Author: boundary2

  • Jorge Amar & Scott Ferguson—Power, Corruption & Lies: A Left View of the Upcoming Spanish Election

    Jorge Amar & Scott Ferguson—Power, Corruption & Lies: A Left View of the Upcoming Spanish Election

    By Jorge Amar & Scott Ferguson

    In a few weeks a general election will be held in Spain. The optimistic verdict of the Spanish mass media concerning the economy is clear: the Spanish economy is purportedly a paradigm of recovery and macroeconomic management that should serve as a model for other member countries of the Eurozone. If this is genuinely the case, however, then why is the Spanish miracle not providing any discernible hope for Spaniards? In surveys carried out by the reputable Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas, 60.6 % of Spaniards identify unemployment as their greatest concern and for the most part perceive the economic situation as bad (35.7%) or very bad (14.9%). The answer is that most households have not shared in the “recovery.”

    Touting record growth, analysts both domestic and international have joined in chorus celebrating the success of the so-called “German Model” in Spain. This counter-intuitive and frankly suicidal approach to economic crisis recommends forcing further deflation via government cutbacks. The idea is to induce an internal devaluation of Spain’s economy relative its Eurozone partners, thereby rendering Spanish exports more “competitive” abroad. In other words, millions suffer and generations are lost, while neoliberals insist the only way up is paradoxically down.

    Spain’s apparent recovery is mostly an illusion built up from stylized facts. In truth, the acclaimed surplus in the current account balance has been the result of a deleterious free fall in imports and steady expansion of low-value added exports such as food, fuel and intermediate goods. So while aggregate demand has risen and the current account balance looks to be in surplus relative to its previous position, Spain’s productive capacity continues to atrophy as it replaces high- with low-skill jobs and ship materials outside the country.

    The perverse effects of this process have been registered by the National Statistics Institute’s Employer Confidence Index, showing that for the first time since 2017 more firms expect business to worsen than improve. They have appeared in Spain’s Industrial Production Index, which began downgrading the development of country’s industrial capabilities beginning at the end on 2018. And they are most evident in the balance sheets of Spanish firms and households,  which are now deeply and unsustainable in the red.

    Meanwhile, Spain’s alleged economic rebound has only normalized unemployment and poverty, as workers continuously lose ground in their share of national income to the owners of capital. “If the distribution that existed before the outbreak of the crisis had been maintained,” writes Javier G. Jorrín, “labour incomes would have to increase by 32.6 billion euros and Gross Operating Surplus (GOS) would have to be reduced by 8.1 billion. In short, a transfer of 40,000 million from capital to wages.Neither the number of employed nor total wages have recovered from the crisis. As Jorrín also notes, “Spain currently has the same total wages (at current prices) as in 2008 with 780,000 fewer wage earners.” What is more, Spain remains the nation with the second highest unemployment rate in the EU, surpassed only by Greece.

    It is unsurprising that high unemployment and uneven income distribution has been accompanied by a drastic increase in wealth inequality in Spain. This amounts to, on the one hand, an increase in the number of rich and ultra-rich from 144,600 in 2012 to 224,200 in 2017. Despite the economy’s precipitous fall during the first years of the global financial crisis, the Spanish 1% would come to  possess 25% of the country’s wealth by 2017. On the other hand, poverty and social exclusion are spreading. As Isabel García reports, nearly one in three children under 16 years of age (31%) with 10.8% living in severe poverty. 13.1% of the Spanish population retired between 2014 and 2018. And 14.1% of the employed now risk falling below the poverty line.

    At the same time, both centrist Social Democrats (PSOE) and right-wing PP in the Spanish government have approved debilitating austerity measures (euphemistically called “reforms”) that have strengthened capital in its struggle for national income. Spain’s social expenditure gap in comparison to other European economies has not been reduced at all. Totalling 16.8% of GDP, social expenditure in Spain is still significantly lower than the European Union average of 19.1%, with France spending 24.4% and Portugal 18% of GDP. The results of have been disastrous. Labor and capital battle over unpaid overtime, which today constitutes around 46% of overtime worked. And Spaniards continue to lose confidence in the major labor unions, which have all too readily conceded to the government’s austerity measures.

    Far from improving the Spanish economy, the growth strategy pursued by the PP and PSOE governments has exacerbated systemic problems, making life ever more difficult for the poor. Principally, the government’s strategy has been to stoke property bubbles and expand rental markets rather than spending directly on communities and delivering jobs to the unemployed. Such inflationary spending has reduced individual savings to a record low, mirroring the dangerous savings levels Spain saw on the eve of the financial crisis.

    The latest real estate bubble arose in two stages. First, the Zapatero Social Democrat government legalized real estate investment trusts (REITs). Next, the Popular Party created tax incentives and expedited the sale of public property, housing, and companies to vulture funds. (This includes properties held by the “bad bank” created by the Spanish government in the aftermath of the financial crisis, when it relieved the four nationalized Spanish financial institutions of their toxic assets.) As a consequence, Spain has seen an explosion in speculative real estate investments and now ranks second in the world in real estate investment trusts. Spanish cities are pushing out the poor to make room for the wealthy. In the words of Manuel Gabarre and Sonia Martínez, city centers are being “reduced to renting flats to tourists and housing ‘expatriates’, people coming from other countries with highly paid jobs and who can pay a rent that the normal Spanish citizen cannot afford.” And newly privatized public companies have also ended up in the hands of vulture funds. From the airport manager (AENA) to the railway service (RENFE ADIF), the government is abandoning public infrastructures and responsibilities and, instead, delivering enormous sources of income to the private sector.

    Should election forecasts prove correct and the PSOE maintains its grip on power, the PSOE government’s disastrous neoliberal policies will likely be carried out in full support of both Brussels and the major political parties on the right. A PSOE government will not lack allies in the Spanish parliament to pass neoliberal economic policy dictated from Brussels. Such parties include the PP, and the liberal “Ciudadanos” who, on economic matters, are typically allied with the Social Democrats in votes in the European Parliament. But could also include “Vox,” the party of the Spanish ultra-right.

    That said, resistance does persist, and especially in the embattled region of Catalonia. It is striking, for example, that left-wing parties in Catalonia did not support the PSOE’s 2018 draft budget and have since received increased support in the polls. At present, the Catalonian party known as “Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya” (ERC) is predicted to expand its 9 current deputies to around 14 or 15. The Spanish central government has officially lifted its former suspension of the regional government’s powers, but the Catalonian government nevertheless remains inactive. If Catalonian authorities manage to hold autonomous elections, however, ERC representatives could go from 32 currently to between 40 and 43.

    Still, the only ERC candidates who remain fully committed to the wishes of the Catalan voters are Oriol Junqueras (currently in prison) and Marta Rovira (exiled in Switzerland). They are also joined by Carles Riera i Albert, candidate for Catalonia’s anti-capitalist and pro-independence left-wing party CUP. Should they win in an autonomous election, anti-neoliberal representation would go from 4 to 8 deputies in the autonomous regions of Catalonia. Although this would not include representation in the Spanish Parliament, the Cortes Generales.

    The fracture in Spain’s disappointing leftist party, Podemos, is becoming most clear in Madrid’s local and regional elections, which are set to take place after the general election. Most indicative of this breakdown is the fact that Podemos’s celebrity campaign manager, Iñigo Errejón, has decided not to represent the party in Madrid’s upcoming gubernatorial election. Breaking with Podemos, Errejón is running as an independent on a business-friendly “Más Madrid” platform. Errejón’s campaign seems to hinge primarily on Errejón personal celebrity.

    Moreover, Errejón is now joining forces with the openly left, but tacitly neoliberal mayor of Madrid, Manuela Carmena, who is presently seeking re-election. As a retired judge and former member of PSOE-associated think tank “Fundación Alternativas,” mayor Carmena has long spoken the language of the left. In her 2015 “Ahora Madrid” (“Now Madrid”) campaign, for instance, she promised to build a meager 4,000 new public housing units and to make Madrid an asylum city for mostly African immigrant street vendors who have been intimidated by the city’s police and high-end retailers. During her first term, however, Carmena has built fewer than 1,000 public housing units. She has betrayed Madrid’s struggling street vendors by using city funds for a public relations campaign that instructs consumers to avoid buying their goods. And she facilitated the sale of 1.27 million square meters of land owned the public railway company to property speculators and did so in brash defiance of social opposition movements, including the municipal group of her “Now Madrid” project.

    Later commenting to Le Figaro on her failed promises, Carmena has characterized her platform as merely a “set of suggestions,” while dismissing the leftist politics she has courted as “inflexible.” With Errejón at her side, Carmena now speaks in managerial and technocratic terms about forming a “government of the best talents.” Thus far, however, such team-building has mostly translated into the firing of Carlos Sánchez Mato, a top leftist economist for the city government.

    Podemos party leaders are now expressly distancing themselves from Errejón on account of his shift toward Carmena’s centrism. However, it is important to remember that Carmena first rose to power with the express support of Podemos and Izquierda Unida, suggesting that Podemos’s current identity crisis is hardly new.

    A major wildcard in the upcoming election is the scandal involving high-stakes government corruption and Watergate-style criminality. Essentially, the PP utilized a corrupt faction of the national police to spy on Unidos Podemos and fabricate documents which, among other things, implied that the Podemos-associated CEPS Foundation had received $7.1 million euros in support from Hugo Chavez’s Venezuelan government. What is more, the PP has leaked to alt-right media sensitive personal information about Pablo Iglesias obtained illegally from a stolen cell phone belonging to a key aid of the Podemos leader. Podemos has repeatedly attempted to subpoena the high-ranking officer at the center of the plot as news of the scandal has come to light. In turn, the PP, PSOE, and centrist Ciudadanos parties have consistently blocked all such subpoenas. Yet recently, the ruling PSOE party was rocked by further scandal when presidential press secretary, Alberto Pozas, stepped down in response to espionage charges, linking him directly to the leakage of the cell phone information. The question now is whether last-minute developments or revelations in this developing story will introduce any surprises in the forthcoming election.

    Barring such a surprise, the anticipated results of the election are not likely to change the neoliberal policies that have shaped Spain over the past 30 years. Tragically, the 2019 General Election will almost certainly deliver a significant blow to the spirit of “15M,” the anti-austerity protest movement that began in March 2011 and defined a generation of Spanish political resistance. But all hope is not lost. Across Spain there are pensioners, tenants, feminists, students and numerous collectives of workers such as taxi drivers, researchers, and hotel cleaners, who continue to resist the neoliberal order and demand social justice in the streets.

    Looking ahead, the most crucial political contest for the Spanish left concerns the uncertain fate of the Euro currency zone and its fiscal straightjacket or “golden rule.” In the short term, Spain caught the tailwind of European Central Bank´s (ECB) bond purchase program, while benefiting from the ECB’s de facto suspension of its punishing golden rule for the PP government. For these reasons, the PP government’s discretionary fiscal deficit slightly rose and real GDP growth minimally returned by the end of 2018. Yet Spain is now the last remaining country enjoy the ECB’s soon-to-be defunct “excessive deficit procedure.” When the new government forms after the election, Spain is set to begin a new era of fiscal consolidation, which will not only curtail public deficits, but also dissolve the mirage of the Spanish miracle.

    For the foreseeable future, then, any Spanish left worthy of the name should do what every European leftist movement must do: overturn the Eurozone’s spiral of austerity, reclaim the public purse, and revive the European community in a far more just and sustainable fashion.

    ——————————————————————————————————

    Jorge Amar is a Research Scholar at the Global Institute for Sustainable Prosperity and the president, and founding member of, the Full Employment and Price Stability Association (APEEP) in Spain. Amar holds a University degree in economics from the University of Valencia and is presently a doctoral candidate in Applied Economics at the Universidad Valencia. He has also edited and participated in several Spanish translations of Modern Monetary Theory texts, including Warren Mosler’s Seven Deadly Innocent Frauds and Bill Mitchell’s Eurozone Dystopia.

    Scott Ferguson is Associate Professor of Film & Media Studies in the Department of Humanities & Cultural Studies at the University of South Florida. His book Declarations of Dependence: Money, Aesthetics, and the Politics of Care was published by University of Nebraska Press in 2018. Professor Ferguson is also a Research Scholar for the Global Institute for Sustainable Prosperity, co-director of the Modern Money Network Humanities Division, and co-host of the Money on the Left podcast.

  • Dominic Pettman — The Species Without Qualities: Critical Media Theory and the Posthumanities

    Dominic Pettman — The Species Without Qualities: Critical Media Theory and the Posthumanities

    By Dominic Pettman

    This article has been peer-reviewed by the b2o editorial board.

     At what point can we confidently say that an emerging field, or nexus of fields, has “arrived” into the academy? When there are conferences dedicated to it? When there are book series bearing the name, backed by university presses? When there are job descriptions that mention it? When there are actual degrees offered in it, as opposed to occasional classes, splashed across departments? Or when some other criteria or metric invented by institutional historians or pragmatic administrators has been satisfied? Some humanities disciplines appear to be etched forever on Mount Olympus – history, literature, philosophy (even as some departments bearing these names are being closed, absorbed, or otherwise threatened with obsolescence). When we take the long view, fields and disciplines coalesce, crystallize, evolve, calcify, and crumble. Consider how “rhetoric” is no longer a monolithic institutionalized discourse unto itself, and yet the dust of its unceremonious toppling can be found in the offices and lecture halls of so many different fields. In contrast, “cinema studies,” for instance, has been taught for nearly a century, and yet continues to fight for its own legitimacy in certain ivory halls. (“Gender Studies” has a similar fugitive relationship to the academy, sometimes being dissolved into different departments and programs, even as it enjoys a “critical mass” of student interest and faculty commitment. As do so many others.) Taken as a whole, “the humanities” have been under siege for several decades now, and something else seems to be emerging from the glowing ashes, something we might loosely label the “posthumanities.”[i] Whether this new formation will be just another field folded within the humanities, or whether it augurs the end, and subsequent renewal, of an entire tradition, remains to be seen. It is an interesting moment, however, for the arrival of the posthumanities, given that there is not yet a degree or department in this field, but a vital hive of courses, programs, conferences, and publications creating and inhabiting this new terrain.

    This arrival has been a long time coming, to be sure; staggered, inconsistent, and unevenly distributed. Some might date a posthumanities orientation as beginning with Kant, and his rather tentative, equivocal anthropology. Others with the challenges to our sense of self-mastery and world dominion offered by La Mettrie, Nietzsche, Darwin, or Freud. And still others might pinpoint the decisive moment as recently as the usherings of Donna Haraway, N. Kathryn Hayles, Bruno Latour, Friedrich Kittler, and Karen Barad, with their expansion of the humanist frame to include cyborgs, animals, ghosts, objects, and subatomic particles. But however, and whenever, we choose to fix the date of induction, the posthumanities represent an unprecedented re-orientation of knowledge – and constellation of new practices – that promise to make an enormous contribution to the ongoing enterprise of self-understanding writ large. (Whereby self-understanding is the essential foundation for navigating alterity, in all its most telling or pressing forms.) More specifically, the posthumanities pay special attention to our relationship to relationships; including and especially the relationship to our tools (which themselves are conscientiously helping to reveal new relationships, as well as often rendering older relationships – say, with viruses or carbon – in a new light).

    Knowledge is a transductive process, much as we have repressed this fact over the past few centuries. It is not a package passed from person to person, but a system which produces the nodes in the network – you and I – through the very process of circulation. (Or “sharing,” in today’s terminology.) Just as Nietzsche believed that our writing tools are at work, influencing our thoughts, the posthumanities – here considered a singular assemblage – is alert to the active role that technology and media play in structuring, presenting, and representing our thoughts to ourselves and each other. In doing so, this endeavor is involved in a type of media studies that is both expansive and intensive, potentially leading into every nook and corner of human investigation and exploration. The question of media (for instance, “how do different technologies determine or influence human habits in certain ways?”) evolves and expands to become more the question of mediation itself (such as, “how are human habits enframed by apparatuses of all kinds, both material and not?”). What we know, and how we know it, is now framed within a productively destabilizing ontology. We can no longer presume who the “we” is that manifests the privileged place of knowing. (Even if such certainty was rarely as certain as it seems, on closer inspection.) By opening up the “we” to alien, prosthetic elements, right from the origin of our own species-being, the posthumanities allows a more capacious – and arguably more accurate – understanding of world history, and the subjects of its jagged trajectories.

    In simpler terms, if the posthuman is the name we give to the recognition that the human has always been an inherently technical creature, then the posthumanities registers the fact that we are not so much the rational animal, as the mediated animal. Everything we do, think, and communicate is always already mediated. Hence the new global interest in media studies, as something that goes far beyond the analysis of the structures and contents of communications and entertainment industries, to the very heart of our own, semiotically saturated, being.

    The humanities today are a cluster of disciplines, approaches, sensibilities, values, questions, techniques, and conceptual lenses, designed to help us navigate the perplexing business of being human in a modern world (that is, a world that will be significantly different when we leave it, than when we are born into it; in contrast to our pre-modern ancestors). The humanities might thus be considered a discursive engine for producing interpretation, critique, and the ongoing evaluation of values.[ii] Reading the past – which does not mean only reading texts in the Archive, but also objects and artificial fossils of all kinds – is a necessary condition for orienting ourselves in time and space: a capacity that some critics (notably Bernard Stiegler) believe that we are swiftly losing; becoming existentially disoriented, and unable to sustain or contribute to the trans-generational human project. The humanities have built their reputation and authority on their ability to act as not just a moral compass for our kind, but an aesthetic astrolabe and ethical protractor. By paying close attention to language, and other semiotic systems, which allow the encoding and decoding of experience, and subsequent life-lessons, the humanities are engaged with both the transfer and production of knowledge across epochs. They are concerned with not just interpreting and understanding the “transgenerational loops” that make up one’s identity, direction, and purpose, but actively maintaining them, while also forging new ones, according to new desires, imperatives, contexts, and goals.

    Some would thus contend, myself included, that the humanities (again, speaking in the singular) has been engaged in “media studies” since its inception, avant la lettre. (Consider John Ruskin and Lewis Mumford on architecture, or even Leonardo da Vinci on the virtual technics of war.) On the other hand, one could also conduct a “media studies” style revisionist history of the humanities themselves: pointing to the technologies, organs, and innovations that allowed this novel abstract entity to coalesce and then continue within its own globalizing conatus (writing materials, pedagogic architectures, libraries, sailing ships, colonial communication channels, etc.).

    Media Studies

    Media Studies, as a quasi-discipline in the university (speaking in the North American context) emerged out of the broadcast-based soil of Communications Departments, the post-war discourse of cybernetics, the emphasis on formal structures in the work of the Toronto School, the rise and rise of cinema studies, as well as McLuhan’s meta-literary insistence on technological ecologies.

    “Media studies” is currently one of the most capacious interdisciplinary spaces in the academy, which is why it attracts so many refugees from scholars who feel cramped by their own parent discipline. As with English departments in the 1980s and 1990s, before many lifted the drawbridge in the new millennium, Media Studies departments tend to house a diverse group of thinkers and makers – from journalists, to filmmakers and videographers, to podcasters to sound studies scholars, to cinephiles, theorists, designers, analysts, fetishists, feminists, activists, fans, and a new strain of archaeologists. This is its strength, and its potential weakness. The rise of the “studies” model – as with Cultural Studies, Gender Studies, Food Studies, etc. – exhibits a growing interest in clustering work around an object of study, rather than a specific approach or methodology. This can lead to very exciting, paradigm-shifting work. But it can also result in a Babel of different agendas and registers, which often only coalesce in the eyes of administrators or in wishful phantom student demographics, rather than according to any specific internal logic or organizing principle. This collective – and only partially coherent – endeavor, it is true, threatens to fall apart. (Especially as the other, more established and traditional disciplines wake up to the importance of media to their own legacy and mission, and begin to annex parts of the former domain of Media Studies, sometimes reinventing the wheel in the process.) But in the meantime, the effort to keep this big tent upright has produced some vital ideas and exciting subfields. The very fact that we are obliged to repeatedly ask, “what is Media Studies?” bodes well for the increasing understanding of its object (or rather many objects . . . and vectors), since this is an ongoing, generative question. (And in this sense, McLuhan’s famous title, “Understanding Media,” was as much an asymptotic challenge, as a simple description of his project.)

    Indeed, in an age of fake news, meme farms, bitcoin, smart-phones, and tweeting presidents, the other disciplines can no longer ignore the importance of media. They can no longer pretend that it has only a prosthetic relationship to human concerns, but is rather constitutive of them. (Something media scholars have always been aware of.) I might hasten to add, however, that when we take the long view, this new disciplinary interest in technics makes perfect sense, given that media studies has itself incorporated concepts and methods from disciplines which preceded it. I’m thinking here of historians like Joseph Needham, Fernand Braudel, and Wolfgang Schivelbusch; anthropologists like Gregory Bateson and André Leroi-Gourhan, sociologists like Manuel Castells and Jean Baudrillard, political scientists like Langdon Winner, and philosophers, such as Martin Heidegger, Gilbert Simondon, Gilles Deleuze. (Not to forget Plato, of course, whose famous cave is still de rigeur for week one of any Introduction to Media Studies course.) It is also necessary to remember that much contemporary media studies also leans heavily on the Frankfurt School, French poststructuralists, and the Birmingham Cultural Studies school.

    In short, Media Studies is at a very interesting cross-roads, given that we can no longer assume we all agree, or even instinctively know, what counts as “media.” Everything can be considered an enabler of mediation (even objects or phenomena that seem to stubbornly refuse or even discourage communication; such as black boxes or censorship regimes). I myself have written about love as a technology, and taught a course on food as a cultural medium. The challenge is thus to find and nurture the solar principle, or principles, around which our common questions and concerns can revolve.

    What is the difference between media studies and the philosophy of technology? Or an anthropology of communication? Or a material history infrastructures? All of these approaches have something significant to contribute to the study of media. But then what makes media studies distinctive? The difference, I would venture, is that media studies begins with the object, or the vector. It begins with the in-between; the interface; the threshold. Nothing is taken for granted, when it comes to considering communication or “impact.” Indeed, the arguments offered by the traditional humanities and social sciences do indeed look very different when we zoom in on the material arrangements that underpin great social changes or cultural shifts. (McLuhan on the epochal shift afforded by the horse-stirrup-knight-lance assemblage is a classic example here.)[iii]

    Hence the new interest in “media archaeology” and what Siegfried Zielinski calls “the deep time of the media.”[iv] The pre-Columbian quipu of the Inca – a collection of fibrous and colorful knots – in hindsight, appear to be precursors to databases or indexes. And for a popular media historian, like Tom Standage, the telegraph can be called the Victorian Internet (just as it becomes possible to tell the tale of so-called “social media” over three millennia).[v] Indeed, history looks very different when we view it from the point of view of the technologies that enabled it. (I’m thinking of Manuel de Landa’s “robot historian,” who narrates the evolution of war from the perspective of different types of weapon, rather than the people they killed.)[vi] As this example suggests, there is a danger of evacuating, or at marginalizing, humans, when we focus on media. I would argue, however, that this kind of decentering is crucial if we are to in fact relocate the human in a more measured, ethical – and, dare I say, even cosmically accurate – way.

    This brings us back to the posthumanities; in which the “post” is not merely a chronological fact of coming afterwards, but a kind of ruptured continuity, mutated legacy, or even instructive haunting. As with postcolonialism, postmodernism, or the posthuman, we can never get fully “past the post,” as it were. The key term continues by its very presence, as something supposedly transcended or left behind, but persisting nevertheless, leaving its traces; continuing to inform and permeate the present and the future. The claim here is that the posthumanities, far from rendering the traditional humanities obsolete, reinvents them, giving them a new lease on life.

    Critical Media Theory

    One avatar of the posthumanities is that young branch of media studies known as “critical media theory,” of which I consider my own work just one example. Critical Media Theory relies heavily on the legacy, methods, and ethical spirit of the humanities; but does so with a keen (and rather urgent) sense of its short-comings and blind-spots, in the age of the anthropocene.

