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  • David Fieni — ‘Hold to poetic knowledge without creating a fetish’, or How to Resist Disfiguring the Maghreb in Theory

    David Fieni — ‘Hold to poetic knowledge without creating a fetish’, or How to Resist Disfiguring the Maghreb in Theory

    This essay is part of a dossier on The Maghreb after Orientalism.

    by David Fieni

    In his free verse anti-manifesto from 1976, Class Warrior – Taoist Style, Abdelkebir Khatibi warns readers against the dangers of turning metaphor into an idée fixe, challenging them to “hold to poetic knowledge without creating a fetish” (2017: 17).  Such a formulation sums up one core impulse of Khatibi’s body of work, which activates the opaque force of language in the elaboration of a decolonial idiom that shutters back and forth between critique and poetics.  This injunction also offers a productive frame for understanding a central task of Edward Said’s Orientalism, namely the imperative of detailing the violence involved in the figuration of worldly experience.  Thinking through the legacy of Said’s groundbreaking study forty years after its publication, and particularly the book’s continued relevance both in the Maghreb and for critical work about the Maghreb, prompts us to ask how critique today can resist turning knowledge about the Maghreb – poetic or otherwise – into a fetish.  In what follows, I work through some of the ramifications of this confluence of Khatibi and Said regarding figuration and knowledge as it relates to the disciplines of Francophone studies, comparative literature, and postcolonial criticism.

    In “Counterpoint and Double Critique in Edward Said and Abdelkebir Khatibi: A Transcolonial Comparison,” Françoise Lionnet makes a welcome call for a renewed interest in Khatibi’s work for comparative critique, and more specifically, for the study of postcolonial and transnational literatures.  She reexamines Khatibi’s critical writing, focusing on the key chapters in Maghreb Pluriel (Plural Maghreb), alongside the work of Edward Said.  Lionnet begins by comparing Khatibi’s “double-critique” and Said’s practice of “contrapuntal reading,” but ends with an appraisal of the two authors’ different approaches to the critical practice of contrepoint. She argues that while both thinkers should be lauded for having opened new avenues of reading, rendering minor or marginalized voices audible amidst the din of colonial and neo-colonial babble, Khatibi ultimately offers a more convincing model for critique:

    Therein I believe lies the principal difference between Khatibi and Said: for although Said is interested in how “a particular type of research and knowledge begins to build up” allowing for the study of culture “as contrapuntal ensembles” of hybrid identities (Said, 1993: p. 52), ultimately he can only address their common ground of translatability, whereas Khatibi wants to allow for an as-yet-unthought exteriority beyond the “archeology of silence” that represses other languages, genders, and peoples in their unheard difference.  For Said, what is translatable is that which is discernible within the overall arrangements of literary and musical high culture as the site of a historic face-off between the imperial west and those who resist its claims in their “disparities and discrepancies” (Said, 1993: p. 114) which must eventually come to order and harmony, as in the musical interplay or counterpoint of the concert performance.  (Lionnet 2012: 404, original italics) 

    Whereas Said’s model of contrapuntal reading, first announced at the end of Culture and Imperialism (1993), would seem to betray his excessive concern for “high culture” which would somehow determine what has value for academic research, Khatibi’s understanding of contrepoint, Lionnet points out, takes its lead not from Western classical music, but rather from the work of weaving and sewing, such as that done by Moroccan carpet makers.  While such a claim does have a certain appeal—that Khatibi’s weaving metaphor draws upon local practices while honoring women’s work—Lionnet’s contention here also dismisses what is distinctive about Said’s understanding of counterpoint, namely its capacity to elaborate the very historical processes through which knowledge is “built up” in specific languages but not in others.

    Indeed, there are valuable reasons to pursue the kind of argument Lionnet hints at here.  For instance, one could read Khatibi’s insistence on the contrepoint specific to Moroccan carpet making as an invention of technique that would not simply be borrowed from so-called “Western” techniques or procedures of thought (from Nietzsche to Derrida, say).  In this scenario, one might understand the way that Khatibi articulates his thought in relation to the work of Moroccan women who weave carpets not as a mode of filling “foreign” theory with local content, but rather as a way of elaborating a practice of portable reading.  Yet Lionnet does not base her argument on such an interpretation.  Instead, she simply misreads Said’s notion of contrapuntal critique and offers Khatibi’s contrepoint of weaving in its place as a self-evidently superior critical model.  The question thus becomes: are Khatibi’s transversal intersemiotics—developed through readings of carpets, tattoos, literature, calligraphy, proverbs, and jokes from Moroccan and Islamic contexts—only good for reading Moroccan, Maghrebi, minor, or marginal cultural artifacts?  In other words, can Arab(ic), Islamic, or Maghrebi theory travel?  Can it travel to the self-appointed “centers” (the metropole or capital)—and there constitute itself as an exilic territory? (Fig. 1)

    Figure 1. Tuareg carpet. Photo by David Fieni.

    While there may be any number of contingent reasons for preferring the contrepoint of a carpet to that of a fugue, I am not entirely convinced that there is anything inherent to a beautiful Moroccan carpet that would necessarily make it a better theoretical model for transnational and transcolonial comparison than a Bach fugue.  The inverse of such an affirmation would also of course be true: namely, that nothing guarantees that the hermeneutic resources of a Bach fugue would be superior to those contained within a Moroccan carpet.  After all, in his text on the intersemiotics of such carpets, Khatibi set out “to study this imagination in the space of the carpet, as one studies a page of Aristotle, with the same seriousness, exposing aesthetic theories dedicated to the imaginary and the symbolic” (d’étudier cette imagination dans l’espace du tapis, comme on étudie une page d’Aristote, avec le même sérieux, en exposant des théories esthétiques, consacrées à l’imaginaire et à la symbolique (Merino 2013: 123-4)).

    This constellation of texts points in the direction of a contrapuntal double critique, which would short circuit close reading with distant reading, making selective use of the kind of poststructuralist tools that Khatibi himself develops and repurposes, but would not stop there.  Rather, such a critique would instead continue to listen for the “unheard differences” that are both interior and exterior to the texts and cultural products under consideration.  It is Said, I would argue, even more than Khatibi who prompts us to take this historical step back from the object of our analysis.  A valuable instance of this kind of reading can be seen in Aamir Mufti’s Forget English! Orientalisms and World Literatures (2016), which understands Said’s philology as a kind of contrapuntal close reading that emphasizes precisely the processes of historical sedimentation which operate at multiple levels within the text and outside of it.

    Taking a contrapuntal double critique seriously would mean examining the textual self-disappropriation that Khatibi discusses, which also animates his experiments with simultaneity, with distance and closeness. It would also mean stepping back to think about the continuing predominance of dispossessed languages and discourses which Said, as well as Khatibi himself, both foregrounded in their work.[1]  So instead of a “bad,” Western counterpoint (Said and Bach) versus a “good,” Maghrebi contrepoint (Khatibi and the Moroccan carpet), we have instead two competing modes of simultaneity.  On the one hand, there is Khatibi’s singular kind of espacement, what he calls “le tissage par la syntaxe” (weaving through syntax), a practice more on the side of superimposition, of interference or static, capable of opening up an exilic form of “hostage” within the text.  On the other hand, we have Saidian simultaneity, which is perhaps more temporally and historically oriented, less about resolution, to be sure, than perpetual disruption. Like exile, the simultaneity of Saidian counterpoint plays along the seams of what he calls an “unhealable rift” (Said 2000: 175), concerning itself with the historical dimensions of planetary relations.  “Exile,” Said writes, “is life led outside habitual order. It is nomadic, decentered, contrapuntal; but no sooner does one get accustomed to it than its unsettling force erupts anew” (Said 2000: 186).

    So we might therefore say that Said’s notion of counterpoint is primarily but not exclusively temporal-historical in nature, bound to musical forms of expression, which serve as a theoretical point of departure.  It imagines renewable reading practices that can attempt to account for mobile structures of silencing as well as echo-chamber effects and divergent variations on multiple themes that seem to all be happening at once, although they are in fact each played in accordance with their own distinct time signatures.  This critique—or shape of critique—occurs alongside and at the same time as Khatibi’s somewhat more spatial understanding of counterpoint, perhaps more akin to weaving or sewing, and, in particular, articulated in places in relation to the art of Moroccan rug making.  What, then, might a contrapuntal double critique look and sound like?

    Khatibi’s own reflections on exile, francophonie, pseudonymy, and syntax can open up further paths of such future reading.  Let us first consider what he has to say about the linked questions of literary and linguistic forms of hostage, hospitality, and self-dispossession.  In “The Name and the Pseudonym,” Khatibi examines the particular case of “Francophone writers”:

    The literature whose name we bear, whatever our origin, citizenship, or nationality, has been forced, through a particular poetic exercise and work, to constitute a territory that belongs to nobody, but which politics seize like private property, and so well that in certain public sessions one gets the rather curious sense that the “Francophones” are a community of hostages.  But who and what holds them hostage? (Khatibi 2008: 115-6)

    Francophone writers write under the constraint of the utopian condition of “their” language.  This is a pre-existing condition of so-called “Francophone” literature, which in turn becomes a point of arrival for a philosophical meditation on languages in the plural.  For Khatibi, the Francophone writer is caught in an interstitial space, between the no-where of utopia and the political instrumentalization of languages.  Instead of answering the questions he asks at the end of this passage, Khatibi evokes the “weaving through syntax” that allows him to “widen the space of hospitality” in his “own” text:

    It is syntax that is my aim, my point of connection and the wake I leave in the time of each vocable.  Syntax: a unification in movement of the target language.  Thanks to this simultaneous translation, to this process of grafting, I record what returns to me from memory without forced reservation.  In this way, I investigate the forces of silence between languages, the erasure of traces and their rest stops, their becoming ash.  So if I sing the praises of syntax, it is because it widens the space of hospitality where the writer is received in his own text as a guest, in the shadow of the writer. (2008: 116)

    For Khatibi, syntax is the privileged site of poetic procedures: internal, simultaneous translation, the grafting of diverse elements, and “the erasure of traces.”  It allows him to bypass the impasses of philological sedimentation and the symbolic politicization of language.  He confesses to feeling “an affinity with a language . . . stronger than the sentiment of belonging” (117), and in general, his work aims to sabotage any deterministic relationship between language and ownership, between language and property, provoking a perpetual rupture in the pact between language and the nation.  Writing in the “language of the other” is always an act of “self-disappropriation” for Khatibi, but also a way of asserting that “language is not property.”  One could say that Khatibi here agrees with Derrida and the notion of “monolingualism” being a “prosthesis” for an origin that is always irrecuperable and lost to memory and language.  But Khatibi describes, performs, and traces the seams that mark the disappropriation of this monolanguage, moving from “monolanguage” to “bi-language” and beyond.

    But we cannot stop here, because within the synchronic virtual silences of these texts we find diachronic silences, determined by the historical process of the silencing or accumulation of languages and knowledge practices.  This process is precisely what, in a forthcoming book, I explore under the title of Decadent Orientalisms: a colonial politics that institutes the study of comparative languages and literatures, including those of “the Orient,” under the very sign of these languages’ supposed decadence, and, ultimately, their disappearance.  This kind of Orientalism is both descriptive and prescriptive: an apparatus that functions by breaking down, that integrates only to disintegrate.  The ambivalent nature of this apparatus prompts us to also pay attention to the philological context at work here, even when reading texts as fragmented and radically decentered as those of Khatibi.  The armes miraculeuses (miraculous weapons, Césaire 1970) of the Khatibian text “record” the memory of other languages, and the author “investigate[s] the forces of silence between languages.” The fact that this investigation takes place in French remains a significant element of the inscription of silence in history and in the world that this text performs, however.  Are dialectal Arabic or Tamazight at liberty to circulate in the same global spaces and think according to the same techniques or procedures as can French?  The virtual apparition of other languages and signifying practices in the Francophone text coincides precisely with their marginalization, with their virtualization.  The disappropriation Khatibi writes about is thus haunted by the politics of assimilation and the colonial notion of francophonie as instances of attempts at diversity in French.  The French language remains a world in itself, a “littérature-monde” (to allude to the title of the 2007 book by Michel Le Bris and Jean Rouaud), just as “Global English” or “Anglophone Literature”—rubrics that serve to satisfy the demands for diversity put on the canon.  This means that rendering French heterogeneous and non-identical to itself is inseparable from a homogenization of textual practices and procedures of thought into the “globalized” form of a monolingual “world literature.”  Should we borrow a rhetorical move from Derrida, and boldly affirm that Khatibi is in fact the most “minor-transnational” of all Francophone writers?  (This performatively ironic assertion about Khatibi’s “identity” comes from Derrida’s lecture on “la francophonie outside of France,” published in Le Monolinguisme de l’autre, where he declares himself “the most Franco-Maghrebian” of the pair (Derrida and Khatibi), and possibly even “the only Franco-Maghrebian” (Derrida 1996: 29, original italics).)  After all, from the perspective of the hexagon or North American French studies, Khatibi’s texts might be said to satisfy a certain demand for otherness, opening out onto the Arabic language, Moroccan popular culture, and Islamic mystical traditions without requiring any Arabic whatsoever from the critic.  Such a claim is less a critique of Khatibi than of certain critical approaches to Francophone literature in the Maghreb.  Thus the challenge of reading Khatibi today, and, by extension, the challenge for a field such as Francophone studies, is to acknowledge the extraordinary diversity of rhetorical techniques employed in these texts without celebrating this as diversity tout court, without fetishizing this poetic knowledge.  As with Khatibi and Francophone studies, so, too, with comparative literature.

    Another way of framing this argument is that Arabic calligraphy, darija, Tamazight, and other local practices (tattooing, proverbs, jokes, etc.)—those things that serve as the poles that Khatibi uses to make French or Francophone practices render their static and generate the opacity or interference of the intersign—may well have a higher redemption value in the “world republic of letters” when uttered in French.  That is, the self-disappropriation that Khatibi transforms into something like a virtue of literary asceticism borders on complicity with the forms of disappropriation that are also still very much operative in the world literary system, albeit in a more brutal and far less theoretical way.  The asymmetrical structures of the institutions of world literature, relating to, among other things, values attached to certain so-called “global” languages, the system of consecration by which an author from the margins must be recognized and praised by writers, critics, and publishing houses at the center (Paris, London, New York, etc.) continue to regulate who reads and writes what and in what languages.  I do not point out the obvious facts of the situation in order to pass judgment on Francophone writers from the Maghreb such as Khatibi.  Quite the opposite: I would say that it is precisely because Khatibi has taken this problematic of language conflict further than any other writer of his generation that we must not stop at a celebratory appraisal of his singular rhetorical inventions—which is a common strategy when reading writers “from the margins”—nor is it advisable to transform this singularity into a theoretical model to follow.

    Khatibi himself urges us to do the same.  Likewise, Said did not turn contrapuntal reading into a critical fetish the way that Lionnet wants to do with contrepoint.  One is reminded here of the scarcely hidden Orientalism at the heart of Pascale Casanova’s La république mondiale des lettres (World Republic of Letters 1999), which begins with a discussion of Henry James’s “The Figure in the Carpet,” which Casanova uses to illustrate the critical revelations that can follow a change of one’s vantage point, yet is cited in a book that repeatedly reinforces the centrality of Paris to the entire planetary institution of literature.  In contrast, Said insisted that counterpoint function as a relational operation one performs on the archive, a means of radically decentering the T-O map of Orientalist faith.  Instead of taking hard-won poetic knowledge as a fixed point of departure for further theorization about the Maghreb, Khatibi and Said prompt us to trace the figures projected onto the Maghreb (by both Orientalist and purportedly anti-Orientalist writers) back to the violence and erasure that these figures simultaneously elide and generate.  Such is one possible path through the epistemological minefield that Orientalist knowledge has left scattered in language and thought.

    The kind of “poetic knowledge” that Khatibi offers, then, is a disruptive force that operates according to the relational logic of “survival in transformation” (Khatibi 1983: 17).  Against this, Orientalism does not simply put forth a figure or a set of figures, but rather sets in motion an epistemological apparatus that is constantly adapting to changing conditions of geopolitics and cultural economies of representation and knowledge production.  This is one cause of what I call the decay of Orientalism: it must retain a core set of axioms while at the same time changing its modes and tenor.  Which brings us to perhaps the most urgent point of all: that Orientalism itself must not become a monolithic theoretical model, but must rather be leveraged as a relational tool responsive to adaptations and even cooptations of actors and agents of settler-colonialism and neo-imperialism in an Orientalist mode.  If thinking about Said’s larger project now in relation to the Maghreb reveals the ways that Orientalism itself is a metaphor, it also cautions us to wield the figurative violence it produces without turning it into a fetish.

    Measuring the core impulse of Orientalism against the historical mutations it undergoes is one way of renewing the potential of the decolonial project articulated by both Said and Khatibi.  But one may also measure other modalities of relation against Orientalism; Edouard Glissant’s elaborations of the philosophies and poetics of relation spring immediately to mind (1990; 2009), as do other examples, such as Lionnet and Shu-mei Shih’s Minor Transnationalism (2005), or the transcolonial Maghreb elaborated by Olivia C. Harrison in her book (2016) and her contribution to this dossier.  In its jarring mélange of Marx and Lao Tzu, playing with Sufi metaphors in French, Khatibi’s Class Warrior – Taoist Style engineers a mutually disorienting mode of relation that demonstrates one escape route from the postcolonial impasse of Francophonie haunted by revenant Orientalism.  Bypassing France in all ways but the language of the poem, Khatibi’s verse articulates a perpetual revolt in a language that effects a disappropriation on multiple planes: of French and Arabic poetic traditions, of the committed decolonial writer’s fetishized Marxian verbiage, and of language as a guarantor of identity.  Khatibi’s turn to Chinese Taoism engineers modalities of poetic knowledge that imagine ways of short-circuiting the master metaphors of Orientalism.  In a similar vein, contemporary Moroccan Arabic haiku turn to Japanese poetics to defamiliarize Arabic poetic form while inventing a new ecopoetic idiom.  Both instances take readers into emerging possibilities of a new kind of contrapuntal reading.  The Arabic haiku movement, which has flourished especially in Oujda (Nasri 2017), a city often considered to be on the margins of Moroccan cultural production, represents a contemporary instance of the kind of “poetic knowledge” articulated in Khatibi’s poem.  Haiku by poet Sameh Derouich perform a similar self-disappropriation of Arabic poetics while improvising an ecopoetics of literary, linguistic, and environmental relation.  Derouich’s work is just one example of cultural production in the Maghreb flourishing blissfully beyond Orientalist master tropes and epistemological prisons.

    Let me end, then, with two poems by Derouich which resonate, albeit in a quietly vital way, with what Abdellatif Laâbi called the “seismic pathways of freedom” of future poetry (1969: 43).  The first haiku deliberately blindfolds the poet’s eyes to figurative language, and the second intuits something like the political will of the social from falling leaves.

    With my metaphor blindfolded           ma‘suba al-majaz

    I look at you,                                      anthuru ilayk

    Oh almond blossoms!                        ya azhar al-lawz

    (2016: 55)

    Without authorization,            bidun tarkhis

    Autumn leaves                        tatajamharu

    Assemble.                               awraq al-kharif

    (24).[2]

    By disabling poetic figuration and its distortions, Derouich stages the event of poetic knowledge as an elucidation of complex experience, where private and public, familiar and unfamiliar, mediated and immediate, words and things traverse each other.  If the first poem offers a moment of lucidity that is both open to the reader and utterly inaccessible, the second haiku affirms the primacy of this non-figurative lucidity.  Whatever aesthetic or political theory one wishes to milk from the almond blossoms or extract from the autumn leaves, these poems suggest, will necessarily be derivative and secondary.  In this way do Derouich’s poems set flowers and trees native to the Mediterranean into a naturalized poetic form bereft of any sentimental indigenizing theory.

     

    David Fieni is Assistant Professor of French at the State University of New York, Oneonta. He is the author of Decadent Orientalisms: Configuring the Decay of Colonial Modernity in French and Arabic (forthcoming 2019) and translator of Laurent Dubreuil’s Empire of Language (2013). Fieni has co-edited special journal issues on “The Global Checkpoint” and on the Moroccan writer Abdelkebir Khatibi. His work has appeared in diacritics, boundary 2, PMLA, and Expressions Maghrébines.

     

    References

    Casanova, Pascale.  1999.  La république mondiale des lettres.  Paris: Seuil.

    Césaire, Aimé. 1970. Les armes miraculeuses. Paris: Gallimard.

    Derouich, Sameh.  2016.  100 Haiku.  (n.p.): Literary Convoy Publications.

    Derrida, Jacques.  1996.  Le monolinguisme de l’autre, ou la prothèse d’origine.  Paris: Galilée.

    Glissant, Édouard.  2009.  Philosophie de la relation: poésie en étendue.  Paris: Gallimard.

    —.  1990. Poétique de la relation.  Paris: Gallimard.

    Harrison, Olivia C.  2016.  Transcolonial Maghreb: Imagining Palestine in the Era of Decolonization.  Stanford: Stanford University Press.

    Khatibi, Abdelkebir. La blessure du nom propre.  Paris: Denoël, 1974.

    —.  2017.  Class Warrior–Taoist Style.  Trans. Matt Reeck.  Middletow: Wesleyan University Press.

    —.  1995.  Du signe à l’image: le tapis marocain, Casablanca: Lak International.

    —.  1995.  “Incipits.”  Du bilinguisme.  Ed. Jillal Benanni.  Paris: Denoel.

    —.  2010.  “The Language of the Other: Testimonial Exercises,” Introduction by David Fieni, trans. Catherine Porter.  PMLA, 125.4, October (2010), 1006.

    —.   2008.  Œuvres de Abdelkebir Khatibi, III: Essais.  Paris: La Différence.

    Laâbi, Abdelatif.  1969-1970. “Les singes éléctroniques.” Souffles 16-17.  Casablanca: Editions les croisées des Chemins, n.d.

    Lionnet, Françoise. 2011.  “Counterpoint and Double Critique in Edward Said and Abdelkebir

    Khatibi: A Transcolonial Comparison.”  In A Companion to Comparative Literature, edited by Ali Behdad and Dominic Thomas, 388-407.  Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell.

    — and Shu-mei Shih, eds. 2005.  Minor Transnationalism.  Durham, NC: Duke University Press.

    Merino, Leonor.  “Pour Abdelkebir Khatibi: Le visage de la terre est déjà recouvert des yeux de tant de bien-aimés disparus.”  Interview with Abdelkebir Khatibi.  Abdelkebir Khatibi, intersigne, special issue of Expressions maghrébines, David Fieni and Laurent Dubreuil, eds. 12.1 (Summer 2013), 121-4.

    Mufti, Aamir.  2016. Forget English!  Orientalisms and World Literatures.  Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

    Nasri, Chourouq.  2017.  “Poetry as Resistance: An Ecocritical Reading of Sameh Derouich’s Haiku.”  Ikhtilaf: Journal of Critical Humanities and Social Studies. 1 (Fall): 59-69. http://identityanddifference.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/Chourouq-Nasri-Poetry-As-Resistance-Nasri.pdf

    Said, Edward.  1993.  Culture and Imperialism. New York: Knopf.

    —.  1979.  Orientalism.  New York: Vintage Books.

    —-. 2000.  Reflections on Exile.  Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

     

    This essay includes material that has been translated and modified from David Fieni, “Désappropriation de soi et poétique de l’intersigne chez Khatibi,” Expressions maghrébines 12, no. 2 (2013): 1-17.

    [1] One thinks immediately, for example, of Khatibi’s essay on Jacques Berque, “L’Orientalisme désorienté” from 1976, two years before Said’s Orientalism.

    [2] The haiku in this collection appear in the original Arabic alongside translations into French, Spanish, and English.  Mourad El Khatibi, Abdlekebir Khatibi’s nephew, did the translations into English.  I have slightly modified the first translation and kept the second poem as published.

  • Susan Slyomovics — “The Ethnologist-Spy Was Hanged, at That Time We Were a Little Savage”: Anthropology in Algeria with Habib Tengour

    Susan Slyomovics — “The Ethnologist-Spy Was Hanged, at That Time We Were a Little Savage”: Anthropology in Algeria with Habib Tengour

    This essay is part of a dossier on The Maghreb after Orientalism.

    by Susan Slyomovics

    Il fut pendu l’ethnologue-espion, writes poet-novelist-anthropologist Habib Tengour, En ce temps-là nous étions un peu sauvages (1976 : 131).[1] Tengour’s sly voicing of the violent indigene consigning ethnology to the gallows asks us to rethink authority and expertise in the social sciences. Tengour was born in Mostaganem in 1947, a town he registers in rhymed Algerian Arabic as vingt-sept makla we sket, “zip code twenty-seven food and silence” (2012: 36). His father Mohamed Tengour was a member of the Parti du Peuple Algérien (PPA) and head of the Organisation secrète (OS) for the Mostaganem region, both crucial entities to the formation of the Front de Libération Nationale (FLN). Twice arrested and imprisoned for nationalist political activities, Mohamed Tengour was banished from his home region. Forced to relocate to France, he resumed activities on behalf of an independent Algeria and brought his family to Paris.[2]

    Figure 1. At his father’s tomb, 2015. Habib Tengour (front left), his uncle Ghali (front right) and uncle’s friend (back). Photo by Mansour Benchehida. Reproduced by permission of Mansour Benchehida and Habib Tengour

    Raised and educated between Algeria and France, Habib Tengour will crisscross the Mediterranean Sea calling himself Ulysses, another consummate ethnographer whose life depends on fieldwork and literature in a quest for a restoration to homeland and identity (Yelles 2012): “My name is Ulysses I am 22 years old and I am doing sociology because I failed law” (Je m’appelle ULYSSE j’ai vingt-deux ans je fais de la sociologie parce que j’ai echoué en Droit) (9). He returns to Algeria in 1972 to complete military service, then becomes director of the newly established Institute of Social Sciences at the University of Constantine. He resigns in 1975 in opposition to proliferating provincial university graduate programs created in the absence of trained social sciences professors, each new one producing “a parody of Lin Biao! Encircling the cities by the countryside. That’s a little how the University of Algiers was gradually encircled by provincial universities” (1995: 71-72).

    A year before Tengour’s homecoming, Mohammed Seddik Benyahia, a member of Algeria’s first provisional government and minister of higher education and research from 1971-77, declares that ethnologie, “contaminated by colonialism,” must be “submitted to a process of decolonization.”[3] A forerunner document to Benyahia’s call was the Tripoli Plan of 1962 elaborated by the National Council of the Algerian Revolution (CNRA) on the eve of independence. Dismantling former European settler colonial structures called for more appropriate post-independence measures of redress and reconstruction than ethnology imparts:

    French colonialists undertook, by war, extermination, looting and confiscation, to systematically destroy the Algerian nation and society. More than a mere colonial conquest to ensure control of the country’s natural wealth, this enterprise sought, by all means, to substitute foreign settlement for the autochthonous people. (Colonna 1972: 260)

    The French conquests of Algeria in 1830, Tunisia in 1881, and Morocco in 1912 also resulted in France establishing journals, institutes, scholarly organizations and universities instigated by metropolitan exigencies over its overseas colonies. France was the preeminent social scientific model for the Maghreb and the Maghreb contributed to shaping French social sciences (Slyomovics 2013). The Commission Scientifique de l’Algérie (1839-41), modeled on Napoleon’s scientific expedition to Egypt, was created to map Algeria’s culture and geography, as were the 1904 Mission Scientifique to Morocco and the creation of the French institute in Cairo in 1909. In 1925, the Institut d’Ethnologie in Paris established by Marcel Mauss, Lucien Lévy-Bruhl, and Paul Rivet arrived on the social science scene at the apogee of close to one hundred years of research on the native following in the wake of military officers and colonial civil servants whom Bourdieu calls ethnologues spontanés, “spontaneous ethnologists” (Mammeri 1985: 8). Engaged in ethnology, folklore, and collecting on behalf of metropolitan museums, Tengour’s legions of ethnologist-spies were effective in spoliating native material and intangible cultures.

    Anthropology, according to Talal Asad (who prefigured Edward Said’s critique of the West’s Orientalism), is an intellectual agent of colonialism inevitably embedded in hegemonic and imperial power relations because “the world also determines how anthropology will apprehend it” (1973: 12). And that ethnographic world of inquiry ended, dissipating the colonial regime of Francophone scientific researchers in the Maghreb enraptured by North African ethnology (Slyomovics 2014). It is not surprising, therefore, that postcolonial theory owes a debt to Maghreb-based thinkers. Among them on any list are Abdelkebir Khatibi, Albert Memmi, Abdelmalek Sayad, Paul Sebag, Abdelkader Zghal, Habib Tengour, Jacques Derrida, Pierre Bourdieu, and Frantz Fanon, all “provincializing” Europe (Chakrabarty 2000) from the Mediterranean’s North African shores.

    Following Benyahia’s call to boycott ethnology, debates swirled around a post-independence anthropology inquiring, in fact, what is to be done? Would linking the identity of the indigenous social scientist to the discipline of anthropology produce more relevant, less universalizing, unbiased “Arab social science”? Or another intellectual path, should Islamic and Arab sources reanimate social theories derived from the fourteenth-century Maghrebi thinker Ibn Khaldun? (Morsy et al. 1991: 81-115). What if decolonizing the social sciences in Algeria became the means to hijack and manipulate the path of Arabization (ta’rib), thereby blocking progressive movements such as student or Berberophone rights, as Tengour suggests? (1995: 68) In contrast to tortuous attempts throughout the Arab world to reconcile nascent academic social sciences with Western Orientalist anthropology, at least on the official level, Algerian authorities said no. Ethnology was banned outright at the twenty-fourth International Conference of Sociology in Algiers in March 1974:

    Ethnology fully participated in the colonial system. Created by colonialism, it accepted its presuppositions. You might even say it served as an ideology for this system. . . . Decolonization has scientific aspects. The rejection of ethnology as a discipline of study specific to developing countries is one of them. As a method and an ideology, it has developed a logic and thus it constitutes a scientific danger, an ideological screen between the social reality of third world countries and those who want to study them. (L’ethnologie a participé totalement du système colonial, dont elle est la création et dont elle a accepté les présupposés. Elle tenait même lieu à la limite d’idéologie à ce système. . . . La décolonisation a des aspects scientifiques. Le rejet d’ethnologie comme discipline d’étude propre aux pays en voie de développements en est un. . . . Comme méthode et comme idéologie elle a développé une logique et par là même elle constitue un danger scientifique, un écran idéologique entre la réalité sociale des pays du tiers monde et ceux qui veulent les étudier. (Mammeri 1989 : 18))

     

    A Detour

    It is worth recalling that one of the largest colonial resettlement programs occurred in wartime Algeria (1954-62), merely a dozen years before Benyahia spoke out. To dismantle peasant support for independence fighters, approximately one quarter of the indigenous rural population was displaced. The French military process of forcible removal was overseen by the army’s Specialized Administrative Sections (Sections Administratives Spécialisées, SAS). Officers apprenticed in so-called Muslim sociology were charged with the study of villagers before and after resettlement. Social science was implicated, as early as Émile Durkheim’s The Division of Labor in Society that depicted an Algerian traditional Kabyle society frozen in premodernity: “The Hebrews remained in it [segmentary social organization] to a late date and the Kabyles never passed beyond it” (Durkheim 1997 [1893], 175-178). The French army, attentive to lessons in Durkheimian sociology on tribal solidarities, imbibed Orientalist perversions of fourteenth-century thinker Ibn Khaldun in which forced sedentarization and relocation consolidated their state power (Mamdani 2017). French Algeria’s wholesale destruction of a rural agrarian world through land dispossession was updated to align with wartime scorched earth policies, then cynically relabeled modernization. A significant portion of Algerian society endured internal exile and immiseration on a vast scale as victims of controlled experiments to discover the viability of the so-called pacification programs in regroupement camps that were never more than outdoor prisons (Omouri 2001; Henni 2018). The recurring figure of the embedded anthropologist within the military is not new. Moreover, it could be said that Benyahia was operating well within Durkheimian paradigms: in France, ethnology and sociology were intertwined, thus eerily presaging Benyahia’s judgments about ethnologie versus sociologie despite Durkheim’s attempts to distinguish sociology as meta-theorizing from ethnology’s empirical data-driven practices:

    The customs, beliefs, institutions of peoples are matters too profound to be judged like this, so lightly. This is why sociology must focus its research primarily on societies that can be studied from genuine historical documents, while ethnographic information should be used only to corroborate and, to a certain extent, illuminate precedents. (Durkheim [1895] 1975, 1: 76-81)

    Presciently, this Algerian post-independence rejection of ethnology, understood by Benyahia as a body of knowledge predicated on the colonizer’s description to better police the population, had been foretold by Albert Memmi. Refusal is a rite of decolonization:

    We then witness a reversal of terms. Assimilation being abandoned, the colonized’s liberation must be carried out through a recovery of self and of autonomous dignity. Attempts at imitating the colonizer required self-denial; the colonizer’s rejection is the indispensable prelude to self-discovery. That accusing and annihilating image must be shaken off; oppression must be attacked boldly since it is impossible to go around it. After having been rejected for so long by the colonizer, the day has come when it is the colonized who must refuse the colonizer. . . . Henceforth, the colonizer adopts a negative approach. . . . He does without tobacco if it bears the colonialist’s stamp! These are pressure methods and economic sanctions, but they are, equally, sacrificial rites of colonization. (Memmi 1965: 172-173)

    Benyahia maintained an equipoise between rejecting colonial ethnology and establishing a comprehensive pedagogical program from kindergarten to conservatory and an advanced research institute for the study and preservation of Algeria’s magnificant heritage of Arab-Andalusian music. His advocacy for “decolonizing the social sciences” along with the rise of critical reissues of colonial-era ethnography, which led to reassessing Algeria’s colonial-era anthropology, cast Bourdieu, whose Algeria writings continue to be published posthumously to this day, as a key figure. Bourdieu founded an Algerian association of research in demography, economy and sociology; he collaborated and coauthored important studies with his colleague Abdelmalek Sayad; and his military experiences in wartime Algeria for the information services of the French army and the French government statistics office in Algiers led to discussions about instrumentalizing ethnographic research. Bourdieu and Sayad’s angry depictions of French Algeria’s wartime forced dislocations resulted in a publication ban of their book, Le déracinement (The Uprooting) that lasted until after the Algerian War of Independence. They describe the pauperization of Kabyle farmers herded into “regroupment” camps by the French military, “as if the colonizer instinctively found the ethnological law in which the reorganization of the habitat, a projection of the most fundamental structures of culture, leads to a generalized transformation of the cultural system. . . . The politics of regroupment, a pathological response to the deadly crisis of the colonial system, brings to light the pathological intent that inhabits the colonial system” (Comme si le colonisateur retrouvait d’instinct la loi ethnologique qui veut que la réorganisation de l’habitat, projection des structures les plus fondamentales de la culture, entraîne une transformation généralisée du système culturel. . . . La politique de regroupement, réponse pathologique à la crise mortelle du système colonial, fait éclater au grand jour l’intention pathologique qui habitait le système colonial (Bourdieu and Sayad 1964 : 26-27)). While describing the army’s strategies to coerce, supply, and rehearse informants in camps, Bourdieu takes note of the natives, perennially under investigation, who resisted their French questioners despite an “atmosphere of police inquisition and psychological action” (Bourdieu 1963: 261). Defying the social scientist under colonialism transforms into a fixation against ethnology.

    Bourdieu himself began as an ethnologist later announcing a switch to sociology. Reductively speaking, physical anthropology was “anthropologie” while empirical fieldwork research in the human sciences was “ethnologie” in France, its analogue in England “social anthropology” and “cultural anthropology” in the US. In many Anglophone academic environments, the latter two melded into “sociocultural anthropology.” Even in France, Georges Balandier, among the founders of the Centre d’études sociologiques (Center for studies in sociology) in 1946, called for more convergences (Balandier 1948; Siebaud 2006).

