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  • Tim Christiaens–“Why Do People Fight For Their Exploitation As If It Was Liberation?” (Review of Jason Read’s The Double Shift)

    Tim Christiaens–“Why Do People Fight For Their Exploitation As If It Was Liberation?” (Review of Jason Read’s The Double Shift)

    “Why Do People Fight For Their Exploitation As If It Was Liberation?”

    Tim Christiaens

    Popular culture is one of the sites where this struggle for and against a culture of the powerful is engaged: it is also the stake to be won or lost in that struggle. It is the arena of consent and resistance.

    – Stuart Hall (2019, 360)

    Please Sign Here to Work Yourself to Death

    A sense of dread befalls us when the topic of work enters the conversation. From nurses in overrun hospitals to adjunct academics between teaching gigs, many workers are seeing their workload grow while paychecks and job security shrink. Yet surprisingly, people still cling to their jobs and the capitalist work ethic in general as if it were their salvation. Hustle culture and structural overwork are rampant across the labor market. From gig workers operating on multiple platforms to Wall Street interns working around the clock, the capitalist work ethic has become what Karl Marx called a “religion of everyday life” (Marx 1992, 969). The rituals of time management and incessant self-branding dominate not only people’s labor-time but also their free time. Away from the office, many still zealously perform the liturgies of self-optimization and social networking to maximize their productivity.

    When people genuinely need the income from their wages to survive, a harsh or opportunistic work ethic is understandable. Without a job, people are oftentimes reduced to the status of “homeless and empty-handed labor-powers” (Marx 2005, 509). With nothing but their labor-power to sell, they have little choice but to drag their bodies to work every morning. Yet historically, many institutions have fostered a work ethic built on higher motivations than mere fear. In early capitalism, the Protestant ethic of thrifty labor in the service of God justified newly emerging capitalist labor relations, and even without the ominous gnawing of hunger, large sections of the twentieth-century male working class in the Global North supported traditional employment relations. In the days of Fordism, even monotonous hard labor often gave access to a chance at a middle-class lifestyle and social recognition as a contributing member of society. ‘Having a job’ was a gateway to recognized public status and comfortable living standards. Thanks to a social compromise between capital and the white male working class, the latter received high wages and political representation in exchange for social peace and labor productivity. If people agreed to work hard in the factory and not vote communist, the company and the welfare state would guarantee a secure consumer lifestyle.

    For a long time, this seemed like a good deal for all parties involved. Yet circumstances changed in the 1970s and ‘80s, when economic crises, popular protests, and capitalist investment strikes blew up the social compromise. Workers wanted more opportunities for authentic self-expression in their labor, populations previously excluded from the benefits of Fordism demanded emancipation (women, immigrants, the colonized), and capital experienced a profitability crisis for industrial activity in the Global North. Without cheap resources from colonial territories and free reproductive labor from working-class women, male workers’ high wages and political influence became too costly. Large corporations moved their factories to low-cost countries, while demanding states to cut their social security systems. The fear of gnawing hunger returned to put workers in their place. However, the decline in job security and income protection still constitutes an insufficient explanation for the persistence of the capitalist work ethic. The compulsion to work is not just an externally imposed burden today, but also an ethos and intimate desire. Hustle culture permeates everyday life across social classes and lifestyles.

    When the first waves of the COVID-19 pandemic subsided, public discourse reveled at the rise of ‘quiet quitting’. Suddenly workers restricted their efforts to the bare minimum job requirements. Employees would work just enough to avoid alarming the boss but refused to put in any extra effort. However, a few years later enthusiasm has returned for always-on work culture. In a cruel twist on Marx’s prophecies about life under communism, late capitalism has made it possible for me to do one thing today and another tomorrow, to hunt for bartender gigs in the morning, fish for online clickwork in the afternoon, curate a mass following on LinkedIn in the evening, and monetize my car on Uber after dinner, depending on whatever suits me at the time, without ever becoming hunter, fisherman, herdsman or taxi driver.

    Hustle culture promises to render each moment of the day productive. People believe themselves to be entrepreneurs of their own lives and combine multiple jobs to chase after idealized representations of financial success and social prestige. While this attitude might have been born under the sign of economic necessity, what keeps such micro-entrepreneurs going demands further explanation. Constant busy-ness is not just begrudgingly tolerated but actively desired. And this time, there is no Protestant ethic or Fordist social compromise to explain it. Even when people can count on social safety nets, like unemployment benefits, many still strive for overachievement. A deeply rooted affective attachment to work animates late-capitalist culture. This might have made sense when jobs gave access to middle-class consumerist lifestyles, but today this promise often rings hollow. University students take out loans, swallow Ritalin and cram for exams to get a diploma that no longer guarantees steady employment. Journalists spend hours building an online reputation on social media in a desperate effort to avoid being replaced by AI. Aspiring academics publish numerous papers in the hopes that, against dwindling odds, they finally receive a chance at tenure.

    After decades of dismantling worker protections and welfare institutions, this attitude seems painfully masochistic. An epidemic of burnouts has consequently accompanied the rise of hustle culture. At one point, the incessant pressure to work must run out of steam. One cannot continuously push one’s body and mind beyond their limits without suffering the consequences sooner or later. Yet the work ethic is so ingrained in everyday life that many prefer to persist in overwork rather than allowing themselves some well-earned rest. Amazon installs vending machines dispensing painkillers to its warehouse workers, while life-coaches build careers out of helping people squeeze money out of every minute of their day. The Japanese even have a word for people dying from overwork: karoshi.

    What explains this insistent attachment to the capitalist work ethic even at our own peril? This question forms the kernel of Jason Read’s reflections in his recent book The Double Shift: Spinoza and Marx on the Politics of Work (Verso, 2024). Read links it to the age-old question of voluntary servitude from the Dutch philosopher Benedictus Spinoza: “why do people fight for their servitude as if it were their salvation”? Why, in the age of the perpetual hustle, do so many workers voluntarily subject themselves to the exploitation of the neoliberal workplace and refuse to organize?

    Beyond Traditional Ideology Theory

    According to Read, the explanation for our passionate attachment to work lies in the inner workings of ideology. He eloquently defends an affective approach, claiming that the narratives and representations that justify contemporary work culture integrate workers’ affects into an ideological rationalization of the capitalist work ethos. He opens the book with a reference to Marx’s observation that “life is not determined by consciousness, but consciousness by life” (Read 2024, 2). Through our material interactions with our surroundings, we develop ideas and representations of how the world operates and what our place in this environment is. Through the lens of Spinoza, Read interprets these interactions as always already animated by affect. The world responds to human sensibility in ways that either increase or decrease those humans’ capability to act in the world. The world of work can make us angry, joyful, desperate, hopeful, and these tonalities structure our capacities to act in the world. Affects form the basic timbre of our everyday worldly conduct.

    However, ideology is not merely the immediate affective reflection of our material interaction with nature. An institutionally constructed regime of signs and representations filters these impressions through the dominant social culture. ‘Culture’ in a general sense is mediated by social institutions and the latter influence how we perceive the world and affect our surroundings. These institutions are chiefly in the hands of the ruling classes, so the interpretive lenses we acquire to put our lived experiences into words predominantly reflect the assumptions and aspirations of the ruling elites. Our felt sensibility of the world is our own, but the vocabulary with which we express and navigate these affects come from elsewhere. Ideology theory demonstrates how the ruling ideas of the ruling class sink so deeply into human subjectivity until they become the spontaneous ideology with which we articulate the world and our place in it. Ideology establishes what Stuart Hall has called “the regime of the taken for granted” (Hall 2016, 138), the narratives and the refrains that pre-consciously determine how our lived experiences are translated into the common vernacular of everyday life.

    Read subsequently identifies a tension at the heart of ideology and our understanding of work. On the one hand, our conscious reflections on work derive from our lived experiences, our material interactions on the job. On the other, the meaning of these interactions is filtered through a system of representations and practices alien to work itself. The ruling ideological apparatuses influence how we affectively undergo our labor conditions. People often experience their job as grueling exploitation yet live it as their liberation. According to Read, the ideology of work has curiously succeeded in coopting and subsuming people’s everyday experiences of work in an ethos that promotes structural overwork as the key to happiness.

    Work has become the answer to every problem, the solution to everything – not only for ensuring one’s economic status but also for defining relationships, one’s sense of self, and other fundamental elements of everyday life experience. In a society that increasingly eschews politics, or collective action, as a way of remedying or transforming life, work is that last remaining activity of transformation left to us. (Read 2024, 4)

    Work is indeed experienced as exhausting toil and sorrowful exploitation, yet within the ideologically constructed social imaginary of contemporary capitalism, there is no way out of this conundrum but through overwork. The ideology of work gives meaning to our efforts and articulates our hopes and joys in such a way that we see our liberation in more work rather than less. Desire itself is articulated through an ideology that attributes inherent value to the occupations of always-on work culture. Political solutions are blotted out of the regime of the taken for granted, and the only viable option left is to hustle through life in pursuit of getting rich enough to leave the rat race behind. Of course, for most of us the rat race never ends.

    In Capital Volume I, Marx predicted that two barriers would stop the infinite growth machine of capital accumulation: “the weak bodies and the strong wills of its human attendants” (Marx 1996, 406). Workers would organize and construct a collective will to counter the exploitative tactics of capital, or their bodies and mind would slowly falter under the pressure of factory-labor. Yet today, the workers’ collective will is rarely strong enough to obtain substantial gains. And their weak bodies burn out at excruciating speed with little effect. Ideology has neutralized the forces of resistance emanating from workplace domination to mobilize workers to act against their own interest.

    The red thread throughout Read’s book is the attempt to update Marxism’s traditional ideology theory to explain why people’s strong wills and weak bodies have been coopted into entrepreneurial ideology and incessant hustling. In classical Marxism, the class struggle between workers and capitalists determines the evolution of the economic base. Classical Marxism presents the labor experience as a pure or originary moment in which two classes struggle for control over the means of production. The cultural and political superstructure responsible for the development and diffusion of ideology is subsequently built on top of this struggle. In the immediate material interaction with the world, workers experience their exploitation, but the ideologies of the superstructure are allegedly designed to obscure this basic fact. All it takes for the revolution is for Marxist critics to pluck the imaginary flowers from workers’ chains with the cold force of reason to reveal the ugly truth underneath. This picture, firstly, ignores how ideologies always already permeate the work experience itself. There is no pure moment of real consciousness of workplace exploitation that is only afterwards corrupted by ideology. The affective experience of work is always already articulated through the lens of social imaginaries.

    Secondly, the classical Marxist approach is excessively rationalistic. It presumes that the mere act of informing workers of their real class interest, as opposed to their false consciousness, will make nefarious ideologies disappear, like spraying pesticides on imaginary flowers. However, as Spinoza commented, people often ‘see the better and do the worse’ (Read 2024, 166). They know the boss is a bully, the pay is unfair, and the system is rigged, yet they choose to adapt and rationalize that choice because they cannot imagine a way out. How individuals perceive and acquire knowledge about the world is immersed in an infrastructure of intimate desires that is impervious to reason. Ideology is not mere superficial veneer that can be scraped off through the power of reason. It affects human conduct so intimately that it becomes almost indistinguishable from life itself. Our most profound sense of self and our most personal choices are products of ideological work.

    Read illustrates this point with the 2019 film The Assistant, a story about a day in the life of Jane, a junior assistant at a movie production company where sexual harassment is rampant yet kept under the lid. Jane aspires to become a movie producer herself one day, but for now she is stuck in an infinite string of menial secretarial tasks. She gradually learns more about the sexual misconducts of her boss, yet she also picks up on the quietism among her co-workers, who all seem to know yet do nothing. They see the better but do the worse. Jane optimistically goes to human resources to save her colleague from sexual harassment, yet the director makes it clear that nothing will come from her complaint. By the end of her day, Jane has accomplished nothing. She realizes that continuing her investigation equals career suicide. Her hopes and dreams of becoming a movie producer all depend on the monster everyone knows to be a sexual predator, so there is little to be gained from filing a complaint. The boss would probably remain firmly in his seat, while Jane would have to abandon her dreams of a career in film. When the credits roll, Read hypothesizes that Jane will probably return to work the next day and settle for the cynical consensus that animates the office.

    The Assistant shows that ideological acceptance of workplace domination is not just a matter of fanciful illusions that could easily be dispelled by the cold force of reason. It has seeped into the affective lifeworld of the production company. Desperate resignation rules in the office corridors. Those who know better are emotionally blackmailed into doing the worse. Their career hopes and aspirations are coopted as leverage in a cynical play of voluntary servitude. According to Read’s Spinoza, those in power actively integrate parts of the lived experiences of the powerless to let ideological rationalizations of voluntary submission settle in. They must coopt sentiments circulating in the population and give them a specific political orientation that favors the status quo. This clarifies the tension between affective experience and ideological domination in Read’s analysis: our immediate lived experience of work do, in fact, disclose exploitation, but these experiences have been articulated within social imaginaries that coopt our deepest desires and block off any hopes for collective resistance. The only option left is to stay calm and carry on as if more exploitation were our only liberation.

    This theory of ideology enables Read to offer not only illuminating cultural readings of the despair that animates movies like The Assistant, but also to unmask the false alternatives offered in movies and tv-shows that are ostensibly more critical of late-capitalist work culture but fail to capture just how deep the ideological cooptation goes. In the first chapter, for example, Read impressively takes on two movies from 1999 that seem more critical of contemporary work culture than they actually are: Fight Club and Office Space. Both offer an explicit critique of the capitalist work ethos: Fight Club supposedly dispels the myths of “working jobs we hate so we can buy stuff we don’t need” (Read 2024, 63) and Office Space allegedly demonstrates the inanity of contemporary service and office jobs. But Read shows that these films confuse the critique of capitalist labor in general with the critique of specific forms of concrete labor in favor of other forms of (capitalist) concrete labor. Rather than attacking work culture as such, both films criticize two particular forms of work dominant in the 1990s: white-collar work in office culture and the rising trend of service work with high requirements of emotional labor. Yet neither film truly succeeds at imagining a post-capitalist, post-work future. Through the character of Peter, who ends up as a construction worker, Office Space offers a retreat to manual labor as the solution. Fight Club presents a more existentialist yet equally individualistic response. When Tyler Durden holds a convenience store cashier at gun point, he asks the man what job he truly wants to do. The cashier confesses he always dreamed of being a veterinarian but gave up too quickly. After this encounter with mortality, Durden lets the cashier live with the warning that, if he does not pursue his dream, Durden will come back to kill him. Both films do not question labor as such or the culture of overwork. They criticize the labor practices dominant in 1990s capitalism and replace them with manual or existentially authentic labor. They rearticulate the workers’ hatred of all labor into a critique of particular forms of labor and so leave the capitalist work ethic as such intact.

    In sum, an exploration of the ideology of work and people’s steadfast attachment to work as a means of getting ahead must take the affective dimension of ideology into account. Ideological justifications of work must convincingly put into words how people feel about themselves, each other, and their jobs. Marx and his acolytes might have called work under capitalism exploitative and alienating, but if I consider my boss and supervisors as a chosen family, then trade-unionists will probably fail to organize us. Marx and his acolytes might preach about class struggle between workers and capitalists, but if I see a foul-mouthed business mogul on tv trolling Democrats who look and talk like the high-school teachers that I used to hate, I will probably cheer along. Getting people to fight for their exploitation as if it were their liberation is often a matter of putting into words the affects others have failed to convincingly articulate into a more emancipatory project.

    The Affective Hellscape of Late Capitalism

    If we study more closely how Read applies his affective theory of ideology to work culture, we find three explanations for why workers actively desire contemporary hustle culture. Despite all reflections on the subtleties of ideology, Read firstly affirms that many workers still hate their job with a passion and would gladly quit … but at the end of the month, rent is due. Not ideological cooptation of their hopes and desires, but fear motivates their attachment to overwork. These individuals do not have any strong affinity with the work ethic, but the mute compulsion of the market forces them to endure. When people fear for their livelihoods or fear losing the social recognition that comes with having a job, they will latch on to the capitalist work ethic despite all the humiliations they suffer at work.

    Read’s second answer delves more deeply into his affective theory of ideology. He explains how mass media and popular myths about work coopt the feelings people have about their job and inflect these into passionate attachments to work for its own sake. The most obvious example is how Hollywood myths about self-made businessmen or ‘chosen ones’ inspire crowds of followers to think of themselves as entrepreneurs of their own lives. If books, movies, and tv-shows repeatedly put relatable underdogs in leading roles as chosen ones that beat all the odds to save the world, then audiences will undoubtedly start to imagine similar futures for themselves as well. A common joke about zombie movies illustrates this problem well. When watching zombie movies, people often imagine themselves in the role of the sole survivor who saves the world through impressive feats of heroism. While other people are mindless automatons, only the individual’s go-getter attitude assures survival. However, in the event of a real-life apocalypse, it is much more likely for any one of us to wander among the zombies. The film preys upon our main character syndrome to encourage narcissistic predispositions toward individualism. But any sober reflection on the apocalyptic scenario should show that egoistic survivalism is a sure route to oblivion. That emancipation more often comes from collective action rather than individual success is maneuvered beyond the frame.

    Yet the power of myth goes deeper in our working lives. Especially in careers that facilitate the joys of creative self-expression or meaningful human contact, these momentary flashes of happiness are often abused as excuses for worsening pay and working conditions. Jane, The Assistant’s protagonist, finds genuine joy in the world of movies she suddenly inhabits. But her happiness is quickly used against her. The same leveraging of joy in exchange for pain is rampant in contemporary work culture. Should unpaid interns at a fashion company really complain about grueling working hours if they get to work with genius designers? Is art not their passion? Should adjunct academics really demand a proper wage if they get to teach the theories they love to eager students? Is academia not a vocation? Should nurses really form a union and go on strike if they can meaningfully contribute to patients’ lives? Is the latter’s gratitude not payment enough?

    Read’s third and most harrowing answer is the phenomenon of negative solidarity. Sometimes workers see the suffering they have endured as a badge of honor. They allegedly deserve social recognition because they have dragged themselves to work every day and now demand compensatory respect for their pain. This is the middle manager who, because they were bullied into submission their first day on the job, must make new colleagues suffer just as much. Or the person who refuses to join a union “because we did not have collective bargaining back when I was just barely getting by”. Or the university professor who ignores rumors about a colleague’s sexual misconduct, “because we all have stories like that from when I was a grad student”. Or the exploited workers who refuse to express solidarity with striking teachers “because they get time off during the summer while we still have to work”. Negative solidarity is the living embodiment of the sunk cost fallacy. By now, people have invested so much in a losing game that they obstinately refuse to withdraw and keep on suffering more losses. Any other people with a chance at improving their lives must be violently struck down again. If I cannot have nice things, no one can. In that way, solidarity in misery is perpetuated.

    Under the aegis of negative solidarity, people give up the struggle for a better future, choose to adapt to desperate circumstances and force others to do the same. The best they can hope for is to become entirely self-reliant and cut off all ties to others. If you do not need help from anyone, then no one can ever disappoint you. In Coming Up Short, Jennifer Silva (2015) documents how millennials struck by the Great Recession rarely reacted with public outrage or political action. Apart from a few highly localized outbursts of collective action around the Occupy Wall Street movement, most millennials did not politically organize at all. They interpreted their fate as the outcome of personal trauma and singular misfortunes in their individual biographies. They deeply mistrusted social movements or collective institutions and hoped to become completely independent to pursue individual success. An excruciatingly demanding work ethic and the endurance of endless hustles were the safest route to such independence.

    Sorry to Bother You With Some Rebellion

    After approximately 200 pages, one closes The Double Shift with a feeling of despair reminiscent of Mark Fisher’s Capitalist Realism. It is easier to imagine the end of the world than the end of the capitalist work ethic. That may come as a surprise since Read himself regularly writes that resistance is possible and that workers can always fight back against their exploitation. He even ends his book’s conclusion with a discussion of Sorry to Bother You, a film that allegedly exemplifies successful resistance against the all-pervasive ideology of work. In this film, Cassius Green, a.k.a. Cash, a black low-level employee at a telemarketing company, finds sudden success when he learns how to use his ‘white voice’ to sell products. While his co-workers are striking for better working conditions, Cash increasingly focuses on his own social climbing. Even when his girlfriend and co-worker Detroit confronts him about selling slave labor over the phone, Cash rationalizes the problem away in an impressive feat of negative solidarity: “What the fuck isn’t slave labor?” (Read 2024, 200). But all ends well, in Read’s interpretation. Ultimately, Cash is confronted with the surreal abuse of his company breeding literal workhorses from human/animal hybrids. He snaps out of the ideological dream of self-centered careerism and joins the protests. According to Read, this shows that the power of imagination and surrealist revelations of exploitation still possess the potential to wake people up from their ideological slumber.

    And yet the dread remains. The last ten pages of the book do not make up for 190 pages of doom and gloom. Read’s approach suffers from a feature common in contemporary critical theory: final page redemptionism. It also affects the writings of, among others, Theodor Adorno, Giorgio Agamben, or Franco ‘Bifo’ Berardi. They first delineate in excruciating detail how instrumental rationality dominates contemporary culture, the state of exception has become the rule, or neuro-totalitarian fascism has killed off human sensibility. But then, at the very end of the book, a glimmer of hope appears. Where the danger is, also grows the saving power. A message in a bottle, tossed out at sea, can bring back reason from its hibernation. A real state of exception can render us all ungovernable. Chaosmic spasms of exhaustion will give birth to new rhythms of life. These redemption arcs are, however, usually cut short too soon. While the oppressive reality of the status quo is disclosed in its minutest details, the answers presented are mere concluding gestures.

    While despair is tempting and imagining alternative futures is hard, it is a task worth pursuing. Not only for our own sanity, but also out of responsibility for those who suffer from the injustices depicted in critical theory. Structural overwork and the epidemics of burnout, loneliness, and despair make new victims every day. Meticulously explaining how this disaster has come about and can persist, amounts to philosophical defeatism. It surrenders the social imaginary of emancipation to the status quo of capitalist realism. Theory fails to fathom an escape from current practices of domination. However, theory will take you only so far. In opposition to theoretical defeatism, Albert Camus pleads for a praxis of incessant rebellion: “Rebellion is born of the spectacle of irrationality, confronted with an unjust and incomprehensible condition. […] It insists that the outrage be brought to an end” (Camus 1991, 10). The spectacle of irrationality in always-on work culture can trigger two kinds of responses: theoretical melancholy that incisively describes how our suffering was inevitable due to ideological cooptation, or practical outrage that struggles to make it stop. Rather than theorizing about how resistance is futile and only a god can save us, rebellion emanates from a practical attitude that insists on injustice to end. In The Plague, when the epidemic has overcome the city and the protagonists fail to construct an effective response, doctor Rieux and the other inhabitants continue to develop new tactics to combat the disease. Through incessant experimenting and strategizing, they hope to find a solution. Camus writes that

    many fledgeling [sic] moralists in those days were going about our town proclaiming there was nothing to be done about it and we should bow to the inevitable. And Tarrou, Rieux, and their friends might give one answer or another, but its conclusion was always the same, their certitude that a fight must be put up, in this way or that, and there must be no bowing down. The essential thing was to save the greatest possible number of persons from dying and being doomed to unending separation. And to do this there was only one resource: to fight the plague. (Camus 2010, 128–29)

    In The Plague, the infection eventually just disappears. The collective action of doctor Rieux and his comrades had little to do with the outcome. But my argument for rebellion against quietism is not just a matter of desperately wishful thinking. Through the practical insistence of rebellion against workplace domination, alternatives can still appear where critical theory might not have expected them.

    Already in the 1960s, the Italian Marxist Romano Alquati stressed how Marxist theory tends to be excessively pessimistic about the capacities of working-class self-organization, because it fails to register the forms of ‘invisible organization’ among factory workers (Alquati 2013). This idea has recently gained new traction to explain the spontaneous protests of, for instance, Deliveroo couriers and Amazon warehouse workers (Cant 2020, 130; Delfanti 2021, 148). The answers that fail to emerge on the pages of philosophical texts, often arise unexpectedly in material practices. Resistance to the capitalist work ethic is taking place in the workspace almost all the time, though it often stays just under the radar as a weapon of the weak. Workers go more often to the bathroom than their bladders can justify, they steal office equipment at an alarming pace, they hold secret meetings on the job about the Israel/Palestine conflict, and union activism in the United States is at an all-time high. I am not saying that global emancipation is just around the corner, but a complete theory of ideology should be able to explain the successes of the oppressed just as convincingly as their defeats.

    New emancipatory tactics are constantly being invented. Oftentimes, the protest movements that seem to have failed or that did not deliver the revolutionary salvation hoped for, become the incubation hubs for novel experimental initiatives. After the 2015 Nuits Debout protests in Paris, for example, IT specialists wanted to directly combat the exploitative practices of food-delivery platforms like Deliveroo and Uber Eats. They developed software for a cooperative food-delivery platform and have since founded CoopCycle, an international federation of food-delivery couriers across the globe. While Deliveroo and others pressure couriers toward overwork via surreptitious and opaque algorithmic management, CoopCycle’s app opts for human dispatching so that a human manager determines whether or not tasks are doable for couriers. After the Occupy Wall Street protests, Michelle Miller, Jess Kutch and others developed the online tool Coworker.org, with which workers can propose and discuss issues for collective action at work. Coworker.org has, for instance, been instrumental in mobilizing Starbucks workers, first for relatively small-scale actions, like demanding updates on dress code policy. But meanwhile, these small-scale successes have paved the way for large-scale collective action at Starbucks. Every struggle, even those that ostensibly fail, build up a reservoir of invisible organizational power that can be reignited in novel forms at a later date.

    Do You Hear the People Sing?

    A good theory of ideology should not only explain how dominant institutions coopt popular desires and integrate them into the reproduction of the status quo. It should also highlight the invisible organizations that silently subvert or retool ruling discourses to further oppositional interests. Ideology is not just a matter of unilateral cooptation or neutralization, but also of struggle and negotiation. The ideology of work is not just an expression of one-way workplace domination, but is also a stake in a struggle over who controls the labor process. Stuart Hall once called these tactics of ideological resistance ‘cultures of survival’ (Hall 2016, 187). Even in their darkest days, the oppressed are never entirely defeated or coopted into a dominant ideology. They rather continuously negotiate with dominant ideologies to expand their interstitial freedoms. In the cracks of the system, the oppressed struggle for room to breathe.

    Hall’s prime example was the Afro-American black slaves’ reinvention of Christianity as a subversive ideology. One could dismiss religion as yet another ideological state apparatus geared toward the cooptation of people’s lived experiences. Slave-owners had originally preached Christianity among the slaves to encourage obedient submission, but the slaves themselves negotiated for another interpretation. They took the Christian religion of their oppressors to give voice to their suffering and hope of liberation. While the slave-owners’ religion attempted to articulate slaves’ affective experiences into an ethic of voluntary obedience, slaves’ counter-articulation of these affects gave birth to a more combative ethos. Instead of Matthew’s “Blessed are the meek” or Saint-Paul’s exhortation for slaves to consider themselves free in the Lord, the black slaves turned to Moses and his call for liberation from bondage. It gave birth to a rich musical tradition of Afro-American gospel and blues, in which the sorrows, anger, and hope of slaves’ lived experience were put into words in opposition to the status quo. As Hall perceived, “suddenly, you could hear this traditional religious music and language – a part of the dominant culture – being subverted rhythmically from underneath” (Hall 2016, 198).

    In The Black Atlantic, Paul Gilroy takes up Hall’s suggestion for a more elaborate study of the history of black music. Popular music has been famously criticized as a culture industry that neutralizes resistant affects among the people with soothing bedtime songs of comfort. But Gilroy notes, among others, the development of call-and-response motifs in black music as a formal weapon of the weak to democratically take back control over the discourses narrating their lives:

    There is a democratic, communitarian moment enshrined in the practice of antiphony, which symbolizes and anticipates (but does not guarantee) new, non-dominating social relationships. Lines between self and other are blurred and special forms of pleasure are created as a result of the meetings and conversations that are established between one fractured, incomplete, and unfinished racial self and others. Antiphony is the structure that hosts these essential encounters. (Gilroy 2022, 79)

    Ideological cooptation emerges from the ruling class’s ideological narratives translating the affective, lived experience of oppression into subjectivities that support the status quo. Yet counter-hegemonic tactics, like the antiphonies of black music, facilitate a democratic remaking of these ideological subjectivities. The oppressed learn to experience the joy and pleasures of a culture built on communitarian solidarity through the singing of the black diaspora.

    One still recognizes this practice in songs like Kendrik Lamar’s “Alright,” the unofficial anthem of the US Black Lives Matter movement. With Lamar’s verses rapping about anti-black discrimination and police brutality, Pharell Williams’s chorus sounds like a vox populi evangelizing “We gon’ be alright”. The song reached mainstream international acclaim in 2015, when Lamar performed it at the BET Awards on top of a graffitied police car. Protesters in Cleveland had also sung the chorus to celebrate their successful struggle to prevent the police illicitly arresting a 14-year-old black boy. The video of this incident went viral online, further solidifying the song’s status as articulation of Afro-American lived experience of police violence. We could dismiss this as just another cooptation of popular desires into the business strategy of a culture industry avid to make money from the lived experience of the poor and oppressed. However, such reductionism does little justice to what the song has actually meant to BLM protestors. In the verses, Lamar reflects on how fame and money are luring him into a deal with the devil that can only end in depression and “going cray”. These temptations are, however, just the new “forty acres and a mule” promised to black people to coopt their desires into complacency with a social system that routinely brutalizes and kills black men and can easily destroy even powerful individuals like Lamar himself. These apocalyptic contemplations are interspersed with an uplifting chorus that asserts confidence in the future (“We gon’ be alright”). While such confidence can easily be mistaken for naïve optimism, a more truthful reading offers it as a battle cry. A politically articulated ‘We’ senses itself strong enough to make sure that everything is going to be alright. This song does not articulate yet another “Blessed are the meek”, but an oppositional “Let my people go”.

    If we listen for similar statements among anti-work anthems, we could cross the ocean of Gilroy’s Black Atlantic and focus on Belgian artist Stromae’s break-out song Alors on danse. When asked about why he wrote this song about nightclubs, he responded, “for me [the most melancholic places] are nightclubs, because arguably they entertain a kind of false euphoria. One says one goes to a nightclub to have a good time. […] Because if you did not have a good time, it was not a successful night-out. […] These are people who live otherwise normal lives and I would hence argue that wherever there is extreme joy, there must also be extreme sadness” (Burnett 2017, 81 my translation). The clubbers’ manic oscillation between exhilaration and depression takes shape in the dialogue between the song’s verses and chorus. The verses document the drudgeries of everyday working life:

    Qui dit proches te dit deuils

    Car les problèmes ne viennent pas seuls

    Qui dit crise te dit monde

    Dit famine, dit tiers-monde

    Et qui dit fatigue dit réveil

    Encore sourd de la veille

    Alors on sort pour oublier tous les problèmes.

    With this call for escapism in response to mourning, crisis, famine, and exhaustion, the upbeat chorus commences “Alors on danse” (“So one dances”). It’s interesting to note Stromae’s choice for the impersonal pronoun ‘on’ (one) instead of the more personal ‘nous’ (we). He does not sing that “we dance” on the weekend to forget our troubles but that “one dances” to deal with one’s issues. Even the joy of dancing is no longer a lived experience we could call our own. In contrast to Lamar’s articulate We, Stromae documents the alienation of a fragmented One. Dancing at the club is just another motion one goes through as “mere living accessory of [capital’s] machinery” (Marx 2005, 693). The impersonal pronoun articulates the alienation of an existence lived on repeat, a cynical struggle to make it until the weekend so one can binge-drink as self-administered therapy. At least then, one can party one’s misery away until Monday morning, when the ordeal starts all over again and the drunken memory of past joys has receded into oblivion. Stromae articulates the despair of an unsustainable culture built on exploitative work, yet he attacks any notion that work and exploitation would constitute our liberation. Rather than articulating and coopting our dreams and desires into an ideological narrative that identifies empowerment with more work, Alors on danse explicitly dispels any myths about our dream careers. Work is nothing but five days of drudgery so one can pay rent and drink alcohol to forget. Stromae takes up the reality of always-on work culture and presents it in its grimmest grayest colors. Rather than massaging our lived experience into compliance with the status quo, the back-and-forth rhythm between verses and chorus highlights the stark contrast between our lived experience and the meagre coping mechanisms society offers. By laying bare the contradictions of the capitalist work ethic, the music might one day stop.

    What distinguishes the approach to ideology inspired by Hall and Gilroy from Read’s is that the latter mostly focuses on how ideologies coopt the perspective of the oppressed to subsequently make it serve the oppressors’ interests. Gilroy and Hall are certainly no strangers to this analysis, but their focus is on culture and ideology as matters of struggle. The oppressed frequently corrupt the ideological refrains of their oppressors and use it against their masters. In music, for example, the oppressed articulate weapons of the weak that expose the drudgeries of work and the injustices of social domination. The music industry, in that regard, is not just an ideological state apparatus to functionally reproduce the status quo. It is an arena of negotiation, where marginalized cultures struggle to articulate their lived experiences. The affective hellscape of contemporary capitalism hits hardest in the contradictory call-and-response dynamics of Alright or Alors on danse. It is by renegotiating the dominant ideologies’ attempts at cooptation that the oppressed increase their interstitial freedoms. As Hall concludes, “the conditions within which people are able to construct subjective possibilities and new political subjectivities for themselves are not simply given in the dominant system. They are won in the practices of articulation which produce them” (Hall 2016, 206).

    Tim Christiaens is assistant professor of economic ethics and philosophy at Tilburg University in the Netherlands. His research focuses on critical theory and the digitalization of work, neoliberalism, and the power of financial markets. He is the author of Digital Working Livespublished with Rowman & Littlefield in 2022, and has published papers in Theory, Culture & Society, European Journal of Social Theoryand Big Data & Society.

    References

    Alquati, Romano. 2013. ‘Struggle at FIAT’. Translated by Evan Calder Williams. Viewpoint Magazine. 26 September 2013. https://viewpointmag.com/2013/09/26/struggle-at-fiat-1964/.

