‘on’ because it was not an act dictated by an individual conviction, but a necessary act to protect honour. The act of silencing culminates in the murder of the new-born:

    La main de la mère qui s’empare d’un oreiller blanc, l’applique sur le visage du nourrisson allongé par terre auprès de la tante Zahia et qui appuie, appuie. Cette main qui pèse sur le coussin et maintient la pression. Les spasmes, à peine perceptibles, du bébé ligoté par des langes qui le sanglent de la racine des bras à la pointe des pieds. Le cri muet des yeux de Zahia qui semble tout figer.[30]

    Medea is the mythical figure that Mokaddem alludes to in describing Algeria. In The Complex of Medea, 2006, Rita El Khayat chooses to compare the mother to the sorceress Medea to destabilise the patriarchal beliefs held by women. Fundamental to reflecting on the relationship between a mother and her daughter, the productions El Khayat propose an idea of femininity and motherhood that Mokaddem agrees on to a certain extent.

    The study of Rita El Khayat reflects on violent motherhood through the evocation of the Greek myth of Medea. Medea thus becomes the symbol of a mother’s brutality and murder. For Selma, Medea becomes the mother and the country:

    L’image de Médée hante Selma. Elle s’est imposée dès que celle du meurtre est venue lui dessiller les yeux lors de cette brusque restauration de sa mémoire. Mais comment risquer la comparaison quand la mère comme la tante feraient si pâle figure aux côtes de Médée? […] Médée méprise souverainement la notion du mal et tue pour se venger d’un époux et des puissants avec lesquels ce dernier fait alliance. Elle leur inflige un supplice radical et s’en vante. […] Seules la honte et la menace du déshonneur ont présidé à la décision familiale d’un meurtre. La mère n’en a été que l’exécutante. […] En vérité, c’est au pays tout entier, à l’Algérie, que sied le rôle de Médée. [C’est elle] qui a assassiné les uns, exilé les autres, fait incinérer des bébés dans des fours, abandonnant d’autres enfants avec d’indicibles blessures. Elle continue à se mutiler en reléguant la moitié de sa population, les femmes, au rang de sous-individus dans les textes de sa loi.[31]

    Algeria appears to the eyes of the writer as a despotic land. To Mokaddem, Algeria is the reincarnation of Medea: enchantress, powerful, murderous, and ruthless. The thought of the invariable Algerian land accompanies all those women, who like Selma chose exile in silence. If they continue to live there, it means that they will accept things in silence.

    Moreover, it is interesting to note that Malika Mokeddem’s interpretation rejects all forms of nationalist rooting, expressed by the majority of postcolonial authors. Malika Mokeddem flees Algeria to a refuge in France, which she does not consider France as her exile. The writer wants to be homeless, stateless, in a town of an indistinct ailleurs.

    *****

    To conclude, women’s silence is a frequent theme and an integrating component in Algerian stories. In Mokaddem’s Je Dois Tout a’ ton Oubli, silence is criticised as an act of acceptance and submission if not the perpetuation of that same oppressive tradition. In Djebar’s Women of Algiers in their Apartments, the portrayal of silence is given a colonialist reading and its later explosive interpretation of Picasso as an emancipating act of Algerian Women today. Thus, caught between tradition, colonisation and patriarchy, Algerian women endure the violent act of silencing and rape; yet many of them, like Selma’s mother, perpetuate absence and displacement.

    Bibliography  

    Barya, Mildred. “The Segregated Gaze: Assia Djebar’s Women of Algiers in Their Apartment”. February 4, 2014. <http://www.africanwriterstrust.org/the-segregated-gaze-assia-djebars-women-of-algiers-in-their-apartment/> (10/10/2014, 14:50).

    Bhabha, Homi. “The Other Question”. In the Sociology of Literature Conference. Essex University, 1982. In The Politics of Theory. Ed. Francis Barker. Colchester, 1983. <http://courses.washington.edu/com597j/pdfs/bhabha_the%20other%20question.pdf> (10/08/2014, 14:08).

    Burnett, Leon. “Puer Aeternus: Child of Modernity”, Mito e Interdisciplinariedad: Los Mitos antiguos, medievales y modernos en la literatura y las artes contemporáneas; ed. José Manuel Losada Goya and Antonella Lipscomb. Bari: Levante Editori, 2013, 143-154.

    Clark, Anna. Women’s Silence Men’s Violence. London and New York: Pandora, 1987.

    Cuterara, Antonio. La mafia e I Mafiosi. Palermo: Reber, 1900. Ed. Sala Bolognese, 1984.

    Debra, Kelly. Autobiography and independence selfhood and creativity in North African postcolonial writing in French. Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2007.

    Delacroix, Eugène. ‘Femmes d’Alger dans leur intérieur’, 1849, Assia Djebar, Women of Algiers in their Apartment.

    Djebar, Assia. Ces Voix qui m´assiègent: En Marge de ma Francophonie [These Voices that Besiege Me: Outside of my French-Speaking World], 1999 <http://books.google.co.uk/books?id=Ta-MLTOyh5YC&pg=PA309&lpg=PA309&dq=ASSIA+DJEBAR,+THESE+VOICES+THAT+BESIEGE+ME> (8/9/2014, 12:50).

    Djebar, Assia. Women of Algiers in Their Apartment. Trans. Marjolijn de Jager. The University of Virginia Press, 1992.

    Grami, Amel. “Gender and War”. Conference: University of Birmingham, School of Arts and Music, Department of Modern Languages, Arabic Section, UK. 10 /10/ 2014.

    Henner, Hess. Mafia & Mafiosi: Origin, Power and Myth. Australia: Crawford House, 1998. <http://books.google.co.uk/books?id=U0-qglRPSAQC&pg=PA110&lpg=PA110&dq=Cu+%C3%A8+surdu,+orbu+e+taci,+campa+cent%27anni+%27mpaci>(8/9/2014, 11:50).

    Kabbani, Rania. Europe’s Myth of the Orient. London: Pandora Press, 1986.

    Mokeddem, Malika. Je Dois Tout A Ton Oubli. Paris: Grasset, 2008.

    Merini, Rafika. Two Major Francophone Women Writers, Assia Djébar and Leïla Sebbar A Thematic Study of Their Works. New York: Peter Lang, 1999.

    Omertà, <https://www.google.co.uk/search?q=omertà+definition&oq=omertà+definition> (2/8/2014, 14:50).

    Picasso, Pablo. ‘Les femmes d’Alger, version H’, 1955 <http://search.it.online.fr/covers/?m=1849> (2/10/2014, 10:00).

    — ‘Les femmes d’Alger, version I’, 1955 <http://search.it.online.fr/covers/?m=1849>(2/10/2014, 10:00).

    — ‘Les femmes d’Alger, version J’, 1955 <http://search.it.online.fr/covers/?m=1849> (2/10/2014, 10:00).

    — ‘Les femmes dAlger, version K’, 1955 <http://search.it.online.fr/covers/?m=1849>(2/10/2014, 10:00).

    — ‘Les femmes d’Alger, version M’, 1955 <http://search.it.online.fr/covers/?m=1849> (2/10/2014, 10:00).

    — ‘Les femmes d’Alger, version N’, 1955 <http://search.it.online.fr/covers/?m=1849> (2/10/2014, 10:00).

    — ‘Les femmes d’Alger, version O’, 1955 <http://search.it.online.fr/covers/?m=1849> (2/10/2014, 10:00).

    Rittner, Carol. Rape: Weapon of war and Genocide. MN: Paragan House, 2012.

    Said, Edward. Orientalism. NewYork: Pantheon Books, 1978.

    S.X. Goudie, “Theory, Practice and the Intellectual: A Conversation with Abdul R. JanMohamed.” <http://english.chass.ncsu.edu/jouvert/v1i2/GOUDIE.HTM> (13/09/2014).

    Waxman, Yossi. ‘Femmes d’Alger dans leur appartement.’ 2009 <http://www.newmasterartist.com/artist/yossi-waxman/artworks> (2/10/2014, 10:00).

     

    [1] French presence in Algeria lasted from 1830 to 1962.

    [2] Amel Grami, “Gender and War”, (Conference: University of Birmingham, School of Arts and Music, Department of Modern Languages, Arabic Section, UK, 10 /10/ 2014.

