• Brian Willems — Natural Instruments: Real-World Adaptations of Fictional Financial Algorithms

    Brian Willems — Natural Instruments: Real-World Adaptations of Fictional Financial Algorithms

    by Brian Willems

    This is not an essay which aims at creating knowledge. It will not provide a new interpretation of a text. Nor will it apply a new critical perspective in order to uncover unseen aspects of a work.

    Instead of being part of what Joseph North calls the “historicist/contextualist” paradigm, limiting itself to self-referential scholarly study, this work aims to be a piece of criticism, in the outdated I.A. Richards’ sense of the term. This means the essay, and the experiment it describes, attempt to have real-world effects and consequences. It does so through an experiment called Natural Instruments.

    Natural Instruments are experimental financial algorithms founded on natural processes. However, they are not a part of what Anthony Brabazon and Michael O’Neill have collated under the idea of Biologically Inspired Algorithms for Financial Trading, which takes models of social interaction, immune systems and the function of biological neurons as its inspiration. The aim of Natural Instruments is not to make money, but to highlight some of the problems found in financial trading of the past and present, and to attempt to find new ways to imagine a future outside the financial time of hedged potentialities and long-term debt obligation. One way of doing this is to connect financial trading instruments with non-human aspects of the world. Thus Natural Instruments are trading algorithms under the direct control of nature.

    While the connection between nature and automated trading may sound like something new, they are actually intimately and historically linked. The basis of the theory of automated financial trading goes back to the random motion of pollen grains suspended in water, first observed by British botanist Robert Brown in 1827. The motion of the pollen grains, eventually called Brownian Motion, became the “random walk” of the “efficient market hypothesis,” the blindness of which help lead to the 2007-8 financial crisis. Natural Instruments are experiments which illustrate the problem of the efficient market hypothesis. They live on extreme volatility rather than trying to contain it. They do this by repeating Brown’s experiment, in a way. In the first of a series of such experiments, a pollen grain is given direct control over financial trading.

    One key feature of fictional financial algorithms is that they foreground the volatility of the data an algorithm is based on. Some novelists, such as Kim Stanley Robinson and Hari Kunzru, have created fictional financial instruments which reflect rather than contain this volatility.

    In the financial world, volatility is defined by the standard deviation of a set of data. Standard deviation is the spread of data around its mean, with a standard deviation of 3 mostly seen as an acceptable margin of error in statistics. Therefore, the higher the deviation, the more volatility there is. The role of volatility in financial algorithms is important because it defines the kind of world the algorithm can take into account. Here I am following the work of Peli Grietzer, who recently defended his PhD Ambient Meaning. Grietzer connects the function of autoencoder algorithms to literary theory. What is key for our discussion is that “When we extend the concepts of a canon, worldview, and mimesis to the world of algorithms, we detach the canon/worldview/mimesis triplet from its natural domain of art and culture to identify it with any and all structural triangles that comprise a set of privileged objects (canon), a schema of interpretation (worldview), and a capacity for reproduction and representation (mimesis).” Hence, just as a literary critic unfamiliar with feminism has problems asking certain important questions about a text, when an event lies outside an algorithm’s assumed standard deviation, the algorithm cannot “see” what happened. Such models, in the words of Brian Holmes, are “the source of a fundamental disconnect between the informational sky above our heads and the existential ground beneath our feet.”

    For example, as Scott Patterson shows in Dark Pools, an influential paper from the mid-90s argued that the 1987 stock market crash was a theoretically impossible “27-standard deviation event,” meaning that “Even if one were to have lived through the entire 20 billion year life of the universe and experienced this 20 billion times (20 billion big bangs), that such a decline could have happened even once in this period is a virtual impossibility.” In general, the algorithms used before the Black Monday crash of 1987 were not programmed to include the kind of volatility that was taking place in the real world. Instead, they assumed the world was a much more stable place. Some financial algorithms found in contemporary fiction have addressed this problem directly by placing extreme volatility at the heart of how the algorithms work.

    As mentioned earlier, the problems some real-world financial algorithms have with extreme volatility are due to two main factors: the idea of a random walk and the Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH). Put simply, the random walk means that on a micro scale, past performance of a stock price has no bearing on future performance. For example, if a stock price moves down, this has no relation as to whether the next move will be up or down. Stock prices go on a “random walk,” meaning that their future state cannot be predicted from their previous state. This observation is based on what Robert Brown saw with pollen grains, which when suspended in water moved in an erratic fashion. Regarding the second factor, at times EMH is confused with the random walk, but it is really quite different. EMH states that the price of a stock reflects all known information about that that stock, thus negating any advantage having knowledge in advance of others might bestow. Its similarity to the random walk is that if prices are efficient, there is no gain to be made on short-term bets.

    EMH and the random walk have been popularly combined in Burton Malkiel’s A Random Walk Down Wall Street, which was first published in 1973 and went through 11 revised editions by 2015. Riding out a number of crises and bubbles over the years, Malkiel’s book has never changed its basic investment strategy: the long-term return of the totality of a stock market index (S&P 500, Nasdaq, or a mix of US and non-US indices) will out-perform any short-term investment strategy in individual stocks. Believing that future stock price changes cannot be predicted (the random walk) and that all pertinent information about an asset will be shared (EMH), Malkiel suggests investing in a Total Stock Market Index, meaning buying every single stock of an index and holding on to it for as long as possible. This strategy ignores daily volatility and hot picks, instead counting on what are hopefully the gradual, long-term gains of the world economy. By eliminating volatility from his strategy, Malkiel hopes to beat the market over the long term.

    The random walk and efficient market theory are key factors in the most well-known financial algorithms, the Black-Scholes-Merton options model. In An Engine, Not a Camera, Donald MacKenzie argues that the wide-spread use of the Black-Scholes-Merton model for financial options was one of the main reasons for the US stock market crash of October 1987. The model brought the market in line with a certain view of volatility. The model is thus “performative,” meaning that it does not just describe the market, but effects it.  The Black-Scholes-Merton model assumes a fixed level of volatility for financial assets. When a trader uses the model, and sees a stock deviate from what the model says the correct level of volatility should be, this difference can be exploited for financial gain.

    However, the model became performative because when it started to be extremely popular, traders brought the market more in line with the model. “Reality adapted to the theory,” as Elena Esposito says in The Future of Futures. The fixed level of volatility assumed by the Black-Scholes-Merton model is based on the random walk, and the model itself, as Holmes says, “can be placed at the origins of the ‘artificial world model’ of finance capitalism.” Although the random walk assumes random changes from one price point to another (it cannot be predicted whether the price will go up or down), this change in constrained by a simple natural log calculation.

    The role of the natural log and its relation to volatility defined by standard deviation is the key intervention that Natural Instruments make in financial models, so let’s take a look at the role of volatility in the Black-Scholes-Merton algorithm, because this is where the output of the Natural Instruments experiment will go.

    The Black-Scholes-Merton is an algorithm for European-style call options, meaning a contract which allows (but does not oblige) the holder to buy a stock on one specific date for a specific price. It looks like this:

    (Investopedia.com)

    We don’t need to understand everything about the algorithm, but we do need to understand enough in order to understand how the Natural Instruments experiment will work.

    Put simply, C is the amount you must pay the option writer, N is a normal bell curve distribution of values, K is the price for which the option could be sold. More interesting for the experiment are e and s. E is the exponential term used in a natural log calculation. Its value is approximately 2.71828, a number which is found when the growth rate of different entities is measured. Populations, the GDP, bank interest, Moore’s law and radioactive decay are all examples of growth which follow e. We want to leave this number alone in the algorithm, since it will come into direct conflict with our target s, or standard deviation. We want to change s in the experiment because this is what the quote above said was impossible when it reached 27. We will see why below.

    One piece of fiction that explicitly deals with the fixed volatility of the Black-Scholes-Merton options model is Kim Stanley Robinson’s New York 2140 (2017). The novel features two financial algorithms, although only one will concern us here. The novel is the original inspiration for Natural Instruments.

    In the book, rising sea levels caused by climate change have flooded many coastal cities, including New York. However, many of the cities survive, developing new patterns of work and finance based around a water economy.

    Franklin Garr, a hedge fund manager, directly addresses the inability of previous financial models to capture the complexity of the current situation, saying near the beginning of the novel: “I was looking at the little waves lapping in the big doors and wondering if the Black-Scholes formula could frame their volatility.” Garr is expressing doubt as to whether this financial model is complex enough to be able to “see” the level of volatility found in the quick-changing situation of the flooded city.

    Yet in “A Formal Deduction of the Market,” financial trader and theorist Elie Ayache argues that the formalism of the Black-Scholes-Merton model, meaning the range of volatility it employs, does not just limit its ability to “see” the market, but that it actually creates the market it can take into account. In other words, the model writes the world it supposedly analyses, rather than relating to the variability of the world: “The formalism in its finest form (i.e. Brownian motion) has produced a new reality – the market – that has nothing to do with statistics or with the idea that outcomes are realized at each trial and generate statistical populations.” As Arne De Boever argues, finance makes the world psychotic, meaning that “the speculative operations of finance make human beings disavow existing reality, sometimes in combination with the substitution of another reality for the existing one.”

    However, in Robinson’s novel, the psychosis of financial formalism does not mean that betting on flooded properties is off the market. For this, Garr has invented his own algorithm, the Intertidal Property Pricing Index (IPPI), which combines the housing index with changes in sea level. Garr’s index is based on intertidal law, which goes back to Roman times and is still in effect throughout much of the world. Intertidal land is thus, as is stated in Robinson’s novel, a new kind of commons: “It was neither private property nor government property, and therefore, some legal theorists ventured, it was perhaps some kind of return to the commons.” The IPPI is meant to allow for betting on this most volatile of properties: buildings built on land that cannot be owned. “Were you in debt if you owned an asset stuck on a strand no one can own, or were you rich? Who knew?” The answer from Garr is that “My index knew.”