    Burnett, Joanne. 2017. ‘Why Stromae Matters: Dance Music as a Master Class for the Social Issues of Our Time’. The French Review 91 (1): 79–92.

    Camus, Albert. 1991. The Rebel: An Essay on Man in Revolt. New York: Vintage Books.

    ———. 2010. The Plague. London: Penguin Books.

    Cant, Callum. 2020. Riding for Deliveroo: Resistance in the New Economy. Cambridge: Polity Press.

    Delfanti, Alessandro. 2021. The Warehouse: Workers and Robots at Amazon. London: Pluto Press.

    Gilroy, Paul. 2022. The Black Atlantic: Modernity and Double Consciousness. London: Verso.

    Hall, Stuart. 2016. Cultural Studies 1983. Durham: Duke University Press.

    ———. 2019. Essential Essays: Vol. 1. Durham: Duke University Press.

    Marx, Karl. 1992. Capital: Vol. 3. Translated by David Fernbach. London: Penguin.

    ———. 1996. Capital: Vol. 1. Translated by Samuel Moore and Edward Aveling. London: Lawrence & Wishart.

    ———. 2005. Grundrisse: Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy. Translated by Martin Nicolaus. London: Penguin Books.

    Read, Jason. 2024. The Double Shift: Spinoza and Marx on the Politics and Ideology of Work. London: Verso.

    Silva, Jennifer. 2015. Coming up Short: Working-Class Adulthood in an Age of Uncertainty. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

  • Michelle Chihara–Uncanny All the Way Down: A Response to Frederik Tygstrup

    Michelle Chihara–Uncanny All the Way Down: A Response to Frederik Tygstrup

    This response was published as part of the b2o review‘s “Finance and Fiction” dossier.

    In “Learning from Madoff: On Fiction and Finance in 21st Century,” Frederik Tygstrup describes Bernie Madoff and his famous financial scam as an allegory for the 2008 crisis and the rise in speculative capital at the turn of the 21st century. Madoff’s split-strike conversion strategy (as he called it) was pure fiction.[1] Tygstrup positions the story of Madoff’s fictional trades in an age of enormous growth in fictitious assets.

    Madoff took money from investors and claimed to be trading it, but he was just parking the money in a bank account. When clients wanted to withdraw their funds, he pulled money out of the bank account and called it return on investment. Then he went looking for more clients whose new deposits would cover the gap. This is a classic Ponzi scheme. Madoff, the investor with two sons and a blonde wife and a home in the Hamptons, was arrested a couple of months after Lehman Brothers went bankrupt, just as the scale of the global crisis was coming into focus. The man’s entire financial career was a lie. Unlike the derivatives traders who built a house of cards on mortgage-backed securities, Madoff had no financial cover story. He was faking it one hundred percent. But the size and timing of his fraud raised a question: Is the entire economy a scam?

    The Madoff case engendered a number of documentaries and book-length investigations into what the scheme did and did not mean. Tygstrup quotes Colleen Eren’s book, whose very title calls the case “the public trial of capitalism.” Tygstrup describes the affect swirling around Madoff as excessive, then offers an “allegorical reading” of this fascination. He finds that “the case becomes a kind of a slightly convex mirror in which we not only see his (devious) deviation from normal market behaviour, but also a replication of it, only in a slightly distorted fashion.” The judge who sentenced Madoff to 150 years in prison had a “striking” tone of indignation, and the conviction was “quite exuberant,” Tygstrup writes, for “what was, after all, a fairly trivial white-collar crime, the big numbers notwithstanding.” The level of affect, for Tygstrup, was extra, given the big but humdrum crime.

    The amount of emotion that Madoff provoked was “remarkable,” for Tygstrup, given “the very normalcy of what he was doing.” Based on trades he was not in fact making, Madoff kept promising money managers that he could bring in high returns forever. But of course, at some point, the debt would have to be called in. For Tygstrup, only the size of the heist was “sublime,” and Madoff got away with it for so long in part because he was reflecting the market back to itself: “Madoff’s fictitious investment fund also tells us something about the nature of fictitious capital in an age of accumulation by financialization: precisely not as an anomaly, but as an allegory of unsustainable credit-based and highly leveraged capital accumulation.”

    Tygstrup’s argument thus relies on setting Madoff’s normalcy off against a historically specific change in the overall level of financialization. It relies on a relatively common claim about a quantitative increase in the fictitiousness of capital at a particular moment in time. The idea is that Madoff might have been easier to clock, he would have stuck out more, if not for a quantitative growth in fictitious capital. Later, Tygstrup summarizes financial history by saying that after 1929, “certain limits were set for how much banks should be allowed to leverage.” After the run on the banks that triggered the Depression, in other words, the regulators put some limits on fictitious assets. Speculation was kept in check by reserve ratios, where those reserves served as a foundation or referent for financial activity. After the 1980s, according to Tygstrup, deregulation allowed the degree of leverage to rise, and it “skyrocketed.” He cites Martijn Konings’s Capital and Time for a description of “inflated positions” that “performatively built up supplementary market value.”

    There’s no question that the fascination with Bernie Madoff, an ideal Jewish scapegoat and record-breaking Ponzi builder, emerged out of both a desire to punish the entire rentier class and a desire to excise a bad apple. His normal qualities made him a good stand-in for finance generally. And at the same time, if Madoff was an unusual criminal, then getting rid of him might allow finance to get back to the status quo. In this way, punishing Madoff served both a desire to see and not to see systemic problems. And Tygstrup is correct in pointing out that the financier who was called a monster exhibited a real lack of monstrosity. The scale of his crimes may have been monstrous, but he didn’t seem particularly devious and the money wasn’t spent on cocaine and hookers and yachts–just one mistress and a second home. The fear that Madoff provoked came from the subtlety of the distortion. If, generically, Madoff served as an allegory for the events of his era, perhaps affectively he entered the category of the uncanny. Madoff was so familiar that he was eerie, unheimlich.

    So Madoff’s performance was uncannily successful at a historically specific moment, granted. But Konings’s point, in Capital and Time, is precisely not that 2008 indicated that capitalism had breached some kind of objective boundary. Tygstrup almost seems to accept the reasoning that Konings is pushing against. Konings critiques argumentation that relies on a distinction between “real and fictitious forms of value and sees the tendency of finance to exceed its natural limits” (Konings 2018: 36) His point is precisely to critique the critiques that see limits and foundations, or that rest on the idea that something has objectively “skyrocketed,” leading to a quantitative imbalance.

    For Konings the temporal dynamics of speculation and austerity are themselves fundamental to an inherently self-referential system:

    If a kind of double movement is at work in capitalist life, this involves not a periodic oscillation between foundational values and speculative impulses but, instead, the constant need to respond productively to speculative provocations, to reconstruct reality around a new connection that cannot be undone and has irrevocably altered how things work. (Konings 2018: 12)

    Meanwhile for Tygstrup, the emotional excess in the fascination with Madoff depends on something being “conspicuously bloated” within capitalism itself. That bloat implies something swollen beyond its normal size, where normal is defined in reference to a real or a more real type of value, and where the idea of real value usually involves some nostalgia for Fordist production. But Konings wants us to see a system defined by its self-referentiality, with no outside to the logic, and no ultimate ground. The historically specific detail that makes Madoff’s case fascinating is only the crisis itself, which of course differs from the last crisis, but not because the quantitative growth creates a qualitative difference. Any implication that reserve ratios or Glass-Steagall-style regulations might let the air out of finance’s bloated core is a fool’s errand, a path to further complicity. When there’s a run on the bank, everyone gets swept up looking for the monster. Before that, the monster always appears as an innovator. But it’s important to remember that the finance sector has no path to a healthy flat stomach.

    Perhaps Madoff should be considered in conjunction with another allegorical figure, Jordan Belfort, the inspiration for the movies Boiler Room and The Wolf of Wall Street. Belfort ran penny stock scams for years. He spent 22 months in prison and then went on to sell his memoirs and become a kind of self-help guru who gives workshops on investing. He too was emblematic of the 2008 crisis. He was first indicted in 1999, the first movie came out in 2000, and the second, directed by Martin Scorcese, followed in 2013. Madoff was the subject of a number documentaries, but never got quite the auteur treatment that Belfort did. In a performative economy, Belfort was the better performer.

    In 2014, a former enforcement attorney for the SEC wrote an article for The Wall Street Journal entitled, “How ‘the Wolf of Wall Street’ Really Did It: The stock scam wasn’t emblematic of greed in the Financial District. These guys were just shrewd crooks working out of Long Island.” In the body of the article, former prosecutor Ronald L. Rubin insisted that the offending firm depicted in the Wolf movie “was not a real Wall Street firm, either literally or figuratively. Its offices were in Long Island…” The fraudulent acts, the cocaine and the strippers and the toxic masculinity that became Hollywood’s inspiration? These were not emblematic of Wall Street. These guys weren’t even from Manhattan.

    In 2014, Rubin was concerned with defending the legitimate men of finance from the figurative implications of The Wolf. Belfort’s scam depended on high-pressure sales and stock IPOs. Rubin wanted it to be clear that Belfort was “just a thief.” But Belfort’s methods were remarkably close to the standard practices of the industry. He told stories about investments in particular companies, built trust, and then suggested that if his marks balked, they were leaving money on the table. If this is highway robbery, the highway is still the stock market. Both in real life and in fiction, Belfort fit the archetype of the hard-charging, hard-partying, hypermasculine Wall Street trader. Belfort could have been a Master of the Universe straight out of the The Bonfire of the Vanities, or a Gordon Gekko-type from the movie Wall Street, or one of Liars Poker’s big swinging dicks.[2]

    For Rubin’s way of thinking, Madoff was monstrous because he seemed so normal, and the toxic masculine archive was exaggerated in order to sell spicy stories about bad apples. The real Bear Stearns just wasn’t like that. As a prosecutor, he wrote that he had learned: “[E]very business, especially those involving large sums of money, attracts criminals. For example, after the real-estate market collapsed in 2008, scammers began peddling worthless loan-modification products to impoverished homeowners facing foreclosure. Such predators were no more characteristic of the mortgage industry than Jordan Belfort was of Wall Street.”[3]

    Rubin directed attention to the figure of the criminal precisely in order to exonerate the industry. So for Rubin, the mortgage originators peddling NINJA loans (No Income No Job or Assets to back them) on the way up, then packaging those NINJA loans into tranched securities in special purpose investment vehicles, passing them off their books, and privatizing enormous profits on commissions and sales? Those were real, regular, businessmen.

    When those businessmen socialized the losses after the crash, people like Rubin relied on the idea that the crisis was a kind of organic natural disaster, an objective reality that made victims of regular people, including mortgage originators and securities brokers.

    Rubin understood that the market, writ large, needed public trust, and so he was concerned with appearances, with the problem of representation. In order to make Belfort seem abnormal, Rubin aligned him with criminal others. “Scammers” preyed on homeowners who needed help modifying their loans. In search of fakes to stand in contrast with the real, Rubin bemoaned fraudsters who were taking advantage of vulnerable people. Madoff had pretended to be a normal trader before the crisis. Scammers pretended to be helpful bankers after the bailout. But all of these symbolic negotiations, of masculinity and emblems and fakes, were part of the creation of value within the system.

    Arguably, homeowners were vulnerable to fake bankers because the state wasn’t forcing the bailed-out banks to provide help, for real. In courts across the nation, creditors who had profited from the securities on the way up were trying to claim assets they no longer owned. When it wasn’t convenient to own the assets, they had passed on the responsibility, but now they wanted money from foreclosures. The creditors were abusing the bankruptcy process to such a degree that a US Senator had to pass a law to try to get them to stop.[4] Everyone, in other words, had to work hard to distinguish the mortgage industry from the criminals. Rubin needed fictional representations of criminals to do so.

    Rubin’s interpretive work distinguishing the real from the fake, the allegory, and the morality tale, was part of the work of reconstructing capitalist realities. Distinguishing the monsters from the scammers from the innovators is part of the performance that creates value forms. Money refers only to itself. Thus in a capitalist context, the relationship between referent and representation, between productive labor and fictitious asset, creates a gap. In that gap, we find both the creation of value forms and constant analysis, in a dance that often imagines that the next round of speculation will find a way to keep us safe from its ravages, that the next round will respect some objective limit or fundamental economic reality (Konings 13-19). Rubin wanted to distinguish “real” trades from “fake” money, and real creditors from fake bankers. He wanted to retroactively validate past investments in mortgages, precisely as a means of getting financiers back to the business of creating new and better speculative positions—this time, they promise!

    Tygstrup seems correct to the extent that the fascination with Madoff revealed a productive ambivalence. Madoff was both a bad apple and a stand-in for the whole rotten mess. But that ambivalence isn’t peculiar to Madoff, and it doesn’t herald a quantitative level, in relation to the ever-receding bottom line, at which finance will finally topple over.

    The promise that if we validate this round, or rein something in, the solution to the mystery of real value will be just around the bend—that is a seduction inherent to neoliberal reason. In a discussion of The Sopranos as something of an allegory, Matt Seybold put it this way:

    Neoliberalism is a regime that governs by fiscal arbitrage, and laws exist only to establish a baseline against which we can measure financial risk. The question then becomes, what can you get away with: “Can you make more money breaking the law than is required to mount a successful legal defense…? Is the grift worth more than the graft it takes to pull it off?” (Seybold)

    This makes it seem that, yes, the entire economy is a bit of a scam, and Madoff and Belfort were both looking for an answer to the same question. Madoff moved more money than Belfort, he just managed to pull off less and fell harder. It then struck everyone as truly weird, almost uncanny, that Madoff never had a plan.

    When the creation of value forms shifts, and alters how things work, it’s a worthwhile exercise to understand who is being served up as a bad apple, and why. It’s worthwhile keeping an eye on where neoliberal reason is directing our attention—perhaps especially in moments of crisis. But if these crooks are representative of anything, it was of their provincial specificity, of the last gasp of Wall Street, before the apotheosis of global dark money. And of course, the film of The Wolf of Wall Street, which narrated the rise and fall of a powerful American trader, couldn’t get funded until its backers found a kleptocratic Malaysian financier.[5] The Wolf of Wall Street, in that sense, is both meta-allegory and big, fat, bloated symptom. But the ground, the material referent to keep in mind, is not some elusive final limit but the suffering of the Malaysian people, when the theft of their sovereign fund was made real by the markets. The system isn’t getting more objectively fictional, it’s getting more unequal.

    Michelle Chihara is currently on book leave as Associate Professor of English at Whittier College, where she teaches contemporary American literature, media studies, and creative writing. She has also served as Associate Dean and Director of the Whittier Scholars Program for individualized curricular design. Recent publications include an entry on “Men” in Finance Aesthetics: A Critical Glossary (forthcoming 2024 from Goldsmiths Press); a chapter in New Directions in Print Culture Studies from Bloomsbury Press (eds. Daniel Worden and Jesse Schwarz); articles in Distinktion: A Journal of Social Theory, American Literary History and Postmodern Culture. She co-edited The Routledge Companion to Literature and Economics (2018). From 2016-2022 she was Economics & Finance editor at Los Angeles Review of Books, before serving as Editor-in-Chief through 2023. Before academia, she worked as a reporter and has published reportage and essays in a variety of publications, including Mother Jones, n+1, Post45: Contemporaries, Bloomberg and Avidly.org.

    References

    Bernard, Carole, and Phelim P. Boyle. 2009. “Mr. Madoff’s amazing returns: An analysis of the split-strike conversion strategy.” The Journal of Derivatives 17, no. 1: 62-76.

    Chihara, Michelle. 2020. “The Rise of Behavioral Economic Masculinity.” American Literary History 32, no. 1: 77-110.

    Konings, Martijn. 2018. Capital and Time: For a New Critique of Neoliberal Reason. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press.

    La Berge, Leigh Claire. 2015. Scandals and Abstraction: Financial Fiction of the Long 1980s. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Morath, Eric. 2011. “Bill Strengthens Trustee’s Power to Protect Homeowners.” Wall Street Journal, May 27.

    Rugin, Ronald L. 2014. “How the ‘Wolf of Wall Street’ Really Did It.” Wall Street Journal, January 3.

    Seybold, Matthew. 2022. Podcast episode: “The Sopranos Revival (Remember the End of the End of History?)” with Peter Coviello and Xine Yao. The American Vandal, September 29. The Center for Mark Twain Studies.

    Hope, Bradley; John R. Emshwiller and Ben Fritz. 2016. “The Secret Money Behind ‘The Wolf of Wall Street.’” Wall Street Journal, April 1.

    [1] See: Bernard 2009, which makes clear that it was relatively obvious that Madoff’s returns could not come from the strategy he claimed to be using.

    [2] See: La Berge 2015 for a discussion of hypermasculinity, scandals, and abstraction. I also discuss masculinity and epistemic authority in economics in Chihara 2020.

    [3] See: Rubin 2014. Rubin had initially helped Elizabeth Warren set up the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau. Later, according to his own website, as an attorney in private practice he “defended clients against CFPB enforcement attorneys he had trained,” and still later he wrote an article for the conservative magazine The National Review about the CFPB’s “Tragic Downfall.” Rubin felt the CFPB had become too politicized. (The CFPB still exists, so this is a metaphoric downfall.)

    [4] See: Morath 2011. Sen. Patrick Leahy (D-VT) was one of three senators who recognized that the actions of creditors in the bankruptcy process rose to the level of abuse and fraud, and so the politicians introduced legislation to curb the behavior.

    [5] See: Hope 2016 for one example of the many articles and books written about the 1MDB scheme.

  • Frederik Tygstrup–Learning from Madoff: On Fiction and Finance in the 21st Century

    Frederik Tygstrup–Learning from Madoff: On Fiction and Finance in the 21st Century

    This article was published as part of the b2o review‘s “Finance and Fiction” dossier. The dossier includes a response to this article by Michelle Chihara.

    It’s just money! It’s made up! Pieces of paper with pictures on it so we don’t need to kill each other just to have something to eat. It’s not wrong. And it is certainly not different today than it has ever been.

    John Tuld (played by Jeremy Irons), in J. C. Chandor: Margin Call

    The idea of fiction and the use of paper money came into being more or less at the same time: in the mid-18th century, at a time when Western modernity developed its characteristic propensity for speculation. Fictions were understood then as imaginary tales that had no real referent in the world, but that nonetheless retained interest by presenting something that could arguably have been, once one had willingly suspended one’s disbelief. Paper money, meanwhile, was acknowledged to have no intrinsic value whatsoever, but to nonetheless possess the very practical quality of being a measure of comparative value, if backed by a belief in its ultimate convertibility by the state. In both instances, we see on the one hand a speculative leap into a universe of conjecture–the plausibility of a given event, or the compatibility and eventual exchangeability of different goods–; and, on the other, a self-conscious caveat that this leap is only warranted if, in the first case, we don’t take the speculative face of fiction for something real, and, in the second, we don’t take the speculative face of money as something unreal. As long as we believe firmly enough in fiction not having an actual referent, and in money having an actual value, we are able to manoeuvre these otherwise slippery media. But, every so often, these intricately balanced equilibria tend to falter and we discover that what we took for fiction should really be understood at face value, or that what we took for good money is really nothing but fictitious assets.

    Much more can be said about this peculiar kinship between fiction and money, their long common history, and the many ways in which they have shown proclivity to forage into the domain of the other, often with strange and disquieting consequences. In the following, I will examine a recent case where the domains of fiction and of money intertwine and eventually demonstrate the contemporary (although long-standing) fragility of their twin orders.

    *

    In June 2009, Bernard Madoff was sentenced to 150 years of incarceration for a fraud of more than 65 billion dollars. Through the golden years of financial accumulation, spanning from the abolition of the Bretton-Woods agreement in 1973 to the crash of 2008, Madoff worked his way up to become one of the most prominent fund managers on Wall Street, a pioneer of digital trading, co-founder of the NASDAQ, and at a certain time owner of one of the five biggest trading agencies on Wall Street with a net credit of more than 150 billion dollars. It was only after the crisis of 2008, when liquidity froze and capital was suddenly withdrawn from the markets, that the Madoff fund was revealed to be thoroughly insolvent: the generous returns were not the outcome of felicitous investment strategies but were simply paid from the steadily incoming deposits to the fund. A Ponzi scheme, in other words, where no investments were taking place, and where returns were paid for by taking on more credit, demanding more returns, and so on. For a certain period of time, anyway. In Madoff’s case, for probably more than 20 years.

    For those 20 years, Madoff was considered a wizard, a genius in the creation of more money out of money. And then he turned out to be just another crook. A crook whose trick was to feign, to all the investors he ruined, that he could do precisely what the rest of Wall Street was doing too, transforming money into more money—although he, of course, could do it just a little better. There were no investments taking place in the firm. Madoff simply deposited the incoming funds to his account in Chase Manhattan Bank and withdrew what was needed to pay returns and eventual repayments to investors who wanted out (which was rare), all the while producing neat and reassuring statements that itemized the alleged buying and selling of assets, citing their real market values at the time, and vaunting the merits of his unfailing “split-strike conversion strategy”. An elaborate fiction, in other words.

    The Madoff case has drawn huge amounts of media attention, much more than other Ponzi schemes that have blown up both before and after Madoff. This is not least—according to the sociologist Coleen P. Eren, who has mapped the media turmoil—because of the sheer size of the amounts involved and the duration of the scheme. The international press of course covered the unravelling of Madoff’s scheme and the 6 month-process from indictment to conviction. The case also provided, however, a fecund “human interest” angle that allowed the media to delve into the auctioning of the family’s houses and yachts, Ruth Madoff’s wardrobes and jewelleries, the painful conflict between Madoff and his sons, as well as with the victims that lost their fortunes. Since the case blew up, there has been a steady flow of books and articles; a film, The Wizard of Lies (2017), based on a book by New York Times journalist Diana Henriques, featuring Michelle Pfeiffer and Robert de Niro as Ruth and Bernie Madoff; and the 2023 Netflix show Madoff: The Monster of Wall Street. The Madoff case clearly provided a veritable drama of dethronement, as if it was tailored for public attention.

    This flood of cultural production testifies to a distinct combination of fascination and outrage. On the one hand, one easily recognizes the default fascination with the rich, the case offering a peep into the life in the upper echelons of banking and brokerage, mobilizing sentiments of admiration and awe. And Madoff’s life did indeed have, in every detail, the appearance of the successful modern financial entrepreneur: penthouse, villas, private jets, charity galas, board meetings, conspicuous parties. It’s a lifestyle that is admired and desired by many, and a profession that many believe in—that of making money out of money. The intensity of this belief, desire, and admiration also explains, then, the concomitant feeling of outrage when it was revealed that the wizard was a crook, who took investments from family, friends, philanthropists, pension funds, reassuring them all that their money was safe and thriving with “uncle Bernie”, all the while funnelling them into a scheme that would definitely—and fatally—prove unsustainable in the long run.

    It is tempting, of course, to speculate on the close relations between these expressions of fascination and outrage and the mixed feelings they display, involving disappointment (what we admired was not admirable after all), frustration (what we believed in is not to be believed), Schadenfreude (let the mighty fall), and class anger (the superrich are getting richer all the time, time to call it out). Whatever the exact case may be, the vilification of Madoff did seem to have a particularly affective tension to it, as when the cover of New York Magazine portrayed him as a “monster”, diligently photoshopped. One of the books about Madoff’s Ponzi scheme, Brian Ross’s The Madoff Chronicle, has Madoff’s personality laid out by an ancient FBI criminal profiler who casuistically portrays him as a typical “sociopath” and “cold-blooded” narcissist. Others have called him a crook, a liar, a schemer, a seducer, and much more (all these reactions are richly documented in Eren’s book mentioned above). Even one of the more sober renditions of the Madoff story, Diana Henriques’s The Wizard of Lies, cannot resist succumbing to indignation when glossing Madoff’s crimes (“only a soulless, heartless monster could have inflicted such pain on those he knew and supposedly cared about,” and “no human being could construct a life of such brazen, destructive lies” (346)).

    The tonality of indignation is in fact striking, as is the, by all standards, quite exuberant conviction for what was, after all, a fairly trivial white-collar crime, the big numbers notwithstanding. What did Madoff do? He swindled rich people and money managers who found themselves entitled to have a 20 percent annual gain on their fortune, and who believed that the well-dressed and soft-spoken Madoff in his sleek office could deliver this.

    In this sense, the remarkable affect sparked by the Madoff case might not even be his criminal acts, but the very normalcy of what he was doing. Coleen Eren points to what she calls the metaphoric nature of the trial: “Talking about the trial became a way of talking about punishment not only for Madoff but for those responsible for the financial crisis […] He offered a “fix” for all the other improprieties and crimes that went unpunished, including the class inequalities and greed and the ressentiment” (Eren 120).

    The Madoff case, pace Eren, can thus come to represent what is flawed in contemporary financialized capitalism. This representative identification of Madoff with something bigger might indeed be metaphorical (or even metonymical: representing a totality by one part of it); I would like, however, to suggest an allegorical reading, by which the case becomes a kind of a slightly convex mirror in which we not only see his (devious) deviation from normal market behaviour, but also a replication of it, only in a slightly distorted fashion.

    One of the big issues that keeps coming up in the reactions to the case is not only the magnitude of the fraud—the unimaginable, sublime number of 65 billion dollars–but also its longevity: how on earth, everybody exclaimed, could Madoff keep his fraud running for several decades? One answer to this is evidently that he was hedged by a financial market that expanded in volume with the same pace as his need for supplementary capital deposits to cover the interests he paid to his creditors. For twenty years, the amount of idle capital in the financial markets kept growing at a rate that matched the Madoff fund’s need to take on credit. Nobody wanted their money back for any purposes (of course some did make withdrawals and made a lot of profit by exiting the Ponzi scheme in time; however, the net growth of the fund sufficed to keep the pyramidal expansion of the business going for an exceptionally—and uniquely–long period of time). In other words, Madoff’s business didn’t stand out as an anomaly, but the exponential growth requirement of his Ponzi scheme was underwritten by the market at large. In this sense, Madoff’s fictitious investment fund also tells us something about the nature of fictitious capital in an age of accumulation by financialization: precisely not as an anomaly, but as an allegory of unsustainable credit-based and highly leveraged capital accumulation.

    *

    In the third volume of Capital, Marx discusses an array of different forms of so-called interest-bearing capital (credit, bonds, and shares) and the idea that comes with them, as he puts it, that it is “the property of money to create value, to yield interest, as it is the property of pear-trees to bear pears” (Marx 516). The sweet dream, in other words, shared by Madoff’s investors and the rest of us, that money has its own particular fertility. Marx’s analysis of interest-bearing capital highlights two particularly noteworthy features: first, that its value is essentially promissory. If money, after all, does not procreate all by itself, interest refers to a value yet to be produced, that is, an anticipation of a valorising process that is expected to take place in the future. If liquid capital results from previous valorising processes (at some point Marx calls it “frozen labour”), fictitious capital—in all its forms—is a promise of value to be produced at some point in the future, a “frozen future”, if you like. Secondly, fictitious capital has the particular feature that it can, by way of its promissory nature, be promised more than once. One given asset—or one specific claim on the future—can be counted, for instance, both as somebody’s fortune and as a security for a credit, or for a second or third credit, for that matter. “Everything in this credit system appears in duplicate and triplicate, and is transformed into a mere phantom of the mind” (603). Capital here retains its fictitiousness in that promises can be stacked up, to an amount where the aggregated claims cannot be honoured. Due to these two features, the trader in credit appears, with Marx’s characteristic penchant for one-liners “as a prophet and a swindler at the same time” (573).

    Marx’s concept of fictitious capital is itself almost prophetic. In Capital, it was an addendum to the primary analysis of valorisation of labour, just as in his time speculation was a marginal source of valorisation in comparison with the decisive means of valorisation, that of production. Today’s financialization has turned the hierarchy between the two upside-down, and the twin mechanisms of fictitious capital—claiming a value in the present that is only to be produced in the future, and using credit to obtain more credit—are now ubiquitous and central to the economy. Where the role of finance has generally been considered, by modern economists as well as by Marx in his time, as a means to create liquidity, that is, to move capital to wherever it is needed, the combination of the deregulation of financial markets, the stagnation of production, and advanced technologies of finance, has created a situation where financial transactions, rather than production proper, have become the main means of capital accumulation. Credit is by now—as Michel Feher has argued in Rated Agency—the most yielding commodity of all, and consequently the wave of financialization has amassed an immense volume of credit by securitizing still more assets. Real estate, infrastructure, health, education, and everyday consumption have all been turned from dormant values into assets that, when securitized with the tools of finance, can provide immediate access to liquid capital. Credit, then, however, of course also entails debt. And the massive securitization of almost everything has built up momentous positions of debt: commercial debt, private debt, national debt. This is the contemporary version of the “prophetic” side of fictitious capital: there are more outstanding claims on values to be produced in the future than ever before. Or, put differently, the return on capital assets remains high as long as more debt is heaped up in in the future—precisely the mechanism that allowed Madoff’s Ponzi scheme to remain hedged by the rising market.

    There is more to financialization, however, than this heaping up of obligations that by now weigh down so heavily on the future. To properly gain profit from possessing credit, the finance markets moreover accommodate different ways of gearing up credit. One of them is to systematically leverage any given credit position, that is, to use credit to buy more credit. After the 1929 crisis, certain limits were set for how much banks should be allowed to leverage, but since the 1980s, these precautions have been gradually suspended and the degree of leverage of banks, financial institutions and corporations has skyrocketed, using existing claims to issue more claims, and indeed using these inflated positions to performatively build up supplementary market value, as Martijn Koonings has compellingly shown in Capital and Time. When banks (in the recently broadening sense of the word, now covering all kinds of financial institutions and agents) are allowed to lower the reserves ratio, and when the economy is at the same time “eased” with generous issuing of public debt—that is, when there are both ways and means for leverage at hand—claims on future production of value are multiplied over and over again. Banks, as pointed out by Stefano Sgambati, “are impelled to come up with financial innovations that, besides enhancing their leverage, propel an ever growing marketization of other people’s debts” (Sgambati 309). This is also the point at which fictitious capital comes to refer not only to the “prophet”, but also to the “swindler”: where the same promise pertaining to the future is given more than once for every given asset.

    And we can go even further. One thing is to obtain more credit with the credit already at hand; yet another—and this is a second defining feature of financialization—is to constantly re-mediate credit in order to create more liquid capital. This is the business of derivatives, contracts betting on the future value of credit positions, contracts that can again be bought and sold and eventually exchanged again to liquid capital. Derivatives can price risk, or put differently, they are a means of packaging risk as a commodity that can be bought and sold on a new and lucrative market—a market presently estimated to an outstanding gross value of some 500 trillion dollars. Derivatives are what Cédric Durand has called a “second generation fictitious capital” (Durand 148), and the surge in issuing derivatives (following another set of de-regulations) has led to the invention of a brand-new commodity: a piece of securitized contingency. Practical as they might be, derivatives in their present, rogue form have produced another layer of outstanding claims on the future: not only multiple claims on every asset, as in the case of the present leveraging techniques, but now also factoring in the price of the risks inherent in the contingencies of the future, to be paid by the very same future.

    When finance is no longer a supplement to the traditional mode of capitalist valorisation, that is, buying labour and collecting a surplus value by selling the products of this labour, but a primary means of accumulation in itself, it appears to have found potential surplus value in new places, beyond the “secret abode of production” analysed by Marx. Throughout the last four decades, where the increase in production has stagnated, the returns on capital to be obtained in the financial markets have nonetheless increased handsomely. And if we do stick to Marx’s insight that money does not yield interest like pear-trees bear pears, we should look somewhere else to gauge the source of this abundant creation of wealth. Saskia Sassen has observed that financialization has by now become “a capability to securitise just about everything in an economy and, in doing so, subject economies and governments to its own criteria for success” (Sassen 118). To pinpoint this new mode of subjection, she picks up another concept heralded by Marx, namely that of “enclosure”, given that today financial firms, as she puts it, “enclose a country’s resources and its citizens’ taxes” (15). And more specifically, the resource being enclosed comes down to being the future itself, the future in which the momentous debts incurred by the credits produced by way of financial instruments eventually reach maturity.

    Looking at contemporary financialization this way, the allegorical nature of Madoff’s scheme becomes immediately apparent. The market in its totality and Madoff shared the inability to honor the outstanding debt positions, and the coy expectation that in the future somehow this gap will be filled. In Madoff’s case this would happen by multiplying depositions (which again had worked for decades); in the financial markets at large, it would happen by the belief in a steep increase in productivity to cover the enormous heaps of debt. The latter is an expectation with no historical evidence to back it up—one that is unsustainable to boot.

    This structural homology between the Madoff case and the larger case of 21st century financialization becomes even more blatant if viewed through the lens of Hyman Minsky’s 1992 “financial instability hypothesis”. According to Minsky, historical periods where accumulation is based on debt expansion rather than increase in production will move through stages of hedged finance (where interest on debt is paid and capital preserved), speculative finance (where interest can still be paid, but the invested capital needs to be “rolled over”), and finally Ponzi finance (where the cash flow no longer suffices to cover neither repayment nor interest, and where credits might eventually need to be depreciated). This is what has become known as the “Minsky moment”, the cusp of a crisis of speculation with insufficient growth to sustain the demand for valorisation. That Minsky moment occurred, one could say, both to Madoff and to the rest of the financial world in 2008. It occurred on different scales, one where the Ponzi fiction did violate legislation and restrictions, and one where the Ponzi-version of fictitious capital, providing the conditions of possibility for the credibility of the former, did not. There is a similarity here that has even made economic sociologists suggest we don’t talk about different magnitudes of Ponzi schemes, but simply about financialization as a “Madoffisation” of the economy (Monaghan and O’Flynn 2017)—a process through which were issued cascades of deferred claims that can be immediately monetized–or, put differently: an enrichment in the present to the detriment of the future.