    [3] Assia Djebar, Women of Algiers in Their Apartment, Trans., Marjolijn de Jager (The University of Virginia Press, 1992), opening page.

    [4] Djebar, Women, 44.

    [5] Barya, “The Segregated Gaze: Assia Djebar’s Women of Algiers in Their Apartment” (February 4, 2014) <http://www.africanwriterstrust.org/the-segregated-gaze-assia-djebars-women-of-algiers-in-their-apartment/>

    [6] Djebar, Women, 66.

    [7] Djebar, Women, 14.

    [8] Assia Djebar, Ces Voix qui m´assiègent: En Marge de ma Francophonie [These Voices that Besiege Me: Outside of my French-Speaking World] <http://books.google.co.uk/books?id=Ta-MLTOyh5YC&pg=PA309&lpg=PA309&dq=ASSIA+DJEBAR,+THESE+VOICES+THAT+BESIEGE+ME&source=bl&ots=D3VcGzNp7_&sig=t8tJhyY36DmcTC4X3zAuoGqCRY0&hl=it&sa=X&ei=TeFtVL- kDbaSsQT9mYGwCg&ved=0CDIQ6AEwAw#v=onepage&q=ASSIA%20DJEBAR%2C%20THESE%20VOICES%20THAT%20BESIEGE%20ME&f=false> 107.

    [9] Rania Kabbani, Europe’s Myth of the Orient, (London: Pandora Press, 1986), 67.

    [10] S.X. Goudie, “Theory, Practice and the Intellectual: A Conversation with Abdul R. JanMohamed,” <http://english.chass.ncsu.edu/jouvert/v1i2/GOUDIE.HTM> (13/09/2014).

    [11] Said, Orientalism, 3.

    [12] Bhabha, Other, 1.

    [13] Bhabha, Other, 8.

    [14] Djebar, Women, 160.

    [15] Djebar, Women, 161.

    [16] Bhabha, Other, 9.

    [17] Rafika Merini, Two Major Francophone Women Writers, Assia Djébar and Leïla Sebbar A Thematic Study of Their Works. New York: Peter Lang, 1999, 2.

    [18] Merini, Two,3.

    [19] Merini, Two,3.

    [20] Djebar, Women, 165.

    [21] Djebar, Women, 14.

    [22] Mokeddem Malika, Je dois tout à ton oubli, (Paris: Bernard Grasset, 2008), 68. “They [the women of Selma’s family] are not working. They live with their children at their mothers’ house. […] Suddenly Selma has the strange feeling of crossing a cemetery for the living that is far one thousand miles from any human awareness. […] their lack of education keeps them concerted in poverty.” [Translation mine].

    [23] Kelly Debra, Autobiography and independence selfhood and creativity in North African postcolonial writing in French, (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2007), 286.

    [24] Mokeddem, Dois, 85.

    [25] Mokeddem, Dois, 85. “When had they spent time together? All their life, they had only to cross their silence, a so dizzying silence that kept them at bay. If she had to find a word, only one, which could define the mother, it would be ‘never’. Moreover, the mother remains silent before her. It has always been so. Does not she have the clearest demonstration that night?” [Translation mine].

    [26] Mokeddem, Dois, 86. “So much violence has been committed here without ever a glimpse of justice; as trauma has always been denied and put under a bushel.” [Translation mine].

    [27] Mokeddem, Dois, 88. “There has always been a particularly worrisome obstacle [which] is expressed by the feeling of a vague threat.” [Translation mine].

    [28] Mokeddem, Dois, 92. “It is her [Algeria] which fomented violence and abuses with such a destructive pleasure.” [Translation mine].

    [29] Mokeddem, Dois, 71. “What do you expect us to do? We were obliged to stifle it all!” [Translation mine].

    [30] Mokeddem, Dois, 11. “The hand of the mother who grabs a white pillow, pressing on the face of the infant lying on the floor with aunt Zahia, pressing, stifling and crushing. The barely noticeable Spasm of the grieving infant, tied up from head to toes. The silent cry of Zahia’s eyes seems to freeze everything.” [Translation mine].

    [31] Mokeddem, Dois, 84-5. “The image of Medea haunts Selma. It imposed itself as soon as the murder came to open her eyes at the sudden recovery of her memory. Nevertheless, the analogy would appear futile as the mother and the aunt pale in comparison to Medea. […] Medea sovereignly abhors the notion of evil and kills to avenge her husband and the powers with which he made a covenant. It inflicts a radical punishment and praises it. […] Only the shame and the threat of dishonour pushed the family to a decision of murder of which the mother was a mere performer. […] In fact, it was the whole country: Algeria that plays the role of Medea. [She’s] the one who murdered some, exiled others cremated babies in ovens, and left other children with untold injuries. It continues to mutilate itself by relegating half of its population, women, who continue to be cast sub-individuals in its texts of law.” [Translation mine].

  • Anissa Daoudi – Untranslatability of Algeria in “The Black Decade”

    Anissa Daoudi – Untranslatability of Algeria in “The Black Decade”

    Anissa Daoudi

    العربية | Français

    مشنقتنا التي علقها اله وهمي صنعه البشر حسب نزواتهم” (ة)”

    “(ة) is our gallows, hung by an imaginary God, created by men according to their fancy” 

    The  above quotation was handwritten for me by the Algerian writer Fadhila Al Farouq  inside my copy of her novel تاء الخجل Taa al Khajal (2005)[1]. The Arabic letter ‘taa marbuta’ or ‘closed taa’ is the principal indicator of the feminine gender.  In its uncial form, it usually appears as a circle under two dots (ة).  The handwritten version by Al Farouq has two tilted lines emerging from both sides (δ[2]), making it look like a hangman’s noose.  For her (δ), represents a noose around women’s necks.  She uses ‘our’ to refer to all Arab women without exception.  She denotes this noose as an imaginary ‘man-made’ tool created according to men’s fancy to represent God or religion in general.  Al Farouq uses the ‘closed taa /ة/’ as a metaphor to refer to the closed society she lives in.  The circle constituting blockage of her society, in which people are going around in circles, not finding a way out.  There is the suggestion of an impasse, a very pessimistic view as it eliminates the possibility of hope for change.

    Al Farouq’s novel has been translated into French as La Honte au Feminin (2009)[3]. The title in French evokes questions about translatability in general and about transferring concepts, rather than words or phrases, from the source to the target text.  The translated version into French opts for ‘F’ for the French word ‘feminin’.   Only does this not have the same cognitive image of the ‘closed taa /ة/’ as a circle, but also it distorts the whole concept.  Al Farouq devotes a complete chapter to the issue of the feminine gender in the Arabic language, its symbolic significance and how it impacts gender politics.  She entitles the chapter “تاء مربوطة لا غير”, “ta’marbuta la ghaira, ‘a closed taa /ة/’ and nothing else”, which has been translated into French as, “F” fermé et rien d’autre.  The translated version into ‘F’ for ‘feminin’ is a direct alphabetical interpretation of the original language.  However, what the author wants to convey is the indirect and symbolic signification of the circle in the ‘closed taa /ة/’, referring to ‘no exit’ situation.   Al Farouq does not imply the notion of the circle as symbolic of something that is whole, complete, ideal and eternal but as something that has no ending and no beginning.  Al Farouq’s reader should understand that the intended meaning is that of the closed Algerian society.  The direct alphabetical interpretation, however, relates to the discourse about the Arabic language and feminism, highlighting the masculinity of Arabic through its grammar.  This is not a new issue: it has been addressed by scholars such as, Yousra Muqaddam[4], Zuleikha Abu Risha[5] and Abdellah Al Ghadhami[6].  They all start from within the Arabic grammatical system and its feminine indicators to deconstruct the wider patriarchal masculine system in their societies.   Al Farouq’s example and many others make up the core of this article, which discusses the ‘untranslatability’ of Algeria, to borrow Apter’s title (Apter, 2006: 94). Specifically, this article concentrates on the ‘untranslatability’ of Algeria during the 1990s, known as the ‘Black Decade’ during which the whole country descended into turmoil.  The ‘untranslatability’ of Algeria exists not only at the linguistic level, as lack of equivalence or mistranslation, but also exists in plural ‘untranslatabilities’, as I shall explain in the course of the article.