    Unlike the Black-Scholes-Merton model, the IPPI is attempting to index nature. It takes actual movements in sea level as a measure of current volatility. Thus in Robinson’s novel, nature is key. This connection to nature makes Garr wonder if the IPPI will work.

    This first Natural Instruments experiment aims to re-insert the volatility of nature into financial trading. It does this by putting a trading algorithm under the direct control of pollen grains. It sets out to illustrate, in a very simple manner, Ayache’s contention that one way to challenge the formal blindness of finance is to realize that “the derivatives market … may really be the consequence of true, mathematical Brownian motion.”

    To do so a number of steps need to be undertaken:

    1. Create a program in which can visually track the movements of a pollen grain and export its x, y coordinates into an Excel file;
    2. Find the standard deviation (more accurately in this case, the standard distance, because two coordinates are used) between the x, y values of each frame captured;
    3. Input the result of this standard distance into the s of the Black-Scholes-Merton formula.

    First, we will run a program that will track the pollen grain and export the movement data. The program is adapted from a common visual tracking tutorial. The program was simply modified to track the pollen grain and then write its x, y coordinates into a .csv Excel file.

    For the next step, the pollen grain movement was taken from a video recorded by a group at Hamilton College who recreated Brown’s original experiment. One pollen grain was isolated in the video and then tracked with the program.

    The main point of interest of the experiment is that the standard distance calculated for the x, y coordinates is 26.32 (ni_calc). This is extremely close to the 27-standard deviation event which was quoted above as being impossible. This means that either this pollen grain, which was the first one chosen for the experiment, is impossibly rare, or that the financial traders who wrote the essay were looking at the world the wrong way.

    This “wrong way” is looking at the world through the Black-Scholes-Merton options model. We can see this by inserting into it a standard deviation of 27, as observed with the pollen grain. But first we must set up a fairly standard option:

    stock price (s) of 100.00

    strike price (K) of 110.00

    rate of interest (r) of 0.1

    time until the option can be exercised (t) of 3 years.

    When we put 27 into the standard deviation (s) of the Black-Scholes-Merton, we render it useless. The algorithm can calculate a call premium when s is between 1 and 3, but once it reaches 10, not to mention 27, the call premium of the option matches its stock price, rendering the model ineffective:

    s 1 = C of 5.85

    s 2 = C of 92.15

    s 3 = C of 98.02

    s 4 = C of 99.95

    s 5 = C of 99.99

    s 6 = C of 99.99

    s 10 = C of 100.00

    s 25 = C of 100.00

    s 27 = C of 100.00

    This progression is also true when different stock prices and strike prices are used: a standard deviation of 10 and above pretty much equalizes the call premium and the stock price (we can extend the number beyond two decimal places and see some minor differences, but that is not important here).

    A number of holes can be quickly poked in this argument, ranging from the way the pollen grain was tracked to the option inputs for the Black-Scholes-Merton algorithm. However, this initial version of the experiment does not have to be that accurate. What is important is that it shows that an algorithm based on the random walk of real-world plant grains becomes worthless, thus functioning as an example of what Matteo Pasquinelli calls “creative sabotage.” Or, just as was indicated in Robinson’s novel, the model does not account for the volatility that is expected, it cannot see the world that it is supposedly based on.

    This is not the first time problems with volatility have been found in the Black-Scholes-Merton algorithm. Far from it. And this is not an essay written by a mathematician, nor a financial trader. But what this experiment can show is that financial algorithms miss much of the volatility of nature because of the small amount of volatility they are allowed to “see.”  This is shown not through the interpretation of a text, but through experimentation based on properties found in a text. This blindness of financial algorithms can cause problems, not just for financial traders but for those with mortgages and other forms of debt which are wrapped up in these financial instruments, as was seen the large number of people who lost their homes in the 2007-8 financial crisis. Creating algorithms which make algorithms useless is one way to expose this danger to housing, jobs, and debt obligations brought about by such “blindness.” Financial algorithms such as the Black-Scholes-Merton model are supposedly based on the natural process of the random walk. Yet, when they are actually controlled by nature, they become useless. This is the revenge of nature, via the algorithm.

    Ayache, Elie. “A Formal Reduction of the Market.” Collapse 8 (2014): 959-998.

    Brabazon, Anthony and Michael O’Neill. Biologically Inspired Algorithms for Financial
    Trading. Berlin: Springer, 2006.

    De Boever, Arne. Finance Fictions: Realism and Psychosis in a Time of Economic Crisis.
    New York: Fordham University Press, 2018.

    Esposito, Elena. The Future of Futures: The Time of Money in Financing and Society.
    Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2011.

    Grietzer, Peli. Ambient Meaning: Mood, Vibe, System. 2017. Harvard University. PhD
    dissertation.

    Holmes, Brian. “Is it Written in the Stars? Global Finance, Precarious Destinies.” Continental

    Drift. 2009. Internet: https://brianholmes.wordpress.com/2009/11/06/is-it-written-in-the-stars/.

    Mackenzie, Donald. An Engine, Not a Camera: How Financial Models Shape Markets.
    Cambridge: MIT Press, 2008.

    Malkiel, Burton. A Random Walk Down Wall Street: The Time-Tested Strategy for Successful

    Investing. New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 2015.

    North, Joseph. Literary Criticism: A Concise Political History. Cambridge: Harvard
    University Press, 2017.

    Pasquinelli, Matteo. Animal Spirits: A Bestiary of the Commons. Rotterdam: NAi Publishers, 2008.

    Patterson, Scott. Dark Pools: The Rise of the Machine Traders and the Rigging of the U.S.

    Stock Market. New York: Crown Business, 2013.

    Robinson, Kim Stanley. New York 2140. London: Orbit, 2017.

    _____

    Brian Willems is assistant professor of film and video at the University of Split, Croatia. He is most recently the author of Speculative Realism and Science Fiction (2017) and Shooting the Moon (2015).

  • Richard Hill – Too Big to Be (Review of Wu, The Curse of Bigness: Antitrust in the New Gilded Age)

    Richard Hill – Too Big to Be (Review of Wu, The Curse of Bigness: Antitrust in the New Gilded Age)

    a review of Timothy Wu, The Curse of Bigness: Antitrust in the New Gilded Age (Random House/Columbia Global Reports, 2018)

    by Richard Hill

    ~

    Tim Wu’s brilliant new book analyses in detail one specific aspect and cause of the dominance of big companies in general and big tech companies in particular: the current unwillingness to modernize antitrust law to deal with concentration in the provision of key Internet services. Wu is a professor at Columbia Law School, and a contributing opinion writer for the New York Times. He is best known for his work on Net Neutrality theory. He is author of the books The Master Switch and The Attention Merchants, along with Network Neutrality, Broadband Discrimination, and other works. In 2013 he was named one of America’s 100 Most Influential Lawyers, and in 2017 he was named to the American Academy of Arts and Sciences.

    What are the consequences of allowing unrestricted growth of concentrated private power, and abandoning most curbs on anticompetitive conduct? As Wu masterfully reminds us:

    We have managed to recreate both the economics and politics of a century ago – the first Gilded Age – and remain in grave danger of repeating more of the signature errors of the twentieth century. As that era has taught us, extreme economic concentration yields gross inequality and material suffering, feeding an appetite for nationalistic and extremist leadership. Yet, as if blind to the greatest lessons of the last century, we are going down the same path. If we learned one thing from the Gilded Age, it should have been this: The road to fascism and dictatorship is paved with failures of economic policy to serve the needs of the general public. (14)

    While increasing concentration, and its negative effects on social equity, is a general phenomenon, it is particularly concerning for what regards the Internet: “Most visible in our daily lives is the great power of the tech platforms, especially Google, Facebook, and Amazon, who have gained extraordinary power over our lives. With this centralization of private power has come a renewed concentration of wealth, and a wide gap between the rich and poor” (15). These trends have very real political effects: “The concentration of wealth and power has helped transform and radicalize electoral politics. As in the Gilded Age, a disaffected and declining middle class has come to support radically anti-corporate and nationalist candidates, catering to a discontent that transcends party lines” (15). “What we must realize is that, once again, we face what Louis Brandeis called the ‘Curse of Bigness,’ which, as he warned, represents a profound threat to democracy itself. What else can one say about a time when we simply accept that industry will have far greater influence over elections and lawmaking than mere citizens?” (15). And, I would add, what have we come to when some advocate that corporations should have veto power over public policies that affect all of us?

    Surely it is, or should be, obvious that current extreme levels of concentration are not compatible with the premises of social and economic equity, free competition, or democracy. And that “the classic antidote to bigness – the antitrust and other antimonopoly laws – might be recovered and updated to face the challenges of our times” (16). Those who doubt these propositions should read Wu’s book carefully, because he shows that they are true. My only suggestion for improvement would be to add a more detailed explanation of how network effects interact with economies of scale to favour concentration in the ICT industry in general, and in telecommunications and the Internet in particular. But this topic is well explained in other works.

    As Wu points out, antitrust law must not be restricted (as it is at present in the USA) “to deal with one very narrow type of harm: higher prices to consumers” (17). On the contrary, “It needs better tools to assess new forms of market power, to assess macroeconomic arguments, and to take seriously the link between industrial concentration and political influence” (18). The same has been said by other scholars (e.g. here, here, here and here), by a newspaper, an advocacy group, a commission of the European Parliament, a group of European industries, a well-known academic, and even by a plutocrat who benefitted from the current regime.