    *

    The allegorical relation between the Madoff case and the crisis of financialized capitalism that co-occurred in 2008 sheds an interesting light on the present relationship between fiction and finance. If our everyday understanding of the two rests, as I claimed at the beginning, on our creed that fiction does not represent actual beings, and that money does represent an actual value, our two cases testify to all kinds of transgressions of this understanding. Madoff’s meticulously crafted fictitious fund was taken to have a referent, and as long as it functioned, it thrived because it was hedged by growth in financialized accumulation, the lies and subterfuge notwithstanding. The break-down of the financial market—when the inflated edifice of assiduously fashioned varieties of fictitious capital fell apart and left the world economy and the livelihood of millions and millions of people in deep crisis—similarly established that the nominal value of most of the circulating assets was eventually non-founded. Or, to put the conundrum differently: when the fictitious character of money was being exacerbated by financialized capitalism and conspicuously bloated itself, we at the same time learned that fictions, even if they are un-founded, still have the power of world-making on even the largest scales.

    This disquieting muddle, where the epistemic designs of fiction and of finance lose their neat contours, is at the heart of the scandal that broke out when the Madoff fund bankrupted. Madoff’s fiction, eventually avowed, was telling the truth about a bigger but stubbornly non-avowed fiction, like a distorted mirror reflecting the state of things at the onset of the financial crisis. This perplexity can be read in the conviction of Madoff, which of course enumerated all the infringements on current laws and regulations the Madoff fund had perpetrated. However, it also went quite a bit further in the statement of the honourable judge Chin:

    In a society governed by rule of law, Mr. Madoff will get what he deserves and will be punished by his moral culpability… Trust was broken in a way that has left many—victims as well as many others—doubting our financial institutions, our financial systems, our government’s ability to regulate and protect. (qtd. Eren 125)

    The judge is impeccably blunt: Madoff is morally condemned for discrediting our financial system. The exorbitant sentence is bestowed on Madoff to establish a distinction between his fiction and the bigger fiction of financial engineering and in order to reassure us all that we, and the frenzy of financialization that we cannot imagine escaping, are still situated in an orderly reality. That we are not just the secondary characters in somebody else’s fiction, in which they are about to seize what we believed was our future, appropriating that future and whichever aspirations we might have for it, for their own immediate gain.

    There is no doubt that judge Chen’s sentencing “sent a message,” as the saying goes—the message being that there are beliefs that should not be tinkered with. But still, Madoff and his crimes were not solely placeholders for potential misconduct in the finance sector at large. I would suggest that his true moral crime—the one that might instigate doubts about the financial system—was revealed in the sentencing to be not his fraudulent fictions, but the way his business came to act as a displaced representation of the mundane, all-too-common practices of the contemporary financial sector that had set off the crisis. As an allegorical demonstration, the Madoff case could harbinger an undesired insight into the state of things. A play in the play, a fiction within a larger fiction, like the famous allegory devised by Hamlet:

    Is it not monstrous that this player here,

    But in a fiction, in a dream of passion,

    Could force his [the King’s] soul so to his own conceit

    (Shakespeare 270)

    The allegory is, of course, educational; but just as the ancient king of Denmark in Shakespeare’s drama eventually proved unfit to read the allegorical message of the embedded play, so our present, more than ten years after the sentencing of Bernard Madoff—and ourselves as spectators to the unravelling of his Ponzi scheme—have been equally deaf to the message.

    This deafness is undoubtedly a structural one, supported by a disposition to uphold a strict distinction between what morally suspect financiers do and what is the logic of the financial system at large, even to the detriment of a foreboding but better sense that these two are actually quite in synch. A mixed feeling, in other words, like the one encompassing both admiration for the financial wizard and the incipient suspicion that the system itself is somehow rigged. Psychoanalysis has taught us that the force of a rejection mirrors an affective investment. When rejecting the insight provided by the allegory—the formal homology as well as the practical metabolism between Madoff’s scheme and the logic of financialized capitalism—, our present might somehow obliquely be recognizing this lesson. At the same time, however, it must determinedly disregard it because it is strictly non-admissible within the present world-image.

    This mixed feeling is probably nowhere more tangible than in the rapidity and vehemence with which Madoff’s crime was identified and denounced as a Ponzi scheme. Such a swift identification and denunciation are manageable for the cultural imagination, because they leave the actual interdependence between Madoff’s Ponzi scheme and the larger economical (and political) context of the fund’s activities in the shadows. Instead of taking in the allegorical lesson and recognizing the Ponzi-like character of financialized capitalism at the cusp of the 2008-bubble, the public eye on Madoff—again, ranging from yellow press to the New York Southern District Court—focused on Madoff’s fraud as “one of the most egregious financial crimes of our time” and as “extraordinarily evil,” as reiterated in 2020 by Judge Chun when rejecting Madoff’s bid for compassionate release. (New York Law Journal, June 4, 2020). Keep the focus on the man, we are told, and on the 11 counts to which he pleaded guilty. Let Madoff remain a metaphor of dishonest financiers—by all means, do not allow him to become an allegory of the financialized economy itself. Condemn the man, exonerate the system. Could we do otherwise?

    Frederik Tygstrup is Professor of Comparative Literature at the University of Copenhagen and PI of the research project “Finance Fiction. Financialization and Culture in Early 21st Century,” funded by the Independent Research Fund Denmark 2018-22.

    References

    Chandor, J. C. Margin Call. 2011.

    Eren, Colleen P. Bernie Madoff and the Crisis: The Public Trial of Capitalism. Stanford: Stanford University Press 2017.

    Durand, Cédric. Fictitious Capital. How Finance is Appropriating Our Future. Trans. David Broder. London: Verso 2017.

    Feher, Michel. Rated Agency. New York: Zone Books 2019.

    Henriques, Diana B. The Wizard of Lies: Bernie Madoff and the Death of Trust. New York: St. Martin’s Press 2011.

    Koonings, Martijn. Capital and Time. For a New Critique of Neoliberal Reason. Stanford: Stanford University Press 2018.

    Marx, Karl. Capital. Vol. 3. London: Pelican Books 1981.

    Minsky, Hyman P. The Financial Instability Hypothesis. New York: Levy Economics Institute of Bard College 1992.

    Monaghan, Lee F. and Micheal O’Flynn. “The Madoffization of Irish Society: from Ponzi Finance to Sociological Critique.” The British Journal of Sociology 68/4, 2017.

    Ross, Brian. The Madoff Chronicle. New York: Hyperion Books 2009

    Sassen, Saskia. Expulsions: Brutality and Complexity in the Global Economy. Massachusetts: Harvard University Press 2014.

    Sgambati, Stefano. ”The Art of Leverage: A Study of Bank Power, Money-making and Debt Finance.” Review of International Political Economy 26/ 2, 2019.

    Shakespeare, William. Hamlet. Ed. Harold Jenkins. Arden Shakespeare. London: Methuen 1982.

  • Paul Bové wins CELJ Distinguished Editor award

    Paul Bové wins CELJ Distinguished Editor award

    The Council of Editors of Learned Journals (CELJ) has announced Paul Bové, who recently retired as boundary 2’s long-time editor, as one of two winners of the CELJ award in the “Distinguished Editor” category. The award will be announced at the annual Modern Language Association Convention, at the end of CELJ Session #276, Friday 01/05, from 1:45–3pm. boundary 2 and its community joins the CELJ in congratulating Paul on this outstanding achievement!

    According to the judges’ comments, Bové stood out among several exceptionally strong candidates for having served at least three decades at the helm of boundary 2. The judges credit Bové with instituting a new editorial vision for boundary 2 when it was struggling in its initial years of publication, and with building the journal’s reputation and influence over the past thirty years. The judges further praise Bové for developing an effective editorial collective rather than a strictly hierarchical approach to leadership, all to the benefit of a journal that has been consistently interdisciplinary and has published work that has been significantly influential across several fields.

  • Dominique Routhier–A Question of Strategy: A Response to Arne De Boever

    Dominique Routhier–A Question of Strategy: A Response to Arne De Boever

    This response was published as part of the b2o review‘s “Finance and Fiction” dossier

    In the text “Wu Wei (無爲) on Wall Street,” Arne De Boever notes the curious ubiquity in finance fiction of references to the ancient Chinese war general Sun Tzi, author of the perennial bestseller The Art of War. De Boever ponders why ancient Chinese theories of war crop on Wall Street (in fiction as well as in reality) and whether there might be a deeper relation between Sun Tzi’s doctrine of “wu wei” and neoliberal ideology more generally.[i]

    To get at the question of the “content” of the neoliberal “parallelism” between war, finance, and management, De Boever returns to the French sinologist François Jullien’s tri-partite work on “efficacy” written over the last two decades before the turn-of-the millennium. According to De Boever, Jullien’s thought—at the center of which stands the Chinese notion of “wu wei” or, in French, “laissez faire”—facilitates a particularly easy exchange between discourses of war and management and thus provides an intellectual template for neoliberal thought.

    De Boever is thus suggesting how Jullien might have assisted—in a much more direct way than someone like Foucault, who has often been accused of intellectual alignment with neoliberalism (Zamora and Behrent 2016)—in the historical transformation of ancient Chinese military thought (broadly informed by Daoist principles of “action through non-action”) into neoliberal management theory:

    China’s non-Western model of warfare as it is exposed in Jullien’s Treatise becomes highly productive both within Jullien’s work (where it leads to his Lecture) but also outside of it, in its reception in management studies, as part of the development of contemporary management strategies not just for China but at large.

    This is a compelling argument, particularly so since Jullien, as De Boever notes, did not merely theorize “efficacy” in management but actively participated in shaping new management doctrines for the neoliberal era through his work as a prominent international business consultant. By zooming in on the “unexceptional” thought of Jullien, and on the doctrine of “wu wei” in particular, De Boever thus offers a fresh perspective on the genealogy of neoliberal thought.

    In what follows, I will respond to this argument by taking a slightly different but, I hope, complementary approach to understanding why Sun Tzi became a reference for Wall Street stock traders as well as a stable of new management theory.

    Let me begin with a recent remark by Junius Frey, who in the foreword to Yuk Hui’s The Question Concerning Technology in China: An Essay in Cosmotechnics touches briefly upon the topic of Chinese Daoism and notes, à propos the doctrine of “wu wei”:

    The idea that to govern is to follow the vagaries of Nature, and that power ideally merges with the order of things, already captivated Quesnay in the 18th century in his eulogy of China’s despotism. The fascination with Chinese politics during this whole episode went hand in hand with consternation over American politics. One can maintain, along with the Marxists of Chuang, that “     the Chinese Communist Party functions as a vanguard for the global capitalist class” and that “its experiments are important precisely because they are situated on the first line of expansion of capital today, in both its industrial and financial dimensions, and are suited to the confrontation with the very limits of accumulation on its largest scales (Chuang, Social Contagion).” (Frey 2021)

    Though the consequences that Frey draws from this observation are to my mind rather obscure (in short, Frey claims that today’s “imperial domination” is essentially “Chinese”), the embedded quote by the Chinese anti-authoritarian communist collective Chuang usefully shifts the focus away from the terrain of competing “ideas” to the real terrain of the material struggle between classes or class war.

    *

    One of the most incisive strategists of class war is the French situationist Guy Debord. Debord’s thinking on war in the expanded social setting of late capitalist society not only prefigures key insights in so called “French theory” but also points to the transformation of war theory, via François Jullien, into management theory.

    While it is well known that Debord and the situationists played a key role in the (failed) revolutionary events of May ’68, it is less well known that after the dissolution of the Situationist International (SI) in 1972 Debord (re)focused his attention to the study of the history of war, military theory and the question of strategy (Guy 2018). Debord believed that late modern warfare was no longer isolated to the battlefield, with two opposing armies confronting each other. Instead, Debord believed that war had transformed itself into a form of generalized class war that “should be understood in its social omnipresence.” (Debord 2018, 449). For Debord, the study of war was more than simply an intellectual pastime: it implied the question of strategy—when, how, and where to fight—for those who, like Debord himself, actively sought to overthrow capitalist society’s class-rule.

    During the 1960s and early 1970s, against the backdrop of anti-colonial wars and uprisings in Algeria, Congo, Vietnam, and many other places, Debord studied, excerpted, and commented on a number of historical strategists from Sun Tse (the spelling Debord preferred to distinguish from the French Maoist spelling then in vogue, as noted by Laurence Le Bras) to Machiavelli, Jomini and Clausewitz (who appears in De Boever’s text), to mention just a few of the most well-known (Debord 2018).

    Read in the light of the voluminous dossier on strategy that Debord left behind, his entire late oeuvre comes across as a sustained strategic study of the dynamics of “the social war” as a continuation of traditional warfare with other more “spectacular” means (Debord 2018, 111: Debord uses the term “la guerre sociale sous le spectacle”). Debord was not alone in turning to military theory to understand society. Debord’s interest in military theory may be seen as continuous with a broader intellectual turn in France where “from the mid-1970s to the early 1980s, with the Vietnam War also in recent memory, the topic of war began to attract the attention of a number of leading French thinkers” (Engberg-Pedersen 2022, ?).  A key figure in this context is André Glucksmann whose Discours de la guerre from 1967 took up aspects of Mao Tsé-Toung’s writings on Chinese guerilla warfare and became an intellectual touchstone for the French rethinking of strategy and war (Glucksmann 1979).

    However, by contrast to Foucault or Deleuze & Guattari, who would become well-known for their repurposing of Clausewitz, Debord’s key role in the rediscovery of the “classics” of war, and hence his influence on French radical thought, remains partly obscured. Debord himself contributed to the obfuscation of his role in reconfiguring war theory for revolutionaries by withdrawing into the shadows of French public intellectual life, publishing scarcely, and conspiring with a still smaller circle of trusted comrades and friends. Debord’s correspondence with one of these comrades, Jaime Semprún, provides an interesting view into French (post)war thought.

    Believing that Debord had recommended to the prestigious French publishing house Champ Libre to reject his manuscript, Semprún accused Debord of being a kind of literary puppet master working behind the scenes to actively curate the available body of knowledge to fit his particular ideas of social revolution. Debord vehemently refused to have played any such role. Interestingly, however, Debord admits in his letter to Semprún to have had a certain influence on the resurgence of classical war theory, the perspectives of which he felt had been intellectually compromised:

    Concerning the majority of the re-published ‘classics’—Clausewitz, Gracian, etc.—I absolutely do not see what my revolutionary reputation might add to them and still less what they might add to my revolutionary reputation (or even to my not-too-spectacular personal notoriety), since I have kept myself far from consecrating scholarly prefaces to them or adding to them my name as the person responsible for the collection or any other affair. Moreover, I find that all this—for the happy few who know that I recommended these books (in any case, my name is not used to recommend these books to the public)—is only testimony to a certain general culture, about which I have never sought to brag, but I do not dream of being embarrassed about it due to Vincenno-cadrist illiteracy (Debord 1976).[ii]

    Though he preferred to take no credit for it, Debord was in fact, indirectly, responsible for the republishing of major works of strategy by Clausewitz and others during the 1970s. But his interest in war theory reaches much further back, to the 1950s if not before. In fact, by 1965 Debord devised his own wargame, called Kriegsspiel; a ludic device to aid strategic thinking that Debord and the Chinese born situationist Alice Becker-Ho, later Alice Debord, would play together and about which they would co-author an entire book (Becker-Ho and Debord 2006). The literature on Debord’s wargame is vast, and growing, and for the tech savvy there’s even a digital version of the game available (Guy 2020; A. Galloway 2022; A. R. Galloway 2021).

    One little-noted fact in the history of Debord’s war game, however, is that the 1963 “prototype” for this game was produced by fellow situationist René Viénet (Guy 2018, 466). This is an  interesting detail in the context of De Boever’s thinking about Jullien as Viénet was, incidentally, a sinologist like Jullien, and a quite influential sinologist at that. Viénet, then, was perhaps not only “the main person responsible for informing the Situationist understanding of Maoist China” but also in all likelihood one of the main avenues through which the stream from French radical thought flew back to inform, and shape, the ideas and intellectual problematics of someone like Jullien (Zacarias 2020, 224).[iii] Whether or not Jullien’s conception of Chinese strategy as starting from “the potential inherent in the situation” [Jullien qtd. De Boever     ] was shaped by situationist thought is less important than the fact that certain ancient Chinese ideas about the “vagaries of Nature” clearly resonated in French postwar thought. Debord, for one, seems to latch on to the Daoist elements in Sun Tse’s Art of War, noting how “an army’s form resembles water” and “an army is exactly comparable to water because in the same way as a stream flows around peaks and throws itself down slopes, an army avoids strength and strikes weakness” (Debord 2018, 317–18).

    Interesting as it would be to trace the connection between Debord, Viénet, and Jullien in more detail, I want to end by shifting the methodological lens from the study of the historical transmission and evolution of ideas to the material and social conditions that produced these ideas in the first place. As already suggested, Debord’s interest in war did not arise in a vacuum but was defined by the backdrop of decolonization struggles, colonial violence and anti-colonialist liberation wars. If one studies Debord’s work there is frequent reference to anti-colonial struggles abroad in for instance Algeria, or in Congo, where the spontaneous revolts led by Patrice Lumumba was hailed as the only ‘worthy sequel’ to the interwar periods revolutionary avantgarde movements (Smith 2013, 70; Yoon 2013; Routhier 2023, 205–6). Within the constraints of this brief response, let me just gesture towards some of the existing literature on the situationists’ internationalist anti-colonialism (Dolto and Moussa 2020; Corrêra 2023). But even gesturing points us further in the right direction, I think, and helps shift the perspective from the history of ideas à la Foucault to the Marxist viewpoint of social antagonism and class war à la Debord. Method, in short, is also always a question of strategy.

    From the viewpoint of social antagonism the question is perhaps not so much whether Jullien’s reconfiguring of Sun Tzi and the “wu wei” doctrine impacted or influenced neoliberal management theory. I think De Boever very convincingly shows that he probably did. What seems more urgent to ask, pace De Boever, is why a French sinologist like Jullien comes to ventriloquize Capital? Why is the reemergence of Sun Tzi’s theory of war conspicuously coterminous with the rise of neoliberalism? To what extent do the changes in the organic composition of capital during the postwar decades change the terms and conditions (literally and figuratively) of class war? And, most importantly: what is the proper strategic response for those happy few of us who would like to think, in the stinging words of Junius Frey, “that the encounter between traditional Chinese thought and the European tradition can be something more than a spiritual supplement for functionaries on the rise, à la François Jullien” (Frey 2021).[iv]

    Dominique Routhier is a researcher, writer, and critic based in Copenhagen, Denmark. He has most recently published the book With and Against: the Situationist International in the Age of Automation (Verso, 2023).

    References

    Becker-Ho, Alice, and Guy Debord. 2006. Le jeu de la guerre: relevé des positions successives de toutes les forces au cours d’une partie. Paris: Gallimard.

    Corrêra, Erick. 2023. “The Internationalist Anti-Colonialism of the Situationists.” Brooklyn Rail, February 2023. https://brooklynrail.org/2023/02/.

    Debord, Guy. 1976. “Letter to Jaime Semprún,” September 26, 1976. https://www.notbored.org/debord-26December1976.html.

    ———. 2018. Stratégie. La librairie de Guy Debord. Paris: Éditions L’Échappée.

    Dolto, Sophie, and Nedjib Sidi Moussa. 2020. “The Situationists’ Anti-Colonialism: An Internationalist Perspective.” In The Situationist International: A Critical Handbook, edited by Alastair Hemmens and Gabriel Zacarias, 103–17. London: Pluto Press.

    Engberg-Pedersen, Anders. 2022. “War and French Theory.” In War and Literary Studies, edited by Anders Engberg-Pedersen and Neil Ramsey, 85–101. New York: Cambridge University Press.

    Frey, Junius. 2021. “Sketch of a Communist Political Doctrine.” Ill Will, September. https://illwill.com/sketch-of-a-communist-political-doctrine.

    Galloway, Alexander. 2022. “How I Modeled Guy Debord’s Brain in Software.” ROM Chip: A Journal of Game Histories 4 (1). https://romchip.org/index.php/romchip-journal/article/view/162#fn-d0da464098a70e702cbc1660bb575977.

    Galloway, Alexander R. 2021. Uncomputable: Play and Politics in the Long Digital Age. Brooklyn, NY: Verso.

    Glucksmann, André. 1979. Le discours de la guerre. Paris: Grasset.

    Guy, Emmanuel. 2018. “Postface.” In Stratégie, by Guy Debord. La librairie de Guy Debord. Paris: Éditions L’Échappée.

    ———. 2020. Le Jeu de La Guerre de Guy Debord: L’émancipation Comme Projet. Paris: B42.

    Routhier, Dominique. 2023. With and against: The Situationist International in the Age of Automation. London ; New York: Verso.

    Smith, Jason E. 2013. “Missed Encounters: Critique de La Séparation between the Riot and the ‘Young Girl.’” Grey Room (July): 62–81. https://doi.org/10.1162/GREY_a_00116.

    Yoon, Soyoung. 2013. “Cinema against the Permanent Curfew of Geometry: Guy Debord’s Sur Le Passage de Quelques Personnes à Travers Une Assez Courte Unité de Temps (1959).” Grey Room (July): 38–61. https://doi.org/10.1162/GREY_a_00115.

    Zacarias, Gabriel. 2020. “Détournement in Language and the Visual Arts.” In The Situationist International: A Critical Handbook, edited by Alastair Hemmens and Gabriel Zacarias, 214–35. London: Pluto Press.

    Zamora, Daniel, and Michael C. Behrent, eds. 2016. Foucault and Neoliberalism. Malden (Mass.): Polity press.

    [i] I would like to thank Jason Smith for insights and improvements on a draft version of this text.

    [ii] The term Vincenno-cadrist refers to those employed at the Centre universitaires de Vincennes, which was established in 1968 as a response to the Parisian student protests of May ’68. In the early 1970s, Vincennes was a maoist hotbed for much of what would become known as “French Theory.”

    [iii] Worth mentioning here is also Simon Leys’ (the pen name of Pierre Ryckmans) important anti-maoist book Les Habits neufs du président Mao (Paris: Champ libre, 1971).

    [iv] For a more nuanced assessment of François Jullien’s thought and its critical relevance, see Arne De Boever’s François Jullien’s Unexceptional Thought: A Critical Introduction (London: Rowman & Littlefield, 2020).

  • Arne De Boever–“Wu Wei (無爲) on Wall Street”

    Arne De Boever–“Wu Wei (無爲) on Wall Street”

    This article was published as part of the b2o review‘s “Finance and Fiction” dossier. The dossier includes a response to this article by Dominique Routhier.

    “Read Sun Zi”

    I want to begin with a bit of locker-room talk I came across when I was doing the primary research for my book Finance Fictions (Boever 2018).[1] It’s a scene from Oliver Stone’s film Wall Street (Fox, 1987). The scene shows the by now infamous trader Gordon Gekko (memorably portrayed by Michael Douglas), quoting Sun Zi, the ancient Chinese military general and strategist of war,[2] to explain his trading strategy. “Every battle is won before it’s ever fought”, Gekko tells Buddy Fox (played by Charlie Sheen). “Think about it”. The question I want to ask is simple: why is Gekko, a trader, quoting Sun Zi’s The Art of War? Why is Gekko telling us to place our bets on Sun Zi? Let’s think about it, as Gekko suggests.

    I’ve started doing this in a roundabout way, through a reading of the French philosopher—Hellenist and sinologist—François Jullien (see Boever 2020).[3] Jullien is a controversial figure, and you’ll probably gather from what follows why that is so; but his work can also be helpful, I want to show, in understanding the appearance of Sun Zi in Stone’s Wall Street. Ultimately, I will also expand my frame of reference beyond finance and think about Sun Zi’s relation to theories of neoliberal government. In fact, if you’ve read some of the literature on finance and neoliberalism, chances are that you’ve come across references to Sun Zi.

    Consider another example from a very different but, I would argue, related context: in To Our Friends, The Invisible Committee references Sun Zi multiple times—including, by the way, the quote “to ‘win the battle before the battle’” (Invisible Committee 2015, 137)—to theorize what earlier in the book they understand to be (silently echoing the work of Michel Foucault) neoliberal governance. When they list a range of adjectives to characterize this type of governance, they use “flexible, plastic, informal” and “Taoist” (68). Why “Taoist”?

    And to return to finance, and financial fiction: when in Tash Aw’s finance novel Five Star Billionaire, the Shanghai businesswoman (and former left-wing activist) Yinghui Leong attends an event where she is nominated for the “Businesswoman of the Year awards”, Aw lets us know that “the ceremony was held in the ballroom of a hotel … decorated with huge bouquets of pink flowers and banners bearing quotes from Sunzi’s The Art of War: OPPORTUNITIES MULTIPLY AS THEY ARE SEIZED. A LEADER LEADS BY EXAMPLE, NOT FORCE” (Aw 53). Why Sun Zi at this awards ceremony? That is what I propose to think about.

    In Management as in War

    So, first: Jullien. In an interview with Richard Piorunski that was published in the journal Ebisu in 1998, Jullien states the following (the translation here is mine as in almost all of the other quotations that I’ll be using): “I’ve accompanied French businesses in China to help them negotiate. There are strategies, ancient, classical Chinese strategies, to which the Chinese will stick” (Piorunski 1998, 173). How did Jullien, a sinologist and philosopher, end up accompanying French businesses in China? As Jullien himself indicates in the interview, his presence in China at the side of French businesses is due to his work on efficacy. This work extends over three volumes. There was, first, the book The Propensity of Things, which (as per its subtitle) proposed to work “Toward a History of Efficacy in China” (Jullien 1995). This was followed by the much shorter A Treatise on Efficacy: Between Western and Chinese Thinking (Jullien 2004), which explicitly continued the thinking of the earlier book. (Both of those titles have been translated into English.) Finally, there is Jullien’s still untranslated Conférence sur l’efficacité [Lecture on Efficacy] (Jullien 2005), which is even shorter and also more informal in tone, closer to the mode of oral delivery. The title of the book’s German translation is more revealing about the origin of this particular work: Vortrag vor Managern über Wirksamkeit und Effizienz in China und im Westen (Jullien 2006)—in other words: Lecture for Managers on Efficacy and Efficiency in China and the West.

    What began as a historical, and densely academic project in Propensity of Things about the notion of potentiality in Chinese thinking evidently morphed over time into a much less dense, much less formal lecture for managers about efficacy and efficiency. The book in the middle, Treatise on Efficacy, is about “warfare, power, and speech” (Jullien 2004, ix). But its opening question already anticipates the later Lecture for Managers: “What do we mean”, Jullien asks there, “when we say that something has ‘potential’—not ‘a potential for’ but an absolute potential—for example [he writes] a market with a potential, a developing business with a potential?” (vii) Treatise might be a book about war, but the theory of war it develops is framed as an inquiry into economic potential, into the potential of a business. Clearly, whatever Jullien will have to say in the book about war is presented as applying to business as well. In management as in war, one might say—a parallelism that I’ll want to extend here to “In finance as in war” and also to “In neoliberalism as in war”. But what would be the content of such a parallel construction? Everything depends here on one’s theory and practice of war.

    To give some substance to the parallelism “In management as in war”, I am going to look primarily at the relatively unknown (and untranslated) Lecture for Managers. Lecture reads like an informal summary of Treatise, in other words it’s very much a lecture on war. But this is perhaps not its key concern. If it comes to naming the precise connection between military theory and management theory, it is not so much the notion of “war” as that of “strategy” that is most relevant. Indeed, at its most philosophical, the Lecture seeks to open a divergence between Western and Chinese strategies for bringing something about—strategies for efficacy, as the title of both Treatise and Lecture suggest. At this level, the central question of both the Treatise and the Lecture is not essentially related to war at all; rather, it’s because theories of efficacy have been developed mostly in theories of war that Jullien turns to those to lay out his thinking about efficacy.

    After some preliminary remarks that lay out his method and address, indirectly, criticisms that have been levelled at his work, Jullien arrives in his Lecture at what he understands to be the Western approach to efficacy, which constructs a model, plan, or ideal form (eidos, to use the Platonic term) to achieve a goal (telos). Once that’s done, the subject acts according to this plan, seeking to achieve the set goal. He argues that the Western thought of war demonstrates this logic, all the way up to Carl von Clausewitz, who appears in both the Lecture and Treatise as a kind of hinge figure. This is because the late 18th-, early 19th-century Prussian general and military theorist both presents us with Western warfare-by-modelization, if you will, and realizes its limits, namely the fact that no war will match the model, plan, or ideal form—the geometry—that has been set for it. Jullien points out that this kind of objection to Plato already starts with Aristotle, who is much more attuned to what escapes the model (Jullien 2005, 17).

    Already with Aristotle then, but this becomes particularly visible in Clausewitz, there is a gap that opens up between the theory and the practice of warfare—“[t]o think about warfare is to think about the extent to which it is bound to betray the ideal concept of it” (Jullien 2004, 11)–and it’s this gap that opens up a point of contact with the Chinese theory of warfare. Clausewitz is particularly attuned to the gap between theoretical and practical war, and theorizes what he calls the “friction” (26) between the model and the reality of it. This is the cross that the Western theory of war has to bear. But Jullien uses this realization, which comes from a gap within the Western theory of war, to jump to Chinese theories of war by Sun Zi (and Sun Bin).

    Jullien points out, when he begins to discuss these authors, that “today many managers take inspiration from these authors without understanding them well, both in Europe and in Japan. Those are managers ‘à la Sun Zi’” (Jullien 2005, 29). Chinese strategy, Jullien explains, starts from the potential of a situation (30), from the shi of a situation as he discussed it in Propensity. “[I]nstead of imposing our plan upon the world, we could rely on the potential inherent in the situation” (Jullien 2004, 16). What happens in war—the efficacy achieved in war—needs to be understood as the actualization of that potential, as the natural outcome of the situation (Jullien 2005, 32). Most important when going to war is not to make a model, plan, or ideal Form, but to evaluate the situation and its potential (33): a good general will understand the potential of a situation to such an extent that, when they engage in war, the outcome of the war is entirely predetermined—the situation could not allow it develop otherwise (35). As Jullien explains, because the Chinese theory of warfare focuses on evaluating the potential of the situation rather than making a model, there is zero uncertainty about the outcome it anticipates (the outcome is “unswerving, “inevitable”, determined before the battle, etc. [42]). Whereas in the West, war is haunted by the language of chance, necessitating a plea to the gods through sacrifice for example to try to obtain a desirable outcome, Jullien points out that Sun Zi’s Art of War explicitly forbids this, because nothing in warfare should be exterior to the logic of a situation (35). It’s about a certain kind of attunement with reality that enables one to allow reality to follow its path, its course, its dao, but to one’s advantage in war. Chinese warfare is not warfare-by-modelization but warfare-by-regulation, and the dao is what regulates all things. (The model for this is in fact respiration, breathing in and out.)

    If the Western model (and in the opposition that’s developed here you can of course see some of what critics like Edward Slingerland deem to be Jullien’s orientalism at work[4]) is telos-oriented and governed by a means-ends logic, Jullien points out that such an architecture cannot be found on the Chinese side (where we have “set-up” and “efficacy” instead), even if that does not mean it is illogical. Rather, efficacy is achieved by allowing the consequences of a situation to come to fruition or maturation. There is no heroism associated with generals, there is no glory in managing a business. It has nothing sensationalist to it: effective victories remain unseen[5] and they ought, in fact, to be easy: indeed, they merely realize to a business’ advantage the logic that already lay contained in nature. A manager does not so much “do” or “act”, they don’t “force”.[6]

    To overstate the case somewhat, one might describe this as a theory of “non-action”,[7] as Jullien does in both the Lecture and the Treatise (Jullien 2004, 84-103). (It’s worth pointing out that this term “non-action” translates the key daoist notion of “wu wei” that you find in my title, and to which I’ll return later.) It would be more precise, however, to substitute “non-action” by “action through non-action” or “transformation” in this context: the Chinese general—like the Chinese sage, in fact–does not so much do nothing but seeks to discreetly “transform” their adversary rather than confront them head-on. After all, the Chinese model, as Jullien points out, still “leaves plenty of room for human initiative” (Jullien 1995, 203). Nevertheless, if “action” in Jullien’s summary is “of the moment”, “local”, and “subject-related”, “transformation” is “global”, “durational” and “discreet”—it does not necessarily refer back to a subject.[8] While such transformation is efficacious, it takes place “silently” (58), unnoticed. The strategy of transformation breaks with the Western mythology of “the event” (58-62), which is closely related to Christianity in Jullien’s analysis. It’s the Vietnam war, and specifically the strategy of the Vietnamese, that illustrates this best. To win without battle (an overstatement, surely?): instead, there is “a process of progressive erosion, of making the adversary lose countenance” (61), which Jullien associates with “psychological warfare” (61). In the West, warfare amounts to destruction. But in the Chinese theory of warfare, losses ought to be avoided, and on both sides: in war, it’s preferable to leave the troops intact (62; Jullien 2004, 47). He associates this with deconstruction rather than destruction (Jullien 2004, 48).[9] As Jullien also puts it in Treatise: “nothing could be more economical” (48). And indeed, we should not forget that Jullien is offering all of this theory of Chinese warfare in the context of a Lecture for Managers. Management is a little like psychological warfare, he appears to be saying; you’re trying to de-countenance your adversary not through action but silent transformation. That’s what management is all about.

    Path into China

    Given the above overview, I suppose it should come as no surprise that research on Jullien will turn up articles written by military officers and business leaders.[10] Of Jullien’s reception in management theory, I’ll discuss just one example, Dominique Poiroux’s “En quête de la voie en Chine” (“In search of the path in/into China”), published in the Journal de l’école de Paris du management. Poiroux is credited simply by the name of the business for whom at the end of 2002, he left to China: “Danone” (Poiroux 2007, 8). The article summarizes his experiences in 8 sections whose titles operate as statements summarizing their main advice. Let me list them to give an idea of their range:

    • “Cent jours pour écouter” (“One hundred days for listening”)
    • “Prendre du recul” (“Taking a step back”)
    • “Gagner du temps” (“Gaining time”)
    • “Si l’ennemi ne peut être arrêté, préparer une alliance” (“If the enemy can’t be stopped, prepare an alliance”)
    • “Rester humble au quotidien” (“Stay modest in relation to the everyday Chinese person”)
    • “Un demi-effort, cent succès; cent efforts, un demi-succès” (the Chinese proverb is included in transcribed Chinese as well: “shi ban gong bei; shi bei gong ban”; “half an effort, one hundred successes; one hundred efforts, half a success”)
    • “Se séparer d’un collaborateur, mais rester bons amis” (“Separating oneself from a collaborator, while staying good friends”)
    • and finally “Savoir se laisser mener en bateau” (here too, in the transcribed Chinese: “man tian guo hai”; “letting oneself be guided in a boat”).