     

    “The Poetic Discovery of the Real”

    If the terms ethnology, sociology, folklore and anthropology are often deployed interchangeably, in turn, Tengour’s poetic discovery of the real (1985: 13) and deadpan black humor play with the overlapping homophony of the word “social.” In This Particular Tartar 2 (1997–1998), his sociologist persona is mistaken for a social worker by a Tartar stranded in Paris. The Tartar, a recurring protagonist in the Tengourian corpus, becomes the exonym for Western social science in its petty bureaucratic actualizations; he is coded the migrant perennially flooding Europe like his fierce ancestral hordes, “invaders from the East whom they called, without distinction, Tartars” (2010: 122):

    The city planning bureau asked me to interview him in the context of a study on gypsies and other travelers.

    This particular Tartar distrusts sociologists. I think he confuses us with social workers.

    My interview was limited to brief questions/answers.

    I didnʼt succeed in getting a serviceable life story out of him.

    I had read up on the Tartars beforehand, to help me establish contact.

    He didnʼt appreciate my empathy. (130)

    Unlike long-standing Orientalist studies from anthropology, folklore and ethnology about so-called “primitive” non-European peoples, languages and customs, sociology in Algeria was considered less tainted by the colonizer’s cultural depredations (Ben Naoum 2002). Mobilized on behalf of practical socioeconomic and political orientations and marching to state-inflected parameters on proletarianization, pauperization, unemployment, and shantytowns, post-independence Algerian sociology was brought to bear on topics such as development, detribalization, migration, newly launched agricultural programs, urbanization and industrialization (Madoui 2007).

    In 1985, the year Tengour obtained a French doctorate in ethnology, Algeria was in the midst of state-mandated programs ensuring university teaching in Modern Standard Arabic, MSA (al-‘arabiya al-mu‘asira), no one’s native tongue and as yet linguistically lesser in the face of Algerians’ trilingual usage of Algerian Arabic (darija), French, and Amazigh/Berber languages. More government interventions followed the ban on ethnology and mandated Arabic in university social sciences faculties. Algeria’s Minister of Higher Education Abdelhak Rafik Brerhi, following a recommendation of FLN chief Mohamed-Cherif Messadia, proposed an addendum to mandated FLN party membership for state employees. A 1985 directive added a provision that professors disrespecting the regime’s political choices were liable to court actions and lawsuits, followed by decrees not only mandating MSA’s preeminence but attempting to substitute English for French. Although research conducted within Algeria has never been isolated from Western paradigms, political sociologist Lahouari Addi concludes that because university critics of the regime like himself were either in exile or teaching outside the country, government strictures on political and linguistic allegiances became moot in the face of the brain drain of Algerian intellectuals (Addi 1991 and 2002: 71-77 and Ayoub 2000).

    Likewise, ethnographic studies of the tribe were taboo in Algeria during decades of the FLN single-party state (1962-89). Although tribal values were admired, the tribe as a social institution was deemed archaic and divisive. Research on Algeria’s tribes shows that despite interventions through mass education and compulsory army service, the tribe is not in opposition to the Algerian state but remains an important sociopolitical entity, hence a worthy object of study (Hachmaoui 2012; Ben Hounet 2008; Tengour 1980: 1985). In his own way, Tengour intervenes in the debate about what is to be done with ethnology in his doctoral thesis on the Beni Zeroual tribal confederations of the Chlef plain surrounding his Mostaganem home region. His ethnological propositions move away from static social science categories about la tribu towards a complex story of doubled and parallel origins, one in which the Beni Zeroual tribe’s history counterintuitively does not reside in the powerful eponymous founding ancestor figure. Unlike Algerians in Paris whose connections to any tribal group solidarity has melted away in the world of the banlieues (housing projects on the outskirts of French cities where migrant workers were concentrated), Tengour’s hypothesis is instead that, in Algeria, this fabled past was and is sustained by the local patron saint, the marabout. As Tengour unfolds generations of tribal formations, he recounts the inevitable subdividing of the tribe (qabila) into the fraction (ferqa), then further devolving into sub-fractions, clans and extended households. For him, only the last stage exhibits genuine value in terms of economic, social, and affective kinship. This means that if the tribe exists in name through reference to their eponymous ancestor Zeroual, it does so primarily to attach descendants to imagined Arab and Arabian peninsular origins. Intervening disruptive factors in the Maghreb’s history were long-standing, fluid pre-colonial affiliations and cross-border tribal movement frozen by subsequent French colonial insistence on naming, registering and refashioning tribal structures (1985: 139-142). Such factors lead Tengour to place the tribe’s memory, history, and very soul in the hands of the non-tribal marabout. These saintly spiritual leaders, whose descendants to this day transmit the tribe’s written history orally, are uniquely able to trace origins to Arab progenitors and wandering Sufi adepts, all the while ministering to the Beni Zeroual, who are in fact not Arabs, according to Tengour, but rather Arabized Berbers (1982). Taken to its conclusion, Tengour’s thesis reconfigures the marabout as an imaginative storyteller, religious leader, and tribal ethnologist, the one who does not belong to the tribe, irrespective of the tribe as imaginary traditional system or colonially distorted institution. The marabout does so by preserving written history, thereby keeping alive publicly and orally for the tribe its own genealogy and origins. Finally, the question is not if tribal lineages are socially imagined and culturally invented, but rather who tells the tale of segmenting lineages and who listens. Writing and history, story and voice, tribe and tribal memory, storytelling and identity are structurally and productively inverted. Most of all, nothing memorable is lost in Gens de Mosta, Tengour’s hometown chronicles where his concept of cultural memory is on offer to his younger, skeptical narrator by another storyteller, Allal, the venerable mujahid, communist, and International Brigade fighter:

    Figure 2. Tengour home in Tigditt neighborhood, Mostaganem, June 20, 2018. Photo by Susan Slyomovics

    Open your ears wide and remember what you are told. And learn to tell a story … a people never forgets what’s essential to its being. No people can be fucked all the time! Memory is a very complicated thing. In fact nothing ever is really lost. Memory works in the shadows. It loves secrecy. Apparent forgetfulness is its refuge during hard times. It waits for its hour to come and while the stomach is rumbling it does not stop digging. There isn’t only what’s written down that remains. Spoken words also leave traces. (2011 [1997]: 214)

    Collective embodied forms of recognition, acceptance, and transmission that are performatively enacted by the storyteller need not entirely align with official social worldviews of the Algerian nation-state, but artfully circumvent them while giving narrative pleasure to the listener.

     

    Doubling and Exile: Both Ethnologist and Novelist

    Tengour turned back to France in the early nineties to teach at the University of Evry until his retirement in 2017, believing that “there exists a divided space called the Maghreb but the Maghrebian is always elsewhere. And that’s where he makes himself come true” (2011: 262). His departure from the Algerian academy coincided with the onset of the “Black Decade” (decénnie noire) and internal strife beginning in the early 1990s. Tengour’s “elsewhere” highlights cultural hybridity and ambivalence, métissage and dichotomy, rupture and orphanhood, schizophrenia and doubles that continue to bind and underpin those who engage simultaneously in literary and ethnographic writings about the Maghreb. Such doubling and multilingual heritages are historically conjoined to displacement and exile for Algerian writers. As Maghrebi intellectuals move between the homeland and the metropole of the former colonizer, familiar tropes of splitting and separation emerge: Malek Chebel invokes “Algerian schizophrenias” (1995: 287) reminiscent of Albert Memmi who, three decades earlier, picked at the “painful discord within oneself” (le douloureux décalage d’avec soi), a cleavage that measures the self in relation to a colonizer forever deemed the model or its antithesis (1965: 140). Abdelkebir Khatibi seems to solve these conundrums of the formerly colonized writer from the Maghreb region by evoking an initial positive role as producers of the “ethnographic novel. . . . The novel as a witness to its era, in a period of oppression and the absence of a free press, the novel plays the role of informant” (le roman ethnographique . . . un témoignage sur une époque ; en période d’oppression et en l’absence d’une presse nationale non officielle, il peut jouer le rôle d’informateur (Khatibi 1968 : 28)). While Khatibi sees the ethnographic novel genealogically as a necessary early literary stage, Réda Bensmaïa argues powerfully against any continued tendency to view Maghrebi works not as literary creations worth considering for their innovative style and language but as “ethnographic evidence” extraneous to some hypothetical French literary canon (Bensmaïa 2003: 7). For literary critic Zineb Ali Benali, it seems that the evident richness of post-independence studies in linguistics, sociology, and history from and about the Maghreb results in studies that do not reach beyond local North African university circuits to wider publics. Consequently, “the novel is more than an informant” writes Ali Benali returning to Khatibi’s famous formulation, “it is the nation’s archivist. . . . We can then say that fiction is a sort of an archivoir for a story not yet, or insufficiently, unlocked” (Le roman, cet archiviste de l’histoire. . . . On pourra alors dire que la fiction est une sorte ‘d’archivoir’ pour une histoire non encore, ou insuffisamment, déverrouillée (Ali Benali 2003)).

    Does that mean that literary realism is the vehicle for the native just as scientific inquiry into the life of the native is for European ethnographers? Through poetry, performance, and prose as well as anthropology, Tengour belongs to a stellar lineage in which generations of Algerian novelists and poets consider contemporary social science topics even as they conduct fieldwork in ethnology and oral literature. Assia Djebar, for example, appears as an ethnologist of the intimate, everyday interior worlds of women, visually documenting stories, festivals, and songs of women in her film, La nouba des femmes du Mont Chenoua (The Nouba of the Women of Mount Chenoua) (1977). Other notable ethnologist-novelists are Mouloud Mammeri and Mouloud Feraoun. A recent literary phenomenon is Amara Lakhous, novelist and anthropologist trained at the Sapienza University of Rome. His book, Clash of Civilizations over an Elevator in Piazza Vittorio was originally published in 2003 in Arabic, Kayfa tarda min al-ziba duna ‘an tawdak (How to Be Breastfed by a She-Wolf Without Being Bitten). Recast by the author into Italian, it is now widely read in English translation (2008). When asked about his writing process, the multilingual self-translating Lakhous explains how he moves from right to left on the page just as he maintains a south-to-north cross-Mediterranean presence:

    I wrote the first version of Divorzio all’Islamica a viale Marconi (Divorce Islamic Style)which was published in 2010, in Italian (I work on multiple versions — for example, Clash of Civilizations . . . had about twenty versions). When I finished — as you know, in Arabic you write from right to left — I divided the file and made two tables: Italian text on the left and Arabic text on the right. I have a multi-language keyboard, so I can go from one language to the other. And I would look at the Italian text, and write in Arabic, and if I found something that seemed more convincing as an image in Italian, I would change it. So the two texts were born together, and published within a month of one another: the Arabic text was published in August and the Italian text in September. They’re twins. (Ray 2014)

     

    Ethnographic Surrealism

    Looking back thirty years on a career in ethnology and literature, Tengour reflects on his “taste for fieldwork” and “listening to the other” combined with “poetic impetus” and “discipline and rigor essential to grasp things”: “Je me suis spécialisé en anthropologie par goût du terrain et aussi pour être à l’écoute de l’autre. Il y a dans la posture de l’anthropologue un maintien qui permet l’élan poétique tout en obligeant le regard à une discipline et une rigueur indispensables à la saisie des choses” (Agour 2008). His lifelong engagement with anthropology emphasizes local and historical terrains that do not confine him to the role of informant or mere chronicler of his Algerian interlocutors. He navigates the spaces of social science with exceptional autonomy and surrealist subversion, by turns wildly innovative and corrosively comic. Tengour’s influential manifesto “Maghrebin Surrealism” (2011 [1981]: 261-269) is intertextually alive to surrealist antecedents. He layers a “homage” to André Breton embedding the latter’s definition of surrealism in italics in his own text to guide him to “the actual functioning of thought. Dictated by thought, in the absence of any control exercised by reason, exempt from any aesthetic or moral concern” (Breton 1924 in Tengour 1981: 269). This practice finds echoes in anthropology exemplified in the concept of “ethnographic surrealism” as defined by James Clifford:

    To state the contrast schematically, ethnographic humanism begins with the different and renders it (through naming, classifying, describing, interpreting) comprehensible. It familiarizes. A surrealist practice, on the other hand, attacks the familiar, provoking the irruption of otherness—the unexpected. The two attitudes presuppose one another; both are elements within a complex process that generates cultural meanings, definitions of self and other (1981: 562).

    Tengour’s ethnographic attitude is shaped by surrealism and shapes it in turn. Consider that his initial fieldwork and teaching forays were framed by Benyahia’s illocutionary speech act against ethnology. That an academic field was made off limits is surely as surrealist as any Breton manifesto. Beyond ill-conceived, widely disregarded nation-building diktats by higher education bureaucrats, Tengour’s arguments about ethnographic participant-observations are infused with “the unbearable limits of a dailyness so difficult to bear.” Besides, he notes that given Algeria’s post-independence trajectories, who needs writers to chase after fictional madmen to populate their Maghrebi novels?

    I council the reasonable man to go sit by the river and he will see pass by all the madmen he ever wanted to meet; provided that he live long enough. All Maghrebians know the subversive power of madness; their artists (with rare exceptions) know it less well than they do, as shown by the sugary and lukewarm use they make of it in their works trying to compel the unbearable limits of a dailyness so difficult to bear.

    The madman, the mahbûl, the medjnûn, the dervish, the makhbût, the msaqqaf, the mtaktak, etcetera, belongs to folklore, alas. This reduction reveals the narrowness of the outlook. . . . The Algerians in particular — are seduced by the image of the madman: he is thought to speak what had been silenced. In most cases we are dealing with postcard-madmen (colonial exoticism was fond of this sort of postcard), boring and pompous. (Tengour 2011 [1981]: 263)

    Tengour follows through with a multitude of research and writing projects in which Maghrebi Sufism is where “surrealist subversion asserts itself . . . there where the exterior observer sees only heresy, sexual dissoluteness, coarse language, incoherent acts, etcetera.” All that might be labeled spiritually heterodox or ethnographically unworthy – the particularity of North African Sufism, the textures of his childhood Tigditt Mostaganem neighborhood, Algeria’s magnificent gut-wrenching rai music – these are Tengour’s fields of inquiry. While Breton’s manifesto ends with “existence is elsewhere,” Tengour’s remake of a modernist rhetorical genre will posit “that despite my perverse attachment to art, it is ‘elsewhere’ that I hope to sojourn,” a narrative flourish that enticed him toward ethnography. 

    Susan Slyomovics is Distinguished Professor of Anthropology and Near Eastern Languages and Cultures at the University of California, Los Angeles. Her current research
    project is on the fates of French colonial monuments in Algeria. She is editor of several
    volumes and the author of How to Accept German Reparations (2014), The Performance of Human Rights in Morocco (2005), and The Object of Memory: Arab and Jew Narrate the Palestinian Village (1998).

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    Memmi, Albert. 1965 [1957]. The Colonizer and the Colonized. Translated by Howard Greenfeld. New York: Orion Press.

    Morsy, Soheir, Cynthia Nelson, Reem Saad, and Hania Sholkamy. 1991. “Anthropology and the Call for Indigenization of Social Science in the Arab World.” In The Contemporary Study of the Arab World, edited by Earl T. Sullivan and Jaqueline S. Ismael, 81-115. Edmonton, Alberta: The University of Alberta Press.

    Omouri, Noara. 2001. “Les Sections Administratives Spécialisées et les sciences sociales: Études et actions sociales de terrain des officiers SAS et des personnels des Affaires algériennes.” In Militaires et guérillas dans la guerre d’Algérie, edited by Jean-Charles Jauffret and Maurice Vaïse, 383-98. Paris: Éditions Complexe.

    Ray, Meredith K. 2014. “Interview with Amara Lakhous.” Full Stop:
    http://www.full-stop.net/2014/04/09/interviews/meredith-k-ray/amara-lakhous/

    Siebeud, Emanuelle. 2006. “Ethnographie, ethnologie et africanisme: La ‘disciplinarisation’ de l’ethnologie française dans le premier tiers du XXe siècle.” In Qu’est-ce qu’une discipline? edited by Jean Boutier, Jean-Claude Passeron, and Jacques Revel, 229-45. Paris: Éditions de l’EHESS.

    Slyomovics, Susan. 2013. “State of the State of the Art Studies: An Introduction to the Anthropology of the Middle East and North Africa. In The Anthropology of the Middle East and North Africa: Into the New Millennium, edited by Sherine Hafez and Susan Slyomovics, 3-22. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

    —. 2014. “Algerian Women’s Būqālah Poems: Cultural Politics, Oral Literature and Anti-Colonial Resistance,” Journal of Arabic Literature 45: 145-68.

    Tengour, Habib. 1976. Tapapakitaques. Paris: Oswald.

    —. 1980. “L’Ancêtre fondateur dans la tradition orale maghrébine,” Peuples méditerranéens 17: 67-75.

    —. 1980. “La notion de tribu en Algérie.” Cirta 4: 2-6.

    —. 1981. “Le surréalisme maghrébin,” Peuples méditerranéens 17: 77-81.

    —. 1985. “Spatialités maghrébines traditionelles, Étude d’un cas: les Béni-Zéroual.” PhD dissertation, University of Paris VII.

    —. 1995. “Le fourvoiement des élites: entretien,” Intersignes 10: 67-78.

    —. 1997. Gens de Mosta. Arles: Actes Sud / Sindbad.

    —. 2010. “This Particular Tartar.” Translated by Marilyn Hacker. Virginia Quarterly Review 86, no. 3: 122–31.

    —. 2011. “Exile is my Trade”: The Habib Tengour Reader. Translated by Pierre Joris. Boston: Black Widow Press. https://issuu.com/pjoris/docs/exile_is_my_trade

    —. 2012. Dans le soulèvement: Algérie et retours. Paris: Éditions de la Différence.

    Yelles, Mourad. 2003. “Introduction.” In Habib Tengour ou l’ancre et la vague, edited by Mourad Yelles. Paris: Karthala.

    —. 2012. “‘Personne, voilà mon nom’: jeux de masques et fictions identitaires chez Habib Tengour,” Expressions maghrébines 11, no. 1: 43–58

     

    [1] For texts not translated into English, translations are mine. Otherwise, in-text references are to English translations by Pierre Joris (Tengour 2011) or Marilyn Hacker (Tengour 2010), neither year reflecting Tengour’s original publication dates.

    [2] Habib Tengour, personal communication with the author, July 1, 2018, and Archives nationales d’outre-mer, 5H1 106 Oranie.

    [3] Until E. E. Evans-Pritchard’s The Sanusi of Cyrenaica (1949), Anglophone anthropology of the Middle East and North Africa had been equally castigated as “folklorism and trait distribution surveys of a more naïve anthropology” (Slyomovics 2013: 9).

  • Olivia C. Harrison — Introduction: Dossier ‘The Maghreb After Orientalism’

    Olivia C. Harrison — Introduction: Dossier ‘The Maghreb After Orientalism’

    by Olivia C. Harrison

    In his path-breaking book Orientalism (1978), Said does not mention the Maghreb by name (al-maghrib, “the place of the setting sun” in Arabic, a region designating northwest Africa, and in particular the French former colonies of Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia), even though French Orientalism and imperialism play, alongside their British and American counterparts, a lead role in producing what Said calls “the Orient.” Said is deliberately vague in delimiting the contours of this much fantasized region. After all, the Orient is not a place, but rather “an idea that has a history and a tradition of thought, imagery and vocabulary,” as he was continuously at pains to explain (Said 2003: 4). And yet the absence of even an imagined Maghreb in Said’s account of Orientalism – Delacroix’s paintings, Théophile Gautier’s sketches and stories, Malek Alloula’s collection of “harem” postcards – is all the more striking by virtue of the fact that the vast archive he mobilizes, beginning with Napoleon Bonaparte’s 1798 invasion of Egypt and the “takeover of North Africa” that ensued, is in large part a French colonial one, stretching from the Atlantic coast of Africa to the Pacific shores of Indochina (Said 2003: xxii). As wryly noted by an otherwise sympathetic critic, “an Algerian . . . could not possibly have written a study of Orientalism and neglected completely, as Said neglects, the French relation to North Africa” (Musallam 1979: 22). And although Said does not detail what he calls “the dialectical response” to imperialism in Orientalism (2003: 104), anti-colonial writings from France’s colonies, and in particular from the Maghreb – by Frantz Fanon, Albert Memmi, and Abdelkebir Khatibi, among others – have been seminal to the development of the field Said’s work helped launch in the English-speaking world: postcolonial studies.

    Said in part redressed this imbalance in his sequel to Orientalism, Culture and Imperialism, a book that supplements his analysis of imperialist representations – including Albert Camus’s Algerian writings – with a renewed focus on “resistance against empire” by the likes of Aimé Césaire, Fanon, and Abdallah Laroui (1993: xii). And yet the Maghreb remains peripheral in Said’s work, symptomatic not only of the vicissitudes of biographical origins and itineraries, but also, as Françoise Lionnet has suggested, of “the long imperial history of conflicting Anglophone and Francophone spheres of political and cultural influence in relation to the Arab civilizations of the Maghreb and the Mashriq” (2011: 399). Said’s Palestinian and Egyptian background, and his location in the English-language academy, partly explain his critical orientation toward the Arab east (al-mashriq). With the exception of Laroui, whom Said cites at several points, and a brief if admiring mention of “the decolonizing literature of the time, whether French or Arab – Germaine Tillion, Kateb Yacine, Fanon, or Genet” at the end of his long analysis of Albert Camus’s Algerian writings, there is little evidence of a sustained engagement with Maghrebi literature and theory in Culture and Imperialism (Said 1993: 185).

    It is not our task to fault Said with yet another critical lacuna on empirical grounds. Much ink has been spilt on the absence of the German, Russian, Spanish, etc., empires in Orientalism, despite Said’s explicit insistence that his focus was on methodology rather than exhaustiveness (Said 2003: 4). Our aim, rather, is to imagine what conclusions Said might have drawn had he more fully engaged with Maghrebi anti-colonial literature and theory. What can the Maghreb teach us about Orientalism, and Orientalism? In turn, and equally important, Said’s work continues to ask crucial and difficult questions of Maghreb scholars. In light of his deconstruction of naturalized areas of study, what are the stakes of our ongoing commitment to an area studies model born out of Orientalism and the Cold War era shift to American ascendency? What does the Maghreb, as frame of analysis, enable, and what does it foreclose?

    For those of us who work on the Maghreb, one of the most important lessons of Said’s Orientalism is what he called “methodological self-consciousness”: the call to interrogate, denaturalize, and historicize the borders of the regions we study (2003: 326). If Said was not the first to draw attention to the colonial production of areas of study – Mohamed Sahli, Laroui, Mohammad Abed Al-Jabiri, and Khatibi are some of his Maghrebi predecessors – Orientalism has had by far the greatest impact in terms of global reach and academic dissemination, a feature of the unequal translation and distribution of intellectual capital, no doubt, but also of Said’s preternatural capacity to synthesize an encyclopedic amount of scholarship into forceful, and often polemical, argument. Translated into more than thirty languages, Said’s best-known work has become an unavoidable reference for students of the Maghreb, from Colombia to Japan – and this despite the fact that Orientalism overlooks the Maghreb in locating the stretch of European imperialism “from the eastern shores of the Mediterranean to Indochina and Malaysia” (41).

    In this dossier, we ask what it would mean to think the Maghreb after Orientalism, forty years after the publication of a work that invites us to denaturalize our disciplinary formations and areas of specialization. “After” is here both a marker of the time that has elapsed since the publication of Said’s watershed book, and an acknowledgment of the debt owed in Maghreb studies to Said. With a nod to Ali Behdad’s 1994 special issue of L’Esprit Créateur, “Orientalism after Orientalism,” we also seek to supplement, expand, and critique some of the tenets of Orientalism. As a number of scholars working in the wake of Said have shown, the Maghreb is in a number of ways exemplary of the colonial condition, from the production of ethno-racial identities in the colonial laboratory (Lorcin 2014, Anidjar 2003, Hochberg 2009) to the occlusion of the colonial past (Stora 2005, Shepard 2006) and the transfer of legal and discursive practices of governmentality from colony to metropole (Hajjat 2012, Le Cour Grandmaison 2010). Since Said’s untimely passing, the Maghreb has come into view in spectacular fashion. In the wake of the mass popular movements ignited in Tunisia in 2010 and the refugee crisis still unfolding before us, how might a renewed focus on the Maghreb allow to us to revisit and update Orientalism? Expanding our focus yet further, what might Said have made of the shift of geopolitical gravity away from Europe and the United States – a shift he already acknowledged in Culture and Imperialism, without elaborating upon its consequences for our understanding of cultural imperialism (1993: 284)? The essays published in this dossier seek to explore the critical role of the Maghreb in understanding, and undermining, the political, military, and epistemic forces that Said bracketed under the term Orientalism.

    Said was not the first to expose the imperial workings of what Moroccan poet Adbellatif Laâbi called “colonial science”: the disciplines that make up the field of Orientalism (1967: 3). In her essay, Susan Slyomovics uncovers a rich archive of efforts to decolonize the social sciences in the Maghreb, from official appeals to ban ethnology in Algeria and Pierre Bourdieu’s damning sociology of colonial Algeria, to the playful writings of Habib Tengour and the literary criticism of Khatibi. David Fieni takes up Khatibi’s essays and poetry to offer a Saidian model of “portable theory.” Against the idea that theoretical paradigms originate in a particular place (Europe, say, or the Maghreb), Khatibi’s “transversal intersemiotics” become an invitation to think across colonial cartographies – metropole and colony – without losing sight of the power differential that produced them as discrete sites. This transcolonial methodology animates Olivia C. Harrison’s essay, which turns to Khatibi’s writings on the Maghreb as a “horizon of thinking” and Said’s notion of Palestine as “utopia” to elucidate a neglected dimension of Orientalism: Said’s attachment to decolonization as an ongoing process, one that requires anti-colonial critique in the present.

    The next two essays in the dossier take up a medium that is absent from Orientalism, but was nevertheless important to Said: film. Brian T. Edwards tracks the coincidence of American ascendancy and Orientalist representations in Hollywood, starting with the 1942 film Casablanca, which ushers in new forms of Orientalist representation even as it rescripts classic tropes. Madeleine Dobie elaborates on Said’s paradoxical relationship to the Maghreb in her essay on the iconic film of the Algerian revolution, Battle of Algiers. If the Maghreb is absent from Orientalism, Said’s public comments on Gillo Pontecorvo’s film make clear the importance he attached to Algeria as both model of decolonization and admonition against unrestrained nationalism.

    Algeria is, in this sense too, a figure for Said’s Palestine, even though he did not locate the separation of the twin figures of the Semite – the Arab and the Jew – in the Maghreb. Reflecting on Hélène Cixous’s and Jacques Derrida’s notion of “the cut” that separates Arab and Jew, Gil Z. Hochberg concludes this dossier by reading the “impossible figure” of the Arab Jew into Orientalism to supplement, and complicate, Said’s critique of colonial discourse.

    Written forty years after Said’s field-defining book, the essays in this dossier reflect a deep engagement with his thinking, sketching in broad strokes several areas of research on “the Maghreb after Orientalism.”

     

    Olivia C. Harrison is Associate Professor of French and Comparative Literature at the University of Southern California. She is the author of Transcolonial Maghreb: Imagining Palestine in the Era of Decolonization (2016) and co-editor of Souffles-Anfas: A Critical Anthology from the Moroccan Journal of Culture and Politics (2016). Her manuscript-in-progress, Banlieue Palestine: Indigenous Critique in Postcolonial France, charts the emergence of the Palestinian question in France, from the anti-racist movements of the late 1960s to contemporary art and activism. Her most recent article, forthcoming from diacritics, examines the recuperation of minority discourses by the French far and alt right.

     

    References

    Alloula, Malek. 1987. The Colonial Harem. Translated by Myrna Godzich and Vlad Godzich. Manchester: Manchester University Press.

    Anidjar, Gil. 2003. The Jew, the Arab: A History of the Enemy. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

    Behdad, Ali. 1994. “Orientalism after Orientalism.” L’Esprit Créateur 34 (2): 3-11.

    Gautier, Théophile. (1845) 1973. Voyage pittoresque en Algérie. Geneva: Droz.

    Hajjat, Abdellali. 2012. Les frontières de l’“identité nationale”: l’injonction à l’assimilation en France métropolitaine et coloniale. Paris: La Découverte.

    Hochberg, Gil. 2007. In Spite of Partition: Jews, Arabs, and the Limits of the Separatist Imagination. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

    Laâbi, Abdellatif. 1967. “Le gâchis.” Souffles 7-8: 1-14.

    Le Cour Grandmaison, Olivier. 2010. De l’indigénat. Anatomie d’un “monstre” juridique: le droit colonial en Algérie et dans l’empire colonial français. Paris: Zones.

    Lionnet, Françoise. 2011. “Counterpoint and Double Critique in Edward Said and Abdelkebir Khatibi: A Transcolonial Comparison.” In A Companion to Comparative Literature, edited by Ali Behdad and Dominic Thomas, 388-407. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell.

    Musallam, Basim. 1979. “Power and Knowledge.” MERIP Reports 79: 19-26.

    Lorcin, Patricia. (1995) 2014. Imperial Identities: Stereotyping, Prejudice and Race in Colonial Algeria. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press.

    Said, Edward. 1993. Culture and Imperialism. New York: Knopf.

    —. (1978) 2003. Orientalism. New York: Vintage.

    Shepard, Todd. 2006. The Invention of Decolonization: The Algerian War and the Remaking of France. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

    Stora, Benjamin. (1992) 2005. La gangrène et l’oubli: la mémoire de la guerre d’Algérie. Paris: La Découverte.

  • Ross Posnock — “Trust in one’s nakedness”  James Baldwin’s Sophistication

    Ross Posnock — “Trust in one’s nakedness” James Baldwin’s Sophistication

    by Ross Posnock

    I will begin with a brief passage from the contemporary American poet and essayist Douglas Crase’s 2004 memoir of the mid-20th century botanist/aesthetes Dwight Ripley and Rupert Barneby, who launched their pursuit of “plants in the North American desert” from what he—Crase—calls an “improbably sophisticated base.”

    The baroque furnishings of Rupert’s loft, the Surrealist paintings, the books in too many languages and especially those in English—not so much Auden and Isherwood, but Firbank and Corvo, the three Sitwells, the whole privileged cohort of Harold Acton, Evelyn Waugh, Nancy Mitford, Henry Green and Anthony Powell—put me on guard. Prominent on one shelf was Memoirs of an Aesthete, perhaps the best known of Harold Acton’s titles, which in those days stood out to me mainly for the awkward rhyme it cast from aesthete to effete, and which practically advertised that here was a library written by and for the frivolous, the highbrow, the undemocratic, and the epicene (2004: 23, 90).

    Though his unease speaks for itself, Crase also voices familiar American anxieties that “sophistication” triggers. Saddled with the scent of British decadence, “sophistication” has never entered the literary critical lexicon. Indeed it has never been a contender, and now less so than ever given the furious political rage against elites. But the word merits reexamination in discussing an author of whom it was said (notoriously, by Norman Mailer) that “even the best of his paragraphs are sprayed with perfume,”  (1992: 471) of whom, at his funeral, “his aestheticism and ultra-sophistication” were noted, on the way to a concession that “Jimmy was a civil rights leader” too. The speaker, Amiri Baraka, did not dwell on “sophistication” but implicitly set it against the political—a predictable binary that James Baldwin did not endorse (1991: 453).

    In an event that begs to be read as an allegory of Baldwinian sophistication receiving its public due—in England, appropriately enough–in 1965 he debates at the Cambridge Union William F. Buckley, that veritable caricature of American patrician capital S “Sophistication”—he of the silkily disdainful ornate vocabulary and orotund cadences. Easily available on You Tube, the debate shows Baldwin not only triumphing, but producing in Buckley the grimaces and sneers and other facial contortions that signal the latter’s unhappy consciousness that suddenly he does not own aristocratic poise and British intonation, that a usurper, an upstart, is in his midst, an unaccountable mocking black double replete with Oxonian intonation. At one point Buckley snidely comments on this—“in The Fire Next Time he speaks without a British accent which he used for you tonight”–evidently unnerved that what he assumed was his own vocal signature is not his alone. As if Baldwin has “stolen” his voice!

    What we might call the “setting”—the frame—of Baldwin’s sophistication is a fluid ease of movement, inevitably arousing controversy, between countries and classes and realms—the impoverished young expat improvising a life all over Paris, the apocalyptic voice of the civil rights movement, the famous author comfortably making his way in the wealthy celebrity world of global literary stardom, the gracious host at his final home in the village of St Paul de Vence in the South of France, all the while keeping the  Harlem hometown “street” credibility and charisma that even Baraka admitted he never lost. What Baldwin once wrote of Duke Ellington—that he was “able to move, without missing a beat or manifesting the slightest uneasiness, from Harlem cornbread to Buckingham Palace caviar and back again, ad infinitum–” describes the ease of his own interracial and class movements (1998: 673). This mobility of Baldwin’s is usually called “cosmopolitanism,” a word suggested by Baraka’s “ultra-sophistication”; but the latter does not reduce to the former. Whereas “cosmopolitan” is abstract, keeps us at a distance, is necessarily a political statement about one’s relation to nation, “sophistication” may be or become political but is first a mode of physically being in the world, the texture and surface displayed in clothes, carriage, voice, gesture: in presence, in sum.

    But the presence of sophistication troubles our deeply American fantasy of transparent identity: “she would be what she appeared and she would appear what she was,” as that lover of sincerity the young Isabel Archer describes herself (1995: 56). Behind Isabel’s ideal is an intellectual genealogy worth sketching here, even roughly, for it is decisive in shaping the status of American sophistication as an oxymoron. I call her fantasy deeply American but its romantic individualism recalls Jean Jacques Rousseau’s declaration early in the First Discourse (1750):  “how pleasant it would be to live among us if exterior appearance were always a reflection of the heart’s disposition.” Society, however, spoils the chance for such immediacy, for our “much vaunted urbanity” requires we don “false veil of politeness,” demands the suggestion of a manner and a style—often found in the “richness of attire” and “elegance” of a “man of taste” (1964: 37). Rousseau would have us cast all this off.  He draws out the class implications in his Confessions: “Among the people…natural feeling makes itself heard,” whereas in the “highest ranks of all it is absolutely stifled, and beneath a mask of feeling it is always self-interest or vanity that speaks” (1953: 144). To minimize vanity he recommends wearing the “clothes of a farmer,” an outfit shorn of “ornamentation”-–the enemy of “virtue, which is the strength and vigor of the soul. The good man is an athlete who likes to compete in the nude” (1964: 37-38). To the “vile ornaments” that help comprise “urbanity” Rousseau opposes the rustic “virtue” of nakedness. Although romanticism, esteeming the feeling heart’s urgent expression, is conventionally opposed to another foundational American logic, Puritanism, with its root suspicion of untrammeled subjectivity, in this context both share an anti-materialist, debunking asceticism, as if impatient “to wipe away the rubble of culture and get to the bottom of things” (to borrow Adorno’s words about another foe of “mediating functions” Thorstein Veblen) (1981: 84, 91).  One way to explain this convergence is that Rousseau, born in Geneva, the laboratory of John Calvin, inevitably felt this shaping influence, especially in his early writings. The First Discourse is animated by a skepticism not only of “the rubble of culture” but also of “this herd called society”—as if to acknowledge the primacy of social bonds—indeed relationality itself–represents a fall into inauthenticity (Rousseau 38). In other words, it is difficult to resist naming Rousseauism, inadvertently acting in concert with Puritanism, as a crucial tool in the conceptual arraignment of sophistication as un-American.

    The Confessions is the autobiography of a flagrant anti-sophisticate, thereby affirming its author’s self-description as a paragon of sincerity and honesty. He copiously illustrates his farcical romantic adventures and the ineptitude of his social performances– his appearance of slow-wittedness and “stupidity” made conversation a particular torture in the drawing rooms of Paris. Rousseau also reveals himself as an adept shape-shifter and impostor when the occasion required. But the Rousseau who helped shape mythic American self-identity is not a man of contradictions–staging his anti-theatricality, his sly stupidity. This Rousseau was put aside for the flattened opposite—champion of the natural as the ground of virtuous being.  “Ground” here is not only figurative but literal. For the vastness of American land—the “spirit of place”—(as D.H. Lawrence put it and Charles Olson on Melville would reaffirm) facilitates visceral assent to the US as Nature’s Nation (a title of a book by Perry Miller, who attributed the phrase to Emerson). Scott Fitzgerald rehearses this recognition scene in one of American literature’s canonical moments, the end of The Great Gatsby (1925) where the eyes of the Dutch sailors’ watch in awed wonder the “fresh, green breast of the new world.” But the moment is “transitory, enchanted.” No sooner has Fitzgerald evoked this Eden then he has the trees “pandering” in whispers, trees soon to vanish into lumber for building mansions. Two years before Gatsby Lawrence had been jeeringly contemptuous: “The land of the free! This, the land of the free! Why, if I say anything that displeases them, the free mob will lynch me, and that’s my freedom.” In no other country, says Lawrence, does the individual have such “abject fear of his fellow countrymen.”  The fear undergirds the “myth of the essential white America,” which, he famously concludes, rests on “the essential American soul”: “hard, cold, stoic, isolate and a killer. It has never yet melted” (1977: 9, 68).