    Critical Media Theory complicates McLuhan’s definition of media as “the extensions of man,” just as McLuhan himself, at times, recognized man may be extensions of media. (As when he impishly suggested that human beings could be considered “the sex organs of the machine world.”)[vii] Media is thus posited as ubiquitous, atmospheric, perhaps even elemental. From this perspective, the media is not just newspapers and televisions and cell-phones, but perhaps even the environment itself (as John Durham Peters, Jussi Parikka, and Shannon Mattern have argued).[viii] This approach renders the nature/culture divide moot, as we begin to see the use of organic media in the natural world (for instance, cetaceans using sonic communication, or cuttlefish signaling to each other through the phasing of colors, and so on). Critical media theory thus dovetails in some interesting ways with the new interest in “environmental humanities,” as the natural sciences open up new doors, and indeed vast new territories, for the study of media. (Hence the uptick in interest in the work of Estonian biologist Jakob von Uexkull, who emphasized – and even tried to represent – the different perceptive environments, or umwelten, of different species.)[ix]

    Again, the question concerning media shifts from being one primarily about epistemology (“what we know, and how we know it?”), to one principally about ontology (“what is this thing that thinks it knows, and on what basis does it make this assumption?”). Critical Media Theory explicitly acknowledges the difficulty that media studies has had recognizing its proper object from within itself (and thus actively seeks perspectives from other intellectual umwelten, such as systems theory, biology, art history, process philosophy, science and technology studies, etc.). It is also less concerned with issues of representation (or ideology), than the scaffolding which allows ideological effects to circulate at scales and speeds previously unconsidered. (Think of flash-trading, CRISPR gene technologies, 3D printing, or high speed algorithms.) At one time, literary theory, for instance, felt it had a strong handle on “media” as a fledgling discipline, because of its own profound grasp of the mechanics of narrative. But this is no use when it comes to the examples I just mentioned. And even in the mid-twentieth century, in the case of cinema, attention to narrative does not account for the subtle but real differences between, say, Technicolor and Color-by-Deluxe.[x] Critical Media Theory thus aims to be both hyper-timely (keeping up with cutting-edge innovations, like block-chain or biotech), and also deliberately untimely (in appreciating the longer and larger context from which all innovations emerge and are received).

    Indeed, new media always emerge from, and are encountered within, a cultural milieu or matrix. For me, cultural studies and media studies are a mobius strip, tracing the often seamless distinctions between form and content, infrastructure and ideology. The wager of Critical Media Theory is that by asking more fundamental, theoretical questions – as well as forging unexpected new ones – it is possible to more directly and usefully engage with the unstable and unpredictable landscape of media.

    We should therefore never assume we really know, in a positivist sense, what technology is, or what our relationship to it is (as if these are static or timeless). Indeed, some of the most provocative and arresting work being done in this area suggests that the human body is itself an exquisite form of immanent prosthetic technics. (I’m thinking especially of the work of David Wills, who is associated with the school of “originary technicity.”)[xi]

    Which brings us back, once again, to the posthumanities.

    The Posthumanities

    Forced into a nutshell, the posthumanities describe the humanities after the human. As mentioned already, however, this does not mean that we simply do away with the human, as if we could, even if we wanted to. Rather, it obliges us to reconsider the project of the humanities after the human has become a problem twice condensed. (According to the logic in which the humanities were always concerned with delineating the ambiguities of our species-being.) The difference in this case is that rather than exploring the enigma of ourselves from a solid, anthropocentric perch – with a goal of enlightenment, self-understanding, actualization, cosmopolitan concord, and secular salvation – the posthumanities revisits the human scene with a great diversity of perspectives, intentions, and agendas; as well as with new de- and re-constructive instincts.

    One critique of “the posthuman turn” is that it allegedly moves the critical and political goal-posts at a crucial moment in the ongoing battle for social justice. The struggle to be recognized as fully human, by those subjectivities deemed historically not-quite, are now – in a fashionable twist of circumstance, authorized by the most enfranchised – revealed to be naïve, misguided, or moot. While it is true that a certain (white, masculinist) strain of posthuman thought exists – one that reeks of the Promethean (with social-Darwinist resonances), usually operating under the name of “transhumanism” – this is primarily a preemptive reflex against the ascendent deconstruction or critique of humanist chauvinism. Transhumanism, or macho posthumanism, attempts to augment or fortify the imagined community of the human, in a kind of engineered identity panic. It is thus a far cry from the kind of anti-foundational project of radical co-belonging that I am trying to trace here. Questioning the category of inclusion (“the human”) is, ultimately, a more effective political project than trying to measure up to rigged (racist, sexist) criteria. Moreover, it abolishes the power-position of prime arbiter, judge, or taxonomist. One can decide for oneself what forms of being and belonging are most important, as well as owning and defining the terms of one’s own becoming (as we see in cultural movements like queer negativity, afrofuturism, or afropessimism).[xii] Indeed, posthumanities opens the halls and meeting rooms of the academy to those figures previously deemed “bad subjects”: women, the non-white, the indigenous, the poor, the queer, the differently abled (both physically and cognitively), the aesthetically inclined, the affectively attuned, the non-human, the cybernetic, and even the essentially electronic. The posthumanities is thus emphatically not just about expanding the possible topics on which a scholar might turn their attention, but expanding the frame to allow many different types of intellect contribute to the conversation, ask new questions, bring new experiences, new bibliographies, as well as new tools, perspectives, methods, and motivations. Man cedes the stage to the multitude. The anthropos, to the anthropotechnical milieu.

    But if the human is no longer the substrate or goal of the humanities, what might it be? How might we refigure our sense of shared species-being, far beyond the narrow, ethnocentric, phallic, logocentric template that clings on to this day? (Questions now associated with the remarkable work of Sylvia Wynter.)[xiii] Indeed, we may consider the human to be “the species without qualities”: a creature with no clear defining feature, other than its deep need to find a stable definition and raison d’etre for itself. Bernard Stiegler calls this state of originary lack, at the core of our own sense of self and purpose, “the default of being.”[xiv] He argues that the human is posthuman from the very beginning, and not a recent historical development, since we started using tools from our origins as prosthetic means to compensate for that which we lacked. (Freud would come to call us, with a heavy dose or irony, “prosthetic gods,” on account of this paradoxical Promethean promise and dependence.) As such, the human is a kind of negative space, on which we project our own fantasies of essence (rather than the messy business of provisional and local becoming). Giorgio Agamben notes that Linnaeus himself, the father of taxonomy, could not muster up any positive attribute of the human to distinguish itself from the other hominids, other than its ability to point at itself, and give itself a name.[xv] (The shadow of Eden thus looms long over the scientific method.) Agamben called our attempts to use logic and discourse to give ourselves unique qualities “the anthropological machine,” a cultural device for sorting the human from the non-human according to redundant criteria. (Or better yet, for producing the human from extra-human or infra-human materials.) We could thus conceive of “humanity” in similar terms to the nation-state, as an “imagined community” or “consensual hallucination.” (I have elsewhere argued that human exceptionalism is akin to American exceptionalism. Certainly, there is no denying that this country is different and unique. But whether that is something to celebrate or emulate? Well . . .)

    In any case, the posthumanities embraces these shaky foundations, rather than try to repress or deny them. It considers the ongoing identity crisis called “humanity” – what I called “human error,” the erroneous assumption that we are, simply and self-evidently human – into an opportunity. [xvi] As John Gray notes, there is no such thing as “humanity,” only humans.[xvii] And as Peter Sloterdijk insists, a person who grows up in front of a computer is different to someone with a book.[xviii] (A reality that we teachers are obliged to confront every day, as our students seem to represent not so much a generation gap, as an interspecies divide, thanks to the cognitive monopoly of smartphones.) If the humanities were largely preoccupied with the question, “Why is the human?,” the posthumanities asks, “Where is the human? How is the human? When is, or was, the human?”[xix]

    Two names in particular deserve mention, as helping to establish and promote the practice and ethos of the posthumanities: Cary Wolfe and Rosi Braidotti. Cary Wolfe edits an influential series with this name, and dedicated to this idea.[xx] And the working assumption here, to quote the publisher’s website, is that, “traditional humanism is no longer adequate to understand the human’s entangled, complex relations with animals, the environment, and technology.”[xxi] The posthumanities is thus animated, and held together, by the tension between a conception of the posthuman as primarily historical, on the one hand, and philosophical, on the other. The challenge is certainly not to nail down the precise date when we stopped being fully, organic humans – or to anticipate one in the future – but to appreciate the ongoing co-evolution of our species with our machines, liberated from a specific, moralistic origin story or teleology. If, to paraphrase Bruno Latour, “we have never been human,” then we give ourselves greater license and latitude to attend to the task of both self-redefinition, and reorientation towards manifold Others with whom we are intrinsically entangled. Rosi Braidotti is the other most visible champion of the posthumanities, which she rightly believes to be an intrinsically feminist project.[xxii] Braidotti is in fact on the brink of publishing a co-edited collection exploring the posthumanities as an emerging meta-discipline, or sequel to the humanities.[xxiii]

    Both Wolfe and Braidotti have been criticized, however, for simply using humanities methods – and established academic protocols and privileges – to examine the posthuman, rather than following their own rhetoric to its logical conclusion (i.e., radical new methods and approaches). For the posthumanities to be more than simply a description of a new field of study – rather than a comprehensive reboot of the humanities themselves – we need to be creative and rather brave, especially when it comes to questioning our own habits of both mind and deed. As an unnamed spokesperson for The Center for Disruptive Media notes: “[I]f knowledge and research are the result of complex processes involving both human and non-human objects and actants, what does this mean for politics and ethics? In short, how can we perform knowledge-making practices differently, to the point where we actually begin to take on (rather than take for granted, repress or ignore) the implications of the posthuman for how we live, work and act as academics and researchers? What can the humanities become in all these entangled constellations?”[xxiv]

    In any case, both the humanities and the posthumanities situate themselves “after the human,” in at least two senses: the first, after we became posthuman hundreds of thousands of years ago, wielding flint and bone; and after in the sense of, “in pursuit of,” as a figure beyond the horizon, that we have not yet been able to become, blocked by our own sense of previous or automatic accomplishment. (What Derrida called, “the messianic without a Messiah.”[xxv] A trope that also brings to mind Gandhi’s famous quip, “What do I think about Western Civilization? I think it would be a good idea.” We might say the same of the human.)

    I myself have sought the elusive “human element” in places where we most expect to find it: love, free will, the voice, the deliberate gesture, and the application of intentional attention.[xxvi] However, I have yet to find it. Rather than an exceptional human element, I have encountered complex symbiotic iterations of the organic and the machinic, which themselves produce forms of intelligence, some of which then, belatedly, recognize themselves as human. (Following the lines of a type of real-world geometry I call “the cybernetic triangle”; that is, the trialectic overlaps and distinctions between humans, animals, and machines.)[xxvii] This is why I consider the media – again, broadly defined – as a vanity mirror for our ongoing fragile sense of self. We use words, images, and sounds in flattering ways to reinforce our ever-threatened sense of species-being (even, and especially, when we are admonishing ourselves for not living up to our true “humanity”). This is a masochistic tic which makes us feel simultaneously inadequate, guilty, compassionate, at least latently humane, and thus (ultimately) absolved. In doing so, we continue to exclude, ignore, demean, neglect, and exploit, those who we do not deem to measure up to full humanity (not forgetting this is the subject of the humanities). Hence, once again, the need for the posthumanities. To shine a light on those who were obliged to remain obscured in darkness precisely to reflect our own portraits of humanhood.

    A Gesture of Conclusion

    If the humanities are a technology or discursive machine for producing the kind of subject that would recognize itself in the process of such an interpellation (secular, rational, individual etc.), and act accordingly, the posthumanities are a new perspective on this process, being especially attentive to different kinds of subjectivities, environments, and ways of thinking and being. The posthumanities “remediates” the humanities for a more inclusive mission, while also “premediating” the kinds of (as yet unknown) knowledges which the new millennium so urgently calls us to respond.[xxviii] As such, it is not just a feminist project, but an anti-colonial one.

    Just before I mentioned “the deliberate gesture” as another place that I sought to find the so-called human element, only to encounter a strange alloy of animality, technics, and the negentropic byproduct of their often agonistic entanglement. (Something others might call intelligence, or semiotic tendencies.) As humans, and humanities scholars, we are deeply interested in our own gestures. And yet the closer one looks, the clearer that it becomes that we require prosthetic implements, and other non-human agents, in order to make them. This irony is something that media theorist Vilem Flusser was extremely sensitive to, as he detailed many key gestures that we cherish, including the gesture of writing, photographing, smoking a pipe, and even turning a mask around.[xxix] (The New York Times, on the day I wrote this paragraph, ran a story on the new gestures that the latest iPhone coaxes from its increasingly creaturely consumers.)[xxx]

    Flusser believed that human gestures have been alienated and constricted by modernity, or rather by our stagnant “posthistorical” condition, and that while gestures are not themselves free, something about freedom is still expressed in them.[xxxi] How might we relate to technology in an active way, not simply adapting, or even submitting, to the subtle violence of its protocols and subliminal imperatives? (For instance, the rise of so-called “racist technologies,” in which the biases of programmers is coded into the algorithm; as with face-matching software, or into the medium itself, as with Kodak film.)[xxxii] Such a question needs to be addressed from a posthumanist perspective if we are not to simply lapse into a nostalgic, romantic, neo-Luddite position (which assumes, naively, that the human somehow predated technics, before being contaminated by it).

    In collaboration with historian, Carla Nappi, I will be soon publishing a book called Metagestures, in which we enlist the rather novel methodology of “fictioning,” as a way to pay a different kind of attention to primary sources, which in turn, creates different kinds of knowing.[xxxiii] Together we went through Flusser’s inventory of gestures, one by one, and then built short stories of our own – miniature worlds, in fact – in which his ideas are reanimated, repurposed, and redeployed. In doing so, we gained a new understanding of, to quote Nappi, “the ways that materiality and material experience emerge out of relations and relationships.”[xxxiv] This collaborative practice also forced a deeper appreciation of the process whereby “the kind of orientations that relate bodies in space and time leave traces in our documents.”[xxxv] Metagestures is thus an attempt to go beyond a default theoretical response to a theoretical text, by centering play, poetics, collaboration, and creative experimentation.

    Indeed, there is an emerging wave of writing from academics who feel enervated by the same intellectual – well – gestures; and who seek to import new voices, strategies, conceits, and genres into our discursive worlds.[xxxvi] This project is one such example of this new wave, originally inspired by Vilem Flusser’s own willingness to go beyond the conventions of the analytical essay towards more speculative and mischievous projects (of which his Vampyroteuthis Infernalis – a philosophical treatise on the ontology of the giant squid – is his most famous example).[xxxvii] Metagestures was thus born from a dual effort to approach scholarly life as an art practice; and the hope is that it will inspire others in turn to treat so-called primary sources with a different kind of attention and intention.

    I finish with this example not only as an instance of a (not uncontroversial) technique that practitioners of the posthumanities might use – in their own projects, and for their own purposes – but also in the hopeful, utopian spirit of Flusser himself. Since, despite all evidence to the contrary, this postmodern Renaissance man believed that our gestures, no matter how small, modest, or fleeting, contain the seeds to transform a rather dire global technical-political situation into something more, well, perhaps not “human,” but certainly more thoughtful, open, attentive, creative, generous, ingenious, instructive, seductive, and free.

    The earlier attempts to challenge the hegemony of so-called Man, or an exclusivist understanding of humanity (such as the one now under the umbrella of cultural studies), tended to consider the media as an object or site to be analyzed, exposed, deconstructed. The posthumanities, especially in the guise of critical media theory, consider media to be part of the DNA of the human. (Indeed, DNA is itself a case of natural-technics, now open to cultural interventions.) The humanist is now rendered humanish. I’ve defined the posthumanities as the humanities after the human. It therefore seeks to help forge a new post-ideological notion of the human, or at least clear a conceptual space for the hitherto elusive human to emerge. Not in order to catch, identify, and tag such a specimen, but to better appreciate the manifold ways in which human beings can be human. (But not only human.) What some call “hominization” is thus not the carrying forward, like a flickering flame, of the metaphysical, hypocritical essence of our kind. Rather it is the cooperative process by which we construct new machines for dismantling patriarchy, white supremacy, predatory capitalism, the factory farming system, and all the other firewalls we have constructed against a truly inclusive and compassionate project of human becoming.

     

    Dominic Pettman is Professor of Culture & Media at the New School for Social Research and Eugene Lang College. He is the author of numerous books on technology, humans, and other animals; including Creaturely Love (Minnesota) and Sonic Intimacy (Stanford). His forthcoming book Metagestures, co-written with Carla Nappi, will be published by Punctum Press in March.

     

    NOTES

    [i] In retrospect, a patient historian of ideas and institutions may be able to piece together the puzzle of why the posthumanities emerged where and when it did so. Writing in the midst of this emergence, however, we might simply note that one of the main motivations driving this particular train is the urgency with which any sense or security of an actual existing future is now threatened by climate change, environmental devastation, plundernomics, and other factors which seem to be canceling the very taken-for-granted temporality on which transgenerational intellectual work depends. The posthumanities is thus a pragmatic (perhaps even partly cynical) attempt to keep genuine interdisciplinary thought alive, in an eco-system in which scholars are encouraged to bunker down in established canons and disciplines to survive; as well as being a more idealist and ambitious attempt to provide real answers to extremely complex and pressing problems. (After-Auschwitz and after-Hiroshima, so to speak, but before whatever name we will be giving to the next spectacular anthropogenic catastrophe; even as the latter mostly unfolds as an insidious and imperceptible “slow” or distributed form of violence and suffering.)

    [ii] For an interesting recent taking stock of this ever-green theme, see Simon During, “The Idea of the Humanities,” unpublished, but available, http://www.academia.edu/34926361/The_idea_of_the_humanities_2017_

    [iii] Marshall McLuhan, War and Peace in the Global Village (San Francisco: Hardwired, 1997), pp.27-31.

    [iv] Siegfried Zielinski, Deep Time of the Media: Toward an Archaeology of Hearing and Seeing by Technical Means (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2008).

    [v] Tom Standage, The Victorian Internet: The Remarkable Story of the Telegraph and the Nineteenth Century’s On-line Pioneers (New York: Bloomsbury, 2014). See also, Tom Standage, Writing on the Wall: Social Media – The First 2,000 Years (New York: Bloomsbury, 2014).

    [vi] Manuel de Landa, War in the Age of Intelligent Machines (New York: Zone, 1991). For my own riff on this theme, see “Some Remarks on the Legacy of Madame Francine Descartes – First Lady and Historian of the Robocene – on the Occasion of 500 Years Since her Unlawful Watery Execution,” Public Domain Review, https://publicdomainreview.org/conjectures/some-remarks-on-the-legacy-of-madame-francine-descartes/ (accessed June 11, 2018).

    [vii] Marshall McLuhan, Understanding Media: The Extensions of Man (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1994), p.46.

    [viii] John Durham Peters, The Marvelous Clouds: Toward a Philosophy of Elemental Media (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2016).

    Jussi Parikka, A Geology of Media (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2015).

    Shannon Mattern, Code and Clay, Data and Dirt: Five Thousand Years of Urban Media (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2017).

    [ix] Jakob von Uexküll, A Foray into the Worlds of Animals and Humans: with A Theory of Meaning (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2010).

    [x] An observation I owe to McKenzie Wark, in conversation.

    [xi] David Wills, Dorsality: Thinking Back through Technology and Politics (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2008). See also Arthur Bradley & Louis Armand (eds.), Technicity (Prague: Litteraria Pragensia, 2014).

    [xii] See Lee Edelman, No Future: Queer Theory and the Death Drive (Durham: Duke University Press, 2004), and Alexander G. Weheliye, Habeas Viscus: Racializing Assemblages, Biopolitics, and Black Feminist Theories of the Human (Durham: Duke University Press, 2014), among many others.

    [xiii] Sylvia Wynter, On Being Human as Praxis (edited by Katherine McKittrick), (Durham: Duke University Press, 2015).

    [xiv] Bernard Stiegler, Technics and Time 1: The Fault of Epimetheus (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1998).

    [xv] Giorgio Agamben, The Open: Man and Animal (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2004).

    [xvi] See my book, Human Error: Species-Being and Media Machines (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2012).

    [xvii] John Gray, Straw Dogs: Thoughts on Animals and Humans (London: Granta, 2003), p.12.

    [xviii] Peter Sloterdijk, “Rules for the Human Zoo: A Response to the Letter on Humanism,” Environment & Planning: Society & Space, 27: 1, 2009.

    [xix] Geoffrey Winthrop-Young has touched on these questions, especially as they relate to the subfield of “cultural techniques.” (For example, in early agrarian times, fences, pens, and gates performed and reinforced the animal/human distinction.) See “Cultural Techniques: Preliminary Remarks,” Theory, Culture & Society, 30(6), 2013, pp.3-19.

    [xx] Wolfe is also the author of the widely-cited What is Posthumanism? (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2009).

    [xxi] See https://www.upress.umn.edu/book-division/series/posthumanities (accessed June 11, 2018).

    [xxii] Rosi Braidotti, The Posthuman (Cambridge: Polity, 2013).

    [xxiii] Cecilia Asberg & Rosi Braidotti (eds.), A Feminist Companion to the Posthumanities (New York: Springer, 2018).

    [xxiv] “Disrupting the Humanities: Radical Methodologies for the Posthumanities,” seminar (2015), hosted by the Center for Disruptive Media and Coventry University. https://openreflections.wordpress.com/2015/02/24/2953/

    [xxv] Jacques Derrida, Specters of Marx: The State of the Debt, The Work of Mourning & the New International (London & New York: Routledge, 2006).

    [xxvi] For love and the human, see both Love and Other Technologies: Retrofitting Eros for the Information Age (New York: Fordham, 2006) and Creaturely Love: How Desire Makes Us More, and Less, Than Human (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2017). For a discussion of free-will, see “The Orc and the Penguin,” in Look at the Bunny: Totem, Taboo, Technology (Wincheter, UK: Zero Books, 2013). For my consideration of the voice, see Sonic Intimacy: Voice, Species, Technics (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 2017). For a meditation on the deliberate gesture, see Metagestures (Punctum, 2019). And for my take on intentional attention, see Infinite Distraction: Paying Attention to Social Media (Cambridge, UK: Polity, 2016).

    [xxvii] See Human Error, especially pp.5-8.

    [xxviii] See Jay Bolter and Richard Grusin, Remediation: Understanding New Media (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2000), as well as Richard Grusin, Premediation: Affect and Mediality After 9/11 (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2010).

    [xxix] Vilem Flusser, Gestures (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2014).

    [xxx] Ann-Marie Alcántara, “All the New Gestures You’re About to Learn on the iPhone X, New York Times, December 26, 2017. https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/26/smarter-living/using-iphone-x.html

    [xxxi] Vilem Flusser, Post-History (Minneapolis: Univocal, 2013).

    [xxxii] See, for instance, Genevieve Yue, “China Girls on the Margins of Cinema,” October 153 (Summer 2015), pp. 96–116.

    [xxxiii] Carla Nappi & Dominic Pettman, Metagestures (Punctum, forthcoming 2019).

    [xxxiv] Carla Nappi, “Metamorphoses: Fictioning and the Historian’s Craft,” PMLA 133.1 (2018), pp.160-165.

    [xxxv] ibid.

    [xxxvi] See, for instance, the new journal, Thresholds (openthresholds.org), and the presentations and workshops on “collaboration, engagement, attention,” hosted by Lauren Berlant and Kathleen Stewart (such as, https://www.gc.cuny.edu/All-GC-Events/Calendar/Detail?id=44099)

    [xxxvii] Vilem Flusser, Vampyroteuthis Infernalis: A Treatise, with a Report by the Institut Scientifique de Recherche Paranaturaliste (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2012).

  • b2@PITT boundary 2’s Spring 2019 Conference

    b2@PITT boundary 2’s Spring 2019 Conference

    The spring 2019 conference will be at the University of Pittsburgh, from April 5-6.

    The event schedule is listed below. Events are free to the public and in the Cathedral of Learning at the Humanities Center (Room 602).

    Friday, April 5, 2019

    1 – 1:50 PM, Jason Fitzgerald, University of Pittsburgh, “Making Humans, Making Humanism: History and Universalism on Amiri Baraka’s Black Nationalist Stage”

    2 – 2:50 PM, Nancy Condee, University of Pittsburgh, “Wishful Thinking: The End of Sovereignty”

    3 – 3:50 PM, Gavin Steingo, Princeton University, “Reinterpreting Culture with Hildred Geertz”

    4 – 4:50 PM, Margaret Ferguson, UC Davis, “Unquenchable Myths of Hymen in Hymenoplasty Surgery, Crowd Virginity Testing, and Other Social Sites Present and Past”

    5 – 5:50 PM, Annette Damayanti Lienau, Harvard University, “Islamic Egalitarianism and (French) Orientalism: Re-reading the ‘Margins’ of the ‘Muslim World’”

    Saturday, April 6

    9 – 9:50 AM, Bruce Robbins, Columbia University,  “Single? Great? Collective? Frederic Jameson’s World History”

    10 – 10:50 AM, Piotr Gwiazda, University of Pittsburgh, “Ghosts and Anchors: Translingualism in Contemporary US Poetry”

    11 – 11:50 AM, Bécquer Seguin, The Johns Hopkins University, “Imagination Burning: On Lorca’s Anti-Colonialism”

    1 – 1:50 PM, Kara Keeling, University of Chicago, “Queer Times, Black Futures”

    2 – 2:50 PM, Donald E. Pease, Dartmouth College, “Indigeneity, ‘Americanity, Nathaniel Hawthorne’s Romance with Settler-Colonial Capitalism”

    3 – 3:50 PM, Reading by Dawn Lundy Martin, University of Pittsburgh

    4 – 4:50 PM, In Memoriam, Joseph A. Buttigieg

  • Peter Gratton — Neoliberalism’s Appeal: Crime, Punishment, and the State on Trial (Review of Geoffrey de Lagasnerie’s Judge and Punish)

    Peter Gratton — Neoliberalism’s Appeal: Crime, Punishment, and the State on Trial (Review of Geoffrey de Lagasnerie’s Judge and Punish)

    by Peter Gratton

    Review of: Geoffrey de Lagasnerie’s Judge and Punish: The Penal State on Trial, trans. Lara Vergnaud (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2018). Originally published in French as Juger: L’État pénal face à la sociologie (Paris: Librairie Arthème Fayard, 2016).