    Rather than explain all of these, I want to note that the first section of Poiroux’s article explicitly credits a lot of these wisdoms to Jullien, with Poiroux writing that Jullien’s book Treatise on Efficacy will often be quoted in the sections that follow. He does not clarify what Jullien’s book is about—war–, only that while he will be applying it to management, “it was not at all written in that context” (Poiroux 2007, 9). It’s worth noting that this is in fact an overstatement: as I’ve discussed, Jullien’s book is explicitly framed through a question about the potential of a business and it includes several references to the economic realm and management strategy. That Jullien’s book is a work of military theory certainly becomes visible in the short section titles that I’ve listed: suddenly, the Danone business leader can use the military language of “enmity” and “alliance” to summarize his management advice. It’s remarkable, I think, that there is no reflection on this shift in the article: it shows to what extent the presence of military language is simply accepted in this context as the language of management. “Strategy” seamlessly crosses here from military into management theory, anecdotes from military history are without any friction applied in the context of management and as part of the broader project of explaining to Western business leaders how to find a “path” in or into China, as the article title puts it. The use of the term “path” by the way is itself significant: it is a rather obvious pun on the Chinese notion of the dao, the path or way that is the flow of all things; but it is repurposed here as part of a Western business strategy for gaining an economic foothold in China.

    Many other articles can be found to illustrate the easy exchange between military theory and management theory, which revolves around the term “strategy”. While those never demonstrate any deep engagement with Jullien’s work (often they aren’t even context-specific), the casual references to his thought are many and contribute to the development not only of business strategies in China specifically but—and this is worth emphasizing–of management theory in general. This is different from Poiroux’s use of Jullien in a specifically Chinese situation. China’s non-Western model of warfare as it is exposed in Jullien’s Treatise becomes highly productive both within Jullien’s work (where it leads to his Lecture) but also outside of it, in its reception in management studies, as part of the development of contemporary management strategies not just for China but at large.

    Wu Wei and Laissez-Faire

    This is where I want to expand the frame of reference beyond management to theories of neoliberal government. For there are elements in the Chinese theory of war that resonate with what one might call today’s neoliberal government. I can argue this theoretically, but I want to do so historically as well in order to give some factual, non-speculative grounding to this proposition.

    Consider for example the chapter “Do Nothing (With Nothing Left Undone)” in Jullien’s Treatise, where Jullien as elsewhere in his work suggests that one of the models for efficacy (both in war and elsewhere) is “the growth of plants” (you will find this model discussed in the work of the later Confucian Mong Zi or Mencius, by the way) (Jullien 2004, 90). This is because

    one must neither pull on plants to hasten their growth (an image of direct action), nor must one fail to hoe the earth around them so as to encourage their growth (by creating favorable conditions for it). You cannot force a plant to grow, but neither should you neglect it. What you should do is liberate it from whatever might impede its development. You must allow it to grow. Such tactics are equally effective at the level of politics. A good prince … is a ruler who, by eliminating constraints and exclusions, makes it possible for all that exists to develop as suits it. His acting-without-action amounts to a kind of laisser-faire [my emphasis, ADB] but not to a policy of doing nothing at all. (91)

    The idea is repeated in explicitly political terms later on, in the chapter “Allow Effects to Come About”. With respect to political reality, Jullien writes:

    The excessive fullness that burdens it is, as we have seen, that of regulations and prohibitions that, as they multiply, end up weighing society down so that it is impossible for it to evolve as it should. An emptiness needs to be created, those regulations must be evacuated, to allow reality the space in which it can take off. For as soon as nothing is codified any more (codification being nothing but a reification of fullness), because nothing any longer bars the way to initiative, this can deploy itself sponte sua. In the emptiness created by the removal of prohibitions and regulations, all that is necessary is to allow things to happen, to allow them to pass through, so that action now occurs without activity. (112)

    Even if both of these quotes seem to include an idea of freedom (with the verb “liberate” being used explicitly in the first), one should not get the wrong idea here: it is by allowing the plant to grow, and to develop sponte sua, that the Chinese politician exercises control. So you get a strange situation where the notion of action through non-action, or wu wei, becomes a model for the control exercised by a laisser-faire government. This is the particular exercise of sovereign power that the ancient Chinese sages recommend.

    With respect to this phrase laisser faire/ laissez-faire, I have to include here a brief historical note about its origins.[11] I do so specifically because of laissez-faire’s importance in contemporary analyses of neoliberalism. It is worth noting that the phrase laissez-faire originates in the 18th-century French economist François Quesnay’s writings on Chinese despotism. Indeed, “laissez faire” is a French translation of the Chinese notion of “wu wei”, which means—as I’ve already discussed–“without exertion” and is closely associated with the Chinese understanding of effective government. Certainly when the phrase laisser faire appears in Jullien, in a chapter titled “Do Nothing (With Nothing Left Undone)”, that is where we should situate its origins. But as such, the notion’s appearance in Jullien can of course not be disentangled from its translation into the work of Quesnay, and by extension the work of the French physiocrats, whose ideas about the “natural”, “spontaneously” self-regulating market producing the natural “true price” of a good, so interested Michel Foucault in both Security, Territory, Population [1977-1978] (Foucault 2007) (which dedicates a lecture to the physiocrats [Foucault 2007, 55-86]) as well as The Birth of Biopolitics [1978-1979] (Foucault 2008) (which recalls Foucault’s earlier discussion of the physiocrats [Foucault 2008, 30-37]). (As far as I know, Foucault does not mention the phrase’s origins in wu wei; Roland Barthes’ course on The Neutral, however, from 1977-1978 (Barthes 2005) [in other words, at the same as the lectures by Foucault just mentioned] does include a [superficial—as far as I can tell, Barthes relies on a single, secondary source] engagement with Daoism and a discussion of wu wei.) It is this idea of wu wei or laisser faire/ laissez-faire that according to many would later on lead to Adam Smith’s notion of the invisible hand (liberalism/ neoliberalism); at the same time, one might find it present in Jeremy Bentham’s notion of the panopticon as well (sovereignty). These are by no means the only political interpretations that have been given of wu wei: it’s most commonly been associated with political anarchism.

    There are at least two things we learn from this genealogy. First of all, wu wei/ laisser faire—and by extension neoliberalism–is a practice of power. Second, it does not mean doing nothing: whatever you understand by “let it be” needs to add up to a practice of acting otherwise, of acting through not-acting (enlarging what’s already happening in nature rather than forcefully going against it). Putting one and two together, we can say that wu wei/ laisser faire names a practice of power that self-occludes. This explains the references to Sun Zi and to Daoism in The Invisible Committee’s To Our Friends, when a theory of neoliberal government is laid out.

    At this point we are also in a position to understand why Lao Zi, whose Dao De Jing is in spite of its mere few thousand words the foundational text of Daoism, can be appreciatively quoted in Ronald Reagan’s “State of the Union” address from 1988. The line Reagan quotes about 5 minutes into the address is: “Govern a great nation like you would cook a small fish; do not overdo it”. One year before, Gekko had already quoted Sun Zi, and specifically the idea of wu wei in Sun Zi, in Stone’s Wall Street. Applying wu wei to trading, Gekko appears to place himself precisely within the understanding of neoliberal laissez-faire that I am uncovering here. “I don’t throw darts at a board. I bet on sure things. Read Sun Zi, The Art of War: ‘Every battle is won before it’s ever fought’. Think about it”. If “probability theory” in Jullien’s view is one of the ways in which the West dealt with the tension, central to Clausewitz’ thought, between absolute and real war (Jullien 2004, 42)—and there is a great book on this by the Danish scholar Anders Engberg-Pedersen (Engberg-Pederson 2015)–, Chinese strategy by contrast “has always avoided” “the kind of gamble accompanied by risk and danger” (Jullien 2004, 82).

    In today’s situation of neoliberal government, in which the overlap of finance and politics has only intensified, references to Sun Zi have also abounded, and much remains to be explored. In the Introduction to her recent new translation of The Art of War, Michael Nylan points out that “[e]ven before becoming president, Donald Trump tweeted Sunzi wisdom to his followers” (Nylan 2020, 18). Nylan continues:

                Trump, unlikely to have read The Art of War, included enthusiasts in his administration. Steve Bannon was a missionary for Sunzi. Sebastian Gorka, former deputy assistant to the president, sported a vanity license plate: “Art War”. (18)

    Nylan also quotes James Mattis’ comment that while “the Army was always big on Clausewitz … the Marine Corps has always been more Eastern-oriented” (18). Semper Sun Zi.

    Is Wu Wei Neoliberal?

    There is a whole other discussion that I’m not completely ready to engage with about whether wu wei is indeed neoliberal—about whether wu wei’s translation into laissez faire and laissez faire’s translation into neoliberalism does indeed hold water. The issue is, perhaps unsurprisingly in the case of a translation like this across time and space, complicated. Although wu wei is typically considered to be a daoist notion (you’ll find both verbal and nominal wu-forms throughout the daoist corpus), it also explicitly appears once in Confucius’ Analects, which in fact mobilizes the notion of wu wei to capture a model of government where the people are not so much guided through “coercive regulations” and “punishments” but by “virtue” (Confucius 2003, 175)—by the ruler projecting virtuous behavior that would then trickle down to their subjects (what one might call today “trickle-down morality”). “Ritual”, not law, is in Confucius’ book, what keeps the people in line. At first sight, this emphasis on virtue may not sound very neoliberal, but that could only be a provisional conclusion: scholars like Melinda Cooper and Wendy Brown have shown, in their books Family Values and In the Ruins of Neoliberalism, how crucial conservative morality is to neoliberal government (Cooper 2017; Brown 2019). Today, of course, this insistence on morality has become hollowed out: Brown writes of a merely “contractual use” of morality by today’s neoliberalism, and this is certainly one of the meanings her book’s title (that we are living in the ruins of the neoliberalism).

    Interestingly, the Confucians were precisely accused of such a hollowing out of morality—of morality becoming pure form, devoid of content—by the daoists, who ridiculed what they understood to be the performance of empty ritual. They have been associated, rather, with political anarchism (Ames and Hall 2003, 14; 102), an association that I think moves too far in the other direction since it does not capture the ways in which wu wei’s action through non-action is actually a hierarchical practice of power. (On this count, however, we would need a more extensive discussion of anarchism and its meanings. But it seems this is the obvious reason why The Invisible Committee uses “Taoist” as an adjective to characterize neoliberal government, and not their own anarchist practice.)

    The later Confucian Mong Zi or Mencius famously opens his book with a rejection of those who put profit over righteousness: “Why must your majesty speak of profit [he asks King Hui of Liang]? Let there simply be benevolence and righteousness” (Mengzi 2008, 1). Importantly, however, this is not a rejection of those who seek profit as such—only of those who place that pursuit over being benevolent and righteous. Mong Zi’s English translator, the eminent sinologist Bryan Van Norden, summarizes Mong Zi’s position as follows:

    Mencius taught that those who are talented have an obligation to use their skills for the betterment of society and not merely their own self-aggrandizement. He said that we must look without ourselves to find our best inclinations and develop them. He argued that loving families with good values produce caring adults who have integrity. He asserted that government must aim at the well-being of all the people not just the well-off. He declared that rulers who punish those who steal because they live in poverty and lack education are merely setting traps for the people. He claimed that war is a final resort that usually causes more troubles than it solves. (Mengzi 2008, 197)

    As I’ve already said, the emphasis on “loving families” and “good values” does not necessarily take us out of neoliberalism. But perhaps the focus on “the betterment of society” and the positioning against “self-aggrandizement” do; perhaps the focus on “integrity” (the position against “corruption”) does, too. Most striking here I find the proposition that government must aim at the well-being of all, not just the well-off, and should not punish those who steal because they are poor or uneducated: instead, the implication goes, the government should make sure everyone is educated and lives a good life.

    It seems then, that wu wei is not quite comfortably at home on Wall Street, even if (as I’ve shown) it contains quite a few elements that have enabled many to situate it there.

    Arne De Boever teaches American Studies in the School of Critical Studies at the California Institute of the Arts (USA), where for over a decade he also directed the MA Aesthetics and Politics program. He is the author of numerous articles, reviews, and translations, as well as several books on contemporary comparative fiction and political and aesthetic philosophy. His most recent books are Against Aesthetic Exceptionalism (University of Minnesota Press, 2019), François Jullien’s Unexceptional Thought: A Critical Introduction (Rowman & Littlefield, 2020), and Being Vulnerable: Contemporary Political Thought (McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2023).

    References

    Ames, Roger and David Hall, eds. Dao De Jing: “Making This Life Significant” (A Philosophical Translation). Trans. Roger Ames and David Hall. New York: Ballantine Books, 2003.

    Aw, Tash. Five Star Billionaire. New York: Spiegel and Grau, 2014.

    Barthes, Roland. The Neutral: Lecture Course at the Collège de France, 1977-1978. Trans. Rosalind Krauss and Denis Hollier. New York: Columbia University Press, 2005.

    Boever, Arne De. Finance Fictions: Realism and Psychosis in a Time of Economic Crisis. New York: Fordham University Press, 2018.

    —. François Jullien’s Unexceptional Thought: A Critical Introduction. New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2020.

    Brown, Wendy. In the Ruins of Neoliberalism: The Rise of Antidemocratic Politics in the West. New York: Columbia University Press, 2019.

    Confucius. Analects. Trans. Edward Slingerland. Indianapolis: Hackett, 2003.

    Cooper, Melinda. Family Values: Between Neoliberalism and the New Social Conservatism. New York: Zone Books, 2017.

    Engberg-Pederson, Anders. Empire of Chance: The Napoleonic Wars and the Disorder of Things. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2015.

    Foucault, Michel. Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1977-1978. Trans. Graham Burchell. New York: Picador, 2007.

    —. The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1978-1979. Trans. Graham Burchell. New York: Picador, 2008.

    The Invisible Committee. To Our Friends. Trans. Robert Hurley. Los Angeles: Semiotext(e), 2015.

    Jullien, François. The Propensity of Things: Toward a History of Efficacy in China. Trans. Janet Lloyd. New York: Zone Books, 1995.

    —. A Treatise on Efficacy: Between Western and Chinese Thinking. Trans. Janet Lloyd. Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2004.

    —. Conférence sur l’efficacité. Paris: PUF, 2005.

    —. Vortrag vor Managern über Wirksamkeit und Effizienz in China und im Westen. Trans. Ronald Vouillé. Leipzig:  Merve, 2006.

    Mengzi. Mengzi. With Selections From Traditional Commentaries. Trans. Bryan W. Van Norden. Indianapolis: Hackett, 2008.

    Nylan, Michael. “Introduction”. In: Sun Tzu, The Art of War. Trans. Michael Nylan. New York: Norton, 2020. 9-34.

    Piorunski, Richard. “Le détour d’un grec par la Chine. Entretien avec François Jullien.” Ebisu 18 (1998): 147-185.

    Poiroux, Dominique. “En quête de la voie en Chine”. Journal de l’école de Paris du management 2: 64 (2007): 8-15.

    [1] This text was first presented at a boundary 2 conference at the University of Pittsburgh in Fall 2019 (thank you Paul Bové for the invitation). I later presented revised versions of it at the “Finance and Fictions” event at the California Institute of the Arts in January 2020, and at Syddansk Universitet in Fall 2022 (thank you Anders Engberg-Pederson for the invitation). I would like to express my gratitude to the audiences at those various occasions—which included, in Denmark, my respondent in this forum, Dominique Routhier–for their comments and questions.

    [2] The authorship of The Art of War is uncertain as in the case of many ancient texts.

    [3] See: Boever 2020. Most of this text is based on what was later published as chapter three of this book, titled “In Management as in War”.

    [4] I have commented on this at length in: Boever 2020, Chapter 1.

    [5] Ibid., 42.

    [6] Ibid., 45.

    [7] Ibid., 53.

    [8] Jullien, Conférence, 56.

    [9] Ibid., 48.

    [10] I don’t have time to discuss to military uses of his thought here (on this, see: Boever 2020), but based on articles that I’ve found I conclude that his Treatise is frequently assigned as reading at military academies.

    [11] I want to thank Andrew Culp for initially guiding me in this direction.

  • Christian Thorne–World Literature as Counter-Revolution

    Christian Thorne–World Literature as Counter-Revolution

    For more on the subject of world literature, see Christian Thorne’s interview with Joe Cleary that was published in our series “Re-read, Re-examine, Re-think”

    Poetry for when the tariffs come down

    The current interest in world literature tends to boil down to a single open-ended recommendation: that we be curious about what happens to literature when it travels outside of its home country and, often enough, outside of its native language. What happens to American literature when non-Americans get their hands on it? Do readers in China tend to understand Dostoevsky differently from readers in Russia? Why did German readers take so quickly to the Latin American Boom novel? How did Män som hatar kvinnorMen Who Hate Woman—morph into the leering demi-blason of The Girl with the Dragon Tattoo? Do different countries have different cultures of translation?—different standards for what counts as a good rendering?—different foreign literatures that they tend to favor? Or is everybody really just reading Swedish crime novels?

    This particular conception of world literature is most often traced back to Goethe, which is both plausible and a bit of a problem. For any biography of Goethe will tell you that he was an oligarch from the banking city of Frankfurt and a counter-revolutionary official in one of Germany’s petty autocracies, the kind of guy whose finance ministry responded to peasant grievances by ordering that the Bauer be punished for having dared to complain; the kind of guy, I mean, whose government shut down any student societies they suspected of democratic sentiments and who paid informants to keep tabs on the political attitudes of their classmates and professors (Rothe; Wilson). The question, of course, is what we should make of these biographical prompts. Is it possible that a theory as manifestly liberal and world-loving as Weltliteratur could carry the marks of Goethe’s social and political positions? Is world literature poetry for patricians? Is it anti-Jacobin?

    Anyone who has pored over Goethe’s scattered comments on the topic would, I think, have to say yes and yes. Of course, the cosmopolitanism of world literature as usually presented is entirely generic and low-stakes—an internationalism born of buying the right books, the worldly-wisdom of the Duolingo app and the laboriously mastered subjunctive. But to all this ¿Donde está la biblioteca?, Goethe’s original account adds some more specific features that have proven easy to overlook. I’ll just name three.

    1) World literature is, above all, a contemporary project undertaken by living writers. It’s not that Goethe meant to dissuade anyone from reading books that were both foreign and old. As a young playwright, he made his name by writing pseudo-Shakespearean rant; and he closed out his career a half century later by publishing a twelve-book homage to the Persian ghazals of the fourteenth century. His own engagement with the literary past would thus be hard to dispute. But Goethe maintains even so that world literature comes into being only when living writers keep tabs on each other’s work and, better still, when they enter into conversation across national boundaries. “Living, striving literati should get to know each other, and through their own inclinations and similarity of tastes, find the motive for corporate action” (qtd Strich 350). Kenzaburō Ōe conducts an open correspondence with Günter Grass about the legacy of World War 2 in their respective countries. In 2016, the Goethe-Institut matches German poets with South Asian ones, so that they can translate each other’s work, even if they don’t understand each other’s languages. Langston Hughes befriends the Hungarian Arthur Koestler—in Turkmenistan. Thus construed, world literature has the surprising tendency to push us away from the classics, since the idea, rather, is to track new, transnational literary constellations as they emerge, or, indeed, to help foster their emergence, even if that’s not how W. W. Norton seems to understand the matter.

    2) World literature is a project of mutual correction and expansion. If you are a writer and you spend most of your days in London, one good reason to read Indian and Somali and Chilean literature is to learn about ways of writing that the British haven’t gotten round to yet—to encounter new techniques, new styles, perhaps entire new forms or genres. Irish and Egyptian writing gets imported to fill a niche, to remedy a deficit in domestic literary production, to furnish the book stalls with the things that we don’t make. It is important to notice that world literature, on this understanding, cannot be pitted against this or that national literature. We don’t advance the cause of world literature by repudiating (as provincial or exclusionary) the framework of Pakistani or Polish literature, or by insisting that there is finally no such thing as “Mexican literature.” Quite the contrary: World literature battens on the national literatures that it at once subsumes-and-retains. It needs the national literatures, since there will be much less reason for me to read Jamaican novelists if it turns out they are all writing like Faulkner anyway. Goethe, in fact, sometimes seems to suggest that the character of a national literature will only become apparent once it is assessed by foreign readers (Strich 349). American literature is manifestly diverse, and the critic in New York is accordingly likely to brag about its breadth and variety and fine gradation—to insist that American literature is no particular way. But critics in Paris are in a good position to spot what American writers do more often than French writers, or what they do to a perfection. They will be quicker to announce—and perhaps to admire—the distinctive features of American fiction and poetry, because they will not accede to that Whitmanesque literary narcissism that holds that we are all things and all ways. World literature is an active process of learning what foreign writers do better than you do.

    3) World literature is writing under the sign of the market. You don’t need someone with a Warwick PhD to tell you that world literature is the poetry of global capitalism. It should be apparent to anyone who re-reads the paragraph I just wrote that Goethe has patterned his argument on the classical, more or less Smithian defenses of international trade: National literatures should not try to be self-sufficient. At any given point in time—though, of course, changingly—your national literature will do some things better than others. As of 1600, German poets hadn’t figured out yet how to write sonnets or classical epics. American writers in the 1840s wrote almost nothing that we would recognize as a realist novel. Home-grown, ethnically English modernism was pretty tepid as modernisms go—an avant garde from the middle of the pack. What your literature does best, meanwhile, will be more apparent to remote readers than to local ones. Italian writers are well advised to let Danish and Russian and Turkish critics tell them what they are doing right, and this in much the same way that Italian farmers need to know that Dutch greenhouses can grow bell peppers but not olives. The national character of any country’s literature gets bestowed upon it comparatively and from without—which is to say, internationally. Most important: All readers gain simultaneously when nations practice a free trade in letters—and when local writers agree to lean in to their already established advantages. (“The immediate consequences of a general world literature; the nations will be quicker in benefiting by each other’s advantages” (qtd Strich 351).)  Brazilian and Indonesian and Norwegian literatures should therefore figure out ways of exchanging what each does best. Columbia should export magic realism for roughly the same reasons that it exports coffee.

    Goethe, it is worth noting, is entirely upfront about all this. Sometimes his language is figurative: The German language, he says, is “a market where all nations are offering their wares” (qtd Strich 28). Goethe’s great twentieth-century expositor says that you should “enrich your own personality with the geistiger Gut aller Völker, the spiritual goods of all nations” (Strich 30). A translator, meanwhile—back to Goethe—is a “middleman” in the “generalized commerce of the mind,” the one who “makes it his business to promote trade.” Translation, indeed, is “one of the most important and worthy businesses in all of world trade” (qtd Strich 17). The interesting thing about those last two sentences is the way in which the commercial metaphor in the first edges back towards a factual claim in the second. Maybe translators are like import-export houses; but then again, maybe they are best understood as actual businessmen, at which point it becomes salient to remark that Goethe sometimes draws strong and entirely literal connections between Dichtung and the economy: World literature, he says in one draft, has become “inevitable,” given the “ever-increasing speed of Verkehr”—of traffic, commerce, and intercourse (Strich 45). Weltliteratur is literature for free-marketeers—poetry for when the tariffs come down.

    Goethe occasionally refers to “European or world literature,” which is doubtless exasperating, insinuating as it does that Weltliteratur could come into being and still omit most of the world, though non-European versions of this German program are easy enough to devise (qtd Strich 251). Oxford’s “very short introduction” to Native American Literature begins, in its very first paragraph, by assuring readers that American Indians have always been traders: merchants of the high desert, brokers of the wet prairie, a paleo-bourgeoisie who collected goods from far-flung regions, seashells and chunkey stones and grizzly-bear teeth. That opening paragraph also suggests that Native literature works on these same commercial principles, “displaying a dynamic world inextricably connected to and even fascinated with other worlds” (Teuton xix – xx). Trade is the key to understanding indigenous art. A people receives: “By the late twentieth century a number of Native poets received extensive formal training” (104). A young Blackfeet poet has an Irish-American for a mentor at the University of Montana and sets out “to adapt western poetic forms” (ibid). And a people also gives: “If Native Americans were hopelessly conquered, how could they be sharing traditional knowledge at Princeton? (74)” Native poems and novels are thus documents of “interaction” (xix)—ledgers, I think such books are called—and we’ll want to look back now to see that Goethe and his expositor have their own words for “interaction”, several of them, in fact, in emphatic synonymy. “Keine Weltliteratur ohne Wechselseitigkeit und Gegenseitigkeit und Austausch.” “No world literature without mutuality and reciprocity and exchange” (Strich 69).

    It is worth underscoring here just what it is that Goethe expects from the international trade in poems and plays. Again: World literature arrives in any one country to augment its national literature—to extend its catalogue of titles and perhaps in some sense to plug that literature’s gaps. The word in German for this kind of add-on is Ergänzung, which your dictionary will instruct you to translate as “supplement,” though in English this could quickly prove misleading. The curious thing about the word “supplement” is that it strictly means “to supply a deficiency” or “to make up a lack.” You take a vitamin supplement because you’re a vegan and won’t otherwise get enough B12. If you need a supplemental policy, that’s because your employer has left you underinsured. And yet the word “supplement” has tended to drift over time to designate things that are genuinely optional or indeed supernumerary. For twentieth-century newspapers, the “Sunday supplement” was the insert that contained the week’s only comic strips in color, alongside puzzles and celebrity profiles; supplement here names that-in-the-newspaper-which-is-not-news. You might read it, but then again you might just hand it to the kids. Admissions offices at American colleges often discourage their applicants from sending “supplementary letters of recommendation”—more letters, that is, than the admissions officers have asked for; more than they want to read. German Ergänzung, meanwhile, can sometimes refer to a mere “addition,” but what keeps it from naming an unwanted or trivial addition is the root that it permanently flaunts, that second syllable -ganz-, which is the ordinary German word for “whole.” An Ergänzung contributes towards making something whole. Why this matters should become apparent if I now remark that the counter-revolutionaries of Goethe’s generation typically spoke of the French republic as a malign solvent, as an engine of disintegration and fragmentation, as violently sundering the still living bonds that had bound Alteuropa together. Burke describes the process by which “men dissolve their ancient incorporation”; the “dissolution of an ancient society … hath taken place in France” (E. Burke 1992, 164). The state, Burke says, is “not morally at liberty … wholly to separate and tear asunder the bands of [its] subordinate community, and to dissolve it into an asocial, uncivil, unconnected chaos of elementary principles”—though this, of course, is precisely what he took the Jacobins to have done (E. Burke 2014, 101). Thus, too, Goethe: “Everything on earth seems at once to come apart. In the states most adamant, the basic laws fall apart. And property breaks loose from its old owner. Friend breaks loose from friend. In this way, too, love breaks loose from love.” (qtd Rothe 79) Or there’s this, from the West-East Divan, first published in 1819: “North and West and South splinter apart, thrones explode, kingdoms tremble: take flight to the pure East to taste the air of the patriarchs! Amidst loving, drinking, singing, Khidr’s spring will make you young again” (113). I trust this makes the matter sufficiently clear: Revolution is the crisis; world literature will be its overcoming. In an age of social fragmentation, you read Hafez—or mock-Hafez—because he will transport you back before the Day the Thrones Exploded, rejuvenating a Europe-of-three-compass-points by re-acquainting you first with the habits of patriarchy. Goethe often says that world literature is one of the best ways for the learned members of any country to acquaint themselves with the cultures of other nations, and finally to accept or “tolerate” these (qtd Strich 359). It is easy enough to applaud this biblio-pacificism, provided we also say clearly that world literature, in this configuration, is meant to revive the ancien regime, to reknit the social bonds that the Revolution has severed. Weltliteratur is a making-whole is restoration. Literature is ligature.

    The question at this point is whether you think Goethe is right about any of this? Do you, for one, think that the most conspicuous thing about markets is that they overcome differences and divisions, rather than create them? Do you think that international trade is first and foremost the creator of benign human connection? It is easy enough to see that Goethe is offering a literary riff on eighteenth-century doctrines of doux commerce, which riff one is tempted to paraphrase in the accents of a Montesquieu: Where the ways of man are gentle, there is world literature; and wherever there is world literature, there the ways of men are gentle. The natural effect of world literature is to lead to peace. The hard part comes once we acknowledge that the notion of sweet trade is one of the capitalist era’s stupider myths, one that redescribes as irenic and collaborative a system whose very defenders more typically call it “competitive” and “disruptive”; or once we remark that the theory of world literature resembles nothing so much as Thomas Friedman’s claim that no two countries that both have a McDonald’s have ever fought each other—No two countries that have both read Turgenyev…. For once we do that, we will find ourselves obliged to ask about world literature all the difficult questions that dissident economists have taught us to ask about international trade. Do all countries have equal access to world literature and do they all benefit from it equally? Do French and American authors gain readier entry to the international presses than do Nigerian or Filipino ones? Do a nation’s writers have to change the way they write—do they have to manufacture a different literary product—in order for their writing to circulate internationally? Does world literature sort Korean and Guatemalan writers into winners and losers, and does it do so in patterned ways? Can world literature induce a nation’s writers to prioritize the needs and desires of foreign readers over the needs and desires of local ones? Are small languages more likely to suffer from literary trade dependency, which we might define as the ability of foreign readers to dictate the shape of one’s national literature, including their ability to withdraw their interest from it altogether? Can world literature introduce distortions into a nation’s writerly economy, perhaps by herding all of a country’s poets and novelists into the same few export niches, in a manner that generates literary monocultures—endless fields of Rushdie, vast plantations of Garcia Marquez? Can countries with more developed literary institutions inhibit poorer countries from developing literary institutions of their own? Do talented writers tend to exit the smaller, regional, and often dominated vernaculars in order to add to the literary riches of the larger, mostly imperial languages? Is there conflict in world literature, and not just concord? Do rival literary groups seek to remold world literature each to its own advantage?

    The danger of drumming out these questions in such brisk tattoo is that they will drown out Goethe’s own misgivings about the market. For anyone who continues to read in Goethe’s essays will eventually realize that he was not the altogether enthusiastic adherent of trade that his isolated statements sometimes make him out to be. He does, after all, begin to suspect the obvious, which is that an expanded, energized and international market for books will tend to produce a highly commercial and consumerist literature—boarding-school apologetics masquerading as feats of the imagination (Tom Brown’s Schooldays, but this time with wizards); some improbably famous pornography that you can download on your Kindle so that no-one on the subway will know what you’re reading (you know, the one about the aspiring young professional woman who learns to love getting dominated by a billionaire); serial killer novels from the UK, serial killer novels from Japan, serial killer novels from Argentina; not, at any rate, the transnational salon of fine song and keen judgment that the elderly German poet once promised you. Goethe’s way of putting this is to say that he dreads the coming literature of the multitude: “What appeals to the multitude will spread endlessly and, as we can already see now, will be well received in all parts of the world, while what is serious and truly substantial will be less successful” (227). And yet he continues to hope that the market in foreign literatures will remain open to true poets and their discerning critics. World literature might well produce, as its most public face, a sink of ephemerally cosmopolitan hackwork, a kind of world-pulp, and yet it will at the same time make it easier for “the serious-minded” to find each other in their own market niche, where they can “form a silent, almost secret congregation” (ibid). This is presumably what Goethe had in mind when he said that the writers of the world must find a “motive for corporate action.” That last phrase is especially suggestive, because it suggests that Goethe is trying to figure out how to revive, at least in spirit, one of the corporate bodies of the vanished Ständestaat. World literature should allow writers to gather as though they were organized into a guild or medieval university, and is thus how the old Gelehrtenrepublik—not just “the republic of letters,” but “the republic of learned men”—will survive in a liberal economic order otherwise primed to distrust such closed institutions. What we can say now, then, is that Goethe’s conception of world literature takes it cues, not only from Adam Smith, but also from Metternich. In the ten or fifteen years before Goethe started commenting on Weltliteratur, the major political project across the continent was the making of a new European federation—a Europe of peace and order to be created via vigorous diplomatic exchange and the ruthless repression of populists, nationalists, and the Left. An American admirer of Metternich’s singles out the prince-chancellor’s ethos of “conservative internationalism” (Egedy). One Dutch historian credits him with attempting a properly “European ‘security culture’ marked by a preference for multilateral problem-solving through international congresses, ministerial conferences and international commissions” (Clark summarizing Beatice de Graaf). “Europe,” Metternich once said, “has become my native country” (qtd Egedy 139). The counter-revolutionaries, said the important Burkean intellectual who served as Metternich’s secretary, were building “a great political league, which with some justification has been dubbed the European Republic” (ibid). And world literature came into being as the writing of this royalist anti-republic: “European, or world literature,” to quote Goethe again; a parallel order of congresses, conferences, and commissions for writers without portfolio; the Concert of Europe in prose and rhyme.