    But the unflattering exposure by literary men of what the American rhetoric of mythic nature and natural man conceals had no chance to prevail against the perennially potent spell cast the previous century by geographical sublimity and the “manifest destiny” it was held to embody. This phrase (of 1845) had caught the spirit of an ambition to colonize nature expansively under the auspices of a romantic nationalism that had started with Thomas Jefferson, great admirer of Rousseau. The success of that geographical effort was more than matched by the ideological colonization of Nature, turning it into America’s birthright, a crucial fantasy in building our massive bias towards triumphalism and self-congratulation. These dispositions, seemingly benign, are actually anxious defenses fueled by hostility to various forms of New World otherness—be they “savages,” witches, antinomians, African–Americans and indigent Europeans, many of the latter conscripted to indentured servitude. They all trigger the reflex branding–“unnatural.” While Rousseau, himself a commoner and insistent outsider on many levels, did not intend this discriminatory effect, his purism tends to function this way, given his commitment to transparency’s absolute value even as a doomed project, a fixation that Jean Starobinski explored half a century ago. As disseminated in the new Eden, seeds of Rousseauvian purism cultivate a host of durable and pernicious dichotomies, all keeping our native anti-intellectualism and its attendant pathologies flourishing, including abiding suspicion of the urban and urbanity in general, and pious veneration of the simple life.

    The motor of that suspicion is an unspoken assumption that to possess or compose a manner or style opens up a psychic split or gap fatal to the self-identity that is the basis of sincerity.  “One no longer dares to appear as he is,” laments Rousseau (1964, 38).  He calls that fatal gap “reflection” and eventually regards it “the root of all evil,” the enemy of the immediacy of first impulses; with reflection comes our exile from the natural world ruled by instinct (Starobinski, 1988: 207).  Perhaps this fall into the reflective mediacy of manner or self-fashioning still retains residues of guilt in the sophisticated, manifested in the fact that sophistication is difficult to talk about. Save for Daisy Buchannan in The Great Gatsby, one feels uncomfortable proclaiming one’s sophistication, it sounds…unsophisticated, as if the ban on talking about one’s sophistication obeys the logic of sincerity’s pre-reflective transparency. A hint of defensiveness, of anxiety–suggesting sincerity’s priority–attaches to our relation to sophistication. This hints at an abiding tension between sophistication and self-consciousness, a tension with a long history in aesthetic/cultural theory. We will look at some of this history below while also noting late in the essay that, like Rousseau, Baldwin too elects nakedness as a desirable state of being, yet he does so without warring against urbanity. Indeed urbanity is enabling for Baldwin. 200 years after Rousseau, in the freedom of Paris, the city the philosopher enjoyed only against his will, regarding it as the mecca of phoniness, Baldwin finds the opportunity to fall in love, daring to make real what terrifies Jim Crow America: the ideal of colorblind intimacy. What he learns is that “people do not fall in love according to their color”: nakedness “has no color” (1998: 366).  Fusing what Rousseau sets in conflict—the urbane and romantic–Baldwin is spared the neurosis inherent in Rousseauvian mystique. Of one its products, 1950s Beat romantic primitivism, Baldwin had this to say about what he called its “mystique”: “No one is more dangerous than he who imagines himself pure in heart: for his purity, by definition, is unassailable” (1998: 277).

    Baldwin’s timeliness seems to be ratified on a daily basis, but the best known evidence, in addition to academic conferences, books, and a journal now devoted to him, are Raoul Peck’s acclaimed film I Am Not Your Negro (2017) and novelist Jesmyn Ward’s The Fire This Time (2016), her edited collection of essays by young black writers musing upon and updating Baldwin’s apocalyptic warnings of 1963.  And there is the rise to international prominence of bestselling essayist and memoirist Ta-Nehisi Coates as a media darling, the writer Toni Morrison proclaimed “heir” to Baldwin as America’s “conscience.” Yet their differences are more striking than similarities: with his carefully managed self-image as a man of virtuous organic solidarity, Coates seems almost the “anti-sophisticate” compared to the expatriate, hedonistic cosmopolitan he venerates. Another dissonance: Raul Peck’s film is full of stirring clips of Baldwin’s public presence but gives little hint of his unsettling skepticism about what we ordinarily mean by race and identity. So for all his ubiquity Baldwin is still out of focus for us. Imagine the dilemma of earlier commentators grappling with his recalcitrance to familiar categories. The culture had to devise ways to “package” Baldwin.

    Ebony gave it a shot in a cautiously admiring 1961 article titled “the angriest young man.” Baldwin granted his anger but distinguished it from bitterness. “I could be described as bitter if I hated white people, which I don’t.” He tells Ebony-–prime arbiter of black bourgeoisie taste and standards; “Why Negroes Don’t Like Eartha Kitt” appeared in a 1954 issuehe tells them “with a smile, ‘I am what you might call a drinking man although I don’t start the day with a shot of scotch.’” This is because he is sleeping in the morning, since his writing time commences after midnight. “He has few close friends but a wide circle of acquaintances, mostly in the arts.” Ebony leaves it at that. Maintenance of Black Dignity is their raison d’etre. “Angriest” and “slim, sardonic, pleasure loving” bachelor will have to suffice; beneath this language beckon matters best left unmentioned (Morrison, 1961: 23-30).

    This reticence makes a good deal of sense in 1961 and is an unintended tribute to Baldwin’s inassimilable being. Sophistication’s constitutive oddness suits Baldwin because his self-fashioning was unprecedented and unprecedentedly odd: a high school graduate from Harlem, who never attended college, small in stature, with frog-eyes, as his step-father had often told him, whose speaking voice sounded like that of the British actor Leslie Howard (to borrow Darryl Pinckney’s remark), whose homosexuality was an open secret (he regarded the word as descriptive of acts, not identity), whose essayistic voice sounded unraced, whose prose style was the envy of the New York intellectuals in whose journals he would precociously publish. Of his intricate syntax and elaborate, exalted cadences, F.W. Dupee remarked in the inaugural review of the inaugural issue of the New York Review of Books: “Nobody in democratic America writes sentences like this anymore. It suggests the ideal prose of an ideal literary community, some aristocratic France of one’s dreams” (1963: 2). “Aristocrat” was in fact a word Baldwin employed; as we will see near this essay’s conclusion, he stripped it of its usual sense of entitlement, rewriting it as a synonym for a certain kind of calm, unflappable public action.

    Baldwin’s conspicuous artifice suggests that he understood identity as did his revered Henry James—as precisely unnatural, not a given determined by biology or social class but rather as “the way in which one puts oneself together…an invented reality” comprised of a “great number of elements” (2011:89). This may be the cornerstone of his sophistication.  He assembled himself with no small measure of audacity, in the process shattering received expectations of blackness, of masculinity, of intellectuality, of sophistication. If forced to find a single word to sum up the assemblage named James Baldwin it might be “freak,” a word he used in 1972 to describe himself (1998: 363). “Sophisticated freak” if forced to find two words.

    Baldwin’s poise, as the video of the Cambridge debate with Buckley shows, made him a natural for television, a medium he would master early as a key technology in his rise to celebrity. He shares a comparable level of televisual mastery with the country’s most famous sophisticate circa 1960—the new young President. Indeed Edmund Wilson had made the comparison. Of Baldwin in late 1962, Wilson notes in his diary: “We heard him give a lecture at Brandeis. … He seems to have taken over some of President Kennedy’s manner at his press conferences, leaning forward, listening intently & seriously, answering right away and without hesitation…in such a way as to be sure he has the sympathy of his listener” (1993: 168-169). Baldwin’s poise in public is powerful because it is in the service of his intellectual dexterity: it allows him calmly, carefully–and at the same time passionately–to make arguments, demanding that his audience listen to his terms, his logic, his critique, never using sentimentality or other glib tactics to win people over. (Sentimentality, he says, is always an “aversion to experience”). He never flatters; or wants to be loved. “’Elegant’ was the word that Mary McCarthy kept coming back to in connection with Baldwin, in her 1989 memorial tribute. From our vantage, three decades after his death, Baldwin’s elegance is founded on a certain measure of impersonality, an immunity to our culture of hype and ingratiation which makes him seem from another time, a lost world.

    Here I want to pause: I will return to Baldwin after taking a wider, longer view to dilate upon some of the points raised above about the peculiarities of “sophistication.”

    This is how the ‘sophisticated’ talk about sophistication: they don’t. When the topic comes up one meets blankness, disavowal, dismissal, or a request to change the subject.  So when the former editor of The New Yorker magazine, author of books on ballet and on Sarah Bernhardt, and head of the esteemed publishing firm Alfred Knopf, Robert Gottlieb, was asked about sophistication he dismissed it, had nothing to say about it. The most he would concede of a famously sophisticated personage and a good friend of his—Irene Mayer Selznick—was that she was “classy. “ When his interlocutor presented him with Kenneth Tynan’s verdict—that American sophistication is an oxymoron– he agreed.  Sophistication is Noel Coward, Gottlieb added, a British thing. In a 1971 diary entry Kenneth Tynan, the English bon vivant, drama critic and essayist wrote:

    American talent does not survive sophistication. It needs to preserve a certain naivete, a hayseed element, even a touch of the child, and the primitive, if it is to retain its juice & energy. This is true of Huckleberry Finn, of Scott Fitzgerald (always an outsider in Paris & the Cote D’Azur), of Hemingway (with the boyish braggarty of his virility cult), of the out-of-towners who founded and wrote for The New Yorker, [Harold Ross et al], of Ring Lardner’s ingrained & obsessive provincialisms, of Whitman, Sherwood Anderson, Runyon, John Ford…When urban sophistication lays its hands on the American artist, it is like frost on a bud…. When US talent goes elegant, NY really becomes…a ‘road-company Europe’. Exception: Cole Porter is about the only one I can think of” (2002: 74)

    One might read this hymn to the hayseed sophisticate as Tynan’s rendition of the effects of American anti-intellectualism, our chronic condition that seems hard to separate from a consideration of American sophistication. When we ponder why in America sophistication is “frost on the bud” the most obvious suspect is our native Puritanism. Its unease with and suspicion of art—indeed with subjectivity itself—encouraged a “plain style” that by the late 19th century turned into the reign of literary “realism,” a genre that minimized artifice and maximized fidelity to facts (especially those that confirmed bourgeois verities).  H.L. Mencken, the most influential critic of the 1920s, made “the Puritan” his all-purpose epithet to describe American culture’s obedience to “Boston notions of English notions of what is nice” (1987: 6). Though no Puritan, Emerson shares their impatience with novels and in “Art” says that the actual art object has a certain “paltriness” compared to living human expression: “the sweetest music is not in the oratorio, but in the human voice.” “Reality hunger” is still said to be our insatiable craving, one that distrusts the power of imagination. Whereas sophistication, starting with its etymology, points in the opposite direction: The OED reports: as verb: sophisticate: “to mix with some foreign or inferior substance,” “to render impure,“ “to render artificial, to deprive of simplicity, in respect of manners or ideas”) as noun: sophistication: “the use or employment of sophistry…falsification; disingenuous alteration or perversion of something; conversion into some less genuine form.” Only by 1850 appears “the quality or fact of being sophisticated; especially  (a) worldly wisdom or experience; subtlety, discrimination, refinement; (b) knowledge, expertise, in some technical subject.”  The OED lists not a single “‘positive’ definition of the term sophistication…It is not so much that the meaning of the term shifts from negative to positive as that the negative meaning persists within the positive, with the result that even the most celebratory invocations of sophistication as worldliness remain haunted by the guilty sense of sophistication as a deviation from, even a crime against, nature,” as Joseph Litvak observes in his excellent Strange Gourmets: Sophistication, Theory, and the Novel (1997: 4).

    All this baggage, etymological and otherwise, burdens sophistication’s life in Nature’s Nation: our homegrown art forms–plain style and literary “realism”–are anxious anti-art art forms that make “sophistication” a target to shoot against: decadent affectation and exhibitionism but also a symptom of undemocratic (East coast) elitism. Bashing it will always be a sure fire political applause line. From this soil grew the suspicions that have, for instance, long shadowed Henry James. “ ‘Art’ in our Protestant communities” is still regarded as “vaguely injurious,” James wrote in 1884, as he was beginning to break with canons of realism and to ignore strictures of Victorian moralizing (1984: 47).

    But if our Puritan induced national unease with art and artfulness encourages looking askance at sophistication, our other pillar, capitalism, champions it as a motor of cultural commodity acquisitiveness.  The “culture philistine,” a phrase made famous, if not invented by, Nietzsche, is one who confuses self-cultivation with culture and depends on being in the know, keeping up with the latest.  Every product—from cars to university press books to haute couture and cuisine–depends on advertising exhibiting this year’s version of sophistication to instigate the envy and anxiety that creates desire, otherwise the market would grind to a halt. The 1950s were a boom-time for sophistication; two new technologies–the paperback revolution, the LP record–made high culture goods unprecedentedly available to an aspiring middle class. New performers emerged—late night radio hosts, stand up comedians and cartoonists purveying “sick” humor and political satire (Jules Feiffer, Mort Sahl, Lenny Bruce), beatnik poets and black jazz musicians in Village clubs. And that witty parody and embodiment of sophistication as predatory worldliness: Eartha Kitt. They were all part of a thirst for urban and urbane extremity to cut against the torpor of “the tranquilized fifties” (Robert Lowell’s phrase), a rage that Mailer caught in The White Negro, itself a manifesto for a new hipster lexicon of sophistication.  While denying it to black people: “the Negro, all exceptions admitted, could rarely afford the sophisticated inhibitions of civilization, and so he kept for his survival the art of the primitive” (1992: 341).

    Without using the Nietzschean term, Baldwin comments on the “culture philistine” in a 1959 essay on mass culture. “The aim of the people who rise to a high cultural level—who rise, that is, into the middle class—is precisely comfort for the body and the mind.” But the modernist books and records they consume are bent not on comfort but on “disturbing the peace—which is still the only method by which the mind can be improved.” These culture goods tended to be sold and purchased as markers of status, they “bear witness… to the attainment of a certain level of economic stability and a certain thin measure of sophistication. But art and ideas come out of the passion and torment of experience: it is impossible to have a real relationship to the first if one’s aim is to be protected from the second” (2011: 4). Here “thin” “sophistication” functions as a species of protection, on a par with white American “innocence,” a key target in The Fire Next Time.  Ironically, in 1964 Baldwin would be accused of trafficking in “thin” sophistication—called a “show-biz moralist” “given over to fame and ambition,” betraying a “once courageous and beautiful dissent” (Brustein, 1964). All because he refused to know his place (as our black moral conscience) and collaborated with fashion photographer Richard Avedon, his high school friend, on an expensive coffee table book that brought together Avedon’s photographs of American celebrities and anonymous mental patients, with Baldwin’s essay “Nothing Personal.” This critique would hardly be the last nagging effort to hold the high living Baldwin to ascetic standards.

    How, in the US, does sophistication “thicken” to become something other than bourgeois insulation or the antithesis to passionate experience, something other than self-conscious manner, pretension or snobbery?  The answer is obvious: it must become natural, to invoke that All-American panacea. Thomas Jefferson posited a “natural aristocracy among men” grounded in “virtue and talent,” to replace “an artificial aristocracy founded on wealth and birth, without either virtue or talents”; analogously, one could speak of a “natural” sophistication manifested in ease of embodiment, a nonchalance enacted in deed and air and bearing  (1988: 388). Hence the “sophisticated” don’t talk about sophistication; they are busy being sophisticated. But Jefferson’s upholding of the “natural” couldn’t predict that the word and idea would become an American fetish, an impoverishing ideology promoting, as noted earlier, an array of evils, among them racialist thinking as well as anti-intellectualism and ahistoricism. Within the social and cultural environment in which American sophistication is performed the ideology of the natural rules, fomenting hostility and suspicion, external and internalized, inevitably deforming those performances.  Think of the founding editor of The New Yorker, the aggressively philistine Harold Ross, (whom Dorothy Parker called a “monolith of unsophistication”); or Mencken, national arbiter of sophistication who couldn’t bear New York, preferring his native Baltimore, where he lived with his mother; or Sinclair Lewis, often playing in public the role of a bumptious bounder in the style of his George F. Babbitt: these are three of the 1920s “martyrs” of American sophistication.

    When we leave the US we discover that the natural and sophistication remain linked, but dialectically rather than antithetically.  I am thinking of Italian Renaissance authors in the 16th century instructing aspiring courtiers to conceal the artifice of manner behind apparent simplicity. To do so was to practice sprezzatura–a word coined by Castiglione in The Book of the Courtier (1528)–his neologism designed to instruct those at court “to conceal all art and make whatever is done or said appear to be without effort and almost without any thought about it…Much grace comes of this…. Art, or any intent effort, if it is disclosed, deprives everything of grace” (2002: 32).  Castiglione’s dialogues recommended “that cool disinvoltura”–ease—“of those who seem in words, in laughter, in posture not to care” (33).

    Unlike the US fetish of the natural, which claims it as a veritable birthright, the Italian and French theorists of taste and deportment and art do not simply celebrate the natural but turn it inside out, preserving the natural by denaturalizing it, as the making of a manner becomes the appearance of the spontaneous. So compelling to readers was this crafting of an artless art, (itself subject to all sorts of deceit, since lack of affectation can itself be affected, a perennial possibility The Book of the Courtier discusses) so compelling did readers find it that they tended to ignore Castiglione’s elite court context: the book was “mistaken” by many as ”a practical handbook of manners” (Javitch, 2002: vii).  Dr Johnson in the late eighteenth century praised it as the “best book that was ever written on good breeding” (qtd. Burke, 1995: 390).  The dandy Beau Brummell tacitly states its logic:  “If John Bull turns around to look at you, you are not well dressed; but either too stiff, too tight, or too fashionable” (qtd. Kelly, 2006: 5). The reclusive genius, poet and essayist Giacomo Leopardi, reprises the paradoxes of sprezzatura in his vast notebook Zibaldone, (composed in 1817-1832) in the course of a critique of Romanticism’s effort directly to recover the primitive. Regarding creating the impression of naturalness and spontaneity, “which ought to appear achieved with supreme lack of effort,” without “any show of artifice and arduousness,” Leopardi says that in fact such impressions “are the daughters of art alone, those which cannot be achieved except through study…are most difficult to get the habit of, the last to be achieved, and of such a kind that even having acquired the habit, it is impossible to put into practice without extreme exertion” (2015:  1258, # 3048).

    Sprezzatura is etymologically connected to heedlessness—of art, of danger, of ostentation—which is less a complacent neglect or ignoring than a masterful ease, a refusal to let anxiety enter, as Paolo D’Angelo has recently observed in his book on artem celare (art concealing art). French classical thinkers, like Bouhours in the 17th century, were concerned with cognate concepts that similarly resist transparent definition– concepts such as delicacy and grace. They define themselves as a “Je ne sais quoi.”  This phrase—“I don’t know what”—names a refusal to name and thereby make self-conscious and subject to preordained fixed rules behavior that eludes cognitive clarity, that instead relies on the charm of surprise. Readers of Bourdieu’s Distinction will recall that it draws on the great seventeenth-century French debates over taste between the learned academics—seeking to ground art in rules–and the mondain—aristocrats “who refused to be bound by precept, made their pleasure their guide, and pursued the infinitesimal nuances which make up ‘je ne sais quoi,’” debates that Bourdieu calls “a permanent struggle” appearing in every age (1984: 70). Like the growing new field of aesthetics, sophistication flew under the radar of rationalism or intellectual judgment, with their appeal to objective criteria, measures, proportions (D’Angelo, 2018: 121). “Nothing is liked more in nature than what is liked without knowing precisely why,” noted Father Bouhours of the delicacy of grace (qtd. D’Angelo 122). “Urbanity”—derived from urbanitas, the Roman ideal of refinement–is used in 1644 as “a scarcely perceptible impression… it can be felt but not seen… It is the science of conversation”  (Barnouw, 1993: 57). Eluding rules and language, these new concepts rely on nuances of social interaction, a subtlety palpable and felt, understood but only intuitively, attuned to the unique flow of interaction.

    This demotion of language and of rational cognition orients the new aesthetic perspective on sensibility in the late 17th century. Christoph Menke in his book Force: A Fundamental Concept of Aesthetic Anthropology notes that Leibniz distinguishes between rational and sensible cognition; the rational is based on definitions and the sensible is based on examples, and of the latter we must say that they are ‘Je ne sais quoi’: in other words, “I know something even though I do not know it with the precision of a definition” (2012: 15). Adds Menke: “by distinguishing between the ability to know and the ability to define, Leibniz transforms the domain of the senses into an object that is open to epistemological inquiry: the object of ‘aesthetics’” (15). Leibniz, Menke notes, supports his claim that we have reasons in the form of examples—embodiments–rather than definitions for our “sensible cognitions” by appealing to the practice of painters and other artists. They have the ability to judge correctly whether something has been done badly or well but are “unable to give a reason for their judgment.” Of work they dislike, all they tend to say is –“’it lacks something, I know not what.’” Artists’ responses show that “sensible perceptions and judgments can be called ‘correct’ without being clear and distinct and, thus, without our defining the criteria by which the perceptions and judgments are being made” (16).   The phrase “clear and distinct” nods to Descartes’ criterion for knowledge and signals Leibniz’s liberation from it, via his respect for artists’ intuitive knowledge.

    It seems we have gone far afield from Baldwin. But have we? Consider his statement from 1959:

    “What the times demand, and in an unprecedented fashion,” Baldwin says, “is that one be—not seem—outrageous, independent, anarchical. That one be thoroughly disciplined—as a means of being spontaneous” (2011: 9). The first part of this exhortation is couched in the rhetoric of authenticity impatient with appearance  (“be–not seem”). But Baldwin complicates this Isabel Archer stance by insisting that discipline—self-conscious control–releases the spontaneity of outrage and anarchy.  In effect he is preserving the natural by denaturalizing it, to repeat the logic of sophistication’s constitutive paradox, its artless artfulness. Baldwin’s grasp of sophistication’s logic is mediated at least in part by Henry James, who taught him that being an American is a “complex fate,” the quotation Baldwin uses to launch the opening essay of Nobody Knows My Name.  (The Portrait of a Lady and The Ambassadors were Baldwin’s two favorite James novels, ones he taught during his teaching stints and also wrote about. In 1968 when asked what book he would recommend to a Black Power militant he replied The Princess Casamassima) (Leeming 1994: 300).  Fascinating James from the start is how American spectacles of naturalness or innocence also depend on what he calls “the pervasive mystery of style”: at the heart of  “Daisy Miller,” for instance, is the mystifying question of just how sophisticated is the heroine’s naivete, how cunning her social affronts– this young woman from Schenectady is enjoying herself in Rome.

    My basic claim in what follows is that the word and concept “sophistication” is crucial if we would appreciate Baldwin’s intricate performance in “The Black Boy Looks at the White Boy,” his self-described “love letter” to Norman Mailer (that first appeared in Esquire, May 1961). In its depiction of the relation of a black to white writer, the essay is nothing less than unprecedented and its audacity merits the admittedly vexed angle of vision that “sophistication” affords.

    In “The Black Boy Looks at the White Boy” Baldwin’s shattering of expectations starts with the second sentence when he casually remarks that his essay is a “love letter.”  First of all, what in the world is Baldwin doing writing a “love letter” to Mailer, author, four years earlier, of the often outrageous racial primitivism of The White Negro?  Baldwin should be coming out with both guns blazing. “Love letter” disconcerts, to put it mildly. In 1961 it would carry more than a whiff of transgressive shock with its hint of interracial homosexual relations. In an interview after the Baldwin essay came out, Mailer said: “he had me strong where I wasn’t strong and weak where I wasn’t weak.” Rachel Cohen reads this as evidence that Mailer was “upset” by Baldwin’s phrase “love letter” and “would have preferred to have been praised for his violence than for his tenderness, or that he was uncomfortable with the idea that Baldwin was a little in love with him or the implication that he might be a little in love with Baldwin” (2004: 239).  These then scandalous implications may partly be why the phrase “love letter” is usually ignored and the essay is best known for Baldwin’s contempt for hipsters and beats. The “downright impenetrable” nonsense he finds in “The White Negro”—Mailer relies on “borrowed heirlooms” of white male sexual fantasy  “so antique” that Baldwin is shocked that “at this late hour” they should be “stepping off the A train”—is dismaying, but what is more, Baldwin is “baffled by the passion with which Norman appeared to be imitating so many people inferior to himself, i.e. Kerouac and all the other Suzuki rhythm boys.” What is Mailer, whose best work is subtle and complex and tough, “doing, slumming so outrageously, in such a dreary crowd?” (1998: 277).

    The opening of “The Black Boy Looks at the White Boy” presents a not so innocent abroad: Baldwin recollects enjoying himself in a Paris living room the evening he first met Mailer. Though the enjoyment is mixed with wariness, for the bristling Baldwin (“I was extremely worried about my career”, i.e. “fighting for my life”) has met his equal: ”Norman and I are alike in this, that we both tend to suspect others of putting us down, and we strike before we‘re struck.”  The high-strung Baldwin describes himself as ready to rumble:  “I was then (and I have not changed much) a very tight, tense, lean, abnormally ambitious, abnormally intelligent, and hungry black cat”  (269). In Norman he faces his opposite (and double): “two lean cats, one white and one black, met in a French living room. I had heard of him, he had heard of me. And here we were, suddenly, circling around each other. We liked each other at once, but each was frightened that the other would pull rank. He could have pulled rank on me because he was more famous and had more money and also because he was white; but I could have pulled rank on him precisely because I was black and knew more about that periphery he so helplessly maligns in The White Negro than he could ever hope to know” (270). But no sooner has Baldwin invoked this macho standoff  (as if the New York intellectuals meet West Side Story, the reigning Broadway hit of the day) then he denaturalizes it:  “Already you see, we were trapped in our roles and our attitudes: the toughest kid on the block was meeting the toughest kid on the block. I think that both of us were pretty wary of this grueling and thankless role, I know that I am.”  But extricating oneself is easier said than done: “one does not cease playing a role simply because one has begun to understand it.”  These roles—preordained clichés that taboo the unexpected– are at once survival strategies and “fulfill something in our personalities” while also imposed by “the world” to “trap and immobilize you.” To outwit, or at least mitigate, the force of these reifications Baldwin will practice what he calls a “watchful, mocking distance” (270-271).

    He first exerts that mocking distance upon “the prison of masculinity,” a target he had already critiqued in a 1954 essay on Andre Gide (231). But with Mailer Baldwin finds himself caught up again in the dreary American routine of macho posturing, for the author of “the White Negro” insists on it. The “myth of the sexuality of the Negroes which Norman, like so many others, refuses to give up” is a myth that comes with a high cost: it “means that one pays, in one’s own personality, for the sexual insecurity of others.”  This makes the “relationship” of a “black boy to a white boy” a “very complex thing” (270). Baldwin has to “pay” for Mailer’s obsession by submitting to the straitjacket of  “toughest kid on the block” enraged at infantile white “innocence” and its “weird nostalgia” for “the breast that has been taken away.”  But now Baldwin grants that “time and love have modified my tough-boy lack of charity” (270). Love—his warm affection for Mailer—turns the racial/sexual battleground, which had been threatening to dominate, into one strand the essay weaves into the “love letter” it is. In a startling intimacy of address, Baldwin says:  I take Norman “very seriously, he is very dear to me,” and “the night we met, we stayed up very late, and did a great deal of drinking and shouting. But beneath all the shouting and the posing and the mutual showing off, something very wonderful was happening. I was aware of a new and warm presence in my life, for I had met someone I wanted to know, who wanted to know me” (269, 271).

    Though “I am a black boy from the Harlem streets, and Norman is a middle-class Jew,” Norman is “very dear” not least because, like Baldwin, he started as an outsider to the literary establishment, who embarked on a “terrifying adventure,” beginning from nowhere, to become a famous American writer.  With success comes incessant demand for new product. So the daily question is how to sustain the pace while keeping “despair” away as one sits alone at the typewriter.  The temptation to leave one’s desk is hard to resist, especially when the “real world” offers seductions—“opportunities”—“to be good, to be active and effective, to be admired and central and apparently loved” (274). After having “fought so hard to wrest from the world fame and money and love,” Baldwin is now left wondering (with Peggy Lee): is that all there is? “Here I was, at thirty-two, finding my notoriety hard to bear” [Baldwin’s fame was to blossom with the publication two years later of The Fire Next Time]. But I “could not undo the journey which had made of me such a strange man and brought me to such a strange place” (273).

    The “strange place” is American literary celebrity, a jet set society founded on the international prestige of literature in the fifties and sixties, and already a relic of the past by the time Baldwin died in 1987. In that world fraternal rivalry and competition among peers are the coin of the realm.  Baldwin and Mailer are fond of each other while convinced of one another’s distinct limitations (black jazz musicians “really liked Norman” but “did not for an instant consider him as being even remotely ‘hip’… They thought he was a real sweet ofay cat, but a little frantic” (272) (this last word noting the fatal want of ease that is a sine qua non of sophistication); Mailer tells us in “Some Notes on the Talent in the Room” that Baldwin not only perfumes his pages but pulls his punches, is “incapable of saying ‘Fuck you’ to the reader” ((1992: 471). Baldwin learns this verdict in the living room of James Jones’s Paris apartment; Bill Styron is also there and “the three of us sat in Jim’s living room, reading aloud, in a kind of drunken, masochistic fascination, Norman’s judgment of our personalities and our work.” The “condescension” of the judgment “infuriated” Baldwin, but he soon cools down, realizing how “childish” are Mailer’s remarks. “No one can be more lewdly vicious” than an “imitation libertine,” he says of Norman (277).

    But the trading of insults should not distract us from the essay’s deeper, more daring move—publishing the interracial friendship of co-workers in the kingdom of American celebrity culture (to adapt Du Bois). Theirs is an intimacy founded on resemblance, which is why Baldwin says at the outset: “I have no right to talk about Norman without risking a distinctly chilly self-exposure.” They share life lived at a high altitude, a life of jostling camaraderie that for Baldwin was also a realm of equality. After all, one can be competitive only with someone you have already recognized as an equal. The two men both “get a big bang out of being the center of attention” and enjoy together the beach at Provincetown, and both collect an ‘entourage” “pitifully far beneath” them, and both face the conundrum that afflicts the famous (if not only them): how can I be released from “the prison of my own egocentricity?”

    Although “celebrity,” like “sophistication,” usually sums up for reflexive moralists the serpents in the garden of American innocence, the postwar world of American literary/cultural celebrity inhabited by a Baldwin, an Ellison, a Duke Ellington (among other paragons of style) was a new kind of aristocracy and furnished respite from the invidiousness of Jim Crow. For the price of entry neither whiteness nor blackness mattered, only success (“fame and money and love”) as measure and proof of one’s fulfillment of the ambition, shared by Baldwin and Mailer, to make a revolution in consciousness. This lofty goal required as many readers as possible, as much public “exposure” as possible—Baldwin achieved the cover of Time Magazine—and kept one busy making the endless rounds, among them Hugh Hefner’s Playboy mansion or David Susskind’s “Open End” talk show.  Baldwin said it was hard at a certain point to resist the “show business” of American celebrity.  He succumbed at times, we have seen; and Mailer did too. So by the end of the essay, when he learns that Norman is running for Mayor of New York, Baldwin says: “It’s not your job.”  “You son of a bitch, you’re copping out” because you are one of a very few who “might help to excavate the buried consciousness of this country” (283).

    Loyalty to the demands of one’s “job”—a nexus of aesthetic, ethical and political imperatives—is what Baldwin calls “responsibility.” And he demands it in a moment mixed with the anger and the respect and fraternal affection of one professional for another, both of whom are now on the inside of the global literary world, flirting with its constant lure of fatal capitulation to destructive narcissism. “The Black Boy Looks at the White Boy” permits us to see the rude candor of truth telling, the coercive masculine rituals, the envy and combat, the pleasure, the glamour, and affection, while insisting on ethical, political, aesthetic seriousness, in sum: commitment to one’s job. Rather than privileging this last quality, Baldwin’s sophistication exposes the whole panoply, calmly keeps all of this tumult in play by upholding “a kind of watchful, mocking distance between oneself as one appears to be and oneself as one actually is” (271). In other words, by banishing the Isabel Archer fantasy of transparency, he instead takes as a given the immobilizing roles—cliches and other forms of hyper-legibility that foreclose experience–that are the traps the world sets. Then he is able to let his “mocking“ self-consciousness function as the ”discipline” that unlocks these traps and releases the ease of his unprecedented performance of sophistication embodied in his “love letter” to Norman Mailer.

    As a kind of coda, I want to ask from whence did his sophistication come; that is, how did Baldwin become Baldwin?  As if in answer he pointed to improvisation.  I “had to make” myself “up” as I “went along,” he notes in “Black Boy Looks at the White Boy,” since “the world had prepared no place for you, and if the world had its way, no place would ever exist” (279).  Luckily, he had a guide, had been “taken in hand,” “escorted into the world,” as a ten year old, “by a young white schoolteacher, a beautiful woman, very important to me” (480).  Orilla “Bill” Miller conducted his aesthetic education, gave him “books to read and talked to me about the books, and about the world…and took me to see plays and films, plays and films to which no one else would have dreamed of taking a ten-year-old boy. I loved her, of course, with a child’s love; didn’t understand half of what she said, but remembered it; and it stood me in good stead later” (480). But it was what Bill Miller did not say but came to embody that most counted. Her cultivation of sophisticated taste in her protégé was important, but even more so was her whiteness. “It is certainly partly because of her, who arrived in my terrifying life so soon, that I never really managed to hate white people.”  Like Bette Davis–with her “pop-eyes popping,” who “when she moved, she moved just like a nigger”–proving that a rich white movie star could also be ugly (“She’s uglier than me!”) hence not inherently Other, Bill Miller fractured the sense of whiteness as the menacing monolithic enemy. In her bohemianism and radicalism, in her reliability and compassion and concern, she was not white for Baldwin in the way all other white people were. Her “difference,” he now realizes, had a “profound and bewildering effect on my mind…. From Miss Miller, therefore, I began to suspect that white people did not act as they did because they were white, but for some other reason. She too was treated like a nigger, especially by the cops, and she had no love for landlords” (482, 481).

    In her human goodness Bill Miller demystified “color” as an explanation for racism and planted the seed of Baldwin’s famous, seminal statement near the end of The Fire Next Time that “color is not a human or a personal reality; it is a political reality. But this is a distinction so extremely hard to make that the West has not been able to make it yet” (345-346). In other words, in conducting his aesthetic education, Bill Miller simultaneously politicized her precocious student. The political for Baldwin is close to the pragmatic for it involves asking oneself: what use can be made of the facts as we find them. What “use” can be made of my “strangeness,” my experiences, the “American Negro past,” he asks himself (345). And this habit of interrogation helped him avoid surrendering to white supremacy, avoid turning it into a fetish feeding boundless rage, which makes one sound, in this “racist country,”  “familiar and even comforting,” the “familiar rage confirming the reality of white power” (412).