    Do we have a choice? Can we continue to pretend that we don’t need to adapt antitrust law to rein in the excessive power of the Internet giants? No: “The alternative is not appealing. Over the twentieth century, nations that failed to control private power and attend to the economic needs of their citizens faced the rise of strongmen who promised their citizens a more immediate deliverance from economic woes” (18). (I would argue that any resemblance to the election of US President Trump, to the British vote to leave the European Union, and to the rise of so-called populist parties in several European countries [e.g. Hungary, Italy, Poland, Sweden] is not coincidental).

    Chapter One of Wu’s book, “The Monopolization Movement,” provides historical background, reminding us that from the late nineteenth through the early twentieth century, dominant, sector-specific monopolies emerged and were thought to be an appropriate way to structure economic activity. In the USA, in the early decades of the twentieth century, under the Trust Movement, essentially every area of major industrial activity was controlled or influenced by a single man (but not the same man for each area), e.g. Rockefeller and Morgan. “In the same way that Silicon Valley’s Peter Thiel today argues that monopoly ‘drives progress’ and that ‘competition is for losers,’ adherents to the Trust Movement thought Adam Smith’s fierce competition had no place in a modern, industrialized economy” (26). This system rapidly proved to be dysfunctional: “There was a new divide between the giant corporation and its workers, leading to strikes, violence, and a constant threat of class warfare” (30). Popular resistance mobilized in both Europe and the USA, and it led to the adoption of the first antitrust laws.

    Chapter Two, “The Right to Live, and Not Merely to Exist,” reminds us that US Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis “really cared about … the economic conditions under which life is lived, and the effects of the economy on one’s character and on the nation’s soul” (33). The chapter outlines Brandeis’ career and what motivated him to combat monopolies.

    In Chapter Three, “The Trustbuster,” Wu explains how the 1901 assassination of US President McKinley, a devout supporter of unrestricted laissez-faire capitalism (“let well enough alone”, reminiscent of today’s calls for government to “do not harm” through regulation, and to “don’t fix it if it isn’t broken”), resulted in a fundamental change in US economic policy, when Theodore Roosevelt succeeded him. Roosevelt’s “determination that the public was ruler over the corporation, and not vice versa, would make him the single most important advocate of a political antitrust law.” (47). He took on the great US monopolists of the time by enforcing the antitrust laws. “To Roosevelt, economic policy did not form an exception to popular rule, and he viewed the seizure of economic policy by Wall Street and trust management as a serious corruption of the democratic system. He also understood, as we should today, that ignoring economic misery and refusing to give the public what they wanted would drive a demand for more extreme solutions, like Marxist or anarchist revolution” (49). Subsequent US presidents and authorities continued to be “trust busters”, through the 1990s. At the time, it was understood that antitrust was not just an economic issue, but also a political issue: “power that controls the economy should be in the hands of elected representatives of the people, not in the hands of an industrial oligarchy” (54, citing Justice William Douglas). As we all know, “Increased industrial concentration predictably yields increased influence over political outcomes for corporations and business interests, as opposed to citizens or the public” (55). Wu goes on to explain why and how concentration exacerbates the influence of private companies on public policies and undermines democracy (that is, the rule of the people, by the people, for the people). And he outlines why and how Standard Oil was broken up (as opposed to becoming a government-regulated monopoly). The chapter then explains why very large companies might experience disecomonies of scale, that is, reduced efficiency. So very large companies compensate for their inefficiency by developing and exploiting “a different kind of advantages having less to do with efficiencies of operation, and more to do with its ability to wield economic and political power, by itself or conjunction with others. In other words, a firm may not actually become more efficient as it gets larger, but may become better at raising prices or keeping out competitors” (71). Wu explains how this is done in practice. The rest of this chapter summarizes the impact of the US presidential election of 1912 on US antitrust actions.

    Chapter Four, “Peak Antitrust and the Chicago School,” explains how, during the decades after World War II, strong antitrust laws were viewed as an essential component of democracy; and how the European Community (which later became the European Union) adopted antitrust laws modelled on those of the USA. However, in the mid-1960s, scholars at the University of Chicago (in particular Robert Bork) developed the theory that antitrust measures were meant only to protect consumer welfare, and thus no antitrust actions could be taken unless there was evidence that consumers were being harmed, that is, that a dominant company was raising prices. Harm to competitors or suppliers was no longer sufficient for antitrust enforcement. As Wu shows, this “was really laissez-faire reincarnated.”

    Chapter Five, “The Last of the Big Cases,” discusses two of the last really large US antitrust case. The first was breakup of the regulated de facto telephone monopoly, AT&T, which was initiated in 1974. The second was the case against Microsoft, which started in 1998 and ended in 2001 with a settlement that many consider to be a negative turning point in US antitrust enforcement. (A third big case, the 1969-1982 case against IBM, is discussed in Chapter Six.)

    Chapter Six, “Chicago Triumphant,” documents how the US Supreme Court adopted Bork’s “consumer welfare” theory of antitrust, leading to weak enforcement. As a consequence, “In the United States, there have been no trustbusting or ‘big cases’ for nearly twenty years: no cases targeting an industry-spanning monopolist or super-monopolist, seeking the goal of breakup” (110). Thus, “In a run that lasted some two decades, American industry reached levels of industry concentration arguably unseen since the original Trust era. A full 75 percent of industries witnessed increased concentration from the years 1997 to 2012” (115). Wu gives concrete examples: the old AT&T monopoly, which had been broken up, has reconstituted itself; there are only three large US airlines; there are three regional monopolies for cable TV; etc. But the greatest failure “was surely that which allowed the almost entirely uninhibited consolidation of the tech industry into a new class of monopolists” (118).

    Chapter Seven, “The Rise of the Tech Trusts,” explains how the Internet morphed from a very competitive environment into one dominated by large companies that buy up any threatening competitor. “When a dominant firm buys a nascent challenger, alarm bells are supposed to ring. Yet both American and European regulators found themselves unable to find anything wrong with the takeover [of Instagram by Facebook]” (122).

    The Conclusion, “A Neo-Brandeisian Agenda,” outlines Wu’s thoughts on how to address current issues regarding dominant market power. These include renewing the well known practice of reviewing mergers; opening up the merger review process to public comment; renewing the practice of bringing major antitrust actions against the biggest companies; breaking up the biggest monopolies, adopting the market investigation law and practices of the United Kingdom; recognizing that the goal of antitrust is not just to protect consumers against high prices, but also to protect competition per se, that is to protect competitors, suppliers, and democracy itself. “By providing checks on monopoly and limiting private concentration of economic power, the antitrust law can maintain and support a different economic structure than the one we have now. It can give humans a fighting chance against corporations, and free the political process from invisible government. But to turn the ship, as the leaders of the Progressive era did, will require an acute sensitivity to the dangers of the current path, the growing threats to the Constitutional order, and the potential of rebuilding a nation that actually lives up to its greatest ideals” (139).

    In other words, something is rotten in the state of the Internet: it has “collection and exploitation of personal data”; it has “recently been used to erode privacy and to increase the concentration of economic power, leading to increasing income inequalities”; it has led to “erosion of the press, leading to erosion of democracy.” These developments are due to the fact that “US policies that ostensibly promote the free flow of information around the world, the right of all people to connect to the Internet, and free speech, are in reality policies that have, by design, furthered the geo-economic and geo-political goals of the US, including its military goals, its imperialist tendencies, and the interests of large private companies”; and to the fact that “vibrant government institutions deliberately transferred power to US corporations in order to further US geo-economical and geo-political goals.”

    Wu’s call for action is not just opportune, but necessary and important; at the same time, it is not sufficient.

    _____

    Richard Hill is President of the Association for Proper internet Governance, and was formerly a senior official at the International Telecommunication Union (ITU). He has been involved in internet governance issues since the inception of the internet and is now an activist in that area, speaking, publishing, and contributing to discussions in various forums. Among other works he is the author of The New International Telecommunication Regulations and the Internet: A Commentary and Legislative History (Springer, 2014). He writes frequently about internet governance issues for The b2o Review Digital Studies magazine.

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  • Ragini Tharoor Srinivasan – What Literature Does (Review of Amit Chaudhuri, ed., Literary Activism)

    Ragini Tharoor Srinivasan – What Literature Does (Review of Amit Chaudhuri, ed., Literary Activism)

    A review of Literary Activism: Perspectives ed. Amit Chaudhuri (Oxford University Press, 2017)

    by Ragini Tharoor Srinivasan

    There’s a debate going on among some of my English department colleagues, centered on the following questions. What responsibility do faculty trained primarily in American and British literatures have to the teaching of English literatures of the non-West? How should English literature of South Asia or East Africa, for instance, be contextualized in terms of the relevant subcontinental and regional literatures in other languages? On what grounds might texts originally written in Bengali, Urdu, Swahili, or Arabic be taught in an English department? Is knowledge of the original language in which a text was written required for teaching it in translation? If so, what constitutes such knowledge?

    I’ve been thinking about these questions lately through the terms offered by Literary Activism, an idiosyncratic volume that collects proceedings from a 2015 Oxford symposium and even some of the email debriefing that followed. The title refers to a broad constellation of activities and object relations that motor critical engagements with literature in and beyond the academy. Literary activism is not quite “championing,” except when it is. It is not literature in service of what we conventionally understand as the political, nor is it simply an affirmation of the politics of aesthetics. Literary activism has a newly urgent brief given how markets and information technology have debased contemporary discourses on the literary; by that same token, it has been practiced as long as writers have written and readers have read. In editor and symposium-convener Amit Chaudhuri’s words, literary activism bears “a strangeness that echoes the strangeness of the literary…[it] may be desultory, in that its aims and values aren’t immediately explicable” (2017a: 6).