    Geoffrey de Lagasnerie’s Judge and Punish: The Penal State on Trial, first published in French as L’État pénal face à la sociologie (The Penal State Confronts Sociology, Paris: Librairie Arthème Fayard, 2016) and translated well by Lara Vergnaud, is an at times brilliantly written polemic, decoding the ways in which we take our systems of judging and punishing as an ever-existing part of our background. This book is not a genealogy of the jurisprudential models used in the West and so is not akin to Michel Foucault’s history of the prison in Discipline and Punish (1975). Nor is it a long history of the birth of punishment as in Friedrich Nietzsche’s Genealogy of Morals (1887). Nor is it is call for prison abolitionism à la Angela Davis. But it is a searing and necessary brief against how we judge guilt and innocence in criminal trials that provide entree to the state networks of systemic violence against the poor, those of color, and the marginalized in general. De Lagasnerie proves an ample prosecutor of the current French system—the book is replete with memorable lines that will stick with any jury of his peers reading along—and his suit is one that can and should be brought in different jurisdictions across the West.

    Yet his case all but falls apart as he comes to his summation. There, in the final chapters, after so many allegations that he is undertaking a “radical” critique of these systems, he argues for a neoliberal response to crime and justice that he argues has not yet occurred in practice.  “If modern transformations of the state had truly been driven by a neoliberal logic,” he writes, “they wouldn’t have taken the form of a strengthening of the penal state,” he states as if it were a matter of fact (180). This left neoliberalism, he stipulates, would privatize much of the criminal justice system (175-6). He leaves unexplained the rapid increases in the prison population of the United Kingdom, the United States, Australia, and his home country of France, those places where fiscal austerity and neoliberalism have been strongest even as crime rates have decreased often to their historically weakest. How to explain this correlation between neoliberal governance and the steroidal increase in the rise of our prison populations if it’s not in fact a relation of causation? He offers no exculpatory evidence. His amicus curiae for neoliberalism—the idealist route when facts are not in evidence—is to say neoliberalism hasn’t been taken far enough: its hyper-individualism provides another “conception of judgment and law” (79) that has been ignored by a dépassé but still remnant state authoritarianism that neoliberalism has yet to conquer (62). Once this occurs, there will be a privatization of criminality, creating a “horizontal” relation between victimizer and victimized, with minimal intervention by the state, whose sovereign, top-down relation to those rendered guilty of crimes would all but disappear (183).

    De Lagasnerie thus joins other followers of Foucault in recent memory who have taken a neoliberal turn, especially after the publication a decade ago of Foucault’s investigations of the incipient neoliberalism of the late 1970s in his 1978-9 lecture course, The Birth of Biopolitics. Based on a misreading of these lectures, those friendly to Foucault’s work like de Lagasnerie and Foucault’s Marxist critics both argue he welcomed neoliberalism’s critique of the totalizing, bureaucratic state as a means for countering state power. About this as a political strategy or even as a reading of the later Foucault, I have more than a reasonable doubt, but let me first let de Lagasnerie make his case before rendering a verdict at the end of this essay.

    De Lagasnerie opens the book with his own reporting on many scenes of trials in Parisian courts. His method is sociological but not the kind of empirical sociology that merely describes what is underway. That, nevertheless, he does well: de Lagasnerie details the quotidian, mechanical way in which defendant after defendant is processed, with the high stakes matched only by the manifest boredom (malaise) of the trials themselves (9). Prosecutors and defendants alike use the same arguments over and over, and the system itself turns on such iteration or repetition. This is what makes the structure look as natural and inevitable as the Earth’s revolution around the sun. Everyone appears to be treated the same even as defendants of color, for example, are more likely to face graver sentences and are far more likely to be found guilty (201-2). “The very repetition” of the trials, de Lagasnerie writes, “immunizes the penal apparatus [le dispositif pénal] from criticism” (8). Every step in the process, from the arrest to pre-trial hearings to the trial to the judgment and sentencing, “operates,” he notes, “within the comfort of habit, an obvious and automatic way of reacting to illegal activity, unhindered by the need or desire to question what is happening” (8).

    One shouldn’t for a moment diminish the vast asymmetry between the trauma for those involved and the almost nonchalant bureaucratic manner at play. The only questioning of the system occurs when this system fails to function, e.g., when a crime goes unpunished, when the lawyers don’t follow the procedure, and so on, but never concerns the system itself. Any discussion of factors beyond the facts and persons of the case are a priori and legally inadmissable. Even the most progressive of trial observers may say, sure, there is systemic racism, the police are corrupt, and so on, but he pulled the trigger, he is the guilty party, and despite it all, he  is responsible and so he—not some system, not some history of racism, not someone or something outside the courtroom walls—must be punished. How, after all, does one put a system, let alone the state, on trial?

    De Lagasnerie argues we continually fail to take the lessons of sociology into account–hence the subtitle of the French edition. We focus on the procedures of these trials—they are an object of endless fascination for viewers of films and television and readers of detective novels—but we invariably leave out the wider social context in which these trials take place. Against this manner of investigation, de Lagasnerie is attuned to how each case, despite its repetitiveness, individualizes the defendant: witnesses, supposedly expert or otherwise, are put on the stand to sketch out a character who would commit such an alleged crime. But these depictions invariably leave out any social context. Even the “slightest attempt to comprehend the cause of their actions,” he argues, “is deemed irrelevant to the point that when certain mechanisms or variables—gender, race, class, age—are mentioned, notably by defense lawyers, their importance is dismissed” (4). Even in the country that gave us structuralism, “the consequences of structural and collective forces are [left] absent, even as, a few inches away, on the other side of the [court] wall, their impact is visible for all to see” (5).

    The book, then, operates also as an appeal for sociology, a discipline understood here as unveiling those very structures that create subjects, including the subjects of the law that we are from the very beginning. This sociological approach would “de-individualize” the trial system. Nevertheless, despite devoting his last chapter to “rethinking sociology,” Lagasnerie is unclear about just what his method is. Like a detective, one has to collect clues here and there throughout the book to attempt to solve the mystery oneself. At points he describes the juridical system as “unconscious” and at others says that sociology aims to “deconstruct” the processes of crime and punishment (e.g., 9, 35, 36, 62, 63, 137-8), while also saying that we should follow the insights of Pierre Bourdieu (e.g., 21, 40-41, 53-4, 63, 92-3, 197), or even the utilitarianism of the economist Gary Becker (188), providing even more confusion, since one can’t just pick and choose from these authors like an à la carte menu. In any event, here is one of his better explanations of what he overindulgently calls a  “renewed method for philosophy and the social sciences” (206):

    Questioning the criminal justice system requires unearthing the reasons why, when confronted by an event or act, we feel the need to identify, singularize, and judge rather than understand, generalize, and politicize: what purpose is served by an individualizing perception of events and the attribution of responsibility to singular subjects? Why create guilty subjects? What is the meaning of the system of judgment and of responsibility? (89)

    To answer these questions, we need a “sociological perspective,” which

    allow[s] us to become aware of everything that we implicitly assume and suppress in the act of judging. A social critique of the logic of the penal state allows for an understanding of the system of judgment in terms of its positivity, foundations, and functions; therefore, it allows us to see how it belongs to a more general economy of power. (99)

    This reference to a “general economy of power” is reminiscent of Foucault, who argued that all forms of knowledge, including even the science of sociology itself, are implicated in movements of power. Despite relatively minor criticisms of Foucault at several points (e.g., 16-17), de Lagasnerie seems to agree with him, for example, when he describes the role of prosecution experts who use pseudo-concepts borrowed from psychiatry and criminology as working hand in glove with state power (110). Rather than taking the trial system as a matter of course, de Lagasnerie’s sociological approach would “artificialize reality” (83) and “denaturaliz[e] or rende[r] artificial the apparatus [dispositif] of responsibility,” that is, the trial system. This would have the effect of undoing our “mechanisms of denial” (6) by which we disavow the “repressive nature” (18) of the state as it acts—and it acts par excellence through the criminal justice system.

    Here, though, he takes leave of Foucault, for whom power is not “repressive” or top-down. “We must cut off the king’s head” in political theory, Foucault famously said, not because there are never “vertical” forms of power, but because these result from lateral movements of disciplining and normalization. The state, then, is not the starting point for Foucault, which would make it an ahistorical and static entity from which power emanates, but is rather the result of movements “from below” that crystallize into this or that site in which the state is said to operate: the governmental psychiatric hospital, the prison, the military barracks, and so on. To say that the state is repressive misses the implication of each of us within the very systems of power he was attempting to outline. In this way, any libertarianism or anarchism, left or right, would fall to a Foucaultian critique: there is, as de Lagasnerie admits, always power that operates at a distance from the state (20)—the processes that normalize each and every one of us (think of mass conformism)—such that even if the state were to disappear altogether, power would still wind its way through each of us within a given society. This is why Foucault derided the idea that one could speak objectively about any given state of affairs: power operates through us, even in our most personal affairs, such in acts of sex, and our existence is the effect of contingent, historical, and, as de Lagasnerie puts it, “artificial” movements of power (8). In this way, we are subjectivized, not subjects freely choosing who we are to be. Thus, we are not subjects who choose to enter into the law but are rather “a subject of the law” that is “subjected to and confronted by the state’s construction of reality and having to live with it” (15-16). That is to say, the state’s vision of reality could not exist without docile subjects who answer to the law as a matter of course.

    For Foucault, this does not mean we can simply exit from that reality to a vision of another, since we are the creation of our particular historical milieu and the matrices of power within it. There is no God’s eye view or objective place from which to judge this reality as better or worse than any other: the point of his genealogies of the prison, sexuality, biopower, and so on, was not to make normative or ethical claims. To do so requires thinking of knowledge without power, a disinterested power, which Foucault denied throughout his work. This is not to say, for example, that Foucault did not engage in political activism when it related to the French prison system, which he did. This didn’t mean that he didn’t look for counter-forms of power on the margins of society that could perhaps provides practices of freedom not overdetermined by our disciplinary relationships, which he did. But this also meant that any work by Foucault the author had an interest and was invested in how that knowledge could be used strategically within the games of power at play as he was writing in the 1970s. To put it another way, there is not, for Foucault, an “outside” of power.

    This problem is not just one for Foucault: Marx argued he could not envision a communist society because he was produced within a capitalist system and any such vision would be idealist, even as he never tired of categorizing all the ways in which workers within a capitalist system were alienated from the products of their labor. The same goes for Jacques Derrida, whose deconstruction always noted the ways in which we speak borrows from the very systems we would wish to critique, or for decolonial thinkers such as Frantz Fanon, who set out to show the ways in which the colonized interiorized the means for their own exploitation and domination, or for feminists whom snarky conservatives believe ought not to wear dresses and so on—as if they, too, could leave the choices on offer within intertwining systems of patriarchy at home, at work, and within what we call politics in the limited sense of state governance. De Lagasnerie at times seems to get this point, describing well that the nature of subjectivity is not some metaphysical problem afar from our juridical and judicial systems:

    The justice system functions as an objective possibility in our lives that each of us must take into account and that shapes each one of us as a result (my emphasis). …None of us is sure to escape justice either; indeed, none of us do. It is a part of our everyday lives. Rare are those individuals who will never find themselves facing a judge or lawyer, the threat of a prison sentence or damages, or the eventuality of pressing charges or being sued. But even those who never have any direct contact with the justice system will have been nonetheless unavoidably forced to take into account its existence and demands—the potential to be accused and/or convicted of a crime—if only precisely to avoid it, either by respecting the law or by adopting strategies of concealment. (7)

    The violence of this system is not “intermittent,” but “underlies the very nature of the legal order” (38). De Lagasnerie justifiably argues that political theorists too often focus on tidying up the procedures of governance, while ignoring the violence that underlies them (42). In sum, while political theorists are happy to describe the violence that pre-existed the political, or the chaos that would ensue without a given political system, they are loathe to deal with the consequences of their theories for those judged guilty of not following the social contract. As de Lagasnerie puts it, “the task that political philosophy has assigned itself can be defined as follows: imagine a way to describe the state without mentioning violence; ensure that our relationship to the law is neutralized; and offer a depoliticized perception of politics” (42). For these theorists, the rule of law has been one of the greatest advances of Western civilization: all fall under the law and the subjectification mentioned above makes us responsible to the whole of society: when we break the law, it is not a lateral trauma against another individual, but against the state. Hence, in the United States, for example, cases are brought by the “people” of such and such jurisdiction against a defendant, as represented by a district attorney or other prosecutor. “Modern justice is a system in which interindividual actions,” as he puts it, “are reshaped by the state into actions against ‘society’” (154).

    Political theorists thus disavow the bloody products of their own thinking. There is no law without its enforcement, as Immanuel Kant once put it, and de Lagasnerie pulls no punches in describing just who should be brought into the dock: “[W]hat the judge does, objectively, is harm. To judge is to inflict violence. All legal interpretations inflict suffering on the individuals to whom they’re applied, whether it be by imprisoning them, taking away their property, or killing them” (37). Where dominant narratives depicts a neutral site in which justice is blind and any punishments are meted out neutrally, for de Lagasnerie, the “courtroom becomes the scene of an assault” (38, his emphasis). He writes:

    Living under the rule of law means living in a context in which the state has the right to dispose of us. Contrary to what a large proportion of political theory maintains,  being a subject of the law does not mean, first of all, being a protected and secure subject. We are first and foremost subjects who can be judged—that is, imprisoned, arrested, and convicted. We are vulnerable subjects, dispossessed in relation to the logic of the state. (40, original italics removed)

    Here, de Lagasnerie offers an advance over Foucault, who often underplayed  “juridical” power—the stuff of the entire legal apparatus—in his considerations of how we are normalized as subjects. De Lagasnerie suggests, rightly, though, that it is through the criminal justice system that these norms are enforced in the most vicious terms; it is this that makes us precarious subjects. Anyone who has been poor, of color, or on the margins of our societies knows deep within their bones this precarity. We need only think of the gruesome and grueling ways those in African American communities of the U.S. are under constant police surveillance or how one is punished for being poor: a unpayable fine for a broken tail light on the car needed to get to work becomes a bench warrant, which in turn becomes time in jail, which means the loss of that job and a criminal record denying one future employment—and the state is not done with its work yet. The uprisings in Ferguson, Missouri, five years ago were sparked by the fatal shooting of Michael Brown by police, but it was already a community under siege, like so many other minority communities across the U.S., U.K., and in France: the average household in Ferguson had three arrest warrants each, a later U.S. Department of Justice report found, with 16,000 out of 21,000 people in the community, largely African American, wanted by the law. This is the rule of law as it functions outside of theory and even if de Lagasnerie is vague about just what structural factors are in play (for a sociologist, he has an annoying tick in his books of merely mentioning “structures” and “systems” but never identifying them in any particularity), the problem of recidivism among the so-called criminal population is but another way to say that from within the legal system, there is no exit: voting rights are often taken away, future employment is limited largely to manual and impermanent labor, and merely being in one’s backyard becomes a killable offense. The criminal justice system is at once individualizing (you failed to show up for that warrant) and yet is also aimed at entire classes of people always already deemed a “criminal element.” It is in this context that de Lagasnerie is right to say, “Rather than saying that the state ‘sentences to death,’ we must say that it kills [assassine]; that it doesn’t arrest individuals but ‘abducts’ [enlève] them; that it doesn’t imprison people but ‘wrongfully detains’ [séquestre] them; that it doesn’t force them to pay fines but ‘robs’ [dépouille] them” (60).

    De Lagasnerie insightfully notes that the French criminal justice system defines responsibility, as in the U.S. and elsewhere, negatively: the law only lists when one is not responsible for given crimes, but generally not what responsibility positively means. Hence, there is a veritable right, especially for agents of the state and those aligned with it, to irresponsibility, a right to impunity. There are those who are held responsible—and then are all those who have the right to irresponsibility, not just people with the wealth to avoid the criminal justice system altogether but first and foremost agents acting in the name of the state. What then is to be done? He writes:

    Our challenge then becomes to reflect on the possibility of creating new narratives. That means reformulating what happens in order to develop a new awareness of reality that will prompt us to assign the cause of events not to individual agents but rather to collective logics rooted in concrete situations. We must question our urge to judge and orient our energy toward transforming political totalities rather than toward punishing individual actions, which are merely the occasional and local manifestations of those totalities. (132)

    Surely this chafes at our very understanding of ourselves and others: to live is to judge, it seems. We measure our personal lives in terms of small writs of wrongs righted through micro punishments: the cheating partner is given time in the clichéd dog house, the wayward employee is reprimanded and faces loss of work, the perpetually late student is given marks off her participation grade, the sloppy waiter is punished with a bad tip, a recent book out receives, ahem, its deserved review. The list is endless. We don’t do these things, we tell ourselves, because it is in our interest or because we like it. Every parent says this: it hurts me more than it hurts you, the child I am punishing; it is what everyone would do in our place when we punish you. In the courts, this is obvious: the judge shouldn’t have an interest in who wins. He or she is merely to decide based upon the evidence before her and not take the first or second side: she sits literally above the prosecutor and defendant, the first and second parties. This is key today: at some point in Western history, we invented what is called the third party, an objective position where we pretend we don’t have an interest or desire in the results, a point Foucault takes up in his 1970-1 Lectures on the Will to Know when he studies ther advent of the rule of law and “objective” forms of judging in ancient Greece. But I don’t need to tell you how this story ends: study after study shows, whatever the intent of the judge, an interest is served: those who are white and/or wealthy face far fewer penalties in our criminal justice systems. But we couldn’t have knowledge as we understand it—that is, philosophy, history, and sociology—without this objective, third-party stance either: we are judging objectively what is metaphysical, what happened in history, and so on, or those disciplines wouldn’t exist. You can see, then, what Foucault means by power/knowledge: power operates in our courts and uses models of knowledge, while those models of knowledge themselves are a form of power. After all, the courts are nothing but knowledge producing places: endless files line the offices of our courthouses, all in rendering the power of the state based on criminological and other theories.

    The “fantasy” of the objective third party position thus removes our own implication in the micro-punishments we mete out, a point ignored by de Lagasnerie, but one that is crucial to the apparatus he describes. After all, by “putting the state on trial,” de Lagasnerie repeats the very logic his work should be undermining. He maintains that his own “scientific approach” can “produce knowledge” that allows us to “step back from ourselves,” even as he had described earlier in the book the ways in which who we are allows no such “step back” outside the subject of the law (210), indeed going so far as to say that these structures are “unconscious” (7), though one wonders just how one steps back from what cannot by definition be brought to conscious awareness. De Lagasnerie thus will want two things at the same time: “sociology would force us to break with that inclination in order to experience what we might call an immediately political relationship to the world” (132) and that we take a “critical distance…from the system of judgment” (11). But if we are formed in and through being a subject to the law, how is such a critical distance possible? And isn’t any notion of a critical distance an intellectual mirror of the judging we see in criminal trials, that is, that we as scientists, sociologists, or philosophers can sit above the fray and pass judgment, even as de Lagasnerie sentences us to take “an immediately political relationship to the world”? In any event, we are to pass judgment over this system of judging by to compare it to a reality beyond or beneath these power relations:

    Part of the violence of the justice system comes from the fact that the penal state governs us by forcing us to correspond to an image of the subject that is at odds with our true mode of existence. It is this disconnect that causes and encapsulates the violence of the juridical order. In fact, that disconnect is itself violent. Being a subject of the law means being subjected to and confronted by the state’s construction of reality and having to live with it. As a result the legal subject experiences a certain amount of dispossession and vulnerability. …The interesting question here is not our creation as subjects of the law but precisely the fact that we are not, in reality, subjects of the law. (15-16)

    Here, we could raise various ontological questions of just how, as subjects to the law, we are to discern such a reality, or whether what “we” are and how we view ourselves is always politicized, always within formations of power, and therefore, not in some nature or existence elsewhere.

    At this point, de Lagasnerie, to correct this violence, suggests two different tactics at once: first, we must begin to think responsibility as “collective” and within “systems of relationships within which individual agents exist” (93). This means, in a sense, suspending individual judgments:We must question our urge to judge and orient our energy toward transforming political totalities rather than toward punishing individual actions, which are merely the occasional and local manifestations of those totalities” (131-2). No doubt, then, this means a complete transformation of everything we think of under crime and punishment: a truly radical move, it would be a legal theory without precedent but one that is necessary for thinking another future not imprisoned in the systems of the now. And yet, this “ethical task” of “reconstituting collective logics” (132) is to be supplemented by a neoliberal approach that de Lagasnerie valorizes as well, one that re-individualizes us outside such collective logics so-called criminality. Here he supports Becker’s approach:

    If we read, for example, economist Gary Becker’s seminal texts on crime and punishment, it’s clear that their underlying objective is to reject the relevance of transcendent totalities (“public order,” “state,” “society”) that undergird the repressive use of the law and to restore actions and their consequences to what they really are (my emphasis), meaning singular events or facts: a criminal act is an interpersonal interaction in which one individual wrongs another. A crime is a lateral and local matter that brings together victims and guilty parties, not, as modern law would have us believe, individuals and the state, individuals and society, or individuals and the law….Ultimately, claims Becker, we could say that victims are nothing more than involuntary creditors. … Damages therefore become the favored “punishment.” (173-4)

    This is not quite an adequate reading of Becker, who is more than happy to describe crimes as a cost to “society,” but nevertheless let’s see where de Lagasnerie wants to take neoliberalism:

    Neoliberal rationality is based on a refusal to accept the validity of a plane of reality higher than the discordant multiplicity of individuals and the relations between them. From this perspective there are only individuals and individual relationships. (175)

    If this is the case, then what to make of his brief for sociology with which the book begins and ends? By way of an answer, he notes later in the book:

    Because the penal state individualizes causes in order to judge, critiquing the workings of the law requires us to reflect on the violent effects produced by that concealment of social forces. But because the state socializes interindividual actions and their effects in order to punish, we must contrast it with a vision that dismantles the perceptions established by totalizing concepts such as society, collective consciousness, and the like. So, on the one hand, we are dealing with an opposition between a sociological vision and an individualizing one and, on the other, with a left-libertarian vision and a socializing one. (181)

    In short, we are to replace thinking of judging criminality in terms of crimes against the state or the nation, one takes it, and more in terms of how they are “private singular matters … lived in a specific manner by the agents involved” (175), presumably in the shadow of the societal structures that de Lagasnerie describes. At no point does de Lagasnerie recognize the neoliberal view of the subject as antithetical to the sociological approach that he champions from the beginning to the end of the book. Each is to be a rational agent where all forms of interpersonal violence is to be perceived economically and privately. No doubt, de Lagasnerie is right to suggest that this would denude, in theory, the state of much of its power, but in practice it’s all-too-clear what would continue to occur, given that the state would linger in these affairs, as he notes, to make sure justice is served: those with money can simply pay off their “debts” while those who are poor won’t. And what will happen to them? The backstop answer is clear.

    Neoliberal rationality, and all the more so libertarianism, is individualizing. It perceives rape, theft, injury, and attack for what they are: private, singular matters that, each time they occur, are invariably lived in a specific manner by the agents involved. The function of the law should therefore be to institute sanctions and compensation for the injury inflicted. The notion of horizontal, compensatory, or reconstructive law replaces criminal and vertical law. We have here a complete rejection of the idea, so essential to the state apparatus, that rape, theft, injury, and aggression constitute, above all else, disruptions of the public order, that they are acts contrary to society’s interests and should be punished for that very reason. (175-6)

    The invention of crimes to mete out punishments, as Nietzsche argued, has a long history in the West, and the punitive society, as Foucault called it, is not undone by privatizing these affairs. Here the problem is not just philosophical but historical: we have seen this manner of justice before, and de Lagasnerie never takes up this history or the great inequalities of wealth in the present day. The history of the Greek city-states is one of ridding them of private suits on behalf of oligarchs. So too in ancient Rome, where there is a lesson: when the famous XII tables were published, the poor who had access to those who could read did not accede to the law; they revolted now knowing what the law was. Born in 1981, de Lagasnerie has grown up as political options were limited to variants of neoliberalism, where the state could seen as a “robber” through taxes and during which one could write texts calling for both a sociological approach and one that denies it at the same time—he never brings his own subjectification into account here. Hence, as he suggests we do for so-called “criminals,” I would want to put his own work into a context, a history, and a milieu where neoliberalism seems to be the only option. For a future worthy of the name, I hope it isn’t. I join him in wanting to condemn to death the system of judgement and punishing that exists today in France and elsewhere. Justice calls for nothing less, even as it is invented everyday, here and there, answering to the singular trauma of victim and victimizer, a trauma that can’t be accounted for or counted in dollars and cents.