    To temper one’s potentially devouring rage against white supremacy as all-powerful, and impervious, allows pragmatic, political moves. He salutes as “aristocrats” the black actors who make them. Baldwin uses the word to honor the endurance of black children calmly walking through vicious mobs to get to school.  Near the end of The Fire Next Time, he writes:  “The Negro boys and girls who are facing mobs today come out of a long line of improbable aristocrats—the only genuine aristocrats this country has produced…They were hewing out of the mountain of white supremacy the stone of their individuality…. I am proud of these people [here he is speaking also of “the unsung army” of black people who helped secure funds for black schools] not because of their color but because of their intelligence and their spiritual force and their beauty” (343-344).  They are “genuine aristocrats” because in their poise and sophistication they embody not only the “great spiritual resilience not to hate the hater,” but they also make something out of the condition in which they are embedded. They use it, “hewing” their inwardness, their individuality, “out of the mountain of white supremacy.”  Baldwin suggests that the capacity for making is not only a political but an aesthetic practice when tells his nephew at the end of his letter that begins The Fire Next Time, “You come from a long line of great poets, some of the greatest poets since Homer.” Poets, like aristocratic political actors, are precisely makers (poeisis), creators, who are transforming obdurate realities (294).

    Baldwin practiced the aristocratic making that he preached, using his experience to discover how the delusion of color functioned “as a weapon” to hide one’s “nakedness” and hence to thwart one’s capacity to love. Implicitly referring to his own life of loving white and black people, women and men, Baldwin remarks, “Love” is the “key” to “life itself,” a precious entrance that starts with self-knowledge. Intimacy pries “open the trap of color” to expose one’s “nakedness,” which has no color. “One must accept one’s nakedness”; this can come as “news only to those who have never covered, or been covered by, another naked human being” (366).  The other trap, the other flight from nakedness, was fixed identity (of race, of sexual preference). Identity is of course unavoidable but all depends on how one wears it. “Identity would seem to be the garment with which one covers the nakedness of the self: in which case, it is best that the garment be loose, a little like the robes of the desert, through which robes one’s nakedness can always be felt, and, sometimes, discerned. This trust in one’s nakedness is all that gives one the power to change one’s robes” (537).  To “trust in one’s nakedness”: such poise is not a Rousseauvian pursuit of transparency but rather the ultimate sophistication, emptying the word of its usual armor and artifice. Let this remarkable, insufficiently known statement (from The Devil Finds Work, 1976), stand as Baldwin’s distillation of his life and art’s still exhilarating, still daunting, imperative.

     

    Ross Posnock teaches American literature at Columbia University; his most recent book Renunciation: Writers, Artists and Philosophers who Abandon their Careers (Harvard, 2016) was a TLS Book of the year and short-listed for the Christian Gauss Award.

     

    References

    Baldwin, James. 1998. Collected Essays. New York: Library of America.

    Baldwin, James.  2011. The Cross of Redemption: Uncollected Writings. New York: Vintage.

    Baraka, Amiri. 1991. The LeRoi Jones/Amiri Baraka Reader. New York: Thunder’s Mouth.

    Barnouw, Jeffrey. 1993. “The Beginning of ‘aesthetics’ and the Leibnizian conception of sensation.” In Eighteenth-Century Aesthetics and the Reconstruction of Art, edited by P. Mattick, 52-95. Cambridge UK: Cambridge University Press.

    Bourdieu, Pierre. 1984. Distinction. Translated by Richard Nice. Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press.

    Brustein, Robert. 1964. “Everybody Knows My Name.” New York Review of Books, December 17.

    Buckley, William. F. 1965. Cambridge Union Debate with James Baldwin. 
    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oFeoS41xe7w

    Burke, Peter. 1995. The Fortunes of the Courtier. University Park, PA. Penn State University Press.

    Castiglione, Baldesar. 2002. The Book of the Courtier.  Translated by Charles Singleton. New York: Norton.

    Cohen, Rachel. 2004. A Chance Meeting. New York: Random House.

    Crase, Douglas. 2004. Both: A Portrait in Two Parts. New York, Pantheon.

    D’Angelo, Paolo. 2018. Sprezzatura: Concealing the Effort of Art from Aristotle to Duchamp. New York: Columba University Press.

    Dupee, F.W. 1963. “James Baldwin and the ‘Man.’ New York Review of Books, February 1.

    Fitzgerald, F. Scott. 1925. The Great Gatsby. New York: Scribner’s.

    James, Henry. 1984. Literary Criticism. New York: Library of America.

    Javitch, Daniel. 2002. “Preface.” Castiglione, Baldesar. 2002. The Book of the Courtier.  Translated by Charles Singleton. New York: Norton.

    Jefferson, Thomas. 1988. The Adams-Jefferson Letters. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.

    Kelly, Ian. 2006. Beau Brummell: The Ultimate Man of Style. New York: Free Press.

    Lawrence, D.H. 1971. Studies in Classic American Literature. London: Penguin.

    Leeming, David. 1994. James Baldwin: A Biography. New York: Knopf

    Leopardi, Giacomo. 2015. Zibaldone. Translated by Michael Caesar and Franco D’Intino et al. New York: Farrar, Straus.

    Litvak, Joseph. 1997. Strange Gourmets: Sophistication, Theory and the Novel. Durham, NC:, Duke University Press.

    McCarthy, Mary. 1989. “A Memory of James Baldwin.” New York Review of Books, May 27.

    Mailer. Norman. 1992. Advertisements for Myself. Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press.

    Mencken, H.L. 1987. H.L. Mencken’s Smart Set Criticism. Washington, D.C., Regnery.

    Menke, Christoph. 2012. Force: A Fundamental Concept of Aesthetic AnthropologyTranslated by Gerrit Jackson.  New York: Fordham University Press.

    Morrison, Allan. 1961. “The Angriest Young Man.” Ebony, October.

    Rousseau, Jean–Jacques. 1953. The Confessions. Translated by J.M. Cohen. London, Penguin.

    Rousseau, Jean–Jacques. 1964. The First and Second Discourses. Translated by Roger D. and Judith R. Masters. New York: St. Martin’s.

    Starobinski, Jean. 1988. Jean-Jacques Rousseau: Transparency and Obstruction. Translated by Arthur Goldhammer. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

    Tynan, Kenneth. 2002. The Diaries of Kenneth Tynan. London: Bloomsbury.

    Wilson, Edmund. 1993. The Sixties: The Last Journal, 1960-1972. New York, Farrar, Straus.

     

  • Brent Hayes Edwards — The Recourse to Internationalization: A Response to Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak

    Brent Hayes Edwards — The Recourse to Internationalization: A Response to Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak

    This is part of a dossier called “Du Bois in a Comparative Context.” The dossier emerges from an MLA Special Session in January 2018 of the same title, organized by Nergis Ertuk.

    by Brent Hayes Edwards

    “Du Bois in a Comparative Context” was the title of the session of the January 2018 Modern Language Association convention where I presented an initial version of this response to Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak’s essay “Du Bois in the World: Pan-Africanism & Decolonization.” The session title struck me as a usefully provocative way to frame Gayatri’s intervention, especially due to the double implication of the phrase. If it implies the question of what it means to read Du Bois across contexts—to see his work from different vantage points—it also raises the issue of considering Du Bois himself as a comparativist thinker. What would it mean to approach the monumental oeuvre of a man who in 1940 described the main current of his work over the previous fifty years as “centering around the hurts and hesitancies that hem the black man in America” (Du Bois 1986 [1940]: 551) as a model of comparative thought?

    Spivak’s essay is an attempt to think through the significance of what she describes as the ultimately “failed encounter” in 1946 between Du Bois and the great Indian jurist, economist, Dalit activist, and constitution-framer Bhimrao Ramji Ambedkar. As their brief correspondence demonstrates, both men were committed to “efforts at joining struggles,” she writes, but their epistolary encounter in 1946 was a “stood-up date”: a lost opportunity. Spivak analyzes the reasons this exchange proved to be a dead end. Although Du Bois told Ambedkar that he had “every sympathy with the Untouchables of India” (Du Bois 1946), she argues that he could not go beyond such a rhetorical gesture because Du Bois’s “understanding of Pan-Africanism, leading to the visionary world without colonialism, did not offer him an opportunity to get into struggles interior to colonized space.”

    When a connection is made between political struggles, Spivak notes, it is usually metonymic: a matter of focusing on one issue as the point of continuity (taking the part for the whole). In both cases, whether in Du Bois’s “stylized spectacular way” of exoticizing India in works like his 1928 novel Dark Princess, or in Ambedkar’s concerted efforts to study US race relations, the “metonymic obligation … backfired because they were both temperamentally and circumstantially in an amphibolic relationship with identitarianism; for both of them, identitarian thinking and acting both built and broke.”

    The efforts at joining struggles that were a driving force both in Pan-Africanism and in decolonization movements often rely on what Spivak terms “class-continuity”: the mutual recognition and attendant camaraderie among the elite. It is not uncommon for leaders of social movements such as Du Bois and Ambedkar to come into contact through this dynamic of recognition, a resonance between itineraries of privilege, summarized in her essay: “Harvard-Columbia-London School of Economics; top administrator and world-class intellectual; neither of them subaltern by birth.” It seems clear that in this case class-continuity was indeed the “first enabler,” as Spivak puts it.

    This was a repeated pattern in Du Bois’s links to the international vanguard of Pan-Africanism and decolonization, she writes, because his “anti-colonial connections were with the nationalist dominant.” Such an impulse is evident in Du Bois’s career even much earlier. When he wrote to Gandhi and Tagore in February 1929 to request that each send a message to be published in The Crisis, Du Bois stressed the exclusivity of his milieu, describing himself to Tagore as “the Editor of a small magazine which has a circulation of a little less than thirty thousand copies monthly among the educated Negroes,” and justified his request as one vanguard speaking to another: “I want the Negroes in this land to hear directly from a great leader of the Indian people” (Du Bois 1929; Gandhi 1929; Tagore 1929).

    At the MLA panel, I took the prompt of the session title to as an opportunity to pose a question: would it be right to describe the failed encounter between Du Bois and Ambedkar as a failure of comparison? Put differently, does their inability to join their struggles (through a metonymic understanding of each as part of a larger whole) amount to what one might term a methodological shortcoming or blind spot, or is it instead an ideological limitation (due to an identitarianism that finally proves to be too solipsistic)?

    Spivak’s essay also begins to make a case (promised to be further elaborated in the book-in-progress of which this piece is a section) that certain texts by Du Bois “stage an inability to imagine the subaltern episteme—stateless social groups on the fringe of history—to remind ourselves of Gramsci’s formula—as they prepare to step into citizenship,” although she insists that in Du Bois’s work, “this inability cannot be imagined or staged in the case of the interiority of the post-colonial.” By “stage an inability to imagine,” I take her to mean that the texts themselves perform that incapacity or dereliction, which is incorporated into their very form in a manner that is legible to the reader.

    Spivak highlights the unusual way Du Bois comes to employ the term caste throughout his writing in theorizing the regime of American racism: a formulation such as “color-caste” comes to serve as a “convenient abstraction” that helps him “to describe all the divisions that are not quite race or class, with internal ‘keep out’ rules.” With respect to the passages where Du Bois’s writing does succeed in staging an inability to imagine the subaltern episteme, I would only add that it seems necessary to distinguish between points where caste serves a term of critical analysis (as with his use of “color-caste”), and other points that might be described on the contrary as an internalization of what Gayatri calls “the natural-inequality story” (that is, the notion that “some people are just not good enough”) as a “very general analogy for a hierarchy that is neither race nor class.” One example of the latter is the startling paragraph in the fifth chapter of The Souls of Black Folk where Du Bois writes disparagingly of the founders of black universities such as Fisk, Howard, and Atlanta, that

    they forgot, too, just as their successors are forgetting, the rule of inequality:—that of the million black youth, some were fitted to know and some to dig; that some had the talent and capacity of university men, and some the talent and capacity of blacksmiths; and that true training meant neither that all should be college men nor all artisans, but that the one should be made a missionary of culture to an untaught people, and the other a free workman among serfs. And to seek to make the blacksmith a scholar is almost as silly as the more modern scheme of making the scholar a blacksmith; almost, but not quite. (Du Bois 2007 [1903]: 59-60)

    The proposition that Du Bois’s work can be understood as “staging an inability to imagine” also compelled me to revisit another of his most important transitional pieces from the interwar period: the article first published under the title “Worlds of Color” in Foreign Affairs in 1925 and subsequently reprinted in revised form later that year as “The Negro Mind Reaches Out” in the anthology The New Negro (Du Bois 1925; Du Bois 1989 [1925]; on the second as a revision of the first, see Edwards 2007: 128-29). After all, that piece is Du Bois’s attempt to discover an adequate figure for the way that, in the wake of World War One, “the race problem is the other side of the labor problem; and the black man’s burden is the white man’s burden…. [E]mpire is the heavy hand of capital abroad” (Du Bois 1989 [1925]: 386).

    The essay memorably makes recourse to yet another of Du Bois’s habitual optical concept-metaphors, figuring the relationship between capitalism and imperialism as a matter of shadows: “With nearly every great European empire to-day walks its dark colonial shadow…. One might indeed read the riddle of Europe by making its present plight a matter of colonial shadows, speculating on what might happen if Europe became suddenly shadlowless” (Du Bois 1989 [1925]: 386). The essay proceeds through a series of sections in which Du Bois deploys this figure in a description of the politics of labor in various European empires: “The Shadow of Portugal”; “The Shadow of Belgium”; “The Shadow of France”; “The Shadow of England.” Toward the end of the piece, in a section titled “Labor in the Shadows,” Du Bois strains to extend this figure in order to encompass the emergence of labor movements around the world. Currently, he observes, “white labor is segregating colored labor in just those parts of the world where it can be most easily exploited by white capital and thus giving white capital the power to rule all labor” (408). But “colored labor” knows this, he adds; “and as colored labor becomes more organized and more intelligent it is going to spread this grievance through the white world” (408).

    In the final section of the essay, Du Bois attempts to suggest the ways that this burgeoning organization of “colored labor” might result in fully-fledged anticolonial internationalism. “How much intelligent organization is there for this purpose on the part of the colored world?” he asks. “So far there is very little. For while the colored people of to-day are common victims of white culture, there is a vast gulf between the red-black South and the yellow-brown East” (408). The title of this final section invents a striking figure for the emergence of anticolonial internationalism—a “common consciousness of aim”—among peoples of color around the world: “The Shadow of Shadows” (408). “Some day they are bound to awake,” he predicts (411). Du Bois describes the “tangible accomplishment” of his own work in the Pan-African Congresses as “a little and negligible thing” (411), but an effort that is part and parcel of this broader emergence: “yet slowly but surely the movement grows and the day faintly dawns when the new force for international understanding and racial readjustment will and must be felt” (413).

    Spivak points out that over the course of his career—in a “sustained evolution” that can be traced from articles such as “Worlds of Color” all the way to his late Black Flame trilogy of novels—Du Bois took into account the way that “in colonialism, slavery became an instrument (however out of sync) of the self-determination of capital.” By the 1930s, with his magisterial Black Reconstruction, Du Bois was able to “write it into the world-historical discourse of Marxism, rewriting the color line, by way of colonialism, into brown, red, and yellow.”

    As I have suggested, we should understand “the shadow of shadows” as Du Bois’s first figure for this rewriting. But it is worth returning to, I think, because it is ultimately so strange and unwieldy—a figure hovering at the verge of incoherence. It represents something other than what Gayatri calls the “differential ontology of social formations,” in my opinion. The figure seems to collapse upon itself: is it really possible for a shadow to have a shadow, or for one shadow somehow to proliferate into a succession of other shadows? To further elaborate Gayatri’s argument, then, I wonder whether we might say that the figure of “the shadow of shadows” stages—in what is characteristic fashion for Du Bois: through the conundrum of an optical metaphor—the inability to imagine the ground of comparison: that is, the basis on which that metonymic obligation in “joining struggles” could be carried out.

    *  *  *

                Having had time to think a bit more about the correspondence between Du Bois and Ambedkar, I would like to pursue one other line of thought here. Revisiting the letters they exchanged in 1946, I wonder whether it really was a “failed encounter.” One could just as easily make the case that their back-and-forth was a clear and straightforward transaction in the spirit of solidarity. Ambedkar’s letter to Du Bois in July 1946 makes a specific request:

    I was very much interested to read that the Negroes of America have filed a petition to the U.N.O. The Untouchables of India are also thinking of following suit. Will you be so good as to secure for me two or three copies of this representation by the Negroes and send them to my address. I need hardly say how very grateful I shall be for your troubles in this behalf. (Ambedkar 1946)

    Ambedkar describes himself as a “student of the Negro problem” and explains that “there is so much similarity between the position of the Untouchables in India and of the position of the Negroes in America that the study of the latter is not only natural but necessary.” But the letter is basically a request for information. It makes a case for parallel strategies—each movement sending its own petition to the United Nations—but not for joining struggles.

    At the end of the month, Du Bois’s reply emphasizes his “sympathy for the Untouchables of India.” But he interprets Ambedkar’s request as a request to share information between parallel but discrete causes, and he fulfills it to the letter:

    As you say a small organization of American Negroes, The National Negro Congress has already made a statement which I am enclosing. I think, however, that a much more comprehensive statement well documented [sic] will eventually be laid before the United Nations by the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People. If this is done I shall be glad to send you a copy. (Du Bois 1946)

    Ambedkar’s message “did not catch fire” (to use Spivak’s phrase) because it was sent and received as a request for assistance between struggles marked by “similarity,” rather than as a means of proposing an avenue of collaboration. Du Bois’s posture—utilitarian solidarity (“I shall be glad to be of any service I can render if possible in the future,” he concludes his letter), not collaboration—takes us back to Spivak’s point that his “anti-colonial connections were with the nationalist dominant.” A decade later, when Du Bois writes a fascinating essay about Gandhi for an Indian periodical on the eve of the Civil Rights era, it’s the same thing—one vanguard learning strategy from another, but not a joining of struggles. After World War Two, Du Bois writes, “we American Negroes …. began too to realize the role of Gandhi and to evaluate his work as a guide for the black people of the United States” (Du Bois 1995 [1957]: 91). Again: a guide, not a fellow traveler.

    I have not touched upon one of the most important threads of Spivak’s essay: her argument that both Du Bois and Ambedkar were committed to “studying the greatest tools of generalization, as a member of the group that was not allowed to generalize, into the world-historical discourse of constitutionality.” Whether one is thinking of race or caste, whether one is thinking of the black poor in the US or the colonized in India, the great difficulty is that, as Spivak writes, “the fleshliness of the gendered episteme of the racialized and the fleshliness of the indefinitely heteronomous gendered episteme of the casted … cannot be generalized or analogized.” Either way, one is confronting “a situation that can only be generalized with real access to citizenship.”

    This is a complicated angle of comparison, Spivak admits, because while Ambedkar was one of the architects of the Indian constitution after independence in 1947, Du Bois was a “ferocious” critic of the perversities of the “constitution fetish” in the United States, where all too often fealty to the inviolability of the founding document of American democracy has come to serve as an alibi for the prolongation of racist oppression. Still, Spivak argues, both men saw citizenship grounded in the guarantees of state constitutionality as the primary, even the sole, mechanism for the achievement of full democracy and a “visionary world without colonialism.” Constitutionality, she concludes, “is the agenda for this failed date.”

    This is a crucial insight. In 1931, when Du Bois contributed an essay on “India and Africa” to a volume in honor of Tagore, he suggested that their interests “have more in common than the interests of either have with the ideals of modern Europe” (Du Bois 1931). It is “the dark millions of India and Africa and their descendants and kinsmen throughout the world,” Du Bois wrote, who “have upon their shoulders the vast responsibility of re-making this world nearer to the ideals of true civilization and high culture.” As he saw it, to fulfill that goal India and Africa would have to take up “mighty opportunity” provided by the two core advances of modernity: industry, on the one hand, and democracy, on the other. The ideal of democracy is rooted in “the fact that out of the masses of people can be developed just as much power and genius, ability and culture as has in the past been shown by the aristocracy, by the favored few.” Although Du Bois does not evoke it explicitly here, when he counsels that India and Africa “must educate and develop the masses of their people” he arguably takes for granted that such a project can only proceed on the basis of citizenship grounded in the protocols and guarantees of a constitution.

    Nevertheless, to return to the Du Bois-Ambedkar exchange, I am not entirely convinced that constitutionality was the unspoken and unfulfilled agenda of their interaction. It is worth reconstructing the historical context of that moment in 1946 to get a better sense of what Spivak calls the “contextual imperatives” of the broader political moment.

    The previous month, in June 1946, the National Negro Congress presented a petition largely written by Max Yergan, Revels Cayton, and Herbert Aptheker to the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations “on behalf of 13 million oppressed Negroes of the United States of America,” asking the UN to investigate the systemic oppression of the black population in the US as a human rights violation (National Negro Congress 1946). We should recall that, as historian Carol Anderson has observed, the impetus of the petition was expressly a rejection of constitutionality (Anderson 81). The very first document in the petition is a “letter of transmittal” from Max Yergan to Trygvie Lie, the Secretary General of the UN, in which Yergan explains that “we, a section of the Negro people, having failed to find relief from oppression through constitutional appeal, find ourselves forced to bring this vital issue—which we have sought for almost a century since emancipation to solve within the boundary of our country—to the attention of this historic body” (National Negro Congress 1946: 1).

    Although the petition was eventually blocked from full consideration in the UN—in no small part through the behind-the-scenes machinations of American delegates including Eleanor Roosevelt, who had grave concerns at the prospect of establishing a mechanism by which an “oppressed” minority “could get its case before the United Nations in spite of its own government” (quoted in Anderson 87)—other civil rights officials including Du Bois and Walter White found it to be an inspired strategy. As White put it, the National Negro Congress initiative “captured the imagination” of the black community by “lifting the struggle of the Negro” out of the “local and national setting and placing it in the realm of the international” (quoted in Anderson 91).

    Du Bois and White emerged as the driving forces behind an effort by the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) to draft a new petition that would build on the National Negro Congress attempt, but go farther. As Du Bois wrote to Ambedkar on July 31, he was confident that the NAACP would be able to prepare “a much more comprehensive” and “well documented” statement. Whereas the National Negro Congress petition ran to a mere fifteen pages, the NAACP assembled a team of researchers to compile a thorough dossier on the pervasive impact of racial discrimination in every aspect of American life, culminating in a hundred-page long petition titled An Appeal to the World! that was delivered to the UN in October 1947 (Plummer 178-84; Anderson 94-111; Dudziak 44-46).

    It is important to remember that the Economic and Social Council had only established the Commission on Human Rights in February 1946. When Du Bois and Ambedkar were writing each other the following summer, these were brand-new instruments, in other words. (The Universal Declaration of Human Rights would not be adopted until December 1948.) It is unsurprising that—from their separate vantage points, on different sides of the globe—Du Bois and Ambedkar were both keen to test the leverage that a recourse to internationalization might provide in the case of their different “minority” struggles. The point, however, is that unless we read them as concomitant strategies—through which one aims to up the ante by making a rights claim on the basis of an international “constitution” (the UN Charter) to find redress when the recourses provided by a national constitution prove to be a dead end—the agenda behind their exchange was internationalization rather than constitutionality.

    The month before the men corresponded, there was another important test case, an incident that Kamala Visweswaran notes may have even inspired Ambedkar to contact Du Bois (see Visweswaran 154). On 22 June 1946, India filed a formal complaint in the UN against the Union of South Africa regarding the mistreatment of Indian workers there. India charged that, by openly discriminating against Indian guest workers, the South African state had violated “a series of treaties whereby India would provide South Africa with laborers and the South African government would, in turn, ensure that the Indian workers enjoyed all ‘the rights and privileges of citizenship’” (Anderson 86). The South Africans attempted to mount a defense on the basis of the “domestic jurisdiction” clause of the UN Charter, which some interpreted as a severe restriction of the scope in which the UN could act: Article 2, paragraph 7 specified that the UN was not authorized “to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state” (Logan 90). According to the South African government, segregationist laws restricting Indian land ownership were not a treaty violation but strictly a domestic affair.

    The US delegates were troubled by the dispute because of the precedent it potentially represented. One US Senator admitted that he found it difficult to discern the difference between “Indians in South Africa and negroes in Alabama” (quoted in Anderson 87). In January 1947, a makeshift alliance among UN delegates from the Soviet bloc and from the emerging Third World drove the General Assembly to pass a resolution condemning the South African segregationist legislation as a violation of human rights. The South African government was instructed to bring itself into “conformity with the principles and purposes of the Charter” (Anderson 88-9). For African American observers including Max Yergan and Rayford Logan, this was a momentous development because it seemed to enshrine the principle that the international protection of human rights outweighed “domestic jurisdiction.” Logan drove home the point in his contribution to An Appeal to the World!, a chapter expounding the legal basis for protecting the “rights of minorities” under the UN Charter: with its January 1947 resolution, he argued, “the General Assembly has implicitly recognized that any act in violation of the principles set forth in the Charter is a matter of concern to all the Members of the United Nations and falls within the competence of the General Assembly irrespective of the nature of origin of the situation” (Logan 93-4).

    After Du Bois was able to stir up public pressure, the UN Commission on Human Rights finally agreed to receive An Appeal to the World! in October 1947, without making any commitment that its claims would be investigated or discussed at greater length, much less acted upon (Anderson 103-105; Dudziak 44). Interestingly, the NAACP team strove not only to document the breadth of American racism but also to frame it as an issue that went beyond the “domestic” treatment of African Americans alone. Du Bois was able to gather support from a range of foreign organizations, mostly Caribbean and African labor unions and national councils, as well as some of the groups that had coalesced around the 1945 Pan-African Congress in Manchester (the International African Service Bureau, the League of Coloured Peoples, and the West African Youth League) (see Plummer 181). In his introduction, Du Bois argued that “because of caste custom and legislation along the color line, the United States is today in danger of encroaching upon the rights and privileges of its fellow nations” (Du Bois ed. 1947: 13). Foreign visitors and even UN delegates had faced discrimination and violence in the United States when “mistaken for a Negro.” Du Bois conceded that “these are but passing incidents,” but insisted that

    a discrimination practiced in the United States against her own citizens and to a large extent a contravention of her own laws, cannot be persisted in, without infringing upon the rights of the peoples of the world and especially upon the ideals and the work of the United Nations.

    This question then, which is without doubt primarily an internal and national question, becomes inevitably an international question and will in the future become more and more international, as the nations draw together. (Du Bois ed. 1947: 13)

    Given that the NAACP was a non-governmental organization claiming to speak for a minority population in a member nation-state that was unwilling to bring the petition through official channels, the only way for An Appeal to the World! to get a hearing at the UN would have been for a member state to agree to sponsor it. Intriguingly, India emerged as a potential sponsor of the petition; as early as January 1947 the Indian delegation invited the NAACP drafters to give a briefing on its contents, and Du Bois found their reaction to be “friendly and sympathetic” (Plummer 179).

    That same month, however, Jawaharlal Nehru wrote to Indian emissaries in the US about the “Negro problem.” He emphasized that “our sympathies are entirely with the Negroes,” but instructed Indian representatives to “avoid any public expression of opinion which might prove embarrassing or distasteful to the Government or people of the country where they serve” (Slate 2012: 178). The Indian diplomatic corps should refrain from “participating in functions which deal with controversial domestic politics or with sectarian affairs” (Plummer 182). Under the circumstances, India did not offer to bring the petition forward to the General Assembly. In the end it was the Soviet Union that made the case in the Commission on Human Rights that the charges in An Appeal to the World! should receive further investigation and discussion by the General Assembly. The US delegation was able to portray the Soviet attempt as brazen Cold War propaganda, and the proposal ended up being defeated in December 1947.

    When one recalls the significance of 15 August 1947 for the “midnight’s children” generation in India, it is easy enough to conclude that—the class-continuity between Du Bois and Nehru notwithstanding—it must have seemed all too risky for a nation on the cusp of independence to sponsor such a petition. Still, if India had sponsored the NAACP An Appeal to the World! at the UN, it would have marked a notable collaboration, an “effort at joining struggles” in the interest of internationalization. More than the pragmatic and sympathetic exchange between Du Bois and Ambedkar, I would argue that this “missed date” was the real failed encounter between African America and India in the late 1940s in the overlaid shadows of Pan-Africanism and decolonization.

    *  *  *

    Gayatri’s essay culminates with an extremely dense and difficult question:

    So, I ask Hortense, do these differences, between the collective ontic and the differential ontology of social formations, between the ungeneralizable subaltern and the constitutional subject, qualify as a species of that abeyance of closure, that break in the passage of syntagmatic movement from one more or less stable property to another – two separate differences – in the dream of decolonization and the ruse of globality?

    Although it feels like something of a transgression to dare to answer a question so openly addressed to Hortense Spillers, I do want to close by outlining my own sense of an initial response.

    Earlier in the piece, Spivak quotes a passage from Spillers that is cited by Nahum Chandler in his groundbreaking book on Du Bois. The quotation comes from Spillers’s “Moving on Down the Line,” an essay first published in 1991, which as I understand it was originally a section of her unpublished doctoral dissertation on the African American sermonic tradition. She writes: “if by ambivalence we might mean that abeyance of closure, or break in the passage of syntagmatic movement from one more or less stable property to another, as in the radical disjuncture between ‘African’ and ‘American,’ then ambivalence remains not only the privileged and arbitrary judgment of a postmodernist imperative, but also a strategy that names the new cultural situation as a wounding” (Spillers 2003 [1991]: 262; Chandler 148-49).

    As Spillers explains, her own essay is a reading of “African-American sermons as a paradigm of the structure of ambivalence that constitutes the black person’s relationship to American culture and apprenticeship in it” (Spillers 2003 [1991]: 255). She proceeds through a virtuosic reading of the texts of two sermons given by two early African American preachers: Samuel Magaw’s inaugural sermon at the African Church of Philadelphia on 17 July 1794, and William Miller’s sermon at the African Church of New York on 1 January 1810. In saying that the sermons are documents of ambivalence, Spillers above all means to highlight the ways that Magaw and Miller handle the relation between the African ancestry and American circumstances of their free black audiences. Their sermons neither describe the transition to the United States as “progress” in any simple sense (much less triumph over “pagan” origins in Africa), nor privilege African identity in a rhetoric of proto-nationalism. Instead, in Miller’s sermon for instance, “‘Africa’ marks a site of degradation at the same time that Miller embraces it as a point of cultural origin” (260). For Spillers, this particular kind of “double-speaking” (261) represents an “abeyance of closure,” a paradigmatic staging of that broader ambivalence that structures the African American “apprenticeship” in American culture.

    The two, paired “differences” in Spivak’s question should not be conflated. The term “collective ontic” is a “solecism,” as Spivak admits; strictly speaking it is indeed something of a grammar violation to imply that the ontic could be somehow shared or recognized among a collectivity. I interpret the “collective ontic” as an allusion to the facticity of what Du Bois calls “color-caste”: the systemic disfranchisement and oppression of the African American population as a group. The “differential ontology of social formations” would seem to imply the complex dynamics of political positioning and vanguardism—for instance, Du Bois’s characteristic references to “college-trained men” as the necessary means of the “salvation” of the masses. If so, the “movement from one more or less stable property to another” would mean something rather different in this case than it does with regard to movement between the properties (“African” and “American”: ancestry and citizenship, one might say) that are poised in ambivalent relation in Miller’s sermon. In any case, for Du Bois, the “color-caste” regime touches the black elite as much as the masses; as he writes in his introduction to the NAACP petition, “the discrimination practiced in the United States is practiced against American Negroes in spite of wealth, training and character” (Du Bois 1947: 12). So it seems plausible to argue that the experiential difference between the collective ontic and the differential ontology of social formations could qualify as a species of the particularly African American abeyance of closure described by Spillers.

    I am less sure about the other pairing Spivak evokes, between the “ungeneralizable subaltern,” on the one hand, and the constitutional subject, on the other. To go back to two of Spivak’s earlier attempts to theorize the term, subaltern refers to “people from the very bottom layer of society excluded even from the logic of the class-structure” or, to put it in a more theoretical register of abstraction, “the absolute limit of the place where history is narrativized into logic” (Spivak 2001: 121; Spivak 1988: 207). In other words, subaltern is a way of marking an outside to the logic of social mobility and democratic participation in state politics. As Spivak writes, the whole problem is that the “fleshliness of the indefinitely heteronomous gendered episteme of the casted … cannot be generalized or analogized.” The only solution, she emphasizes, is “real access to citizenship.” But if that process is carried out—if one can indeed succeed in what Gayatri calls the “slow and persistent” work of building subaltern agency to the point where someone from that “bottom-layer” position does begin to gain the reflexes of democratic citizenship—then I don’t see how such an individual would experience or articulate the ambivalence Spillers describes. In theory, at least, in the transition from subaltern to citizen there should be no abeyance of closure. On the contrary, any such accomplishment would presumably have to involve a complete and unambiguous syntagmatic movement from one more or less stable property to another: a radical transformation, with no looking back.

    _____

    Brent Hayes Edwards is a Professor in the Department of English and Comparative Literature at Columbia University. His books include The Practice of Diaspora: Literature, Translation, and the Rise of Black Internationalism (Harvard University Press, 2003), Epistrophies: Jazz and the Literary Imagination (Harvard University Press, 2017), and the translation of Michel Leiris’s Phantom Africa (Seagull Books, 2017).

    _____

    Works Cited

    Ambedkar, B. R. 1946. Letter to W. E. B. Du Bois, July, 1946. Du Bois Papers. Special Collections and University Archives, University of Massachusetts Amherst Libraries. http://credo.library.umass.edu/view/full/mums312-b109-i132

    Anderson, Carol. 2003. Eyes off the Prize: The United Nations and the African American Struggle for Human Rights, 1944-1955. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Chandler, Nahum Dimitri. 2014. X— the Problem of the Negro as a Problem for Thought. Durham: Duke University Press.

    Du Bois, W. E. B., ed. 1947. An Appeal to the World! A Statement on the Denial of Human Rights to Minorities in the Case of Citizens of Negro Descent in the United States of America and an Appeal to the United Nations for Redress. New York: National Association for the Advancement of Colored People. https://archive.org/details/NAACP-Appeal-to-the-World

    Du Bois, W. E. B. 1986 [1940]. Dusk of Dawn: An Essay Toward and Autobiography of a Race Concept. In Writings, edited by Nathan Huggins. New York: Library of America, 1986. 549-802.

    Du Bois, W. E. B. 1995 [1957]. “Gandhi and the American Negroes.” Gandhi Marg [Bombay] (1957) 1, no. 3: 1-4. Collected in E. B. Du Bois: A Reader, edited by David Levering Lewis. New York: Henry Holt. 90-92.

    Du Bois, W. E. B. 1931. “India and Africa.” In The Golden Book of Tagore: a Homage to Rabindranath Tagore from India and the World in Celebration of his Seventieth Birthday, edited by Ramananda Chatterjee. Calcutta: The Golden Book Committee. Manuscript in Du Bois Papers, Special Collections and University Archives, University of Massachusetts Amherst Libraries. http://credo.library.umass.edu/view/full/mums312-b229-i056

    Du Bois, W. E. B. 1946. Letter to B. R. Ambedkar, 31 July 1946. Du Bois Papers. Special Collections and University Archives, University of Massachusetts Amherst Libraries. http://credo.library.umass.edu/view/full/mums312-b109-i133

    Du Bois, W. E. B. 1929a. Letter to Mahatma Gandhi, February 19, 1929. Du Bois Papers. Special Collections and University Archives, University of Massachusetts Amherst Libraries. http://credo.library.umass.edu/view/full/mums312-b181-i613

    Du Bois, W. E. B. 1929b. Letter from W. E. B. Du Bois to Rabindranath Tagore, February 19, 1929. Du Bois Papers. Special Collections and University Archives, University of Massachusetts Amherst Libraries. http://credo.library.umass.edu/view/full/mums312-b183-i406

    Du Bois, W. E. B. 1989 [1925]. “The Negro Mind Reaches Out.” In The New Negro, edited by Alain Locke. New York: Atheneum. 385–414.

    Du Bois, W. E. B. 2007 [1903]. The Souls of Black Folk, edited by Brent Hayes Edwards. New York: Oxford World’s Classics.

    Du Bois, W. E. B. 1925. “Worlds of Color.” Foreign Affairs 3, no. 3: 423–444.

    Dudziak, Mary L. Cold War Civil Rights: Race and the Image of American Democracy. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000.

    Edwards, Brent Hayes. 2007. “Late Romance.” In E. B. Du Bois and the Gender of the Color Line, edited by Susan Gillman and Alys Eve Weinbaum. University of Minnesota Press. 124-149.