    Contributors to Literary Activism include scholars, journalists, publishers, creative writers, and literary critics. In response to Chaudhuri’s capacious opening gambit, they variously explore literary activism as “the crucial work that seeks to restore the importance of the literary to the public sphere” (Majumdar 2017: 122); the championing of writers by colleagues who believe “unconditionally in the value of [their] work” (Zecchini 2017: 20); a “critical” practice that can reorient debates on literary tradition and the modern (R. Chaudhuri 2017: 190); a counterpart to market activism (Graham: 2017); exemplified by the “passionate advocacy” of poetry translation (Mckendrick 2017: 249); a combination of literary “karma or work…jnana, or knowledge…and srishti, or creation” (Chakravorty 2017: 268); and “activism on behalf of an idea of literature” (Cook 2017: 298). These accounts are not mutually exclusive. Rather, they are consistent with how literature bridges and confounds private-public distinctions: traversing the figural space within and between minds, on the one hand, and passing materially through hands and institutions, on the other.

    Literary activism can be private, as in the case of English-Marathi poet Arun Kolatkar, who Laetitia Zecchini describes as having practiced his art in “a hostile or indifferent environment” (2017: 25). Kolatkar and his fellow poets “did not need the market or the public to know that their work was outstanding” (30); in fact, neglect by mainstream publishers was the enabling condition of their work. Spurning market logics, Kolatkar and his contemporaries published in their own presses, retained control over all aspects of production, and actively translated their and others’ works. They were “creating a world of their own, with their own standards and audience, however limited” (30). Zecchini’s translation of Kolatkar began with a private intimation as well, through an unexpected encounter with his poetry that she describes in terms of falling in love.

    Literary activism is also public, as in Amit Chaudhuri and Peter McDonald’s joint nomination of Arvind Krishna Mehrotra, a superlative poet, translator, and critic, for the post of 2009 Oxford Professor of Poetry. That nomination brought together novelists, scientists, historians, political thinkers, philosophers, and numerous other “well-wishers” in service of a campaign that was, Chaudhuri stresses, never going “to win”; it was “a deliberate long shot that should succeed” (2017b: 240, 245). That it didn’t succeed (the post ultimately went unfulfilled, a turn of events involving an alleged smear campaign by Ruth Padel against Derek Walcott, regarding his history of sexual harassment) was the point. By highlighting the work of Mehrotra, Chaudhuri and McDonald were able to lay bare the extra-literary considerations operative in the filling of posts like that of Oxford Professor.

    Zecchini’s and Amit Chaudhuri’s essays situate literary activism between acts of private creation and public consumption, between literature as a practice of living and literature as products in circulation. They contribute to the volume’s larger discussion of the relationship between literary activism and the “market activism” of publishing houses, agents, and booksellers. David Graham offers a normative account of market activism as the work of “experts” who are able “to bring new, fresh, and important voices to readers around the world” (2017: 80). Graham, a publisher, describes himself as both “a businessman whose business has been making literary works sell” and “a midwife to literary talent” (73). This tellingly mixed language captures the simultaneously opportunistic and beneficent nature of publishing.

    For most contributors, however, market activism is the province of those less interested in literature than in what sells. “[H]ow do we establish what is authentic,” Dubravka Ugrešić asks, “and what a product of market compromise?” (2017: 208). “[C]an any amount of activism really re-energize [literature’s] declined importance in the contemporary public sphere?” Saikat Majumdar wonders (141). Tim Parks laments the pervasive conflation of literary worth with accessibility, exemplified by how publishers and literary-festival organizers celebrate the success of texts that they themselves have been responsible for promoting (“How pleasant, then, to convince oneself that what reaches out to everyone is also the best” [2017: 157]). Reflecting on her own circumscribed position as a “Croatian writer who lives in Amsterdam,” Ugrešić wryly observes the mass culture industry’s unwillingness to read transnational literatures in anything other than national terms (208).

    Critiques of the culture industry, pandering publishers, and the marketplace of least-common-denominators are not new. But the contributors to Literary Activism go further by routing the literature-market binary through a significant third term: the academy. Derek Attridge describes how, over the course of many years, he championed the work of J.M. Coetzee and Zoë Wicomb, writing critical essays and a monograph about the former, and planning a conference and editing a volume about the latter (Attridge also nominated Wicomb for the Windham-Campbell Prize, which she received). It is the kind of affirmative academic attention that Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak has paid to Mahesweta Devi’s stories, or for that matter, which Majumdar has given to Amit Chaudhuri’s novels. All of this, Attridge speculates, “must have had some effect on publishers’ decisions, prize-awarding bodies, reviewers, and all the other agents in the literary marketplace” (2017: 59).

    What is the nature of this effect? How does academic attention to certain writers inflect their position in the literary marketplace—and vice versa? There is a long history of scholarship on literature’s relations to the market (Brier 2017), but it is only recently that the academy is taking stock of its particular mediation of those relations. As Andy Hines observes in an essay on the new institutionalism, only now are literary critics “willing to admit that we have been pushed around all along” (2018: np). Two remarkable paragraphs in Amit Chaudhuri’s essay strike at the heart of this vexed triangulation. He writes:

    By the late 1980s…departments of English…looked with some prejudice upon value and the symbols of value, such as the canon; problematized or disowned terms such as ‘classic’ and ‘masterpiece’; often ascribed a positive political value to orality, which it conflated with non-Western culture, and a negative one to inscription or ‘good writing’, which it identified with the European Enlightenment. Some of this was overdue and necessary. (2017b: 224)

    Chaudhuri is referencing two concurrent phenomena here. For one, a spate of works including Pierre Bourdieu’s rules of art (1992), John Guillory’s work on canon formation (1993), and Pascale Casanova’s world republic of letters (1999) problematized accepted terms and modes of literary valuation. At the same time, English studies was being transformed by critical theory, postcolonialism, feminism, and cultural studies. Construed positively, the discipline underwent significant internal reformation; viewed more suspiciously, it metabolized the oppositional knowledge projects that had emerged to contest its disciplinary hegemony.

    Chaudhuri’s passage then shifts subtly in focus:

    Meanwhile, publishers robustly adopted the language of value – to do with the             ‘masterpiece’ and ‘classic’ and ‘great writer’ – that had fallen out of use in its old location, fashioning it in their own terms. And these were the terms that academics  essentially accepted. They critiqued literary value in their own domain, but they were unopposed to it when it was transferred to the marketplace. Part of the reason for this was the language of the market and the language of the publishing industry were…populist during a time of anti-elitism…For example: from the 1990s onward, publishers insisted there was no reason that literary novels couldn’t sell…What they meant was that, in the new mainstream category of ‘literary fiction’, only literary novels that sold well would be  deemed valid literary novels. Academics neither exposed this semantic conflict nor  challenged the way literary value had been reconfigured. (2017b: 224-225)

    This is “the genius of market activism” that “disinherits and revivifies” terms of literary value that have fallen out of favor in the academy (A. Chaudhuri 2017b: 226). The result is that the status of Harold Bloom’s latest entrant into the Western canon is rightly debated, but first-time novelists debut “instant classics” and “modern masterpieces” that are unblinkingly received as such. And it’s not just that an indiscriminate public is being told what to read by Oprah, Reddit, or for that matter the Times. Now, rather than an Attridge elevating a Wicomb, the market tells the academic who and what is worthy of study. This transformation in market-academy relations has most significantly impacted those who teach and study contemporary and non-Western literatures. Chaudhuri’s passage closes with a note on such academics:

    When, in response to political changes in the intellectual landscape, they extended the old canon and began to teach contemporary writers, or novelists from the former colonies, they largely chose as their texts novels whose position had been already decided by the  market and its instruments, such as certain literary prizes. (2017b225)

    Chaudhuri is treading lightly here, but anyone familiar with his creative and critical oeuvre knows who he is talking about. The South Asian and South Asian diasporic writers most frequently taught and researched in the Anglo-American academy are Booker winners (Salman Rushdie, Arundhati Roy, Aravind Adiga), Pulitzer winner (Jhumpa Lahiri), and a Nobel Laureate (V.S. Naipaul). High profile nominations can bring otherwise minor texts to prominence, as do reviews in outlets like the Times or New Yorker. Scholars wondering which contemporary works will stand the test of time (as if the test of time were an adequate arbiter of literary value) turn to prizes and bestseller-lists in order to identify what is worthy of study. This is the context in which we “subsist on a sense that the lineage of the Indian English novel is an exemplary anthology of single works, rather than a tradition of cross-referencing, borrowing, and reciprocity” (A. Chaudhuri 2017b: 229). This is the context in which we become literary activists.

    This is also the context in which South Asian literature, to continue with the above example, becomes equated with South Asian literature in English, when in fact, as contributors to Literary Activism discuss, South Asian literature in English is part of a rich South Asian literary archive and must be studied in the context of the subcontinent’s multilingual traditions. For example, Rosinka Chaudhuri’s essay on the literary sphere of early 19th-century Bengal shows how “contentions between the major literary languages of India, including the classical and folk languages, nouveau urban and mixed languages, colonial and ‘native’ languages, played an instrumental role in the many negotiations between modernity and literary craft” (2017: 190). Zecchini’s approach to Arun Kolatkar and Amit Chaudhuri’s reading of Arvind Krishna Mehrotra are attuned to such negotiations in the 20th-century context.