     

    Peter Gratton is a professor philosophy in the department of history and political science at Southeastern Louisiana University. He has written extensively on political and critical theory. He is currently writing a book that in part takes up the kinds of judgment used in the prison industrial complex.

  • Tyler M. Williams — Following Catherine Malabou (Review of Brenna Bhandar and Jonathan Goldberg-Hiller’s “Plastic Materialities: Politics, Legality, and Metamorphosis in the Work of Catherine Malabou”)

    Tyler M. Williams — Following Catherine Malabou (Review of Brenna Bhandar and Jonathan Goldberg-Hiller’s “Plastic Materialities: Politics, Legality, and Metamorphosis in the Work of Catherine Malabou”)

    by Tyler M. Williams

    Review of Brenna Bhandar and Jonathan Goldberg-Hiller, Plastic Materialities: Politics, Legality, and Metamorphosis in the Work of Catherine Malabou (Durham: Duke UP, 2015)

    Catherine Malabou’s pioneering philosophical conceptualization of plasticity has attracted a recent surge of critical attention, yet she rejects any suggestion that plasticity is her own, signature idea.[1] Malabou instead argues that plasticity, unattached to the singular identity of an author, circulates dynamically within the history of philosophy and gains its conceptual shape from the rich heritage that has unwittingly played host to it. Plasticity, Malabou says, is “trapped within the movement of contemporary philosophy itself” (Malabou and Williams 2012: 4). Although the vast majority of Malabou’s work since the publication of her first book, The Future of Hegel, highlights the debt that key philosophical periods and figures owe to plasticity’s power (a quiet tradition that spans from antiquity through poststructuralism and into the current vogue of new materialism), she consistently adds that plasticity also exceeds any strict disciplinary circumscription. Indebted as much to biology as to philosophy, and then onward to psychoanalysis, gender studies, literature, and anthropology, to name a few, plasticity by Malabou’s account always pushes at philosophy’s limit as philosophy’s unassimilated, supple remainder. Equally at home inside and outside philosophy, giving philosophy its shape while simultaneously exposing it to adaptation and change, plasticity challenges the very possibility of a rigid distinction between conventional notions of “inside” and “outside.”

    Derived etymologically from the Greek plassein, meaning both “to give” and “to receive” form, plasticity expresses the malleable condition of anything subjected to changes in form. Critics have often misconstrued Malabou’s understanding of plasticity’s transformability by treating it as a nihilistic ceaselessness or “perpetual change” that never stays in one place long enough to stand for anything.[2] This misreading reduces plasticity to an infinite production of the new by synonymizing plasticity and elasticity, two terms Malabou repeatedly distinguishes from each other—particularly in What Should We Do With Our Brain? but also in Plasticity at the Dusk of Writing and Ontology of the Accident, to say nothing of her many essays and interviews. Although elasticity and plasticity both give and receive form, elasticity retains the ability to return to a form prior to its transformation. Elasticity’s polymorphism thus amounts to a state of infinite variability and ceaseless change, but plasticity “cannot return to its initial form after undergoing deformation” (Malabou 2008: 15). Plasticity envelops the capacity for transformation and the rigid solidity of “a certain determination of form” (15).

    Almost paradoxically, then, plasticity’s resistance to elasticity comprises its most dynamic aspect. As much as plasticity changes form, it also preserves a shape, marks a point of resistant stability, and concretizes itself while retaining the mobility that threatens the concrete with destruction, which is why Malabou describes plasticity as terroristic in Ontology of the Accident (5). Taken as a whole, Malabou’s work shows that the philosophical tradition operates according to this dialectic. When she writes in Plasticity at the Dusk of Writing that plasticity’s “range of meanings” continues “to evolve with and in language” so much that “the very significance of plasticity itself appears to be plastic,” Malabou suggests that plasticity is doubly responsible for solidifying tradition and for maintaining that tradition’s suppleness (2010: 67). Its “significance” forms and reforms itself into the future like a type of auto-inheritance that shapes and preserves the legacy through the dynamic processes of heredity itself. The “significance” of plasticity therefore cannot be confined to the specific domains of Malabou’s study. Similar to Derrida’s insistence that deconstruction is “at work in the work” (1986: 124), plasticity for Malabou names a general logic that remains irreducible to any particular discourse, which is why she rejects a proprietary claim on the concept.

    The practical question of what to “do” with plasticity is thus both urgent and irresolvable. Urgent because, in addition to mobilizing innovations within neurobiology and epigenetics, plasticity’s dialectic of change and resistance constitutes, according to Malabou, the most adequate model for democratic opposition to hegemonic structures of global power. Irresolvable because plasticity is not an abstract transcendental concept, so the “doing” of plasticity will always be a matter of plastic materialities—of the brain (What Should We Do with Our Brain?), of gender (Changing Difference), of the subject (Self and Emotional Life), of trauma (The New Wounded), and so on. Yet, when following Malabou, a major interpretive error is to mistake the forest for the trees, as it were, and to restrict plasticity’s general movement to the specific contexts via which Malabou happens to articulate it. Plasticity is itself plastic and thus constitutes a generalizable “motor scheme,” a “metamorphic structure,” rather than a given technique, tool, or circumscribed topic (2010: 12, 27). As an interdisciplinary project, Malabou’s work demands a disciplinary responsibility to the intractably philosophical “motor” of plasticity’s “structure.”[3]

    Highlighting plasticity’s transformational role at the heart of the philosophical tradition, but paying particular attention to the interdisciplinarity Malabou draws from philosophy’s mutability and variability, Brenna Bhandar and Jonathan Goldberg-Hiller present Plastic Materialities: Politics, Legality, and Metamorphosis in the Work of Catherine Malabou, the first book of collected essays to be devoted entirely to Malabou’s growing oeuvre.[4] The volume includes three previously unpublished or thoroughly revised essays by Malabou herself, a brief interview conducted with her by Bhandar and Goldberg-Hiller, and nine critical essays that address Malabou’s work from a variety of disciplines including psychoanalysis, postcolonial studies, aesthetics, epigenetics, Marxism, biopolitics, critical race theory, entomology, and war studies.

    Plastic Materialities commendably demonstrates the vast applicability of Malabou’s thought. Unsurprisingly, the distinction between the volume’s stronger and weaker essays falls along lines of interdisciplinary responsibility. Chapters that remain attentive to the disciplined stakes of Malabou’s interdisciplinarity are most at home in a book of this sort, since they avoid the aforementioned trap of essentializing the scientific contexts in which Malabou articulates plasticity’s general “scheme.” Weaker chapters commit this essentialist error by ignoring the philosophical discipline of Malabou’s project, treating it instead as an easily transplantable index of interdisciplinary terms.[5] Rather than catalogue these merits and shortcomings in each chapter, what follows is a general account of how this distinction relates this volume to Malabou’s project as a whole.

    As the editors remark in their introduction, Plastic Materialities wants to identify how plasticity shapes a political itinerary (15). The volume thus addresses directly a debate that has trailed Malabou at least since the arrival of What Should We Do with Our Brain? in English translation in 2008: whether her account of plasticity necessarily entails the inherent political resistance she identifies with it. Much of Malabou’s short book argues for this necessity by calling for a shift in our “neuronal consciousness,” a shift that amounts to recognizing the brain as plastically adaptable to environmental input rather than conventionally programmatic and mechanical. She argues that a major consequence of this shift from neural preformationism to adaptability includes the abandonment of corporate, imperial, social, economic, and biopolitical structures of sovereignty predicated on neuronal ideologies of a rigidly centralized brain. Moreover, if many structures of power today already appear to work plastically, then, like its biological counterpart, this plasticity logically includes within it a foundational and unassailable resistance. Precisely what this resistance entails remains mostly unclear in Malabou’s work. The task of this volume therefore seeks to clarify the stakes of this resistance. In light of global neoliberalism’s wholesale reliance on corporate-capitalist models of flexibility and elasticity, for example, the editors, following Malabou both to the letter and toward new horizons, target the implications of plasticity’s “use” to “disrupt these structures” (2).

    At least two major considerations follow from the project Plastic Materialities sets for itself. The first, which Alberto Toscano most directly articulates in his chapter, concerns this fundamental question about the adequacy of plasticity with politics. Toscano argues that Malabou’s use of plasticity to “rethink the dialectical character of contemporary social forms,” particularly the “neoliberal formatting of change under the imperatives of flexibility, adaptability, and employability,” remains too philosophical (91, 97). He claims that Malabou’s philosophical recourse to neurobiology preserves the traditional image of philosophy as a discipline responsible for “providing a conceptual synthesis for other disciplines and practices” (93). As a result, this traditionalism only enables Malabou to link neuroplasticity and political resistance analogically: the brain is like the social, biological resistance to neural order is like political resistance to hegemony, plastic matter works like philosophical critique, and so on. Yet, Toscano concludes, “To think the social is like the brain is no more enlightening today than to think that the economy was like a large organism in the nineteenth century or like a hydraulic machine in the twentieth” (105). Unlike some essays in Plastic Materialities that uncritically accept and then reapply Malabou’s politics elsewhere (those by Carotenuto, Shapiro, Grove, Bhandar and Goldberg-Hiller all trend in this direction), Toscano’s essay remains skeptical of whether Malabou’s politicization of plasticity is sufficiently—or even necessarily—political.

    The second consideration concerns the volume’s isolation of “destructive plasticity” as a privileged concept. According to Malabou, “destructive plasticity” coincides with the productive work of “positive” plasticity. For example, in a synthesis of production and destruction, the brain abandons unused synaptic connections to build ones that are more efficacious. The priority Plastic Materialities places on “destructive plasticity” removes it from the broader context of Malabou’s work, thereby reducing it to a simple synonym for “resistance” and thus to some sort of tool or “resource” that can be “used” in the process of realizing some sort of intentional outcome (2, 20). However, as she makes clear in her own contributions to this volume, Malabou expressly rejects this teleology. Characterizing “destructive plasticity” as an apparatus that can be applied to whatever disciplinary field skews the dialectical symmetry of Malabou’s work and overlooks the contexts in metaphysics and ontology in which Malabou first formulates this concept. Moreover, insofar as Malabou’s later work radicalizes destructive plasticity beyond the productive/destructive binary, the very possibility of destructive negativity remains for her an ongoing question.

    In the paragraph that opens the final chapter to Ontology of the Accident, her “essay on destructive plasticity,” Malabou is still asking if “destructive plasticity is possible” (2012c: 73). Although the untitled preface to this short book clearly asserts that, yes, destructive plasticity is indeed possible and this possibility is evident biologically, the type of destruction that interests neurobiologists is ultimately productive. This productive destruction works as a “sculptural power that produces form though the annihilation of form” (Malabou 2012b: 49). (To reuse the example provided earlier, a process of “cellular annihilation” destroys certain components of an organism to enable that organism to grow, develop, and survive.)[6] However, although current biological discourses recognize the productive work of destructive negativity, Malabou’s interest in the possibility of a more radical destructibility in Ontology of the Accident and The New Wounded goes beyond this productive, positive function. Malabou wants to think the possibility of a negativity that remains exclusively or absolutely negative. A negativity unadorned, as it were, with a complimentary, positive, or redeeming teleological function.

    Of course, one could suggest (as Malabou does) that this questioning of possibility already assumes a position of affirmation, since possibility “designates what one is capable of” or “what may come into being” (2012c: 73). To question the possibility of anything asks for the affirmation of that thing’s production. In this sense, questioning the possibility of destructive plasticity’s negativity finds itself wrapped tightly in contradiction; the premise of the question compromises the possibility of a non-productive negativity from the start. From the metaphysical tradition that positively binds possibility to actuality, the possibility of an unproductive negativity would seem logically impossible. Malabou therefore demands a new understanding of possibility as such, an ontology that could account for a possible negativity that is not already affirmative. In other words, unlike Hegel’s dialectically productive negativity, Malabou seeks a possibility that would not be possible, a no that refuses a silent yes, a possibility that would not be tethered to the affirmation of a creativity. The most destructive force in Malabou’s renegotiation of possibility is its impossible demand, or rather its demand for impossibility. The “ontology of the accident” thus names the impossible possibility of the absolutely impossible.

    Malabou’s own contributions to Plastic Materialities address these two considerations together—as if the two are actually one. Across her three essays, Malabou argues that attention to the ontology of plasticity demands a specific politics. Her contributions to this volume investigate the chance of this onto-political relation and the (im)possibility of its future shape. Plastic Materialities makes an impactful contribution to the growing field of interest in Malabou’s work precisely because Malabou here provides perhaps her most thorough account of the relationship between plasticity’s ontological critique and its political import.

    In “From the Overman to the Posthuman: How Many Ends?” Malabou revisits the conclusion Derrida reaches in his famous essay “The Ends of Man.” There, Derrida remarks that the history of nonhumanist philosophy—including Hegel, Husserl, and Heidegger—ultimately reconstitutes an essentialist concept of the human. Derrida argues that a grand repetition is at stake, since early attempts outside humanism retain and repeat the premises of that same humanism. The “end” (closure) of humanism carries an essentialist “end” (telos) of the human. And yet, at the end of Derrida’s text, which Malabou argues is a sort of beginning, a passing reference to Nietzsche leaves open an opportunity to rethink repetition and, thus, to renew a thinking of the possibilities and impossibilities of humanism. Is there a chance for nonhumanist thought, Malabou asks, that does not fall victim to this essentialist repetition?

    Malabou points out that Nietzsche’s sense of repetition is related directly to revenge, since “revenge” names the memory (what Nietzsche calls the “inability to forget”) essential both to the human and to the structure of temporal succession. Redemption from the repetitions of humanism would thus be tantamount to a redemption from revenge, a yes-saying that can embrace repetition without relying on the retention of a pre-constituted essence. To account for this refined sense of repetition, Malabou turns to recent biological research into reparative stem-cells, which can renew (i.e. repeat) themselves and thus forge new bodies or parts of bodies without recourse to a structure of “revenge.” A repetition that does not simply fulfil a program but produces itself from out of itself. The possibility of the non-human, or of “the non-humanist tradition,” for Malabou amounts to thinking repetition beyond the vicissitudes of this essentialist revenge. Here and in her other two contributions to Plastic Materialities, Malabou argues that these innovations in biological research create new philosophical horizons—not simply within the applicative domains of “philosophy of science” or “bio-philosophy” but, more specifically and significantly, within the traditions of metaphysics and humanism writ large.

    By thinking plasticity as both a thing and a process, that is, as an object of scientific research and as the transformation of philosophical concepts of essence, life, being, the human, etc., Malabou identifies an impasse at the heart of biopolitical and poststructuralist confrontations with “science.” In her essay, “Will Sovereignty Ever Be Deconstructed?” she specifically targets the tendency for thinkers like Derrida, Foucault, and Agamben to regard science as a rigidly mechanical counterpart to the critical dynamism of the humanities.[7] (Here, one might think of Heidegger’s famous statement that science does not think, although Malabou does not include Heidegger in her list of interlocutors in this particular essay.) Philosophy’s rigid characterization of science, Malabou argues, commits biopolitics to an unwitting preservation of the very structure of sovereignty it claims to deconstruct.

    Malabou analyzes previous attempts to deconstruct sovereignty’s relation to biology by claiming that for Foucault, Agamben, and Derrida, “even in different ways, biology is always presented as intimately linked with sovereignty in its traditional figure” (38). That is, even Foucault’s famous theorization of “biopower” beyond or outside the specter of monarchical structures of state sovereignty, preserves a rigidified notion of biology as a “regulatory law” that operates teleologically within an organism. From this perspective, the organism will have always retained “the form of a micro-Leviathan” and will thus never be distinguishable from more traditionally minded and monarchically guised structures of power. Unsurprisingly, for Malabou, Foucault typically regards biology as “the ally of sovereignty” (42) and biopolitics generally treats the biological as that which legitimizes the transformation of the “floating signifier” into a fixed, rigid, and centralized motif (e.g. “blood and sex”). Lastly, Malabou claims, “biology always appears, for philosophers, as an instrument of power, never as an emancipatory field or tool” because the biological is always treated as a “secondary phenomenon” to the primacy of “the symbolic” (38, 42).

    In short, Malabou’s critique is that these thinkers too often treat biology as a rigid mechanism that simply services the whims of biopower. Not only does this mechanization preserve traditional models of centralized authority and sovereignty, it also denies any “biological resistance” to this mechanization. Ultimately, Malabou wants to argue that plasticity constitutes this biological resistance from within the confines of sovereign mechanization. Put otherwise, plasticity transgresses restrictive understandings of “biology” as a “political force” (40). The motor behind this plastic capacity is epigenetics, which accounts for either the activation or inhibition of certain genetic factors in an individual’s biological makeup. This process is significant for Malabou because it describes a transformability that is itself non-genetic. For example, within the genetic determination of the brain, the synaptic formation of neural connections depend upon a constellation of non-genetic—yet nonetheless determinative, that is, epigenetic—influences such as experience, learning, and environment:

    Plasticity is in a way genetically programmed to develop and operate without program, plan, determinism, schedule, design, or preschematization. Neural plasticity allows the shaping, repairing, and remodeling of connections and in consequence a certain amount of self-transformation of the living being. (Malabou 2015: 43-44)

    This epigenetic structure signals for Malabou the “becoming obsolete of the notion of program in biology,” an obsolescence that “opens new conditions of experience, new thresholds of rationality, as well as new philosophical and theoretical paradigms” (44). For example, according to Malabou, epigenetics allow us to think “history” and “biology” as a “dialectical couple within biological life itself,” which allows us in turn to abandon the classic desire to “survey the biological from an overarching structural point of view” (44). Plasticity would thus name the role that “the symbolic” (the empty signifier devoid of meaning and thus capable of renegotiating its meaning ad infinitum) traditionally plays, except now this “symbolic” resides within the plastic formation of the biological itself: the ability of life to transform itself “without separating itself from itself” (45).

    Malabou concludes that any discourse founded upon this reliance on the “symbolic”—as a “surplus or excess over the real”—ought to be renegotiated via this plastic transformation of the empirical/transcendental relation that epigenetics calls into question.[8] Entirely opposed to transcendental structures of meaning, Malabou claims that it is now no longer the case that a “gap between the structural and the material” is required to “render the material meaningful” (45).

    Both Alain Pottage and Fred Moten offer captivating challenges to Malabou’s conclusions. Pottage claims that the role “environment” plays in biological discourses highlights the “autoplastic” process of a structure that structures itself, a “system that is its own product,” a self that produces itself by fashioning the equipment that mobilizes itself (89). Recognizing that this auto-generative capability is central to Malabou’s own thinking of plasticity, Pottage also notes that this process is exactly what Foucault describes as “ethopoiesis.” Foucault is actually a thinker of plasticity, Pottage argues, despite Malabou’s dismissal of him. Similarly, Moten takes issue with Malabou’s insistent need to “deconstruct biopolitical deconstruction,” a gesture that, he argues, ultimately reconstitutes very thing it claims to deconstruct. Doesn’t locating sovereignty within the materiality of the brain just relocate in tact what had previously been confined to symbolic life? And doesn’t this relocation ultimately just make the brain a new version of the old sovereignty (283)? Contrary to Pottage’s reliance on the autopoiesis of an internally self-transformative and auto-corrective system, Moten wants to preserve the possibility of a rupture from outside, a rupture that might critique sovereignty beyond a simple relocation.

    Although Pottage and Moten both contest the impetus for Malabou’s investigation into plasticity’s politics, they do not challenge the ontological foundation for her investment in this materialism or the currency this ontology has within the sciences (not just neurosciences). This relation between ontology, politics, and science comes into full focus in Malabou’s essay, “Whither Materialism? Althusser/Darwin.” Here, Malabou argues for an intractably political understanding of how Darwinism collapses transcendence into a strict materialism.

    If “materialism” is understood simply as the “name for the nontranscendental status of form,” where “matter” is understood as a self-formation that produces “the conditions of possibility of this formation itself,” then any materialism worthy of the name cannot legitimately be considered transcendental, since “transcendental” indicates “a position of exteriority in relation to that which it organizes” (48). As a result, following Althusser, Malabou claims that the history of philosophy has described this relationship between materialism and transcendence in two main ways.

    The first is “dialectical teleology,” which describes an internal tension toward a telos governs “the formation of forms.” Althusser and Malabou both reject this form of materialism because it ultimately abides a fundamentally transcendental structure. In this configuration, an anterior structure of meaning precedes form and governs its formation.

    The second is “materialism of the encounter,” which regards form as being governed by “the non-anteriority of Meaning.” According to this configuration, form is “form” only as the result of an “encounter.” As Malabou puts it: “forms are encounters that have taken form” (49). According to Althusser, this “materialism of the encounter” entails a rethinking of “necessity.” For him, necessity ought to be thought “as the becoming-necessary of the encounter of contingencies” (qtd. by Malabou 2015: 49). One cannot conceive “necessity” as a rigid, transcendental priority if meaning is not anterior to the formation of forms and if form is the result of an encounter. “Necessity” would be a formation itself, a “becoming-necessity” formed by the encounter between contingencies whose meaning is constituted ex post facto rather than being transcendentally anterior to it. For Althusser, this formation works biologically just as much as it does historically and politically: a species, a people, or a historical movement “gels at certain felicitous moments” and means what it means because of this gelling.

    Malabou’s essay calls into question the legitimacy of Althusser’s homogenization of the political, historical, and biological into a single, unifying process of plastic formation. She asks, “Can we transpose what happens at the level of nature to that of the political and of history?” Is the “encounter” of natural selection in biology comparable to socio-political encounters? To address these questions, Malabou uses Darwin as a route back to Althusser by noting that plasticity “constitutes one of the central motifs of Darwin’s thought” and situates itself “effectively at the heart of the theory of evolution” (50). As Malabou sees it, Darwin describes the evolutionary idea of natural selection precisely as “plastic,” specifically in terms of the relationship between the “variability of individuals within the same species and the natural selection between these same individuals” (50).

    As a thinker of the formation of form, Darwin notes that, to use Althusserian language, variability comprises the “void” or “nothing” from out of which form forms. The possibility of variation is nothing other than the potential within a species for transformation: “the quasi-infinite possibility of changes of structure authorized by the living structure itself” (50). More specifically, this variability is “quasi-infinite,” Malabou claims, again in Althusserian language, because the possibility of variability does not depend on the rigidity of a predetermined, “anterior” criteria or “meaning.” Instead, form is formed “when variability encounters natural selection,” when selection renders the contingency of variability into a necessity. As such, Malabou concludes, “the materialism of the encounter thus pertains to a natural process that assures the permanent selection and crystallization of variations” (51). In this sense, the structure of the encounter Althusser describes has a clear biological component to it since the process of Darwinian natural selection occurs ateleologically, without intention, as a promise, to-come.

    It would therefore be misleading to think of “evolution” as a linear sense of progress and perfectibility. Even though Darwin would use language of “improvement” and “betterment” to describe the adaptability of a species via the processes of natural selection, Malabou cautions that one should not mistake this sense of perfectibility as a teleological “finalism” (52). Instead, thinking natural selection as plastic highlights that the “survival of the fittest” is not a simple elimination of the quantitatively weak in favor of the endurable strong. It is instead a dynamic process of openness to possibility, to adaptability, to complexification, a horizon of potential devoid of predetermination, intent, criteria, and linearity.

    Since “social selection” appears to be precisely the opposite of this unintentional (or non-intentional) structure of natural selection, it would seem as though social and natural selection have no significant overlap. One works automatically, absent of predefined criteria, while the other is a social decision intentionally made according to precise, predefined criteria. Furthermore, given the devastating history of ascribing social functions to natural selection in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries (under the guise of so-called “Social Darwinism”), Malabou notes the sensitive need to proceed with caution when claiming that natural processes might possibly undergird social processes. However, she also notes that the ateleological plasticity of natural selection undermines Social Darwinism’s conflation of natural selection with social selection from the start. Precisely because natural selection is not a rigid sorting of weak versus strong traits according to an intentional and decisive rubric, the racist and supremacist taxonomies of Social Darwinism have no justifiable basis in biology whatsoever. The biological dynamism of natural selection—and of plasticity more generally—demonstrates from all sides the restrictive and repressive outcomes inherent in any attempt to assert “Social Darwinism” as the “social destiny” of biology.[9]

    Yet, the possibility of locating a more authentic connection between natural and social selection, between the biological and the political, will require that the same “void” that constitutes the ateleological structure of biological formation also operates politically. Malabou locates this social plasticity in Althusser’s reading of Machiavelli, who describes the Prince’s virtue according to “his ability to select the best possibilities fortune [contingency] offers, yet a selection made with no intention to do so” (53). How could something like this work, and what could possibly account for the “void” from out of which the encounter forms? “There seems to be no void in our societies,” Malabou states, since, everywhere around us, processes of social selection of aptitudes ultimately select according to a candidate’s conformity to the selective criteria rather than exceptional distinction/difference from them, thus “ensuring the perpetuation and renewability of the identical […], never the emergence of singularities out of nothing” (54).