    Learning still from Casanova

    At this point, the student of world literature has two options. You can convict Goethe of having freighted Weltliteratur with some outmoded Biedermeier ideology and resolve to redo the concept without all that unpleasant business about markets and patriarchs. In practice, this is likely to mean turning every West African novel you ever read into a delivery system for some generic, vacant “alterity”—“I believe that one of the fundamental desiderata of a World Literature course should be the inculcation of an appreciation for the nuances of alterity” (Pizer 15)—without ever pushing yourself to say how le livre de l’Autre is produced and distributed. The alternative would be to hew all the more closely to what is most unpalatable in Goethe’s presentation. For the latter’s theory of freie Marktliteratur is not simply an error, and the mystified position is not the one that tactlessly blurts out world literature’s dependence on the market. It is the one that touts literature’s cosmopolitan encounter with the other while maintaining a discreet silence about transnational fiction’s conditions of existence. A great many of us have explained what we find least convincing in Pascale Casanova’s World Republic of Letters—I certainly have (Thorne)—but all too few of us have taken the trouble to build on her achievement and where necessary amend it. Her insight continues to outstrip ours. One easy way forward would be to scour the classics of dependency theory and world-systems analysis in order to see which of its many claims we could poach and repurpose. Among the gawkish charms of Casanova’s work is her evident resolve to model The World Republic of Letters on Wallerstein’s Modern World System without ever bothering to cite it, her method apparently having been to write the word “literary” wherever Wallerstein had written “economic” and then to see whether she could make the resulting sentence stick. This procedure has much to recommend it—but then why stop with Wallerstein? World-systems theory didn’t stop with Wallerstein. Doesn’t the study of world literature deserve its Samir Amins and Andre Gunder Franks and Janet Abu-Lughods? I’ve already begun to catalogue the questions we might yet ask about world literature, but that list could easily be extended, like so:

    -In one recent year, publishers in the UK brought out some 186,000 new titles and editions. Uganda, by contrast (and in another recent year), published 288. What, then, are the differences between a literary scene whose bookshops are full of imported books and one whose bookshops mostly stock domestic manufactures?

    -A different question that might at first sound like the same question: What are the differences between literary scenes where translated titles make up a large percentage of new books and ones where they don’t? Translated titles make up some 3% of the new books published in the UK every year, but roughly half of the new books appearing in Denmark or Finland. Can we say in some general way what kind of effects it is likely to have when translations make up such a large percentage of a country’s publishing list?

    -Do we know why some countries and not others emerge as regional literary hubs—as satellites, that is, to the properly global literary centers? Can we say, for instance, why Latin American publishing, once it took its transnational turn, was coordinated from Argentina and Spain and not, say, from Columbia and Mexico (Santana-Acuña)?

    -If we pause to remark that some countries have achieved mass literacy and established commercial publishing houses only late in the day, much later than the modern book trade’s Gutenbergian heartlands, it might occur to us to wonder whether literature is produced differently in such countries—countries, that is, where the entire apparatus and ideology of literature have been borrowed en bloc from abroad? Does publishing, in other words, display latecomer effects? And if so, can these effects be discerned in the literature itself?

    -Similarly, is there a difference between a literary form in the country of its origin, where it first appeared as an attractive innovation, and that same (but maybe no, not same) form when adopted by writers in other countries? The literary historians have identified scores and scores of such cases, but would it be possible to establish some defensible generalizations on this topic? Ask first about something moderately concrete: What’s the difference between the French realist novel and the various latecomer realisms? And then see if you can extrapolate: What’s the difference between any literary form and latecomer versions thereof?

    -Is it possible for writers in a particular national language to import a literary form without first having written in the mode to which that form was initially a response? It is often observed that literary modernism never took root in China, first because it was largely sidelined by the politically committed literature of the 1920s and ‘30s, and later because the Communist government would not publish it (eg Denton). We also know that when censorship eased in the 1980s and ‘90s, Chinese writers began eagerly experimenting with foreign models, many of them by that point postmodern (Zha). So what do we make of this postmodernism that did not follow a modernism? If we identified five or six instances of such leapfrogging, would it be possible to come to any general conclusions about it?

    -Goethe himself observed that national literatures can suffer from trade imbalances (Strich 159). For many decades, nobody outside of Germany much wanted to read what German poets were writing. The Germans were reading the French, Italians, English, and Spanish, but they weren’t being read in return. His point, finally, was that this situation had changed in his lifetime; that the imbalance had been addressed; that Germany literary goods were at last available in sundry European marketplaces. We might then ask about the effects of such a switchover. Could we perhaps study various national literatures in two cross sections each?—the generation before their most prominent authors became fixtures of literature in translation and also the generation after. Could we say anything in general about such turning points? Do national literary scenes change when they get incorporated into world literature?

    -What if, say, Native American writers wanted to delink from world literature? What would they have to do to take charge of their own writing and so to undermine the adventitious authority of non-Native editors, scholars, and lay readers? What are the obstacles to this project and how could they be cleared?

    Of course, if questions aren’t your bag—if, say, you expect something less tentative from an essay—I can offer you theses, which I will count off.

    Thesis #1) There is a social whole that may be called world literature, which came into existence in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, when translations between the vernacular languages began to compete with the scholarly networks of international Latin, and which has since expanded from its European origins to cover the globe.

    Thesis #2) No analysis of individual national literatures can be made without placing them in the context of a commercially and academically organized world literature.

    Thesis #3) The study of world literature is incomplete if it fails to consider what lies outside of it: the literature that stays in place, poems without a passport, novels without exit visas, the literature that remains national or provincial, the writing that, in some cases, sees world literature as its enemy.

    Thesis #4) Since the Second World War, at the latest, English has been the globe’s dominant language, and its presses have been able to impose relative order on world literature. What is world literature in the age of the Big Four?

    Thesis #5) Anyone reading under the rubric of world literature will have trouble so much as spotting the existence of other transnational literary systems, though once glimpsed, these other systems will provoke questions of their own: Do other systems merely produce alternative conceptualizations of world literature—different reading lists, with a different mix of national literatures? Or are they rivals to world literature in the form that has come down to us, which is above all a market literature? Is it possible to generate a transnational literary system by other than commercial means?

    Five theses. But then theses are just questions masquerading as findings, and these five should not be understood as the considered products of study and reflection. They, no less than the questions, are on loan from the Braudel Center. They are what our conclusions might look like if we were capable at this moment of drawing conclusions—a measure, then, of the work to be done.

    Reading Joe Cleary

    To resume: Literary historians still have a long way to go to catch up with Pascale Casanova; we are, if anything, in danger of letting the trail that she blazed in 1999 grow over with the banality of ethics. This all by itself is reason enough to hail the publication of Joe Cleary’s 2021 book on Irish and American modernisms. For Cleary is one of the few literary historians of note to have adopted Casanova’s model in some at least semi-systematic fashion. I should say upfront that anyone opening Cleary’s volume for the first time may not be able to tell as much just by scanning its table of contents: a chapter on Yeats and Pound, a chapter on James and Eliot, one on Fitzgerald and O’Neil, a standalone chapter on Joyce. Disappointed readers might at this point wonder why nobody had told them we were experiencing a Hugh Kenner revival. But the book is called Modernism, Empire, World Literature, and most of its considerable interest is generated by the way that Cleary lets that third category monkey-wrench our settled perceptions of hyper-canonical authors. In practice, after all, don’t we most often use the rubric of world literature to convince students to read writing from Asia and Africa and South America? What would it mean, then, for the concept of world literature, having first sherpa’d us into the undervisited fastness of un-American books, to whip round and swallow up our literary proximity? Strange, you say—this account of world literature, Cleary’s, that includes no literature not written in English. But then that strangeness is very much to his point. To announce that The Great Gatsby is best understood as “world literature” is a little like telling a fan of Conogolese soukous that Aerosmith was the real world music all along. It’s irritating, but you might learn something by losing your grip on some too convenient categories.

    I can put this another way. Readers are likely to warm to Modernism, Empire, World Literature when they begin to notice that a book that seems to be about an overfamiliar canon-of-two-nations is in fact about a transnational system of literary production and the competition for attention and prestige that, crackling across all such systems, precludes the smooth functioning of their circuits, the uptown hum of well-reviewed books in wide circulation. That said, the essentials of Cleary’s argument are easy enough to telegraph:

    1) that modernist literature, in the English-speaking world, was largely the creation of Irish and American writers, who typically wrote with easily politicized chips on their shoulders—a grudge against English writers and critics for presuming to tell the world what counted as belles lettres, and for occupying all the seats at literature’s high table. One of many reasons we might consider modernism important, then, is that it marked the moment when Irish and American writers joined forces to overturn a thoroughly entrenched literary hierarchy. The old story you were once told about modernism—that it was an insurgency against a routinized academic art undertaken by avant gardes and experimentalists—gets overwritten here by a second, less familiar story, which is that it was a mutiny launched by the periphery of the literary world system against that system’s overendowed center;

    2) that this literary revolt tracks other major geopolitical shifts, and especially the rise of the United States as a global superpower and the epochal decline of British imperial might. Britain gets recast as junior partner to the US: modernism was, among other things, the playing out of this process in literature—and may not have succeeded had it not been accompanied by extra-literary changes on a large scale;

    3) that many important modernist works reflect on these geo-literary rivalries in their own pages. The literary historian might still want to set aside his copies of The Golden Bowl and Pound’s Cantos for as long as it takes to understand how trans-Atlantic publishing was organized in the year 1900 or 1925. But when he resumes his reading, he will find that the period’s poems and novels record their own fraught sense of transnational literary relations, which can serve as provisional and vernacular maps of the literary system, to be tested, no doubt, against the independent findings of the literary sociologists.

    Specialists of various kinds will have their own reasons for consulting Cleary’s splendid book. Students of literary modernism could see the book as putting a cap on three decades worth of research into the peripheral modernisms—“Modernism and African Literature” (Woods); “Modernism and Caribbean Literature” (Gikandi); “The Theory and Practice of South Asian Literary Modernisms” (Banerjee)—by making it clear that even such hyper-canonical American figures as Henry James and T.S. Eliot are best understood as peripheral modernists in their own right, sharing more with George Lamming or Amos Tutuola than with Marinetti or Baudelaire. Students of Irish literature, meanwhile, might want to mull Cleary’s big geopolitical revision to older accounts of the innovations that originated west of Liverpool: Irish modernists entered the scene as the informal allies of their American cousins. Together they opened a war on two fronts against the English literary establishment, centered in London but transnational in reach. Two of Cleary’s key figures, O’Neill and Fitzgerald, discussed in a single chapter, are Irish-Americans and can thus seem to embody that alliance in their very persons. One of Cleary’s more intriguing stories is his account of how that alliance broke down, as the US (and not Ireland!) asserted its position as the new headquarters of the world literary system, framing itself henceforth as the modernist (and then postmodernist) literary nation par excellence, and so relegating late twentieth-century Irish writers to world literature’s B team: Banville, where once there was Beckett.

    For anyone, finally, still hoping to devise a more materialist account of world literature, Cleary’s (repeatable?) accomplishments are fourfold:

    1) He retains the basic categories of the old nationalist literary histories—American, Irish, British or English—while demonstrating that these very categories only function relationally, within a transnational system. It is forever tempting to explain literary modernism as the effect of big changes that happened first outside the domain of literature: industrialization, urbanization, the accelerated pace of steamer and rail. Maybe modernist literature is but the reflected image of the skyscraper and electric light. But what Cleary is able to show is that this explanation won’t do—that each nation’s modernism came into being only in conjunction with the multiple modernisms of many nations, each experiencing these other modernizations at different times and different speeds. One immediately wishes for scholarly volumes that would attempt the same argument for other schools and periods—and rushes, perhaps, to outline them. Can we reconceive of American postmodernism as a specific position within an ensemble of international postmodernisms? Could we convince les romanistes that Flaubert was only possible because he was in conversation with realisms that were not French?

    2) He relaxes Casanova’s relentless emphasis on Paris as global literary center in order to emphasize experiments that originated on the literary periphery. Casanova, despite finally knowing better, sometimes gives the impression that poets from Denmark and Ireland and Senegal had to travel to Paris to learn how not to write like provincials. In this regard, Cleary sounds like no-one so much as Samir Amin announcing that Marx had been wrong, that world-historical transformations are more likely to take place not in the core of the world-system but at its subordinated geographical margins. And, indeed, Cleary’s reasoning is based on some not unconvincing economic analogies. Historians of the seventeenth-century have observed that the merchants who built Atlantic capitalism—the in this case English enterprisers who fundamentally (and violently) transformed the Atlantic rim in order to furnish Western Europe with various hot-weather commodities—were not London’s most successful merchants, at least not at first. If they had been successful to begin with—or if they had enjoyed better connections to the royal establishment—they wouldn’t have needed to attempt something as preposterous as the Caribbean sugar plantation, the farming and export on an industrial scale of a non-native plant on islands with no existing infrastructure and no available workforce. Innovation—and, indeed, innovation at the periphery, falls to those with no easier options (Brenner). So, too, with literary modernism: It is Cleary’s hunch that English writers, propped up by a transnational literary establishment whose aesthetic criteria already favored them, could afford to embroider gradual, twice-generational refinements on the realist novel or lyrically to coast on Tennysonian fumes, whereas American and Irish figures writing in those same modes could only render themselves redundant. From the modernism that overturned this literary culture, then, we would want to draw two conclusions at once, which are really the same conclusion run in opposite directions: that literary innovations are, if anything, more likely on the periphery than at the putatively cutting-edge core, as writers attempt to pull free from hierarchies of distinction that never seem to work to their advantage; and that the world’s economically underdeveloped regions are therefore not fated to supply world literature with the traditional, the folkloric, and the re-enchanted.

    3) He brings to the fore Casanova’s rather muted perception of rivalry within the literary system, helping us perceive world literature as an arena of conflict, and not as a list of “books to read before you die.” For many readers, Casanova’s great achievement was to help them see that powerful institutions, concentrated in just a few of the planet’s cities, get to create world literature—get to determine which books will pass from the small (and often dominated) languages into the large (and often imperial) languages, get to decide which books will get translated and reviewed and taught. This has been enough to make her book a generational touchstone. If we wish now to add to The World Republic of Letters an expanded account of national literary rivalries, either within the system or at its borders, then this is only because she has so convincingly described that system’s success—i.e., its relative closure—such that we now need to ask how subordinated writers, and foreign ones, no less, have ever managed to compel the system to change its standards of literary judgment. What lies beyond the system’s closure? Many of us grew up reading Haruki Murakami, because he offered a Japanese variant of postmodernism; and J. M. Coetzee, because he offered a South African variant of postmodernism; and Roberto Bolaño because he offered…. But it is enough to read that sentence to wonder what else those countries had to offer, outside of this Penguin-curated po-mo; to wonder that is, about the novels that we didn’t get a chance to read, about how and why they got shut out, and about whether some of them, at least, wouldn’t have forced us to revise or expand our rather settled criteria for judging contemporary fiction.

    4) He pushes readers to identify major changes in the literary world system—transformations, that is, in the organization of world literature. In this, he is very much unlike Casanova, who encourages an almost sepulchral perception of continuity across several centuries; a literary world system ­that is and always was run out of Paris; a French-but-international neoclassicism giving way to a French-but-international-Enlightenment; giving way to a French-but-international realism (in the manner of Balzac); giving way to a French-but-international modernism (in the manner of Mallarmé); a four-century Frenchness which may finally have petered out around 1960, with the rise of New York, so let’s stop the book before we get there. Cleary breaks with Casanova first by assigning Paris a partner, identifying London as a second Western literary center, co-responsible for organizing world literature, at least by the nineteenth century; and next by spending the bulk of Modernism, Empire, World Literature documenting London’s eclipse, its drastically reduced ability to set the global canon. ­His arguments thus serve as a prompt to think about how else we might periodize the literary world system, and about how and why the institutional organization of world literature sometimes changes. Have there been other major geographical shifts in the world literary system, in addition to the one that Cleary identifies? Was there a world literature before the one centered on France? Does the literary world system simply track the capitalist world system? Does literary authority follow on from economic power and military might? Surely that would have to be one’s first hunch, but then how do we account for the central role played by France, which no economic historian has ever thought was the world economy’s preeminent power at any stage? Conversely, many economic historians hold that Antwerp and then Amsterdam were the dominant entrepots in the seventeenth-century version of the world economy. But then there doesn’t seem to have been a Dutch variant of world literature, one that held, I mean, even for readers outside of the Low Countries. But then if world literature does not, after all, trot obliging behind the world economy, can we say why not? Can we identify its independent sources of authority and the mechanisms by which these sources sometimes move? The mutation in the world literary system that we will presumably most want to talk about is the one that scholars will have the hardest time studying, which is the transformation that might or might not be underway right now; the one that may transfer the headquarters of world literature to precincts far away from New York and so out of the hands of Simon & Schuster; the one that may yet lead to a version of world literature in which nobody reading this essay now is likely to have any say.

    References

    Amin, Samir. Unequal Development: An Essay on the Social Formations of Peripheral Capitalism. Monthly Review, 1976.

    Banerjee, Rita. The New Voyager: Theory and Practice of South Asian Literary Modernisms. 2013. Harvard University, PhD

    Brenner, Robert. Merchants and Revolution: Commercial Change, Political Conflict, and London’s Overseas Traders, 1550 – 1653. Verso, 2003.

    Burke, Edmund. Further Reflections on the Revolution in France. Liberty Fund, 1992.

    —. Revolutionary Writings. Cambridge University Press, 2014.

    Casanova, Pascale. The World Republic of Letters. Harvard University Press, 2004.

    Clark, Christopher. “A Rock of Order” in the London Review of Books (42:19), 2020.

    Cleary, Joe. Modernism, Empire, World Literature. Cambridge University Press, 2021.

    Denton, Kirk. “Historical Overview.” Columbia Companion to Modern Chinese Literature, 2016

    Egedy, Gergely. “Peter Viereck’s View of Metternich’s Conservative Internationalism”. The West Bohemian Historical Review (2012): 133 – 147.

    Gikandi, Simon. Writing in Limbo: Modernism and Caribbean Literature. Cornell University Press, 1992.

    Goethe, Johann Wolfgang. Essays on Art and Literature. Goethe’s Collected Works, Vol. 3. Suhrkamp, 1986.

    —. West-Eastern Divan. Ginko, 2019.

    Pizer, John. The Idea of World Literature. Louisiana State University Press, 2006.

    Rothe, Wolfgang. Der Politische Goethe: Dichter Und Staatsdiener Im Deutschen Spätabsolutismus. Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1998.

    Santana-Acuña, Alvaro. Ascent to Glory: How One Hundred Years of Solitude  Was Written and Became a Global Classic. Columbia University Press, 2020.  

    Strich, Fritz. Goethe and World Literature. Kegan Paul, 1945.

    Teuton, Sean. Native American Literature: A Very Short Introduction. Oxford University Press, 2018.

    Thorne, Christian. “The Sea Is Not a Place: Or, Putting the World Back into World Literature.” boundary 2 (2013) 40 (2): 53-79.

    Wilson, William Daniel. Das Goethe-Tabu: Protest Und Menschenrechte Im Klassischen Weimar. Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, 1999.

    Woods, Tim. “Modernism and African Literature.” The Oxford Handbook of Modernisms. Oxford University Press, 2012: 926 – 941.

    Zha, Jianying. China Pop. New Press, 1995.

    Christian Thorne is co-editor of boundary 2 and the author, most recently, of Deconstruction is America. He teaches in the English department at Williams College.

  • Christian Thorne Interviews Joe Cleary–World Literature Under American Supervision

    Christian Thorne Interviews Joe Cleary–World Literature Under American Supervision

    This interview is part of a series titled “Re-Read, Re-examine, Re-Think”. For more on Casanova, Cleary, and world literature, see Christian Thorne’s companion essay.

    Christian Thorne:  We’ve all read some cutting reviews of Pascale Casanova’s work. But you refuse to be cutting. Your book sets out, rather, to extend and amend The World Republic of Letters in a sympathetic spirit. Can we imagine you’re talking to someone who read maybe two chapters of Casanova fifteen years ago? What might such a person have missed? What in Casanova’s approach is most worth carrying forward? What might we learn from her that we will have a harder time learning from other scholars? And what in her framework have you nonetheless felt compelled to revise?

    Joe Cleary: When Harvard University Press translated The World Republic of Letters (1999) into English in 2004, its reception in the English-speaking world did appear to be quite frosty and skeptical. Much of the early criticism was predictable and concentrated on matters such as eurocentrism, francocentrism, canonicity, and so on. For some critics, one of the problems with Casanova’s study was that it was too systemic and imposed an excessively tidy order on the putative complexity of modern literary production and consecration. For others, hers was a rickety system produced by loosely combining Bourdieu, Braudel, Wallerstein, and others, and as such not nearly systemic enough. In addition, there was considerable resistance to Casanova’s stress on competition and conflict, on rivalries and struggles, on power and domination as matters constitutive of ‘world literature.’ For the more Goetheian and Kantian versions of ‘world literature,’ for criticism that assumed a contemporary transnational dispensation for which nation-states no longer greatly matter, or indeed for liberal modes of criticism generally, Casanova’s stress on the literary world system as an always contested force field that had been historically created and then transformed by national rivalries, as well as by individual authors’ bids for recognition and consecration, struck an unwelcome note. In other words, Casanova’s emphasis on conflict and competition, repression and recognition, domination and revolution did not sit well with those forms of world-literature studies that highlighted cross-civilizational communication and exchange, or those forms of postcolonial criticism that stressed hybridity, or modes of liberal criticism premised on literature’s capacity to cultivate empathy. The World Republic of Letters cites a great many writers (more writers than critics I imagine); I’m not sure if many contemporary writers have returned the compliment and seriously engaged Casanova.

    However, the skeptical or dismissive responses to Casanova are only part of the story. The World Republic of Letters was quickly translated into numerous languages, generated extensive international debate, and attracted a good deal of serious and respectful criticism. It is worth mentioning, too, that The World Republic of Letters received an early and enthusiastic welcome from senior figures associated with the ‘new left,’ including Perry Anderson, Edward Said, Fredric Jameson and Terry Eagleton, and her later essays appeared, as did Franco Moretti’s, in the New Left Review.

    What are some of the things worth carrying forward in Casanova’s work? To begin with, it is worth stressing that her work did not begin and end with The World Republic of Letters; the later articles and books deserve consideration though her career was, due to illness, all too short. Some things that I value in the World Republic book are the following:

    Casanova stresses the historical nature of the world literary system, which she traces back to the rise in the early modern period of European national vernacular literatures, absolutism and the Westphalian state system and, later, the era of national self-assertion and self-determination.

    She is interested in how that system consolidates and regulates its operations and dominates its peripheries but also, vitally, in how, from time to time, that system undergoes transformations and mutations. And periodically, maybe not more than once or twice a century, as Jerome David puts it, the world literary field is subject to revolutionary disruptions or re-centerings when new literary forces or movements, the bearers of new representations of reality, burst on the scene and impose themselves on the existing field. More than others, Casanova is interested in the social conditions, literary and linguistic strategies, and motivations that enable significant transformations. These concerns seem of particular interest in our contemporary moment when the postcolonial decolonizations of the 1960s and 1970s and even more “the rise of China” and the BRICs are challenging Western European and US geopolitical and geocultural world domination. Though Casanova was working loosely with Wallerstein’s work, Giovanni Arrighi’s The Long Twentieth Century appeared in 1994 and his Adam Smith in Beijing in 2009.  Arrighi and Casanova were apparently unaware of each other’s work, but their interests converge despite their different disciplines. Each is interested in articulating and analyzing political and cultural phenomenon in terms of a modern world system, in explaining the history and dynamics of the emergence and operations of that system, and in considering the possibility of its imminent transformation.

    Casanova’s interest in the peripheries and semi-peripheries of the world literary system as sites for change is also worth stressing. Her knowledge of these postcolonial peripheries may have been limited and sometimes superficial (though she was hardly alone in this respect). Nevertheless, she contended that the drive for radical change issues periodically at least from the semi-peripheries and peripheries. Writers in the metropolitan centers (Paris, London, New York) can easily bask in their contemporary fame and apparent ‘universality’ and take the advantages they derive from the world system largely for granted. Those from the peripheries have greater reason to be more conscious of the powers and privileges that accrue to the centers and they have to be canny about how to maneuver to find recognition in that system or to take it on in various ways. Directly or indirectly, their strategies can disclose a great deal about the operations of the world literary system. Likewise, at the level of the nation, the most prestigious literary nations can rest on their past historical accomplishments and powerful consecrating institutions. Those countries or cultures with historically lesser prestige typically have fewer resources but if they find the will to improve their situation or to challenge and buck the system, they can sometimes find the means to do so.

    What in Casanova’s framework did I feel compelled to revise in Modernism, Empire, World Literature?  First, it is important to say that the study of world literature has clearly developed quite a bit from 1999 when Casanova’s volume appeared. Naturally, some things are clearer now than they were some quarter of a century ago. Likewise, geopolitical developments, such as the rise of East and South Asia, for instance, have probably done more to change settled perceptions of things than have the critical debates and academic controversies on world literature over that period because that “rise” has done so much to highlight the contingent nature of American cultural and political power. Therefore, many things appear in different light now than they might have done when Casanova was writing her book in the 1990s. That said, even in my early review of the World Republic of Letters in the Field Day Review I pointed to several limitations of her framework that still matter. I noted then that she made no allowances for world literary systems not centered on Paris; the Soviet world literary system centered on Moscow was an obvious example. Katerina Clark’s Moscow, The Fourth Rome: Stalinism, Cosmopolitanism and The Evolution of Soviet Culture, 1931-1941 (2011) is a pioneering study in English of that literary world and its ambitions. Important studies by Monica Popescu and Rossen Djagalov on that Soviet system and the ‘Third World’ have followed. Likewise, Casanova pays no heed to non-European literary systems organized in terms of “world languages” such as Chinese, Arabic, Urdu, Hindi, Turkish, and so on. Even if one takes the view that these other systems were eventually subordinated to the European-centered system that was globally expanded in the age of empire, and that they were therefore considered ‘non-modern’ as opposed to modern systems, their persistence and accumulated accomplishments were something Casanova did not engage. Casanova is not wrong, in my view, to stress the exceptional importance of Paris and French culture for other cultures almost everywhere in the modern era.  But the world literary system seems to be more layered and laterally stratified than she describes. Thus, while Casanova is, I feel, sincerely interested in how things change, her system can seem, despite itself, somewhat static and caught in Parisian freeze-frame. For Modernism, Empire, World Literature, I wanted to study one moment of rupture in which, I contend, the literatures of one soon-to-be-dominant but still-quite marginal literary power, namely the United States, and one British colony and semi-periphery, Ireland, were able to effect a transformation of the Anglophone literary world previously centered on London. Moreover, in so doing, I suggest, these literatures energized what we now called Anglophone modernism and its strange new forms, styles, idioms and extravagant ambitions. As with most, maybe all, “revolutions,” this modernism was a compound of radical and reactionary intellectual and aesthetic forces and ambitions, but when it imposed itself on the early twentieth-century world system one could never see “English literature” in the same way as before. A sea change had occurred: New York emerged as a rival to London as literary capital and Dublin became, for a period at least, a significant site of peripheral literary insurgency, one to which several African American, Caribbean, Indian, Chinese, and African writers looked with considerable interest. In Modernism, Empire, World Literature, I am interested in the literary, intellectual and institutional dynamics of this change in a more granular way than Casanova could be in The World Republic of Letters. I have no real competence to deal with contemporary changes brought about by Asian and African decolonizations and by “the rise of China,” but for the period when I was writing the book my sense of the transatlantic modernist period was shadowed by considerations that comparable or greater changes may be underway now as US hegemony is contested by a variety of new forces.

    CT:   The most obvious difference between your book and Casanova’s is that you give detailed readings of individual literary works, and she mostly doesn’t. Having brought into view the existence of a world literary system, she spends nearly all of her book trying to figure out how that system works—and this in roughly sociological terms. What has to happen for a novel or a poem to count as world literature? Who gets to say that a particular book should be read all around the world, and what gives them the authority to do that? Which are the institutions that allow books to circulate outside their countries of origin? What sorts of books do those institutions tend to promote? And why books of that type and not others? How does the situation of a writer in any of the small languages differ from a writer in any of the global or imperial languages? What forms of inequality does the system tend to produce?

    But those aren’t exactly your questions, since you’ve found a way to travel from Casanova’s reconstruction of the system in extensio back to particular works, which you need to lift from out the system long enough to peer at them closely. You seem, in other words, to have translated Casanova’s literary sociology into something rather like a practical criticism, and I’m wondering what a fellow literary historian would have to do in order to emulate your accomplishment. If we’ve read Casanova carefully, which questions should we asking of individual novels and poems and plays? 

    JC: Though I reach back into the mid-nineteenth century to consider how Paris and London shaped conceptions of American and Irish national cultures in that century, and to review the ways in which American and Irish literary nationalist conceptions of their particular situations internalized much of this metropolitan sense of things, even as they also partially resisted it, Modernism, Empire, World Literature covers a more compressed timeframe than Casanova’s much wider study. Moreover, while Casanova deals with literatures in several languages, my study deals only with a few English language modernisms. This narrower frame allows more scope for detailed textual studies. Because of questions of scale and its association with Moretti’s “distant reading,” world literature studies are sometimes assumed more interested in questions of markets, circulation, translation, consecration, or consumption than in incisive close readings, and I did want to press against this. Even so, I should stress that I consider the sociological dimensions of Casanova’s work crucially important. Any serious literary materialist analysis ought to pay proper attention to how literary works are produced and circulated, and to the many institutions or awards systems through which they reach publics—booksellers, libraries, schools, universities, broadcasters, academies—and leftist cultural study ought to be responsive to such analysis. The challenge is really how to do this kind of sociological study dialectically so that one does not crudely reduce the literary work to a mere effect of the external conditions of its production and transmission.

    In the individual case studies in Modernism, Empire, World Literature, I attempt to show how the dynamics of the world literary system often show up, directly or indirectly, in the torsions of the literary texts themselves. They do so in different ways, not in the same repetitive manner in every great literary work. In the case of The Golden Bowl the subject of imperial cultural plunder and transfer—Roman, British, and American—is thematized in the figure of the enormously wealthy art collector Adam Verver and the expert management of crises is dramatized in the figure of Maggie Verver. In Eliot’s The Waste Land, English and European collapse, political and literary, is not so much directly thematized as inscribed in the distressed form and dissonant linguistic music of the poem, though the poem, as I read it, is as much reconstructive in impetus as it is a lamentation of collapse. That is, what The Waste Land offers is a poetic reconstruction on new principles that accompanies Eliot’s attempted reconstruction, conducted via The Criterion and elsewhere, of a “European republic of letters” after World Wars I and II. And Eliot’s reconstructed poetics and his will to recuperate this international “republic of letters” seems to anticipate the wider American reconstruction and management of Europe after World War II. In Walcott’s Omeros, a much later work obviously, the triangulation of Europe, the United States, and Africa, with the exilic poet-persona anxiously shuttling between these sites and his abandoned island home of St. Lucia, gives the epic its topos and compositional form. In its American-European and Caribbean-African shuttlings, Omeros expresses at the level of form an ambitious will to master the contemporary US-dominated world literary system that a clearly distressed “Walcott” self-figure unhappily inhabits. That is to say, for Walcott the Caribbean poet must either master his circumstances or be mastered by them and become, like the Saint Lucian service worker strata in his poem, low-wage worker-writer in the literary field. In these cases, and others, I attempt to underline that while writers have little option but to navigate the given literary field or system as best they can, the task of the critic is not simply to diagnose, after Casanova, how that field or system works outside of or as surround to the literary work once it is published. Critics can also work to show how the pressures of that force field or dynamic structure imprint themselves, whether in open or obscure manner, on the literary work’s style, content and form. Just as Marxist critics are interested in investigating how the traces of the commodity form imprint the literary work, or how the literary work resists its conscription as commodity, so we can expect that if a great literary work inhabits a complex and contested world literary system, that system will also inhabit the literary work, however obscurely.

    However, questions of literary form are only one piece of this. Some writers seem to be, as Casanova suggests, lucidly aware of the operative logics of the world literary system and quite deliberate in their determination to improve their individual situations or those of their national literatures in that system. I consider this matter particularly in the case of Yeats and Pound, two writers who had big ambitions for their national literatures and were restively antagonistic to London’s imperial cultural authority, which they both, in their respective ways, considered ‘decadent.’ In addition, in the case of Joyce, I discuss the treatment of national rivalries and the consecration of literary greatness by way of Stephen Dedalus’s contentions with Shakespeare (and behind him Goethe and Yeats) in the ‘Scylla and Charybdis’ episode of Ulysses. The epic has always been a particularly important form to assertions of individual and national literary distinction and greatness; each chapter of Modernism, Empire, World Literature attends to questions of epic, though the approach varies in each case.

    You asked, which questions prompted by Casanova’s work should we direct at individual novels, play or poems? Firstly, I think we should include writers’ and critics’ critical writings in this catalogue also. Casanova’s work, in my view, prompts several different types of questions—these include issues of mimicry and emulation, the inscription of literatures in a system and the inscription of that system in literary works, the uneven character of transnational literary exchanges and rivalries, and so on. I consider Casanova’s World Republic to be an ambitious but inevitably preliminary or rough sketch of a world literary system, not something she intended to be the completed model. Moreover, Casanova’s work describes what is essentially a Western European literary world system, one that has been contested and reconfigured a great deal since World War II, and one that is changing again in our time as new technologies of transmission, new geopolitical struggles, new migrations, and new literary or cultural capitals exert their influence. Since we should think of the system as dynamic and contested, rather than static or merely self-reproducing, the questions that we ask about literature will change, to some extent at least, as the system changes.

    CT: I’m wondering about the place of Paris in your thinking. Let me say straight off that I take this issue to be more important than it might at first glance seem. I finished The World Republic of Letters suspecting that Casanova had made Paris too important. That book sometimes gives the impression that world literature is largely the creation of Éditions Gallimard.  But then when I finished your book, I couldn’t altogether quash my misgivings about your having (mostly) omitted Paris. To hear you tell it, ambitious Irish and American writers had to work out their relationship to the English literary establishment, but they didn’t have to take any kind of position with regard to the French (or the German or the Spanish). At first glance, this seems only obvious: Writers in the former English colonies have always had to play king-of-the-mountain with the English canon. But I’ve always thought of Casanova as usefully prodding us beyond that commonsensical position. If there really is a literary world-system, then that system is one; that’s the force of the concept, as adapted from Immanuel Wallerstein. Post-colonial theory taught us all how to talk about the literatures of the individual European empires, but Wallerstein’s point was always that the empires should not be considered in isolation, that they finally add up to a single network—conflict-ridden and dynamic, to be sure, but functionally unified even so. World-system theory has always been a theory of super-imperialism. The literary world-system is to that extent most visible when a novel or poem moves from one linguistic zone to another. The concept of the Anglosphere, by contrast, doesn’t capture the multi-imperial dimensions of the thing.