    Which brings me back to the questions at the top of this essay. Originally hired as a Global Anglophonist, I am one of only two members of our literature faculty whose primary scholarly field is neither American nor British literature. I am also on the executive committee of an undergraduate major in World Literature that is housed in another college (formally and institutionally at our university, the “world” doesn’t belong to English). I therefore approach the debate about teaching texts in translation from my position at the interstices of the “Global Anglophone” and “World Literature,” which are distinct paradigms for the teaching of non-Western literatures. The former admits only texts written in English and is arguably a renomination of the postcolonial; the latter conventionally allows for the teaching of non-English texts in English translation.

    Surprising even myself, I have become an advocate—I dare say an activist—for the inclusion of non-Anglophone works of “World Literature” in English translation alongside works of “Global Anglophone” literature in our seminars and Masters exam lists. Why? Because we cannot teach and administer exams as if Chinua Achebe (a usual suspect) is only in conversation with Joseph Conrad, as if Things Fall Apart has nothing to say to Tayeb Salih’s Season of Migration to the North (translated from Arabic). Because graduate students reading Rushdie and Roy (more usual suspects) should very well know Intizar Hussain (translated from Urdu) and Kamala Suraya (translated from Malayalam). Because, as Roanne Kantor puts it, “no coherent historiography of the Global Anglophone can be built within the ‘Anglophone’ itself” (2018: np).

    My advocacy has been met by a complicated resistance. Faculty who oppose the teaching of texts in translation worry that the delinking of these texts from their source languages is intellectually irresponsible. They argue that our contemporary reading practices have, in Tim Parks’ words, “drastically weakened and in many cases altogether severed” “the old connections that linked writer to community” (149-150), and that teaching literature in translation will only exacerbate this problem. This critique, along with the suspicion that World Literature is “the educational equivalent of a shopping-mall food court” (Damrosch 2013: 153, 158), is worth heeding. But what is the alternative? The Global Anglophone circumvents the vexed politics of translation, but it valorizes Booker- and Nobel-prize winning writers like Rushdie, Wole Soyinka, and Nadine Gordimer. To return to Amit Chaudhuri’s argument, the Global Anglophone is preoccupied with Anglo-centric international prizes and the “instant classics” they create. It is by nature overly focused on the contemporary, as colonial histories prefigure the relevant 20th and 21st-century texts.

    Rigid adherence to the Global Anglophone rubric reflects an impoverished theory of translation as well, a topic discussed at length in Literary Activism. It is of course true, as Parks notes, that translations are not “always enriching” (170). By that same token, as Ugrešić writes, “Every translation is not only a multiplication of misunderstandings, but also a multiplication of meanings” (204). Translation is “cultural catalyst” (McKendrick 2017: 249). It is a practice “meant to forge affiliations and connections, to assert bonds of kinship, and to clear a space, however minor or marginal, for [writers] and their predecessors—who are turned into contemporaries by the process of translation itself” (Zecchini 2017:31). Electing not to read literature in translation because one risks misunderstanding is as suspect as assuming translation is a one-to-one “process of recoding” (Cook 2017: 322).

    That the above isn’t obvious is a reflection on the conservatism of English in some quarters, and maybe even literary scholarship more generally. In its final significant through-line, Literary Activism theorizes criticism as an alternative to scholarship, and amateurism as an alternative to expertise. Expert publishers and expert scholars who mediate between author and reader are distinguished from “amateur” critics—the category is Majumdar’s—who read and write without consideration of prize-winners, bestseller lists, market, or promotion-and-tenure-committee approval. For Majumdar, scholars are defined by their commitment to the objective, to their “archive of study” (2017: 115). By contrast, the critic “celebrates and foregrounds her subjective self” and practices literary interpretation as “a creative act” (115). Unlike professional scholars, whose archival considerations are overdetermined, amateur literary critics are characterized by their interdisciplinarity, willingness to take intellectual risks, and love of literature. They practice what Attridge describes as an “affirmative criticism, one that operates…to understand, explore, respond to, and judge what is of value in”—as opposed to the value of—“works of literature” (2017: 51).

    Majumdar is currently editing, with Aarthi Vadde, a volume called The Critic as Amateur that further develops the distinctions between private and public, scholar and critic, literature, market, and academy offered here. That volume (to which I have contributed) also includes essays by Attridge, Rosinka Chaudhuri, and McDonald. Taken together, the pair of books, Literary Activism and The Critic as Amateur, suggest another scene in which literary activism is performed: transnational collaborators deciding over symposia coffee breaks what to publish together next.

    I have come to think of much of the work I do as an English professor as literary activism. Certainly, my advocacy of an expansive literature curriculum is activism on behalf of an idea of literature. This essay is a minor piece of activism as well, a gesture of affirmative criticism that aspires to shore up the links between two projects and draw attention to them both. It can be painful at times, both urgent and pointless-feeling, and it might never be “properly remembered or noticed” (A. Chaudhuri 2017b: 244). Say what you want about love. In the first and final instance, literary activism is a form of labor.

    _____

    Ragini Tharoor Srinivasan is an assistant professor of English and Social, Cultural, and Critical Theory at the University of Arizona. She has also taught at the University of Nevada, Reno, and at the University of California, Berkeley, where she earned a PhD in Rhetoric in 2016. A former magazine editor and award-winning journalist, Srinivasan has contributed essays and criticism to scholarly, public, and semi-public venues on three continents. More from www.raginitharoorsrinivasan.com

    Back to the essay

    _____

    References

    • Attridge, Derek. 2017. “The Critic as Lover: Literary Activism and the Academy,” Literary Activism: Perspectives, edited by Amit Chaudhuri. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.
    • Brier, Evan. 2017. “The Literary Marketplace,” Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Literature. Oxford University Press.
    • Bourdieu, Pierre. 1992. The Rules of Art: Genesis and Structure of the Literary Field, trans. by Susan Emanuel. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
    • Casanova, Pascale. 1999. The World Republic of Letters, trans. By M.B. DeBevoise. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
    • Chakravorty, Swapan. 2017. “Literary Surrogacy and Literary Activism: Instance from Bengal,” Literary Activism: Perspectives, edited by Amit Chaudhuri. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.
    • Chaudhuri, Amit. 2017a. “A Brief Background to the Symposium, and Some Acknowledgments,” Literary Activism: Perspectives, edited by Amit Chaudhuri. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.
    • –. 2017b. “The Piazza and the Car Park: Literary Activism and the Mehrotra Campaign,” Literary Activism: Perspectives, edited by Amit Chaudhuri. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.
    • Chaudhuri, Rosinka. 2017. “The Practice of Literature: The Calcutta Context as a Guide to Literary Activism,” Literary Activism: Perspectives, edited by Amit Chaudhuri. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.
    • Cook, Jon. 2017. “Literary Activism: Where Now, What Next?” Literary Activism: Perspectives, edited by Amit Chaudhuri. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.
    • Damrosch, David. 2013. “World Literature in a Postliterary Age,” Modern Language Quarterly 74.2.
    • Graham, David. 2017. “‘Market Activism’: A Publisher’s Perspective,” Literary Activism: Perspectives, edited by Amit Chaudhuri. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.
    • Guillory, John. 1993. Cultural Capital: The Problem of Literary Canon Formation. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
    • Hines, Andy. 2018. “The Material Life of Criticism,” Public Books, Jan. 22, http://www.publicbooks.org/the-material-life-of-criticism/, accessed Sept. 13, 2018.
    • Kantor, Roanne. 2018. “Even If You Gain the World: South Asia, Latin America, and the Unexpected Journey to Global English (working title).” Unpublished manuscript, last modified October 17, 2018. Microsoft Word file.
    • Majumdar, Saikat. 2017. “The Amatory Activist,” Literary Activism: Perspectives, edited by Amit Chaudhuri. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.
    • Mckendrick, Jamie. 2017. “Forms of Fidelity: Poetry Translation as Literary Activism,” Literary Activism: Perspectives, edited by Amit Chaudhuri. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.
    • Parks, Tim. 2017. “Globalisation, Literary Activism, and the Death of Critical Discourse,” Literary Activism: Perspectives, edited by Amit Chaudhuri. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.
    • Ugrešić, Dubravka. 2017. “Transnational vs. National Literature,” trans. David Williams. Literary Activism: Perspectives, edited by Amit Chaudhuri. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.
    • Zecchini, Laetitia. 2017. “Translation as Literary Activism: On Invisibility and Exposure, Arun Kolatkar and the Little Magazine ‘Conspiracy,’” Literary Activism: Perspectives, edited by Amit Chaudhuri. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.

    *Editorial Note (Nov 5, 2018): A broken link was fixed and a line that originally read “…I am the only member of our literature faculty whose primary scholarly field is neither American nor British literature” was changed to read: “…I am one of only two members of our literature faculty whose primary scholarly field is neither American nor British literature.”

  • Charles Bernstein’s New Poetry Collection, Near/Miss

    Charles Bernstein’s New Poetry Collection, Near/Miss

    New from University of Chicago Press: paper, cloth, e-book, and audiobook. 

    Bernstein’s first poetry collection in five years, Near/Miss is the apotheosis of his late style, thick with off-center rhythms, hilarious riffs, and verbal extravagance. The book opens with a rollicking satire of difficult poetry and moves deftly on to the stuff of contrarian pop culture—full of malaprops, non-sequiturs, translations of translations, and a hilarious yet sinister feed of blog comments. Political protest rubs up against epic collage through poems exploring the unexpected intimacies and continuities of “our united fates.” Grounded in a politics of multiplicity and dissent and replete with both sharp edges and subtle lament, Near/Miss is full of close encounters of every kind.