    This article provides an in-depth study of the concept of ‘untranslatability’, developed by Emily Apter (2013), and challenges its practicality in the case of Algeria, where further refinements to the concept are needed.  In her chapter on Algeria, Apter presents the concept of untranslatability as a homogenous notion and explains the reasons that are specific to the Algerian case.  This article seeks to challenge the existing framework and adds typologies that help to illustrate the idea further.  Attempts (for example, Gleeson, 2015) to propose typologies that may be used as guidelines remain within the limits of language and translation.  However, this article proposes a wider look at how language systems or language policies may contribute to types of untranslatabilities, using practical examples from various mediums such as personal interviews conducted by the researcher, novels and testimonies in the two working languages in Algeria, French and Arabic.

    While the ‘Untranslatability’ of Algeria is the overarching theme, the article deals with a phase when Algeria went under the radar for a decade.   It is a historical period about which very little is known.    More importantly, very little is mentioned about the role of women in the conflict, either as survivors or as militants.  This article has three objectives.  The first is to bring to light narratives of Algerian women from the ‘Black Decade’ through different mediums, personal interviews, and cultural production (novels, memoirs and testimonies) in the two working languages of Algeria, Arabic and French.    The second is to challenge the concept of untranslatability as a homogeneous notion, but to show, through using Algeria as a case study, that there are multiple, in some cases interrelated, ‘untranslatabilities’ and at the same time promote ‘translation’ as a way of unsettling and disquieting narratives.  The third is to engage with the global discourse of presenting women not as victims or survivors, but as “capable, active and significant participants in conflict zones” (Daphna – Tekoak and Harel – Shalev, 2016: 2).  The article will then focus on a theme that is hardly mentioned, let alone studied, and which is related to narratives of sexual violence, namely rape.   The first assumption one might make when dealing with ‘rape’, particularly in traditional conservative countries like Algeria, is that one is dealing with a case of ‘cultural untranslatability’.  However, this article challenges some stereotypes and shows that ‘rape’ as a sensitive issue, is rather a universal phenomenon and is treated as being sensitive because of its nature.

    Algeria is a country, which had lived through violence of all sorts under the French colonial system, where women were sexually abused by the coloniser.  However, in the 1990s, the perpetrator was not the French, but the Algerian ‘brother’.  This so-called ‘brother’ raped, tortured and killed according to a different ideology, an ideology which translates ‘rape’ as is known in this modern time into ‘sabi[7], a term used in the Crusade, permitting the act of sexual violence against women of different faith, captured in war.  The lack of accountability for the time factor is crucial for this article as it explains further what Apter refers to as ‘sacral or theological untranslatability’.  For her, “the difficulty remains concerning how to take sacral untranslatability as its word without secularist condescension.  I make no pretense of resolving the issue, only to ensuring that it is to be recognized as the major heuristic challenge for the interpretive humanities” (Apter, 2013: 14). This is a well-known phenomenon, which some Arab thinkers spent their lives throughout history researching and providing answers to.  For example, projects by Al Jabiri, Al Aroui, Arkoun and many others in the Nahdha period such as Al Tahtawi[8].

    The concept of untranslatability is frequently used in the literature of translation theory in a homogeneous way.  Classifying a range of untranslatabilities, not necessarily in any order, advances the concept further and opens further discussion.   It also responds to a lack of precision related to the concept.  The ideas and examples discussed within each section act as suggestions as to how one can understand and classify untranslatabilities.  The discussion draws on the areas of linguistics, semantics, theories of language and power, and literature to explore texts where untranslatability is present.  The five categories presented do not all answer the question as to why Algeria is untranslatable, but give account of the most relevant reasons for untranslatability.  Linguicide, as one of the reasons for untranslatability is challenged by bringing out one crucial element, which is the elimination of the Algerian dialect and how it played a crucial role in the silencing of the population as well as the eruption of the conflict between Arabophone, Francophone and Berberophone.  Intellocide, which is the targeting and killing of Algerian intellectuals in the 1990s, is supported with personal interviews, testimonies, novels and films to give concrete examples that challenge official narratives.  Linguicide and intellocide in Algeria are presented as interrelated motives for untranslatability, which are also direct reasons for why external untranslatabilities happen in the case of this country.  The point of emphasising the various classifications of the concept of untranslatability is to facilitate a clearer understanding both in theory and in practice.

    I.       Theoretical Context

    Much of the recent discourse in translation studies is about the issue of ‘untranslatability’ (Apter, 2013).  Discussions range from ‘everything is translatable and transferred from one language into another (Bellos and Jean-Jacques Lecercle) who claim that in the end nothing is untranslatable’, to all translation is necessary but doomed to failure because of the ‘unachievable nature of the task’, (Barbara Cassin) to everything is ‘untranslatable’, (Apter’s book Against World Literature: On the Politics of Untranslatability, 2013).  Apter’s idea is based on rejecting the assumption that everything can “be translated, exchanged or substituted into one accessible global idiom” (Apter, 2013).  She asks her readers to consider the concept of untranslatability, referring to as she puts it “those thorny, frustrating moments of cultural dissonance and misunderstanding – as the key to translation and cross-cultural engagement” (ibid).  Apter considers words as part of a whole system in which meanings of words depend on their relationship to each other just as Ferdinand de Saussure does.  She then takes this idea further to locate significant differences in thought that are conditioned by language and culture.  For her and for Cassin, the problems faced by translators are a rich site for deeper inquiries.  ‘Untranslatability’ here is perceived as a dynamic concept and a necessary one.  It is considered as a platform from which hegemonic discourses are challenged.  Despite Apter’s attempts to provide examples of untranslatability, further work is still needed to categorise types of ‘untranslatabilities’, to avoid the assumption of the homogeneity of ‘untranslatability’ and to provide more precision.

    The theoretical framework proposed by this article is a new way of looking at the concept of ‘untranslatability’ from that used in the field of Translation Studies.  It takes the Algerian case as an example through which the concept of untranslatability could be understood and further refined.  It presents Apter (2013) with new interpretation and provides multiple ‘untranslatabilities’ on different textual and non-textual levels.  In her chapter, “Untranslatable” Algeria: The Politics of Linguicide”, Apter (2006) goes to analyse why Algeria is untranslatable without naming typologies or putting them into categories.  The article seeks to respond to this lack of precision and presents new dynamics and new types of ‘untranslatabilities’ that are specific to the Algerian case, but that may also apply to other cases of ‘untranslatabilities’.  Unusually, the article not only deals with the supposed typologies that help understand the reasons for the untranslatabilities, but also brings into discussion the different mediums through which the untranslatabilities occur, such as novels, testimonies, and personal interviews in Arabic, in Berber and in French.  This combination of languages is a hands-on case of multilingualism in Algeria that provides both theoretical ideas and also practical situations that can be helpful to translators.

    The first type of ‘untranslatability’ revolves most of the time around the linguistic aspects that make a text ‘untranslatable’ from one language into another.  The focus centres upon structural (im)possibilities of language, where words and their meanings are analysed as secondary elements.  For example, “the untranslatability of sound patterns created by phonemes, words and phrases of a text in its original language” (Gleeson, 2015: 3).  The second type is cultural ‘untranslatability’, which is the most frequently encountered by translators.  Here, the challenge is not only to find an equivalent in terms of meaning, terminology and/or idiomatic expression that equates to the target language, but sometimes goes further to the concepts that might not exist in the target language/culture or which might exist but with different connotations.  Apter locates the source of difficulty in “the deferential weight assigned by cultures to common cognates” (Apter, 2013: 35).  Cultural untranslatability for this article is supposed to start from the theme of rape/sexual violence, which is inevitably a taboo in traditional Arabo-Muslim culture.  However, the sensitivity of the theme is ‘universal’.  In other words, the cultural weight assigned to the word ‘rape’ in most Muslim cultures as well as the rest of the world can be hard to translate.   Instead, the difficulty arises from the historical connotation in Islamic societies to the word/concept of ‘rape’ as we know it now, which was allowed and encouraged in wartime as in the case of /sabi/ (see footnote 6 above).  Rape is also often associated with female virginity and is loaded with connotations, which make its translation a challenging task.  The third type is ‘theological untranslatability’ for which translating into or/and from Arabic is a good example.  Apter refers to the book by the prominent Moroccan thinker Abdelfateh Kilito, Thou Shall not Speak my Language[9], which shows that Arabic is considered a sacred language and therefore, according to Kilito[10], any attempt at translation could lead to misinterpretation and mistranslation.  Kilito’s arguments about the language and its sacredness have been the core of debate for decades in most disciplines.   While Kilito includes this type under the cultural untranslatability[11], I argue that the root is the difficulty lies in the linguistic gap between Classical and Modern Arabic.   In this article, I shall demonstrate that it is because of the sacredness of the language and the lack of language development that ‘untranslatabilities’ occur and continue to persist, despite modernity.