    Edwards, Brent Hayes. 2003. “The Shadow of Shadows.” Positions: East Asia Cultures Critique 11, no. 1. 11-49.

    Gandhi, Mahatma K. 1929. “To the American Negro: A Message from Mahatma Gandhi.” The Crisis 36, no. 7: 225. Original manuscript collected in Du Bois Papers, Special Collections and University Archives, University of Massachusetts Amherst Libraries. http://credo.library.umass.edu/view/full/mums312-b211-i013

    Logan, Rayford W. 1947. “The Charter of the United Nations and Its Provisions for Human Rights and the Rights of Minorities and Decisions Already Taken Under This Charter.” In Du Bois ed. 1947. 85-94.

    National Negro Congress. 1946. A Petition to the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations on behalf of 13 Million Oppressed Negroes of the United States of America. National Negro Congress. https://archive.org/details/NNC-Petition-UN-1946

    Plummer, Brenda Gayle. 1996. Rising Wind: Black Americans and U.S. Foreign Affairs, 1935-1960. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.

    Slate, Nico. 2012. Colored Cosmopolitanism: The Shared Struggle for Freedom in the United States and India. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

    Spillers, Hortense J. 2003 [1991]. “Moving on Down the Line: Variations on the African-American Sermon.” Collected in Black, White and in Color: Essays on American Literature and Culture. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 251-276.

    Spivak, Gayatri Chakravorty. 2001. “Moving Devi.” Cultural Critique 47: 120-163.

    Spivak, Gayatri Chakravorty. 1988. “Subaltern Studies: Deconstructing Historiography.” In In Other Worlds: Essays in Cultural Politics. New York: Routledge. 197-221.

    Tagore, Rabindranath. 1929. “Message to the American Negro.” The Crisis 36, no. 10: 333-34. Original manuscript collected in Du Bois Papers, Special Collections and University Archives, University of Massachusetts Amherst Libraries. http://credo.library.umass.edu/view/full/mums312-b183-i048

    Visweswaran, Kamala. 2010. Un/common Cultures: Racism and the Rearticulation of Cultural Difference. Durham: Duke University Press.

  • Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak — Du Bois in the World: Pan-Africanism & Decolonization

    Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak — Du Bois in the World: Pan-Africanism & Decolonization

    This is part of a dossier called “Du Bois in a Comparative Context.” The dossier emerges from an MLA Special Session in January 2018 of the same title, organized by Nergis Ertuk.

    by Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak

    [OPENING AT 2018 MLA: Thank you, Nahum [Chandler], for being here.  I hope you will situate my paper within your thinking of “a problem for thought.” As I told you in personal conversation, I did not want you to be on the panel because you would be too authoritative for me.  But then I regretted that decision and asked you to be present among us. And thank you always, Brent [Edwards], for saying to me in 1991 that the work that I do could connect to a study of W.E.B. Du Bois. Enough said.]

    In 2009, I gave the Du Bois lectures in order to find an answer to the question: why did Du Bois call the fugitive slaves’ en masse joining of the Union army during the Civil War a general strike?  I have followed the trajectory of that answer through the last nine years. In this essay I will speak on a moment belonging to the broader narrative of Du Bois and decolonization. In conclusion I will touch on globality.

    In September 2017 I started co-teaching a course with Mamadou Diouf on Pan-Africanism and Postcolonialism. This topic touches the limits of Du Bois’s range. It situates enslavement in the American context as producing the African-American as a peculiar agent of undoing the color line. I go into more detail in the book of which this is an edited part (Spivak forthcoming).

    Du Bois’s Pan-Africanism is different from other versions. One might focus on four typical but different examples, always reminding oneself that this is by no means an exhaustive taxonomy: Flora Shaw Lady Lugard, Edmund Blyden, Marcus Garvey, and George Padmore.  Flora Shaw invoked Islamic pan-Africanism combined with racism against the Bantu, Blyden and Marcus Garvey incorporated it within the Pan-African argument of diasporic African resettlement within Africa, in quite different ways. Du Bois, by contrast, connected Pan-Africanism to the decolonization of all African nation-states, and went further to include full international decolonization in that connection.

    Du Bois is generally seen as the father of Pan-Africanism. But it is also well-known that it had its origin in Trinidad, in the risk-taking efforts of a diasporic in Britain, Henry Sylvester -Williams by name, who focused on all Blacks colonized by Britain. Henry Sylvester-Williams organized the Pan-African Association in 1897 and also organized the first International Conference, in London, in 1900, where Du Bois was a guest and began expanding the color line to all colonized countries. Sylvester-Williams died in 1911 and the connection of Pan-Africanism with the British Commonwealth did not remain ideologically foregrounded, although it remained pre-comprehended in the work of C.L.R. James and George Padmore.

    To retrieve Du Bois’s track to Pan-Africanism, we must relate it to the activist scholarship of George Padmore (1903-59) who, as a younger Trinidadian, was no doubt touched, however indirectly, by Sylvester-Williams’s opening of seven Pan-African centers in Trinidad.  Even if we consider only Padmore’s Pan-Africanism or Communism? (Padmore 1956), we get a detailed sense of the status of Pan-Africanism in the historically differentiated nation-states of the entire African continent. Indeed, much of what Padmore locates as problems are relevant to the continent today. His work gives us a sense of the importance of constitutionality, and presents the manifestoes of each of the Congresses.  For the purposes of this essay, what is notable is that within each Manifesto, forwarded to colonial governments as a gesture of resistance, Gandhian principles are tabulated as the guiding principle of each Congress.

    In 1946, on the eve of Indian Independence, Bhimrao Ramji Ambedkar, a member of the Viceroy’s legal council, and a critic of Gandhi because of Gandhi’s caste-Hindu subject-position of “tolerance,” wrote Du Bois, asking him about the possibility of an African-American petition to the UN, hoping to launch such a petition from the untouchables of India. Ambedkar, the framer of the Indian constitution, was from a so-called untouchable caste.

    Figure 1: Letter from Bhimrao Ramji Ambedkar to W.E.B. Du Bois, 1946. Courtesy of University of Massachusetts-Amherst Special Collection
    Figure 2: Letter by W.E.B. Du Bois to Bhimrao Ramji Ambedkar, 1946. Courtesy of University of Massachusetts-Amherst Special Collection

    Du Bois wrote back, saying he knew about untouchability, but the conversation did not go any further, for the attempt to put together such a petition died in the UN. There is now a strong movement to bring African-American struggles together with the largely South Indian (although many Dalit intellectuals are located in well-known North Indian universities) Dalit strike against caste prejudice. This is a good effort, but we also need to remember that post-colonialism and Pan-Africanism, efforts at joining struggles, were anterior to the kind of class-specific collaborations that globality produces today. I believe that Du Bois did not go any further with Ambedkar because his understanding of Pan-Africanism, leading to the visionary world without colonialism, did not offer him an opportunity to get into struggles interior to colonized space. Du Bois’s novel, The Dark Princess, exoticizes a “noble” India, that is even Aryanist — Brahminism, Buddhism, and Islam mixed up in the stylized spectacular way of a romance that asks the reader to remember A Midsummer Night’s Dream.[1]It reflects the desire to overcome the class-specific problem of access to the subaltern but does not have the resources to imagine a plausible fulfillment.[2] 

    The failed encounter between Du Bois and Ambedkar can be read as a stood-up date or faux-bond. Chandler would no doubt dizzyingly theorize Derrida’s Ja ou le faux-bond where the “yes” is staged as a stood up date between plan and performance.[3]

    I will follow Chandler’s lead as I imagine it and note that because of this anaclitic reading of “yes,” Derrida urges in that early piece – in order constantly to make the appointment happen? — that we must (il faut – noting the “fault” (faut) line written into the French “must” [il faut] – suggesting that we will always not quite make it while doing what we must – the effort continues indefinitely as the generations change):

    fight… for a massive transformation of the apparatuses. . . work in several directions, in several rhythms… In order to hold these two unequal necessities together and differentiate systematically a (“theoretical” and “political”) practice, a general upheaval imposes itself: not only as a theoretical or practical imperative, but already as a proceeding under way, one which invests, envelops, overflows us in an unequal fashion. (Derrida 1995, 58-59)

    That is what a “yes” is like, always a missed date – working at externally generated conjunctural imperatives that change unendingly and must be differentiated as theory and politics. Theory and politics are the practices involved here, apposite to the Du Bois-Ambedkar situation. In the space between the appointment and the indefinitely prolonged “missing it,” unrolls the historial (the possibility of study as temporal sequence) – not always historiographed (organized into official history) – as it has not been in this particular case.

    Both pre-digital and digital efforts at joining struggles are helped when there is a certain degree of class-continuity on both sides. This usually relates to the leadership of the struggles. In Du Bois’s library is a book on Gandhi put together on Gandhi’s 75th birthday, hand-dedicated to Du Bois by Jawaharlal Nehru, India’s first Prime Minister.

    Figure 3: Photograph of Gandhiji: His Life & Work, 2012. Courtesy of Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak.
    Figure 4: Photograph of Gandhiji: His Life & Work, 2012. Courtesy of Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak.
    Figure 5: Photograph of Gandhiji: His Life & Work, 2012. Courtesy of Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak.

    These are his connections, the connections enjoyed by Joseph Appiah, or Kofi Awoonor.  Du Bois’s particular friend is Lala Lajpat Rai. His sources for Dark Princess are Rai and perhaps Shridhar Venkatesh Ketkar, a Cornell PhD who taught at my own university (University of Calcutta) and wrote books among which is a History of Caste in India: Evidence of the Laws of Manu on the Social Conditions in India during the Third Century A.D. Interpreted and Examined: With an Appendix on Radical Defects of Ethnology.[4]

    Ketkar, like Ambedkar in the graduate paper I cite below, concentrates on marriage rules – caste is a way of helping preserve social order through the patriarchal manipulation of gendering. Although Du Bois is of course deeply aware of rape and miscegenation, his use of “caste” is much closer to the self-convinced hierarchy half-mockingly described in Marx’s description of so-called primitive accumulation.

    Long, long ago there were on one side a diligent, intelligent and above all frugal elite and on the other lazy, ragged characters who blew off all they had and more.  The legend of the theological Fall of Man may tell us how man came to be cursed to eat his bread by the sweat of his brow; the history of the economic Fall of Man reveals to us how there were people who did not need this at all.  Same difference. So it came to pass, that the former accumulated wealth, and the latter finally had nothing to sell but their own skins. And from this Fall dates the poverty of the great masses, that up to now, despite all their labor, have nothing to sell but themselves, and the wealth of the few, that increases constantly, although they have long ceased to labor. (Marx 1977, 1:873)

    This is something like caste, if you like. Some people are just not good enough, others, superior to them, must “help” them by letting them serve. That is the story that justifies inequality. But that is not the flesh of the three thousand castes (with subcastes) among the Hindus. The natural-inequality story is a very general analogy for a hierarchy that is neither race nor class. It is in this sense that Du Bois uses the phrase “color caste” in the Black Flame Trilogy.[5]

    (Rai’s The United States of America: A Hindu’s Impressions is a hardly disguised orientalist-nationalist claim that the caste-system works better than U.S. race-classism.)

    These are broadly class-continuous connections.  The class-continuity in the case of Du Bois-Ambedkar is even stronger, Harvard-Columbia-London School of Economics; top administrator and world-class intellectual; neither of them subaltern by birth — Du Bois was in the Black middle class, and Ambedkar’s father was a Subehdar in the Army (although they did of course both suffer from race/caste discrimination when they stepped out into mixed territory).  Perhaps the most important of all the connectivities is that Ambedkar wore his Brahmin teacher’s surname and, as Du Bois shows us in his paternal genealogy, the 17th century Chretien Du Bois was white.  I can think that they quietly acknowledged complicity and allowed their practice to be stronger, not speaking for but coming up against what is not their class origin, in the name of constitutionality.[6]

    This is where Chandler’s reading of Du Bois’s biography of John Brown as an “African American,” the abolitionist white man who gave his life for the “Negro,” is superb.  Du Bois’s hero, Manuel Mansart, puts it more simply in a bit of free indirect discourse in The Ordeal of Mansart:

    The students talked frankly about white people in the surrounding world; they did not like them; they did not trust them.  There were always exceptions, and favorite white teachers like Spence and Freiburg were in some subtle, unexplained way incorporated into their own black race — a method all the easier since they too, suffered under the Southern white world’s ostracism and persecution. (Du Bois 1959, 125-6)

    (The connections being insisted upon along the conference circuit today are a version of global “simultaneity,” used to produce thinkers organic to the networking ideology of global capital.)

    Internal to the colonized space, Ambedkar is utterly justified in writing of Gandhi, in the preface to the 2nd edition of The Annihilation of Caste: “. . . to many a Hindu he is an oracle, so great that when he opens his lips it is expected that the argument must close and no dog must bark. [4:] But the world owes much to rebels who would dare to argue in the face of the pontiff and insist that he is not infallible.”  Gandhi’s erratic racism record in South Africa is now well documented.[7]

    And Pan-Africanism, as Padmore shows us, was heart and soul committed to Gandhi’s declared politics in India. Du Bois marked out all the strike-related passages in the Gandhi volume in his library that I have pointed at above.

    The connection, then, between parts joining struggles with caste/class-continuity, is generally metonymic, the leaders and the group focusing on an issue and its ramifications, leaving other items – sometimes perhaps potentially divisive – out of bounds while the struggle is celebrated.

    In the case of the brief exchange between Du Bois and Ambedkar, class-continuity was the first enabler. It was the further metonymic obligation – as subjects against race and caste respectively — that backfired because they were both temperamentally and circumstantially in an amphibolic relationship with identitarianism; for both of them, identitarian thinking and acting both built and broke. (Examples are too pervasive to cite.) “I have suffered from racism as you from casteism” did not catch fire, because Du Bois’s anti-colonial connections were with the nationalist dominant. Du Bois had worked to take Africanity beyond the unique separator of enslavement. He took into account, as indeed did Marx, that in colonialism, slavery became an instrument (however out of sync) of the self-determination of capital. This allowed him to write it into the world-historical discourse of Marxism, rewriting the color line, by way of colonialism, into brown, red, and yellow. His efforts at making these connections were in sustained evolution, and found literary expression in the Black Flame trilogy. Reading and writing in prison, Antonio Gramsci had tried to understand the Sards (natives of Sardinia, Gramsci’s birthplace) as serfs, from Rome to the 20th century, writing in Book 25 of his prison journals. Ambedkar, as a practical politician who had earned his way to the top in a postcolonial situation, asked for a separate electorate for the untouchables (and failed, of course). One must note these contextual imperatives as one equalizes.

    As a youthful graduate student, Ambedkar, in a 1916 essay written for a graduate seminar, was rewriting caste into reproductive heteronormativity – to urge that caste was constituted by the difference in the treatment of surplus-women and surplus-men produced by enforced endogamy — and finally, studying the greatest tools of generalization, as a member of the group that was not allowed to generalize, into the world-historical discourse of constitutionality. This final self-staging was shared by the two, but it was this very thing that did not allow Du Bois to check out the interior color-lines (so to speak) of the progressive bourgeoisie that could unite to call for an end to colonialism. (Let us once again remember Padmore’s documentation of the intimate connection between Pan-Africanism and Gandhianism.) It was Columbia to Harvard, as it were, not a commerce between individual ethnocultures.

    Allison Powers has written on Du Bois’s ferocious critique of U. S. “democratic” travesty of constitutionality (2014: 106-125). I cannot reproduce her complex argument here. I can only point out that she clearly shows that Du Bois’s argument against the “constitution fetich [sic]” is against the fetishization of the original American constitution (Du Bois 1935: 267f). Her conclusion recognizes that Du Bois does not offer a solution to the problem of access to constitutionality but rather quotes “the slight gesture” invoked on the last page. That poetic signal by Du Bois points at the development of imaginative flexibility that comes with what I have elsewhere called “an aesthetic education.” I am not sure that this is a “failure.” When she contrasts Du Bois and Ambedkar, she needs to recognize that Ambedkar was framing a constitution, whereas Du Bois was fighting a famously fetishized one that continues to be fetishized today, for race- and gun-control. Of course Ambedkar finally claimed that he had failed in his task and perhaps this too can allow us to think them together. Anupama Rao correctly notices that Ambedkar’s “attempt to redress the inequities [of caste] through political means was at some level an impossible project that emphasized the contradiction between caste and democracy, rather than resolving it” (Rao 2009: 157).  There is a comparable (though not identical) contradiction between race and democracy. This is part of the fact that the rational abstractions of the political and the juridico-legal must always be bound to the textuality of life. The constitutional subject, uniting our two protagonists, is never achieved – keeping open the historiality of the missed date – not yet historiographed, for race or caste. It is to Du Bois’s phrase “prejudice made flesh” that attention must here be drawn (1935: 323). It is the fleshliness of the gendered episteme of the racialized and the fleshliness of the indefinitely heteronomous gendered episteme of the casted that cannot be generalized or analogized. (I try to norm it at the bottom by teaching democracy as “other people” rather than “my rights” to the poorest of the poor. But that too is not generalizable.) This is part of the challenge of the raced universal or the casted universal of the constitutional subject.[8]

    Always working toward an impossible appointment between flesh and the law.

    The commerce between Orientalized and claimed ethnocultures has apparently expanded considerably, accompanying the expansion of diasporas, in the U.S. as a direct consequence of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965, which abolished the quota system based on national origins that had been U. S. immigration policy since the 1920s; supplemented by the global accessibility enhanced by the digital. Without deep language learning and awareness of cognitive damage resulting from the generalized exercise of millennial pre-colonial ethnocultural structures of power, connected-struggle efforts are good against racism but not against its legitimation by reversal, and do not support or engage with the slow and persistent work for building subaltern agency. The fleshliness of the diasporic claiming conference-culture is imagined national-origin rather than active caste-subjectivity at the bottom. From his handwritten notes in the pages of the African language related books in the core collection (now neglected and open – literally, in unlocked cabinets in a small unlocked room – to imminent destruction and disappearance) Du Bois took with him to Ghana in his nineties, his awareness of the need to achieve cognitive continuity is impressive for any age.

    For he imagined the need to achieve that continuity, but did not deny its impossibility. The effort is restricted to minute handwritten marginalia.

    Here a word to Dalit friends in the academy and the global cultural sphere: we must be able to admit that historical crimes damage the cognitive machine. Exceptional subalterns and/or class-empowered academic members of Dalit struggles do not represent those who remain at the bottom. Vanguardist struggles do not necessarily consolidate a future.

    In Talking to Du Bois, I have tried to show that certain of Du Bois’s texts stage an inability to imagine the subaltern episteme – stateless social groups on the fringe of history – to remind ourselves of Gramsci’s formula – as they prepare to step into citizenship. But this inability cannot be imagined or staged in the case of the interiority of the post-colonial. Lumumba and Fanon, “the tall one and the short,” both of whom came to the 1958 All-African People’s Congress, the first Congress on African space, need to be remembered here. They were both deeply aware of the internal ethnic problems of the post-colonial nation, and Lumumba was killed by it, albeit with the collusion of the CIA. We need also to remember that Ambedkar could not imagine Palestine. He wrote small interventions comparing the image between slavery and untouchability. This is for ourselves to be aware that there are deep historical limitations to the flexibility of our own identities.[9]

    This inability to imagine the interiority of a class-fixed postcolonial does not stop “caste” from being a useful word for the Abolitionists through to Pan-Africanism – to describe all the divisions that are not quite race or class, with internal “keep out” rules. Padmore certainly uses it in many crucial passages, as does Du Bois. As I have indicated above, it is a convenient abstraction but cannot grasp the ungeneralizable fleshliness that belongs to the casted subaltern.

    The most crucial use of “caste” by Du Bois is in his 1948 rejection of the “talented 10th”– the idea that the most intelligent among African-Americans should take it into their hands to help the rest:

    Turn now to that complex of social problems, which surrounds and conditions our life, and which we call more or less vaguely, the Negro Problem. It is clear that in 1900, American Negroes were an inferior caste, were frequently lynched and mobbed, widely disfranchised, and usually segregated in the main areas of life. As student and worker at that time, I looked upon them and saw salvation through intelligent leadership; as I said, through a “Talented Tenth.” And for this intelligence, I argued, we needed college-trained men. Therefore, I stressed college and higher training. For these men with their college training, there would be needed thorough understanding of the mass of Negroes and their problems; and, therefore, I emphasized scientific study. Willingness to work and make personal sacrifice for solving these problems was of course, the first prerequisite and Sine Qua Non. I did not stress this, I assumed it. I assumed that with knowledge, sacrifice would automatically follow. In my youth and idealism, I did not realize that selfishness is even more natural than sacrifice. I made the assumption of its wide availability because of the spirit of sacrifice learned in my mission school training. (Du Bois, “The Talented Tenth Memorial Address” 3)

    Earlier, in the 1905 meeting which gave rise to the Niagara Movement, number four of the eight-point program drafted by Du Bois was “the abolition of all caste distinctions based simply on race and color” (Padmore 1956, 112).

    This is traveling theory, expanding the range of the word “caste,” as generalized reaction to the word “race,” not to get into the thick of the word, into the “collective ontic,” to commit a solecism. Analogous – not that one ever escapes analogy – yet we must maintain a differential taxonomy.

    A last brutal shift into globality, the dream of decolonization under a reality check.  The academic intellectual needs to prepare the ground once again – for an epistemological relocation exorbitant to national liberation – and work for the insertion of the subaltern into constitutionality – the place where Du Bois and Ambedkar meet. The constitutional subject is without identity.

    Nahum Chandler invokes the idea that all generalities are also caught in particularities.  To consolidate this suggestion, he quotes Spillers’s thought of ambivalence. “But if by ambivalence we might mean that abeyance of closure,” she writes, “or break in the passage of syntagmatic movement from one more or less stable property to another, as in the radical disjuncture between ‘African’ and ‘American,’ then ambivalence remains not only the privileged and arbitrary judgment of a post-modernist imperative, but also a strategy that names the new cultural situation as a wounding.”[10]

    The gender-race-class-crosshatched person who occupies the empty space of the constitutional subject for each case is irreducible.  And today, in globality, we do not need the so-called decolonized citizen to tell us the wound is healed.  We need to hear the historical subaltern to feel the wound.

    I will quote the speech in Tallapoosa County Alabama by a man named Alfred Gray . . .  Gray was speaking at a meeting on the eve of elections for the state constitution, which were to take place on February 4, 1868.

    The constitution I came here to talk, 1868, I came here to talk for it. If I get killed, I will talk for it.  Am I afraid to fight the white man for my rights? No. I may go to Hell. My home is Hell. But the white man shall go there with me. My father, God damn his soul to Hell, had 300 niggers, and his son’s son, his son, sold me for $1,000. Was this right?  No. I feel the damned spirit of damnation in me and will fight for our rights until every rascal who chase niggers with hounds is in Hell. Remember the Fourth of February.  We’ll fight until we die, or we’ll carry this constitution. (qtd by Allen 1937, 123-135)

    Mama’s baby, papa’s maybe. In this kind of a situation, the fact that it is the mother who becomes the motor of the argument is historically not only acceptable, but necessary. In that empty position without the mark of legitimacy, we must be able to reclaim the constitutional state over against the state that today manages global capital, so that we walk the walk against my father’s son who, legitimized by capital, knifes me in the back for profit. By analogy, remember – as in the case of caste. All the reading required is the daily news. Flint Michigan and Lagos Nigeria.

    So, I ask Hortense, do these differences, between the collective ontic and the differential ontology of social formations, between the ungeneralizable subaltern and the constitutional subject, qualify as a species of that abeyance of closure, that break in the passage of syntagmatic movement from one more or less stable property to another – two separate differences – in the dream of decolonization and the ruse of globality?

    [POSTSCRIPT]  In The Republic of Caste, Anand Teltumbde gives a detailed analysis of Ambedkar and the Dalit movement in general, clear out of ancestor worship. For the purposes of this brief essay, the point to be noted from within his complex analysis is today’s intense competition among Indian sub-castes to claim state-sanctioned reservation. As he writes,

    on 1 August 2009, the vidvatsabha (council of intellectuals), an initiative led by Prakash Ambedkar [the grandson of B.R. Ambedkar], organized a seminar in Mumbai on the unlikely subject of reservation within reservations. It suggested that reservations for the S[chduled]C[aste]s, which have been disproportionately accessed by a single sub-caste in every state, should be subdivided among all sub-castes in the SC category to ensure that equitable benefit accrues to all of them.[11]

    Du Bois knew well that the analogy works through voting block politics – an abuse of constitutionality – I invoke the Black Flame Trilogy once more. Constitutionality, then, is the agenda for this failed date. We continue to work at it – caste as analogy for the Black diasporic. To compute it in African terms, we go to ethnic groups, and we get mired in singularities. Ambedkar’s focus on a largish nation-state would get lost upon the vast continent. Yet even there a certain generalizability comes through citizenship. Rest upon those abstract structures if you want to historiograph the historial.

    Bibliography

    Allen, James S. Reconstruction: The Battle or Democracy, 1865-1876. New York: New World.

    Ambedkar, B.R. 1937 The Annihilation of Castes, With a reply to Mahatma Gandhi (Tracts for the times), 2nd edition.

    Derrida, Jacques. 1995.  ‘Ja, or the faux-bond II.’ Translated by Peggy Kamuf, in Points…Interviews, 1974–94, 58-9. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

    Du Bois, W.E.B. 1935. Black Reconstruction in America, 1860 – 1880. New York: Free Press.

    Du Bois, W.E.B. 1959. The Ordeal of Mansart. New York: Oxford University Press.

    Du Bois, W.E.B. 1948 “The Talented Tenth Memorial Address,” The Boulé Journal 15, no. 1: 3-13.

    Padmore, George. 1956. Pan-Africanism or Communism?: the Coming Struggle for Africa. New York: Roy.

    Powers, Allison. 2014. “Tragedy Made Flesh: Constitutional Lawlessness in Du Bois’s Black Reconstruction.Comparative  of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East 34, no. 1: 106-125.

    Rao, Anupama. 2009. The Caste Question: Dalits and the Politics of Modern India. Berkeley: Univ. of California Press.

    Marx, Karl. 1977. Vol. 1 of Capital: A Critique of Political Economy. Translated by Ben Fowkes. New York: Vintage.

    Spivak, Gayatri Chakravorty. Forthcoming. Talking to Du Bois. Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press. 

    [1] Although there is an unconvincing and isolated remark against Aryanism in the final section of the book, where the robust realism of the Chicago accounts in the novel is replaced by a series of autobiographical bulletins from both sides, largely in the form of letters, ending in a meeting.  It is as if the “romance” section uses the most expository style.  Brent Edwards points at Du Bois’s own invocation of the romance-status of the novel in The Practice of Diaspora Literature, Translation, and the Rise of Black Internationalism (Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 2003, 234-236) and underscores the complexity of the man but does not comment on this stylistic unevenness of the text.

    [2] Books such as Dorah Ahmad’s plangent Landscapes of Hope: Anti-Colonial Utopianism in America (Oxford Univ. Press, 2009), Nico Slate’s Colored Cosmopolitanism: the Shared Struggle for Freedom in the United States and India, as well as Vivek Bald’s ongoing work on bengaliharlem.com typically speak of connections with sectors that have nothing to do with the located populations in African states and India, and of course not at all with the located ungeneralizable voting subalterns, each specific to a situation that can only be generalized with real access to citizenship. And that is the point I am making. (Slate’s book is somewhat of an exception to this and I will engage with it at length elsewhere.)  In an article called “Caste or Colony? Indianizing Race in the United States,” for example, Daniel Immerwahr writes interestingly, contrasting two texts, that they show “the irreconcilability of two competing visions of how blacks in the US are understood to relate to Indians: one vision identifying race with caste, the other identifying race with colony,” (Modern Intellectual History 4. ii, 2007, p. 275); his references are also to the usual populations, but he might be aware of this; what is alarming is that in the “colony” version, he does not recognize that the text he is looking at is based on an Orientalist view of Hinduism, as “naturally” understanding of non-violence, just as Orientalist views of Buddhism do not recognize the genocidal drive of ethnic Buddhists toward the Rohingyas; and, in the “caste” version, he still clings to the centrality of the Varna and Jati binary opposition that is undone every day on the subcontinent. His excellent list of “Paul Gilroy, Penny M. Von Eschen, Sudarshan Kapur, Brenda Gayle Plummer, Robin D. G. Kelley, Vijay Prashad, Nikhil Pal Singh [who], among others, have demonstrated beyond refutation the persistence and centrality of internationalism in US black thought” (276), does not touch the problem that I am commenting on. Please refer to the text for my understanding of the particular agency of the African-American subject in the thinking of Pan-Africanism, where I stand with, among others, Abiola Irele, The African Scholar (Lagos: Bookcraft, forthcoming).  I treat this problem in greater detail in my forthcoming Talking to Du Bois.

    [3] I say this because of Chandler’s good theorizing of Du Bois’s work as rewriting general ontology in X: The Problem of the Negro As A Problem for Thought (New York: Fordham Univ. Press, 2014).

    [4] Calcutta: Thacker, 1914; Jaipur: Rawat Publications, 1979.

    [5] Du Bois, The Ordeal of Mansart, Mansart Builds A School, Worlds of Color ([1957-61] New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1961-) are Du Bois’s best novels, a fictive representation of Black Reconstruction.

    [6] “Up against” is my translation of tout contre in a powerful passage where Assia Djebar counsels us as to how to “speak” on behalf of those who are tied to us by identity, though not by class (Women of Algiers in Their Apartment, tr. Marjolijn de Jager, Charlottesville: Univ. Press of Virginia, 1992), 2.

    [7] Colored Cosmopolitanism can serve as a well-documented guide.

    [8] “Du Bois’s work invites the supplement of a third term: the raced universal” (Lawrie Balfour, Democracy’s Reconstruction: Thinking Politically with W.E.B. Du Bois, Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 2011), 133.

    [9] For an analysis of the difference between Ambedkar and the Ambedkarites, see Anand Teltumbde, The Republic of Caste: Thinking Equality in the Time of Neoliberal Hindutva (Delhi: Navayana, 2018).

    [10] Nahum Dimitri Chandler, X — The Problem of the Negro as a Problem for Thought (Fordham Univ. Press, 2014), p. 148-9

    [11] Teltumbde, Republic, 87.  The long-term solution is humanities-style education, not unmindful of critical mainstreaming, by well-trained individuals, an impossible prospect. Du Bois’s own project of producing an informed and critical black voter class was not allowed to continue at the University of Atlanta.  Information about this is readily available in biographies, but, to my mind, the best account is to be found in his thinly disguised James Burghardt in The Ordeal of Mansart. Ambedkar did not live long enough to devote any real time to this sort of education.  Gramsci’s intuitions for producing subaltern intellectuals remain buried in his prison journals. My own minuscule effort, , outside of the Du Bois-Ambedkar exchange, described in “Margins and Marginal Communities: A Practical Keynote,” was first presented at Maulana Abul Kalam Azad Institute of Asian Studies, Kolkata, December 17, 2013, and is now forthcoming with Sage in ‘Margins’ and ‘Marginal’ Communities in the Asian Perspective: Identity and Resistance, edited by Nandini Bhattacharya Panda.

  • Justin Raden — Review of Gilbert Simondon’s On the Mode of Existence of Technical Objects

    Justin Raden — Review of Gilbert Simondon’s On the Mode of Existence of Technical Objects

    a review of Gilbert Simondon, On the Mode of Existence of Technical Objects (University of Minnesota Press, 2016)

    by Justin Raden

    In a recently translated interview, Bernard Stiegler makes a strong appeal for an unlikely partnership between technical knowledges and philosophy. Stiegler chides and ventriloquizes “academic philosophy” for its proud negligence when it comes to technical knowledge. “As if,” he says, “we could ever feel proud of not understanding how a system functions.” He continues: “How can we claim to understand anything about Hegel if we do not feel capable of understanding the functioning of a diode? Hegel, who himself wrote on electricity, would have undoubtedly found this ludicrous.”[i] Such an appeal is typical of Stiegler, whose opus, the three-volume Technics and Time, begins by claiming that the history of philosophy is the history of the suppression of technics. But what do diodes have to offer philosophy or any discipline outside of electrical engineering? How is it, exactly, that no reading of Hegel can reasonably avoid a prerequisite course of study in circuit diagrams?

    Stiegler’s polemic points in two directions: at a misrecognition in the contemporary discourse about our own technological landscape, and at an inability to discover in the history of philosophy precursors to this discourse. In the 1990s, when Stiegler’s work first appeared, critical and social theory in the Anglo-American scene was little interested in emerging frameworks for conceiving of changes in the social fabric. Mark Poster complained that in spite of “alternative rubrics” like “postindustrial society, information society, the third wave, the atomic or nuclear or electronic age” we continued to rely on the perceived power of old explanatory models.[ii] In the meantime, the intellectual scene Poster bemoaned has been replaced with a fervor of interdisciplinary activity in which a number of fields in the humanities have rushed to upgrade the critical apparatus by adopting epistemological and methodological frameworks from elsewhere. The most notable in the field of literary studies are the appropriations of aspects of Latourian “science studies” and the computational and media theory that has coalesced into the ambiguously circumscribed discipline of digital humanities. And yet Stiegler’s early work, while it might appear as a radical innovation in philosophical thought, is partly premised on a return to a lesser known French thinker whose work problematizes both of these disciplinary orientations: Gilbert Simondon. Indeed, Simondon (and Stiegler in turn) troubles the logics which partition and predicate the newness of the new and the oldness of the old.

    The long overdue English translation of Simondon’s Du mode d’existence des objets techniques (On the Mode of Existence of Technical Objects), originally published in 1958, provides an opportunity to reflect on the protean terrain of the human sciences as they struggle to account for ever more rapid technological change and its relation to ecological, economic, and political crises. Simondon’s interventions are manifold and the consequences of these are only just beginning to be appreciated and interrogated for their contemporary relevance. His principal objective is the reintegration of the philosophy of technology with philosophy in general, or more exactly with culture in general. This as yet unrealized ambition produced, for Simondon, a social imaginary of technology that, if anything, is more entrenched today: the mythologizing of robotics, the errant belief that automatism signals the highest level of technical development, the experience of alienation as non-knowledge of the machine.

    Tracing the disaggregation of techne or technics (or sometimes “the mechanical arts”) from what he calls “noble thought” or “the noble arts” back to ancient Greece, Simondon describes the consequences of this division through the twentieth century. Doing so allows him to provide a corrective to a mode of thought that cannot think the intervention of the technical object “as mediator between man and the world” (183) in the sense that it directs or determines the form of the detachment from the prior unity into nature and culture. The division of thought as Simondon describes it originally occurs because of a devaluation of technics––especially technics that employed tools––due to its association with slavery. This process is then periodically reduplicated: “there is, in each epoch, a part of the technical world that is recognized by culture, while other parts of the technical world are rejected” (104). As a result of this series of expurgations, we become, beginning especially in the nineteenth century, alienated from the world of machinery such that by the mid-twentieth-century we experience a “disjunction of the conditions for the intellection of progress and for the experience of the internal rhythms of work” (132).

    Despite the affective registration of this disjunction––psychological alienation from the technical world––the lesson has continued to evade Western thought. Looking back on Simondon’s legacy in 1997, Régis Debray lamented that “Those who did develop an attentive, informed criticism of technological filiations and breaks, from Bertrand Gille to George [sic.] Simondon, were confined to a good deal of intellectual isolation [… As a consequence of] the denegation of material mediations we are paying for a long ancestral heritage of neglect.”[iii] It’s unclear whether things have improved much on this front.

    One site of this problem’s legibility has been the reaction in media-technical oriented literary criticism against the work of Friedrich Kittler. Technological determination is out, we are told. This position seems similarly premised on a misunderstanding, or worse: on the kind of deliberate disinterest in understanding described by Stiegler. In a sense, Kittler’s work traces media-aesthetic histories that appear as a function of the suppression of technics within culture as described by Simondon. The aphoristic opening shot of Kittler’s Gramophone, Film, Typewriter––“Media determine our situation”[iv]––gestures toward the realization of Simondon’s ambition to combine philosophical and technical thought. His work provocatively traces the media-technical bases of discursive production in the spirit, if not the letter, of Simondon’s own project. Technological or media determination refers to the conditions of the appearance of these media-aesthetic histories, not to some revived naturalism. In this way, Kittler’s work is tracing an insight of Simondon’s that appears threatening to scholarly fields that remain essentially Schillerian in their promotion of aesthetic education. The ultimate goal of philosophical thought, as described by Simondon in On the Mode of Existence of Technical Objects (hereafter Mode)––a philosophical thought which does not elide technics––surpasses aesthetic thought which is, pace Schiller, “a reminder of the rupture of unity… as well as a reminder of the search for its future unity” (173).