    “The term for two words in different languages that appear the same but have completely disparate meanings is a ‘false friend.’ Flip to any page in Charles Bernstein’s mercilessly brilliant, no-holds-barred new collection and you will encounter a friend you thought you knew, but this phrase, quotation, proverb, equation, cameo, bit of received language will have been evacuated and filled again by the poet’s constructions and reorientations. Bernstein puts words and their groupings, associations, and connotations ‘through the wringer,’ submitting them to a kind of durability test, so that when we emerge from the theater of one of his poems, rubbing our eyes to adjust to the light, our ossified relationship to the language we use has been pleasantly, productively obliterated. In the genius of Bernstein, a word is a whirl is a world.”
    Claudia Rankine, author of Citizen: An American Lyric 

    “‘Nothing can be truly interesting except the exhaustive,’ Thomas Mann wrote a long time ago. Many of these poems suggest a return to that spirit, in a poetry of wit, ideas, and exploration, with both ease and elegance. These are poems you want to put down and pick up again. And when you do, you find something you hadn’t seen last time. It’s a book I’m glad to have. You’ll be glad you have it, too.”
    Samuel R. Delany, author of Times Square Red, Times Square Blue

    “A major poet for our time — & then some – Charles Bernstein has emerged as a principal voice –maybe the best we have – for an international avant-garde now in its second century of visions & revisions.”
    Jerome Rothenberg, editor of Technicians of the Sacred

    Near/Miss launches in New York, Washington, D.C., Philadelphia, and Chicago:
    •Wednesday, Nov. 7, 7pm,  McNally Jackson Books, with Amy Sillman, Tracie Morris, and Felix Bernstein, 52 Prince Street, New York, NY 10012. (Facebook event page.)
    •Monday, Nov. 12, 8pm, Bridge Street Books, 2814 Pensylvania Ave NW , Washington, DC 20007
    •Wednesday. Nov. 14, 6pm, Penn Book Center, 130 S. 34th Street, Philadelphia, PA 19104 (FB event page)
    •Thursday, Nov. 29, 7:30pm (TBA),  Books Are Magic, with Peter Straub, 225 Smith Street, Brooklyn NY  11231
    •Sunday, Jan, 6. 3pm, 57th Street Books, 301 E. 57th St., Chicago, IL 60637

    Review of Near/Miss by Feng Yi: “Entanglement of Echoes in Near/Miss,” JELL (Journal of English Language and Literature): pdf

    Cover image by Susan Bee, Pickpocket (2013, 20″ x 24″, oil on canvas)

    A paperback edition of Recalculating was recently published by Chicago.
    The audiobook of Near/Miss will be available soon from Audible and from Chicago.

  • Does Attention to Language Matter Anymore? boundary 2’s 2018 Conference

    Does Attention to Language Matter Anymore? boundary 2’s 2018 Conference

     

    The annual 2018 boundary 2 conference from November 1-3 at University of Pittsburgh is on the subject of “Does Attention to Language Matter?”

    Philology, criticism, and translation are three techniques that reveal the constant importance of language to all forms of humanistic activity and artistic creativity.  This conference is a reminder of the risks that come from forgetting the realities of language and an important reminder of these disciplines’ vital role in regulating the relation between meaning and word, between power and value.

    The event schedule is listed below. Events are free to the public and in the Cathedral of Learning, Room 501. Nuruddin Farah’s talk on November 1st will be at City of Asylum and is free with an online RSVP.

    November 1

    7:00 PM Nuruddin Farah, reading and Q&A at City of Asylum

    November 2

    1:00 PM Jeffrey Sacks (UC Riverside), “The Philological Thesis: Language Without Ends”

    2:00 PM Anita Starosta (Penn State University), “We Are All Migrants! / Migrants Go Home!”

    3:00 PM David Golumbia (Virginia Commonwealth University), “The Deconstruction of Philology”

    November 3

    10:00 AM Leah Feldman (University of Chicago), “Embodying Philology: Theater Adaptation in Post-Soviet Central Asia”

    11:00 AM Annette Lienau (Harvard University), “Between Pride and Scorn: The Conceptual Limits of the ‘Arabophone’ and Its Challenge to (post)-Orientalist Philologies”

    2:00 PM Howard Eiland (MIT), “No Getting Around It”

    3:00 PM Jonathan Arac (University of Pittsburgh), “Ways of Working with Language”

    4:00 PM Susan Gillespie (Bard College), “The Possibility of Translation”

     

  • Lionel Ruffel  — A Dangerous Book (On The Invisible Committee, The Coming Insurrection)

    Lionel Ruffel — A Dangerous Book (On The Invisible Committee, The Coming Insurrection)

    by Lionel Ruffel

    Translated from the French by Claire Finch and Jackson B. Smith

    We are watching a man on a screen. He displays all the characteristics of a vigorous, conservative, republican, married, paternal, naturally born-to-lead American. He’s white, his name is Glenn Beck, he has a baby face and a crew cut, and he’s wearing the mandatory uniform — a red tie with white stars, a striped shirt, and a dark suit. He leans his elbows on the table, using them to emphasize all of his gestures. It’s like we’re at his house and he’s talking to us in private. He’s speaking to us so casually that it even feels a little like water cooler gossip, but don’t let that fool you: what he’s about to tell us is serious. We’re watching Fox News; it’s July 1st, 2009. He starts with the typical idiotic conspiracy theories. But then, less than a minute into the show, something happens, and suddenly we’re confronted with the unexpected, the incredible, the weird: he holds up a small book, yes, you heard me correctly, a book. And he not only holds it up, he flips through it, turning a few pages without reading them, and we can tell right away that he hasn’t read the book and that this doesn’t matter. He hasn’t read it yet, because he just got it, but he’s been waiting for it for a long time. “It is a brand new book,” he tells us, and he looks at us, knowingly, “it is a dangerous book,” and he looks at us threateningly, “it is called The Coming Insurrection,” and here he takes his time, exaggerating each syllable. He holds up the book again, making sure to repeat the title two times, and the second is even more terrifying than the first. “It is written by the Invisible Committee.” Now he looks utterly aghast, because, as he’s speaking, at this very moment, “it calls for a violent revolution.” He gives a little automatic smile, a knowing smile, when he tells his viewers that this Invisible Committee is an anonymous group—and he emphasizes anonymous—and they come from France, of course, although he doesn’t actually say “of course,” we can hear it anyway.

    *

    What makes a book dangerous? So dangerous that a celebrity commentator of a major conservative American television network would devote so much energy to it. So dangerous that the French state imprisoned nine people and flung open what became known as the so-called “Tarnac” case, getting wrapped up in another one of those judiciary true-crime fiascos that it does so well. The combination of the two, the celebrity commentator and the French state, thus gave the book a double recognition the likes of which no French book has received in a very long time. We can’t help but think about similar cases that came before, even though they already seem like they happened so long ago: Guyotat, Genet; or the cases that happened even longer ago: Baudelaire, Flaubert. I recall those cases of literary trials, because the so-called “Tarnac” case, and here comes my hypothesis, is fundamentally a literary trial, even though we’re using it as a false pretext to debate terrorism in our courts. Each of these literary trials thus reveals an anxiety that corresponds to its period, an anxiety about the production of literature and the production of truth. When we talk about the 19th century, we often mistakenly bring up morality, but it was actually all about putting realism on trial. When we talk about the 1960s, we discuss morality and politics, but the true source of anxiety was the hordes of young educated people and readers, let’s call it “democratization.” With the Tarnac case, we talk about terrorism, but it’s a trial that pulls us back to the question that Kant famously asked in 1790: “What is a book?” And it’s true, after all: What is a book? What is a book that Glenn Beck waves at us on a television set? What is a book when we’re reading its unauthorized translations in the middle of a coffee shop? What is a book that leads to the arrest of nine people? These questions are not at all insignificant, because their answer depends on how we think about the collective body, about politics, and about democracy.

    I might be moving too fast, and if you aren’t already familiar with the case, I can quickly go over its main cadences. The starting point was nothing out of the ordinary: a book, called The Coming Insurrection, and some criminal intrigue: someone sabotaged several train lines. The two are linked by a series of readers: the police, the legal system, and the political world, which I’ll call “bovaryan” because…ok, let’s put it in the most simplistic terms, they have a tendency to confuse what is real with what is fiction. The book in question, The Coming Insurrection, the one that worried Glenn Beck so much before he even read it, thus became the sole evidence in a trial by media, and an important one, as its principal actors were the then-Minister of the Interior and the still-acting head of the SNCF (the French National Railway Corporation), and it was broadcast during primetime on the most-viewed private national French television channel. And the book continued to act as evidence in a protean, constantly shifting legal trial that lasted for ten years, until the French Supreme Court finally dismissed the false charges of terrorism. But even now, we can’t help but feel that it will never truly end.

    So if there was no real legal basis for the case, what was it actually about? In my opinion, it was about the following: that the book has no official author, except for an invisible collective. And it is this fact that calls into question the entire modern structure of literature. What is a book? What is a book without an author? Without visibility? Without rights of ownership? How can we use such a book? Can a book be evidence? Because the modern structure of “the literary” is none other than the modern structure of ownership, or put differently, capitalism’s raison d’être. These are the actual questions that the Tarnac case poses. And they are the fundamental literary questions of the new millennium.