    From a Marxist perspective, this emphasis on the functionary’s conformity and obedience seems to account for the closure of the possibility of a plastic social selection. From a Bourdieusian perspective, this same degree of acquiescence to the norm precludes the dynamism of plasticity’s social selection—except this time in the name of “privilege,” which, Malabou notes, is “the most predetermined selective criterion ever” (55). The outcome is the same from either perspective: “social selection has the goal of reproducing order, privilege, or the dominant ideology.” It praises conformity, obedience, compliance, and acquiescence to the dominance of the selective criteria. “Who has never had the feeling,” Malabou asks, “that social selection was, in effect, a program and never a promise and that the morphological transformations of society were, deep down, only agents of conservation” (55)?

    Does this mark a limit of social selection? Since social selection always seems to retain this intentional sense of sorting desirable traits, will social selection always lack plasticity? Will “the materialism of the encounter always [be] doomed to be repressed by that of teleology, anteriority of meaning, presuppositions, predeterminations” (52)? Will social selection always be the rigidity that undermines the plasticity of natural selection? Can there be a formative plasticity of social selection? In short, Malabou wants to know if social selection can “join in any way the natural plastic condition,” understood specifically as “the promise of unexpected forms” (55).

    The only way to account for this encounter between the social and the biological would be to recover a “plastic” condition in which both regimes operate according to “criteria that do not preexist selection itself” (56). Here, Malabou is not too far from her earlier desire to uncover a repetition without revenge in her reading of Nietzsche, or her general project of thinking “possibility” beyond the positivity of a preconstituted affirmation. Such a thinking must avoid insisting too soon on difference, since “selection in the order is always an act that confers value and therefore creates hierarchies and norms” (56). Malabou here describes an anarchic ontology, a structure of difference that forms itself and its meaning from an encounter that itself has no predetermined, anterior “meaning.” In Deleuzian language, Malabou summarizes this anarchy as a “selection that produces its own criteria as it operates” (56).

    The void from out of which selection and its criteria form themselves constitutes the possibility of the promise. It is from out of this void (which Malabou also calls an “anonymity”) that “new forms can emerge” as “singular, unpredictable, unseen, regenerating” (57). In a slightly different language, Malabou calls this void “the originary deprivation of ontological wealth” (59). This elegant description highlights the core political thrust of how Malabou envisions plasticity’s radicalism, contrary to Toscano’s earlier accusation that Malabou’s politicization of plasticity proceeds only analogically. To think this “void” emptied of teleological determination and constriction, to uphold a commitment to the “non-anteriority” of its meaning from out of which the formation of form emerges via the materiality of the encounter, is “the most urgent ethical and political task” for a “global world” in which “every place is assigned,” regulated, owned, accounted for (58). This commitment would amount to a renewed call to the subversion of capitalist ideology and to the promise of politics.

     

    Tyler M. Williams is Assistant Professor of Humanities at Midwestern State University.

     

    References

    Boever, Arne De. 2016. Plastic Sovereignties: Agamben and the Politics of Aesthetics. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.

    Burdman, Javier. 2016. “Necessity, Contingency, and the Future of Kant.” Diacritics 44, no. 1: 6-25.

    Derrida, Jacques. 1986. Memoires: For Paul de Man. Translated by Cecile Lindsay, Jonathan Culler, and Eduardo Cadava. New York: Columbia University Press.

    Galloway, Alexander. 2010. “Catherine Malabou, or The Commerce in Being.” French Theory Today: An Introduction to Possible Futures Pamphlet 1. New York: TSPY/Erudio Editions.

    Malabou, Catherine. 2008. What Should We Do With Our Brain? Translated by Sebastian Rand. New York: Fordham University Press.

    — — —. 2010. Plasticity at the Dusk of Writing. Translated by Carolyn Shread. New York: Columbia University Press.

    — — —. 2012a. “Following Generation.” Trans. Simon Porzak. Qui Parle 20, no. 2: 19-33.

    — — —. 2012b. The New Wounded: From Neurosis to Brain Damage. Trans. Steven Miller. New York: Fordham University Press.

    — — —. 2012c. Ontology of the Accident: An Essay on Destructive Plasticity. Translated by Carolyn Shread. Malden, MA: Polity.

    Malabou, Catherine and Tyler M. Williams. 2012. “How Are You Yourself? Answering to Derrida, Heidegger, and the Real.” theory@buffalo 16: 1-22.

    Schwartz, Jeffrey and Sharon Begley. 2002. The Mind and the Brain: Neuroplasticity and the Power of Mental Force. New York: Harper Perennial.

    Williams, Tyler M. 2013. “Plasticity, in Retrospect: Changing the Future of the Humanities.” Diacritics 41, no. 1: 6-25.

    Notes

    [1] In his preface to Malabou’s Plasticity at the Dusk of Writing, Clayton Crockett suggests that “the concept of plasticity” comprises Malabou’s “original, signature idea” (2010, xi). Malabou disputes this claim in an interview by suggesting that plasticity does not belong to her as some sort of proprietary concept; it exists within the circuitry of philosophy’s relation to itself and to others (Malabou and Williams 2012, 4).

    [2] For an example of this misrepresentation of Malabou’s plasticity, particularly its misconstruction as a type of elastic flexibility, see Galloway 2010, 15.

    [3] For more on the relationship between disciplinary rigor and interdisciplinary range in Malabou’s work, particularly regarding the long history of exchange and dissociation between the humanities and the sciences, see Williams 2013, 10-13.

    [4] The second book, published just this past year, is Thinking Catherine Malabou: Passionate Detachments, ed. Thomas Wormald and Isabell Dahms (London: Rowman & Littlefield, 2018).

    [5] In similar terms, though admittedly in an entirely different context, Michael Clune has recently characterized this distinction as “good” versus “bad interdisciplinarity.” See Clune 2018.

    [6] Two examples of this positive role that destruction plays biologically ought to suffice. First, Malabou cites Jean Claude Ameisen: “the sculpting of the self assumes cellular annihilation or apoptosis, the phenomena of programmed cellular suicide: in order for fingers to form, a separation between the fingers must also form. It is apoptosis that produces the interstitial void that enables fingers to detach themselves from one another” (2012c, 4-5). A second example, given by Jeffrey Schwartz, explains how the brain modifies itself in response to either the lack or the abundance of external stimuli, particularly regarding the loss of synaptic efficacy that allows unused neural functions to ‘make room’ for the growth of highly used functions. In this example, the unused visual cortex of a blind person’s brain is recruited for tasks typically resigned solely to the somatosensory cortex. Schwartz describes how the visual cortex of blind patients’ brains activates while reading Braille, to suggest that the visual cortex, receiving no visual stimuli, destroys its previous function to adopt a new one (2002, 198).

    [7] For more on this distinction and Malabou’s critique of it, particularly with regard to the role the sciences play within the humanities, see Williams 2013. Additionally, for a thorough discussion of Malabou’s relation to the tradition of what she calls “biopolitical deconstruction,” particularly at the intersection of aesthetics and politics, see De Boever (2016).

    [8] For a thorough reading of Malabou’s treatment of transcendence and materialism, particularly in her readings of Kant and her engagement with Meillassoux, see Burdman (2016).

    [9] “Social destiny” is a phrase Malabou uses in an earlier version of this essay, which was published in theory@buffalo in 2012 as “Darwin and the Social Destiny of Natural Selection.” In fact, pages 50-56 of Plastic Materialities previously appeared as pages 144-147, 149-151, and 151-153 of theory@buffalo vol. 16 (2012), having been translated from the original French by Lena Taub and Tyler M. Williams.

  • Rob Wilson, Stubborn Resistance: Juliana Spahr’s Auto-ethnography in the U.S. Poetic Undercommons

    Rob Wilson, Stubborn Resistance: Juliana Spahr’s Auto-ethnography in the U.S. Poetic Undercommons

    by Rob Wilson

    a review of Julianna Spahr’s DuBois’s Telegram (Harvard University Press, 2018)

    He called his doctor and joked to him that he was ill with late capitalism.  His doctor did not laugh…

    –Juliana Spahr and David Buuck, “The Side Effect,” An Army of Lovers.[1]

    Change is quick but revolution

    will take a while.

    America has not even begun as yet.

    –Diane di Prima, “Revolutionary Letter # 10”[2]

    Amid atrophied hopes for a literature effectively ‘revolutionary’ in a precarious time of post-Occupy, authoritarian revanchism, the far-flung ills and blockages of Late Capitalism, and what she tracks as returns of “stubborn nationalism,” Juliana Spahr stakes her claim for U.S. poetry with a bleakly Adorno-esque refusal she aims to conjure into new millennial credibility: “’this is not a time for political works of art.’”[3]  The three postwar U.S. literary movements she tracks in Du Bois’s Telegram:  Literary Resistance and State Containment – turn-of-the-new-century alter Englishes, avant-garde modernism, and movement literatures of resistance since the mid-1960s– will offer an emplotted “slide from [Audré] Lorde to Adorno” (15).  This means the shift from claims of poetic activism in writing as such, back to negation, irony, or qualification of such immediate claims for transformative resistance.  All this movement is figured under the pervasiveness of capitalist structures and presumes what Spahr calls literature’s semi-autonomous or “half-in and half-out relationship with capitalism” (16) and so many varied refusals of “complicit nationalism” (53).  To phrase this in the book’s overall analytical trajectory, Spahr tracks how “movement literature with its ties to militant resistance [across the late 60s and early 70s] morphed into multicultural literature” across later decades that instead seek to represent national inclusion and canonical assimilation of diversity (127).

    Spahr’s much-needed lyric/critical jeremiad, putting the micro-literary (poetics) and the macro-political (structured relations) together where they belong, tracks an under-recognized trajectory of state interference in literary figurations and more sublimated avowals into the turn of the twenty-first century as immersive poet-scholar subject.  Spahr complicates and renews “the vexed and uneven relationship between literature and politics,” challenging the all too literary avowal that “literature has a role to play in the political sphere, that it can provoke and resist” (4); that writing (especially “language writing”) as such comprises a politics of resistance in its negations, fragments, non-linearity, and deconstructions.  Framing structural issues and social relations between literature and the state as well as alternative forms of what literature might do politically, Spahr deepens the grasp between such historical ties and private foundations, sites of higher education, as well as publishing outlets both multinational and “a localized, decentralized small press culture” (5) in localities like Honolulu, Oakland and Buffalo.  The book is ‘auto-ethnographic” of Spahr’s own entanglements, complicities, and refusals of American literary-national culture and its university programs and funding structures that sustain it short of revolution and resistance as nourished in the coalitional social “undercommons.”[4]

    Writing on the side of alternative languages and social forms, language becoming minor and de-Anglicized, Spahr embraces the micropolitical flux of what M. M. Bakhtin called the “heteroglossia” within the dialogics of the sign.[5] She yet warns that “there is no robust counter” as alternative to state funding forms and modes of liberal domination, “with a politics that is anything more contestatory than liberal” (26).  Her heart, as poet, editor, publisher, and teacher, remains tied to alternative production and circulation sites in communities of resistance from subpress collective in Honolulu and Chain in Philadelphia to Commune Editions in Oakland. Even as she elaborates multiple forms (experimental, multicultural, neo-formal modernist or worse) for containing, manipulating, acculturating, and restricting “literary resistance” by the American state, still somehow, this study remains hopeful of “antistate” (53) as well as “other-than-national” (53) poetics in form, substance, and social relation.

    This is no melancholic rear-view mirror, but a proleptic movement forward as such into and beyond the contemporary. The sustained argument or, better said, way of reading this poetry is finely scaled at critical-creative levels of macro and micro intervention that may just carry the new millennial day (“it survives”), even if as W. H. Auden demurred in the radical thirties of Yeats, Eliot, Pound, and Rukeyser,

    For poetry makes nothing happen: it survives

    In the valley of its making where executives</p

    From ranches of isolation and the busy griefs,

    Raw towns that we believe and die in; it survives,

    A way of happening, a mouth.[6]

    Making unexpected linkages from Paris and NYC to Africa and the Pacific, Spahr’s study shows that American liberal-literary culture (not just amid well-studied Cold War antagonisms and cooptation but into the blockages of the present moment), was never that free or autonomous.  It was never under-determined or “apolitical” in poetry’s homespun global diplomatic role to shape the world into an American telos figured as freedom, liberation, and self-determination, especially in the global wake of World War II and rise of English. 

    “Relentless monitoring” and co-optation of literary sites, outlets, and works became the US state-funded norm to counter, mollify, moderate, neutralize, and defuse resistance and thus keep any form of “armed militancy” (especially black or Third-World affiliated) at foreign bay (130-131). Networks of foundation funding and State Department support provided the capillary flow of power and capital, covertly and more openly so at times across the sixties and seventies if still “under recognized” (141) in its pervasive impact and consequences as Spahr claims.  At the university level, this meant “an institutionalization of these culturalist movements that would sever them from more insurgent and militant possibilities as they were located within the university” (139).  Such networks of biopower helped to produce and contain racialized resistance, as Roderick Ferguson, Eric Bennett, and Jodi Melamed et al have noted, as recuperated within if not beyond the Cold War academy.[7] 

    Challenging her own immersion in lyric ideologies of First World privilege and a university literary culture aligned with US “imperial globalization,” Spahr exposes claims, taking academic dominion as absorbed in her “avoidance” training at SUNY Buffalo,  that “the modernist tradition excluded [valuing] writing that had direct connection to thriving culturalist and anticolonialist movements of the time” (8).  “I was thinking,” Spahr admits while tracking her own counterconversion to “poetry’s [subaltern] socialities and prosovereignty literatures” in counter-nationalist Hawai’i in the 1990s and the alter- or other-than-Englishes then emerging, “in the way the State Department and the liberal foundations that worked with the State Department wanted me to think” (10).[8]  As Spahr will admit later in chapter three reflecting on another wave of stubborn nationalism, “in many ways this book is an autobiography about how my education [at Bard and Buffalo] told me that certain forms of literature were autonomous when they were not and how long it took me to realize this” (110). Still, Spahr’s will to cultivate resistance remains no less stubborn, no less deeply affiliated as material and literary intervention.

    We need a larger context for mapping strategies of liberal containment, then and now, as in the global critical visions of Aamir Mufti and Stathis Gourgouris working against the unity of the Anglo-global norm and residual claims of Bandung humanism.[9]  For this Spahr deftly turns back to a Cold War moment of resistance in an uncanny trans-Atlantic sign.  The Congress of Black Writers and Artists was planned, for Paris 1956, to serve as “a second Bandung” to help promote the production of literature by black writers, in effect aiming at a kind of literary self-determination beyond colonial interference or world-systemic alignment (1) by the US or USSR.  W.E.B. Du Bois, whose passport had been revoked by the US government the year before, sent a telegraph explaining his non-attendance and refusing acquiescence to the state:  “Any Negro-American who travels abroad today,” Du Bois wrote, “must either not discuss the conditions in the United States or say the sort of thing which our state department wishes the world to believe.”[10]  He further explained his action in terms of political refusal and social re-alignment:  “The government especially objects to me because I am a socialist and because I believe in peace with Communist states like the Soviet Union and their right to exist in security” (2). 

    Indeed, as Spahr elaborates this longer duration, CIA front groups would fund Americans attending as writers and expected ideological acquiescence in return for such support:  “In addition, all [writers, such as Richard Wright, Mercer Cook, and Horace Mann Bond et al] had agreed to file reports to the Congress for Cultural Freedom, another CIA front group created to covertly launder funds from the CIA into various cultural diplomacy projects, when they returned” (2).  In this particular Paris conference forum, the US state department wanted to assure that voices of anti-colonialism would not carry the agenda and that systemic critiques tying US racism to such figurations in Europe and the Caribbean would be diminished.  Here Richard Wright played anti-communist informant, assuring that figures such as Duke Ellington would attend the congress rather than the antinomian Paul Robeson whom James Baldwin, by contrast, had long defended as figure of radical black critique from Harlem to Paris to Moscow. 

    Bandung in 1955 had awoken this US apparatus to African literature as a site of decolonization struggle (93), even as embraced through quasi-blackface figures like Uli Beier funded from Nigeria to Papua New Guinea.[11] “The combination of cultural center and [literary] journal was a classic CIA pattern at the time,” meaning post-Bandung as Spahr explains (96). The CIA works with private US foundations to support postcolonial English writing in Africa and the Boom in Latin America as literary freedom beyond ordinary realism at best or some version of “apolitical’ influencing the transnational imaginary and containing the literature of decolonization. Not as Aime Cesaire advocated for Martinique, revolution in the name of bread, fresh air, and poetry.  All literature is embedded in social relations, struggles, and wars of position however sublimated.  Spahr rather jarringly supports Pascale Casanova’s all-too-Francocentric assumption of aesthetic experimentation that literature is created via “incessant struggle and competition over the very nature of literature itself—an endless succession of literary manifestos, movements, assaults and revolutions,” both at the world and national level.[12]  This agonistic struggle to define and canonize American poetry, Spahr shows, had the manipulation of the nation-state as long shadow to its formally “autonomous” achievements.

    Spahr presumes, with the world republic of letters model of Casanova she invokes, that there is an inherent conservation function to “literature that is written in the language of the state, the standard language” (12).  But such writing is always being opposed, denaturalized, and denationalized from various angles, as in the poetry of Myung Mi Kim et al.  Such resistance is read at best as partial or transient or, by now, “rare.”  Spahr views such resistance as “supplementary” to more radical claims.  She notes how literary ties to social movements of resistance “so often fail to be revolutionary for long, fail to grow, or merely maintain [community] solidarity” (14). 

    In chapter one, Spahr assumes that a poetics in by-now-dominant English that includes “languages other than English” might offer “a possible literature of resistance,” at least to “linguistic curtailment” or death of minor or other languages (29), linguicide-via-global-hegemony.[13]  Given the threat of monolingual nationalism cum globalization, other languages from Polish to Thai heritages et al begin to manifest in American English poetry, but hardly marked as “a language of liberation” (33).  Pidgin appears besides colonial languages and is used as investigative medium for global routes and colonial crossings that lead to the present settler-colonial layering:  as in the exemplary transpacific Korean/American work of Myung Mi Kim in Dura and Commons, read by Spahr as situating “the 38th Parallel [tied] to her personal narrative to be understood as a larger historical narrative, as the result of globalizing capitalism” (39). 

    Spahr rightly argues, in such contexts of language mixtures, language politics, and entangled resistances to state-sponsored English anguish in dominated spaces, that “Hawai’i provides an unusually succinct example here of both the importance of literature to [Hawaiian] nationalism and of resistance to [US] nationalism at the turn of the twenty-first century (41-42).  Her reading of these tensions in an array of contexts and struggles from the 1970s to the present is convincing.  Hawaiian language becomes imprisoned yet flourishing, Pidgin English both inflated into anticolonial tactic and accommodated into tourist functioning, as is her related reading of the ambivalent Narragansett language use in experimental texts in Rhode Island in the early 1990s and Nahuatl language use in Francisco X. Alarcon.  Nevertheless, as a force of resistance to dominant-state nationalism and the capitalist dynamics of globalization, Spahr invokes David Graeber on the militant anti-globalization movements from Seattle to Chiapas, assuring that for the state “it is puppets, not literature that police fear at this time” (55).[14]

    In chapter two, Spahr queries how much of an “other than national” challenge literary modernism was as an internationalism of resistance to any such U.S. “literary nationalism,” as she was taught at Buffalo.  Such a poetics embraced “syntactically atypical grammars” and dialectics of idiolects as in “smashing and crashing” (76) prosody of Gertrude Stein’s Tender Buttons that (in its “bourgeois interior” as “imperial space” [74]) yet challenged official verse culture in the New Critical mode (57).  “Nashville, not Paris, was the center” of this official American-verse culture refusal to be sure (57):  “I carried this division in my suitcase with me to my first job at the University of Hawai’i at Manoa” (58) she admits of her pre-conversion model opposing lyric quietude to post-language traditions. Stein’s works need to be read, as she learned in Hawaii, as a response to colonialism and imposed languages (61), “very aware of language politics” (61) in such sites of linguistic and cultural domination and shifting hierarchies. 

    Literary movements towards aesthetic revolution, even in the ferment of little magazines like Transition that played such a crucial role in fomenting international modernism, as Spahr will summarize, “are poked and prodded into existence by social forces and influences”(63).  This occurs even in sublimating modernists like Woof, Eliot and Stein, here read as writing “in a world changed by colonialism” (68). Even Stein, as Spahr tracks her modernist experimental movements into and out of abstractionism, becomes a “cringe-inducing” jingoist (77) and stubborn nationalist Example One.  As “national governments [began to] manipulate, cultivate, and fund what [Casanova] calls ‘autonomous’ literature to instrumentalized it as nationalist” (77).  Spahr rehearses how (ironically in a “Casanova-style rhetoric” [82] embracing aesthetic autonomy) the postwar CIA became increasingly interested in promoting “abstract and avant-garde art forms” as signals of American freedom, ideological transcendence, and anti-communist play via state-sponsored cultural diplomacy to rival that of the Soviet Union.

    Stein’s Four Saints in Three Acts and Gershwin’s Porgy and Bess would be funded, spread, performed, and highlighted internationally as American works “to instrumentalize blackness in cultural diplomacy” via state or private sponsorship (83). Fending off critiques of the USA became a mid-century literary goal, funded, sponsored, nourished at home and distributed abroad in a nexus of state and private sponsorship. This infrastructure makes this “world republic of letters” as Spahr rehearses in compelling scope and detail, wobble with capitalist distortion at the Cold War core of this emergent American-global nexus. Moreover, this core, on the American front from Richard Wright to James Baldwin and William Faulkner et al, took thick-cultural dominion in anthology and university study, as “writers amplified by these networks are disproportionally [still] represented in the canon of American literature” (89).  This cultural diplomacy and funding produced and contained resistance on the home front.  It became, in effect a capillary version of Foucault’s liberal nexus of power and resistance:  “It might be that at the end of the twentieth century one could not become a successfully resistant writer,” Spahr argues, “without having at some moment been supported or amplified by the publication and distribution technologies of these [state-sponsored] networks” (90-1).[15]

    Even in a seemingly post-national or multinational publishing era of the global novel, “the role the Standard English realist novel has in upholding U.S. nationalism” is not abolished especially as it can absorb other national forms and cultural modes, and even as “state sponsored multiculturalism” continues (146-147) through tactics of cultural diplomacy enduringly global. Resistance in the new millennium grows ever more atrophied. Mainstream American poetry, in the wake of programs like Poetry for Bush, becomes gleefully accommodationist, “conventional and outmoded” as in business-value poetic works of Kooser, Keillor, Barr, Gioia et al (157). Such literature produces a faux populism and apolitical muse of cheery pluralism, as in the nationalist inaugural poems (here read as multicultural “strawpoem[s]”) performed by Maya Angelou, Elizabeth Alexander and Richard Blanco. Spahr goes against the grain of this naturalized claim to ratify social diversity as achieved via American literary inclusion: “How to understand this insistence by institutions that U.S. literary production is diverse, is a sort of social justice program [justifying the nation], when it is not in the aggregate is something I am attempting to puzzle through” (182). All this is taking place at a time when the literary vocation has become increasingly professionalized and, at the core, tied to academic legitimation.

    Nowadays, across the new century signified by the neoliberal MFA industry, “literature has been sequestered into [American] irrelevance” (184),  Spahr concludes. This is a poetics shorn of ties to movements of social resistance, militant or antifascist dissent.[16]  More literature is produced but less is read, or read by smaller literary-supporting and reviewing communities, becoming inconsequential, sustained by those with a professional stake in literary production and consumption or its sheer continuation, limited in political efficacy by such “structural conditions” as she elaborates them in this study.