    But this does not invalidate aesthetics for Simondon. In a letter to Jacques Derrida, he proposes a “techno-aesthetics” which, as the neologism suggests, he conceives as an imbrication of technics and aesthetics: “It’s technical and aesthetic at the same time: aesthetic because it’s technical, and technical because it’s aesthetic. There is intercategorial fusion.”[v] Techno-aesthetics is not reducible to an ideology of “form follows function” but instead proposes that aesthèsis––as the production of culturally shared “fundamental perceptive intuition”––is subtended by a technical mediation of sensation equally operant, in some of the examples Simondon provides, in the successful loosening of a bolt with a well made wrench as in the “perceptive-motoric” action of painting. Aesthetics as techno-aesthetics must consider mediation by technical objects in its contemplation of both the aesthetics of nature (as the medium or media of its perceptibility) and the “illusory” aesthetics, to borrow Adorno’s characterization, of art.

    Such a project necessarily relies on taxonomies generated as much out of engineering and mechanics as out of philosophy,[vi] and this leads to some difficulty in navigating Mode. “Essence,” to take a familiar example from philosophy and one which is implicated in Simondon’s techno-aesthetics is just as as much in dialogue here with the phenomenological understanding of a genesis of scientific concepts as it is with the history of the development of the already-mentioned diode. Simondon asks whether the diode can be considered the “absolute origin” of its subsequent elaborations in the triode, tetrode, and pentode. As it turns out, two technical conditions precede the diode and, according to Simondon, constitute its essence, an “absolute beginning, residing in the association of this condition of irreversibility of the electrodes and of this phenomenon of transfer of electric charges through a vacuum; it is a technical essence that is created. The diode is an asymmetrical conductance” (44-45, original emphasis). Beyond merely helping us to better understand the diode, and thereby escaping Stiegler’s scorn, Simondon is applying a complex and original ontology equally to the histories of technical objects and of concepts: an ontology consisting of morphological evolution, which starts with a process Simondon calls “individuation.” Mode applies this ontology, which is more fully explicated in Simondon’s primary doctoral thesis, L’Individuation à la lumière des notions de forme et de linformation[vii] (Mode is his secondary thesis). Elizabeth Grosz has nicely summed up the crucial concept of individuation:

    Simondon is interested in understanding how pre-individual forces, the forces that constitute the condition for both natural and technological existence, not yet individuated, produce individuals of various kinds… This process for the elaboration and emergence of individuality or being from becoming or the pre-individual is an ontogenesis: that is, “the becoming of the being insofar as it doubles itself and falls out of step with itself in the process of individuating.”[viii]

    It is the shared participation in this ontology by both organic material (e.g. man) and inorganic material (e.g. technical objects) that constitutes the relation that Simondon is exploring.[ix]

    Simondon’s work is concerned with the appearance of technological novelty, with what makes a technology present itself as new and under what conditions we can experience the progress of technical development. Written before the advent of the internet and at the dawn of the computer, cybernetics, and information theory, his two doctoral theses provide a completely different framework for thinking the effects that would follow from these events than the ones provided by their own founding figures. From the beginning of M​ode​, Simondon is working to countermand the machine idolatry of modernism. His understanding of the relationship between humans and machines is an even more complex version of the thesis advanced by his dissertation advisor, Georges Canguilhem, wherein the development of machinery advanced according to a biological principle, namely the prosthetic extension of organs. From this vantage point, the process of advocating for the inclusion of technics in culture (an exclusion which Stiegler radicalizes by prioritizing technics over culture in claiming that technical prosthesis is the condition of possibility of the human as such), requires the development of a “general organology” as a kind of study of the relation between these machinic prostheses and the normative understanding of the organs they extend.

    Until the present decade, Simondon’s work was relatively unknown to Anglophone readers. An unofficial, partial translation by Ninian Mellamphy of Part 1 of Mode had been in circulation since 1980, but it’s unclear what kind of audience it would have reached until a revised portion appeared in 2011 in Deleuze Studies, two years after the online, open-access journal of critical philosophy Parrhesia devoted a special issue to Simondon. In the intervening years, a number of Simondon’s books and essays have been translated and his direct influence has appeared in fields as diverse as political science, psychology, literary studies, and philosophy. To be sure, in France theorists like Gilles Deleuze, Jean-Luc Nancy, Francois Lyotard, and Bernard Stiegler have continued the legacy of Simondon’s work, attempting to reintegrate technical thought into philosophy proper. The first volume of Stiegler’s Technics and Time trilogy contains lengthy readings of Simondon’s work. But Technics and Time vol. 1 was translated in 1998, and it doesn’t seem to have been broadly taken up until the publication of Mark Hansen’s influential essay, “The Time of Affect,” in 2004.

    Reading Simondon is a difficult endeavor. This is not least because of his mesmeric pendulations between technical descriptions of engine types and articulations more recognizably philosophical. That is, of course, the point: in addition to describing the relationship between technical objects and man, and tracing the history of that relationship’s mystification, Simondon is performatively integrating two formerly separate modes of thinking to show how an ontology emerges from the genetic imperatives of technical objects. Mode demands of its reader not just that she apprises herself of its taxonomies, its rhythm and structure, which makes progress through the text slow (and summary impossible). It also demands that she do the thing it claims is demanded of thought; to (re)integrate technical/technological thought with philosophy and culture.

    ____________

    Justin Raden is a graduate student at the University of Illinois at Chicago.

    Notes

    [i] Bernard Stiegler, Philosophizing by Accident: Interviews with Élie During. Ed. and trans. Benoît Dillet. Edinburgh University Press, 2017. 32

    [ii] Mark Poster, The Mode of Information, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990. 21.

    [iii] Transmitting Culture. Trans. Eric Rauth. New York, Columbia University Press, 2000. 212.

    [iv] Gramophone, Film Typewriter. Trans. Geoffrey Winthrop-Young and Michael Wutz. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999. xxxix.

    [v] “On Techno-Aesthetics.” Trans. Arne De Boever. Parrhesia, no. 14, 2012. 2.

    [vi] Many of Simondon’s most important terms have been elucidated by Jean-Hugues Barthélémy. See his “Fifty Key Terms in the Works of Gilbert Simondon”, trans. Arne De Boever. In: Boever, Arne De, Alex Murray, Jon Roffe, and Ashley Woodward, eds. Gilbert Simondon: Being and Technology. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2012. 203-231.

    [vii] The second part of his primary thesis, L’Individuation psychique et collective, is forthcoming from University of Minnesota Press as Psychic and Collective Individuation. No official translation exists of the first part, L’Individu et sa genèse physico-biologique, but Taylor Adkins has published an unofficial translation on the blog “Fractal Ontology” — https://fractalontology.wordpress.com/2007/10/03/translation-simondon-and-the-physico-biological-genesis-of-the-individual/.

    [viii] Elizabeth Grosz, “Identity and Individuation: Some Feminist Reflections.” In: Boever, Gilbert Simondon, 38-40.

    [ix] One can also glimpse here an important influence on Gilles Deleuze’s own attempts to think the relation between being and becoming in Difference and Repetition and The Logic of Sense; it is largely Deleuze’s own work that has generated interest in Simondon in the U.S.

  • Anthony Galluzzo — The Singularity in the I790s: Toward a Prehistory of the Present With William Godwin and Thomas Malthus

    Anthony Galluzzo — The Singularity in the I790s: Toward a Prehistory of the Present With William Godwin and Thomas Malthus

    Anthony Galluzzo

    I

    Victor Frankenstein, the titular character and “Modern Prometheus” of Mary Shelley’s 1818 novel, drawing on his biochemical studies at the University of Ingolstadt, creates life by reanimating the dead. While the gothic elements of Shelley’s narrative ensure its place, or those of its twentieth-century film adaptations, in the pantheons of popular horror, it is also arguably the first instance of science fiction, used by its young author to interrogate the Prometheanism that animated the intellectual culture of her day.

    Prometheus—the titan who steals fire from the Olympian gods and for humankind, suffering imprisonment and torture at the hands of Zeus as a result —was an emblem for both socio-political emancipation and techno-scientific mastery during the European enlightenment. These two overlapping, yet distinct, models of progress are nonetheless confused, one with the other, then and now, with often disastrous results, as Shelley dramatizes over the course of her novel.

    Frankenstein embarks on his experiment to demonstrate that “life and death” are merely “ideal bounds” that can be surpassed, to conquer death and “pour a torrent of light into our dark world.” Frankenstein’s motives are not entirely beneficent, as we can see in the lines that follow:

    A new species would bless me as its creator and source; many happy and excellent natures would owe their being to me. No father could claim the gratitude of his child so completely as I should deserve their’s. Pursuing these reflections, I thought, that if I could bestow animation upon lifeless matter, I might in process of time (although I now found it impossible) renew life where death had apparently devoted the body to corruption. (Shelley 1818, 80-81)

    The will to Promethean mastery, over nature, merges here with a will to power over other humanoid, if not entirely human, beings. Frankenstein abandons his creation, with disastrous results for the creature, his family, and himself. Over the course of the two centuries since its publication, “The Modern Prometheus” has been read, too simply, as a cautionary tale regarding the pitfalls of techno-scientific hubris, invoked in regard to the atomic bomb or genetic engineering, for example, which it is in part.

    If we survey the history of the twentieth century, this caution is understandable. Even in the twenty-first century, a new Frankensteinism has taken hold among the digital overlords of Silicon Valley. Techno-capitalists from Elon Musk to Peter Thiel to Ray Kurzweil and their transhumanist fellow travelers now literally pursue immortality and divinity, strive to build indestructible bodies or merge with their supercomputers; preferably on their own high-tech floating island, or perhaps off-world, as the earth and its masses burn in a climate catastrophe entirely due to the depredations of industrial capitalism and its growth imperative.

    This last point is significant, as it represents the most recent example of the way progress-as-emancipation—social and political freedom and equality for all, including non-human nature—is distinct from and often at odds with progress as technological development: a distinction that many of today’s techno-utopians embrace under the rubric of a “dark enlightenment,” in a seemingly deliberate echo of Victor Frankenstein. Mary Shelley’s great theme is the substantive distinction of these two models of progress and enlightenment, which are intertwined for historical and ideological reasons: a tragic marriage. It is no coincidence that she chose to explore this problem in a tale of tortured familial relationships, which includes the fantasy of male birth alongside immortality. It was both a personal and family matter for her, as the daughter of radical enlightenment intellectuals Mary Wollstonecraft and William Godwin. While her mother died a few days after Mary’s birth, she was raised according to strict radical enlightenment principles, by her father, who in his 1793 Enquiry Concerning Political Justice and its Influence on Morals and Happiness argues against the state, private property, and marriage; a text in which Godwin also predicts a future when human beings, perfected through the force of reason, would achieve a sexless, sleepless, god-like immortality, in what is a 1790s-era version of the technological Singularity. Godwin’s daughter drew on this vision in crafting her own Victor Frankenstein.

    While Godwin would later modify these early proto-futurist views—in the wake of his wife’s death and a debate with the Reverend Thomas Malthus—even as he maintained his radical political commitments, his early work demonstrates the extent to which radical enlightenment thinking was entwined, from the very start, with “dark enlightenment” in today’s parlance, ranging from accelerationism to singulatarianism and ecomodernism.[1]  His subsequent revision of his earlier views offers us an early example of how we might separate an emancipatory social and political program from those Promethean dreams of technological mastery used by capitalist and state socialist ideologues to justify development at any cost. In early Godwinism we find one prototype for today’s Promethean techno-utopianism. His subsequent debate with Thomas Malthus and concomitant retreat from his own earlier futurist Prometheanism illuminates how we might combine radical, or even utopian, political commitments with an awareness of biophysical limits in our own moment of ecological collapse.

    Godwin defines the “justice” that animates his 1793 Enquiry Concerning Political Justice as that “which benefits the whole, because individuals are parts of the whole. Therefore to do it is just, and to forbear it is unjust. If justice have any meaning, it is just that I should contribute every thing in my power to the benefit of the whole” (Godwin 1793, 52). Godwin illustrates his definition with a hypothetical scenario that provoked accusations of heartlessness among both conservative detractors and radical allies at the time. Godwin asks us to imagine a fire striking the palace of François Fénelon, the progressive archbishop of Cambray, author of an influential attack on absolute monarchy:

    In the same manner the illustrious archbishop of Cambray was of more worth than his chambermaid, and there are few of us that would hesitate to pronounce, if his palace were in flames, and the life of only one of them could be preserved, which of the two ought to be preferred. But there is another ground of preference, beside the private consideration of one of them being farther removed from the state of a mere animal. We are not connected with one or two percipient beings, but with a society, a nation, and in some sense with the whole family of mankind. Of consequence that life ought to be preferred which will be most conducive to the general good. In saving the life of Fénelon, suppose at the moment when he was conceiving the project of his immortal Telemachus, I should be promoting the benefit of thousands, who have been cured by the perusal of it of some error, vice and consequent unhappiness. Nay, my benefit would extend farther than this, for every individual thus cured has become a better member of society, and has contributed in his turn to the happiness, the information and improvement of others. (Godwin 1793, 55)

    This passage illustrates the consequentialist perfectibilism that distinguished the philosopher’s theories from those of his better-known contemporaries, such as Thomas Paine, with his theory of natural right and social contract, or even utilitarian Jeremy Bentham, to whom Godwin is sometimes compared. In the words of Mark Philp, “only by improving people’s understanding can they become more fully virtuous, and only as they become more fully virtuous will the highest and greatest pleasures be realized in society” (Philp 1986, 84). In other words, the unfortunate chambermaid must be sacrificed if that is what it takes to save the philosophe whose written output will benefit multitudes by sharpening their rational capacities, congruent with the triumph of reason, virtue, and human emancipation.

    Godwin goes on to make this line of reasoning clear:

    Supposing I had been myself the chambermaid, I ought to have chosen to die, rather than that Fénelon should have died. The life of Fénelon was really preferable to that of the chambermaid. But understanding is the faculty that perceives the truth of this and similar propositions; and justice is the principle that regulates my conduct accordingly. It would have been just in the chambermaid to have preferred the archbishop to herself. To have done otherwise would have been a breach of justice. Supposing the chambermaid had been my wife, my mother or my benefactor. This would not alter the truth of the proposition. The life of Fénelon would still be more valuable than that of the chambermaid; and justice, pure, unadulterated justice, would still have preferred that which was most valuable. Justice would have taught me to save the life of Fénelon at the expence of the other. What magic is there in the pronoun “my,” to overturn the decisions of everlasting truth? (Godwin 1793, 55)

    Godwin amends the puritan rigor of these positions in subsequent editions of his work, as he came to recognize the value of affective bonds and personal attachments. But here in the first edition of Political Justice we see a pristine expression of his rationalist radicalism, for which the good of the whole necessitates the sacrifice of a chambermaid, a mother, and one’s own self to Reason, which Godwin equates with the greatest good.

    The early Godwin here exemplifies a central antinomy of the European enlightenment, as he strives to yoke an inadvertently inhuman plan for human perfection and mastery to an emancipatory vision of egalitarian social relations. Godwin pushes the Enlightenment-era deification of ratiocination to a visionary extreme in presenting very real inequities as so many cases of benighted judgment waiting for a personified, yet curiously disembodied, Reason’s correction in the fullness of time and entirely by way of debate. It was this aspect of Godwin’s project that inspired John Thelwall, the radical writer and public speaker, to declare that while Godwin recommends “the most extensive plan of freedom and innovation ever discussed by a writer in English,” he “reprobate {s} every measure from which even the most moderate reform can be rationally expected” (Thelwall 2008, 122). E.P. Thompson would later echo this verdict in his Poverty of Theory, when he compared the vogue for structuralist—or Althussererian—Marxism among certain segments of the 1970s-era New Left to Godwinism, which he described as another “moment of intellectual extremism, divorced from correlative action or actual social commitment” (Thompson 1978, 244).

    Godwin blends a necessitarian theory of environmental influence, a belief in the perfectibility of the human race, a perfectionist version of the utilitarian calculus, and a quasi-idealist model of objective reason into an incongruous and extravagantly speculative rationalist metaphysics. The Godwinian system, in its first iteration at least, resembles Kantian and post-Kantian German idealism as much as it does the systems of Locke, Hume, and Helvetius, Godwin’s acknowledged sources. So, according to Godwin’s syllogistic precepts, it is only through the exercise of private judgment and a process of rational debate—“the clash of mind with mind”—that Truth will emerge, and with Truth, Political Justice; here is a model of enlightenment that resonates with Kant’s roughly contemporaneous ideal-type of progress and Jürgen Habermas’s twentieth century reconstruction of that ideal in the form of a “liberal-bourgeois public sphere.” It is for this reason, and in spite of his conflicted sympathies with French revolutionaries and British radicals alike, that the philosopher rejects both violent revolution and the kind of mass political action exemplified by Thelwall and the London Corresponding Society, hence Thelwall’s and Thompson’s damning judgments. Rational persuasion is the only feasible way of effecting the wholesale revolutionary transformation of “things as they are” for Godwin.

    But this precise reconstruction of Godwin’s philosophical and political system does not capture the striking novelty of Godwin’s project. In the example above, we find a supplementary argument of sorts running underneath the consequentialist perfectibilism. Although we can certainly read in Godwin’s disparagement and hypothetical sacrifice of both a chambermaid and his own mother a historically typical, if unconscious, example of the class prejudice and misogyny the radical philosopher otherwise attacks at length in this same treatise, I would instead call attention to the implicit metaphor of embodiment and natality that unites maid, mother, and Godwin’s own unperfected self. The chambermaid is one step closer to the “mere animal” from which Fénelon, or his significantly disembodied work, offers an escape. If the chambermaid were rational in the Godwinian sense, she would easily offer herself as sacrifice to Fénelon and the Reason that finds a fitting emblem in the flames that consume our hypothetical building. While Godwin underlines the disinterested character of this choice in next substituting himself for the chambermaid, his willingness to hypothetically sacrifice his mother points to his rigid rejection of personal attachments and emotional ties. Godwin would substantially modify this viewpoint a few years later in the wake of his relationship with first feminist Mary Wollstonecraft.

    The figure of the mother—whose embodied life Godwin would consign to the fire for the sake of Fénelon’s future intellectual output and its refining effects on humanity—is an overdetermined symbol that unites affective ties with the irrational fact of our bodily and sexual life: all of which must and will be mastered through a Promethean process of ratiocination indistinguishable from justice and reason. If one function of metaphor, according to Hans Blumenberg, is to provide the seedbed for conceptual thought, Godwin translates these subtexts into an explicit vision of a totally rational and rationalized future in the final, speculative, chapter of Political Justice.[2] It is in this chapter, as we shall see below, that Godwin responds to those critics who argued that population growth and material scarcity made perfectibilism impossible with a vision of humans made superhuman through reason.

    Here is the characteristically Godwinian combination of “striking insight” and “complete wackiness,” which emerges from the “science fictional quality of his imagination” in the words of Jenny Davidson.[3] Godwin moves from a prescient critique of oppressive human institutional arrangements, motivated by the radical desire for a substantively just and free form of social organization under which all human beings can realize their capacities, to a rationalist metaphysics that enshrines Reason as a theological entity that realizes itself through a teleological human history. Reason reaches its apotheosis at that point when human beings become superhuman, transcending contingent and creaturely qualities, such as sexual desire, physical reproduction, and death, eviscerated like so many animal bodies thrown into a great fire.

    We can see in Godwin’s early rationalist radicalism a significant antinomy. Godwin oscillates between a radical enlightenment critique that uses ratiocination to expose unjust institutional arrangements—from marriage to private property and the state—and a positive, even theological, version of Reason, for which creaturely limitations and human needs are not only secondary considerations, but primary obstacles to be surpassed on the way to a rationalist super-humanity that resembles nothing so much as a supercomputer, avant la lettre.

    Many critics of the European Enlightenment—from an older Godwin and his younger romantic contemporaries through twentieth-century feminist, post-colonial, and ecological critics—have underlined the connection between these Promethean metaphysics, ostensibly in the service of human liberation, and various projects of domination. Western Marxists, like Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno (1947) overlap with later feminist critics of the scientific revolution, such as Carolyn Merchant (1980), in naming instrumental rationality as the problem. As opposed to an ends-oriented version of reason—the ends being emancipation or human flourishing— rationalism as technical means for dominating the natural world, or managing populations, or disciplining labor, became the dominant model of rationality during and after the European enlightenment in keeping with the ideological requirements of a nascent capitalism and colonialism. But in the case of the early Godwin and other Prometheans, we can see a substantive version of reason, reified as an end-in-itself, which overlaps with the critical philosophy of Hegel, the philosophical foundation of Marxism and the Frankfurt School variant on display in the work of Adorno and Horkheimer.[4] The problem with Prometheanism is that its proponents’ ideal-type of technological rationality is not instrumental enough: rather than a reason or technology subordinate to human flourishing and collective human agency, the proponents of Prometheus subordinate collective human (and creaturely) ends to a vision of reason indistinguishable from a fantasy of an autonomous technology with its own imperatives.

    Langdon Winner, in analyzing autonomous technology as idea and ideology in twentieth-century industrial capitalist (and state socialist) societies, underlines this reversal of means and ends or what he calls “reverse adaptation”: “The adjustment of human ends to match the character of available means. We have already seen arguments to the effect that persons adapt themselves to the order, discipline, and pace of the organizations in which they work. But even more significant is the state of affairs in which people come to accept the norms and standards of technical processes as central to their lives as a whole” (Winner 1977, 229). Winner’s critique of “rationality in technological thinking” is made even more striking when we consider that the early Godwin’s Promethean force of reason, as evinced in by the final chapter of the 1793 Political Justice—in contradistinction to the ethical and political rationalism that is also present in the text—anticipates twentieth and twenty-first century techno-utopianism. For Winner, “if one takes rationality to mean the accommodation of means to ends, then surely reverse-adapted systems represent the most flagrant violation of rationality” (Winner 1977, 229).

    This version of rationality, still inchoate in the eighteenth-century speculations of Godwin, takes mega-technological systems as models, rather than tools, for human beings, as Günther Anders argues—against those who depict anti-Prometheans as bio-conservative defenders of things as they are just because they are that way. The problem with Prometheanism does not reside in its adherents’ endorsement of technological possibilities as such so much as their embrace of the “machine as measure” of individual and collective human development (Anders 2016). Anders converges with Adorno and Horkheimer, his Marxist contemporaries, for whom this “machine” is a mystified metonym for irrational capitalist imperatives.

    Rationalist humanism becomes technological inhumanism under the sign of Prometheus, which, according to present day “accelerationism” enthusiast Ray Brassier, must recognize “the disturbing consequences of our technological ingenuity” and extol “the fact that progress is savage and violent” (Brassier 2013). Brassier, operating from a radically different, avowedly nihilist, set of presuppositions than William Godwin, nonetheless recalls the 1793 Political Justice in once again defining rationalism as a reinvigorated Promethean “project of re-engineering ourselves and our world on a more rational basis.” Accelerationists strive to revive both rationalist radicalism—with the omniscient algorithm standing in for the perfectibilists’ reason—and the Promethean imperative to reengineer society and the natural world, because or in spite of the ongoing global climate change catastrophe. Rather than the great driver of an ecologically catastrophic growth,  self-described “left” accelerationists Nick Williams and Alex Srnicek argue that capitalism must be dismantled because it “cannot be identified as the agent of true acceleration,” or #accelerate (Williams and Srnicek 2013, 486-7): a shorthand for their attempt to reboot a version of progress that arguably finds its first apotheosis in the 1790s. Brassier’s defense of Prometheanism takes the form of an extended reply to various critics, whose emphasis on limits and equilibrium, the given and the made, he rejects as in thrall to religious, and specifically Christian, notions. Brassier, who outlines his rationalism as systematic method or technique without presupposition or limits—along the lines of “God is dead, anything is possible”—seems unaware of actual material limitations and the theological, specifically Gnostic, origins of a very old human deification fantasy, the Enlightenment-era secularization of which was arguably first recognized by Godwin’s daughter in her Frankenstein (Shelley 1818).

    The Godwin of 1793 in this way also and more dramatically looks forward to our own transhumanist devotees of the coming technological singularity, who claim that human beings will soon merge with immensely powerful and intelligent supercomputers, becoming something else entirely in the process, hence “transhumanism.” According to prominent Silicon Valley “singulatarian” Ray Kurzweil, “The Singularity will allow us to transcend these limitations of our biological bodies and brains. We will gain power over our fates. Our mortality will be in our own hands. We will be able to live as long as we want (a subtly different statement from saying we will live forever)” (Kurzweil 2006, 25).

    Kurzweil explicitly frames this transformation as the inevitable culmination of a mechanically teleological movement; and, like many futurists and their eighteenth-century perfectibilist forerunners, human perfection necessitates the supersession of the human. Kurzweil illustrates the paradoxical character of a Promethean futurism that, in seeking both human perfection and mastery, seeks to dispense with the human altogether: “The Singularity will represent the culmination of the merger of our biological thinking and existence with our technology, resulting in a world that is still human but that transcends our biological roots. There will be no distinction, post-Singularity, between human and machine or between physical and virtual reality. If you wonder what will remain unequivocally human in such a world, it’s simply this quality: ours is the species that inherently seeks to extend its physical and mental reach beyond current limitations” (25).

    Even more than the accelerationists, Kurzweil’s Singulatarianism illustrates the “hubristic humility” that defines twentieth- and twenty-first century Prometheanism, according to Anders. Writing in the wake of the atomic bomb, the cybernetic revolution, and the mass-produced affluence exemplified by the post-war United States, Anders recognized how certain self-described rationalist techno-utopians combined a hubristic faith in technological achievement with a “Promethean shame” before these same technological creations. This shame arises from the perceived gap between human beings and their technological products; how, unlike our machines, we are “pre-given,” saddled with contingent bodies we neither choose nor design, bodies that are fragile, needy, and mortal. The mechanical reproducibility of the technological system or industrial artifact represents a virtual immortality that necessarily eludes unique and perishable human beings, according to Anders. Here Anders seemingly develops the earlier work of Walter Benjamin, his cousin, on aura and mechanical reproduction—but in a very different direction, as Anders writes: “in contrast to the light bulb or the vinyl record, none of us has the opportunity to outlive himself or herself in a new copy. In short: we must continue to live our lifetimes in obsolete singularity and uniqueness. For those who recognize the machine-world as exemplary, this is a flaw and as such a reason for shame.”[5]

    Although we can situate the work of Godwin at the intersection of various eighteenth- and nineteenth-century discourses, including perfectibilist rationalism, civic republicanism, and Sandemanian Calvinism, on the one hand, or anarchism and romanticism, on the other, I will argue here that in juxtaposing Godwinism with present-days analogs like the transhumanism or accelerationism briefly described above, we can see the extent to which older—late eighteenth- and early nineteenth- century—utopian forms are returning, lending some credence to Alain Badiou’s claim that

    We are much closer to the 19th century than to the last century. In the dialectical division of history we have, sometimes, to move ahead of time. Just like maybe around 1840, we are now confronted with an absolutely cynical capitalism, more and more inspired by the ideas that only work backwards: poor are justly poor, the Africans are underdeveloped, and that the future with no discernable limit belongs to the civilized bourgeoisie of the Western world. (Badiou 2008)

    We can also see in recent conflicts between accelerationists and certain partisans of radical ecology the return of another seeming antinomy—one which pits cornucopian futurists against Malthusians, or at least those who emphasize the material limits to growth and how human beings might reconcile ourselves to those limits— that has its origin point in the Reverend Thomas Malthus’s anonymously published An Essay on the Principle of Population, as it affects the Future Improvement of Society with remarks on the Speculations of Mr. Godwin, M. Condorcet, and Other Writers (1798). Malthus’s demographic response to Godwinism led in turn to a long running debate and the rise of an ostensibly empirical political economy that took material scarcity as its starting point. Yet, if we examine Malthus’s initial response, alongside the Political Justice of 1793, we can observe several shared assumptions and lines of continuity that unite these seemingly opposed perspectives, as each of these thinkers delineates a recognizably bio-political project, for human improvement and population management, in left and right variants. Each of these variants obscures the social determinants of revolutionary movements and technological progress. Finally, it was as much Godwin’s debate with Malthus as the philosopher’s tumultuous and tragic relationship with Mary Wollstonecraft that precipitated a shift in his perspective regarding the value of emotional bonds, personal connections, and material limits: seemingly disparate concerns linked in Godwin’s imagination through the sign of the body. The body also functions as metonym for that same natural world, the limits of which Malthus brandished in order to discredit the utopian aspirations that drove the revolutionary upheavals of the 1790s; Godwin later sought to reconcile his utopianism with these limits.[6] This intellectual reconciliation—which was very much in line with the English romantics’ own version of a more benign natural world threatened by incipient industrialism, as opposed to Malthus’s brutally utilitarian nature—was a response to Malthus and the early Godwin’s own early Prometheanism, best exemplified in the final section of 1793 Political Justice, to which we will turn below.

    Two generations of Romantics—from Wordsworth and Coleridge through De Quincey, Hazlitt, and Shelley—sought to counter Malthus’s version of the natural world as resource stock and constraint with a holistic and dynamic model of nature, under which natural limits and possibilities are not inconsistent with human aspirations and utopian hopes. Malthus offered the Romantics “a malign muse,” in the words of his biographer Robert Mayhew, who writes of two exemplary Romantic figures from this period: “ if nature is made of antipathies, Blake and Hegel in their different ways suggest that such binaries can be productive of a dialectic advance in our reasoning” as “we look for ways to respect nature and to use it with a population of 7 billion” (Mayhew 2014, 86).

    One irony of intellectual and political history is how often our new Prometheans—transhumanists, singulatarians, accelerationists, and others—lump both narrowly Malthusian and more expansive “Romantic” ecologies under the rubric of Malthusianism, which is nowadays more slur than accurate description of Malthus’s project. Malthus wielded the threat of natural scarcity or “the Principle of Population” as an ideological tool against reform, revolution, or “the Future Improvement of Society,” as evinced in the very title of his long essay. In the words of Kerryn Higgs, to follow Malthus involves “several key elements” above a concern with overpopulation, such as “a resistance to notions of social improvement and social welfare, punitive policies for the poor, a tendency to blame the poor for their own plight, and recourse to speculative theorizing in the service of an essentially politically argument” (Higgs 2014, 43). It is among eugenicists, social Darwinists, but also today’s cornucopian detractors of Malthusianism, that we find Malthus’s heirs, if we attend to his and now their instrumental view of the natural world as factor in capitalist economic calculation—as exemplified by the rhetoric of “ecosystem services” and “decoupling”—in addition to a shared faith in material growth, to which Malthus was not opposed. While self-declared Malthusians, like Paul and Anne Ehrlich, in their misplaced focus on overpopulation, often in the developing world, conveniently avoid any discussion of consumption in the developed world, let alone the unsustainable growth imperative built into capitalism itself. In fact, for Malthus and his epigones, necessity—growth outstripping available resources—functions as spur for technological innovation, mirroring, in negative form, the teleological trajectory of the early Godwin—a telling convergence I will explore at length in the latter part of this essay.

    “Malthusianism” is a shorthand used by orthodox economists and apologists for capitalist growth to dismiss ecological concerns. Marxists and other radicals—heirs to Godwin’s project, in ways good and bad, despite their protestations of materialism—too often share this investment in growth and techno-science as an end in itself. While John Bellamy Foster and others have made a persuasive case for Marx’s ecology—to be found in his work on nineteenth-century soil exhaustion, inspired by Liebig, and the town/country rift under capitalism—we can also find a broadly Promethean rejection of anything resembling a discourse of natural limits within various orthodox Marxisms, beginning in the later nineteenth century. Yet to recognize both the possibilities and limits of our situation—which must include the biophysical conditions of possibility for capitalist accumulation and any program that aims to supplant it— is, for me, the foundation for any radical and materialist approach to the world and politics, against Malthus and the young, futurist Godwin, to whom we now move.

    II

    Godwin translates this metaphorical substrate of his Fénelon thought experiment into an explicitly conceptual and argumentative form.  He pushes the logic of eighteenth-century perfectibilism to a spectacular, speculative, and science-fictional extreme in Chapter 12 of Political Justice’s final volume on “property.” It is in this chapter that the philosopher outlines a future utopia on the far side of rational perfection. Beginning with the remark, attributed to Benjamin Franklin by Richard Price, that “mind will one day become omnipotent over matter,” Godwin offers us a series of methodical speculations as to how this might literally come to pass. He begins with the individual mind’s power to either exacerbate or alleviate illness or the effects of age, in order to illustrate his central contention: that we can overcome apparently hard and fast physical limits and subject ostensibly involuntary physiological processes to the dictates of our rational will.  It is on this basis that Godwin concludes: “if we have in any respect a little power now, and if mind be essentially progressive…that power may…and inevitably will, extend beyond any bounds we are able to ascribe to it” (Godwin 1793, 455).

    Godwin marries magical voluntarism on the ontogenetic level to the teleological arc of Reason on the phylogenetic level, all of which culminates in perhaps the first—Godwinian—articulation of the singularity: “The men who therefore exist when the earth shall refuse itself to a more extended population will cease to propagate, for they will no longer have any motive, either of error or duty, to induce them. In addition to this they will perhaps be immortal. The whole will be a people of men, and not of children. Generation will not succeed generation, nor truth have in a certain degree to recommence at the end of every thirty years. There will be no war, no crimes, no administration of justice as it is called, and no government” (Godwin 1793, 458).

    James Preu (1959) long ago established Godwin’s peculiar intellectual debt to Jonathan Swift, and we can discern some resemblance between Godwin’s future race of hyper-rational, sexless immortals and the Houyhnhnms; as with Godwin’s other misprisions of Swift, the differences are as telling as are the similarities. Godwin transforms Swift’s ambiguous, arguably dystopian and misanthropic, depiction of equine ultra-rationalists, and their animalistic Yahoo humanoid stock, into an unequivocally utopian sketch of future possibility. For Godwin, it is our Yahoo-like “animal nature” that must be subdued or even exterminated, as Gulliver’s Houynnhnm master at one point suggests in a coolly calculating way that begs comparison to Swift’s “Modest Proposal,” even as both texts look forward to the utilitarian discourse of population control that finds its apotheosis in Malthus’s 1798 response to Godwin. Godwin would later embrace some version of heritable characteristics, or at least innate human inclinations, but despite his revisions of his views through subsequent editions of Political Justice and beyond, he is very still much the Helvetian environmentalist in the 1793 disquisition. He was therefore free of, or even at odds with, a proto-eugenic eighteenth-century discourse of breeding—after Jenny Davidson’s (2008) formulation—that overlapped with other variants of perfectibilism.

    But as Davidson and others note, Godwin shares with his antagonist Malthus a Swiftian aversion to sex, which we can also see in the Godwinian critique of marriage and the family. This critique begins with a still-radical indictment of marriage as a proprietary relationship under which men exercise “the most odious of monopolies over women” (Godwin 1793, 447). Godwin predicts that marriage, and the patriarchal family it safeguards, will be abolished alongside other modes of unequal property. But, rather than inaugurating a regime of free love and license, as conservative critics of Godwinism contended at the time, the philosopher predicts that this “state of equal property would destroy the relish for luxury, would decrease our inordinate appetites of every kind, and lead us universally to prefer the pleasures of intelligence to the pleasures of the sense” (Godwin 1793, 447). Rather than simply ascribing this sentiment to a residual Calvinism on Godwin’s part, this programmatic elimination of sexual desire is of a piece with “killing the Yahoo,” consigning the maid-servant’s, his mother’s, his own body to the fires for Fénelon and a perfectly rational future state, i.e., the biopolitical rationalization of human bodies for Promethean reason and Promethean shame. The early Godwin here again suggests our own transhumanist devotees who, on the one hand, embrace the sexual possibilities supposedly afforded by AI while they manifest a “complete disgust with actual human bodies,” exemplifying Anders’s Promethean shame according to Michael Hauskeller (2014). From the messy body to virtual bodies, from the uncertainties and coercions of cooperation to self-sex, finally from sex to orgasmic cognition, transhumanists—in an echo of the young Godwin, who predicted sexual intercourse would give way to rational intercourse with the triumph of Reason—want to “make the pleasures of mind as intense and orgiastic as … certain bodily pleasures as they hope for a new and improved rational intercourse with a new and improved, virtual body, in the future” (Hauskeller, 2014).