    *

    If we’re talking about the actual nature of the book, there is another imaginary collective—a collective that is a sort of cousin of the Invisible Committee, that definitely shares some of its authors, it is a collective that is truly literary—I’m talking about the Tiqqun collective, which was making itself heard, and emphatically, well before The Coming Insurrection and the start of the Tarnac case. In November of 1999, they sent a letter to Eric Hazan, the director of the publishing house La Fabrique, which would later publish the Invisible Committee in France. Here’s what they wrote. “Dear Eric, You will find enclosed the new version, largely augmented and divided into sections, of Men-machines, Directions for Use. Despite its appearance, it does not behave like a book, but like a publishing virus.” It’s 1999, the internet’s prehistoric period, before social networks, before blogs, before there was even Myspace. In this prehistoric universe, the 20th century’s nineties, viruses play the starring roles, inhabiting our dreams and our nightmares, they embody a threat, of course, but also a source of liberation; they’re a bit, if you want to think of it this way, like an equivalent to today’s Dark Net. But our imaginary pertaining to the virus is also part of the history of the book, and of literature. For since the sixteenth century, since the Bible materially came to be a printed book, since the development of what historian Benedict Anderson termed Print Capitalism, we have been thinking about the book as an organism, as a healthy or “good” body. And we did this because we were scared of this organism’s other side, which we had since begun to see and to dread. A side that might line up with what Tiqqun calls viruses. Of course, in the 16th century the term virus was not yet in use, but the threat is already there. It’s the threat of what’s underground and disquieting. The fanatic Glenn Beck might even say that it’s devilish. We can already use the word virus in this context because in these early modern times, with the advent of a new technology, the organism could circulate, it could spread, and we didn’t know how to stop it because it was almost beyond all control. We needed a concept to organize all of this. Let’s name it then: It has to do with the book, but not just any book, because there are as many concepts of books as there are concepts of the world. It has to do with the modern version of the book, which is an institution as much as it is an ideology.

    It’s in this sense that we can understand the following sentence: “The book is a dead form, in so far as it was holding its reader in the same fraudulent completeness, in the same esoteric arrogance as the classic Subject in front of his peers, no less than the classic figure of ‘Man’.” The book, the subject, and Man, connected in the same network. The Tiqqun writers could say that they are referring implicitly to a text which solidified the modern imaginary of the book, in two pages that are as enlightening as, a priori, they are problematic. A heroic text, as it were. Released more than two hundred years earlier, in 1790. Kant is the author, it is called “What is a book?” and it is part of his work The Science of Right. It is a fascinating text.

    It’s not that Kant revolutionizes everything by himself; he draws from a century of shared reflection. But he condenses and crystallizes. He produces a doctrine of rights intended to put an end to the anarchic situation. Of course he does not want things to go back to the way they were before print capitalism, but he is not at all happy with the way that things are going. It’s all looking too much like the fire that Glenn Beck loves to broadcast at us. Kant’s strategy is impressive in that he disguises his doctrine of rights, wrapping it in an entirely new symbolic architecture, one on which rights will eventually depend. We could say that he produces a fiction dressed up in the attributes of the obvious. For the obvious has already been there for three centuries in Europe at the time when Kant is writing: it is the obviousness of a major technological and capitalist mutation, brought about in large part by the invention of the mechanical press. But, as the historian Roger Chartier has shown, debates that attempt to seize this obviousness are contradictory, dense and disordered. While the mutation has undoubtedly already taken place, Kant is simply intervening with his text to end a debate by proposing a unitary symbolic architecture. He thus asks two questions, which become the two parts of a single legislative text, because they are two sides of the same coin, which is print capitalism. Was ist Geld? Was ist ein Buch? What is money? What is a book? At the end of the eighteenth century, no two questions are more decisive, and they maintain their importance as we move into the beginning of the 21st century. Let’s listen to our hero, here’s what he has to say: “A book is a writing which contains a discourse addressed by someone to the public, through visible signs of speech. It is a matter of indifference to the present considerations whether it is written by a pen or imprinted by types, and on few or many pages.”

    You and I, as regrettably materialist as we are, could have responded to the same question with something simpler, something like “a book is an object,” an object that I can hold up in a television studio, for example, in order to say “This is a dangerous book.” At least we could start here, before moving on to something more complex. But that’s exactly what Kant wants to avoid, his entire project is to extract the book from its materiality, and to make it into an abstraction: “It is a matter of indifference to the present considerations whether it is written by pen or imprinted by types, and on few or many pages.” A matter of indifference, therefore, to materiality, which the text only mentions in the phrase “through visible signs of speech,” and we can all agree that that is extremely abstract; as well as an indifference to length, an indifference to action, and a dissimulation of the rupture that the introduction of printing produced; a dissimulation, therefore, of capitalism’s arrival into print. Or rather our hero feigns indifference for he has a hidden agenda: he hopes to cover the book up with another notion, that of speech (“Rede”). An idea that is so central that Kant describes the very person who employs speech, the speaker, as barely anything more than a “someone” (“jemand”). Not yet an author, that will come later, but Kant is logical, first he needs to render abstract the very idea of the author, in order to convert it into what Michel Foucault will later call a function. What is striking here is that he quickly imposes another idea, one that is essential to the creation of the concept of the author: the public.

    Here the text does something truly new, as up until this point “the public” referred to only two things: a political entity or the people in attendance at a performance. This new public organized around the book is a strange thing; it is connected to this person, the “someone,” and we still have no idea who this could be. Kant is getting to that. “He who speaks to the public in his own name is the author. He who addresses the writing to the public in the name of the author is the publisher.” Kant certainly knows how to save some of the best things for last. He said “someone” because he had a surprise in mind. “Someone” is not one but two people, both of whom assume speech: the author, but also the publisher who speaks for the author, who is in fact this text’s great conceptual innovation. Or to put it more precisely, Kant invented a symbolic triangle to stand in for the book, a triangle composed of three conceptual figures that were entirely new at the time: the author, the publisher (“Verleger”), and the public. And their relationship was also entirely new, because none of the three could exist without the others, and it is here that we see Kant’s main conceptual invention.

    It is significant, because it is an innovation that assumes a unity that stands in opposition to the proliferation of texts, of authorities, and of viruses. The author, the publisher, the public, and the book. We know that until the eighteenth century, literary works in particular were seen as miscellaneous collections that grouped several authors’ contributions together into a single object. One that we could plunder, copy, dismantle, take over. It was rare to associate one author with a text and a book. And if occasionally this did happen, either accidentally or intentionally, then it was vertiginous, like in Don Quixote where the prescience as to what a modern book would be comes from a combination of its obsessive fear, its distancing, its critique. A book was made of multiplicity; a book was a multiplicity that sometimes turned viral. But with Kant, with the move into modernity, with the move away from a caste-based society, in which the political subject is just one specimen of the larger multiplicity, and into a class-based society, in which the political subject is capable of fabricating its own destiny, it was necessary to suppress this proliferation and to impose a unity. So that multiplicity could become profitable, in the economic sense of the term. For the stakes are as much economic as they are philosophical, as it was necessary to transform the book into capitalism’s perfect object. “When a publisher does this with the permission or authority of the author, the act is in accordance with right, and he is the rightful publisher; but if this is done without such permission or authority, that is contrary to right, and the publisher is a counterfeiter or unlawful publisher. The whole of a set of copies of the original document is called an edition.” It’s easier if we read the sentence backwards. Our target is the “set of copies,” now attributable to a sole beneficiary, or more like two beneficiaries, a producer, also known as an author, and the economic agent who enhances the production’s value. We often say that Kant aimed to establish a system of literary ownership, and it’s true, as long as we do not confuse literary ownership with author’s rights. We have a tendency to be blinded by author’s rights, which conceal the rights of yet another agent, the economic agent, the editor. Who nonetheless is never just an economic actor. All of this is, in fact, derived from a certain authority, and an authorization. The economic agent is not just the intermediary in the new symbolic construction around the book, but he is also an agent of authority, because he guarantees authorization. We owe him for the magical transaction that transforms writers into authors and manuscripts into books. He authorizes, he is the author of other authors, the author of authority. Keeping in mind that authority in the context of literature is the expression of a single individuality that brings together a multiplicity. The economic agent is thus much more than we thought: he is a symbolic agent. He is the guardian of capitalism’s magical power, or of the fetishism of merchandise, if you will. And because the book is going to become capitalism’s most fetishized object, the publisher is going to become the book’s head magician.

    Do you think I’m exaggerating? Here is Kant again: “A writing is […] a discourse addressed in a particular form to the public”; “and the author may be said to speak publicly by means of his publisher. The publisher, again, speaks by the aid of the printer as his workman (operarius)” and here we need to distinguish between “means” and “aid,” where “aid” refers to the mechanical operation of what has become an entirely immaterial process, “yet not in his own name, for otherwise he would be the author, but in the name of the author; and he is only entitled to do so in virtue of a mandate given him to that effect by the author. Now the unauthorized printer and publisher speaks by an assumed authority in his publication; in the name indeed of the author, but without a mandate to that effect (gerit se mandatarium absque mandato). Consequently, such an unauthorized publication is a wrong committed upon the authorized and only lawful publisher,” and here it is, we understand it now, this “a wrong committed upon” is precisely where the danger is located because dangerous books are above all those that have committed this terrible wrong, “as it amounts to a pilfering of the profits which the latter was entitled and able to draw from the use of his proper right (furtum usus).” A wrong committed against profits, against the very nature of capitalism.

    The book is simultaneously material and immaterial; its two-sided nature is the same as that of capitalism, which invests objects with magical qualities by fetishizing them. But thanks to the idea of authority, the book occupies a position at the very top of the hierarchy of merchandise. The book constitutes a separate universe, one that is entirely distinct from action, one without an exterior, its own island of intensity. Following this text’s publication, a debate began among German philosophers who detected a flaw in Kant’s reasoning. How can you determine the owner of a speech? Could ownership be based on the ideas that a speech develops? No, the philosophers will say, ideas belong to everyone; an authorized speech is characterized only by its format. Its “format,” which means style, or the expression of an individual genius. Here we come full circle: the magical unity of this object that is already no longer an object is based on the most immaterial act of appropriation possible, that of style, of individual expression.