    There’s more: One of the ways in which you improve upon Casanova is by bringing in the work of Giovanni Arrighi, to refine her use of world-systems theory. But Arrighi is if anything even more insistent than Wallerstein that the world-system has, in any period, only one capital—one country that plays an outsized role in coordinating global capitalism as a whole. You’re doing something notable, then, when you write that “by the nineteenth century Britain and France were the world’s two leading imperial as well as literary powers” (5) or when you say that “the old literary system [was] organized by Paris and London” (39). That strikes me as your major (and silent) amendment of Casanova’s case, all the more notable in that it contravenes one of the central tenets of world-system theory. I can ask my question concretely: What is the status of Paris in your thinking? My impression is that the book first shifts our attention to London by partnering the city with Paris, and then lets itself ditch Paris altogether, but that might not be fair. I can also ask the question theoretically: Can a world system, literary or otherwise, have more than one capital?  

    This is an important issue. One might reverse the question and ask, “Where is London in Casanova’s model?” Your question rightly identifies that the problem of the interplay between various literary capitals, however organized and stratified, requires a good deal more attention than world literature studies has afforded it to date. How do major and satellite literary capitals relate to each other? In what ways are those relationships both competitive and cooperative (or symbiotic) at the same time? If there is only one capital of capitals, then how do the lesser but still major capitals relate it to it and it to them? How do major historical events (world wars, revolutions, new media technologies, the changing statuses of “world languages,” reader demographics) affect such relationships? I think my book has things to say on this but let me try to address your question as clearly as I can.

    First, I think it is essential not to readily conflate the world system model as it comes to us from Wallerstein or Arrighi with the world literary system as developed by Casanova and others after her. It is true that Casanova takes her model from Braudel, Wallerstein, and world systems theory, but that system is economic and political in conception whereas she is conceptualizing a cultural or literary system. It is true, too, as you say above, that a world system is functionally unitary, and I think this holds for both literary and economic-political systems. This would not imply, however, that the operative dynamics of each system are simply the same. The relationship of great literary capitals to each other need not follow the same logic as that of financial capitals. And whereas Arrighi thinks in terms of world systems in which the central coordinating powers are combinations of states and business corporations of increasing size and complexity (in turn city states, nation-states, continental states), it may be that capital cities (Paris, London, New York, Barcelona, Constantinople, Moscow, Beijing) matter more to Casanova’s model even though those cities are mostly national centers also. There may well be a compensatory element to cultural capitals for example. Nineteenth-century London had surpassed Paris in size, and England and its allied European powers defeated the grand ambitions of Napoleonic France. The British Empire also exceeded France’s in size and geostrategic significance. Yet Paris’s cachet as a great center of fashion, consumption, taste, and culture seems still to have surpassed London’s.

    Though some critics disagree, I think Casanova is basically correct to assert that for the nineteenth and much of the twentieth century Paris was the capital of literary capitals, the functional center or hub of the world literary system (one that was effectively and assumptively European even if its sway by the mid-nineteenth century reached into all continents). She takes her sense of Paris’s super-eminence not only from Baudelaire, Benjamin and Bourdieu, but also from the testimonies of writers around the world hymning Paris. What she might have formulated more clearly is the Paris-London relationship and how she thinks it works. I found Evan Horowitz’s article “London: Capital of the Nineteenth Century” (New Literary History, 2010) one of the most useful and suggestive reflections on this topic. Summarizing crudely, Horowitz argues that in all sorts of ways nineteenth-century London and England were more modern and advanced, and more politically stable, than Paris and France. However, he concludes that if uneven development—the clash of center and province, of capitalist industry or finance and agriculture, of modern and non-modern, of academies and avant-gardes—is catalytic to cultural creativity, then London may simply have been too evenly modern to be the volatile and creative cultural crucible that Paris was. Further factors such as Paris’s continental location between southern and northern Europe (something to which Moretti has also drawn attention), its long-accumulated prestige as a center of taste, fashion, and intellectual radicalism, and the prestige of French as the language of transnational culture and diplomacy were also crucial. Nevertheless, even if one accepts Paris’s supereminence this still does not tell us much about the precise nature of its relationship with literary London. The issue is not merely which capital is primary and which secondary, but how primary and secondary centers relate.

    In Modernism, Empire, World Literature I assume Paris’s precedence as world literary capital. Nevertheless, London is a close competitor and serves for writers in the Anglophone world as a hinge-city to Paris and French and European notice and fame. Irish and American writers move between both cities: Henry James, Oscar Wilde, and George Moore are notable late nineteenth century instances. However, many made their larger careers in London or had to establish reputations there to become really notable in Paris. The two cities, however similar in some respects, serve quite different functions: Paris, for example, is decidedly Europe’s art capital in a way London is not. And this matters to literature and to literary modernism, which is in so many ways influenced by the artistic avant-gardes from the Impressionists to the Surrealists. Because Paris is the capital of European art, the trendsetter, the great art collectors and patrons gather there too, those from the Anglophone world included. So, it is not just a case of writers living in Paris; as Henry James observed, ‘American  art’ in his day was made in Paris but even when it was made outside of Paris we find a great deal of Paris in it. We all know about the Irish and American expatriates who moved to Paris in the early twentieth century or in the twenties. But even these writers continued to depend on English or American literary magazines, reviewers, publishers, patrons, and readerships, so for the Anglophone writer it was rarely if ever a case of working exclusively in a Parisian or French world.   However, I also suggest, contra Casanova, that things were slowly but surely changing, and that the changes were speeding up across the twentieth century especially. As the British Empire expanded, and as the United States was transformed from a largely agrarian colony and slave plantation into a growing industrial power and empire (expanding into Mexico, the Caribbean, and the Pacific), the English language’s reach as “world language” was expanding too. Contemporary English-speaking linguists and writers were mostly triumphantly aware of this shift and this awareness is a crucial factor in literary production of the period, though not only among English-language writers. In the Belle Époque and the US’s Gilded Age, there was a much-commented-upon attempt by wealthy Americans, especially on the Atlantic coast, to augment the US’s cultural capital by building great museums, galleries, libraries, concert halls, universities, and so on, to compete with London and Paris and Europe generally. This kind of cultural catch-up led to “the plunder of Europe” and “the Orient” for artifacts of all kinds and their transfer to US repositories. James in The Golden Bowl (1904), Ezra Pound in Patria Mia (1913), and Lewis Mumford in The Golden Day (1926) all write wonderfully on this topic as do many other early twentieth-century writers and present-day American cultural historians and scholars. My argument in Modernism, Empire, World Literature is that while Paris is indeed the leading capital of the world literary system and enjoys an enormous, maybe unrivalled, prestige in the modernist era, the rapid expansion of English across the globe (thanks in part to empire and better communications systems), the remarkable rise in US wealth and power, and European turbulence after 1914 and in the entre deux guerres moment, means that the literary world system is already being reconfigured in ways Casanova either overlooks or recognizes—if she recognizes it at all—only in her own lifetime.

    However, things are happening on the peripheries that matter too. Concurrently, though in very different circumstances, the Irish and Celtic Revivals gained momentum alongside the Irish struggle for Home Rule, and attracted much attention in the US both from mainstream white intellectuals (like Pound or Van Wyck Brooks, for example) and from writers in the Harlem Renaissance (Claude McKay is a notable Caribbean-American instance). My argument is that Irish and American modernisms were nurtured by these earlier domestic national literary and cultural assertions, and by their sense of ambition. Even if many individual modernists wrote scathingly of their domestic societies and cultures and went into long-term exile in London and Paris, they still took with them something of this increasing national assertiveness and diffidence to things metropolitan. For writers from the English-language colonies in Ireland, the US, and the Caribbean, and indeed for Irish nationalist, African American, and Caribbean political and intellectual activists, London and England were critical: it was there that crafts could be refined, contacts made, patrons found, voices amplified, reputations elevated. So, we have great migrations from Ireland (George Moore, Wilde, Shaw, Yeats), the US (James, Pound, Eliot, Stein), and from the Caribbean (CLR James, McKay and others)—these are just the obvious examples. Still, if London is a necessary first citadel to be taken, so to speak, for Anglophone writers, Paris remains preeminent.

    At the same time, there are different ways of taking on Paris in a literary sense. For James, Eliot, and George Moore there are sojourns and immersions in French literary circles or in poetic and other artistic and philosophical developments. Others like Stein and Joyce, Hemingway and Fitzgerald, and many major African-American expatriate artists, bypass London for a more or less direct route to Paris (the routes of Joyce and McKay are more circuitous than most).  Even in the case of someone like CLR James who moves to Lancashire and London, Paris and France are patently important intellectually—one need only consider the enormous reading and research on French domestic and imperial politics and culture necessary for James’s scholarly epic, The Black Jacobins. Or, think of Ulysses, one of the obvious landmark modernist masterpieces. Joyce initially gets published with the help of Pound, but his Parisian consecration comes essentially with Ulysses, a work to which Sylvia Beach’s Shakespeare and Company is indispensable. What an amazing cooperative venture—this creation of Irish Catholic and American Presbyterian expatriate renegades in Paris. The sense of intellectual and artistic ambition not just to get to the European capitals or be recognized there, but to radically remake “literature” as understood in Paris or London is still remarkable and underappreciated.

    In any case, to bring things to a point, my sense is that London and later New York mattered to English-speaking writers from the peripheries because it was there that primary reputations were made. English-language publishers and reviewers were indispensable to finding what every writer needs, namely readers and markets and reviews. Nevertheless, Paris still mattered more to avant-garde painting and literature more than London did, and still conferred the highest form of cultural prestige or consecration: French translation (a power supplemented or confirmed by the Nobel Prize in time). There is another twist though, another ruse of literary history. The English-language modernisms of Ireland, the Caribbean, and the United States may have been written with a certain sense of resentful diffidence to received pronunciation or the King’s English—a diffidence especially obvious in Joyce, Stein and McKay, to mention a few. Nevertheless, one of the paradoxes of the success of English-language modernisms taken collectively is that they also hugely augmented the prestige of English as a world language and world literary language. Other things were also tipping the scales away from French and towards English. The rapid rise of the US as world power after WWI, the assertion of New York as an ultramodern center of finance, fashion and publication, the development of air travel (the language of international aviation is English), the promotion of American popular cinema and culture, and the fall of Paris and France to Nazi Germany in 1940 all contributed. In many respects, the English-language modernisms from the peripheries can be read as a brash challenge to and in some sense, a remarkable takeover and renewal of “English literature” as earlier formulated by means of a converging series of attachments to and rivalries with literary London. Nevertheless, when modernism comes to be celebrated as one of the great literary revolutions or sea changes in twentieth-century literature, then modernism, willy nilly, becomes part of the story of the augmentation of the Anglophone sphere’s cultural prestige and reach and, conversely, part of a relative reining-in of French literary preeminence.

    Paris does not suffer any kind of sudden or absolute decline, but its sense of itself as uncontested “universal” capital of culture comes under strain from the rise of the Soviet Union and the rise of the United States and American English. Had Oscar Wilde, Henry James, James Joyce, William Butler Yeats, Gertrude Stein, Ernest Hemingway, Claude McKay and CLR James not just been fascinated by Paris, but also written their oeuvres in French, how different modern literature would appear!  There’s a Leonard Cohen song that goes, “First we take Manhattan, then we take Berlin.” In the case of Anglophone modernism, this might be revised, “First we take London, then we take Paris.” However, as New York came increasingly into prominence the London-Paris nexus became a more complex London-New York-Paris one. Still, I recognize that my response remains sketchy. It is easier to point to broad contours of change than to explain them in some more finely detailed accounts of reconfigured literary fields or world systems. This, I expect, will require collective scholarship and combinations of cultural sociology, quantitative analysis, translation studies, and close reading. The changing roles of publishing companies, university populations, and critical scholarship, literary migrations, prizes and awards, and many other things, would have to be considered in terms of this wider transatlantic and intercontinental system.

    CT: Casanova makes a few suggestive remarks about American fiction and has quite a lot to say about Irish literature, but you largely omit the very authors she foregrounds—those would be Faulkner and Beckett. I’m wondering if that’s significant. Casanova, after all, regards Beckett as the greatest of all twentieth-century writers—and greatest because he was the culmination of the literary world system, enabled by dislocation to achieve “the total autonomy of literature” (128), a literature beholden to no place, no community, no particular language.

    About Faulkner, meanwhile, she says the following:

    “William Faulkner, no less than Joyce, was responsible for one of the greatest revolutions in the world of letters, comparable in its extent, and in the depth of the changes it introduced in the novel, to the naturalist revolution of the late nineteenth century. … in the outlying countries of the literary world [Faulkner’s innovations] were welcomed as tools of liberation. Faulkner’s work, more than that of any other writer, henceforth belonged to the explicit repertoire of international writers in dominated literary spaces who sought to escape the imposition of national rules, for he had found a solution to a commonly experienced political, aesthetic, and literary impasse.” (336)

    Faulkner, she says, could play this role because he was writing about a backward and perhaps even colonized portion of the U.S., archaic and left behind. His American South was of a piece with the global South, and this made him compelling to readers in the colonies and post-colonies. Faulkner wrote a regionalist and rural fiction, to be sure, but his novels were unlike anything the nineteenth-century had served up under that rubric. It thus fell to a white American to teach the writers of the old Third World how to forge a rural modernism, in which an underdeveloped region manages to sustain stylistic bravura. Faulkner modeled for (post)colonial writers how to stay on the periphery and still be experimental and formally challenging.

    I’m wondering, then, about whether you think Casanova is right about Beckett and Faulkner. And I’m wondering, too, whether you think these judgments are compatible with your account of American and Irish modernisms. Does your passing over Faulkner and Beckett in (near) silence suggest a disagreement or at least a different emphasis? Two years before The World Republic of Letters, Casanova published a single-author study called Beckett the Abstractionist, but then in the later book she wrote about him all over again. In 2021, you published not only Modernism, Empire, World Literature but also The Irish Expatriate Novel in Late Capitalist Globalization, and in neither book do you make more than passing reference to Beckett. Casanova made him central more than once in quick succession. You seem to have responded by skipping him twice over. 

    JC: That’s something I hadn’t ever considered and one to which one might give a few answers.

    Some of the differences may be just down to the vagaries of reading and what makes an impression, some to the architecture of my argument, but some stem from a disagreement with Casanova’s conception of literary world systems.

    In terms of the quirks of reading, I came to modernism as an Irish undergraduate in the early 1980s. We read what would now be considered a conventional and conservative high modernist canon: Henry James, Conrad, Joyce, Woolf, Lawrence, Yeats, early Pound, William Carlos Williams, and Faulkner. If I remember correctly, we encountered Beckett selectively as a dramatist. I came to Beckett’s novels later, after college, and Beckett’s plays still make a deeper impression. (Beckett died in 1989; perhaps he was lodged somewhere anomalous between “contemporary” and “modernist” in undergraduate Irish syllabi and “late modernism” wasn’t really a category.)  It was only at graduate school in Columbia University that I really came to what we now call “postcolonial literature” in a serious way. In some ways, then, the modernist literature that made the greatest impression on me was “early” and “high” modernism, and “late modernism” always seemed a little compromised or hobbled by its adjective, its tardiness. In many ways, I’m anti-Lukácsian when it comes to high modernism, but must fight with my tendency to view “late modernism” in rather Lukácsian terms! Casanova, on the other hand, seems magnetically drawn to Beckett as late modernist and, like Adorno, to have a far keener feeling for Beckett than for Brecht.

    In terms of the structure of my book, it would be a stronger work were there a chapter on Stein or Faulkner, coming after the chapter on Joyce and before that on Walcott. But since the study is fundamentally about how it took the energies of two former peripheries, one a colony in the process of breaking with Britain and the empire, the other a former colony in the process of becoming an imperial metropole and new-world hegemon, to bring about a significant structural change in the literary world system, I wanted to keep the focus largely on the period before World War II. In addition, because my stress was on Irish and American modernist connections and mutual awareness, I decided to focus on F. Scott Fitzgerald and Eugene O’Neill rather than Stein or Faulkner. I saw that chapter as a kind of bridge chapter: two American Irish figures working largely in the US and building on the achievements of the earlier expatriate Americans but belonging to a different phase of American assertion and imminent ascendancy. I was also trying to expand a little the conventional sense of “Irish modernism.” Irish studies, with a few notable exceptions, has largely tended to bypass Irish American modernism and to fixate on the trinity of Yeats, Joyce and Beckett, with Bowen now added to make the trio a quartet. For its part, “American modernist studies” has always been far more interested in American and British modernist connections than in connections with Irish modernism. There are many interesting books on the expatriate Americans in London and Paris, because these were the cities where the major expat writers resided. However, there are few if any ambitious scholarly works on American or African American takes on the Irish Revival and modernism. In many respects, the American scholarly fascination with London and Paris confirms Casanova’s thesis.

    Third, and most important, I fundamentally disagree with Casanova’s assertion that “autonomy” is the highest and finest stage of accomplishment in terms of world literary systems. For her, Beckett’s attempt to be free of all constraints—of nation, public, or language—represents “autonomy” pushed to its auto-referential highest reach, literature aspiring to the quality of visual abstraction.  You’ve written admirably on the contradictions in The World Republic of Letters on this issue in “The Sea is Not a World” in boundary 2. On the one hand, Casanova is committed to the idea of a world literary system that is one but uneven and expanding in scale but disrupted and sometimes even transformed or revolutionized from its peripheries or semi-peripheries. On the other hand, she takes a conception of “autonomy” which is ultimately a kind of meta-art transcending national communities, linguistic adherences, and political commitments as the highest kind of literary attainment because this establishes some sort of absolute sovereignty for literature—autonomy not just from religion or race but nation and state and just about anything else. It’s hard to tell where literary “autonomy” or “sovereignty” does not become in her work a kind of literary “isolationism” or delinking to use a world systems term. Where I differ is that I view that conception of “autonomy” as something that is itself historical and owes something to Flaubert and some versions of nineteenth-century French letters and to some versions of modernism and New Criticism and then to Western Cold War ideology rather than as the given or necessary telos of world literary systems. Put another way, the idea of “autonomy” to which Casanova subscribes belongs to a particular time and place, to a particular configuration of the Western world literary system; I see no reason to accord it the kind of “end of history” status that Casanova seems to grant it. The Soviet world literary system obviously did not assign the same prestige to “autonomy” that the Western Cold War literary system did, and there is no reason why some newly configured world literary system might not create for itself a quite different value system to those associated with either the Soviet or Western literary systems. Autonomy from the authoritarian centralized state and autonomy from capital, the commodity form, and the cultural industries are quite different things, but Casanova appears to conflate them.

    Finally, while I admire the way Casanova ascribes real agency to the élan of great writers like Joyce or Faulkner (and some others) and doesn’t reduce them to mere functions or effects of her system, I’m more cautious of phrases such as that which you cite above. When Casanova says Joyce and Faulkner created “two of the greatest revolutions” in the literary world she ascribes singular agency to them. Revolutions seem to require their Toussaints, Dantons, and Trostkys, so why not accord outstanding writers the stature of their achievements? Nevertheless, the world literary system as such seems only to be structurally changed or radically transformed when there are other geopolitical and geocultural events that, accidentally or otherwise, abet and further the achievements of the great individual writers. Melville’s achievements in the nineteenth century now seem astounding but went largely unrecognized in London or Paris or indeed in the US until the world’s geopolitical circumstances had changed and until more room was made for oddball novels like Moby-Dick. It took the rise of the United States and sea changes in literary taste attributable to modernism for established views on Melville to change significantly. So, yes, Casanova may be largely correct in her sense of Faulkner’s enormous literary influence beyond the United States and in the Global South, but Casanova, like us all perhaps, struggles to keep the dialectics of individual agency and general system in play. By the way, what Casanova says of Faulkner and his conception for writers beyond the US seems analogous in many respects to what Said says of Yeats as poet of decolonization. Yet in Casanova’s Irish schema, Yeats, about whom she has little to say, is only a secondary “rebel” and Beckett a first-rate “revolutionary.”  In my book, I use but also work against her hierarchical valuation of “assimilated,” “rebel” and “revolutionary” writers.

    CT: Even passing familiarity with the Anglo-modernist canon lends credence to Casanova’s big claim: that the system of belles lettres has been organized by transnational literary capitals, metropolitan clearing-houses that vacuum up manuscripts from vast, multi-continental literary peripheries — or that lure the peripheral writers themselves to relocate: the American novelist living in Sussex; the Polish novelist living in Kent; one Irish playwright living in London, a second living in Paris, a third living first in London, then in Paris; the short-story writer from New Zealand moving to England; all those expatriate American poets: Eliot and Pound and H.D. and Stein. One of the ways in which you’ve broken with Casanova, I think, is that you give the impression that the English literary establishment was in some respects quite weak, overwhelmed by all these innovators from abroad, whereas she, despite making some sharp observations about national literary rivalries, tends to emphasize the persistent power of metropolitan cultural institutions (as the arbiters of all things literary). I can put this another way: You make the case that non-English writers, lacking an internationally ratified literary tradition, felt freer to innovate. What you help us see is that modernism could easily carry a certain all but overt national and anti-metropolitan content. Maybe the English had a harder time innovating. And here the economic analogies really do suggest themselves: The English were held back by their very success. They had too much invested in a particular literary infrastructure, too much fixed literary capital. A reader who picked up your book knowing nothing about modernism could perhaps get the impression that there were no English modernists. But then one can’t help but wonder about D.H. Lawrence or Virginia Woolf or Wilfred Owen. So let me ask: You’ve convinced me that modernism has a special affinity for the (rising) periphery. How does that force us to rethink the modernists from the old imperial core?

    JC: Let me make two general comments before coming directly to the English modernists. First, the ways in which various literary metropoles or capitals relate to their peripheries do not necessarily follow some common formulaic rule or pattern. Even if all such relationships involve domination and dependency, the particular dynamics of how London, Paris, Berlin, Moscow, Barcelona, Kolkata and so on relate to their peripheries may differ considerably. As such, the relationship between Parisian modernism and the modernisms of France’s peripheries may not be the same as that of London and the Anglosphere’s peripheral modernisms. Second, while there was an earlier tendency in modernist scholarship to identify modernism almost exclusively with world cities, there is good reason to resist shifting to the other extreme to associate modernism exclusively with semi-peripheries or peripheries. Clearly, if we think of modernism not just in terms of major individual writers but also in terms of the avant-gardes, then most of the avant-garde movements are located in the metropoles. If we follow Peter Bürger and think of the avant-gardes as movements that challenged the art institutions and their ideas about what constituted “art” and its function, then there is obvious reason why the avant-gardes were concentrated in major capitals: the institutional complexes that defined what constituted art were located in these capitals and it was there that the avant-gardes made their assault and impact.  If we think in terms of the more commonly cited avant-gardes—the Impressionists, Symbolists, Cubists, Futurists, Constructivists, Dadaists, Expressionists, Surrealists, Bauhaus, Abstract Expressionists, etc.—London is not the world capital that most readily leaps to mind. Many of these avant-gardes are associated more with the visual arts or theater than with the novel or poetry, but the point stands. (The European avant-garde most identified with non-metropolitan affect and association is probably primitivism.)

    As for a specifically English literary modernism, it is important not to reduce the matter simply to numerical headcounts of “great writers.” To think exclusively in these terms—though literary textbooks and companions appear sometimes implicitly to do so—is to say that England produced X-number of great modernist writers, the US Y-number, the Caribbean Z-number, and thus forth. So, one can allow England its Woolfs, Lawrences, Joneses, Buntings, and others, but this doesn’t go anywhere especially useful. The more significant and less studied matter is what modernism meant for different Anglophone national literatures and how national literary histories retrospectively constructed its place in national terms. It is here we can see real differences.

    The Irish, Scottish and American peripheries produced writers in the nineteenth century that exerted international impact. Napoleon read Macpherson’s Ossian in Italian translation, revered it, and allegedly carried it into battle. Baudelaire was famously impressed by Poe and Nietzsche by Emerson. Thomas Moore’s “Irish Melodies” were translated into numerous European languages. So, as Katie Trumpener, in Bardic Nationalism, and others after her have demonstrated, the Anglophone peripheries were already of consequence in the metropolitan centers well before what we now call modernism. That allowed, it is with literary modernism that Irish and US literatures announce themselves with unprecedented literary force on the “world stage.” The modernisms of Yeats, Joyce, O’Casey and Beckett may respond to the Irish Revival in quite different ways, but they appear more or less concurrently with the drive for Irish independence and, as someone like Wyndham Lewis recognized, are tinted by its assertiveness. American modernist writing undoubtedly expresses a range of extremely complex, often aggressively critical responses to American society. However, whether in its elite white or Black internationalist forms, there is some palpable sense that the US’s role in the world is no longer peripheral but rather that of a great power coming into its prime. In the book, I cite Pound, Scott Fitzgerald, Edmund Wilson, John Peale Bishop, Clement Greenberg and others who give explicit expression to this new sense of American arrival and accomplishment in letters and the visual arts, but that brashness is implicit in American modernist forms and ambitions in other ways too.

    In the case of the English, the same period appears one of considerable fertility especially in the novel. Conrad, Wells, Ford, Foster, Woolf, Lewis, Lawrence, Jean Rhys, Rebecca West, Aldous Huxley, Elizabeth Bowen were all born in the nineteenth century; Malcolm Lowry was born in 1909: their collective careers are enough to indicate novelistic liveliness. Nevertheless, some things appear worth observing. On the whole, the English modernists—including for the most part the outstanding figures of Woolf, Lawrence and Lowry—loosen and renovate the conventions of the realist novel. But very few radically transmogrify the novel as form in the manner of Proust, Joyce, Stein, Dos Passos, Broch, Faulkner, or Beckett. To say as much is not to disparage Lawrence or Woolf or the others but only to note a certain difference. Even when Lawrence or Woolf display an extremely modernist sensibility and a keen familiarity with non-English modernisms, they mostly retain considerable attachment to the realist form and its conventions. The same holds for Bowen, West, Ford, Forster, and others. Indeed, if we were to accord Anthony Powell (born 1905) and his 12-volume Dance to the Music of Time, the major stature that Perry Anderson has recently argued for it in Different Speeds, Same Furies: Powell, Proust and Other Literary Forms (2022), then one might well argue that in England the social realist comic or ironic novel of manners and social novel (strengthened in the best instances by contact with modernist writing) remain the dominant forms across the twentieth century—the modes in which English fiction attains and retains its highest accomplishments. If this is so, then what we call “modernism” would not represent the kind of radical rupture with earlier realism in England that it did elsewhere. Viewed in this manner, Woolf’s and Lawrence’s works would not appear lesser but in a different light nonetheless. My suggestion is not that Woolf and Lawrence are merely ‘minor modernists.’ They are both great writers, serious and superb innovators. My point is that English modernism owes more to non-English expatriates and Celtic fringe writers than is commonly allowed—despite Terry Eagleton’s Exiles and Émigrés (1970) making this point a long time ago—and that for various reasons modernism occupies a different place in the English literary canon than in, say, the Irish, American or Scottish ones.

    In the case of poetry, there are modernist poets but no English figures to compare with Yeats, Eliot, Pound, H.D., Carlos Williams, Marianne Moore or Stevens for sheer impact. Mina Loy (born in 1882 as Mina Gertrude Löwy to a Hungarian Jewish refugee father and English mother) was a London-born avant-gardist who lived much of her adult life in Europe and then became an American citizen, living in New York, dying in Colorado. Hope Mirrlees’s (born 1887 in Kent) Paris: A Poem (1920) is a notable work. David Jones’s (also born in Kent in 1895) In Parenthesis (1937) and Anathemata (1952), and Basil Bunting’s (born 1900) Briggflatts (1966) are late modernist works of large ambition. Hugh MacDiarmid was born in Langholm, Scotland, in 1892; A Drunk Man Looks at the Thistle (1926) was much influenced by Joyce, Yeats, and the Irish Revival and is a modernist long poem. Mirrlees grew up in Scotland and South Africa, Jones was born in Kent to a Welsh-speaking family and strongly identified with Wales, and Bunting lived much of his adult life as an expatriate in France, Italy, Persia and elsewhere, and was greatly influenced by his friendship with Pound. I mention these details for two reasons. In the case of English or British modernism (the two are often conflated), the role of writers from England’s peripheries—from Ireland, Scotland, and Wales—and of European émigrés or the children of émigrés exceeds that of London and of Bloomsbury. Think of the early importance of translators of advanced European poetry and drama: of Welsh-born Arthur Symonds’s The Symbolist Movement in Literature (1899, revised 1919), of Scottish born William Archer’s and Irish-born G. B. Shaw’s early advocacy for Ibsen in theater and of the role of Eleanor Marx, translator of Madame Bovary and An Enemy of Society in 1887 and The Wild Duck in 1888, in promoting advanced European literature. Or consider Irish-born Oscar Wilde’s Salomé, written in French in 1891 and first produced in Paris in 1896, or of Melbourne-born George Egerton’s (born Mary Elizabeth Annie Dunne in 1859, raised in Dublin, educated for a time in Germany, later moving to New York and Norway) immersion in ‘New Woman’ circles and in Nietzschean philosophy and in the Scandinavian modernism of Hamsun and Strindberg. Then consider the émigrés Henry James, Conrad, Lewis, Eliot, Pound, and Rhys. European modernist literature comes inwards to Britain from its peripheries and from the US and other colonies, not outwards from Bloomsbury.  Second, the period we associate with modernism, from the fin de siècle to World War II say, is also a period when Eliot as poet and critic takes over London in terms of poetry and Shaw as leading playwright and critic in terms of drama. And this is when many of the greatest English writers of the time leave England and take off for elsewhere to find inspiration.  D. H. Lawrence travels the world in the 1920s and spends time in the United States before returning to France to die. After periods in Paris, Germany and Italy, Loy leaves for New York in 1916 and dies in the US in 1966. Well-traveled Lowry leaves for New York, Cuernavaca, Los Angeles and Vancouver, returning to die in England in 1957. Auden leaves England in 1939 for New York, dying in Vienna in 1973. The major works of Grahame Greene, Rebecca West, Lawrence Durrell, or Anthony Burgess are more associated with the colonies, or the Middle East, or the Balkans, than with “Little England.” Woolf and Powell may be the two most significant stay-at-home London-based figures in twentieth century English fiction to keep faith with domestic English society. There may be many reasons for these self-exiles from England and London—a disillusionment with post-war England, a search for new materials—but they clearly signal a sense that London is no longer the center of even the Anglophone world let alone of the world generally.

    The significance of the peripheries to Anglophone reception of modernist currents, to achieved high modernist ambition, and the itchy-feet world-crossing restlessness of many of the greatest English poets and novelists of the twentieth century seem to me to index a loss of England’s and London’s earlier confident centrality. Shelley and Byron, Wordsworth and Scott, Dickens and Thackeray, Charlotte Brönte and George Eliot, Thomas Hardy and Tennyson all travelled but their works remain decisively and securely “English” or “British” and, in the case of the canonical novelists especially, are generally firmly located in England or Scotland. In Culture and Imperialism, Edward Said argues that the nineteenth-century English realist novel is so securely English that the empire and colonies were taken largely for granted, appearing mostly only in peripheral vision or in the novelistic background. However, things are changing by the period we associate with early and high modernism. Writers and dramatists from the peripheries are becoming the dominant forces in the Anglophone novel, poetry and drama, and many of the greatest English writers are by then roving restlessly across the world and making the world beyond England their subject matter—it is as though the world can no longer properly be comprehended or panoptically imagined from England or London. The empire becomes visible to the more prestigious forms of English letters largely in its decline and fall, and the United States, the Soviet Union, Europe and the colonies now have to be more directly reckoned with in English letters—as Michael Denning noted long ago in Cover Stories (1987) we see this new and more paranoid worldview emerging in the English spy novel and thriller. The world literary system had pivoted and the English writer had to adjust. It is not, then, that there is no English modernism. It is that English modernism has to share its lesser share of the international limelight with other Anglophone modernisms in a world where the United Kingdom is contending with the nationalisms, literary and otherwise, of its Celtic peripheries and with its declining stature in the world system. “English literature,” if by this we mean literatures in English everywhere, is becoming more global and transcontinental than ever before; “English literature,” if by this we mean literature written by English-born writers about England, is becoming or has already become for several decades anxiously provincialized.

    CT: In your final chapter, on Derek Walcott, you refer in passing to the “now-American-centered world literary system.” (250) The world literary system once organized from the twin capitals of London and Paris is now organized largely by Americans. It is American literary institutions—and American literary administrators—that enjoy a certain disproportionate say in what counts as world literature. That phrase – “now-American-centered” – stands out because it flags a big geographical mutation in the world literary system, which is a matter that Casanova almost entirely neglects. The phrase also puts me in mind again of Giovanni Arrighi, since his great contribution to world-systems theory was to propose a properly Wallersteinian version of the translatio imperii. If a reader were to take away a single claim from The Long Twentieth Century, it would be that the world system has always been organized around a geographical center, but that the system is nonetheless prone to leaping—prone, that is, to the epochal swapping of centers: from northern Italy to the Dutch Republic to Britain to the United States. Once we’ve cracked open the Arrighi, though, I find myself wanting to ask three interlinked questions:

    1)    Arrighi goes on to explain (in great detail) that the world system reorganizes itself whenever it moves to a new capital. Each geographical shift—from Amsterdam to London, say—has been accompanied by major institutional transformations. I’m wondering if you think the same is true of the literary world system? Is the US-centered world literary system importantly different from the older Anglo-French system, and if so, how?

    2)   Arrighi is also at pains to explain why the world system keeps shifting its headquarters—why, that is, finance capital can’t just find a business district where the coffee is good and stay there indefinitely. Briefly: A given entrepot will slowly lose its competitive advantages as these are adopted across the world system, including by its national rivals, and as it finds itself with a given economic regime’s oldest and most dilapidated physical plant. Eventually, new organizational advantages will have to be devised, and this will be easier to attempt on fresh terrain. I’d like to ask, then, whether this argument can be adapted to literature. You agree with Casanova when she says that the capital of a world literary system needn’t be the same as the capital of the world economic system. But then why does the world literary system ever move to a new metropolitan center? What dislodged it from Paris and London?