    In this speculative, coda to his visionary political treatise, Godwin’s predictive sketch of human rationalization as transformation, from Yahoo to Houyhnhnm and/or post-human, represents a disciplinary program in Michel Foucault’s sense: “a technique” that “centers on the body, produces individualizing effects, and manipulates the body as a source of forces that have to be rendered both useful and docile” (Foucault 2003, 249).[7]  We can trace the intersection between perfectibilist, even transhumanist, dreams and disciplinary program in Godwin’s comments regarding the elimination of sleep, an apparent prerequisite for overcoming death, which he describes as “one of the most conspicuous infirmities of the human frame, specifically “because it is…not a suspension of thought, but an irregular and distempered state of the faculty” (456).

    Dreams, or the unregulated and irrational affective processes they embody, provoke a panicked response on the part of Godwin at this point in the text. Godwin’s response accords with the consistent rejection of sensibility and sentimental attachments of all kinds—seen throughout the 1793 PJ—from romantic love to familial bonds. We can find in Godwin’s account of sleep and his plan for its elimination through an exertion of rational will and attention—something like an internal monitor in the mold of a Benthamite watchman presiding over a 24/7 panoptic mind—the exertion of an internalized disciplinary power indistinguishable from our new, wholly rational and rationalized, subject’s private judgment operating in a system without external authority, government, or disciplinary power. And it is no coincidence that Godwin’s proposed subjugation of sleep immediately follows a curiously contemporary passage: “If we can have three hundred and twenty successive ideas in a second of time, why should it be supposed that we should not hereafter arrive at the skill of carrying on a great number of contemporaneous processes without disorder” (456).

    It should be noted again here that Godwin’s futurist idyll, which includes sexless immortals engaged in purely rational intercourse, specifically responds to earlier eighteenth-century arguments regarding human population and the resource constraints that limit population growth and, by extension, the wide abundance promised in various perfectibilist plans for the future. This new focus on demography and the management of populations during the latter half of the eighteenth century in the Euro-American world is a second technology of power, for Foucault, that “centers not upon the body but upon life: a technology that brings together the mass effects  characteristic of a population,” in order to “to establish a sort of homeostasis, not by training individuals, not by training individuals, but by achieving an overall equilibrium that protects the security of the whole from internal dangers” (Foucault 2003, 249). This is the biopolitical mode of governance—the regulation of the masses’ bio-social processes—that characterizes the modern epoch for Foucault and his followers.

    Yet, while Foucault admits that both technologies—disciplinary and biopolitical—are “technologies of the body,” he nonetheless counterpoises the “individualizing” to the demographic technique. But, as we can see in the 1793 PJ, in which Godwin proffers a largely disciplinary program as solution to the original bio-political problem—a solution that would inspire Thomas Malthus’s classic formulation of the population problem a few years later, as we shall explore below—these two technologies were intertwined from the start. The subsequent history of futurism in the west marries various disciplinary programs, powered by Promethean shame and its fantasies of becoming “man-machine,” to narrowly bio-political campaigns. These campaigns range from the exterminationist eugenicism of the twentieth century interwar period to more recent techno-survivalist responses to the ecological crisis on the part of Silicon Valley’s Singulatarian elites, some of whom look forward to immortality on Mars while the Earth and its masses burn.[8]

    Godwin further highlights these futurist hopes in the second revision of Political Justice (1798), in which he underlines the central role of mechanical invention—in keeping with the general principle enshrined at the first volume of the treatise under the title, “Human Inventions Capable of Perpetual Improvement—making the technological prostheses implicit in these early speculations explicit. In predicting an ever-accelerating multiplication of cognitive processes—assuming these processes are delinked from disorder, human or Yahoo—Godwin anticipates both the discourse of cybernetics and its more recent accelerationist successors, for whom the dream of perfectibility—and Godwin’s sexless, sleepless rationalist immortals—can only be achieved through AI and the machinic supersession of the human Yahoo.

    In fact, our new futurists frequently invoke the methodologically dubious Moore’s Law in defense of their claims for acceleration and its inevitability. Moore’s Law—named after Intel founder Gordon Moore, who, in 1965, predicted that the number of transistors, with their processing power, in an integrated circuit increases exponentially every two years or so—revives Godwin’s prophecy in a cybernetic register. It also suggests Thomas Malthus’s “iron” law of population. Malthus argued that “Population, when unchecked, increases in a geometrical ratio,” while “subsistence”—by which he denotes agricultural yield—increases only in arithmetical ratio. Malthus rendered this dubious “law” as a mathematical formula, thereby making it indisputable, although he makes his motivations clear when he writes, explicitly in response to Godwin’s speculations in the last chapter of the 1793 Political Justice, that his law “is decisive against the possible existence of a society, all of the members of which should live in ease, happiness, and comparative leisure; and feel no anxiety about providing the means of subsistence for themselves and families” (Malthus 1798, 16-17; see also Engels 1845).

    Godwinism was for Malthus a synecdoche for both 1790s radicalism and radical egalitarianism generally, while the first Essay on Population is arguably the late, “proto-scientific,” entry in the paper war between English radicals and counterrevolutionary antijacobins—initiated by Edmund Burke’s Reflections on the Revolution in France (1790) and to which Godwin’s treatise was one among many responses—that defined literary and political debate in the wake of the French Revolution. Rather than simply arguing for biophysical limits, Malthus reveals his ideological hand in his discussion of the poor and the Poor Laws—the parish-based system of charity established in late medieval England to alleviate extreme distress among the poorest classes—against which he railed in the several editions of the Essay.  Whereas in the past, population was maintained through “positive” checks, such as pestilence, famine, or warfare, for Malthus, the growth of civilization introduced “preventive” checks, including chastity, restraint within marriage, or even the conscious decision to delay or forego marriage and reproduction due to the “foresight of  the difficulties attending the rearing of a family,” often prompted by “the actual distresses of some of the lower classes, by which they are disabled from giving the proper food and attention to their children” (35).

    Parson Malthus largely ascribes this decidedly Christian and specifically protestant capacity for “rational” self-restraint, to his own industrious middle class; and, insofar as the peasantry possessed this preventive urge, alongside a “spirit of independence,” it was undermined by the eighteenth-century British Poor Laws. Malthus provides the template for what are now standard issue conservative attacks on social provision in his successful attacks on the Poor Laws, which in providing a safety net eradicated restraint among the poor, leading them to marry, reproduce, and “increase reproduction without increasing the food for its support.” Malthus invokes the same absolute limit in his naturalistic rejection of Godwin’s (and others’) egalitarian radicalism, foreclosing any examination of the production distribution of surplus and scarcity in a class society.  Even more than this, Malthus uses his natural laws to rationalize all of those institutional arrangements under threat during the French Revolutionary Period, from the existing division of property to traditional marriage arrangements, but in an ostensibly objective manner that distinguished his approach from Burke’s earlier encomia to a dying age of chivalry.  It is arguably for this reason that the idea of natural limits, in general, is a suspect one among subsequent left-wing formations, for good and ill.

    III

    Malthus, who anonymously published his Essay on Population in 1798, proclaims at the outset that his “argument is “conclusive against the perfectibility of the mass of mankind” (Malthus 1798, 95). And if there were any doubt as to the identity of Malthus’s target we need only look to the work’s subtitle, of which Malthus explains in the book’s first sentence that “the following essay owes its origin to a conversation with a friend on the subject of Mr. Godwin’s essay on avarice and profusion, in his Enquirer.” The friend was Thomas’s father, Daniel Malthus, an admiring acquaintance of Godwin’s who nonetheless encouraged (and subsidized) his son’s writing on this topic. The parson dedicates six chapters (chapters 10-15) to a refutation of Godwinism, often larded with mockery of Godwin, against whose speculative rationalism Malthus counterpoises his own supposedly empirical method; the same method that allowed him to discover that “lower classes of people” should never be “sufficiently free from want and labour, to attain any high degree of intellectual improvement” (95). And although Malthus explicitly names The Enquirer—the 1797 collection of essays in which Godwin admits to changing his mind on a variety of positions, as Malthus acknowledges at one point—as the impetus for his Essay, the work primarily responds to the earlier Political Justice and its final chapter in particular, because Godwin’s futurist speculations (and their more ominous biopolitical subtexts) respond to an “Objection to This System From the Principle of Population,” in the words of the chapter subheading. Godwin replies to this hypothetical objection several years prior to Malthus’s critique, the originality of which was said at the time to consist in his break with eighteenth-century doxa regarding population. Despite their differences, Montesquieu, Hume, Franklin, and Price all agreed that a growing population is the indisputable marker of progress, and the primary sign of a successful nation, since “the more men in the state, the more it flourishes.” And while Johann Süssmilch, an early pioneer of statistical demography, argued for a fixed limit to the planetary carrying capacity in regard to human population, he also inferred that the planet could hold up to six times as many people than the total global population offered by Süssmilch at the time.

    Only Robert Wallace, in his 1761 Various Prospects of Mankind, Nature, and Providence—which Marx and Engels would accuse Malthus of plagiarizing—argued that excessive population is an obstacle to human improvement. Wallace offers a prototype for the Godwin/Malthus debate in constructing an elaborate argument for a proto-communist utopian social arrangement, only to undermine his own argument via recourse to the limits of population growth. Godwin invokes Wallace by name, before adverting to Süssmilch and a far-flung future when human beings will have transcended the limits of finitude. Immortals won’t have to reproduce, a point Godwin makes even clearer in both the final edition of Political Justice (1798) and in his first response to the Essay on The Population—in an 1801 pamphlet entitled Thoughts Occasioned By The Perusal of Dr. Parr’s Spital Sermon—in which he opts for a minimal population of perfected human beings living in a utopian society, rather than an ever- expanding human population.

    While contemporary scholars still read the Godwin/Malthus Debate as a simple conflict between progressive optimism and conservative pessimism, we can still discern some peculiar commonalities between the early Godwin of the 1793 Political Justice and Malthus. Godwin’s speculations on human perfectibility represent a bio-perfectionist solution to the problems of population, sex, and embodiment generally—a Promethean program for overcoming Promethean shame—as I sketch above. Malthus rejects perfectibility along with the feasibility of physical immortality and pure rationality, adverting to humanity’s “compound nature,” a variation on original sin. In this vein, he also rejects Godwin’s prediction regarding “the extinction of the passion between the sexes,” which has not “taken place in the five or six thousand years that world has existed” (92).  Yet Malthus—in proffering disciplinary self-restraint in the service of a biopolitical equilibrium between population and food supply—offers another such solution, motivated by antithetical political principles, while operating from a common set of  Enlightenment-era assumptions regarding the need to regulate bodies and populations (Foucault 2003). The overlap between these ostensible antagonists should not surprise us, since, as Fredrik Albritton Jonsson notes in his critical genealogy of cornucopianism, “cornucopianism and environmental anxieties have been closely intertwined in theory and practice from the eighteenth century onward” (2014). Albritton Jonsson connects the alternation between cornucopian fantasy and environmental anxiety to the booms and busts of environmental appropriation and capitalist accumulation, while he locates the roots of cornucopia “in the realm of alchemy and natural theology. To overcome the effects of the Fall, Francis Bacon hoped to remake the natural order into a second, artificial world. Such theological and alchemical aspirations were intertwined with imperial ideology” (Albritton Jonsson 2014, 167). This strange convergence is most evident in Malthus’s own vision of progress and growth—driven exactly by the population pressure and scarcity that serve as analogue for the early Godwin’s reason—which Malthus, a pioneering apologist for industrial capitalism, did not reject, despite later misrepresentations.

    IV

    Both Marx and Engels would later discern in Malthus’s ostensibly scientific outline of nature’s positive checks on the poor—aimed at both eighteenth century British poor laws and various enlightenment era visions of social improvement—the primacy of surplus population and a reserve army of the unemployed for a nascent industrial capitalism, as Engels notably “summarizes” Malthus’s argument in his Condition of the Working Class in England (1845):

    If, then, the problem is not to make the ‘surplus population’ useful, … but merely to let it starve to death in the least objectionable way, … this, of course, is simple enough, provided the surplus population perceives its own superfluousness and takes kindly to starvation. There is, however, in spite of the strenuous exertions of the humane bourgeoisie, no immediate prospect of its succeeding in bringing about such a disposition among the workers. The workers have taken it into their heads that they, with their busy hands, are the necessary, and the rich capitalists, who do nothing, the surplus population.

    Despite the transparently political impetus behind Malthus’s Essay, his work was taken up by a certain segment of the environmental movement in the twentieth century. These same environmentalists often read and reject both Marx’s and Engels’s critiques of Malthusian political economy, with the disastrous environmental record of orthodox communist and specifically Soviet Prometheanism in mind. John Bellamy Foster notes that many “ecological socialists,” have gone so far as to argue that Marx and Engels were guilty of “a Utopian overreaction to Malthusian epistemic conservatism” which led them to downplay (or deny) “any ultimate natural limits to population” and indeed natural limits in general. Faced with Malthusian natural limits, we are told, Marx and Engels responded with “‘Prometheanism’—a blind faith in the capacity of technology to overcome all ecological barriers” (Foster 1998).

    While Marx rejected a fixed and universal law of population growth or food production, stressing instead how population increases and agricultural yields vary from one socio-material context to another, he accepted ecological limits—to soil fertility, for example—in his theory of metabolic rift, as both Foster (2000) and Kohei Saito (2017) demonstrate in their respective projects on Marx’s ecology.

    This perspective was arguably anticipated by the later Godwin himself, in the long and now forgotten Enquiry Concerning Population (1820), written at the urging of his son-in-law Percy Shelley, in order to salvage his reputation from Malthus’s attacks; Malthus was awarded the first chair in political economy at the East India Company College in Hertfordshire, while Godwin’s utopian philosophy was fading from the public consciousness, when it was not an  explicit object of ridicule. Godwin returned to the absurdity of Malthus’s theological fixation on the human inability to resist the sexual urge, with a special emphasis on the poor, which we can see in first response to Malthus’s Essay in the 1790s, although in a more openly vitriolic fashion, perhaps at the urging of Shelley, for whom the Malthusian emphasis on abstinence and chastity among the poor was “seeking to deny them even the comfort of sexual love” in addition to “keeping them ignorant, miserable, and subservient” (St. Clair 1989, 464). Shelley, unlike the young Godwin of the 1793 Political Justice that influenced the poet’s radical political development, saw in unrestrained sexual intercourse a vehicle of communion with nature.

    The older Godwin offers, in his Of Population, 600 pages of historical accounts and reports regarding population and agriculture—an empiricist overcorrection to Malthus’s accusations of visionary rationalism—in order to show us the variability of different social metabolisms, the efficacy of birth control, and, most importantly, how utopian social organization can and must be built with biophysical limits in mind against “the occult and mystical state of population” in Malthus’s thinking (Godwin 1820, 476). More than a response to Malthus, this later work also represents a rejoinder to the young proto-accelerationist Godwin and that nevertheless retains most of his radical social and political commitments. Of Population troubles the earlier Malthusian-Godwinian binary that arguably still underwrites our present-day Anthropocene narrative and the standard historiography of the English Industrial Revolution.

    In 1798, Malthus argued in favor of population and resource constraints, for largely ideological reasons, at the exact moment that the steam engine and the widespread adoption of fossil energy, in the form of coal, enabled what seemed like self-sustaining growth, seemingly rendering that paradigm obsolete. But Malthus also argues, toward the end of the Essay, that as just the “first great awakeners of the mind seem to be the wants of the body,” so necessity is “the mother of invention” (Malthus 1793, 95) and progress Malthus’s myth of capitalist modernity, the negative image of perfectibilism, underwrites the political economy of industrialization. Malthus stressed the power of natural necessity—scarcity and struggle—to compel human accomplishment, against the universal luxury proffered by the perfectibilists.

    Like the good bourgeois moralist he was, Malthus saw in the individual and collective struggle against scarcity—laws of population that function as secularized analogues for original sin—the drivers of technological development and material growth. This is a familiar story of progress and one that, no less than the perfectibilists’ teleological arc of history, elides conflict and contingency in rendering the rise of industrial capitalism and Euro-American capitalism as both natural and inevitable. For example, E. A. Wrigley argues, in a substantively Malthusian vein, that it was overpopulation, land exhaustion, and food scarcity in eighteenth-century England that necessitated the use of coal as an engine for growth, the invention of the steam engine in 1784, and widespread adoption of fossil power over the next century. Prometheans left and right nonetheless use the term “Malthusian” as synonym for (equally imprecise) “primitivist” or Luddite. But, as Andreas Malm persuasively contends, our dominant narratives of technological progress proceed from assumptions inherited from Malthus (and his disciple Ricardo): “Coal resolved a crisis of overpopulation. Like all innovations that composed the Industrial Revolution, the outcome was a valiant struggle of ‘a society with its back to ecological wall’” (Malm 2016, 23).

    Malthus’s force of necessity is here indistinguishable from Godwinian Progress, spurring on the inevitable march of innovation, without any mention of the extent to which technological development, in England and the capitalist west, was and is shaped by capitalist imperatives, such as the quest for profit or labor discipline. We can see this same dynamic at play in much present-day Anthropocene discourse, some of whose exponents trace a direct line from the discovery of fire to the human transformation of the biosphere. These “Anthropocenesters” oscillate between a Godwinian-accelerationist pole—best exemplified by would-be accelerationists and ecomodernists like Mark Lynas (2011), who wholeheartedly embraces the role of Godwin avatar Victor Frankenstein in arguing how we must assume our position as the God species and completely reengineer the planet we have remade in our own image—and a Malthusian-pessimist pole, according to which all we can do now is learn how to die with the planet we have undone, to paraphrase the title of Roy Scranton’s popular Learning How to Die in the Anthropocene (2015).[9]

    Rather than the enforced austerity conjured up by cornucopians and neo-Prometheans across the ideological spectrum when confronted with the biophysical limits now made palpable by our global ecological catastrophe, we must pursue a radical social and political project under these limits and conditions. Indeed, a decelerationist socialism might be the only way to salvage human civilization and creaturely life while repairing the biosphere of which both are parts: utopia among the ruins. While all the grand radical programs of the modern era, including Godwin’s own early perfectibilism, have been oriented toward the future, this project must contend with the very real burden of the past, as Malm notes: “every conjuncture now combines relics and arrows, loops and postponements that stretch from the deepest past to the most distant future, via a now that is non-contemporaneous with itself” (Malm 2016, 8).

    The warming effects of coal or oil burnt in the past misshape our collective present and future, due to the cumulative effects of CO2 in the atmosphere, even if—for example—all carbon emissions were to stop tomorrow. Global warming in this way represents the weight of those dead generations and a specific tradition—fossil capitalism and its self-sustaining growth— as literal gothic nightmare; one that will shape any viable post-carbon and post-capitalist future.

    Perhaps the post-accelerationist Godwin of the later 1790s and afterward is instructive in this regard. Although chastened by the death of his wife, the collapse of the French Revolution, and the campaign of vilification aimed at him and fellow radicals—in addition to the debate with Malthus outlined here—Godwin nonetheless retained the most important of his emancipatory commitments, as outlined in the 1793 Political Justice, even as he recognized physical constraints, the value of the past, and the primacy of affective bonds in building communal life. In a long piece, published in 1809, entitled Essay On Sepulchres, Or, A Proposal For Erecting Some Memorial of the Illustrious Dead in All Ages on the Spot , for example, Godwin reveals his new intellectual orientation in arguing for the physical commemoration of the dead; against a purely rationalist or moral remembrance of the deceased’s accomplishments and qualities, and against the younger Godwin’s horror of the body and its imperfections, the older man underlines the importance of our physical remains and our the visceral attachments they engender: “It is impossible therefore that I should not follow by sense the last remains of my friend; and finding him no where above the surface of the earth, should not feel an attachment to the spot where his body has been deposited in the earth” (Godwin 1809, 4).

    These ruminations follow a preface in which Godwin reaffirms his commitment to the utopian anarchism of Political Justice, with the caveat that any radical future must recognize both the past and remember the dead. He draws a tacitly anti-Promethean line between our embodied mortality and utopian political aspiration, severing the two often antithetical modes of progress that constitute a dialectic of European enlightenment. While first-generation Romantics, such as Wordsworth and Coleridge, abandoned the futurist Godwinism of their youth, alongside their “Jacobin” political sympathies, for an ambivalent conservatism, the second generation of Romantics, including the extended Godwin-Shelley circle, combine the emancipatory social and political commitments of Political Justice with an appreciation of the natural world and its limits. One need look no further than Frankenstein and Prometheus Unbound—the Shelleys’ revisionist interrogations of the Prometheus myth and modern Prometheanism, which should be read together—to see how this radical romantic constellation represents a bridge between 1790s-era utopianism and later radicalisms, including Marxism and ecosocialism.[10] And if we group the later Godwin with these second-generation Romantics,  then Michael Löwy and Robert Sayre’s reading of radical Romanticism as critical supplement to enlightenment makes perfect sense (see Löwy and Sayre 2001).

    Instead of the science fictional fantasies of total automation and decoupling, largely derived from the pre-Marxist socialist utopianisms that drive today’s various accelerationisms, this Romanticism provides one historical  resource for thinking through a decelerationist radicalism that dispenses with the grand progressive narrative: the linear, self-sustaining, and teleological model of improvement, understood in the quantitative terms of more, shared by capitalist and state socialist models of development. Against Prometheanism both old and new, let us reject the false binaries and shared assumptions inaugurated by the Godwin/Malthus debate, and instead join hands with the Walter Benjamin of the “Theses on the Philosophy of History” (1940) in order to better pull the emergency brake on a runaway capitalist modernity rushing headlong into the precipice.

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    Anthony Galluzzo earned his PhD in English Literature at UCLA. He specializes in radical transatlantic English-language literary cultures of the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. He has taught at the United States Military Academy at West Point, Colby College, and NYU.

    Back to the essay

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    Notes

    [1] The “Dark Enlightenment” is a term coined by accelerationist and “neo-reactionary” Nick Land, to describe his own orientation as well as that of authoritarian futurist, Curtis Yarvin. The term is often used to describe a range of technofuturist discourses that blend libertarian, authoritarian, and post-Marxist elements, in the case of “left” accelerationist, with a belief in technological transcendence. For a good overview, see Haider (2017).

    [2] This is a simplification of Blumenberg’s point in his Paradigms for a Metaphorology:

    Metaphors can first of all be leftover elements, rudiments on the path from mythos to logos; as such, they indicate the Cartesian provisionality of the historical situation in which philosophy finds itself at any given time, measured against the regulative ideality of the pure logos. Metaphorology would here be a critical reflection charged with unmasking and counteracting the inauthenticity of figurative speech. But metaphors can also—hypothetically, for the time being—be foundational elements of philosophical language, ‘translations’ that resist being converted back into authenticity and logicality. If it could be shown that such translations, which would have to be called ‘absolute metaphors’, exist, then one of the essential tasks of conceptual history (in the thus expanded sense) would be to ascertain and analyze their conceptually irredeemable expressive function. Furthermore, the evidence of absolute metaphors would make the rudimentary metaphors mentioned above appear in a different light, since the Cartesian teleology of logicization in the context of which they were identified as ‘leftover elements’ in the first place would already have foundered on the existence of absolute translations. Here the presumed equivalence of figurative and ‘inauthentic’ speech proves questionable; Vico had already declared metaphorical language to be no less ‘proper’ than the language commonly held to be such,4 only lapsing into the Cartesian schema in reserving the language of fantasy for an earlier historical epoch. Evidence of absolute metaphors would force us to reconsider the relationship between logos and the imagination. The realm of the imagination could no longer be regarded solely as the substrate for transformations into conceptuality—on the assumption that each element could be processed and converted in turn, so to speak, until the supply of images was used up—but as a catalytic sphere from which the universe of concepts continually renews itself, without thereby converting and exhausting this founding reserve. (Blumenberg 2010, 3-4)

    [3] Davidson situates Godwin, and his ensuing debate with Thomas Malthus on the limits to human population growth and improvement, within a longer eighteenth-century argument regarding perfectibility, the nature of human nature, and the extent to which we are constrained by our biological inheritance. Preceding Darwin and Mendel by more than a century, Davidson contends later models of eugenics and recognizably modern schemes for human enhancement or perfection emerge in the eighteenth, rather than the nineteenth, century. See Davidson (2009), 165.

    [4] Horkheimer and Adorno’s Dialectic of Enlightenment (1947), with its critique of enlightenment as domination and instrumental rationality, is the classic text here.

    [5] Benjamin famously argues for the emancipatory potential of mechanical reproducibility—of the image—in new visual media, such as film, against the unique “aura” of the original artwork. Benjamin sees in artistic aura a secularized version of the sacred object at the center of religious ritual. I am, of course, simplifying a complex argument that Benjamin himself would later qualify, especially as regards modern industrial technology, new media, and revolution. Anders—Benjamin’s husband and first husband of Hannah Arendt, who introduced Benjamin’s work to the English-speaking world—pushes this line of argument in a radically different direction, as human beings in the developed world increasingly feel “obsolete” on account of their perishable irreplaceability—a variation and inversion of artistic and religious aura, since “singularity” here is bound up with transience and imperfection—as compared to the assembly line proliferation of copies, all of which embody an immaterial model in the service of “industrial-Platonism” in Anders’s coinage. See Anders (2016), 53. See also Benjamin, “The Work of Art in The Age of Mechanical Reproduction” (1939).

    [6] This shift, which includes a critique of what I am calling the Promethean or proto-futurist dimension of the early Godwin, is best exemplified in Godwin’s St. Leon, his second novel, which recounts the story of an alchemist who sacrifices his family and his sanity for the sake of immortality and supernatural power: a model for his daughter’s Frankenstein (Shelley 1818).

    [7] I use Foucault’s descriptive models here with the caveat that, unlike Foucault, these techniques—of the sovereign, disciplinary, or biopolitical sort—should be anchored in specific socio-economic modes of organization as opposed to his diffuse “power.” Nor is this list of techniques exhaustive.

    [8] One recent example of this is the vogue for a reanimated Russian Cosmism among Silicon Valley technologists and the accelerationists of the art and para-academic worlds alike.  The original cosmists of the early Soviet period managed to recreate heterodox Christian and Gnostic theologies in secular and ostensibly materialist and/or Marxist-Leninist forms, i.e., God doesn’t exist, but we will become Him; with our liberated forces of production, we will make the universal resurrection of the dead a reality. The latter is now an obsession of various tech entrepreneurs such as Peter Thiel, who have invested money in “parabiosis” start-ups, for instance. One contribution to recent e-flux collection on  (neo)cosmism and resurrection admits that cosmism is “biopolitics because it is concerned with the administration of life, rejuvenation, and even resurrection. Furthermore, it is radicalized biopolitics because its goals are ahead of the current normative expectations and extend even to the deceased” (Steyerl and Vidokle 2018, 33). Frankensteinism is real apparently. But Frankensteinism in the service of what? For a good overview of the newest futurism and its relationship to social and ecological catastrophe, see Pein (2015).

    [9] Lynas and Scranton arguably exemplify these antithetical poles, although the latter has recently expressed some sympathy for something like revolutionary pessimism, very much in line with the decelerationist perspective that animates this essay. In a 2018 New York Times editorial called “Raising My Child in a Doomed World,” he writes: “there is some narrow hope that revolutionary socio-economic transformation today might save billions of human lives and preserve global civilization as we know it in more or less recognizable form, or at least stave off human extinction” (Scranton 2018). Also see Scranton, Learning to Die in the Anthropocene (2015) and Lynas (2011).

    The eco-modernists, who include Ted Nordhaus, Michael Shellenberger, and Stewart Brand, are affiliated with the Breakthrough Institute, a California-based environmental think tank. They are, according to their mission statement, “progressives who believe in the potential of human development, technology, and evolution to improve human lives and create a beautiful world.” The development of this potential is, in turn, predicated on “new ways of thinking about energy and the environment.” Luckily, these ecomoderns have published their own manifesto in which we learn that these new ways include embracing “the Anthropocene” as a good thing.

    This “good Anthropocene” provides human beings a unique opportunity to improve human welfare, and protect the natural world in the bargain, through a further “decoupling” from nature, at least according to the ecomodernist manifesto. The ecomodenists extol the “role that technology plays” in making humans “less reliant upon the many ecosystems that once provided their only sustenance, even as those same ecosystems have been deeply damaged.” The ecomodernists reject natural limits of any sort. They recommend our complete divorce from the natural world, like soul from body, although, as they constantly reiterate, this time it is for nature’s own good. How can human beings completely “decouple” from a natural world that is, in the words of Marx, our “inorganic body” outside of species-wide self-extinction, which is current policy? The eco-modernists’ policy proposals run the gamut from a completely nuclear energy economy and more intensified industrial agriculture to insufficient or purely theoretical (non-existent) solutions to our environmental catastrophe, such as geoengineering or cold fusion reactors (terraforming Mars, I hope, will appear in the sequel). This rebooted Promethean vision is still ideologically useful, while the absence of any analysis of modernization as a specifically capitalist process is telling. In the words of Chris Smaje (2015),

    Ecomodernists offer no solutions to contemporary problems other than technical innovation and further integration into private markets which are structured systematically by centralized state power in favour of the wealthy, in the vain if undoubtedly often sincere belief that this will somehow help alleviate global poverty. They profess to love humanity, and perhaps they do, but the love seems to curdle towards those who don’t fit with its narratives of economic, technological and urban progress. And, more than humanity, what they seem to love most of all is certain favoured technologies, such as nuclear power.

    [10] Terrence Hoagwood (1988), for example, argues for Shelley’s philosophical significance as bridge between 1790s radicalism and dialectical materialism.

    __

    Works Cited

    • Anders, Günther. 2016. Prometheanism: Technology, Digital Culture, and Human Obsolescence, ed. Christopher John Müller. London: Rowman and Littlefield.
    • Badiou, Alain. 2008. “Is the Word Communism Forever Doomed?Lacanian Ink lecture (Nov).
    • Benjamin, Walter. (1939) 1969. “The Work of Art in The Age of Mechanical Reproduction.” In Illuminations. New York:  Shocken Books. 217-241.
    • Benjamin, Walter. (1940) 1969. “Theses on the Philosophy of History.” In Illuminations. New York:  Shocken Books. 253-265.
    • Blumenberg, Hans. 2010. Paradigms for a Metaphorology, trans. Robert Savage. Ithaca: Cornell UP.
    • Brassier, Ray. 2014. “Prometheanism and Its Critics.” In Mackay and Avanessian (2014). 467-488.
    • Davidson, Jenny. 2008. Breeding: A Partial History of the Eighteenth Century. New York: Columbia UP.
    • Engels, Friedrich. (1845) 2009. The Condition of the Working Class in England. Ed. David McLellan. New York: Penguin.
    • Foster, John Bellamy. 1998. “Malthus’ Essay on Population at Age 200.” Monthly Review (Dec 1).
    • Foster, John Bellamy. 2000. Marx’s Ecology: Materialism and Nature. New York: Monthly Review Press.
    • Foucault, Michel. 2003. “Society Must Be Defended”: Lectures At The College de France 1975-1976. Trans. David Macey. New York: Picador.
    • Haider, Shuja. 2017. “The Darkness at the End of the Tunnel: Artificial Intelligence and Neoreaction.” Viewpoint (Mar 28).
    • Hauskeller, Michael. 2014. Sex and the Posthuman Condition. Hampshire: Palgrave.
    • Higgs, Kerryn. 2014. Collision Course: Endless Growth on a Finite Planet. Cambridge: The MIT Press.
    • Hoagwood, Terrence Allan. 1988. Skepticism and Ideology: Shelley’s Political Prose and Its Philosophical Context From Bacon to Marx. Iowa City: University of Iowa Press.
    • Horkheimer, Max, and Theodor Adorno. (1947) 2007. Dialectic of Enlightenment. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
    • Jonsson, Fredrik Albritton. 2014. “The Origins of Cornucopianism: A Preliminary Genealogy.” Critical Historical Studies (Spring).
    • Kurzweil, Ray. 2006. The Singularity Is Near: When Humans Transcend Biology. New York: Penguin Books.
    • Löwy Michael, and Robert Sayre. 2001. Romanticism Against the Tide of Modernity. Durham: Duke University Press.
    • Lynas, Mark. 2011. The God Species: Saving the Planet in the Age of Humans. Washington DC: National Geographic Press.
    • Mackay, Robin and Armen Avanessian, eds. 2014. #Accelerate: The Accelerationist Reader. Falmouth, UK: Urbanomic.
    • Malm, Andreas. 2016. Fossil Capital. London: Verso.
    • Malthus, Thomas. (1798) 2015. An Essay on the Principle of Population. In An Essay on the Principle of Population and Other Writings, ed. Robert Mayhew. New York: Penguin.
    • Mayhew, Robert. 2014. Malthus: The Life and Legacies of an Untimely Prophet. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
    • Merchant, Carolyn. 1980. The Death of Nature: Women, Ecology, and the Scientific Revolution. Reprint edition, New York: HarperOne, 1990.
    • Pein, Corey. 2015. “Cyborg Soothsayers of the High-Tech Hogwash Emporia: In Amsterdam with the Singularity.” The Baffler 28 (July).
    • Philp, Mark. 1986. Godwin’s Political Justice. Ithaca: Cornell UP.
    • Preu, James. 1959. The Dean and the Anarchist. Tallahassee: Florida State University.
    • Saito, Kohei. 2017. Karl Marx’s Ecosocialism: Capital, Nature, and the Unfinished Critique of Political Economy. New York: Monthly Review Press.
    • Scranton, Roy. 2018. “Raising My Child in a Doomed World.” The New York Times (Jul 16).
    • Scranton, Roy. 2015. Learning to Die in the Anthropocene. San Francisco: City Lights.
    • Shelley, Mary. (1818) 2012. Frankenstein: The Original 1818 Edition, eds. D.l. Macdonald and Kathleen Scherf. Ontario: Broadview Press.
    • Smaje, Chris. 2015. “Ecomodernism: A Response to My Critics.” Resilience (Sep 10).
    • St. Clair, William. 1989. The Godwins and The Shelleys: A Biography of a Family. Baltimore, Johns Hopkins UP.
    • Steyerl, Hito and Anton Vidokle. 2018. “Cosmic Catwalk and the Production of Time.” In Art Without Death: Conversations on Cosmism. New York: Sternberg Press/e-Flux.
    • Thelwall John. 2008. Selected Political Writings of John Thelwall, Volume Two. London: Pickering & Chatto.
    • Thompson, E. P. 1978. The Poverty of Theory: or An Orrery of Errors. London: Merlin Press.
    • Williams, Nick and Alex Srnicek, 2013. “#Accelerate: A Manifesto for Accelerationist Politics.” Also in Mackay and Avanessian (2014). 347-362.
    • Winner, Langdon. 1977. Autonomous Technology: Technics-out-of-Control as a Theme in Political Thought. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.

    works by William Godwin

    • Godwin, William. (1793) 2013. An Enquiry Concerning Political Justice, ed. Mark Philp. Oxford: Oxford UP.
    • Godwin, William. (1797) 1971. The Enquirer: Reflections on Education, Manners and Literature. New York: Garland Publishers.
    • Godwin, William. 1798. An Enquiry Concerning Political Justice. Third edition. London: G.G and J. Robinson.
    • Godwin, William. 1801. Thoughts occasioned by the Perusal of Dr. Parr’s Spital Sermon, preached at Christ Church, April I5, 1800: being a Reply to the Attacks of Dr. Parr, Mr. Mackintosh, the Author of an Essay on Population, and Others, London: G. G. & J. Robinson.
    • Godwin, William. 1809. Essay On Sepulchres, Or, A Proposal For Erecting Some Memorial of the Illustrious Dead in All Ages on the Spot Where Their Remains Have Been Interred. London: W. Miller.
    • Godwin, William. 1820. Of Population. An Enquiry concerning the Power of Increase in the Numbers of Mankind, being an Answer to Mr. Malthus’s Essay on that Subject. London: Longman, Hurst, Rees, Ornie & Brown.