    Voices against the sacredness of the language have been marginalised, for example, Al-Jābirī and Laroui, who think that the way forward for Arabic to flourish and develop as is by cutting off with the ‘glorious past’ and by moving away from the close relationship of Arabic with the Qur’an.  Moustapha Safouan (2007) in his book Why Arab are the Arabs not Free?  The Politics of writing (2007: 49), demonstrates the power relationship between Classical Arabic and writing throughout the Islamic history.  He says: “We are one of the civilisations that invented writing more than five thousand years ago.  The state monopolised it and made it an esoteric art reserved for its scribes”.  He adds that: “written in a ‘higher’ if not sacred language, works about ideas were similarly constituted as a separate domain to which ordinary people had no access to.  The result was that the state could safely eliminate any writers who dared to contradict the prevailing orthodoxies, and that writers, just like the old scribes, only survived within the established order” (ibid).   This same archaic ruse of the state continues to this day (ibid).   This implies that the vernacular is seen as ‘low’ and continues to be used for spoken practices only.   Safouan (2007: 94) thinks that “one of the main disaster of the Middle East to be that it never knew the principle of linguistic humanism as reintroduced in Europe by Dante during the Middle Ages and later intensified thanks to the Reformation and to the creation of European nations”.    Along this line, the Algeria case will be presented, with examples (interviews, novels, testimonies and memoirs) of how Algerian dialect as well as Berber were put a side to silence a whole generation in postcolonial Algeria.

    ‘External untranslatability’ is related to the contextualisation that affects a text regardless of its linguistic content.  External factors may be in a soft form, related to what Toury describes for example as ‘the social role’ of the translator as “fulfilling a function specified by the community”.  Gleeson (2015) adds that ‘External untranslatability’ can be in a hard form, in other words, in a more complex form, such as what Bassnett (2002) calls  ‘uni-directional’ flows of translation.  Here, Bassnett is raising the issue of power relations between the colonised and the coloniser.  Translation was used as an instrument to colonise and to deprive the colonised of a voice.  Translation reinforces that power hierarchy (ibid, 387).  In the same vein, Venuti argues that colonial power plays an important role in maintaining hegemony in translation (Venuti, 1998: 1).  Carli Coetzee gives the example of South Africa where much translation aims to extend and affirm the monolingual privilege by translating African Languages into English (Coetzee, 2013).  She suggests a ‘reverse flow’.  In other words, Coetzee supports the refusal to translate from African languages into English in order to destabilise the hegemony of the English language.  In Algeria and other North African countries, like Tunisia and Morocco, the hegemony lies in the French language dominance over native languages.  I argue that translation into English, Berber or/and local Arabic dialect would widen readership and help dismantle the hegemonic languages in Algeria (Standard Arabic and French).  In this article, these classifications are  not in any particular order, for example, ‘linguistic untranslatability’ is argued in terms of the linguistic situation in Algeria, which goes beyond the limits of the language to analyse a broader issue that is specific to Algeria, namely, ‘linguicide’.  Linked to this is a topic known as ‘intellocide’, which, as I shall clarify below, could fit under both heads.  ‘Theological untranslatability’ and ‘external untranslatability’ can also be interrelated.  What is of importance to this article is what I call ‘untranslatability of the Unspeakable’, which is about the formulation and translation of words that can describe and transfer feelings related to sensitive and painful experiences like rape.  This inability to translate trauma into words is linked to the inability to comprehend and make sense of what goes on, as was in the case of Algeria in the 1990s.   In the following section, Algeria is taken as a case study to demonstrate the different types of untranslatabilities.

    II.       ‘Untranslatable Algeria’

    a)       Algerian linguicide

    The title of this section is borrowed from Apter’s chapter “Untranslatable’ Algeria: The politics of Linguicide” in her book:  The Translation Zone: A New Comparative Literature (2006).   I will shed light on what makes Algeria ‘untranslatable’, starting with the linguicide (ibid) and its roots, challenging Apter’s ideas by unravelling the complex layers of the language conflict Algeria and by taking her dichotomy of Arabophones versus Francophones further to include the regional dialect and Tamazight.  This will illustrate illustrating not only the effects of the ‘language question’ on the whole of post-independence Algerian society, but also other critical factors, such as the issuing of particular laws which preceded and had direct effects on the 1990s and the years that followed, contributing to the instability of the present situation in Algeria.

    In this section I will highlight the ‘untranslatability’ of a whole country through the ‘language question’ as it is always referred to in relation to Algeria (Treacy, 2013: 402).  The term comes from French and takes us directly to the point to be made about language as supposedly a unifying characteristic of any nation.  In Algeria, however, after independence in 1962, the country slipped into a battlefield of different nationalist and Islamist ideologies, some advocating the return to a strict Arab-Muslim identity, and others claiming resistance this, like the Berbers and the Francophones who needed time to adjust to the new movement of Arabisation[12].  The ‘language question’[13] was central to the various discourses in the decades that followed independence.  The country has seen multiple – and at times contradictory- attempts to police the language of the Algerian people.  While the discourses about the Arabisation project had the ingredients for success, in reality the project became a central element of disunity, as it started by marginalizing the Berbers[14], who are indigenous citizens of Algeria, as well as the vast majority of Algerians who had a Francophone education.   The French educational system, including the use of French as a medium of education, remained the only educational system for Algeria for a while before being framed and narrated by revolutionary political rhetoric as the language of the enemy that should be eradicated.  The Arabisation project was responsible for much of the ‘untranslabability’ of the newly independent Algeria and placed a generation in exile in their own country as French was seen as betraying the nationalist sentiment, known as Pan Arab Nationalism[15] which was growing not only in Algeria but also in the whole Arab region.  Ahlem Mosteghanmi’s novel Memory in the Flesh (1985) starts with the following words:

    “To the memory of Malek Haddad, son of Constantine, who swore after the independence of Algeria not to write in a language that is not his.  The blank pages assassinated him.  He died by the might of his silence to become a martyr of the Arabic language and the first writer to die silent, grieving, and passionate on its behalf”.

    Mosteghanmi, a prominent Algerian writer, chose to start her novel recalling the world of Malek Haddad, the famous Francophone writer, and many others who were victims of the linguicide that happened in post-independence Algeria.  Malek Hadad refused to write in the colonial language and died of silence.  Similarly Malek Hadded who was assassinated by the blank page, Assia Djebar’s Le Blanc de l’Algerie (1995) (The Algerian White) argues for the same blankness of the page.  The white in her title refers to the unwritten pages of Algerian history.  It refers to the failed revolution, yet to be written in a new language that is yet to be agreed upon.  The language issue has been central to Djebar who dreamt of a polylingual society that fits the very multicultural situation of Algeria.  Djebar, as Hiddleston (2005: 3) states “uses her writing to uncover the oppressed multilingualism and multi-cultural creativity of Algerian art and literature, and to create a narrative of mourning that appropriately encapsulates the intractable horrors that official and ideological discourses have tried to deny”.  Djebar used French, the presumably secular language, to fight back and to disconnect herself from the monolingual ideology claimed by the Islamists.  For her, “a nation is an entire bundle of languages and this is especially true of Algeria” (Šukys, 2004: 117).