    *

    Now we have a better understanding of Tiqqun and the Tarnac case. We understand why it’s really a literary trial about the very nature of books, which unfolds in the middle of a period that endlessly declares its own crisis. Because a large part of the trial revolved around a question that seems, nonetheless, unfounded: Are you the authors of this book? We also have a better understanding of the irony expressed by a letter to the editor that begins like this, “Despite its appearance it does not behave like a book, but like a publishing virus.” We’re not really talking about moderates and we know it: “The book is a dead form, in so far as it was holding its reader in the same fraudulent completeness, in the same esoteric arrogance as the classic Subject in front of his peers, no less than the classic figure of ‘Man’.” The structure built on unity and completeness trembles, this structure which associates subject, man, and the individual; as Tiqqun’s authors tell us, this structure which is not classic but modern will not hold if its ultimate symbol, the book, loses its identity as a dense block, enclosed, locked, and utopic… if the book opens, instead, to propagation. What follows in the letter is no less suggestive: “The end of institution always perceives itself like the end of an illusion,” rightly characterizing the book as an imaginary institution that is nothing less than the establishing force of the imaginary. “And indeed, it is also the content of truth that causes this outdated thing to be determined a delusion, which then appears as such. So that beyond their character of ending, the great books have never ceased to be those which succeeded in creating a community; in other words, the Book has always had its existence outside of the self, an idea which was only completely accepted fairly recently.”

    And here we arrive at the center of what Glenn Beck was so worried about, these weird communities of readers who meet in order to translate The Coming Insurrection or to read it out loud in a coffee shop. These communities that might have, why not?, read the passage in The Coming Insurrection that potentially inspired the sabotage of the train lines, a passage that talks about flows of communication.[1] There are no more clear borders, and this is terrible for Glenn Beck and those like him. By the way, he talks about borders in his sermon, you know the ones, the borders that nice New York liberals want to abolish. The modern book (its enclosed nature as Tiqqun’s writers put it; this stable, institutional and closed site, as Jacques Derrida writes), was designed to be a border between an inside and an outside, between the body and the mind. Within a reality that was a parallelepiped and symbolically triangular, the book formed a world that belonged to it alone, a world that was perfectly symmetrical, where communication, which had become abstract, was a process that took place between an author and a public, with the publisher as its intermediary. According to Tiqqun’s writers, in fact, reality, this cannot hold any longer. It is not the book itself that can no longer hold, but a certain configuration of the book, one that must be reprogrammed. “You are well placed to ascertain that the end of the Book does not signify its brutal disappearance from the social circulation, but on the contrary, its absolute proliferation […] In this phase there are indeed still books, but they are only there to shelter the corrosive effects of PUBLISHING VIRUSES. The publishing virus exposes the principle of incompleteness, the fundamental insufficiency that is in the foundation of the published work. With the most explicit mentions, with the most crudely convenient indications – address, contact, etc.—it increases itself in the sense of realizing the community that it lacks, the virtual community made up of its real-life readers. It suddenly puts the reader in such a position that his withdrawal may no longer be tenable, a position where the withdrawal of the reader can no longer be neutral.” The authors of Tiqqun bring out the big word, community, to tell us something: the book was neutralized during modernity in order to found a community of citizen-consumers of representative democracy. Tiqqun wants to detach the book from this neutralization, to rediscover the savagery characteristic of the end of the eighteenth century.

    *

    And they succeed in doing this, even before they launch their ships full of explosives, their lead bricks aimed at literature’s soft parts, I mean their three books, The Coming Insurrection, To Our Friends, and Now. In the end maybe Glenn Beck does have the kind of understanding that strikes in dazzling and temporary intuitions. But as he hadn’t read the book yet when he did his broadcast, he couldn’t possibly have known that one of the book’s most scandalous possibilities is the association of the ideal identifier of a literary style, which is to say the idealized expression of a coherent unit, with an imaginary and collective authorship. As if from now on community were possible. This is what makes The Coming Insurrection a dangerous book.

    But it wasn’t so visible, when this savagery, this malfunctioning of the modern book, its absolute proliferation became more and more obvious near the beginning of the twenty-first century, as though it was a question of an increasingly natural environment in which we were evolving. Something in the spread of texts and data changed. Like at the end of our hero’s eighteenth century, remember when anarchy reigned, they published anything and everything, translated hastily, borrowed and copied: books become dangerous, they are real viruses that contaminate the sick bodies of traditional monarchies. Books emerge from the body of books, reach public spaces, digital environments, panic-stricken minds.

    I don’t know what you’ll think about this but I recently read a statistic which I found far-fetched but also extremely significant. There may be more people who have published something in the twenty years surrounding the new millennium than there have been people published in the entire history of humanity. The fantasmatic bubble of the modern book, that which we owe to Kant, has burst. But, needless to say, the book has survived as it has for the past three thousand years. And it will continue to. In this new millennium, it is less autotelic, it is being reconfigured outside of itself, it is spreading, it is coming back to what it is, a temporary capturing of data, of memories, of imaginaries, of fictions, open to all possible uses. A capturing, a treatment, a production of flows, in a world that is no longer what it was, and that hardly disguises itself in different clothes, state, nation, democracy, but not what brings us together, from European post-democracies to illiberal democracies, from authoritarian regimes to populist democracies, this is what the Invisible Committee stated in To Our Friends, their second book, that used a slogan from the movement against CPE, a proposed liberalization of labor laws targeting young people in 2006: “It’s through flows that this world is maintained. Block everything!” It’s so beautiful that it is hard to believe, especially when we remember the passage from The Coming Insurrection that set off the so-called “Tarnac” case.

    Reread the footnote from before: “The technical infrastructure of the metropolis is vulnerable”… The police state wasn’t mistaken when it isolated this passage of the book to get its operations off the ground. The Invisible Committee took hold of the message and shifted the heart of its political analysis from the question of insurrection to the question of flows. “Power is Logistic, Block Everything!” is the title of one chapter in To Our Friends, but this idea comes back all the time, for example here: “There is no world government; what there is instead is a worldwide network of local apparatuses of government, that is, a global, reticular, counterinsurgency machinery.” From one book to another, our political gaze is shifted from the question of democracy to the question of what literary theorist Yves Citton calls mediocracy. Mediocracy or taking over the power of flows, their orientation, their management. Democracies are perhaps nothing more than stories told by mediocracies and fictions are perhaps nothing more than the production of flows. Mediocracy and mythocracy are predicated on each other. And let’s say it, this thing isn’t even new, which doesn’t make it any less interesting. Whenever the Invisible Committee brings up contemporary metropoles, one could just as easily go back 5000 years to when the first cities came into existence, and with them the first writings, and the first totalizing fictions (religions, economies, politics, arts) because the urban world is by nature mediocracy, management of flows, of data, externalization of a memory, quantification, and fictionalization of exchanges in order to produce ties and to maintain order. The whole paradox of literature is that it uses these same tools, that it is exactly pharmakon, poison and antidote. Literary history doesn’t stop telling it to us, telling this story of literary fiction that can save us from fictions of power, but that functions with the same data. One finds it in One Thousand and One Nights, in The Decameron, in Don Quixote. Each one of these works brings to mind a particular moment of mediocracy in which literary fictions are presented as counterfictions. But how do things stand when the mass of flows, of data, is no longer the means by which regimes function but the very heart of governance? How do things stand when media and fiction are developed to such a point that there no longer seem to be any exteriorities?

    What happened next proved it. We have found nothing better for this than books, or rather than literature, whether it appears in the guise of books, of publishing viruses or mutant ancient matter. We have found nothing better than counterfictions because, across from them, fiction reigns, whether it feeds itself with the flows of high-speed trains, notes from intelligence agencies or news broadcasts. The so-called “Tarnac” case states code names like hardboiled fiction titles, far-left, anarcho-autonomists, terrorists, interior enemies, these code names soon become government techniques. They invade news broadcasts, mainstream press and bewitch it. But across from them, the look-outs are watching closely. This time, they are called Tiqqun or the Invisible Committee, and their fiction is no less effective. They begin by interrupting flows, then they state their counterfiction, they say that the insurrection is coming, that they are countless and that they do not take the form of a body, but of a virus. Poison versus virus, that’s the equation that is the basis for literary fiction and that justifies it. Power is panic-stricken and reacts violently because nothing terrifies it more than publishing viruses that are opposed to the poison that it instills. Nothing makes it panic more than this multiplicity. In ten years, the look-outs have let go of nothing, in one thousand and one nights of instruction they will have made the fiction of these contemporary Shâriyâr visible and will have made fools of them.

    That’s where we were. At the beginning of the twenty-first century, the flows were out of control and it was up to us to invest the dangerousness of books and of literary fictions, at times to stop them and to capture them, at times to spread them. To have stated that, and stated it in a book, is what sent nine young people to prison, without any valid motive.

    _____

    Lionel Ruffel is the author of Brouhaha: Worlds of the Contemporary (Trans. Raymond MacKenzie. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2018).

    Notes

    [1] “The technical infrastructure of the metropolis is vulnerable. Its flows amount to more than the transportation of people and commodities. Information and energy circulates via wire networks, fibers and channels, and these can be attacked. Nowadays sabotaging the social machine with any real effect involves reappropriating and reinventing the ways of interrupting its networks. How can a TGV line or an electrical network be rendered useless? How does one find the weak points in computer networks, or scramble radio waves and fill screens with white noise?”