    3)  The “now-American-centered world literary system”: Did you mean the now of 1990, when Omeros was published, or the now of 2021, when Modernism, Empire, World Literature was published? Or both? Has the world literary system changed over the last thirty years—and is it still centered on the US? I could also ask the question this way: On p. 47, you write that “change also occurs within the literary system … when peripheral cultures and their emissaries have the audacity and ambition to dispute a declining centre’s consecrating authority.” Is the American-centered world system in decline? Is anyone in the position to dispute its consecrating authority?               

    JC: There are many nested questions here and each one might require a book to address!  Let me start with your Question (2), move back to (1), and end with some sketchy speculations on (3).

    Yes, Arrighi proposes that economic world systems are not merely organized around particular geographical centers but also that the current center’s dominance is only ceded when some successor center can reorganize the entire system not only in its own interests but in a general manner with benefits accruing to the subsidiary states as well. He contends, moreover, that in the case of those systemic transformations he describes—from the Italian city-states to the Dutch United Provinces to the United Kingdom to the United States—the size and reach of the states involved and the expanse of the overall capitalist system it regulates increases. However, he suggests, too, that each successive hegemon enjoys dominance for a shorter period than its predecessor did. He also stresses that serious financial crises and devastating “world wars”  accompany such transfers. It seems worth adding that the “decline” of the former centers as conceived here is relative decline, not absolute. The US may have taken over the role of capitalist world hegemon from the UK after World War II, but the UK is still one of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council. Japan, Germany and the Soviet Union may have failed in their respective imperial, Nazi and Soviet bids to supersede the US as world hegemon, but all are still leading world states in some respect or other.

    In The World Republic of Letters, Casanova seems to assume that the world economic and world literary systems are structurally similar but separate—or tendentially separate and ideally, in her view, becoming completely so in order that that the production of the most ambitious literatures would be subject to neither church nor nation-state nor capitalist economy. She also swings between defiant assertions that Paris remains in her time the supreme capital of literary capitals for the higher forms of literature—with New York and London merely supervising more upmarket versions of commercially-successful literature—and an elegiac concession that this Anglo-globalization is already or will soon become dominant.

    However, the question you ask is, even if we can imagine a literary world system as roughly analogous to an economic world system, then what motivates its transformation? After all, financial capital and symbolic or cultural capital are not the same and need not follow a similar logic of decreasing returns. So, your question is, why should we suppose that world literary capitals must change even if we accept financial capitals must do so? My response is that there was never a singular all-encompassing world literary system in the manner that Casanova proposes. Even as the Paris-centered system became dominant and arbitrated what was considered passé, “classical”, or “modern” or “avant-garde” in terms of literary value, the older capitals of other world languages and literatures did not cease to matter. And in the twentieth century, a new communist world literary system emerged under Moscow and Beijing. These different literary worlds or sub-systems intersected, collaborated and competed with each other in complex ways. However, it would appear that as different states vie to be supreme world hegemon, they rarely do so in exclusively politico-economic or military terms. To secure their long-term prestige and to convert domination into hegemony they also need to project themselves culturally and intellectually in terms of the arts and sciences. The Italian city-states gave us the Renaissance. The United Provinces give us the Dutch “Golden Age.” This refers not only to transcontinental trade (including the slave trade) and the Dutch East India Company (VOC). It also includes a flourishing of the sciences, philosophy (in the works of Spinoza and Descartes, for instance, who lived in Holland for twenty years and had his leadings works published in Amsterdam and Leiden), the Dutch realist school of painting, and indeed “the Protestant ethic.” The French and British empires give us a different kind of global domination and their modern literatures. That England gave us Mill and Darwin as well as Austen and Dickens and sheltered the émigré Marx. Paris gave us Saint-Simon and Tocqueville and Proudhon and Curie as well as Balzac and Hugo, Stendhal and Zola.

    In the case of the United States, cultural assertion takes the form of anxious “catch up” with Europe well before it achieves either domination or hegemony and is then followed by global cultural projection as it attempts to consolidate its new position after WWII. In the case of New York specifically, its emergence as an international cultural capital was a matter of policy and massive investment. It would seem that a world literary capital requires more than the establishment and cultivation of prestigious literary institutions. To become world capitals, cities have to create whole complexes of institutions in all of the arts—music, dance, opera, theatre, the visual arts, architecture, performance, and in the twentieth century cinema too. Fashion and cuisine are part of the mix. New York achieved this in the form of extravagant galleries, museums, music academies, film institutes, ballet and dance academies, literary and musical bohemian districts (Harlem, Greenwich Village), universities, publishing corporations, arts foundations, high-end newspaper reviews, literary magazines, and so on. Arguably, the visual arts and architecture were more important in the first instance than literature to the construction of new cultural capitals because the visual arts are less linguistically anchored and thus translate quicker and architecture is lived in everyday ways that the other arts are not. Because New York was a more heterogeneous immigrant city than London or Paris were in the early twentieth century, it could, with the help of the Harlem Renaissance and jazz, also appear more “globally modern” sooner than they could. In the same early twentieth-century era, the US also developed and expanded a continent-wide research university system. Nevertheless, it seems likely that without the artistic and intellectual migrations triggered by the Bolshevik Revolution, the victories of Fascism in Western Europe and Japan, and the catastrophe of World War II, the twentieth-century “American Renaissance” might have been far less spectacular. The long-term development of artistic and scientific infrastructure, extensive intellectual and artistic migrations from Europe and elsewhere, and then a more concerted Cold War policy of constructing the US as the guarantor of an imperiled “Western Civilization”—imperiled by communism within and without, and by mass culture—had a cumulative effect. It is too instrumentalist to think of all of this solely as “soft power” but something of that is also involved.

    Nevertheless, even if London—particularly because it shared the same language as the United States—and eventually Paris were ultimately overshadowed by New York, and its satellite cities in Boston, Chicago, San Francisco, and Los Angeles, the former world capitals didn’t cease to be significant. For one thing, they have centuries of old cultural capital from earlier ages that New York cannot match no matter how much classical or medieval or early modern or non-Western art it mimics or funnels into its galleries. For another, London and Paris had well-developed publishing and intellectual links with their imperial colonies and for much of the twentieth century the artists and intellectuals from these colonies still looked to Paris and London as much or more than to New York. Indeed, it is worth noting that several recent expatriate winners of the Nobel Prize for Literature have been attached to France and England: Abdulrazak Gurnah, Kazuoa Ishiguro, V. S. Naipaul, and Gao Xinjian.  However, relative decline is still decline. Many leading European cultural centers were devastated by civil war (Russia, Spain, Greece) as well as two world wars and the economic and other hardships that followed World War II especially. China and Korea were also shattered by civil wars, Japan was nuked, India and Germany convulsed and partitioned. If American culture flourished spectacularly in the “American century”—Louis Menand offers a lively account of this in Freedom: Art and Thought in the Cold War (2021)—many of the world’s other ancient or modern cultural capitals suffered astonishing adversity in the same half-century, yet without simply becoming culturally impoverished.  So, what we get, I think, is a rearticulation of the old European-dominated Western-leaning system with the US as its new center.

    In more conceptual terms, the answer to your question as to why must literary capitals change at all is they are compelled to change when the capitalist world system changes, when the lingua franca of international elites changes, and when old capitals are actively outbid by bold new ones. These are complex variables mutating at different tempos, and they probably only come into decisive alignment over some considerable durée.

    Your second question is, did the US change the world literary system as it became an ascendant force in that system? I would say yes though not in ways analogous to the politico-economic-military system where command or management of things by institutions like the UN, IMF, World Bank, the WTO and NATO are crucial. Instead, the system changes in less overtly directive manner. The most important change comes with the massification and limited democratization of secondary and higher education, a process accelerating unevenly across the globe after World War II. The modern vernacular literatures didn’t have much toehold in the universities till quite late in the nineteenth century or even later and compulsory secondary education only really became widespread in the twentieth century. With the expansion of national secondary and tertiary education systems, especially after WWII, the institutionalized reading of modern vernacular national literatures by adolescents and undergraduates really takes off. In that context, literary historical scholarship and the criticism of modern literature becomes a credentialed university activity. With its well-endowed universities, mix of domestic American and migrant intellectual talent, and arts foundations and publishing conglomerates, the US gradually exerts real force in terms of literary gatekeeping, analysis, and legitimation. In the same period, we see the cultivation of what Mark McGurl calls “the Program Era,” the training of writers and aspirants through MFA programs and the employment of writers within the university. McGurl contends that these programs allowed writers a buffer from the cruder demands of the market and facilitated the continued cultivation of more advanced or experimental forms of poetry and fiction. The university writing program offers a function that wealthy patrons did in the modernist era or that, according to Jordan Brower in Classical Hollywood, American Modernism: A Literary History of the Studio System (2024), the Hollywood studio earlier did for American writers. That seems true but the university also sucked writers away from bohemias, radio stations, film studios, and so on, sites that had fostered different types of formation and conceptions of “the writer.” In any case, in the Cold War context there was also the promotion of university courses on the “great books of western civilization” and “world literature” and the dissemination of these across the globe in world book sets, encyclopedias, and anthologies. This was the period, too, when American Studies programs were vigorously promoted on several continents (the cultural wing of overseas American military bases, perhaps). In time, as the writing programs expanded and the US universities competed with each other to secure the more prestigious reputation, they became magnets also for writers from around the world. Therefore, it wasn’t just “literary cities” like New York or San Francisco but the university residencies that made the contemporary US a new kind of cosmopolitan cultural center where expatriate writers and intellectuals clustered as they might once have done in London or Paris.

    In Modernism, Empire, World Literature I suggest that what we call “modernist literature” played an important transference and value-reorganizing role in this larger process. Because of its high ambition, esoteric qualities, curious mix of classicism and avant-gardism, and so on, modernism lent twentieth-century literature an aura that mixed intellectual respectability with radicalism, interpretative challenge with a promised profundity. It didn’t seem amiss to read Proust with Augustine, Joyce with Homer, Lawrence with Nietzsche, Woolf with Freud, Mann with Goethe, Beckett with Schopenhauer.

    None of this meant that the US now called all the shots. The Nobel Academy continued to consecrate its literary prize from Sweden; Paris continued to translate writers from Europe and beyond; in the UK, Commonwealth Literature studies and the Booker Prize exerted their own countervailing pressures. Likewise, the Soviet Union essayed its own version of “world literature” and the Chinese and other Asian, Arab and Latin American nations assiduously cultivated their own modern national literatures, often deliberately differentiating these from their classical literatures. However, the combined force of American popular culture, Hollywood, the Ivy League universities, and New York as cultural and publishing center lent the US cultural field a luster that few other national cultures could individually match. Moreover, in the course of this wider transformation currencies of literary distinction didn’t standstill; like everything else, they too gradually changed.

    Your third question is when exactly did this transformation take place and has the system changed much in the last thirty years? Is it still US-centered or is the US-centered system now disputed or even in decline? It seems better to think of these processes as sea changes rather than in terms of particular dates.  In the book, I cite John Peale Bishop’s 1941 Kenyon College address in which he notes the fall of Paris to the Nazis and observes that “it was in Europe that the centers of civilization were to be found,” but now: “The actual center of western culture is no longer in Europe. It is here.” I cite also Sartre’s Les Temps Modernes article, “The Situation of the Writer in 1947,” where he surveys the melancholy condition of the postwar European writer, sandwiched now between new supremacies of the Soviet Union and US, the passing of the European haute bourgeoisie as class, and acknowledges that the great eras of European cultural accomplishment were “tied up with European supremacy and colonialism.”  One might equally cite Erich Auerbach’s 1952 “Philologie der Weltliteratur,” in which he contemplates the dissemination of world English by the victorious Americans and worries about the emergence of a single world language, something that would render comparatist scholarship redundant or certainly impoverished. And I cite Clement Greenberg’s 1955 ‘’American-Type Painting,” in which he observes: “Literature—yes we know we have done great things in that line; the English and French have told us so. Now they can begin to tell us the same about our painting.” These are canny worldly critics; each in his own way suggests a sense of a transformative change in which European cultural ascendancy is finally shattered and American supremacy has already arrived or is imminent.

    Has the American-centered system changed in the last thirty years? Capitalism’s reproductive crises since the 1970s, the rise of the internet since the 1980s, the astonishing economic advances of China and East Asia, the massive expansion of the Asian university systems, the inexorably creeping climate crisis, huge domestic inequalities within states almost everywhere: these are cumulatively undoing the contemporary world order and American hegemony is certainly frayed as never before. The signs are everywhere. Left-wing challenges from below by anti-globalization and ecology movements, by Occupy and Black Lives Matter and Palestinian solidarity movements. And challenges from above by the BRICS states. Powerful challenges everywhere by right-wing nationalists and fascists at both state and populist levels. Add to this the increasing disarray of the American political elites and establishment parties, some turning to right-wing populism and authoritarianism, others purveying an exhausted neoliberalism or moderate Keynesianism with no real solutions remotely in sight. Several of the US’s once more compliant client states—Saudi Arabia, Israel, Pakistan—have been openly thumbing their noses at Washington. Humiliations in Iraq, Libya, Afghanistan. The crisis seems enormous at a global level but until or unless some new center can emerge to stabilize the current system or create a new kind of post-capitalist economy that crisis seems only likely to deepen.

    How much does this current instability matter for the world literary system?  For the moment, the more dramatic changes bearing immediately on that system may be technological rather than literary. The expansion of the internet, the creation of Amazon and Alibaba, kindle and audiobooks, now AI: these seem likely to continue to reorganize modes of literary mediation and consumption. In recent decades, peripheral nations attempting to promote themselves internationally appear to focus more on mass culture, sports, cinema or the visual arts rather than on literature. Perhaps this was always so. Certainly, Chinese, Iranian or Turkish cinema, Korean tv series, pop music and cinema, Bollywood, and Saudi and Emirati sports franchises seem to break through onto ‘the world stage’ with more visible impact than national literatures. Peter Vermeulen argues that several of the leading names elevated to become “world figures” in recent decades—Ferrante, Bolanõ, Knausgaard—were translated into English before French and consecrated through New York rather than Paris. Many other big names in the last several decades—Walcott, Heaney, Achebe, Ngȗgȋ, Pamuk, Murakami, Hamid, Adichie—either came through major US writing programs or became attached to such programs in later career. So, the center still holds and writers migrate there or rotate in and out of the US in considerable numbers.

    However, the most important thing to consider is that if the nature of the center has changed in the transition from London and Paris to New York, then what it would mean to challenge the US center may also have changed. Paris and London were the national capitals of rather compact medium-sized nation-states rather than cosmopolitan megacities. Their literary reputations were associated with old and illustrious French and English national literary traditions. Before the downsizing of their empires and the emergence of modernism, France and England made little attempt to cultivate multiracial or multinational imperial literatures. In the American phase of domination, contemporary literatures of the middlebrow or advanced sorts have moved much closer to the university for support and, as mentioned earlier, the decentralized US university system, other US cities and a complex economy of state and foundational supports all contribute to New York’s dominance. So, contemporary equivalents to the American or Irish modernist “sieges of London” that ran from Henry James and Wilde through Yeats and Shaw or Pound and Eliot may be less feasible today. Moreover, Casanova suggests that world-changing literary “revolutions” of the kind associated with Joyce or Beckett or Faulkner came only after “national revolts” or collective “national renaissances” in the periphery or semi-periphery had first laid the foundations and set new heights of ambition. Though nationalist sentiment seems on the rise in both the centers and peripheries of the world system, national literatures are not in favor with Western academies, universities, or awards systems. As James F. English has shown, these now favor more postnationalist and liberal multiculturalist globalist agendas. Perhaps the same is true for the higher-end literary production of the big English-Language publishing conglomerates. All that said, not everything is calm at the center. The influx of critics from the Global South and from East Asia into the US critical establishment is impactful. From the days of Said and Spivak, such critics have consistently challenged the complacency and insularity of the American university humanities. Émigré figures from the peripheries of the Global South may now function as something equivalent to the Henry Jameses or Bernard Shaws of their day. Meanwhile, the European Union is attempting, not with much success apparently, to find a conceptual basis for some reconstructed “European literature” and perhaps we can glimpse attempts to create a new East Asian literary system or force-field involving China, Japan, Korea and Taiwan. At the same time, as the US is becoming more deeply politically factionalized, the country is also becoming more bilingual. Some 54 million Americans now use Spanish as a first or second language of everyday communication. Some estimates suggest that somewhere between 20 and 25% of people in the New York metropolitan region speak Spanish at home. New media technologies may mean that Spanish speakers will not assimilate to English culture as earlier immigrant language groups did. Yet the American literary establishment and leading institutions of consecration remain mostly monolingually English and cultural administrations are now under as much pressure from right-wing conservatives or white supremacists as from external forces.

    Perhaps a better question might be to ask not what has changed at the center in the last thirty years but what it would actually take for a new literary center or capital to emerge. Would a new world political conjuncture be a precondition for such change? Would it require a several generations of writers across the world disaffected with the current American-centered literary system and its modes of valuation? A new world literary prize anchored in a foundation in China or India or somewhere in the Global South to compete with the Nobel Prize? An alternative institutional support system to the US university writing program, one that cultivated different conceptions of the “the writer” and new currencies of literary valuation? Even if a new world literary capital or center emerged it would coexist alongside the US-centered one for some extended time, and I suppose writers would navigate between the two.

    One of Casanova’s basic assumptions in The World Republic of Letters concerning the contemporary moment is that there is an ongoing convergence between elite literary publishing and commercial publishing, thus eroding an earlier distinction as theorized by Bourdieu between “art” and “money” or “high literature” and “commercial literature.”  In this view, the earlier modernist attempt to distinguish between aesthetic status or prestige and commercial value diminishes as corporate publishing increases its market influence globally in setting values and shaping careers.  Three is certainly strong evidence for such convergence and literary sociologists such as James English, Sarah Brouillette, and others, tend to support Casanova’s view to this extent at least. Nevertheless, there are, in my view, reasons to resist the idea of some totalizing convergence of value systems. After all, the universities, the Nobel Prize, the small independent literary presses, and the big publishing conglomerates don’t all trade in the same literary-value-currencies and to some extent they depend for their reproduction on differentiating their functions from each other. If the universities mainly taught writers like Stephen King, J. K. Rowling, Tom Clancy, or Danielle Steele, they would soon loose prestige.    Moreover, established tendencies can always generate backlashes and the dual economy of symbolic versus market valuation has certainly not collapsed. It would be interesting to speculate whether some new articulations of literary and aesthetic valuation that replicated neither those consecrated in the Soviet Union or the US during the Cold War era is conceivable in some future less Euro-American centered literary system. And of course there is always the possibility that in a capitalist world some new center might be even more, not less, market-driven than the current one. Therefore, the emergence of a new world center would be interesting only if it really offered some alternative to the current one.

    Overall, for now, rapid changes in technologies of literary transmission, media, and marketing and AI seem to be reconfiguring things with more consequence than any immediate international literary challenges. Yet the center is not stable even in the center. There are not many signs of dramatic new energies in the old literary capitals or of imminent contestations from the rising great literary powers but change often seems to proceed slowly or not at all and then catapults by sudden leaps. As Casanova suggests, it is far more common for writers from the dominated and peripheral cultures to assimilate or largely conform to the dominant metropolitan literary norms and fashions than to do otherwise. Revolts and revolutions, to use her terms, are much less frequent. So it was ever, so it is still. However, the rebellions, even if rarer, are more exciting and consequential for change. There is the old Hemingway joke: How did you go bankrupt? Gradually, then suddenly. Perhaps the declines of the dominant capitals and circuits follow a similar tempo.  Throughout the nineteenth century, London, England and Great Britain remained free from invasion. The only French military boots that landed on United Kingdom territory in the Napoleonic wars did so in Ireland and the English soon repulsed these expeditions. Paris, in contrast, was rocked by repeated domestic uprisings, putsches, and German invasions. Parisian instability and turbulence probably contributed to the rise of the French avant-gardes and to the radicalism of French intellectual and literary innovation. London remained more stable and more artistically conservative. New York and the US’s domestic stability—quite often repressively enforced—have contributed significantly to American cultural hegemony.  However, while stability may help sustain hegemony in the arts, it may also in time corrode it. Nothing lasts forever. The sheer magnitude of American military power might, as Arrighi allows, maintain American domination of the international world system for a long time. But there is no reason to believe that even if this is the case that American literary or cultural power can be sustained in that manner. Domination is not hegemony. Sparta was not Athens. Hannibal did not conquer Rome but it fell anyway. New York and London are not enemy but fraternal cities, yet there is no doubt which of the two has mattered more to global culture and the arts since World War II.

    Writing in a time of counter-revolutionary success, Percy Shelly penned ‘England in 1918,’ which ends:

                                            A people starved and stabbed in th’ untilled field;

    An army, whom liberticide and prey

    Makes as a two-edged sword to all who wield;

    Golden and sanguine laws which tempt and slay;

    Religion Christless, Godless—a book sealed;

    A senate, Time’s worst statute, unrepealed—

    Are graves from which a glorious Phantom may

    Burst, to illumine our tempestuous day.

    The rapid revolutionary change imagined here did not come in England. Despite Chartism and continuous domestic class agitation, no revolutionary “Phantom”’ appeared to “burst” through there (though the “specter of communism” was announced in London thirty years later in 1848 in The Communist Manifesto). As we know, change came anyway, not only in the form of domestic “long revolutions” but also in unexpected ways from dramatic developments in England’s imperial peripheries.

    Christian Thorne is co-editor of boundary 2 and the author, most recently, of Deconstruction is America. He teaches in the English department at Williams College.

    Joe Cleary is professor of English at Yale and author of Modern, Empire, World Literature and The Irish Expatriate Novel in Late Capitalist Globalization.

  • Tobias Keiling and Ian Alexander Moore–Spoiling the Party? Heidegger’s Lectures on Trakl at Spa Bühlerhöhe

    Tobias Keiling and Ian Alexander Moore–Spoiling the Party? Heidegger’s Lectures on Trakl at Spa Bühlerhöhe

    It all began with plans for a birthday party.[1] Gerhard Stroomann, chief physician and charismatic leader of the posh spa resort and sanitarium Bühlerhöhe (imagine Thomas Mann’s character Hofrat Behrens, transplanted to a postwar “magic mountain” in the Black Forest) would be turning sixty-five in 1952, and he wanted to celebrate it with a weekend of events devoted to his beloved poet Georg Trakl. Even more, he wanted to hear the philosopher Martin Heidegger speak about the poet. Heidegger had already given a few lectures at the spa while he was still prohibited from teaching at the university, including one on language under the guise of a commentary on Trakl’s poem “A Winter Evening.” Although irritated by the overeager, elite milieu of the luxury retreat—“it was,” as one eyewitness reported about the event, “very highbrow, […] teeming with counts and princesses, a bit snobbish”[2]—Heidegger accepted Stroomann’s invitation.

    The “Trakl-Celebration” featured readings of Trakl’s work by several authors (including the “conservative revolutionary” Friedrich Georg Jünger, brother of Ernst Jünger). It also marked the start of a lasting friendship between Heidegger and Trakl’s former patron Ludwig von Ficker. Von Ficker’s extemporaneous speech at the event, which moved Heidegger to tears, recounted the collapse and suicide of the twenty-seven-year-old poet, who had been traumatized by his experiences in a field hospital after the gruesome battle of Gródek in the early days of World War I. Yet it was Heidegger’s own lecture, which was published shortly after the celebration in the influential postwar intellectual periodical Merkur, that would become a touchstone for almost all Trakl-scholarship since. In his lecture, Heidegger presented Trakl as a redemptive successor to Hölderlin, the putative poet of the German language. However, while it is true that, as Thomas Mann’s son Klaus once wrote, Trakl “picked up the lyre that Hölderlin had let sink down,”[3] it is difficult, at first blush, to understand how, of all people, Trakl—the drug-addled, Austrian expressionist in love with decay and obsessed with his sister—could become for Heidegger the next “poet of the Germans”[4] and take on the role of savior of the German people and indeed of the entire Occident.

    ***

    This is just one of the contradictions bound up with Bühlerhöhe. The former spa and luxury hotel, located in the northern Black Forest at an altitude of 800 meters near the town of Bühl, was designed by the architect Wilhelm Kreis in the early 1910s as a tribute to Kaiser Wilhelm II. The founder of the institution was Hertha Isenbart (née Schottländer), who wanted to honor her deceased second husband, a major general, by establishing a luxurious convalescent home for officers of the imperial army. Although the adjacent sanatorium could begin accepting patients already in 1913, the main building, due to the onset of war, never served the function for which Isenbart had intended it. This, and the financial ruin her ambitious project caused her, prompted her to take her own life in 1918.

    In the 1920s, the main building was transformed into a successful spa resort. Stroomann, enthusiastic about this “monument” in the “fairyland” of the Black Forest,[5] became one of the first doctors in residence and soon rose to the position of head physician in 1929. He was to remain at Bühlerhöhe for more than three decades, treating prominent figures from politics, art, and culture who traveled there not only for medical reasons but also for recreation. Among them were politicians from various parties of the Weimar Republic, such as Gustav Stresemann, Heinrich Brüning, and Hermann Müller. In 1933, Adolf Hitler and Joseph Goebbels met there. Other guests at the spa included Georgy Chicherin, the first foreign minister of the Soviet Union, Nobel Prize winners Carl Bosch and Werner Heisenberg, and actors Gustav Gründgens and Werner Krauß. In the 1950s it was the favorite vacation destination of Konrad Adenauer, then the first Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany.

    During the Allied occupation, French soldiers were billeted at Bühlerhöhe. It reopened in March 1949. Just three months later, Stroomann inaugurated a celebrated lecture series at the spa under the title “Wednesday-Evenings,” which would bring many well-known intellectuals and artists to the Black Forest and make Bühlerhöhe synonymous with a place of retreat and discourse for the elite of the young Federal Republic. The “Wednesday-Evenings” also offered a stage for the most famous and controversial German philosopher: Martin Heidegger. In 1933–1934, as Rector of the University of Freiburg, Heidegger had been involved in the National Socialist seizure of power. A denazification committee accordingly banned him from teaching in 1945. Although the ban was lifted in 1949, Heidegger was not able to lecture at the university again until 1951, after he had been granted emeritus status. He therefore sought out other forums in the meantime. He first found them in the elitist “Bremen Club,” where in 1949 he gave a long four-part lecture entitled “Insight into That Which Is” (later known as the “Bremen Lectures”). In a letter to the poet Gottfried Benn, a friend from Bremen tells him what sort of people went to listen to the philosopher there:

    Heidegger was met by a social class that did not exist in such a compact majority in the university towns, the towns of civil servants, or even at Bühlerhöhe: major businessmen, overseas specialists, shipping and shipyard directors—all people for whom a famous thinker is a mythical creature or a demigod.[6]

    ***

    The Black Forest spa was nevertheless attractive enough for Heidegger to repeat his Bremen lecture at Bühlerhöhe in March 1950. Here, too, Heidegger’s performance was a complete success. As Stroomann reports in his memoirs,

    each time there was the utterly exceptional excitement with which people inundated his lecture, his appearance at the lectern, as with no other contemporary figure. … [W]ho can shut themselves off from the prying force of his thinking and knowledge, which becomes evident in a newly creative way with every word: that there are still undiscovered sources? Our Wednesday-Evenings owe so much to him![7]

    To others the lectures seemed scandalous. The philosopher Jürgen Habermas, who had caused a sensation in 1953 with a critical review of Heidegger’s Introduction to Metaphysics, wrote six years later that the “most devoted” of Heidegger’s followers were gathering in places outside the university:

    These small circles, sometimes formed into sects, are scattered across the country and difficult to get an overview of. In one respect they befit the appearance of a thinker who avoids the conferences of his professional colleagues and prefers to face the councils of lay brothers. Among them are the captains of industry who have already achieved proverbial fame seeking relaxation at Bühlerhöhe. Perhaps here, in these charming attempts to interest managers in “field paths,” we have the other side of Heidegger’s contact with reality, the one that is, so to speak, opposite to Being. Detractors see in all this a mysticism meshed with a scam.[8]

    Habermas is right to say that Heidegger was interested in bringing his thought to an influential audience and that, to a certain extent, he ingratiated himself. But what made Heidegger attractive to the “managers” becomes clear only when one works out what Heidegger hardly mentions in his published texts and what Habermas fails to grasp with his criticism of Heidegger’s “scam.” The “Wednesday-Evenings,” whose ideology Heidegger and his style of thinking were representative of, were the attempt of an elite group to find orientation and to work through the events of World War II and its own complicity. These individuals believed themselves to be intellectually and spiritually damaged. Stroomann thought his lecture series could go a long way toward healing them. As he wrote on the invitation to “Insight into That Which Is,” connecting the series’ conversational-therapeutic function with the myth of the post-Nazi “Zero Hour”:

    Everything is a beginning. Anything can arise. Nothing must be undertaken, let alone organized. But we must make progress. Conversation must be enabled in a better way. People must be able to get closer.[9]

    However, if we are to believe the polemical report published in the magazine Der Spiegel, there was no real conversation after Heidegger’s lecture. Heidegger rebuffed questions about human freedom. He castigated a flattering question about the significance of philosophy for the public as a “typical relapse into enframing [Gestell].” To another question, the reporter only says that “Heidegger’s expansive answer gave ample opportunity to return to the solemn silence of the lecture. Then the spell was broken. Outside on the terrace there was sunshine and coffee and cake.”[10]

    The content of Heidegger’s lecture fits into this context of a failed—perhaps never seriously intended—conversation. “Insight into That Which Is” responds to the need for self-assurance by questioning the meaning and possibility of any conscious self-understanding. Heidegger goes all the way back to ancient philosophy to paint a picture of modernity in which technological processes threaten genuine philosophizing, true speech, and human agency in equal measure. In this way, he relieves his audience of personal responsibility for the past. This is particularly clear in the much-quoted passage in which he refers to the Holocaust and to the World War that had just ended—a passage that he removed from the published version of his lecture in 1954. Heidegger considers the Shoah and technological organization to be of essentially equal rank: “Agriculture is now a mechanized food industry, in essence the same as the production of corpses in the gas chambers and extermination camps.”[11] As though nothing could be done about it.

    But Heidegger not only offers to replace responsibility with fate. His lecture also responds to the need for consolation and orientation, not, however, with an appeal to therapeutic conversation, but with an abstract reference to a verse from Hölderlin’s poem “Patmos”: where there is danger—i.e., in Heidegger’s eyes, the technological thinking of modernity—the saving power also grows. Hölderlin was also at the center of Heidegger’s second contribution to the “Wednesday-Evenings,” the lecture “… Poetically Man Dwells ….” The promise of consolation becomes most apparent at the end of this lecture, when Heidegger quotes one of Hölderlin’s late poems in its entirety in order to sketch “‘the life of man’” as “a ‘dwelling life’”:

    des Himmels Höhe glänzet

    Den Menschen dann, wie Bäume Blüth’ umkränzet.

    heaven’s radiant height

    Crowns man, as blossoms crown the trees, with light.[12]

    If Heidegger’s appearances at Bühlerhöhe are indeed characterized by this combination of psychological repression, exculpation through theory, and poetic consolation, then his philosophy reentered the public arena in a manner that is eerily reminiscent of his own biography. Heidegger suffered a mental breakdown in December 1945 and underwent treatment in Schloss Hausbaden, a private psychiatric clinic near Badenweiler. His doctor Victor von Gebsattel provided talk therapy as a means to “Christian serenity [Gelassenheit],” i.e., “the blessed readiness to accept everything as it comes, including pain, disappointment, and above all death,” as von Gebsattel put it in a short book published during the war.[13] In a letter sent from the clinic, Heidegger composed a variation on this theme, in which he makes the sort of healing that his audience was seeking and that Stroomann and von Gebsattel aimed to provide dependent on “whether the dwelling human being is again touched by Being as what is whole and healing, & disaster does not lapse into a mere meaninglessness to be ignored ‘once the war is over.’”[14]

    This interpretation of psychological suffering as the result of an event—whether associated with the promise of bliss or healing through Being—is similar to what fascinated Stroomann about Trakl. In one of his many letters to von Ficker, Stroomann explains why I am summoning the apparition of Georg Trakl: “on a harrowing mission, he signifies, for our generation and for the future, the poetic [das Dichterische], with which, in my view (the view of a physician), humanity, sick humanity, must be permeated”.[15]

    Stroomann was not concerned with the occasional prospect of reconciliation in Trakl’s poetry, regardless of whether one interprets it in Christian terms or, like Heidegger, as another beginning in the history of Being, i.e., as a sign of an epochal break in the deep history of human thought and action. What Stroomann admired was rather Trakl’s ability to maintain spirit and poise (von Gebsattel would have said “serenity”) in the face of the madness of the First World War. In a postcard to Benn, Stroomann explains that Trakl was for him “the phenomenon in which even schizothymia and toxicomania,” unlike in Hölderlin,

    did not break the form. […] Probably Ludwig v. Ficker, certainly Horwitz, and various literary figures call Trakl a Christian poet and make his “reaching into the abyss” a matter of guilt and atonement and grace. I am confronted with a phenomenon of form, the apparition of a biological exception.[16]

    Heidegger, from whose lecture “… Poetically Man Dwells …” Stroomann took the formulation that Trakl’s poetry reaches into the abyss, would have nevertheless rejected Stroomann’s medical interpretation. Yet he shared Stroomann’s opinion that Trakl’s resilience after two world wars was of special importance for the Germans. In a letter to Stroomann, Heidegger even identifies with Trakl to the extent that the latter is the “poet of our generation.”[17] In his philosophy, however, Heidegger does not interpret Trakl’s resilience as the ability of a psychic life to maintain its form. Rather, it is language itself that, as an overarching context, promises to restore the meaning that Heidegger, like his audience, believes to have been lost.