    Anne-­­Emmanuelle Berger (2002: 72) finds Gilbert Grandguillaume’s parallel between what happened to Algerian women and what happened to the Algerian language in independent Algeria a truthful parallel.  Despite Algerian women’s remarkable contribution to the War of Liberation and the “bold steps they took, unveiled, into the public sphere (a process described by Frantz Fanon in his 1959 article ‘l’Algerie se devoile’, Grandguillaume reminds us of the multiple ways in which independent Algeria strove to send the women back ‘home’ and confine them to the domestic sphere” (Berger, 2007: 72).  The parallel is drawn between dialectal Arabic and the ‘unveiled’ Algerian women, “who, like the language they speak inside and outside the home with their fellow Algerians, are a symbol or metonymy for ‘true Algerianness’” (ibid).  Yet when it comes to the formal usage of Arabic, it is the dialectal which gets sent home, in a sense ‘veiled’, confined to the private space only.   While Standard Arabic (SA), known as fusha is the formal language for writing, regional dialects known as ’ammiya are used informally in the spoken form only[16].  This imposition of Standard Arabic in Algeria, known as the Arabisation movement, aims not only to eradicate French but also native languages like Berber.  This ideology goes back to the Association of Algerian ulama[17] movement, which started in the 1930s against colonialism and which claimed ‘Islam as the religion in Algeria and Arabic as its only language’.

    In Blue, Blanc, Vert (2006), Maissa Bey, another Francophone writer, recalls the post-independence era and narrates the linguistic situation in Algeria and its tight relationship to nationalism.  The novel challenges the Arabisation project and sees the imposition of SA as the ‘perseverance of certain colonial modes of domination’ (referring to the Frenchification[18] policy).   Ali, the main character in the novel and who belongs to the generation of Algerians who opted to stay and study in the country, says:

     “In court, the divisions are becoming more and more visible.  There are those who studied in the brother countries, Egypt, Syria, Iraq, and Jordan…  Those who, like me and thousands others, stayed in Algeria, who were taught by teachers, French for the most part, but under the guidance of an Algerian minister, and conforming to his directives.  Where’s the problem?” (Bey, 2006: 145). 

    The quote highlights complicated issues related to authenticity, nationalism and Arabness.  The country became divided into Francophones, (referred to as Hizb Fransa: French Party), and Arabophones: these were Algerians taught in ‘brother’ countries or by teachers from Arab states brought in to Arabise the country, some of whom were from Egypt and were sympathisers or active members of the Muslim Brotherhood Movement.  This linguistic division continued to affect intellectuals and artists in the uprising of the 1980s and the civil war of the 1990s who spoke out and who used French or Berber.  Fadhila Al Farouq, a Berber, Arabophone writer says in a personal interview (14/10/2014) that she feels trapped between her native Berber language and the language she uses for writing, which is Arabic.  She says: “I now started to hate Arabic…I feel trapped, I can’t publish in the language I was brought up with (Tamazight) and cannot in French either… my only medium is Arabic, which was imposed on me at a very early age, at the primary school.  I would only speak Berber privately with a friend in hiding.  I felt the pain of the ‘ablation’ from my roots in Arris[19] and my language Tamazight (Chaoui) to find myself in a new environment (school) forced to speak Arabic”.   She adds: “Tamazight, for me, was for the private sphere and represents intimacy and closeness”.  This is illustrated in her novel Taa Al Khajal where Al Farouq’s victim (Yamina) is a Berber woman from Arris and so is the narrator in the novel, who says:

    “ابتسمت لها، و اقتربت منها أكثر و حدثتها بالشاوية”     

    I smiled at her and I came closer to her and spoke to her in Chaouia” [20]

    Yamina says:

    “لو كنت من غير أهلي لما حدثتك عن شيء”

    If you weren’t from my people, I wouldn’t have told you anything

    Closeness is achieved when words are expressed in the same language of thinking.  Words come spontaneously and effortlessly.  But the language issue escalated to become a source and means of fear.  As Apter rightly argues, “fear of accusation of blasphemy and apostasy; the fear of fatwa unilaterally issued by hardline Islamists against those who would ‘literally’ interpret Koranic references; and finally, the fear of death” (Apter, 2006: 95).   Those who escaped death threats left to become political refugees in France, vacating the cultural scene in Algeria, leaving room for the extremists to implement the Islamisation of the country.

    b)       Algerian Intellocide

    Silence means death

    If you speak out, they kill you.

    If you keep silent, they kill you.

    So, speak out and die

    Tahar Djaout

    Tahar Djaout, was one of the first renowned intellectuals to be assassinated, in 1993.  Editor of the francophone newspaper El Watan, and coordinator of the review Ruptures, Djaout’s conscious decision to write in French was to rebel against the oppression of Berber identity imposed through the Arabization project.  French for him, like for Djebar, becomes a language of protest, and “Djaout explicitly divorces writing from national identity, using literature and journalism to invent new landscapes and to conceive alternative idiolects” (Hiddleston, 2005: 8).   This decision cost him and many other Francophone writers their lives in what Bensmaia (1997: 86) calls ‘intellectual cleansing’.  For the Islamists, it was clear that any opposition to their agenda would mean death, as declared by Mourad Si Ahmed, known as Djamel Al Afghani, the author of this terrible sentence: “Journalists who wage war on Islam with their pens will perish by our swords”.[21] The list includes: Tahar Djaout, Youcef Sebti, Abdelkader Alloula, Lounes Matoub and many more, who were considered infidels.   Women journalists were also targeted.   In a recent interview 15.2.2017, Salima Tlemçani a renowned journalist says:

    To find yourself on a list of journalists sentenced to death was very hard to endure and live. You get to rub shoulders with death on a daily basis and you end up admitting that you will die, your only wish is to be an immediate death. Not a suffering, throat cutting with a non-sharp knife to death or tortured, violated or whatever.  For 10 years, yes I got scared.  Fear of losing a family member, killed because of me. I lived with fear to find myself in the hands of a group this bloodthirsty and savage. I lived with fear to get to the office and to learn of the death of a colleague, murdered. When the gesture the more banal, like to go and buy some croissants next door, just there at the bottom of the house, becomes dangerous, it’s over.” [22]

    Having said that, Benoune (2013: 126) recalls Belhouchet, an outspoken journalist of El Watan (Nation) who witnessed the assassination of his fellow colleagues affirms his determination to continue to work despite the atrocities “Belhouchet decided right that, in honour of those who died at their desks, he and his surviving colleagues would get the next day’s edition out, no matter what”.  This determination and defiance is the core theme of a film by Abderahim Laloui, presented in the following section.

    As part of my data collection, I attended an event organised by Djazairouna, on the 1st and 2nd November 2016, entitled ‘Notre Memoire, Notre Lutte’ (our memory, our fight), during which three films were chosen.  ‘Mémoires de Scènes’ (2016) (Memoirs of Scenes) was one of the films selected.  It is by Abderahim Laloui  (Algerian film director).  It tells a story which takes place at the beginning of what is known as ‘the Black Decade of the 1990s’, during which Algeria had witnessed extreme violence.  The film portrays the life of Azzedine, a journalist who loves theatre and prepares an adaptation of the famous play by Molière, entitled ‘Tartuffe’.  Helped by a group of friends, all amateur actors, he began rehearsals at the theatre of the city. The Mayor of the city, a fanatic, tries to stop them.  However, Azzedine and his friends decided to stick together and ignore the threats made against them.  Yousra, Azzedine’s wife, who also plays a role in the play, tries to reassure her husband and create a climate of serenity within his family.  The story fluctuates between the ‘tartufferies’ and the daily life of this amateur theatre troupe.   After several months of preparation and rehearsals, on the performance day, while the cast looks forward to the arrival of Azzedine and his wife, the horrible news of their assassination is heard.  The play represents the atmosphere of the beginning of the 1990s by referring to the assassination of leading figures in culture, namely the journalist and writer Tahar Djaout and the film director Abdelkader Alloula. The film is played by well-known Algerian actors, such as the icon of the Algerian film, Farida Saboundji and Chafia Boudraa.   From an interview with the co- scenarist Mr. Benkamla (24.03.17), I found out that the film project started off back in 2006 and could not be realised until 2016 due to so many difficulties.

    c)       Untranslatability’ of the unspeakable

    This section focusses on another type of untranslatability, often taken for granted, which is not related to transferring one language into another.  It deals with a more complex typology, which is concerned with the act of translating trauma into words. It is about analysing texts that depict the act of translating trauma.  Translation in this context is used in its broadest sense and does not only mean the act of rendering a text from a source to a target language, but also the act of transmitting, conveying feelings and converting them into words.  When we address the act of translating trauma, a translation activity within the same language takes place; it is the act of converting the unimaginable into words in the same language.  It is dealing with the unspeakable, which is ‘not necessarily unrepresentable’ (El Nossery and Hubbell, 2013).  Therefore, representing the unspeakable is possible; but as Nietzsche and Bergson

    ‘[m]aintain that it is an illusion to believe that we can feel or even imagine pain that has not been personally experienced, and that our capacity is limited to observing it with heightened attention’ (cited by El Nossery (ibid: 11).