     

    “If I was a poet,” as the auto-fiction narrator in Ben Lerner’s Leaving the Atocha Station (2011) confesses, “I had become one because poetry, more intensely than any other practice, could not evade its anachronism and marginality and so constituted a kind of acknowledgement of my own preposterousness, admitting my bad faith in good faith, so to speak.”[17] This is one of many deconstructive feedback loops of self-irony undermining the postmodernist will to literary activism via formalist experimentation. Drifting into and out of “the handful of prefabricated subject positions proffered by capital or whatever you wanted to call it,” Lerner’s hyper-reflective expatriate poet (funded by a Fulbright fellowship) is haunted by dope-addled inaction, museum going, urban drifting, and North American privilege as well as what he calls “bad faith” leftist claims to overcome the political-literary divide running from the Spanish Civil War to 9/11 and the US War in Iraq.  “I could lie about my interest in the literary response to the war because by making a mockery of the notion that literature could be commensurate with mass murder I was not defaming the latter,” Lerner admits of his picaresque literary protagonist, “but the dilettantes of the former, rejecting the political claims repeatedly made by the so-called left for a poetry radical only in its unpopularity” (101).  The Fulbright director in Madrid is only too happy when the Spanish Civil War-researching American expatriate poet finally gives a talk on a “literature now” panel (as Spahr’s study would have predicted) disavowing the political efficacy of literature to alter history, in the tortured self-ironizing claim that “literature reflects politics more than it affects it, an important distinction” (175).

    Leaving behind the 2004 terrorist bombing of Madrid’s Atocha Station if not ironically abiding in deferral tactics of virtuality mimed in the John Ashbery poem of the novel’s very title, Lerner undermines more extremist claims (contra Du Bois, di Prima et al) that “poems [function] as machines to make things happen” (52) in history or society, then or now.[18]  By novel’s end, Lerner’s writer-hero gnostically abides in scare-quotes of irony (as in “the so-called left” or, later, “when history came alive, I was sleeping at the Ritz” [158]) and a future-perfect virtuality. Lerner’s novel is riddled with affects that Benjamin had called at the dawn of European literary modernism the “left-wing melancholy” of idealized attachments to the past, defeated causes, bad poetry, and failed revolutionary dreams.[19]  It is this sense of perpetual poetic self-irony that Spahr herself (as does Lerner’s persona by contemporary analogy) battles against by affirming (against neoliberal odds) the will to break through forever signifying utopic virtuality and backward-focused defeat or compulsion into stronger, transformative, and abiding forms of “resistance.”[20]

    In the face of stubborn nationalism, professionalized academia, white privilege, and multicultural accommodation, Spahr’s Du Bois’s Telegram (like a message blasted from future movements) refuses perpetual self-irony, left melancholy, and pessimism of the defeated will:  “We are for sure not there, yet.  But one can always hope” (194).  That is, to align with insurgent forces of the undercommons to manifest modes of “stubborn resistance” in poetry and other works and sites, as in an emergent subterranean nexus of social domains and labor.[21]


    [1] Juliana Spahr and David Buuck, “The Side Effect,” An Army of Lovers (San Francisco, CA:  City Lights Press, 2013), 101.

    [2] Diane di Prima, Revolutionary Letters (San Francisco, CA:  Last Gasp, 2007), 20.

    [3] Juliana Spahr, Du Bois’s Telegram:  Literary Resistance and State Containment (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard UP, 2018), 15.  Spahr is quoting from Theodor W. Adorno, Notes to Literature, trans. Shierry Weber Nicholsen, vol. 2 (New York:  Columbia University Press, 1992), 93-94.  Further references to Du Bois’ Telegram will occur parenthetically.

    [4] In defense of revolutionary energies and tactics surging up in the present moment of neo-liberal blockage, Spahr credibly invokes Stefano Harney and Fred Moten, The Undercommons: Fugitive Planning and Black Study, (Brooklyn, New York: Minor Compositions, 2013).

    [5] See The Dialogic Imagination:  Four Essays by M. M. Bakhtin, trans. Caryl Emerson and Michael Holquist (Austin:  University of Texas, 1981) on literary language as “ideologically saturated” with contestation and subversion, 171.

    [6] W. H. Auden, “In Memory of W.B. Yeats,” Collected Poems, ed. Edward Mendelson (New York:  Random House, 1976), 197.

    [7] At varying levels of racial and class containment as well as productive proliferation across university culture, see Roderick Ferguson, The Reorder of Things:  The University and Its Pedagogies of Minority Difference (Minneapolis:  University of Minnesota Press, 2012); Jodi Melamed, Represent and Destroy:  Rationalizing Violence in the New Racial Capitalism (Minneapolis:  University of Minnesota Press, 2011); and Eric Bennet, Workshops of Empire:  Stegner, Engle, and American Creative Writing during the Cold War (Iowa City:  University of Iowa Press, 2015).

    [8] On counter-conversions taking place across the decolonizing Pacific at the time Spahr was teaching in Hawai’i during the 1990s, see Rob Wilson, Be Always Converting, Be Always Converted: An American Poetics (Cambridge, Mass.:  Harvard University Press,  2009), especially chapter four on the world vision of Epeli Hau’ofa’s polytheistic Oceania, 119-142.

    [9] See Aamir R. Mufti, Forget English!:  Orientalisms and World Literature (Cambridge, Mass:  Harvard University Press, 2016) and Stathis Gourgourias, The Perils of the One (New York:  Columbia University Press, 2019).

    [10] The FBI file of state surveillance on James Baldwin contains some 1884 pages of documents, becoming a kind of “fiction produced by the state” about the writer’s ties to the Communist party, the Black Panthers, and other radical movements, and his Paris ties:  see Hannah K. Gold, “Why Did the FBI Spy on James Baldwin?”, The Intercept, August 15, 2015):  https://theintercept.com/2015/08/15/fbi-spy-james-baldwin/.  Gold quotes Baldwin’s scathing insight that J. Edgar Hoover is “history’s most highly paid (and most utterly useless) voyeur.”

    [11] For global political contexts within and beyond anti-colonial claims at Bandung, see Aamir Mufti, “The Late Style of Bandung Humanism,” boundary 2 conference on February 12, 2013:  https://www.boundary2.org/2013/02/aamir-mufti-the-late-style-of-bandung-humanism/.

    [12] Pascale Casanova, The World Republic of Letters, trans. Malcolm DeBevoise (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2004), 12.

    [13] Even in the US, Spahr observes in her capaciously empirical first chapter, there are still 169 languages indigenous to this mongrel polity and 430 languages spoken across it, reflecting and refracting varied reactions to the rise of global English, Du Bois’s Telegram, 30. 

    [14] David Graeber, Possibilities:  Essays on Hierarchy, Rebellion and Desire (Oakland, CA:  AK Press, 2007).

    [15] Although Foucault is not invoked in Spahr’s study, the problematic of state power not merely repressing but actually aiding, informing, producing, and abetting certain forms of resistance and dissent, would be compatible with his thickly elaborated model of neoliberal governmentality as an ‘agonism’ of reciprocal incitation, discipline, and struggle across social fields:  see Michel Foucault, The Foucault Effect:  Studies in Governmentality, ed. Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon, and Peter Miller (Chicago:  University of Chicago Press, 1991), 4-5, 141.

    [16] For the longer duration of poetry valued as a site of cultural production and imagination opposed to forms of state domination, tyranny, and terror, see Paul Bové, Poetry Against Torture:  Criticism, History, and the Human (Hong Kong:  Hong Kong University Press, 2010).

    [17] Ben Lerner, Leaving the Atocha Station (Minneapolis, Minnesota:  Coffee House Press, 2011), 101.  Further references to this work will occur parenthetically.

    [18] For a far-ranging intertextual reading of the relationship between Lerner’s two novels and his own hyper-reflective poetics signifying claims of ”virtuality” as contemporary American poet, in the postmodern wake of John Ashbery, Jack Spicer, Robert Creeley et al, see Daniel Katz, “’I did not walk here all the way from prose’:  Ben Lerner’s Virtual Poetics,” Textual Practice 31 (2017):  315-337.  Lerner’s post-Ashbery poetics, self-referentially cited by the novel’s Lerner-like protagonist Adam Gordon in To the Atocha Station, (pp. 90-91), had first been published as “The Future Continuous:  Ashbery’s Lyric Mediacy,” in boundary 2 37 (2010):  201-213.  See also Ben Lerner, “Of Accumulation:  The Collected Poems of Robert Creeley,” boundary 2 35 (2008): 251-262, as particularly relevant to the Marfa chapter of Lerner’s second novel, 10:04 (New York:  Faber and Faber, 2014) set “at the house where Creeley began to die” (167).

    [19] Walter Benjamin, “Left-Wing Melancholy,” republished in The Weimar Republic Sourcebook, edited A. Kaes, M. Jay, and E. Dimendberg (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994),  305.  See also Wendy Brown’s focus on Stuart Hall’s overcoming this attachment to lost objects and idealizations of some quasi-Marxist revolutionary past, “Resisting Left Melancholia,” Verso Books blog (February 12, 2017):  https://www.versobooks.com/blogs/3092-resisting-left-melancholia.  Brown’s influential essay had first appeared in boundary 2 26 (1999):  19-27.

    [20] “Resistance” can seem an antiquated slogan.  In a neo-liberal capitalist regime assuming self-surveillance and self-exploiting labor and consumption, as Byung-Chul Han grimly argues, wherein “auto-exploitation” of the achievement-driven subject has become everyday norm, “People who fail in the achievement-society see themselves as responsible for their lot and feel shame instead of questioning society and the system…no resistance to the [neoliberal] system can emerge in the first place”  See Byung-Chul Han, Psychopolitics:  Neoliberalism and New Technologies of Power, trans. Erik Butler (London and New York:  Verso, 2017), 6; and (by contrast) the heretical tactics of “Idiotism” in Chapter 13.  Hence, “depressive” affects and the “psychopolitical” ills and compulsions of Late Capitalism are tracked in Spahr and Buuck, An Army of Lovers (see footnote one above).  Writing becomes less the resistance than the insistence of such psychosomatic and systemic ills.

    [21] I still admire the subterranean and quasi-messianic force of Bob Kaufman’s absurd/communist (Abomunist) demand from the undercommons of Cold War San Francisco, as first articulated in his Beatitude mimeograph journal (1959):  “Abomunists demand statehood for North Beach.”  See Bob Kaufman, “Abomunist Manifesto,” Solitudes Crowded with Loneliness (New York:  New Directions, 1965), 81. Kaufman’s “black Jesus” tactics of silence, flight, self-martyrdom, and absurdity seem close to what Byung-Chul Han calls (after Deleuze) the immanent beatitude of “Idiotism,” Psychopolitics, 86-87. 

  • Remembering Joseph A. Buttigieg

    Remembering Joseph A. Buttigieg

    May 20, 1947 – January 27, 2019

    boundary 2 – 1978 to 2019

    “it is impossible to blame solely reactionary elements for the rise of fascism . . . the antagonists did not . . . offer a coherent and persuasive alternative . . . because they themselves were lacking in rigor and uncritically adopted methods and paradigms from the dominant culture.”

    “the way to avoid making such blunders . . . is to remain true to the methods of criticism and philology.”

    — “Gramsci’s Method,” boundary 2 (1990)

    The boundary 2 community celebrates Joseph A. Buttigieg’s contributions as a long-standing member of its editorial masthead. In memory of Joe, Duke University Press is making one of his most important essays, “Gramsci’s Method,” freely available for six months. You can find it here.

    Poem for Joe

    by Richard Berengarten

    Now that you’re gone, Joe, without fuss, without hint of ceremony,

    “let me cast a few chosen words on the air, so that others

    may know what kind of man you were, even if only sketchily –

    your company was always a delight, to be looked forward to,

    and your conversation witty, sharp, funny, elegant; your quick

    intuitive vision saw directly through murk, into depths,

    and wouldn’t be fooled or fazed into confusing the one

    for the other. You pitched yourself against turbulent darknesses

    to nurture and foster clarity; and your magnanimous

    gentle heart played central role in your judgments, but without sentimentality or fear, yet with humour and modesty;

    a scholar-thinker, who loved literature and the unending

    play of ideas and images across, into, and out of the mind

    like sunlight striking and streaking over unclouded water

    as if this light in-and-of the mind itself, gathering

    and reflecting that of the entire phenomenal world,

    could, would, and indeed will somehow penetrate and

    influence motives of human behaviour for the better,

    and so transform the very best of human aspirations

    into real presence, into this-now, into now-this, and all

    its most intimate and infinitesimal holdings and flows

    into goodness, τον καλόν, life worth living, life well lived.

    Today, as my own heart ticks over and now and then makes

    sudden small leaps in anticipation of oncoming spring,

    an overwhelming sadness patrols the acres of my being.

    Ah Joe, now you’re gone there’s a hole in the world that won’t

    be sealed over so easily by this year’s remaining snows

    or drained away by our melting and flooding rivers, while

    still I’ll remember you and the rest of this unsung song.

    Cambridge, January 28, February 5, February 15, 2019

    Richard Berengarten is a British poet, translator and editor.

  • Mikkel Krause Frantzen—No utopia, not now? (Review of Miguel Abensour’s Utopia from Thomas More to Walter Benjamin)

    Mikkel Krause Frantzen—No utopia, not now? (Review of Miguel Abensour’s Utopia from Thomas More to Walter Benjamin)

    by Mikkel Krause Frantzen

    “The situation is bad, yes, okay, enough of that; we know that already. Dystopia has done its job, it’s old news now, perhaps it’s self-indulgence to stay stuck in that place any more. Next thought: utopia. Realistic or not, and perhaps especially if not.

    Besides, it is realistic: things could be better.”

    (Kim Stanley Robinson)

    1. Da capo: The so-called death of utopia and other introductory remarks

    Utopia – if not now, when? If not today, tomorrow?

    There is a certain tiredness connected to the topic, before the investigation is even begun, a feeling of déjà dit, of having said it all before to the point of utter exhaustion, despair and self-hatred. Yet it seems imperative to continue anyway, to pursue the question once more: What is the fate of utopia today, in this day and age, where there really is no alternative, as Margaret Thatcher infamously declared, and history has (still) ended, as Francis Fukuyama just as triumphantly trumpeted in 1989?

    In the midst of economic and ecological crisis it does indeed appear as if the utopian spirit has vanished for good. As far as the (un)real economy is concerned, we are witnessing and living through a fully-fledged state of financialization,[1] characterized by ever more sophisticated forms of fictitious capital:  derivatives, futures, options and other products that are traded by algorithms with the speed of lightning (trades are reportedly made in 10 milliseconds or less). After the abolition of Bretton Woods by Nixon in 1971,[2] financial derivatives trading has long since surpassed $100 trillion, and is currently many times the size of the global GDP. Meanwhile, the levels of debt are through the roof. As German scholar Joseph Vogl states in an interview—in an inversion of the famous opening lines from the Communist Manifesto, which he has not only picked up from Don DeLillo’s 2003 novel Cosmopolis but also used as a title for one of his books:

    A spectre or an apparition is a present reminder that something has gone awry in our past. A debt has remained unpaid, or a wrong has not been righted. The spectre of capital works the other way around, signaling that something in the future will be wrong. It is a future of mounting debt that comes to weigh on the present. The ‘spectre of capital’ does not come out of the past, but rather as a memento out of the future and back into the present” (Vogl 2011).

    This specter of capital, which comes from the future rather than the past, haunts more than the world of finance, it also haunts society as such; the spectral tentacles of financialization reach far into everyday life. One concrete example would be the devastating state of chronic indebtedness that makes people suffer all over the world. Another and related example would be the fact that more and more people are getting depressed; globally no less than 300 million people are currently estimated to suffer from the mental illness according to WHO. And as I have shown elsewhere, depression is not only a personal problem but also and above all a political problem which manifests (or should I say conjures up) the alienation of the contemporary subject in its most extreme and pathological form.[4] It is the paradigmatic psychopathology of our time, and a symptom of a neoliberal world where the future is closed off, frozen once and for all.

    In this latest crisis in the cycles of capitalist accumulation, in this season of autumn, if not winter, the future is definitely not what it used to be.[5] As for the imminent ecological disaster, there literally is no future; very soon there is no tomorrow. At all. It should come as little surprise, then, that utopian impulses have seen better days. William Davies writes that there is no “enclave outside the grid” and no “future beyond already emerging trends,” concluding: “The utopia of neoliberalism is the eradication of all utopias” (Davies 2018: 20; 5). Even the harshest critics of neoliberalism and finance capital seem to be caught in a state of left or west melancholy, while other thinkers are all too delighted with having (finally!) arrived in the land of postcritical milk and postutopian honey.[6]

    To supplement the hypotheses of the end of history and the end of nature, then: The end of utopia. It is important to note, however, that this song has been sung before. Raymond Aron proclaimed the end of ideology, revolution and utopianism back in 1955, and very similar arguments were made by Judith N. Shklar in After Utopia: The Decline of Political Faith (1957)and Daniel Bell in The End of Ideology (1960), not to mention Christopher Lasch, a couple of decades later, in his bestseller The Culture of Narcissism: American Life in an Age of Diminishing Expectations from 1979. In 1989, Fukuyama’s article on the end of history was published, and in 1999 Russell Jacoby wrote The End of Utopia. Politics and Culture in an Age of Apathy, where he lays out this genealogy while at the same time describing how around the turn of the millennium he and his contemporaries “are increasingly asked to choose between the status quo or something worse. Other alternatives do not seem to exist,” how they have “little expectation the future will diverge from the present,” and how few “envision the future as anything but a replica of today” (Jacoby 1999: xi-xii).

    Yet there are those who sing a different tune and who insist on the value of utopian thinking (just as there are utopian practices out there).[7] Obviously, Fredric Jameson springs to mind here. In Archaeologies of the Future. The Desire called Utopia and Other Science Fictions from 2005, Jameson, following the work of Ernst Bloch, famously distinguishes between utopia as an impulse and utopia as a program in his general attempt “to reidentify the vital political function Utopia still has to play today”, specifically within the genre of science fiction (Jameson 2005: 21).[8] Also meriting consideration is the political philosopher Miguel Abensour, who passed away in 2017, but whose whole oeuvre was an ongoing analysis and discussion of the continued relevance of utopia in the late 20th and early 21st century through the historical method of revisiting canonical utopian texts, from Thomas More to Saint-Simon, from William Morris to Ernst Bloch. Persistent utopia, he called it in an article of the same name from 2006.

    However, it is the book with the no-nonsense title Utopia from Thomas More to Walter Benjamin, translated into English in 2017, which this review essay will orbit around. The questions probed by Abensour are the following ones: What does it mean to be a utopian animal in a postutopian age?[9] How do we think utopia in a time of crisis and in the face of danger? Can we find sites where utopia persists, and if so, how are we to interpret them? But the question that also animates my text is a question of historicization and periodization. As indicated above, however briefly, it stands to reason that our historical epoch goes back to the beginning of the 1970s, yet this does not mean that everything has remained the same ever since. So what are the continuities and discontinuities—not only between the age of More, the age of Benjamin and the contemporary age—but also between 2000, when Abensour’s book was originally published in French, and 2018, this year of grace (and here I am in particular thinking of the domains of economy and ecology, the transformations in and of finance and nature)? Let us in any case remember, as Abensour cautions us to do, that utopia precisely poses a question, rather than an answer or a solution (UBM: 10).[10]

    2. Between systematic deprecation and uncritical exaltation: Miguel Abensour’s reading of utopian thought in Thomas More and Walter Benjamin

    The book Utopia from Thomas More to Walter Benjamin is a twofold exegesis; a meditation on, first, Thomas More, and, then, Walter Benjamin. It is as simple as that, although as Abensour admits at the very outset, the two thinkers in question have little in common—except for their contribution to utopian thinking. What this means is that Abensour does not in any way carry out a traditional comparative study. “Rather,” the author writes himself, “the project is one of seizing hold of utopia in two different but powerful moments in its fortunes: the first moment is that of utopia’s beginning, and the second is the moment when utopia faced its greatest danger, the moment that Walter Benjamin called ‘catastrophe’” (UBM:9). Two names, two historical moments: Thomas More and the birth of utopia; Walter Benjamin and the danger and possible death of utopia.

    Saving for later a proper actualization of Abensour’s work and the addition of a third historical moment, namely our contemporary moment, about which Abensour more often than not kept his distance, let me simply note that for Abensour it is imperative to avoid two particular and equally untenable positions with regard to utopia: utopia’s “systematic deprecation as well as its uncritical exaltation” (UBM:13). And with that in mind, it is time to hone in on Abensour’s reading of Thomas More, a reading that precisely seeks to avoid praising or damning the book. Sitting with More’s book from 1516 (with the Latin title De Optimo Reipublicae Statu), which coined the word utopia as a play on the Greek words for ou-topia (non-place) and eu-topia (good-place), the reader therefore needs to take into account its “extraordinarily complex textual apparatus” (UBM:20). This implies that attention must be paid to the paratext, the metafictional framework and the oft neglected book I of Utopia—written after the more famous book II—where Raphael Hythloday (another pun), the character/author Thomas More and Peter Giles meet in the Belgian city of Antwerp and starts discussing a series of problems, familiar to any reader of Machiavelli and Plato, concerning the relation between philosophers and kings and how best to offer council to a prince. They also address some of the modern ills affecting Europe at the time: war, poverty, the enclosure of the commons, and the death penalty, which Raphael thinks is too harsh a punishment for a thief (“what other thing do you than make thieves and then punish them?” (More 1999: 24-25). This both sets the scene for and destabilizes book II in advance, the book where Raphael recounts the five years he spent on the Utopia, situated an unknown place in the New World and originally a peninsula but now an island due to the decision of the founder King Utopos to separate it from the mainland. It is here that the readers are rewarded with the image of a true commonwealth, with “no desire for money” and no private property: “For in other places,” Raphael tells his listeners and the readers, “they speak still of the commonwealth. But every man procureth his own private gain. Here, where nothing is private, the common affairs be earnestly looked upon” (More 1999: 119).

    Abensour’s claim, however, is that one should refrain from what he calls “the impatience of tyrannical readings,” which in this case implies that one ought to be wary of readings that interpret Utopia as a proper communist commonwealth, i.e. as “prophesying modern communism” (UBM:30; 22). By the same token, any catholic reading that views Utopia as More’s unequivocal defense of “the values of medieval Christian solidarity” is bound to shipwreck (UBM:22). Abensour groups these types of reading under the heading realist readings, which he contrasts with allegorical readings. The former foregrounds the question of politics, while the latter places the question of writing at the center, and the point is that both are wrong. Already it is clear that the utopian question is, for Abensour, a literary question, a question of both writing and reading. The question of politics and the question of literature must be thought alongside each other.

    Naturally, any utopia is the stuff of fiction; the very idea of utopia entails an imaginary process of fictionalization or fabulation, and borders as such on the genre of science fiction, which Abensour does not touch on. But Abensour’s book does offer a welcome reminder of the rhetorical and literary character of Utopia, the ways in which it operates in several registers at once (travel narrative, satire, political treatise etc.),and how this in turn creates and conditions the political character of the work: “Utopia, so often presented as one of the most vigorous expressions of political rationalism, in fact has much in common with the ruses of the trickster” (UBM:31). The conclusion Abensour draws from all this, is that the utopian task ultimately, in the last instance so speak, falls to the reader: “The privilege the textual device enjoys has the effect of engaging the reader in a different mode of reading, one separate from a sterile ideological one,” he writes in a passage that demands to be quoted at length:

    “It is as if Thomas More, as the title of the book might indicate, did not so much want to present his readers with “the best form of government” as to invite them to look into the topic themselves—and hence the importance of dialogue […] it is a matter of making his readers less into adepts at communism and more into Utopians whose intellects have been sharpened by reading.”

    Anyone with some knowledge of French philosophy in the second half of the 20th century will not have a hard time understanding where Abensour is coming from and why he seemingly has such a guarded attitude towards anything that smells even vaguely of ideology and/or communism.[11] A certain distance is needed, which is why More’s utopia, according to Abensour, rests on a double distance: a distance from the existing order and a distance from “the “positivity” whose contours are utopically drawn” (UBM:49). Manifesting a shift “from the solution or the particular program to the level of principle” is critical in that Utopia thereby “introduces plasticity, and prevents us from reading in a certain erroneous manner” (UBM:52). But I wonder if the price to be paid for the distance and ambiguity stressed so much by Abensour is simply too high? You might end up in front of a window so opaque that you cannot look out of it anymore; that you cannot see what is on the other side. The problem is that the utopia Abensour extracts from Thomas More’s book is so saturated with distance that the island risks disappearing from view. The problem is that the “oblique path of utopia” that Abensour also talks about might in fact be so oblique and curvy that you end up right where you started your journey: back on the mainland.[12]

    3. Utopia or catastrophe? Walter Benjamin and the utopian dreams of the 19th century

    Walter Benjamin, for his part, journeyed to the arcades in the Paris of yesteryear. If More’s Utopia instigated the dawn of utopia, Benjamin’s confronted the danger of utopia: A vision of utopia in the aftermath of the first world war and in the face of fascism across most of Europe. The key question is thus as simple as it is spectacular, if not eschatological: “Utopia or catastrophe?” (UBM:61). The point is clear: We should stick to the idea of utopia, not despite the fact that we are in a state of crisis or amidst a great catastrophe but because of it. As already Kierkegaard emphasized in his writings, hope is only needed when there is none. Utopia seems to have the same absurd and paradoxical quality. The imperative of utopia does not emerge in the hour of triumph, in times so bright that you need sunglasses to go outside; no, the necessity of utopia arises when the light has gone out and everything is completely dark. It is an easy matter to be utopian when everything is all right; the real task presents itself when everything goes to hell. This is one of the lessons that Abensour draws from Benjamin as well: “in the presence of extreme peril, utopia seemed to him more than ever to be the order of the day. In a time of crisis, the need for rescue seemed infinitely greater, and to respond to that need, it seemed best to first rescue utopia by forcing it free from myth and transforming it into a ’dialectical image’” (UBM:13).