    Heidegger went on to develop these thoughts for a celebration that Stroomann organized in 1950 in memory of the writer and literary scholar Max Kommerell. Heidegger did so by way of a close, idiosyncratic reading of Trakl’s poem “A Winter Evening.” The key verses of this poem clearly refer to Christian salvation:

    Wanderer tritt still herein;

    Schmerz versteinerte die Schwelle.

    Da erglänzt in reiner Helle

    Auf dem Tische Brot und Wein.[18]

     

    Wanderer, step in so still;

    Pain has petrified the threshold.

    Shining there in purest brightness

    On the table bread and wine.

    Yet Heidegger rejects this interpretation. Instead, Trakl’s poem becomes an occasion to articulate the idea that meaning is established in the happening of language itself. Fundamentally, it is not we who speak, nor even the poet; instead, “language speaks.”[19]

    It did not go unnoticed that this idea was also a means of relief from responsibility, since it undermined any need for active communication. In a newspaper article about the Kommerell-memorial at Bühlerhöhe, Adolf Frisé, the later editor of Robert Musil’s literary work, writes that Heidegger’s self-referential language runs the risk of “monologuing, of becoming a thinking which spins about in its own head.” This may well suit those who flocked to the “aseptic and poison-free air up there” and took refuge in “the deceptive security in social conventions that have become problematic.” But this “encapsulation” is also an expression of a need to be told what to think rather than to think for oneself: “Like hardly any other people, we [Germans] tend to absolutize an intellectual-spiritual [geistige] figure without criticism or restraint; Stefan George was an example of this. Today, it looks like Heidegger is the next in line.”[20] Heidegger never gave up on this idea of intellectual-spiritual leadership. On the contrary, in Heidegger’s lecture for the 1952 “Trakl-Celebration” at Bühlerhöhe, it takes on one of its most radical forms.

    ***

    This event in honor of Trakl, whose “vast lyrical substance and form” Stroomann described on the invitation as “expressing much decay and melancholy,”[21] is noteworthy as a problematic case of intellectual history not because of the introductory remarks of Trakl-biographer Eduard Lachmann, nor even because of von Ficker’s moving report about the poet’s final days, but because of Heidegger’s peculiar attempt to situate the entirety of Trakl’s poetry. Some of those present, including von Ficker, praised Heidegger’s lecture. It was, in von Ficker’s words, one of the “irruptions of light that matter today.”[22] Others were more skeptical. Benn refused Stroomann’s repeated invitations “to come to Heidegger.”[23] Ruth Horwitz, daughter of Trakl-editor Kurt Horwitz, considered “this kind of intellectual exchange to be dishonest: it dazzles, still more, it bluffs.”[24] Literary critic Walter Muschg called Heidegger’s interpretation “abracadabra” and “an assassination attempt on the German language.”[25] And although Hannah Arendt defended Heidegger’s attempts to survey the “space of the unsayable,” “from which and for whose sake the whole work emerged and was organized,” she also noted that,

    in the process, of course, the ‘interpreter’ can become more important than what he ‘interprets’; then, but only then, does everything turn ‘violent,’ simply because, instead of making the work come to life, he shatters it. It seems to me that this happened to [Heidegger] with Trakl.[26]

    One year after the celebration, even Stroomann would distance himself from Heidegger, at least when communicating with political scientist and Heidegger-critic Dolf Sternberger: “one thing is now certain to me: the Germans’ vulnerability to the magus.”[27]

    If one reads Heidegger’s Trakl-lecture with these critiques in mind, it will not be difficult to see what caused such offense. Although the explicit subject of the “Trakl-Celebration,” and despite Heidegger’s empathetic reaction to von Ficker’s speech, Trakl’s person disappears behind what Heidegger calls his Gedicht, which is less an individual “poem” than the gathering of a complex body of work around a single catchword. This reading is anticipated by what Heidegger says about his procedure of Erörterung: it is not about “interpretation,” “discussion,” or “exchange,” but about the condensation of language and the concentration of the poetic work into a single point. For Heidegger, the fact that an Erörterung considers the Ort or “place” of the poetry and that Ort in Old High German means the tip of a spear is argument enough to be able to bundle and localize Trakl’s poetry as a whole. The place of Trakl’s poetry, according to Heidegger, is apartness, or a state of perpetual departure (Abgeschiedenheit). The final stanzas of Trakl’s “Autumnal Soul” give us a sense for how Heidegger arrived at this thought:

    Bald entgleitet Fisch und Wild.

    Blaue Seele, dunkles Wandern

    Schied uns bald von Lieben, Andern.

    Abend wechselt Sinn und Bild.

     

    Rechten Lebens Brot und Wein,

    Gott in deine milden Hände

    Legt der Mensch das dunkle Ende,

    Alle Schuld und rote Pein.[28]

     

    Fish and game soon slip away.

    Blue soul, darksome wand’ring, soon did

    Sever us from loved ones, others.

    Evening changes sense and image.

     

    Bread and wine of proper living,

    God, into your mild hands

    Layeth man the darksome ending,

    All the guilt and scarlet torment.

    Although here, too, there are allusions to the Christian hope of redemption, Heidegger understands the departure of the soul not as a flight toward heaven, but as a return to the earth. Taking recourse once again to etymology, Heidegger interprets the word fremd in Trakl’s famous phrase Es ist die Seele ein Fremdes auf Erden[29] not as “foreign” or “strange,” but as “on the way …,” that is, in line with the Old High German fram. The soul is not “something strange on earth,” as anyone who reads the German today would expect. It is “headed toward the earth.” “The soul,” in Heidegger’s gloss, “only seeks the earth; it does not flee from it.”[30] As Heidegger explained during a question-and-answer period at Bühlerhöhe the day after his lecture, the final stanza of “Autumn Soul” thus pertains to the “loved ones” and “others” who are in search of Christian transcendence, not to the earthbound Fremdling who is in the process of severing himself from them.[31]

    Es ist die Seele ein Fremdes auf Erden—Heidegger repeats this verse nine times in his lecture, thereby turning it into an incantation that expresses the distance of its addressees from the present and enlists them in the movement he is describing. This movement does not lead to a specific destination; rather, the departure and the journey are themselves transformed into a new homeland. Heidegger violently pieces together an interpretation from quite different poems. In this interpretation, “Trakl’s poetry” becomes the “song of the soul” that no longer strives for a Beyond, but “is only just about to gain the earth by its wandering, the earth that is the stiller home of the homecoming people [Geschlecht].”[32] Incomprehensibility and remoteness from reality are precisely what makes this idea attractive: “Dreamy romanticism, at the fringe of the technically-economically oriented world of modern mass existence? Or—is it the clear knowledge of the ‘madman’ [‘Wahnsinniger’] who sees and senses [sinnt] other things than the reporters of the latest news”?[33] In Trakl’s poem “Springtime of the Soul,” the line about the soul’s strangeness on (or movement toward) the earth is followed by the words:

    Geistlich dämmert

    Bläue über dem verhauenen Wald.[34]

    Spiritually dawns

    blueness over the thrashed forest.

    Heidegger takes this as an occasion to bring the “clear knowledge of the madman” together with that overdetermined and enigmatic concept which has been claimed again and again for what cannot be lost: Geist. Heidegger inscribes himself in a complex conceptual history when, in the last third of his lecture, he takes “spirit” as the key word for the movement of the soul.

    Among the motifs that Heidegger associates with spirit, three stand out. First, the motif of a unity that overcomes an injured separation; for only in “wandering through the spiritual night” does the “simple oneness of pain’s converse character come into pure play.”[35] Second, the fact that Trakl speaks of spiritual night and spiritual twilight allows Heidegger to reinterpret the topos of departure toward the Occident or ‘Land of Evening’ (Abend-Land) as a spiritual home and to connect it with Friedrich Nietzsche’s apotheosis of descent: “The land of evening concealed in apartness does not go under, but remains, awaiting those who will dwell in it as the land of descent into the spiritual night.”[36] Third, “‘the spirit of one who died early,’”[37] as Heidegger says in the words of another Trakl poem, is in oblique but unmistakable reference to Trakl and to all those who were lost in the two world wars. Instead of the redemption and the dawn of resurrection, which the Christian metaphors suggest, Heidegger offers the promise of twilight, which alone will overcome loss and heal pain, if only we learn to inhabit it. In the third year after the founding of the Federal Republic of Germany, Heidegger makes Trakl “the poet of the yet concealed evening land”[38]—a poet who promises neither awakening to a new future nor coming clean with the past in which “those who died early” met their demise. Trakl’s “apartness,” his exemplary resilience, contains all the consolation Heidegger and his audience may hope for.

    ***

    It was on account of this promise that Jacques Derrida situated Heidegger’s lecture for the Trakl-Celebration in the history of the “national humanism”[39] of German philosophy and interpreted it as the consummation of the idea that the Germanic should serve as the exemplar of the Occident or even of humanity as such. Heidegger hears in Trakl’s poetry the appeal to a “certain Germany,” which is supposed to become the place of the true Occident.[40] For those who are familiar with Heidegger’s reading of Hölderlin during the period of National Socialism—a reading that even Kommerell could not help calling a “train wreck” (albeit a “productive” one)[41]—it should come as little surprise that Heidegger was still looking for a poetic guide after the war. For he wanted to be able to present himself not just as a leader, but as someone who was likewise being led. The Trakl-Celebration shows, in any case, that Heidegger, like many of the conservative elite who went to hear him lecture on that weekend in October 1952, could not manage after the war without a poeta vates or even without a “poet as leader” (to recall the title of a controversial product of the George Circle penned in 1928).[42] Reading Heidegger on Trakl allows us to make sense of what the survivors of his generation had repressed rather than overcome. Stroomann establishes this connection between the two world wars in an invitation to a “Wednesday-Evening” poetry reading that Heidegger would introduce in February 1952. Stroomann explains his choice of topic as follows:

    We wish to begin with the topic: ‘New Poetry.’ Whoever experienced the redevelopment of spirit after the first war will be disconcerted by how little of the poetic has emerged from the chaos this time. “Yet,” as Hölderlin’s words admonish, “what remains, the poets establish.”[43]

    ***

    Yet Trakl and his work do not readily lend themselves to this appropriation. If we are to believe later reports, during the celebration at Bühlerhöhe a question made the rounds as to whether Trakl, if he should come back from the dead, would be granted entry into the illustrious event. Likely not, we answer. But it is not surprising that the question arose. It illustrates the mixture of foreignness and fascination that the audience associated with Trakl. The comforting, if violent, appropriation of the poet’s work responds to a need, but it also avoids accountability and moral judgment, only to half-consciously turn it into a joke.

    Would Trakl have accepted the role he was given in 1952? This is not to be assumed, either. In 1914, Trakl gave von Ficker a slip of paper on which he had written: “Feeling in the moments of death-like being: all humans are worthy of love. Awaking, you feel the bitterness of the world; therein is all your unresolved guilt; your poem an imperfect atonement,” only to add verbally: “But of course no poem can atone for an iniquity.” It is hard to imagine that Trakl would have been allowed to utter these words if he had actually been present at the celebration dedicated to him.

    In any case, things did not end well with the spa resort either. Stroomann, the “intellectual-spiritual mediator” who made Bühlerhöhe a “place of trust,” died in 1957. “If,” as his obituary in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung continues, “one may speak of a class of leaders [Führerschicht] in our country, for decades much of it passed under the unmistakable eyes of this man.”[44] The spa business continued after Stroomann’s death until 1986, at which point it was converted into a luxury hotel. The clinic in the adjacent building is still in operation today. However, the hotel closed in 2010, and the main building has been vacant ever since. Occasionally, it serves as a backdrop for movies. Otherwise, what lives on here is only a spirit from another time.

    Tobias Keiling is Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of Warwick. He is the author of Seinsgeschichte und phänomenologischer Realismus: Eine Interpretation und Kritik von Heideggers Spätphilosophie [The History of Being and Phenomenological Realism: An Interpretation and Critique of Heidegger’s Later Philosophy] (2015).

    Ian Alexander Moore is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Loyola Marymount University. He is the author of Eckhart, Heidegger, and the Imperative of Releasement (2019) and Dialogue on the Threshold: Heidegger and Trakl (2022).

    [1] This text is a slightly modified translation, prepared by the authors, of Tobias Keiling and Ian Alexander Moore, Heidegger (und Trakl) auf der Bühlerhöhe (Marbach am Neckar: Deutsche Schillergesellschaft, 2023).

    [2] Georg Britting, Briefe an Georg Jung 1943 bis 1963, ed. Georg-Britting-Stiftung (Höhenmoos: Gesellschaft zur Förderung der Werke Georg Brittings, 2009), 211. Here and below, translations for which an English edition is not supplied in a footnote are by us.

    [3] Der Wendepunkt: Ein Lebensbericht (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer, 1963), 104.

    [4] Martin Heidegger, Hölderlin’s Hymns “Germania” and “The Rhine,” trans. William McNeill and Julia Ireland (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2014), 195, 201.

    [5] Die Geschichte der Bühlerhöhe 1913–1993 (Bühl: Schlosshotel Bühlerhöhe, 1993), 60.

    [6] In Gottfried Benn, Briefe an F.W. Oelze 1950–1956, ed. Harald Steinhagen and Jürgen Schröder (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer, 1982), 342.

    [7] Gerhard Stroomann, Aus meinem roten Notizbuch: Ein Leben als Arzt auf der Bühlerhöhe, 2nd edition, ed. Heinrich W. Petzet (Frankfurt: Societäts-Verlag, 1960), 207.

    [8] Jürgen Habermas, “Martin Heidegger: On the Publication of Lectures from the Year 1935,” trans. Dale Ponikvar, Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal 6, no. 2 (Fall 1977): 164–65; translation modified.

    [9] Deutsches Literaturarchiv Marbach, HS.1989.0010.07111.

    [10] “Heidegger: Rückfall ins Gestell,” Der Spiegel, April 6, 1950.

    [11] Martin Heidegger, Bremen and Freiburg Lectures: Insight Into That Which Is and Basic Principles of Thinking, trans. Andrew J. Mitchell (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2013), 27.

    [12] Cited in Martin Heidegger, “… Poetically Man Dwells …,” in Poetry, Language, Thought, trans. Albert Hofstadter (New York: Perennial, 2001), 227.

    [13] Viktor Emil von Gebsattel, Von der christlichen Gelassenheit (Würzburg: Werkbund-Verlag, 1940), 5.

    [14] Martin Heidegger, Letters to His Wife 1915–1970, trans. R. D. V. Glasgow (Cambridge: Polity, 2008), 197.

    [15] Nachlass Ludwig von Ficker, Forschungsinstitut Brenner-Archiv, 041-048-025-006, http://edition.ficker-gesamtbriefwechsel.net/#/briefe/nach-partnerinnen/5918a905-70df-4122-9b6c-dff94fa96147.

    [16] Deutsches Literaturarchiv Marbach, 86.9760/4.

    [17] As reported in a letter from Stroomann to von Ficker, in Nachlass Ludwig von Ficker, 041-048-025-001, http://edition.ficker-gesamtbriefwechsel.net/#/briefe/nach-partnerinnen/eb9e7a4c-d896-4b88-a6d3-0885d1960072.

    [18] Georg Trakl, Dichtungen und Briefe: Historisch-kritische Ausgabe, ed. Walther Killy and Hans Szklenar, Vol. 1., 3rd edition (Salzburg: Otto Müller, 1974), 57.

    [19] Martin Heidegger, “Language,” in Poetry, Language, Thought, 207.

    [20] Adolf Frisé, Spiegelungen: Berichte, Kommentare, Texte 1933–1998 (Bern: Peter Lang, 2000), 126–27.

    [21] Nachlass Ludwig von Ficker, 48-25-5.

    [22] Ludwig von Ficker, Briefwechsel 1940 –1967, ed. Martin Alber et al. (Innsbruck: Haymon, 1996), 529.

    [23] Benn, Briefe an F.W. Oelze 1950–1956, 142.

    [24] In von Ficker, Briefwechsel 1940–1967, 244.

    [25] Walter Muschg, Die Zerstörung der deutschen Literatur, 3rd edition (Bern: Francke, 1958), 223.

    [26] In Hannah Arendt and Martin Heidegger, Letters, 1925–1975, trans. Andrew Shields (Orlando: Harcourt, 2004), 259–60.

    [27] Deutsches Literaturarchiv Marbach, 1989.0010.07111.

    [28] Trakl, Dichtungen und Briefe, 60.

    [29] Ibid., 78.

    [30] Martin Heidegger, “Language in the Poem: A Discussion on Georg Trakl’s Poetic Work,” in On the Way to Language, trans. Peter D. Hertz (New York: Harper and Row, 1971), 163.

    [31] “Martin Heidegger deutet Georg Trakl. Bühlerhöhe am 4. Oktober 1952,” Forschungsinstitut Brenner-Archiv, 65/33–1, p. 17.

    [32] Heidegger, “Language in the Poem,” 196; translation modified.

    [33] Ibid., 196–97.

    [34] Trakl, Dichtungen und Briefe, 78.

    [35] Heidegger, “Language in the Poem,” 189; translation modified.

    [36] Ibid., 194; translation modified.

    [37] Ibid., 185; translation modified.

    [38] Ibid., 197.

    [39] Jacques Derrida, “Onto-Theology of National Humanism (Prolegomena to a Hypothesis),” Oxford Literary Review 14, no. 1 (1992): 3–23.

    [40] Jacques Derrida, Geschlecht III: Sex, Race, Nation, Humanity, trans. Katie Chenoweth and Rodrigo Therezo (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2020), 136–37.

    [41] Max Kommerell, Briefe und Aufzeichnungen 1919–1944, ed. Inge Jens (Olten: Walter, 1967), 403.

    [42] Max Kommerell, Der Dichter als Führer in der deutschen Klassik (Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 1928).

    [43] Deutsches Literaturarchiv Marbach, 23795IV.

    [44] Friedrich Sieburg, “Unter den Tannen von Bühlerhöhe.” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (April 15, 1957), 2.

  • Alex Gourevitch—Become the Gods: A Response to Jensen Suther

    Alex Gourevitch—Become the Gods: A Response to Jensen Suther

    This article is a response to a text by Jensen Suther that was published as part of the b2o review‘s “Finance and Fiction” dossier

    As is too often the case, when I agree with ninety percent of an argument, I spend all my time on the ten percent with which I disagree. I think learning to love the rich, even those as loathsome as the Roys, is a way to understanding the dynamic of love and domination in Succession. But there is a question of how to think about the personal and the impersonal in the show. We can get there indirectly, by way of comparison. I just read Thomas Mann’s Buddenbrooks and was talking to a friend about the comparison between Buddenbrooks and Succession. Two great works about dynastic succession, but with very different narrative trajectories. The connection between Buddenbrooks and Succession is in the portrayal of patriarchal domination. The institutional fact of succession – who will inherit the family business? – allows that domination to have objective content. Domination is not just an accidental fact of personal psychology, of a father’s ability to morally terrorize or manipulate, but a continual and institutionally stabilized relation. Someone must succeed to the office once occupied by another. The child must succeed the father, not just as father, but also as leader of the enterprise. The power the father has over the child is to confer the title, by which the child becomes something more than mere biological continuity.

    In both Buddenbrooks and Succession, the domination appears at the personal level in the fact that the children fail to measure up to the paterfamilias. In Buddenbrooks, however, the children fail because of the spectral presence of the patriarch’s high moral virtue and its apparent connection to his economic success. The elder Buddenbrook, Johann, was a natural bourgeois. He lived a life of virtue without finding it mere subordination to duty. There is little sense that he had to stifle his basic impulses and inner vitality to the Protestant ethic. Instead he found it spiritually fulfilling, even nourishing. The second-generation Buddenbrooks, however, are inferior in their different ways. None can live as they naturally are. They each find themselves mentally and spiritually stifled, even physically crippled, by their duty to sustain the family in the image of their father’s sober, bourgeois propriety. The naturally impudent and daring daughter, Tony, slowly has the life crushed out of her by the failed attempts to be a good wife and good daughter. The more she tries to carry out her duties the more her life bends and shrinks, like an empty soda can slowly imploding under pressure. Christian, the middle-child, is decadent in mind and body, physically ailing away and economically dissolute: inconsistently employed and endlessly in debt. The eldest and natural successor, Thomas, has neither the will to adapt to the new business conditions nor the spiritual intensity to commit to being a lesser, but proper, businessman. Keeping the business alive means expanding it, but expanding it requires an enterprising spirit at odds with the decency and moderation that he mimics but does not feel. As the unsatisfied and bitter leader of the family enterprise, he is an unworthy successor who fails to sustain the life of his family: the business stagnates and declines while his son and sole heir dies. Buddenbrooks is, therefore, a novel about dynastic decay under a particular kind of social domination. The next generation’s lives are constrained by the unreachable moral example of the previous generation, in the context of a capitalist society that has turned more intensely competitive and, therefore, incompatible with bourgeois moral virtue. Were they to adapt to new conditions, they would violate the example of their father, but to hew to the family morality they must destroy their vitality.

    Succession, however, is not about the same kind of decay because there is no real evolution. Buddenbrooks stretches over three generations, while Succession is almost relentlessly temporally constipated. There is no slow decline from the moral glories of the founding and growth of the enterprise. We start at the peak and are held there for three and a half seasons during which nothing happens. Nothing happens because Logan won’t let “It” happen. Some complain that this temporal stagnation is all in the service of glamorizing the billionaire lifestyle in the guise of prestige TV. All we’re left with is endless shots of private jets, family helicopters, and exclusive residences. But the sclerosis is part of the show’s aesthetic integrity. Logan does not loom over his children by the force of his moral example, like Johann Buddenbrook. Instead – as Jensen observes – Logan sees and despises each of them. He refuses to let them love him.

    But it’s more than that. Logan uses the prospect of succession to ever further crush his children, playing each off the other to keep them all subordinate to him. The children are weak and grasping, not just because they cannot live up to his virtue, but because Logan himself has lost his way. His is a purposeless rule: winning for the sake of winning. “I fucking win!” he screams in the season 3 finale, when he has outmaneuvered his children. When his children ask him why he’s doing this, Logan can only say “because it fucking works.” The dynastic economic project is revealed for what it always was, an exercise in domination. But left with the evidence that his children don’t have the strength and guile to destroy him, he is left only with his will to power now turned inwards, on his own family.

    The reason that the show moves in place, as it were, is because there is still a dynamic tension at the core of Logan’s conflict with his children: the dynasty he created cannot be maintained. He cannot allow a succession to take place because it would mean there is someone worthy of the office. But Logan’s domination of his own family is so complete that there are only children grasping at an inheritance, not worthy of succession. This is not succession as decay, à la Buddenbrooks, but succession as self-annihilation. It is fitting that the only way for a succession to take place, for some kind of historical movement to take place, is Logan dying. It was that or Logan destroying the company by selling it, whichever came first. As it happens, Logan’s will outlives his body. The GoJo deal goes through, Matsson takes over, and the Roy children find themselves outmaneuvered by each other. Roman, ever the truth-teller of the show, explains the result to Kendall: “We are bullshit…You are bullshit, I am bullshit, she is bullshit. It’s all fucking bullshit.” They are bullshit because, though willing to sacrifice each other for their ambition, they are never willing to go all the way, never even quite sure whether they want to succeed their father or want his approval. Shiv’s betrayal, which seals the sale to GoJo, is just the final proof. Matsson was the worthy successor because he was a killer. Even the Roy children know it. They repeatedly accuse Matsson of having killed their father by forcing Logan onto the plane in which he died his ignominious death. It is never clear whether they are more upset at their father’s death or at the dominance Matsson establishes by being responsible for Logan’s end.

    Now I agree that one way to understand Succession is that it is not just a timeless tale of dynastic succession, but one in which that succession is disciplined by its social form: a special kind of social domination. This makes many of the popular comparisons inapt. Some have likened Succession to King Lear. It seems obvious. An increasingly unhinged, aging father tests the love of his three children by rules that make expression of that love impossible. Goneril and Regan’s praise for their father is insincere, not because we know their inner motives, but because of the structure imposed on their speech by Lear. By making their words a test of their worthiness to inherit part of the kingdom, he makes their voice his. Regardless of whether they mean what they say, they cannot mean it. The more they speak, the less they can say. Again, this is not about their true motives but about the conditions under which they speak, conditions determined by their father, who has bound expressions of love to inheritance. In Succession, Roman is the ultimate Goneril-Regan. When Roman pleads with his father, “don’t do this,” in the season 3 finale, Logan asks Roman what he has left. Roman’s pathetic “I don’t know…love?” is so hopeless that it is almost sincere, but also absurd. Love has as little place in a boardroom battle as when inheriting the kingdom. But there is no other conversation Logan understands, no other relation Logan can accept than the struggle to over-power others. The Cordelia option is the one the children left behind at the beginning of season 4: leave the business so that they can be a family. But Cordelia’s silence is not purer. It is just the other side of the domination relationship: she can only express her love for her father by not expressing it. Only further proof that it is the dominator who makes love inexpressible.

    But the Lear comparison withers on further inspection. Lear’s madness is political. He divides the indivisible: a sovereign realm. He compounds the problem by then imagining he can choose his successors. The normal logic of succession, to which he refuses to submit, is that one child – the eldest – inherits it all, because that preserves the integrity of rule. Lear should have as little say as anyone else, yet he wants it all to depend on his will – one kingdom or many, that love should decide, and so on. He is subject to that impersonal political logic, yet wants it all to be personal. Logan Roy, however, is the patriarch of an altogether different enterprise: not the territorially-bound state but the globe-bestriding, multinational corporation. Not Leviathan but Behemoth.

    The universal drama of Succession is mediated by the drama of that social logic – not just of billionaires, but billionaire capitalists, constrained by board-members and shareholders, debt payments and stock prices, conglomerates and subsidiaries. That is why I think Jensen is right to point to capitalist forms of domination in particular. But is this a story about mute compulsion? Where even the very wealthy are as much slaves as everyone else? And where, therefore, we have to root for their love – love them – because it is the only human and emancipatory response to the crushing logic of accumulation?

    It’s true, there is a sense in which the characters are subject to a dynamic they cannot master and that they can only liberate themselves by escaping the social relations they are disciplined by. But I don’t think it’s primarily the silent logic of accumulation that constrains them.

    Now I can imagine a counterargument something like the following. If mute compulsion isn’t the fundamental constraint, then what is? Succession is not itself a timeless logic because it takes different forms. Isn’t that the point of distinguishing between Lear, Buddenbrooks and Succession? Logan’s purposeless rule, of winning for the sake of winning, is as Jensen put it “a late capitalist twist on Lear’s madness.” So Logan has not lost his way in some ethical sense. His is no mere intellectual error. His purposeless rule is an internalization of production for the sake of production, or what Marx called “nothing more than the rationalized motive and aim of the hoarder.”

    I don’t disagree, but there are limits to the mute compulsion reading of Succession. Mute compulsion is the impersonal form of social domination by capital. It is achieved through the discipline the market imposes externally on each of the actors. The clearest account of that domination we have is from volume 1 of Capital. The presentation of that domination as comprehensively impersonal requires assuming, as volume 1 does, that the paradigmatic form of ownership is one in which capital is dispersed across many capitalists. None are in any position to shape the market conditions that discipline them. They are price-takers, in modern parlance, because they are roughly equally situated. (While Marx does later show how capital naturally centralizes and concentrates, that is a natural development of the logic of accumulation that also modifies the nature of those constraints.) When capitalists are in that position vis-à-vis each other Marx does say they are just as much slaves as workers. They are slaves to capital because they are wholly subordinate to the logic of surplus-value extraction. Each particular intersubjective relation is subsumed by this wider social process: exchange-value rules use-value, value accumulation over love and friendship.

    If Succession is an expression of that, we would want it to show us those moments of external discipline, in which characters are forced to adopt the standpoint of capital. And we do sometimes see it. The debt situation in season 1, Stuy Hosseini, proxy battles, desperate attempts to go private, cratering stock prices, hostile takeover threats, the deal with Matsson. Whether the characters want to or not, there are moments when characters must consciously adopt the standpoint of the value-maximizing capitalist, or find themselves and their lives dissolved. This reaches its peak in the first episode of the final season, in the question of whether they will all just cash out. Why not take the billions and be free? Not only do they decide to stay, but never is Kendall prouder than the moment when he gives the successful speech to shareholders on the new value proposition ‘Living Plus.’ He doesn’t want money, he wants to increase value. Cashing out is something close to spiritual death for each of them. But notice one weakness here with the mute compulsion story – they really can cash out. They aren’t petty capitalists, who will go under, and return to the ranks of the working class or whatever. There is nothing really forcing them away from the route Connor takes – spend vast amounts of money on their own vanity projects.

    We might think there is a further form of domination, not external in the sense of market discipline, but social, in the sense of the form that all relations take. This is I think part of what Jensen is getting at. It is not a question of what they are forced to do, but how it is available for them to conceive themselves. Their psychology is already social. For instance, their conception of a family is as an empire not of property but of endlessly accumulating wealth. They can’t imagine the family bond without all being part of the company, making decisions together in the boardroom. They have no experience and no sense of love as its own, independent bond, because who they are as a family and who they are as a business, is inseparable. And that, itself, is product of the social form they are tied up in.

    Now I’m not rejecting that completely. But I don’t quite see the social form of the ‘succession’ as so impersonally capitalist. It is dynastic. The dynastic succession of a commercial empire, not just an ordinary capitalist business. Waystar is a corporate behemoth able to use its economic power to shape and alter markets and to use its political power to anoint or destroy presidents. The Logan family is not subject to the routine discipline of those markets the way, say, a local dry-cleaner or restauranteur or barber is. Succession is also an expression of human power and freedom from within the logic of capitalism. It is an all-too-human form of domination, in which the particular whims of a particular agent – primarily but not only the patriarchal figure – has its own independent existence. And this shapes the dynamic of familial succession. Logan is only willing to hand off to someone like him. The only worthy successor is someone who is equally or even more dominant. And his children routinely wonder what to do with their power. They even seem to celebrate impulsiveness and capriciousness, because they imagine themselves to be exercising Machiavellian virtú just like their father. There is in some sense too much slack, not enough mute compulsion and discipline, which is why they are constantly trying to will themselves into their father’s position. They can never make up their mind and the structure won’t make it up for them.

    So we might say that, while this is a very capitalist form of succession, it is not just a story about impersonal domination, but simultaneously about a highly personal form of domination because it takes place in our particular (Late? Postmodern? Financial?) capitalist society. There is so much wealth and so much market power that it appears like everything depends on the whim and caprice of the patriarch. And personal domination, in the sense of creating the world in one’s own, not just capital’s, image seems like an end in itself.

    That also explains why the trap, the structural logic of the show, is that succession is impossible. Logan has related to his family as to everyone else, as subjects to be manipulated, controlled, dominated – not just used. But those who submit are unsuited to replacing him. Since his children love him, they try to be what he admires – power-seeking, dominant, risk-takers. But they are not really in it to dominate, they are in it for love, so they continuously fail. And Logan, meanwhile, is in it to win. Again, I am not sure we can really get what’s going on with this, without appreciating that the social form of succession is an expression not just of the standard mute compulsion of capital, but of the dynastic form of neoliberal, multinational corporate capitalism. That kind of capitalism creates zones of discretion that add a very personal element to the domination the children experience. It makes the prize they struggle for that much more dramatic, makes Logan seem that much more god-like, and the self-aggrandizement of each not purely delusional or psychologically stunted.

    Which brings me to the politics of the show. Critics complained that we see almost no real people or any of the people doing the work. But that is the genius of the show. It happens in remote and inaccessible areas – private jets and helicopters, Caribbean villas and New York penthouses, Mediterranean yachts and Hampton estates. Even Connor’s private wedding boat has its own private room set aside for the siblings. Over time, the show’s hyper-attention to these exclusive forms of travel, leisure and business, is to make the drama into an Olympian power struggle among pagan gods. Those gods have all the familiar human weaknesses – they are vain and capricious, reckless and indifferent – but coupled to powers no ordinary human beings could have. They choose presidents and they get away with murder. A business (Vaulter) is gutted, whole floors of people unemployed, all because of a petty squabble between two brothers vying for their father’s approval in a boardroom. Or, perhaps the greatest superpower of all, they can just fly over hours-long snarls of plebeian traffic. The emptiness and sterility of most of the settings, the absence not just of anything dirty or even cluttering, but often of any ordinary people, is part of what enhances the sense that these are more than ordinary mortals. When the siblings show up in Sweden to negotiate with Matsson they do so on a literal mountaintop, like lesser Greek divinities locking horns with a Norse deity. Logan’s death was like the death of a Titan, the old gods giving way to the new.

    Some commentators claim that this hyper-stylization glorified the rich, but that is too shallow a reading. The unreachability of the characters, intensified by the remoteness of the settings, was a proper representation of social power in our society. Our capitalist economy is immensely productive and has generated fabulous capacities for social cooperation. But it has done so in a way that makes it seem like, were it not for some foreign power like an employer or financier, we would not cooperate in this social enterprise at all. These immense capacities to shape our material world and determine the rules of cooperation are concentrated in a small number of hands, over whom we exercise little control. We cannot even recognize their social power as our own. It is alien to us. And so it is best represented as the distant powers of a few people who, for that reason, seem more than human. The majority work or don’t work, rest or don’t rest, at their pleasure.

    If that world-shaping power is really a collective one, ours in the broadest national and international sense, then perhaps the real succession story is the one the show doesn’t tell. We are the disinherited. There is a brutal realism to Succession. Only the gods can hurt other gods. There is no Promethean moment. Nobody steals the Roy family’s fire, seizes their property, and brings their power down to earth. And that too is a truth, since nothing seems more remote these days than social transformation. In Greek mythology, the gods begin to die when the people stop worshipping them. In our time, the problem is not one of belief and worship but politics and action. So long as the vast majority does nothing to claim the power that is theirs, then it is not just Gregs all the way down, it is Matssons always on top. Yes, we should love the rich, but we should also want to become the gods. That would be the true succession.

    Alex Gourevitch is an associate professor of political science at Brown University. He is the author of From Slavery to the Cooperative Commonwealth: Labor and Republican Liberty in the Nineteenth Century, and is currently working on a book about strikes.