    The unspeakable or the ‘untranslatable,’ in other words, what could not be translated into words of one’s experience is complicated to say the least but to speak on behalf of someone else’s is illusionary, as stated above.  What is not illusionary though is the imaginative ways writers depict trauma not necessarily through pain-related lexicon but also through ‘the aesthetic of chaos’ (ibid).  Al Farouq, in her novel Taa Al Khajal (2005), considered the first novel to tackle the issue of rape in the 1990s, focuses on the polyrhythmic and polyphonic structure of bodily voices and on syntactic repetition of the traumatic event (ibid).  When she says:

    وحدهن المغتصبات يعرفن معنى انتهاك الجسد, و انتهاك الأنا.

    وحدهن يعرفن وصمة العار, وحدهن يعرفن التشرد, والدعارة

    والانتحار, وحدهن يعرفن الفتاوى التي أباحت “الاغتصاب”

    Only raped women know what it means to violate the body, to violate the self/ego.

    Only they know shame, homelessness and prostitution

    and suicide; only they know fatwas  which have permitted ‘rape’.

    Al Farouq’s style changes into a fragmented one in the above quote and is characterised by repetition and unfinished sentences.  The layout of the lines one after the other is similar to a poem rather than prose.  She opts for an ellipsis overloaded with defiant words to a culture that finds talking about prostitution a taboo, talking about virginity a taboo and defying a fatwa to articulate the unsaid about rape, a taboo. By bringing up the word fatwa, Al Farouq casts doubts on the integrity of the religious institution as such.

    As mentioned earlier, the word rape in Arabic is put between inverted commas “الاغتصاب” because it is a controversial term in Arab culture and because the writer wanted to emphasise the word as it has different connotations in Islamic terminology.  Words from Classical Arabic that allow violating women’s bodies such as  ‘sabi’, ‘jihad al nikah[23] and others have re-emerged in recent years in relation to, for example, Yazidi women captured as sex slaves and before that, in Algeria in the 1990s.  For Al Farouq, there was one word only that captures the meaning of all those terms.  It is “الاغتصاب” (rape) and not any other, as indicated in the quote above.  Al Farouq could have used other words from her mother tongues, Berber and Algerian dialect.  The use of the Standard Language aims at distinguishing it from the common language used by Algerians. In practical terms, the use of SA in most of the Arabic-speaking region is an “exclusive code mastered by only few intellectuals and not by the mass populations” (Bassiouney, 2014).  This is because it is not the spoken language and is different from the dialects.  Al Farouq’s use of Standard Arabic indicates the symbolic power the religious institution has and how it manipulates society by disguising words such as rape. Here, the ‘theological untranslatability’ (Apter, 2013) is not only due to the complexity of the language but also to the theological interpretations associated with it.

    Chapter Four of Al Farouq’s novel is called دعاء الكارثة   (Prayer for Disaster) in which she directly attacks the religious institution, more precisely the mosque, for inciting violence.  She then relates the new gender discourses that call for segregation between Algerians, between those who follow the Islamic party (Front Islamique du Salut; FIS) and the rest of the population.  She goes further by considering the FIS as the new vogue/fashion.  Al Farouq states:

    الناس هنا لا يخالفون ما تقوله المآذن حتى حين قالت:

    “اللهم زن بناتهم”.

    قالوا: آمين

    وحتى حين قالت

    اللهم يتم أولادهم

    قالوا: آمين

    وحتى حين قالت:

    اللهم  رمل نساءهم“.

    قالوا: آمين

    كانوا قد اصيبوا بحمى جبهة الانقاذ, فغنوا جميعا بعيون مغمضة دعاء الكارثة.

    She adds:

    كانت موضة جبهة الانقاذ

    People here do not disagree with what the Minarets say, even when these said:

    “Please God, prostitute their daughters”.

    People said: Amen

    Even when they said:

    “Please God make the children orphans”

    People said: Amen

    And even when minarets said:

    “Please God widow their wives”.

    They said: Amen

    They were all struck down with FIS fever, they all sang with blinded eyes the Prayer for Disaster.

    The above sheds lights on religious discourses in Algeria in the 1990s and more importantly on the ‘feminine question’ as it is referred to in Algeria (la question féminine).  The ‘othering’ speech in the prayer clearly differentiates between ‘us’ the religious people and ‘them’, the secular and sometimes implying the non-Muslims. The multiplicity of discourses regarding women in Islam is not new; there have always been those who call for the return of Sharia’ and those who call for reforms of civil law and for a clear secular ideology.  Tunisia was a notable exception where President Bourguiba banned the Sharia and applied of Civil Law in 1956.  This diversity of discourses contributes to the growth of gender-based writings.

    Women’s writing in Algeria, as opposed to the male-dominated literature, offer as Brinda (2014: 27) suggests, “gendered perspectives that feminize and complicate Algerian historicity and postcolonial subjectivity”.  She adds “Algerian authors dispel monolithic representation of women as passive victims of colonial and nationalist and religious ideology, even as they demonstrate how masculinist ethics of war have ravaged the female body and women’s history through violence, silencing and exclusion”.  After independence, female Algerian writers took on board the mission of giving voice to their fellow Algerian women who could not write, among them Assia Djebar, Malika Mokeddem, Leïla Sebbar, Maïssa Bey, Nina Bouraoui and many more.  These writers learnt the lesson that “silence is a crime” as stated by Miriam Cooke in her book Women and the War Story (1996: 8).

    The inability to translate or the ‘untranslatability’ of feelings of trauma and pain into words is tantamount to resisting comprehension of what goes on around us.  This untranslatability is not restricted to one language or another; it is universal.  Judith Herman’s book Trauma and Recovery (1992) analyses the universality of the effects of trauma and provides a language for discussing the trauma of rape.  Her work has brought to the public sphere an issue considered as a taboo for a long time.  Unlike El Nossery and Hubbell (2013), who believe, as mentioned above, that the ‘unspeakable, is ‘not necessarily unrepresentable’, trauma studies is “characterized by unrepresentability, inexpressibility, and its inability to be assimilated into narrative: for Cathy Caruth (1996), for example, trauma is known only in the way it returns to haunt the individual, often many years after the original event” (Kelly and Rye, 2009: 48).

    Confirming Caruth’s argument, it was only after nearly twenty years, when the only witness and survivor, decided to talk for the first time about the 12 teachers, from the Western part of Algeria (near Sidi Bel Abbes), who were slaughtered by Islamic Fundamentalists.  The only survivor of that carnage was the minibus driver, who was intentionally spared so that the horror could be told in detail.  The teachers were young women; the oldest was not yet forty years old.    For Sidi Bel Abbes, the case represents a profound cultural trauma.  “As opposed to psychological or physical trauma, which involves a wound and the experience of great emotional anguish by an individual, cultural trauma refers to a dramatic loss of identity and meaning, a tear in the social fabric, affecting a group of people that has achieved some degree of cohesion”.  In this sense, the trauma is not only individual but collective.  It may also be called ‘national trauma’.  Eyrman (2001: 2) states that “Arthur Neal (1998) defines a ‘national trauma’ according to its ‘enduring effects,’ and as relating to events ‘which cannot be easily dismissed, which will be played over again and again in individual consciousness’, becoming ‘ingrained in collective memory”.  The killing of the teachers has been remembered every September by some organisations such as Djzairouna, Réseau Wassyla, SOS Disparus, Observatoire Violence Femme OVIF and some few others from the Education sector, despite the Amnesty Law (1999-2005) that forbids people from commemorating the ‘Black Decade’.   In a personal interview on the 27th September 2016, the driver remembers the event and says:

    I was driving slowly, in the usual routine. Reaching the top of a slope, about 7 km from Ain Adden going to Sfisef, with 6 female and 1male teachers on board, I … came across a fake roadblock set up by terrorists, who already had arrested four more cars, including one carrying 5 teachers”.  He adds: “A terrorist ran towards me pointing his ‘Mahchoucha’ and shouted that I should park to the right. He ordered me to get off the vehicle, to hand him the keys and go join the group of people who had gathered on the other side. Then the other terrorists brought down the 5 teachers who were in the other vehicle to put them with those who were in mine, not without having robbed them of their bags and jewellery. …They initially decided to immolate them, after they had sprayed fuel on them. While some were about to prepare the fuel, one bloodthirsty man changed his mind and decided to kill them.  When they were all grouped together, Sabeur chose to attempt an escape, hopping off and heading to the forest. Unfortunately he was hit by a burst of the gunfire, and later to be slaughtered. The other assassins killed the 11 teachers pitilessly.  At that time, I did not hear the screams and cries.  The whole operation took nearly ten minutes, so that all the space was transformed into a pool of blood. I left.  Before they released us, the terrorists “preached” to us and insisted that we should absolutely not talk about the killings and especially not to vote. I took to the road, like a robot, absent minded, mentally and physically destroyed wondering if it was just a nightmare and I would wake up, or a sad reality! ” (27/09/2016). 