    How to rescue utopia, and where? In the past. Abensour quotes a letter where Benjamin states that he aims his “telescope through the bloodied mist at a mirage from the nineteenth century” (UBM:10). What he is looking for in the past, especially in the 19th century, is the century’s dream-images (Wunschbilder), fantasies of the epoch, the hidden or veiled utopias, or the ones that were never realized to begin with. In Abensour’s own words, Benjamin is an “incomparable guide” who can help “us penetrate into the unexplored forest of utopias, not in order to give in to their magic, but to hunt down and chase out the mythology or delirium that haunts and destroys them” (UBM:64). From the beginning of his writing to his tragic death in Portbou at the French-Spanish border in 1940, Benjamin remained “intensely sensitive to the utopian vein that is present throughout the century” (UBM:69). Illumination and awakening was the goal, not to stay in the domain of the dream as Aragon and the other surrealists did in Benjamin’s eyes. This is where dialectics and the dialectical image (filled with ambiguity) comes into play, notwithstanding Adorno’s stubborn accusations in their private correspondences that Benjamin was never, ever dialectical enough: a dialectics of dream and awakening, of past and present, of myth and history, of utopia and catastrophe, of revolution and melancholia.[13]

    But the future? No. Or to be more precise: The notion of futurity remained an unresolved concept in Benjamin’s work. No need to rehearse his remarks, in Über den Begriff der Geschichte (Theses on the Philosophy of History)from the Spring of 1940, on Klee and Angelus Novus, and the storm called progress that blows the angel of history backwards into the future while the ruins of the past are piling up in front of its eyes (Benjamin 2007, 257-258). Instead, let me concentrate, as Abensour encourages his readers to do, on the textual differences between the two prefaces to Das Passagen-Werk that Benjamin wrote in 1935 and 1939, respectively. The Arcades Project as the work is called in English was Benjamin’s ongoing, unfinished project, spanning more than 10 years, in which he visited the old shopping arcades of Paris, these hubbubs of commerce built of iron and galls and filled with Parisian specialties, luxury products and commodities that abound, in the words of Marx, “in metaphysical subtleties and theological niceties” (Marx 2010: 81).

    As a comment on a Michelet-quote—“Each epoch dreams the one to follow”—the first so-called exposé of 1935 includes the lines ”in the dream in which each epoch entertains images of its successor, the latter appears wedded to elements of primal history <Urgeschichte> – that is, to elements of a classless society,” and ends with the following sentences: “The realization of dream elements, in the course of waking up, is the paradigm of dialectical thinking. Thus, dialectical thinking is the organ of historical awakening. Every epoch, in fact, not only dreams the one to follow, but, in dreaming, precipitates its awakening.” (Benjamin 1999, 4; 13) All of this was removed by Benjamin in the second exposé, from 1939, perhaps after the ‘advice’ of Adorno. No more references to Michelet, no more avenir, avenir, no more talk of the dialectical image at all (though it figured prominently in the theses on the concept of history a year later). In Abensour’s reading of this transformation, Benjamin opens up a passage from “a conception of history invoking progress (Michelet) to a conception of history under the sign of catastrophe (Blanqui)” (UBM:88). The exposé of ‘39 thus expires in a completely different affective register, with Louis-Auguste Blanqui and his prison book from 1871, Eternity via the Stars. “This book”, according to Benjamin, “completes the century’s constellation of phantasmagorias with one last, cosmic phantasmagoria which implicitly comprehends the severest critique of all the others […] the phantasmagoria of history itself” (Benjamin 1999: 25). Benjamin then goes on to quote an extensive and brilliant paragraph from Blanqui, where the French revolutionary states that “there is no progress” and notes, in a premonition of Nietzsche’s idea of eternal return, “the same monotony, the same immobility, on other heavenly bodies. The universe repeats itself endlessly and paws the ground in place. In infinity, eternity performs—imperturbably—the same routines.” (Benjamin 1999: 26). Without turning, as Abensour writes, Blanqui into an authority, Benjamin’s exposé of 1939 nevertheless ends on this note, in a “resignation without hope” (Benjamin 1999: 26—a line which Abensour also quotes).

    As such, the exposé resonates, rather unsurprisingly, with the Theses on the Philosophy of History from the following year. In the preparatory notes, the so-called ‘Paralipomena’, Benjamin repeatedly tries out formulations and ideas such as “Die Katastrophe ist der Fortschritt, der Fortschritt ist die Katastrophe” and “Die Katastrophe als das Kontinuum der Geschichte” (Benjamin 1991: 1244). The true catastrophe is not a break with things as they are; the true catastrophe is, rather, that things go on and on. The progress and continuum of history is history’s catastrophe—whereby the historical and political task becomes one of breaking with this continuum. Benjamin himself writes in some oft-quoted lines about revolution as the moment when you pull the emergency brake on the train of history. Utopia in Benjamin, then, is ultimately intimately and dialectically connected with catastrophe: ““The concept of progress must be founded on the idea of catastrophe,” writes Benjamin. It is the same with the practice of utopia” (101).

    4. A new utopian spirit? Five concluding questions to Abensour and the so-called postutopian age

    Abensour’s work takes the reader through two names and two historical moments: Thomas More and the dawn of utopia; Walter Benjamin and the dusk of utopia. To this I want to add a third moment, the contemporary moment, our historical age, in which utopia has not so much disappeared as become utterly irrelevant – which is of course far worse. Utopia is not even in a state of extreme peril anymore, it has simply been deemed too insignificant to attract the slightest attention let alone be put in danger, because, from the point of view of utopia’s sworn enemies, whybother?

    Unfortunately, Abensour is rather silent on the present moment and more or less refrains from actualizing his historical work, though he does sporadically comment on our anti-utopian age and “contemporary misery,” on the thinkers, “postmodern or otherwise” who want us to abandon emancipation altogether, and on the more general, wide-spread “hatred of utopia, that sad passion eternally reasserted over and over, that repetitive symptom which, generation after generation, afflicts the defenders of the existing order, seized with their fear of alterity” (UBM:61; 15; 12).[14] The motivation for the book is thus clear enough, and the fact that Abensour does not have any more to say, or does not want to say any more, about these contemporary matters is only all the more reason to do this ourselves in this context—without leaving behind his concise and useful definition of utopian thought as being ”beyond this or that particular project,” as it is “essentially a thought about a difference from what currently exists, an uncontrollable, endlessly reborn movement toward a social alterity” (UBM:51). As a way of concluding, then, five utopian questions, five questions to utopia, today. If Benjamin’s exposé of 1939 ended on a significantly darker and gloomier note than the one in 1935, then where do our exposés—the exposés of 2000, 2018, 2028—end? On what notes, in which affective attitudes? Do they end in resignation without hope, or in what Benjamin called, in 1931, Linke Melancholie?[15]

    Utopia and time. For all Benjamin’s illuminating thoughts on temporality, our time is not characterized by the “homogenous or empty” time that Benjamin writes about in his theses on the concept of history (Benjamin 2007: 264). By the same token, the problem no longer seems to be the linear, chronological time of historical progress, but rather the heterogenous, loop-like temporality of finance. Today, it is the image of the future, not the past, that “flits by” (“huscht Vorbei”).[16] It is the future that is capsized by capital, pre-emptied in advance by financial speculation and mountains of debt.[17] Yet what would it mean if, accordingly, the political and historical task, the revolutionary and utopian task, becomes one, to modify Benjamin’s thesis 17, of fighting for the oppressed future?[18]

    Utopia and fascism. By now we are certainly in a position to appreciate Abensour’s effort to insist that utopia persists and that it is imperative to attend to when and where it, in Benjamin’s formulation, “flashes up at a moment of danger” (Benjamin 2007: 255). Strangely though, Abensour is reluctant to name any real dangers, any concrete catastrophes. His historical work thus remains rather abstract. In fact, he mentions fascism only once in the part on Benjamin and at the very end at that—and fascism was the historical danger that tainted everything that Benjamin thought and wrote, not only in 1939, but also in 1935 and much sooner than that.[19] Such an omission is simply untenable, both in itself and in light of the current situation. Of course, there is no need to be excessively contemporary, and we cannot have too a myopic focus on the present. But there is historical continuity at stake here. It is impossible to ignore Brexit and Grexit, the reality-presidency of Donald Trump, the alt-right in America, and the European populist parties to the right of the right such as the Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ), the Danish People’s Party (DFP), and Law and Justice (PiS) in Poland. The danger of fascism is not a thing of the past. Can we paraphrase Max Horkheimer and say that anyone who does not want to talk about capitalism and fascism must keep his or her silence about utopia too?

    Utopia and desire. What Abensour highlights time and again is that utopia is a question of desire (recall, also, the subtitle of Jameson’s book, The Desire called Utopia and Other Science Fictions).[20] In “William Morris: The Politics of Romance,” Abensour writes, “the point is not for utopia […] to assign ‘true’ or ‘just’ goals to desire but rather to educate desire, to stimulate it, to awaken it. Not to assign it a goal to desire but to open a path for it” (Abensour 1999: 145-146). He also states that desire “must be taught to desire, to desire better, to desire more, and above all to desire otherwise” (Abensour 1999: 145-146). The point is not to desire another world, but, as a precondition, to desire otherwise (à désirer autrement) to begin with.[21] This pedagogical endeavor runs like an undercurrent through Utopia from Thomas More to Walter Benjamin. In his reading of More, Abensour convinces the reader that More is more interested in the utopian regulation and configuration of desire than in, say, the construction of alternative institutions. Moreover, he discloses that the historical work undertaken by Benjamin was primarily a matter of locating and excavating the dreams and desire of a past epoch, its so-called oneiric dimension, even if or especially when the images of these dreams and desire were already in ruins, in decay or simply buried, dead or alive, which they always were from the vantage point of Benjamin’s melancholic method of allegory. How can we thus understand the question of utopia as a question of education, of learning to desire otherwise, of learning to desire differently, beyond capitalist realism, reproductive futurism and heteronormative moralism – beyond fascism even?

    Utopia and dystopia. Of course, there are no guarantees. The desire called utopia can in itself become anti-utopian, or dystopian. William Davies writes, “In our new post-neoliberal age of rising resentments, racisms and walls, the utopian desire to escape can be subverted in all manner of dark directions” (Davies 2018: 28). Which is true: Desire can indeed run in “all manner of dark directions.” It can lead in the opposite direction of what was intended, it can lead straight into a cul-de-sac. It can be perverted, corrupted. Utopias can be cruel, they have their limits, as China Miéville reminds us in his article “The Limits of Utopia.” The utopia of plastic, for instance. Once, plastic was the dream of a new century, a utopian material, from which Russian constructivist Naum Gabo made a sculpture more or less a hundred years ago. A cheap, submissive, servile, and yet unbreakable and indestructible material, plastic was quickly mass produced, and thus became an integral part of an everyday life that now was made more colorful, smooth and shining. Yet plastics, as we now know, had a flip side. In the Pacific Ocean, islands of microplastic the size of France float around. Plastic has indeed been transformed from a utopia to a dystopia: An omnipresent, indestructible sign of the ongoing ecological catastrophe. Some of the utopias of the historical avant-gardes have suffered a similar fate: their project of a unification of art and life has long ago been realized by contemporary capitalism, in workplaces all around the western world. Analogously, the interstellar aspirations of the Russian Cosmism—leaving planet Earth, defeating the sun, colonizing Mars, and achieving some form of immortality—live on in a perverted form in Silicon Valley, where venture capitalists like Elon Musk wish to conquer the unknown in a SpaceX-rocket. Yet giving up on utopias altogether is not an option. Addressing the liberal left, Nick Land writes: Your hopes are our horror story.” Utopias can indeed be toxic, but the loss of utopias can be toxic as well. Hope has a price, but what is the price of having no hope? What kind of horror is hidden in hopelessness?[22]

    Utopia and nature. Utopia and nature, utopia and ecology. The question is: How to think utopia on the brink of planetary annihilation. But also: How not to think it? Again, the utopian imperative, or impulse, does not emerge in spite of the factthat we are the end, but because of it. This is the lesson from Ernst Bloch, which Abensour carries on: “True genesis is not at the beginning but at the end” (Bloch 1995: 1376). Abensour does implicitly touch on these matters when writing about More and the privatization of the commons (continued today by the privatization of not only land, but of air, that is to say the Earth’s atmosphere) and about Benjamin’s reading of the Fourierist utopia, which seeks to find a new relation to nature and to ground itself on something else than a (technological) domination and exploitation of it.[23] Another relation to nature, another organization of nature, not dictated by Wall Street and Silicon Valley—which also implies other forms of temporality and technology, other structures of desire, other transformations and configurations of bodies, other kinds of social and sexual reproduction. Can we think of a way to think, not the end of history, the end of nature, or the end of utopia, but a history of the end, a nature of the end, a utopia of the end? A utopia at the very end, at long last? Let us, at all events, leave the “enemies of utopia to sing their favorite old song” (UMB: 52).[24]

    Bio

    Mikkel Krause Frantzen (b. 1983), PhD, postdoc at the University of Aalborg, Denmark. He is the author the author Going Nowhere, Slow – The Aesthetics and Politics of Depression (Zero Books, 2019). His work has appeared in Critique: Studies in Contemporary Fiction (2016), Journal of Austrian Studies (2017), Studies in American Fiction (2018), and Los Angeles Review of Books (2018). He has translated William Burroughs’ The Cat Inside and Judith Butler’s Frames of War into Danish, and works, in addition, as a literary critic at the Danish newspaper, Politiken.

    References

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    —. 2008. “Persistent Utopia.” Constellations, Vol. 15, No. 3: 406-421.

    —. 2010. L’Homme est un animal utopique / Utopiques II. Arles, Les Editions de La Nuit.

    —. 2017. Utopia from Thomas More to Walter Benjamin. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

    Ahmed, Sara. 2010. The Promise of Happiness. Durham: Duke University Press.

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    —.  1994.“Left-Wing Melancholy.” In The Weimar Republic Sourcebook, edited by Anton Kaes, Martin Jay, and Edward Dimendberg. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press.

    —. 1999. The Arcades Project. Translated by Howard Eiland and Kevin McLaughlin. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

    —. 2007. Illuminations. Essays and Reflections, Edited by Hannah Arendt and translated by Harry Zohn. New York: Schocken Books

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    —. The Uprising: On Poetry and Finance. Los Angeles: Semiotext(e), 2012.

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    Edelman, Lee. 2004. No Future. Queer Theory and the Death Drive. Durham: Duke University Press.

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    Haiven, Max. 2014. Cultures of Financialization. Fictitious Capital in Popular Culture and Everyday Life. London: Palgrave Macmillan.

    Jacoby, Russell. 1999. The End of Utopia. Politics and Culture in an Age of Apathy. New York: Basic Books.

    Jameson, Fredric. 1994. The Seeds of Time. New York: Columbia University Press.

    —. 1997. “Culture and Finance Capital.” Critical Inquiry, Vol. 24, No. 1 (Autumn): 246-265.

    —. 2005. Archaeologies of the Future. The Desire called Utopia and Other Science Fictions. London: Verso.

    —. 2016. An American Utopia: Dual Power and the Universal Army. London: Verso.

    Keucheyan, Razmig. 2016 Nature is a Battlefield. Towards a Political Ecology. Translated by David Broder. Cambridge: Polity Press.

    Lazzarato, Maurizio. 2011. The Making of the Indebted Man. Los Angeles: Semiotext(e).

    Levitas, Ruth. 2013.Utopia as Method. The Imaginary Reconstitution of Society. London: London: Palgrave Macmillan.

    Marx, Karl. 2010. Capital. Volume I (Marx & Engels: Collected Works, Volume 35). Chadwell Heath: Lawrence & Wishart.

    Miéville, China (year unknown). “The Limits of Utopia.” http://salvage.zone/mieville_all.html.

    More, Thomas. 1999. Utopia. In Three Early Modern Utopias. Utopia, New Atlantis and The Isle of Pines. Edited by Susan Bruce. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Muñoz, José Esteban. 2009. Cruising Utopia. The Then and There of Queer Futurity. New York: New York University Press.

    Nadir, Christine. 2010. “Utopian Studies, Environmental Literature, and the Legacy of an Idea: Educating Desire in Miguel Abensour and Ursula K. Le Guin.” Utopian Studies, Vol. 21, No. 1: 24-56.

    Robinson, Kim Stanley. 2018. “Dystopias Now.” Commune Magazine. https://communemag.com/dystopias-now/.

    Shaviro, Steven. 2006. “Prophesies of the present.” Socialism and Democracy, Vol. 20, No. 3: 5-24.

    —. 2018. “On Lisa Adkins, The Time of Money.” The Pinocchio Theory, September 21, 2018. http://www.shaviro.com/Blog/?p=1520.

    Vogl, Joseph. 2010. The Specter of Capital. Palo Alto: Stanford University Press.

    —. 2011. “Capital and Money are Profane Gods.” The European, November 20, 2018. https://www.theeuropean-magazine.com/joseph-vogl%E2%80%932/370-the-spectre-of-capital.

    Wright, Erik Olin. 2010. Envisioning Real Utopias. London: Verso.


    [1]For more on the concept of financialization, see: Vogl 2010: 83; Haiven 2014: 1.

    [2]As Jameson and others have warned, we should be careful when invoking the gold standard: “I don’t particularly want to introduce the theme of the gold standard here, which fatally suggests a solid and tangible kind of value as opposed to various forms of paper and plastic (or information on your computer)” (Jameson 1997: 261).

    [3]A generalized condition of debt carries with it, to use Maurizio Lazzarato’s phrase, a preemption of the future, i.e. a reduction of “what will be to what is” (Lazzarato 2011: 46).

    [4]See Frantzen 2017. I am, of course, standing on the shoulders of Franco ‘Bifo’ Berardi, who diagnoses the crisis as a crisis in the social imaginations of the future (Berardi 2011; 2012), and the late Mark Fisher who spoke about capitalist realism, i.e. “the widespread sense that not only is capitalism the only viable political and economic system, but also that it is now impossible even to imagine a coherent alternative to it” (Fisher 2009:2). Substantiating and elaborating on Jameson’s well-known claim that it is easier to imagine the end of the world than the end of capitalism, both of them have in their own way diagnosed depression as a prevalent symptom of this historical condition in the western world.  

    [5]Cf. Giovanni Arrighi’s The Long Twentieth Century: Money, Power and the Origins of Our Times (1994).

    [6]One might think of Rita Felski’s book The Limits of Critique from 2015 and Bruno Latour’s hugely influential article “Why Has Critique Run Out of Steam?” from 2004.

    [7]See Wright 2010.

    [8]Some years later, in An American Utopia from 2016, Jameson declared that“utopianism must first and foremost be a diagnosis of the fear of utopia, or of anti-utopianism” (21).

    [9]Here I am alluding to Abensour’s L’Homme est un animal utopique / Utopiques II from 2010.

    [10]Hereafter Utopia from Thomas More to Walter Benjamin is cited as UBM.

    [11]Conversely, it is imperative to remember that utopian is something Marxists traditionally do not want to be. Within the Marxist tradition, the word utopia/utopian has been an insult that Marxists have thrown at people who were deemed to be irresponsible, naïve, unscientific etc. – this has for instance been the case in the longstanding polemics between Marxists and anarchist.

    [12]A further and more traditionally academic objection, which does go beyond my field of expertise, is that I am not sure how original his reading of More is (it makes it hard to tell due to the lack of references to existing scholarship, such as the work of Quentin Skinner and Stephen Greenblatt, for instance).

    [13]It is worth remembering that Abensour has written a text called “Passages Blanqui: Walter Benjamin entre mélancolie et révolution.”

    [14]Queer theorist José Esteban Muñoz echoes this sentiment in his book Cruising Utopia: The Then and There of Queer Futurity, where he writes: “The antiutopian critic of today has a well-worn war chest of poststructuralism pieties at her or his disposal to shut down lines of thought that delineate the concept of critical utopianism” (Muñoz 2009: 10). Inspired by Ernst Bloch, Muñoz insists on the categorical value of futurity, hope and utopia for queer theory as such. Among other things, this leads to an important, loyal but critical discussion of Lee Edelman’s influential No Future: Queer Theory and the Death Drive. In the same queer-theoretical vein, Sara Ahmed asks the question: “Can we simply give up our attachment to thinking about happier futures or the future of happiness?” (Ahmed 2010: 161) The answer is no. Queer theory cannot renounce the future, or utopia proper. As Ahmed also writes: “The utopian form might not make the alternative possible, but it aims to make impossible the belief that there is no alternative” (Ahmed 2010, 163).

    [15]See Benjamin 1994. See also Brown 1999. A philosophical and political question of optimism versus pessimism lies hidden here, but I plan to venture into this particular matter elsewhere, rehabilitating a project of Blochean optimism too long forgotten or neglected by the left. In passing, I just want to bring to the reader’s attention this paragraph from Razmig Keucheyan’s Nature is a Battlefield, which takes a Benjamin-quote (“The experience of our generation: that capitalism will not die a natural death”) and the optimism of early/earlier Marxist historicism as its point of departure: “The Arcades Project was written between 1927 and 1940. Three-quarters of a century later, Benjamin’s comment takes on another meaning. Firstly, it does so because contemporary critical thought has renounced any sense of optimism. After the tragedies of the twentieth century, it is instead pessimism that rules. Currently the question is rather more that of whether revolutionary forces are capable of carrying forth a project of radical social change, or if such a project instead now belongs to the past” (Keucheyan: 2016,151).

    [16]The phrase turns up in the theses on the philosophy of history (Benjamin 2007: 255).

    [17]In a blogpost on Verso’ homepage, Richard Dienst asked the question: Utopia or debt (the economic catastrophe of our time)? See: Dienst 2017.

    [18]Steven Shaviro struggles with a set of similar concerns. How can we adopt speculative approaches to speculative temporality and futurity, he wrote in a recent blogpost, that are not “subsumed by, and subjected to, the speculative time of finance” (Shaviro 2018)? Having earlier written about that “stubborn strain in 20th-century Marxist thought – especially in the writings of Walter Benjamin and Ernst Bloch – that finds kernels of hope in the strangest places: in historical experiences of catastrophic failure and defeat, in all those old practices that the relentless march of capitalism has rendered obsolete, and even in the most debased and “ideological” moments of life under capitalism itself” (Shaviro 2006)—the examples being the arcades or more modern-day shopping malls—Shaviro’s current project seems to one of scrutinizing to what extent speculative fiction and science fiction, which is also is to say utopian fiction, are concentric with the logic of financial speculation.

    [19]For the single reference, see: Abensour 2017: 108.

    [20]Cf. “we might think of the new onset of the Utopian process as a kind of desiring to desire, a learning to desire, the invention of the desire called utopia in the first place.” (Jameson 1994: 90).

    [21]See also Christine Nadir’s brilliant article on Miguel Abensour and Ursula Le Guin’s science fiction-novels through the prism of utopia and the education of desire (Nadir 2010: 29-30). Another key work in this regard is Ruth Levitas’ Utopia as Method, in which she provides a definition of utopia ”in terms of desire” (Levitas 2013, xiii), and where, consequently, ”[t]he core of utopia is the desire for being otherwise, individually and collectively, subjectively and objectively” (Levitas 2013” xi). But the theoretical trajectory starts and ends with Ernst Bloch who on the very first page of his trilogy The Principle of Hope writes: “It is a question of learning hope.” (Bloch 1995: 3).

    [22]I am again relying on and inspired by Miéville’s “The Limits of Utopia.” Moreover, in his foreword to a new edition of More’s Utopia, Miéville writes: “We need utopia, but to try to think utopia, in this world, without rage, without fury, is an indulgence we can’t afford. In the face of what is done, we cannot think utopia without hate.”

    [23]Abensour 2017: 88-93; Benjamin 1999: 17 (though the reading only figures in the exposé from 1939).

    [24]After completing this review essay, I stumbled across a brilliant text by Kim Stanley Robinson, “Dystopias Now,” which I did not have the time to incorporate into this one, except for the epigraph, which is taken from there, and this illuminating quote, which goes into the Jamesonian distinction between utopia, dystopia, anti-utopia and anti-anti-utopia (like Jameson, Robinson argues for the latter, and I fully agree with that, as should be more than clear at this point): “One way of being anti-anti-utopian is to be utopian. It’s crucial to keep imagining that things could get better, and furthermore to imagine how they might get better. Here no doubt one has to avoid Berlant’s “cruel optimism,” which is perhaps thinking and saying that things will get better without doing the work of imagining how” (Robinson 2018).

  • “Does Attention to Language Matter?” 2018 boundary 2 Conference — Videos Available Online Now

    “Does Attention to Language Matter?” 2018 boundary 2 Conference — Videos Available Online Now

    The annual 2018 boundary 2 conference from November 1-3 at University of Pittsburgh was on the subject of “Does Attention to Language Matter?” Philology, criticism, and translation are three techniques that reveal the constant importance of language to all forms of humanistic activity and artistic creativity. This conference was a reminder of the risks that come from forgetting the realities of language and an important reminder of these disciplines’ vital role in regulating the relation between meaning and word, between power and value. You can find the full event schedule here.

    Nuruddin Farah, reading from Maps

    Jeff Sacks on “The Philological Thesis: Language Without Ends”

    David Golumbia on “The Deconstruction of Philology”

    Leah Feldman on “Embodying Philology: Theater Adaptation in Post-Soviet Central Asia”

    Howard Eiland on “No Getting Around It”

    Jonathan Arac on “Ways of Working with Language”

    Susan Gillespie on “The Possibility of Translation”

  • Gil Z. Hochberg — Between Orientalisms: Derrida, Cixous, and the Specter of the Arab Jew

    Gil Z. Hochberg — Between Orientalisms: Derrida, Cixous, and the Specter of the Arab Jew

    This essay is part of a dossier on The Maghreb after Orientalism.

    by Gil Z. Hochberg 

    A Judeo-Franco-Maghrebian genealogy does not clarify everything, far from it,

                       but can I ever explain anything without it?

    Jacques Derrida, “To Have Lived, and to Remember, as an Algerian”

    To depart (so as) not to arrive from Algeria is also, incalculably, a way of not

                          having broken with Algeria

    Hélène Cixous, “My Algeriance, in other words: to depart not to arrive

    from Algeria”

    Algeria is an unfinished story, no doubt for Algerians, but also for France. And for all those who cannot but continue to think through Algeria’s recent and long history of colonialism, as they think not only about Algeria and France but also about modernity, military occupation, Orientalism, Europe, armed resistance, war, and also about Zionism, Jews and Arabs, Palestine, missed opportunities, and possible outcomes. So much and more is contained in the name “Algeria”.

    In the mid 1990s both Jacques Derrida and Hélène Cixous began to write about “Algeria” (about their “Algeria”), each investing in a writing both autobiographical and politically contemplative.[1] In their writings—primarily Le monolinguisme de l’autre ou la prothèse d’origine (The Monolingualism of the Other) (Derrida [1996] 1998)), Mon algériance” (“My Algeriance”), “Stigmata, or Job the dog” (both printed in Cixous’s 1998 Stigmata Escaping Texts), and “Bare Feet” (Cixous 2001)—“Algeria” is a specific place: their place of birth, a nation with a particularly violent and complex history of colonial occupation, but also a name and figure of speech hosting a vast and explosive web of memories, desires, attachments, fears, projections, and identifications both personal and public.

    Derrida’s Monolingualism of the Other is a short reflection on the relationship between language and mastery, identity, citizenship, and colonialism. It is also an intervention into the legacy of the relations between Arabs, Jews, and “Europe” under the conditions of French colonialism in the Maghreb, and above all a commentary about the still contested figure of the Arab Jew.[2] Derrida focuses on the particular case of Maghrebi Jews (Jews of Algeria who were granted French citizenship in 1870, lost their French citizenship under the Vichy regime in October 1940, and regained it in 1943) to talk about matters of possession and being possessed by language, memory, culture, religion, and ethnicity. But Derrida both tells and doesn’t tell the story of Algerian Jews. He both tells and doesn’t tell his story as an Algerian Jew, when he speaks of his “nostalgeria” and of his “independence from Algeria” (1998: 52) and of a “French Jewish child from Algeria” (1998: 49).

    Cixous’s writings about Algeria similarly focus on her experience as a Jew, holding an outsider position in colonial Algeria, to which she belongs only through the direct touch of dust: “a sort of invisible belonging to the land to which I am bound by my atoms without nationality” (1998a: 154). Like Derrida, she centers on the drama of citizenship experienced by herself and other Jews of Algeria (“in 1940 we were thrown out as Jews” (1998a: 213). This is the pretext for her broader focus on being “at home, nowhere” (1998a: 155) and the history of colonial Algeria as a history of “brutal Algeriad . . . crudely fashioned by the demon of Coloniality” (1998a: 156).

    “Algeria” is for both thinkers a way to speak the past in(to) the present, the personal in(to) the public, Algeria in(to) France, and the “Jew” (or the forbidden “J” to borrow Cixous’s expression)[3] in(to) the colonial drama as a third member along with the Arab and the French. It is also a way to speak of loss, of exile, of the limits of national belonging, the limits of origins and narratives of origins, possessing, and possession.

    Both Derrida and Cixous came to “Algeria” late in their lives and writing careers. Their upbringing in colonized Algeria was for the most part absent from their texts until they began to write semi-autobiographies; until, that is, they turned their personal memories and narratives into new modes of political intervention. Indeed, as long as the two prolific writers were engaged in deconstructing Western philosophical metaphysics (Derrida) and advocating “feminine writing” (écriture féminine) (Cixous), they were unquestionably recognized as “French”: deconstruction was French; feminine writing was very French. But to continue to undo European hegemony without questioning “Europe” from its margins (and not only from “within,” by means of deconstructing key European texts) had become by the mid 1990s truly impossible. Certainly in France, which was watching the ongoing civil war in Algeria, while facing a whole series of heated legal debates about “immigration” in France itself. The critical need to question French identity and destabilize French language and citizenship is what led Derrida and Cixous “back to Algeria,” as a site (a memory, a place, a time, a past, and a future) through which to rethink the meaning of being European, and, more specifically, French.

    Addressing the “traumatizing brutality of what is called the colonial war” Derrida, in a later text (“To Have Lived, and to Remember, as an Algerian”) writes: “some, including myself, experienced it from both sides, if I may say so” (Chérif 2008: 35). Writing from both sides, as it were, and from neither, is what Cixous’s and Derrida’s texts about Algeria perform textually by centering on the impossible figure of the Arab Jew. A figure that has become and then “become undone” through the not-so-subtle mechanisms of partition exercised by the French colonial administration. The “Franco-Maghrebi” is Derrida’s name for himself as the French-speaking-Maghrebi-Jew, who as such, is from Algeria but not of Algerian nationality, and who is a French citizen (at times) but who is not, cannot be, quite French. This Jew, not quite Algerian, certainly not quite Arab, can only appear in relation to French (language, citizenship, identity) given the colonial conditions dividing populations by ethnicities and policing language acquisition and national affiliations. The missing figure of the Arab Jew, the fact of its missing, the making of its impossibility, is, however, at the heart of The Monolingualism of the Other just as it is the nexus of Cixous’s Algerian texts. It is the ghostly impossible figure, whose impossibility haunts the historical narrative of colonialism told, most commonly, in terms of a binary division between two positions. In this case: colonizer and colonized, French and Arab, French and Arabic. Accounting for the impossibility of the Arab Jew in Algeria, Cixous writes: “There was not enough time. . . . There was no time. (If there had been time between Arabs and ourselves . . . the two destinal durations would have found themselves in concordance at a certain moment)” (Cixous 1998: 184).

    Writing about their Algerian origins, about their early years in Algeria, about their childhood memories, and also about their becoming French (but never quite French); about their relationship to the French language, French citizenship, and writing (in French); but also about their Jewishness, about being Jewish, about being not-quite Jewish, and certainly not quite Algerian, but also not fully French. This is the similar manner in which Derrida and Cixous write about colonialism: about the colonialisms embedded in language (Derrida) but most certainly about French colonialism and its impact on them, on their own writings, on Jews, on Arabs, and on the making of the Arab Jew in Algeria. Colonialism is at the center of their texts, in the sense that is it said to be responsible for it all: responsible for everything that shaped their own personal experiences, responsible for the matrix of life in Algeria, and responsible for their writing—its content and its style. French colonialism created fractures between Arabs and Jews; it is responsible for the misery of most indigenous Algerians, and for the creation of “the Jew” as a specific figure of difference and alterity: at times more French than the Arab and other times less French, even less French than the Arab. In the context of French colonial Algeria, “Jew” is always already in relationship to Frenchness: “now we were Jews,” “now we were French” “now we were Jewfrench” (Cixous 1998b: 189).

    Within this profound exposition of the nature of French colonialism in the Maghreb, Derrida and Cixous focus on the very unhappy triangle: the French, the Arab, and the Jew (“an utterly unworkable junction” (Cixous 1998b: 183). I have written elsewhere about the mobilization of animosity between Jews and Arabs/Muslims in Europe in the service of “Europe” as (Christian) secular protector (Hochberg 2006). Here it is sufficient to say that the manufactured rivalry between Jews and Arabs created under French colonial conditions is not a side narrative or a minor outcome but a profound and central aspect of the colonial structure as such. A structure very much still in operation, as a recent text by Houria Bouteldja, Whites, Jews, and Us (2016) reminds us. Regarding the ambiguous position of the Jew in France today, Bouteldja cleverly observes that the Jews are “on the one hand, dhimmis of the Republic to satisfy the internal needs of the nation state, and on the other, Senegalese riflemen to satisfy the needs of Western imperialism” (55-56, original italics). As observed by Ben Ratskoff, “the phrase ‘dhimmis of the Republic’ paints France with its own Orientalist brush—as pre-modern, religious, oppressive—and suggests that, despite their so-called emancipation, the functional role of Jews in Europe has not changed. At the same time, Jews are made into ‘Senegalese riflemen,’ the colonized colonizers to whom the perpetuation of imperial violence is outsourced” (2018).[4]

    Derrida and Cixous’s texts invite us to see how colonialism and, more specifically, Orientalism create the “Jew” (as a double agent, both dhimmi and Senegalese rifleman) and at the same time create the impossibility of the “Arab Jew.” In a recent essay (delivered as a lecture), Ella Shohat shows that this process involves the ongoing production of the Jew as “less Arab” and “more French.” She calls this process “the de-orientalization of Jews” and locates it, like Derrida and Cixous, in the midst of the French colonial drama in Algeria (Shohat 2016).[5] In Orientalism, Edward Said already argued that Orientalism was responsible first for bonding Jews and Muslims together under the rubric of “Semites”—subjects of Orientalist study readily understandable in view of their primitive origins—and later for setting these two figures apart as different kinds of Orientals, managed differently by colonial forces (1979: 234). If Orientalism sometimes brings Jews and Muslims or Jews and Arabs together and sometimes sets them apart, Derrida and Cixous’s texts invite us to follow the production of what, in her analysis of French nineteenth century painting, Shohat calls “the split Arab/Jew figure” in becoming. (See Fig. 1-3) Examining French Orientalist representations of Jews from North Africa and the Middle East, Shohat demonstrates how these images tend to be familiar Orientalist images, with no distinction made between Jews and Arabs. “When and how,” she asks, do we begin to see the “Arab Jew” as a distinct figure of Orientalist imagination and colonial control? Her answer, based on a survey of Orientalist paintings, is that this happens only in the early twentieth century, “when Jews in Algeria suddenly appear to have a lighter skin tone than Muslims, and Jewish women appear without head covers.” Around the 1930s, she notes, Jews begin to be visualized as modernized, and Jewish women begin to look more French. “The split of the Jew and the Arab/Muslim is a product of the colonial area,” she concludes. “It is a cut that has not even begun to heal.” <Figures 1-3 about here>

    Cixous and Derrida write about this cut. They write from the place of this cut. They write from this cut and as its outcome. They write as Jews-already-not-Arabs, already (almost) French. They try to recapture the becoming of this writing position without, however, naturalizing any pre-given identity positions (i.e., “Jew,” “Arab,” “French,” “native”). Writing about identities in becoming, about Jews becoming less Arab and more French, both writers attempt to write from a different position: not “as a Jew” or “as an Algerian” or “as a French person.” Their writing seeks to undo these identities while recognizing they cannot be undone: “Certain Jews truly wanted to love France. But it was a love by force. We wanted to love Algeria. But it was too early or too late” (Cixous 1998a: 163).

    The focus on the Jew, which is obviously an autobiographic detail, is not just that. It is also an opportunity to speak a different language: to speak from within the colonial cut and within the Orientalist operation as both an outcome and a resistant trace. To speak not the language of historicity, not the language of the law, not even the language of literature, but a language of a cut as prefigured through the figure of the always already impossible Arab Jew. Stigmata, “the fertile wound” (Cixous 1998b: 182).

    The term Orientalism is not a term either Derrida or Cixous use. Said’s work Orientalism is similarly missing from Derrida and Cixous’s autobiographical texts. And this is perhaps not surprising. Said’s style and framework of analysis are utterly foreign to their writings. Orientalism doesn’t leave a lot of room for thinking in the spaces between binaries and that is precisely what both Cixous and Derrida do, albeit differently. If anything, one could say that both Cixous and Derrida, at times, mobilize an overtly Orientalist language to talk about France, Algeria, Arabs, and Jews (see, for instance, Cixous’s “unshakable certainty that ‘the Arabs’ were the true offspring of this dusty and perfumed soil” or her observation: “when I walked barefoot with my brother on the hot trails of Oran, I felt the sole of my body caressed by the welcoming palms of the country’s ancient dead…” (Cixous 1998a: 153)). But they recognize these Orientalist words as French (“the word Arab belonged to French colonialism” (Cixous 1998b: 183)). Orientalism is a borrowed framework, a borrowed language, a borrowed way of speaking and thinking but not an escapable one per se. Certainly not when speaking from the place of the cut. Not when speaking of the becoming of the separation and the making of the Jew and of the Arab.[6]

    For Cixous, Algeria is primarily a stage on which the colonial drama unfolds: a “perfumed theater, salt, jasmine, orange blossoms, where violent plays were staged” (1998a, 155), where “the scene was always war” (1998a: 156). And on this stage there are roles and positions: “one said: ‘the Arabs,’ ‘the French,’” everyone was forced to play “in the play, with a false identity” (1998a: 156). The colonial stage produces caricature figures. People said: “the Arabs and the French, and also the Jews and the Catholics” (1998a: 156). Names, words, identities have limited freedom on the colonial stage, and very little room for innovation. Thus we get “Fatma,” the Arab maid, the “dirty Jew,” the Frenchman, and the “little Arabs” (1998a: 164). Against this discursive, linguistic, and political fixation—the outcome of colonial administration and Orientalist imagination—but also from within it, Cixous and Derrida attempt to generate a discourse that highlights instability, fragmentation, ambiguity, and loss in the figure of the always already displaced and the always already lost: lost home, lost Jew, lost Arab, and lost Algeria. As a result, we are left with a discourse that is both more intimate and less (overtly) political than the carefully measured discourse commonly modeled on the analysis of Orientalism.

    But I would like to suggest that writing from the place of the cut is an unwritten chapter in Orientalism. Said’s theory, because it insists on a macro-political notion of history and a structural analysis of binary power positions, leaves little room for nuances, differences, and liminal positions that speak from the place of the cut. It is not simply that Derrida and Cixous’s texts bring in, as it where, the missing Maghreb, or the missing figure of the (impossible) Arab Jew and thus complicate an otherwise more coherent, binary formulation of colonial power. It is also that, unlike the discourse of the Arab Jew, developed for example in the writings of Albert Memmi (not just in La statue de sel but in his later essays such as “Who is the Arab Jew?”),[7] Derrida and Cixous’s Arab Jew is not so much a figure (an ethnic figure), but the theoretical elaboration on the production of this historical figure as an impossibility brought about by colonialism and Orientalism. A melancholic underlining precondition that runs through the Orientalist discourse and remains both key to the Orientalist dualistic imagination and invisible in its centrality.

    I am not suggesting that the Arab Jew is central to Orientalism, which presents a rather coherent picture of the Orient, often conflating “Arab” and “Muslim.” And yet this figure is not marginal to the text either. It is a figure that demonstrates the triangulated operation within the (Orientalist) binary imagination. Reading Cixous’s and Derrida’s impossible Arab Jew into Said’s book is not only to challenge its binary structure, criticized by many in the past (Homi Bhabhba 1994, Ali Behdad 1994, Lisa Lowe 1991). It is also to develop a different language, one whose power resides in its ambivalence and non-identitarianism. A language which certainly can sound and read as self-centered, beautified, and sublimated (perhaps too French?) but which gains its importance from its ability to speak from the cut and about the cut.

    The Arab Jew here is a figure of political failure and a failed figure. And this failure itself, visited and revisited as loss, impossibility, “fertile wound” and the outcome of Orientalist imagination is also to gesture towards a different future. One that takes a leap of faith away from but also back to the binary and structured world of fantasy-making reality, which Said left us with forty years ago; a fertile ground from which to “depart (so as) not to arrive from.”

     

    Gil Hochberg is Ransford Professor of Hebrew and Comparative Literature, and Middle East Studies at Columbia University. Her first book, In Spite of Partition: Jews, Arabs, and the Limits of Separatist Imagination (2007), examines the complex relationship between the signifiers “Arab” and “Jew” in contemporary Jewish and Arab literatures. Her most recent book, Visual Occupations: Vision and Visibility in a Conflict Zone (2015), is a study of the visual politics of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. She is currently writing a book on art, archives and the production of the future.

     

    References

    Ahluwalia, Pal. 2010. Out of Africa: Post-Structuralism’s Colonial Roots. London and New    York: Routledge.

    Behdad, Ali. 1994. Belated Travelers: Orientalism in the Age of Colonial Dissolution. Duke: Duke University Press.

    Bhabha, Homi. 1994. The Location of Culture. New York: Routledge.

    Bouteldja, Houria. [2016] 2017. Whites, Jews, and Us: Toward a Politics of Revolutionary Love. Translated by Rachel Valinsky. South Pasadena : Semiotext(e).

    Chérif, Mustapha. 2008. Islam and the West: A Conversation with Jacques Derrida. Translated by Teresa Lavender Fagan. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

    Chow, Rey. 2001. “How (the) Inscrutable Chinese Led to Globalized Theory.” PMLA 116, no. 1: 69-74.

    Cixous, Hélène. 1998a. Mon algériance” (“My Algeriance”). In Stigmata Escaping Texts, 153-172. New York: Routledge.

    ——-. 1998b. “Stigmata, or Job the dog.” In Stigmata Escaping Texts, 181-194. New York: Routledge.

    ——–. [1999] 2001. An Algerian Childhood: A Collection of Autobiographical Narratives. Translated by Marjolijn de Jager. St. Paul, MN: Ruminator Books.

    Derrida, Jacques. [1996] 1998. Monolingualism of the Other, or, The Prosthesis of Origin. Translated by Patrick Mensah. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

    Di Cesare, Donatella Ester. 2012. Utopia of Understanding: Between Babel and Auschwitz. Translated by Niall Keane. Albany: SUNY Press.

    Egéa-Kuehne, Denise. 2001. “La langue de l’autre au croisement des cultures: Derrida et Le Monolinguisme de l’autre.” In Changements politiques et statut des langues: histoire et épistémologie, 1780–1945, edited by Marie-Christine Kok Escalle and Francine Melka, 175-98. Amsterdam: Rodopi.

    Herzog, Annabel. 2009. “‘Monolingualism’ or the Language of God: Scholem and Derrida on Hebrew and Politics.” Modern Judaism 29, no. 2: 226–38.

    Hiddleston, Jane. 2010. Poststructuralism and Postcoloniality: The Anxiety of Theory. Liverpool: Liverpool University Press.

    Hochberg, Gil Z. 2007. In Spite of Partition: Jews, Arabs and the Limits of Separatist       Imagination. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

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    [1] Not everyone welcomed this intervention. And some accused the French intellectuals for “asserting their authority over Algeria” and for ignoring “hard political questions” by choosing instead to write about their personal and privileged experiences and not about colonialism and its impact on the majority of the colonized people. See for example Laroussi (2016: 65).

    [2] For readings of Monolingualism see, among many others: Di Cesare 2012; Naas 2008; Saito 2009; Egéa-Kuehne 2012; and Herzog 2009.

    [3] “During the war . . . the word that begins with ‘j’ was not spoken it was a forbidden, dangerous poisonous word. . . . My mother . . . never said the word Jew in the street. Naïve, she said that a J. Exorcism. Taboo” (Cixous 1998a: 156).

    [4] Dhimmis are non-Muslims under protection of Muslim law. The protection was historically extended to the “Peoples of the Book” (Ahl al-Kitab), which included Jews, Christians, and sometimes Zoroastrians and Hindus. Protection, communal self-government, and freedom of religious practice were provided to dhimmis in return for tax. Dhimmis were also placed under restrictions and regulations in dress, occupation, and residence. The Senegalese riflemen (tirailleurs sénégalais) were among the many colonized peoples allured to serve in the French army during the First World War. By 1918, France had recruited some 192,000 tirailleurs from French West Africa, mostly from Senegal. It was only last year that France finally recognized a handful of these men and granted them French citizenship.

    [5] At the time of writing this essay, Shohat was preparing her essay for publication but had not yet published a written version. A video recording of a talk version of the paper, “Orientalist Genealogies: The Split Arab /Jew Figure Revisited,” is available online at vimeo.com/154166534.

    [6] It would be easy to do one of two things: 1. To accuse Derrida and Cixous of Orientalism. Their writings render themselves easily to such accusation. The most elaborate critique of Derrida’s Orientalism is famously provided by Rey Chow. Accounting for Derrida’s representation of Chinese writing in Of Grammatology, Chow deconstructs Derrida’s own European Orientalist approach. Derrida’s seminal text of deconstruction, she argues, orientalizes Chinese writing as an ideographic language and represents it as the West’s other, which as such escapes scrutiny. The East thus becomes represented by “a spectre, a kind of living dead that must, in his philosophizing, be preserved in its spectrality to remain a Utopian inspiration” (Chow 2001: 72). Cixous too has been blamed more than once, especially in her writings about Algeria. Farid Laroussi, for example, argues that Cixous’s very description of the Arab Jew is based on “an archaic type of Orientalism” (Laroussi 2016: 65). 2. The opposite tendency is to praise Derrida and Cixous (perhaps Deconstruction as such) for generating new ways of thinking and writing that directly challenge Orientalism, confront the superiority of the West, and disable the homogeneity of its “other,” the Orient. Since the early 1990s, several studies have emphasized the deep theoretical and political connections between deconstruction and postcolonialism. In 1990, Robert Young argued that at the heart of French deconstruction one finds “Algeria” as a postcolonial event. He famously opens his White Mythologies by proposing that “if so-called ‘so-called post-structuralism’ is the product of a single historical event, then that moment is probably not May 1968 but rather the Algerian War of Independence—no doubt itself both a symptom and a product” (Young 1990: 1). Since then, several critics have made similar arguments and connections. See, for example, Ahluwalia 2010 and Quayson 2000.

    [7] In this sense these texts both continue and break away from the legacy of Albert Memmi, whose memoir The Pillar of Salt was perhaps the first to document the colonial tragedy in North Africa (Tunis in this case) through the figure of the Arab/Berber Jew as the failed figure of in-betweenness: indigenous but not quite, westernized but not enough. Memmi’s fragmented, displaced, exiled protagonist, Alexandre Mordekhai Benillouche, is a tragic anti-hero and a true victim of colonial estrangement. Several years later Memmi would publish his essay on the impossibility of the Arab Jew, “Why we are not Arab Jews,” concluding that despite the end of colonialism, the figure of the indigenous Arab Jew is not and can no longer be, a possibility. As is well known, Memmi would also become, over the years, an adamant supporter of Zionism, despite choosing to live in France himself. Both Derrida and Cixous follow Memmi’s legacy in many ways, in their own autobiographical writings about Algeria, but they break away from his determined position, replacing it with ambiguity and open-ended futures. While Memmi presents a tragic image of displacement and exile, Derrida and Cixous, each in their own way, celebrate exile, displacement and the position of the outsider (with no mother tongue and no sense of belonging) as a privileged critical position. And as a position from which colonialism may appear not as a coherent subject matter based on monolithic power binarism but as a system based on the creation and generation of differences within. For a comprehensive reading of Memmi’s novel and other writings on the figure of the Arab Jew, see my chapter dedicated to his work (Hochberg 2007: 20-43).