    The testimony by the driver, an ordinary person who was driving on a routine journey to Sfisef, a village in the North Western part of Algeria is compelling.  Twenty years on, he describes vividly the horrific incident in disbelief.  He still wonders whether the brutal incident was just a nightmare.  In a way, this disbelief stems from the inability to make sense of what happened, to digest the incident.  It is an incomprehensibility of the reality, which offers fewer words, if any, to circumvent its untranslatability.  The fact that he was the only survivor meant that he is the only witness to what had happened, which added to the burden of narrating the story and translating his pain into words.

    For Anne Whitehead, cited in Kelly and Ryle (2009: 48), though, by the very nature of its creativity, innovation, literary devices and techniques, fiction is able to represent what ‘cannot be represented by conventional historical, cultural and autobiographical narratives”.

    The killing of the teachers was translated into various forms of cultural production, such as the film (El Manara by Belkacem Hedjaj).  Djebar was among the first to respond to the killing of the teachers in her short stories Oran, Langue Morte (1997).  In a chapter called “La Femme en Morceaux” (The Woman in Pieces), Atyka, a female teacher of French at a high school decides to tell her students a tale from A Thousand and One Nights when four armed men burst into the classroom and executed Atyka in front of the children in her classroom.  Atyka is accused of teaching obscene stories to the children.   It is interesting to note that Djebar’s choice of the form of narrative as a tale of A Thousand and One Nights with Shehrazade as narrator has been used extensively in Algerian literature.   The concept of ‘return to the past’, which the Islamists proclaimed in order to oppress women, is employed by Djebar to evoke memories of violence against women through the Muslim past and the present.  Djebar portrays the untranslatable past through a similar untranslatable present to argue that there is a need to break with the tradition of violence.  More importantly, she depicts the past as ‘untranslatable’ in today’s present.  Walter Benjamin refers to this as ‘Cultural untranslatability’, which stands for the inability of translate the past in to our daily activities automatically, without questioning it.  ‘Cultural untranslatability’ in the case of Algeria relates to the failure to understand a past that denotes either a future of violence or no future at all.

    Untranslatability for Djebar is what drives her to write and translate her ideas and feelings into words by making the traumatic past representable.  She is aware that literary and visual arts can be mechanisms for transmitting what can be unspeakable or untranslatable.  Literature and the arts can bear witness for those who cannot express themselves and might help them to re-join their communities.  For Djebar, what is ‘translatable’ is recording those atrocities and preventing the ‘authority’ (le pouvoir) from writing their own history, something that was done with regard to the War of Liberation in 1962.  Aware of the importance of narrative, Djebar needed to ‘translate’ stories, moments, and feelings and to give voices, particularly to women who have been silenced throughout Algerian contemporary history.  Djebar is well aware of her mission of combining the literary with historiography.   She is conscious of the tolerance and the openness to interpretation she has over her literary texts, but at the same time she is experienced enough to know that those texts have “a certain integrity, a national inalterability, that poses a fundamental problem for paraphrase and for translation” (Harrison, 2014: 418).  This national inalterability for Djebar does not mean the official history; it simply means the national truth that had been eclipsed for Algerians for decades.  Harisson argues in in his article, ‘World Literature: What gets lost in Translation?’ (2014) that “it is not ‘translatability’ that decides what gets translated. Indeed, untranslatability, or the ‘impossibility’ of translation, clearly attracts some translators, and may help make their translation compelling creative works”.

    As mentioned, the atrocities lived in Algeria in the 1990s were unimaginable.  In her novel les Nouvelles d’Algerie (1998), Maissa Bey in the chapter entitled ‘Corps indicible’ ‘indescribable body’ finds it impossible to find words that can describe the horrors of the young girl.  She says:

    C’est ça faire sortir de moi les mots pour dire.  Mais je ne peux plus parler.  J’ai perdu ma voix’.  This is making words come out of me to say. But, I can no longer speak.  I lost my voice.’  She adds: “Ya plus que ces mots en moi qui viennent dans ma tête s’entrechoquent me font mal faut les arrêter c’est ça dresser un barrage pierre a pierre une à une ajoutée les empêcher de pénétrer’ (110).

    “There are more than these words in me coming into my head, colliding, hurting; I have to stop them through building one stone dam, stone after another, preventing them from penetrating”.

    The impossibility of finding words, of completing sentences, finishing an idea is expressed in Bey’s novels.  The narrative voice is voiceless, it is rendered silent.

    In the same vein, al Farouq, says:

    “طوال الطريق و أنا أفكر كيف سأكتب في الموضوع, بأية صيغة, بأي قلب, بأي لغة, بأي قلم؟ أقلام القرابة لا تحب التعدي”.

    I was thinking all the way about how to write about the topic, in which way, with which heart, in what language, with what pen?  The Pens of kin don’t like to transgress.

    She adds:

    “كيف هي الكتابة عن أنثى سرقت عذريتها عنوة؟”

    “How can one write about a female whose virginity was stolen from her by force?”

    In the next section, I will go beyond the language situation in Algeria, the translation of trauma, and the local dynamics of the country to discuss the untranslatability of Algeria globally.  In other words, I will try to answer the question: how is Algeria translated or untranslated in the world?

    d)        External ‘untranslatability’

    The low visibility of Algeria in the global market of translation is very similar to other Arabic-speaking as well as French-speaking countries.  In fact, the uneven nature of global market forces is a topic that needs further investigation.  The visibility “depends firstly on the position of its country of location and language in the world market of translation (central versus peripheral), secondly on its position within the linguistic area (central versus peripheral; for instance the United States versus India in the Anglophone area), and thirdly on its position within the national field (temporally and/or symbolically dominant versus dominated) (Gisèle Sapiro, 2015: 22).   In the case of Algerian literature, belonging to two linguistic sources (Francophone as well as Arabophone) does not really help to enhance its chances of being included among those literatures being translated globally.  According to Sapira, between 1990 to 2003, while French literature by French writers reached 858 translations; only 16 titles were by Algerian writers.  Among the 16 titles, only authors like Assia Djebar, Kateb Yassine, Rachid Mimmouni, Mouloud Feraoun, Mohamed Dib and a few others are translated into English.   In other words, the first generation of writers largely is the one that got translated. The same applies to Arabic literature as a whole, where the most translated writers are the well-known ones like the Egyptian Nobel Prize Laureate Najib Mahfouz, the Sudanese Tayib Saleh and a few others.  The Algerian Tahar Wattar has been translated into English together with others from the first generation of Algerians writing in Arabic.   Ahlem Mosteghanemi has recently been translated into English.  As far as literature of 1990s Algeria is concerned, despite the boom of writing, the number of titles translated is very limited, if not to say non-existent. Emily Apter (2006. 2013), Wail Hasan (2006) and a few other scholars have written about the ‘untranslatability’ of Arabic Literature and about the visibility of the same few names who “are universally acclaimed, excellent writers” (Apter, 2006, 98).   In fact, when we talk about ‘untranslatable’ Algeria in terms of its low visibility, one could say that this problem exists not only in relation to translating into the dominant language (centre and periphery) but it is also relevant to translation into Arabic from French, due to the gulf between Arabophone and Francophone writers.  In other words, Algerian Francophone writers, even well-known ones like Assia Djebar, are not translated into Arabic.  It is only after her death, that the Algerian Ministry of Culture has commissioned Djebar’s books for translation into Arabic.  In other words, the ‘untranslatability’ of Algeria is not only external but also internal.  A related issue is the gap of knowledge between academic literature written in Arabic and in French, which is fragmentary due to disciplinary constraints and to the complexity of the linguistic situation in Algeria.  This is why academic work on, for example, Francophone writers do not give the full national picture due to the nature of the divisions between the languages studied in academia.

    III.        Conclusion

    Although there has been a boom in fictional writing in both Arabic and French, research on the 1990s in Algeria (the Black Decade) dealing with the issue of sexual violence/rape is scarce. This is largely due to the Amnesty Law (1999, 2005), which forbids people from looking into that past period.   These limitations highlight the unusual nature of the research in this article.  What is interesting to note is that fictional writing about the 1990s has seen a boom in recent years in both Arabic and French.

    In this article, I provide an extensive study of the concept of ‘untranslatability’ (Apter, 2013) from both theoretical and practical perspectives.  While Apter presents the concept of untranslatability as a homogenous notion, I expand it by adding typologies that help to illustrate the idea further. This is done using practical examples from various mediums such as personal interviews conducted by the researcher, novels and testimonies in the two working languages in Algeria, French and Arabic.  For example, when analysing the language situation in Algeria, the issue of untranslatability is not only confined to the linguistic battle between Arabophones, Berberophones or Francophones, but also is used to illustrate the dynamics of silencing in postcolonial Algeria.  By this I mean, that the language politics in Algeria elucidate the manipulations done under the Arabisation movement in for example silencing one group or another.  The silencing is a form of untranslatability linked directly to the linguicide in the country.  Under the Arabisation movement motive, a number of Francophone and Berberophone intellectuals were killed and others sought refuge in France, which helped emptying the country from its elite in what is known as ‘intellocide’.  Theological untranslatability is another type discussed in this article, which is related to the relationship between the theological concepts and their translations in the present time (see the example of sabi discussed above).  In fact, the theological interpretations exacerbated a violence regarding what and how concepts are translated or untranslated. In other words, the relationship between what can be translated is not an easy one when one gets to how it can be translated, bearing in mind the historicity as well as the temporality of concepts. The untranslatabilities of Algeria are also intensified by external factors due to the low visibility of Arabic literature in general and Algerian in particular.  This low visibility does not only concern writings in Arabic, but also in French (Francophone literature).  Among the writers translated, only the first generation ones such as, Tahar Wattar (from Arabic into English) and Kateb Yassine (from French into English).   The case of Algeria represents one example of the ‘imposed’ untranslatability’ is inflicted by unequal power relations in the world.  The hegemony of English, which Bassnett describes ‘as uni-directional’ plays a big role in the case of untranslatability.  Finally, an important type of untranslatability, which is central to this article, is the complexity of translating feelings of trauma into words.  Words used to represent and describe the unspeakable, such as rape in a culture like Arabo-Muslim. The ‘social role’ of the translator (Toury, 1993) is connected to the writer’s intricacy of translating themes like ‘rape’.  By this I mean, that the translator is in a similar situation to the writer in that he/she may deem the text untranslatable.

    Classifying a range of untranslatabilities, not particularly in any order, advances the concept further and opens further discussion.  The ideas and examples discussed within each section act as suggestions as to how we can classify untranslatabilities.  Here, untranslatability is recognised as a dynamic concept, which may change and may include other areas.  The discussion draws on the areas of linguistics, semantics, theories of language and power, and literature to present texts where untranslatability is present.  The point of emphasising the various classifications of the concept of untranslatability is to facilitate a clearer understanding both in theory and in practice.   The concluding remarks of this article is that the concept of untranslatability is an organic concept that affects all languages and a number of disciplines and any attempt to raise discussions on how to develop it will only enhance it.

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    [1] .   In an interview on (14/10/2014), the author mentions that most of the events are not fiction, they are based on testimonies she collected when working as a journalist.

    [2] This sign is the nearest I found to represent the ‘closed taa’ and at the same time gives the impression of a noose.

    [3] تاء الخجل Taa al Khajal (2005) published by Riad El-Rayyes Books in Arabic was translated into French  La Honte au Feminin (2009), published by Editions El-Ikhtilef and Arab Scientific Publishers, Inc.

    [4] Yusra Muqaddam  (2010) Al Harim al lughawi.  All Prints.com

    [5] Zuleikha Abu Risha  (2009) Untha al lugha. Ninawa Print.

    [6]Abdellah  Mohamed Al Ghathami (2005) Ta’nith al qasida wa al qari’ al mukhtalif.  Arab Cultural Centre.

    [7]  For more information about the concept of sabi, see Amal Grami’s article in this issue.

    [8] For more information, see Tariq Sabry (2013): Cultural Encounters in the Arab World: On Media, the Modern and the Everyday. I. B. Tauris.

    [9] Kilito, A. (2008) Thou Shall not Speak my language. Translated from Arabic by Wail S. Hassan.

    [10] When Kilito mentions Arabic, he refers to the Standard form (SA).

    [11] For a closer understanding, Hassan argues that “Kilito highlights the problem of cultural translation as an interpretive process and as an essential element of comparative literary studies. In close readings of al-Jahiz, Ibn Rushd, al-Saffar, and al-Shidyaq, among others, he traces the shifts in attitude toward language and translation from the centuries of Arab cultural ascendancy to the contemporary period, interrogating along the way how the dynamics of power mediate literary encounters across cultural, linguistic, and political lines”.

    [12] Arabisation (Arabic: تعريب‎‎ taʻrīb) is part of the wider movement of decolonisation in Algeria. It aims to impose standard Arabic at the expense of French and other local languages such as Tamazight. This language policy reflected a wider vision of Arab/Muslim leaders, who wanted to break from the colonial past and start afresh while forging alliances with Arab/Muslim states.

    [13] For more information about the language question, see: Language Conflict in Algeria by Mohamed Benrabah (2013). Multilingual Matters.

    [14] Berber languages, the languages of the indigenous people in North Africa, are called Tamazight; there are variations within the Berber language, such as Tashelhit and Taqbaylit.

    [15] Pan Arab Nationalism (Arabic: القومية العربية‎‎ al-Qawmiyya al-`arabiyya) is a nationalist ideology celebrating the glories of Arab civilization, the language and literature of the Arabs, calling for rejuvenation and political union in the Arab world.

    [16] This phenomenon is what is referred to as diglossia, which is a linguistic situation where two varieties of the same language exist to fulfil different social functions and are used in the same speech community.  For more information about Arabic sociolinguistics, Reem Bassiouney gives a sketch of the main research trends about Diglossia, language contact and language change in her book: Arabic Sociolinguistics (2009), Edinburgh University Press.

    [17]Association of Algerian ulama Founded in 1931 by Abd al-Hamid ibn Badis and other religious scholars to educate Algerians, promote the Arab-Islamic culture and national identity of Algeria and to revive and reform Islam.  Most importantly, its aim was to protest against colonialism.

    [18] Frenchification is the linguistic policy imposing the use of the French language in political, administrative, legal, and educational institutions and relegating Arabic and Berber to the status of a second language.

    [19] Arris is a Berber town in the Eastern part of Algeria (Chaouia region)

    [20] Chaouia is a variety of the Berber language spoken in the Aurès region (Berber: Awras) of eastern Algeria and surrounding areas.

    [21] For more information, see: http://www.humanite.fr/retour-sur-le-massacre-huis-clos-des-journalistes-algeriens-564025

    [22] Salima Tlemçani, 15th Febrauary 2017.  For more information, see: http://www.valledaostaglocal.it/2017/02/15/leggi-notizia/argomenti/voix-du-monde/articolo/salima-tlemcani-etre-femme-journaliste-en-algerie.html

    [23] Jihad al nikah (جهاد النكاح‎‎) refers to the claimed practice in which Sunni women, sympathetic to the Salafi jihadism, travel to the battlefields and are allegedly voluntarily offering themselves to rebels, fighting for the creation of the Islamic Caliphate.  They are expected to be repeatedly in a temporary marriage, serving sexual comfort roles to help boost the fighters’ morale.  The practice in modern states is referred to as legalising ‘prostitution’.