    For a more complete bibliography see the William Godwin entry in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

     

  • David Fieni — Review of Abdelkébir Khatibi’s “Class Warrior – Taoist Style”

    David Fieni — Review of Abdelkébir Khatibi’s “Class Warrior – Taoist Style”

    Abdelkébir Khatibi

    Class Warrior – Taoist Style, translated by Matt Reeck (Wesleyan University Press, 2017).

    by David Fieni

    This essay has been peer-reviewed by the b2o editorial collective. 

    The improbable mash-up of Marxism and Taoism announced by the title of Abdelkébir Khatibi’s long poem from 1976, Class Warrior – Taoist Style, unfolds in language both brash and opaque, promising a kind of free verse handbook for militants interested in experimenting with new ways of combining action and creation, praxis and poièsis.  The book’s forty sections perform a détournement of the rhetorical techniques of Lao Tzu’s Tao Te Ching while simultaneously re-purposing and deforming both Taoist and Marxist thought and discourse.  And yet while on the surface Khatibi seems to offer a poetic manifesto doubling as a sapiential treatise (and tripling as a tactical guide for revolutionaries), the text also tempts us with a retreat into the space of literary singularity.  Such a reading of the poem could appear to provide evidence of Winnifred Woodhull’s claim that “a subversive poetics has gradually replaced work for change in the political field,” how for Khatibi and many others writing in French since the end of the 1960s, “poetic language has come to be associated with an ‘other’ politics radically divorced from social institutions and from material relations of domination” (x).  The challenge of locating the political in Khatibi’s poem lies in the difficulty of reading it in the context of the author’s poetics of singularity without letting what at first glance appears to be a dehistoricized deconstructionism have the last word.

    Perhaps more than any other postcolonial intellectual of his generation, Khatibi brought together the impulses of decolonization and deconstruction, while problematizing both.  Born in 1938 in El Jadida, Morocco, Khatibi came of age during the nationalist fight against the French Protectorate (1953-1956), studied sociology at the Sorbonne, where he wrote his thesis, Le Roman Maghrebin (1968), then returned to Morocco, where he directed the Institut de sociologie before joining the Centre de recherches scientifiques in Rabat in 1973.  He published in a wide range of genres, including novels, poetry, plays, and essays on art, culture, politics, philosophy, and literature.  His “thinking friendship” with Jacques Derrida culminated with the dialogue that grew out of Derrida’s The Monolingualism of the Other (1996).[1]  Khatibi viewed deconstruction as a decolonizing force targeting both “Western metaphysics” and the metaphysical tradition in Arab and Islamic thought.  He remains an important, if often overlooked, practitioner and theorist of deconstruction, even as he often challenged its half-hidden abstractions with lived practices taken from Moroccan life.  The publication of Class Warrior provides an occasion to revisit a major theme that runs throughout Khatibi’s work: how can the postcolonial writer remain at once creative, critical and committed?

    Khatibi’s thinking about decolonization is remarkable for the unflinching critical acumen he brought to the task.  He begins “Pensée-autre” (“Other-Thinking”), the opening essay of 1983’s Maghreb Pluriel, by acknowledging Fanon’s call to look for “something else” outside “the European game,” but instantly interrogates what he understands as “the right to difference” at the root of this call:

    The innermost depths of our being, struck down and tormented by the so-called Western will to power, hallucinated by humiliation, by brutal and brutalizing domination, can under no circumstances be absorbed by the naïve declaration of a right to difference, as if this “right” was not already inherent to the law of life, that is, to insoluble violence, to the insurrection against one’s own alienation.  (Khatibi 1983: 11)

    Class Warrior — Taoist Style sets into poetic form the “insurrection” of “insoluble” differences transecting personal and collective experience.  Even as the language of political struggle pervades the poem, Khatibi opens the work with a warning against empty political language:

    history is a word
    ideology a word
    the unconscious a word
    words are like dares
    in the mouths of the ignorant

    or each sign regenerates
    an undeniable freshness
    don’t get lost in your own thinking
    don’t disappear into that of others

    test the blood of your thinking
    because in answer to your question
    you will find only quavering targets
    action shapes words
    like the arc consumes the crystalline arrow. (1)[2]

    This first section highlights the importance of the context of an utterance (“the mouths of the ignorant”), distinguishes signs from thinking, urges equilibrium between one’s own thought-worlds and those of others, and asserts the formative force of action relative to language in an image that conceives of the speech act as an act of war (“action shapes words / like the arc consumes the crystalline arrow”).  Subsequent sections introduce the set pieces of the poem’s political vocabulary and set them in motion: “the class warrior” is a “sovereign orphan” (2) who engages “the class enemy” in a revolution both violent and erotic.  “While laughing,” Khatibi tells the reader, “prepare the act of very great violence” (9).  The class war is planetary in scope: “if all oppressed peoples took up arms / they would dance proudly on the class enemy” (20).

    The class warfare described in Khatibi’s poem entails a “radical divestment” (21) on the part of the class warrior (désappropriation tranchante) in the act of revolutionary self-fashioning.  At the same time, the text warns against the kind of annihilation of cultural resources that imperialism, colonialism, nationalism, and capitalism alike have sought to accomplish:

    how to fight without losing ourselves?
    know this:
    now that action germinates in every body
    and your body is changing directions
    fling yourself toward the class enemy
    and over and over display your fiery ardor
    over and over draw the enemy in before pouncing. (38)

    The question asked at the beginning of the above passage will find an answer thirty-three years later from Édouard Glissant.  To the question, “how to fight without losing ourselves?” Glissant will reply with his poetics of relation, affirming “I can change through exchanging with the Other without losing or distorting myself” (Diawara).  A question about fighting becomes one about transformation, yet in Khatibi the class warrior’s battle is ultimately about the radical opening of the self to difference and otherness, even if he prefers the language of violence to that of “exchange.”  These lines join difference and identity (as “two words to point to the same knot” (35)) to the “ardor” of the activated revolutionary body.  This is as close as the poem gets to delivering on the unique tactical advice promised by the title, as the class warrior engages the class enemy through a series of choreographed movements alternating between advance and retreat.[3]  In 1971’s La Mémoire Tatouée, Khatibi describes his own participation in anti-colonial battles in similar fashion: “In El Jadida, I improvised myself mobile protestor, changing neighborhoods, without a fixed plan: the labyrinth of streets provided the key to whoever could zigzag between the assault and our underground forces” (96).  The mobilized body lives the space of the Moroccan city as a new language as “the city was reinventing itself as a new syntax” (96).[4]  Just as the city at war became a language, the language of Class Warrior becomes a space of combat.

    One important way that the manner of “class warfare” reveals itself in the poem occurs in the ways that Khatibi’s poetics of erasure, divestment, and self-disappropriation subvert the supposed content of the poem’s truth claims.  Section eighteen opens with the declaration that first draws then erases the image of a border in the mind of the reader:

    the border between two countries is invisible
    that’s how I can merge with your language without losing myself. (18)

    To affirm the invisible nature of the border, Khatibi must first inscribe its imaginary existence in language.  It is not simply that national borders do not exist in some utopian realm of the poetic imagination, but rather that in the act of erasing the border the poem produces a gesture of signification, which in its vibratory symmetry, exceeds its monolingual signifieds, thereby opening a space where languages and beings may merge without being entirely erased.  The next lines return the reader to the sound of words, and thus to the affective violence of style and manner:

    stick to the wild sound of the word “barbarous”

    you will know the difference of difference
    that your whirling jubilation will bring you
    learn the language of the other
    so that the language of your veins will be distilled

    nothing can surpass the word “barbarous”
    turned into a sword to fight sand

    confront the rapidity of my language and learn. (18)

    The poem here substitutes the supposed wildness of the barbarous person with the “wild sound of the word ‘barbarous.’”  By focusing on the sound of the word itself, Khatibi replaces the act of hearing the other without comprehending the root of this word, and instead exploits the sound substance of the signifier itself in order to hijack the direction of the violence that this word has for so long conveyed.  This tactic of linguistic “terrorism”[5] becomes the class warrior’s ultimate weapon, “a sword to fight sand.”  The final line of the section returns the reader to the speed and agility of the poem’s gestural style, its “shapeshifting calligraphy” (3).  Khatibi’s poetics are on full display here, as writing and erasure, sound and silencing, stasis and motion cancel each other out in the creation of a kind of sculpted static that only signifies in the interstices of the poem’s various semiotic modes.

    As translator Matt Reeck has pointed out, Khatibi begins his idiosyncratic use of the term “class warrior” in La Mémoire Tatouée, where Khatibi mentions his desire to “abolish all tribes” (Khatibi 1971: 21) and become “a class warrior in the tribe of words” (191).[6]  While Reeck identifies the poem’s “Marxist vocabulary” as its “most noticeable lexical feature” (140), his view of the poem follows a line of argument put forward by Marc Gontard, one of Khatibi’s first scholarly critics, that would make of Class Warrior something like a kind of self-help book for personal transformation.  For his part, Gontard focuses on Khatibi’s use and deformation of the rhetorical devices in the Tao Te Ching without so much as once mentioning Marx or Marxism.  According to Gontard, “The class warrior ‘in the Taoist style’ erects an implacable enemy of all orthodoxies.  For him, ‘the great revolution has no heroes,’ and his action leads him to oppose all received ideas, established norms, and totalitarian knowledge” (89).  To be sure, there is much in the poem, and in statements that Khatibi himself has made about his work, to encourage a reading of the poem as an articulation of a kind of “permanent critique” on a personal level.  This critique is made possible not by the author’s privileged membership in a Republic of Letters, but rather in what he calls the “tribe of words.”  Class Warrior – Taoist Style would then teach a specific kind of combat against a rather idiosyncratically defined “class enemy”: a combat that takes place within the social world of language, and where the “class enemy” would be anyone belonging to a group that defines itself as orthodox and self-identical.

    The second section of the poem sketches out the moving figure of the class warrior for the reader, declaring that

    the orphan
    is the class warrior
    the sovereign orphan. (2)

    Reeck’s euphonious translation veers ever so slightly away from an important subtlety in the French, which tells us that the class warrior is “sovereignly orphan” — souverainement orphelin.  The difference between adjective and adverb is the difference between ontology and manner: the class warrior’s orphan-hood is not essentially sovereign, but rather something he performs in a sovereign manner, that is, in a style that imitates the self-contained autonomy at the heart of sovereignty.  In the following lines, the poem itself imitates the rhetorical style of the Tao Te Ching, by first asking a question, and then instead of answering it, presenting the problem to which the orphan would be the solution:

    what does “orphan” mean to us?
    every hierarchy presupposes
    a father a mother and a third
    every politics
    a master a slave and a third

     Khatibi posits the figure of the orphan as a remainder of the violent processes of both Freudian Oedipal normativity and a Hegelian/Marxian dialectical overcoming.  The “sovereignly orphan” class warrior is a product of revolutionary Oedipal violence that cuts him off from all tribes based on filiation, blood, and self-identity.  This is why, in the next line, Khatibi tells readers that “the historical person is a disgrace” (2).  Writing in the context of the 1970s, after the promises of national independence and Arab and Pan-African unity had begun to lose their luster, in the midst of the Moroccan années de plomb, which saw many of Khatibi’s friends and fellow writers imprisoned and tortured for taking political stands, Class Warrior grapples with the problem of neo-colonial mimicry in a supposedly decolonizing world.  “Can you disfigure the class enemy,” the very next lines ask, “without taking on his likeness? (2).  Khatibi aims to decolonize the very concept of class struggle, in a postcolonial world where the “class enemy” has changed appearance while still maintaining the relational class antagonism of a nationalist neoliberal elite.

    The class warrior performs her sovereign autonomy without being defined by it, while at the same time guarding against being consumed by the class enemy, who is, according to the poem, the one consumed by sovereignty:

    sovereignty burns
    the class enemy
    Like a straw dog (2).[7]

    Here Khatibi alludes to the sacrificial straw dogs in the Tao Te Ching, which function in the ancient Chinese text as signifiers that only represent the object of ritual sacrifice.  Lao Tzu writes:

    Heaven and earth are Inhumane:
    they use the ten thousand things like straw dogs.
    And the sage too is Inhumane:
    he uses the hundred-fold people like straw dogs. (37)

    Whereas the Tao Te Ching aligns all of creation (“the ten thousand things”) as signifiers to be consumed, Khatibi specifies the class enemy, which he defines in terms of signifiers arranged as binary pairs:

    inside outside
    nearby far away
    visible invisible
    capital work
    this is the class enemy (3)

    Khatibi’s tactical advice on how to win the war against the class enemy begins with a re-ordering of how one thinks and signifies, which will lead to a radical shift in praxis, and, ultimately, to a transfiguration of the body, which opens dialogue with the previously unthinkable.

    how to defeat the class enemy?
    change your thought categories
    and you will change your actions
    change your actions
    and you will raise up your body
    raise up your body
    and you will talk with the unthinkable

    politics is sensual
    a shapeshifting calligraphy. (3)

    The first three sections of the poem thus stage a fable of the class warrior combatting the class enemy in a way that joins language to action, action to the body, and the body to thought, all of it sketched out in the fluid calligraphic gestures of a phantom hand writing with disappearing ink.

    Despite the many ways that the poem deforms Marxist thought, Khatibi’s fable remains faithful to a Marxist understanding of class in the sense that “class” for the class warrior is a fluid and changeable relation, and not a static universal category, as it is for the class enemy.  Specifically, for Marx, class described the relation between people, labor, and the means of production.  In a letter from 1852, Marx affirmed what he thought was new in his analysis of class, namely “that the existence of classes is only bound up with particular historical phases in the development of production” (Marx 1978: 220).  While there is some validity to the argument that Khatibi’s work often appears to lack clear historical and geographical grounding (Woodhull xviii), one should also reproach critics who fail to situate the development of Khatibi’s output in the historical conditions of its production.  At the precise center of the poem, Khatibi addresses the historical nature of the class warrior’s being and provides what appears to be the poem’s most tangible reference to historical events.  The section begins with a question about the exploitation of one’s past by others and oneself, which Khatibi terms “the usury of your historical being.”  He asks:

    how to defeat the usury of your historical being?
    mobile ungraspable
    you will confront the enemy while timing your breath

    in appearing
    take on the suppleness of the dancing reed (21)

    Again, the enemy here would be the very conceptualization of class itself, and with it, categorical thought, understood as a fixed, rigid, and abstract essence, and the correct tactical advice for fighting this enemy would involve the agility and suppleness of the calligraphic gesture.

    The next nine lines of the poem present a test case for locating the concrete historical and political circumstances of the composition of Class Warrior in relation to which the fluid poetics of the poem emerged:

    prisoner
    cast off your personal fears
    practice the asceticism of non-action

    after the torture
    demystify the torturers

    O suicide
    go back to fight the class enemy
    or hit the open road
    always nuance your aggression

     Read within the context of the poem alone, these lines might at first suggest that the “prisoner” being addressed is the person unable to escape from the confines of rigid thinking, who has become so indebted to the past by the “usury” of her “historical being,” that she has become subject to torture and sees suicide as the only escape.  The historical context, however, adumbrates these lines with the grim reality of the imprisonment, torture, and suicide of a generation of Moroccan activists, artists, and writers.[8]  While it is impossible not to think of Khatibi’s colleagues, such as Abdelatif Laâbi, who were in the middle of long stints in prison at the time that Khatibi was writing Class Warrior, it is nonetheless difficult to untangle the multiple threads of capture knotted in the single word “prisoner.”  Perhaps the most sympathetic reading would have Khatibi offering poetic support and solidarity to his incarcerated friends, urging them to see the hollowness of the torturer’s performance of sovereignty, and encouraging the dead to rise, find freedom, and continue the fight against the class enemy in the spirit of Taoist non-action.

    While attention to historical context remains imperative for all reading, authorial intention can never be the only horizon delimiting reception of a text.  Whereas Khatibi’s avowed politics remain one particular force that shapes our understanding of Class Warrior, this is certainly a text that signifies well beyond the poet’s intentions, beyond his commitment to a political program or engagement with social institutions.  What is more important for potential readers today, I would argue, is the apparatus of the poem and its use for life, the text understood as a resource for resistance, transformation, and liberation from all forms of domination based on fixed categories of thought, including notions of identity deriving from normative configurations of race, ethnicity, religion, nation, and social class.  Can we only know the use-value of a poem by seeing the poet’s credentials as a militant?  On the contrary, the experience of reading tells us that each reader creates a new context of reception, engaging the war of categories, words, thoughts, action, bodies, the knot of identity and difference as we continue to “stretch” Marx for decolonial critique.[9]

    The above comments are not intended as an apology for what some critics have seen as Khatibi’s failure to properly champion the cause of women’s writing in Morocco, or his disillusionment with the increasingly militant turn that the journal Souffles took in the late 1960s.[10]  It is the prerogative of criticism to examine contradictions that obtain when the text and the world are held up to each other.  A careful reading of this poem, however, shows how, in a first move, Class Warrior might seem to seduce the reader to withdraw into a revolution that would be exclusively poetic, but then, in a second move, the text exceeds its own status as a purely literary document.  In the “Preface Letter” he provides for Gontard’s book, Khatibi includes a telling confession that can help readers locate both the political in the text and better understand the relation between politics and style in the poem:

    I don’t believe in any literature of liberation.  The writing incarnated in an obdurate experience, moves toward the impossible, silence and erasure.  And this is precisely where subversion is at work, a subversion one cannot announce ahead of time, nor give the force of law.  Maghrebian or not, the writer (whosoever bears or risks bearing this title), if he extricates himself from all supposedly “committed” aesthetic and artistic postures, immediately finds himself confronted by the unnamable.  Perhaps then he will be able to listen to the voice of others and of the absolute outside, perhaps he will speak, he will write without assistance, without salvation and without gods. (Khatibi 1981: 9).

    Khatibi stakes out an adamantly secular position here, in the idiosyncratically Saidian sense of a “secular criticism.”[11]  His critique of “supposedly ‘committed’ aesthetic and artistic postures” and his affirmation of a politics of listening to the “absolute outside” elucidate the opening lines of Class Warrior: “history is a word / ideology a word / the unconscious a word” (1).  In lieu of hollow ideological repetitions, Khatibi aims for the unthinkable, the unnamable, and the impossible, and he does so in the spirit of detranscendentalized, anticolonial revolt inspired by Marxist thinking.  As he phrases it in a different section of the poem, “stick to an impossible mode of production” (37).  Khatibi replaces a “literature of liberation” with the search for an unforeseeable “subversion” that may effervesce within the established systems and structures of language, thought, and society.

    This refusal of any facile, triumphalist poetics of “liberation” echoes throughout Class Warrior.  “I heard it said / that dream science cures your illness / I heard that and I balled my fists // knowledge will never cure your irremediable distemper” (28).  Here we have a poetics that resonates with Khatibi’s decision to stay in Morocco and work within the system, as opposed to seeking “liberation” in France or elsewhere, as so many writers and thinkers of his generation had done.  The taoist manner adopted by the class warrior would certainly seem to be a function of Khatibi’s life in Morocco under the oppressive regime of Hassan II, as the poet sought out ways to fight with agility, suppleness, and nuance without fleeing.

    The publication of Class Warrior — Taoist Style in English is part of a resurgence of interest in francophone Moroccan writers, and Khatibi in particular in the Anglophone world.  Alongside Olivia C. Harrison and Teresa Villa-Ignacio’s 2016 anthology, Souffles-Anfas (Stanford), Donald Nicholson-Smith’s monumental In Praise of Defeat, an 800-plus page collection of poems by Abdellatif Laâbi, Peter Thompson’s 2016 translation of Khatibi’s Tattooed Memory (L’Harmattan), and Burcu Yalim’s forthcoming translation of Khatibi’s Plural Maghreb (Bloomsbury), Reeck’s Class Warrior – Taoist Style provide readers of English important points of contact with the difficult, powerful, and generative work of Khatibi and other major Moroccan writers of his generation.  Nonetheless, new questions emerge with the translation into English of work that actively sought to terrorize, deform, and destabilize the French language and divest it of its capacity to commit “historical usury” against its users.  What happens to the virtual intertextuality of Arabic and “Berber” languages that animate the syntactical and rhetorical gestures of Moroccan literature in French (along with other signifying practices) when the Francophone text enters into the system of Global English?  And what new combinations of praxis and poièsis might Khatibi in English give rise to?

    References

    Diawara, Manthia.  2009.  Édouard Glissant: One World in Relation.  K’a Yéléma Productions, 48 min.

    Fanon, Frantz.  2004. The Wretched of the Earth. Translated by Richard Philcox; introductions by Jean-Paul Sartre and Homi K. Bhabha. n.p.: New York: Grove Press.

    Fieni, David.  2013.  “Introduction: Désappropriation de soi et poétique de l’intersigne chez Khatibi.”  Expression Maghrébines 12, no. 1 : 1-17.

    Gontard, Marc.  1981.  La Violence du Texte : Études sur la littérature marocaine de langue française. Paris: L’Harmattan.

    Gourgouris, Stathis.  2013.  Lessons in Secular Criticism.  New York: Fordham University Press.

    Khatibi, Abdelkébir. 2017.  Class Warrior – Taoist Style. Translated by Matt Reeck.  Middletown, Connecticut: Wesleyan University Press.

    —.  2007.  Jacques Derrida, en effet.  Drawings by Valerio Adami.  Neuilly-sur-Seine: Al Manar.

    —.  1999.  La Langue de l’autre.  New York: Mains secrètes.

    —. 1971.  La Mémoire Tatouée: Autobiographie d’un Décolonisé.  Paris: Les lettres nouvelles.

    —.  1976.  Lutteur de Classe à la Manière Taoiste.  Paris: Éditions Sindbad.

    —.  1983.  Maghreb Pluriel.  Paris : Denoël.  Unpublished translation by Olivia C. Harrison.

    —.  1981.  “Préface-Lettre.”  Preface to La Violence du Texte : Études sur la littérature marocaine de langue française, by Marc Gontard, Paris: L’Harmattan.

    Laâbi, Abdellatif.  2016. “Contemporary Maghrebi Literature and Francophonie.”  In Souffles-Anfas: A Critical Anthology from the Moroccan Journal of Culture and Politics. Edited by Olivia C. Harrison and Teresa Villa-Ignacio.  Stanford, California: Stanford University Press.

    Lao Tzu.  2015. Tao Te Ching. Translated by David Hinton.  Berkeley: Counterpoint. Accessed April 26, 2018. ProQuest Ebook Central.

    Marx, Karl.  1978. “Class Struggle and Mode of Production.”  The Marx-Engels Reader, edited by Robert C. Tucker. 2D ed. New York: Norton.

    Mufti, Aamir. “Critical Secularism: A Reintroduction for Perilous Times.” boundary 2 31, no. 2 (2004): 1-9. https://muse.jhu.edu/ (accessed May 1, 2018).

    Reeck, Matt. 2017. “Poetics of the Orphan in Abdelkébir Khatibi’s Early Work.” Journal of French and Francophone Philosophy – Revue de la philosophie française et de langue française, 25, no. 1: 132-149.

    Said, Edward.  1983.  The World, the Text, and the Critic.  Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

    Slyomovics, Susan. 2005.  The Performance of Human Rights in Morocco. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.

    Woodhull, Winifred.  1993.  Transfigurations of the Maghreb: Feminism, Decolonization, and Literature.  Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota Press.

    Notes

    [1] See especially Khatibi’s Jacques Derrida, en effet (2007) and La Langue de l’autre (1999).

    [2] For simplified reference in both the English and French editions, numbered references to Class Warrior – Taoist Style refer to the section number, not to the page number.

    [3] Compare this passage in Khatibi to the following passage from the Tao Te Ching:

    There was once a saying among those who wielded armies:

    I’d much rather be a guest than a host,
    much rather retreat a foot than advance an inch.

    This is called marching without marching,
    rolling up sleeves without baring arms,
    raising swords without brandishing weapons,
    entering battle without facing an enemy. (108)

    [4] For more on Khatibi’s singular understanding of “syntax,” see my introduction to a special issue on Khatibi, “Désappropriation de soi et poétique de l’intersigne chez Khatibi” (2013).

    [5] The term comes from Laâbi, who used it in a 1970 issues of Souffles: “This is why Maghrebi or Negro-African literature of French expression is nothing short of a terrorist literature, i.e., a literature that on all levels (syntactic, phonetic, morphological, graphical, symbolic, etc.) shatters the original logic of the French language” (28).

    [6]  Reeck discusses this on p. 140 in “Poetics of the Orphan in Abdelkébir Khatibi’s Early Work” (2017).

    [7] I have amended Reeck’s translation here, which mistakenly substitutes “class warrior” where the text should read “class enemy.”

    [8] See Slymovics (2005) for her important and brilliant account of the imprisonment, torture, and trials during the “years of lead.”

    [9] The reference is to Fanon’s well-known claim, in The Wretched of the Earth, that “a Marxist analysis should always be slightly stretched when it comes to addressing the colonial issue” (5).

    [10] See Woodhull, pp. xx-xiv.

    [11] I am of course thinking of Edward Said’s introduction to The World, the Text, and the Critic, as well as the work of Mufti (2004) and Gourgouris (2013).

  • Mark Lipovetsky – A Culture of Zero Gravity (Review of Pomerantsev, Nothing Is True and Everything Is Possible: The Surreal Heart of the New Russia)

    Mark Lipovetsky – A Culture of Zero Gravity (Review of Pomerantsev, Nothing Is True and Everything Is Possible: The Surreal Heart of the New Russia)

    Peter Pomerantsev, Nothing Is True and Everything Is Possible: The Surreal Heart of the New Russia (First edition, London: Faber & Faber, 2014. Revised edition, New York: PublicAffairs, 2015)

    reviewed by Mark Lipovetsky

    This essay has been peer-reviewed by the boundary 2 editorial collective. 

    Peter Pomerantsev’s book Nothing Is True and Everything Is Possible: Adventures in Modern Russia offers a chain of seemingly disparate but conceptually tied, stories – about  the Kremlin ideologue Vladislav Surkov,  the former “king maker” and oligarch Boris Berezovsky, post-soviet TV networks, Moscow night clubs, the suicides of top models’, new religious sects, the victims of business wars between different branches of power, former gangsters-cum-TV producers, Western expats, the Night Wolves (an organization of bikers which has become an avant-garde of Putin’s supporters), and many other truly exciting subjects. Through these stories, written with a sharp, sometimes satirical pen,  Pomerantsev presents modern Russian as a specific type of cultural organism rather than  a projection of Putin’s or anybody else’s political manipulations and propaganda.

    Pomerantsev clearly rejects a stereotype shared by many contemporary political commentators but harkening back to Soviet times: a reduction of the entire society to the whims of its leaders (sometimes confronted only by a small group of brave and wise dissidents). Although Nothing Is True and Everything Is Possible portrays such “political technologists” as Surkov and depicts several figures of contemporary dissent, Pomerantsev clearly tries to deconstruct this cliche and deliver a much more complex vision. Notably, Putin is rarely mentioned in the book; he is designated simply as “the President,” which suggests that his personality is less important than his position within the system.

    Pomerantsev’s book methodically dismantles the myth about “the return of the Soviet” in recent years – the myth shared by many, within and outside Russia alike. While demonstrating the continuity between the late Soviet modus vivendi, the political compromises of the 1990s, and today’s radical changes, Pomerantsev consistently argues that we have to deal with a completely new kind of the political discourse, within which recognizably Soviet elements play a very different role and disguise rather than reveal what is actually happening.

    The third widespread stereotype that is splendidly absent in Pomerantsev’s book is the discourse on “the Russians’ love of the strong hand,” Russia’s innate gravitation to authoritarian regimes and leaders, and, most notoriously the alleged lack of a democratic tradition in Russia.  Unlike numerous publications about contemporary Russia, these Orientalizing and profoundly essentialist labels never appear in Nothing Is True and Everything Is Possible.[1] For Pomerantsev, Russia is not a backwards and isolated player looking up at the perfect Western world; on the contrary, his book directly leads to an opposite conclusion: “Today’s Kremlin might perhaps be best viewed as an avant-garde of malevolent globalization. The methods it pursues will be taken up by others, and […] the West has no institutional or analytical tools to deal with it” (Pomerantsev and Weiss 2015, 7).

    This quotation is borrowed from a special report, “The Menace of Unreality: How the Kremlin Weaponizes Information, Culture and Money,”  written by Pomerantsev together with Michael Weiss for Mikhail Khodorkovsky’s Institute of Modern Russia. The authors of the report ask: “How does one fight a system that embraces Tupac and Instagram but compares Obama to a monkey and deems the Internet a CIA invention? That censors online information but provides a happy platform to the founder of WikiLeaks, a self-styled purveyor of total ‘transparency’? That purports to disdain corporate greed and celebrates Occupy Wall Street while presiding over an economy as corrupt as Nigeria’s? That casts an Anschluss of a neighboring country using the grammar of both blood-and-soil nationalism and anti-fascism?” (Pomerantsev and Weiss 2015, 5).

    The report works with ideas which have been brewing in Nothing Is True and Everything Is Possible. Yet, this lively and observant book is less about politics per se, and more about culture as an effective form of politics. The reader of Pomerantsev’s book eventually cannot help but realize that Russia’s political turns and twists are born in night clubs and at parties, rather than in Kremlin offices,  that “the President,” despite his unconcealed hatred for western-style democracy, is indeed truly democratic, since his thoughts and acts are synchronized with the desires of the majority of the Russian people (many of his supporters are well-educated, well-travelled representatives of the newly-born middle class);  that in a society dependent on TV broadcasting – and the Russia depicted in the book is exactly such a society –the distance between the cultural and political phenomena is minimal, if existing at all. Although the first edition of the book appeared before Russia’s political turn of 2014, Pomerantsev only had to add a few pages to the 2015 version to reflect the new political reality after the annexation of Crimea. These pages do not stand out but look quite natural, since in the main body of Nothing Is True… Pomerantsev managed to pinpoint exactly those processes and tendencies that made the insanity possible.

    Freedom from stereotypes coupled with Pomerantsev’s spectacular ability to present complex ideas through vivid snapshots, makes his book fertile ground for the discussion of much broader subjects. First and foremost, Nothing Is True and Everything Is Possible raises questions about the role of cynicism in Soviet and post-Soviet culture and politics, as well as about the relation between cynicism, authoritarianism  and postmodernism in both the Russian and global contexts. I will try to present a “dialogical” reading of Pomerantsev’s book, sometimes problematizing its concepts, sometimes expanding on them, sometimes applying them to the material beyond the book’s content. It is a truly rare occasion when a journalistic reportage provokes historical and theoretical questions, which proves that Nothing Is True and Everything Is Possible is a phenomenon out of the ordinary.

     “Reality Show Russia”

    Petr Pomerantsev was born in Kiev in 1977. In 1978 his father, the well-known poet and journalist Igor’ Pomerantsev, emigrated with his family from the USSR and began working as a broadcaster, first at the BBC Radio Russian Service and from 1987 and until present at Radio Liberty. Pomerantsev Jr. recollects in his Newsweek article how he enjoyed playing in the hallways of the BBC Bush House in London (see Pomerantsev 2011a). The BBC Russian service was one of the most vibrant centers of anti-Soviet intellectual activity, so it is safe to assume (and the book confirms this impression) that the author of Nothing Is True and Everything Is Possible  has absorbed the ethos of late Soviet dissidents. This ethos might have served as a repellent in Russia of the 2000s, a country enraptured with nostalgic myths about Soviet imperial might and the stability of the Brezhnev era along with growing demonization of the Yeltsin period of democratic reforms, which strangely resonated with the rapidly increasing number of former and current officers of FSB (the KGB successor) taking up prestigious political, economic and media offices…

    In 2001, after graduating from Edinburgh University and some job experience at British TV, Pomerantsev decides to try himself in Russia – where he stays until 2010, working as a producer at the popular Russian entertainment TV channel TNT. Stays, because, as he explains,  Moscow in these years “was full of vitality and madness and incredibly exciting”; it was “a place to be” (Castle 2015). Along with the increasing monopolization of political, economic, and media power in the hands of the FSB-centered clique,  the 2000s was a period of a noticeable economic growth, when Russia’s cities became cleaner and safer, when ordinary people started to travel abroad on a regular basis, when one could hardly find a Russian-made car within a thick stream of urban vehicles, when restaurants flourished, book sales were on the rise and theatres were full every night … In short, when the economic reforms of the accursed Yeltsin years in combination with the skyrocketing oil and gas prices stated to bring long-awaited fruits (see Iasin 2005).

    While in Moscow Pomerantsev produced reality shows, documentaries, and generally had to bring the “western” style to the “news-free” – i.e., supposedly apolitical – broadcasts of the TNT channel. Nothing Is True and Everything Is Possible is in many ways a memoir about these years on Russian TV. The reality show was one of the genres Pomerantsev produced, so the metaphor of Russian politics as a reality show holds a central places in his book; the first part of the book is entitled: “Reality Show Russia”.

    One of Pomerantsev’s first discoveries associated with these – relatively free and diverse – years, concerns the blurring of the borderline between fact and fiction, between a staged show and the news, especially on  the Russian national channels united by the term “Ostankino” (the major TV studio in Moscow).  As a TV news anchor from Ostankino explained to him, a young foreigner, speaking fluent Russian and working on Russian TV: “Politics has got to feel like … like a movie!” (6)[2]. Pomeranstev’s explains how this motto works in practice: “… the new Kremlin won’t make the same mistake the old Soviet Union did: it will never let TV become dull… Twenty-first century Ostankino mixes show business and propaganda, ratings with authoritarianism […] Sitting in that smoky room,  I had the sense that reality was somehow malleable, that I was with Prospero who could project any existence they wanted onto post-Soviet Russia” (7).  However, his own career on a Russian entertainment channel serves as an illuminating example of the limits of “Prospero”’s power. Pomerantsev describes how he had been producing a reality show about people meeting and losing each other at the airport. Intentionally, he tried to avoid staged and scripted situations, seeking interesting characters and stories instead of sentimental effects. The result was quite predictable:  “The ratings for Hello-Goodbye had sucked. Part of the problem was that the audience wouldn’t believe the stories in the show were real. After so many years of fake reality, it was hard to convince them this was genuine” (73). Furthermore, when Pomerantsev made several documentaries addressing societal conflicts and problems, they all were rejected by the channel on the premise that its viewers did not want to see anything negative.

    Yet, this is only half of the picture. In the second half of the book, Pomerantsev  describes how he received a very tempting invitation to the federal First Channel. The head of programming, the best-selling author of self-help books (this is an important detail in the context of the book) offered him the chance “to helm a historical drama-documentary… With a real, big, mini-movie budget for actors and reconstructions and set designers… The sort of thing you make when you’re right at the top of the TV tree in the West…” (226). And the story was great: “about a Second World War admiral who defied Stalin’s orders and started the attack on the Germans, while the Kremlin was still in denial about Hitler’s intentions and hoped for peace. The admiral was later purged and largely forgotten. It’s a good story. It’s a really good story. It’s a dream project” (227). Most importantly, it was a true story that obviously defied  the newly-rediscovered admiration for Stalin’s politics in Russia’s public and media discourse (these days Putin even speaks highly about the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact). Yet, eventually Pomerantsev decided to decline this generous offer: “… I realise that though my film might be clean, it could easily be put next to some Second World War hymn praising Stalin and the President as his newest incarnation.  Would my film be the ‘good’ programme that validates everything I don’t want to be a part of? The one that wins trust, for that trust to be manipulated in the next moment?” (231). In other words: “In a world that really has been turned on its head, truth is a moment of falsehood,” as Guy Debord writes in The Society of the Spectacle (1995, 14).

    This is a very important realization, not only as the turning point in Pomerantsev’s Russian odyssey, but also as an insight into the logic of the Russian “society of spectacle”, itself resonant with Baudrillard’s almost forgotten concept of the “hyperreality of simulacra”.  What seemed to be an almost grotesque philosophic hyperbole, appears to be Pomerantsev’s and his colleagues’ practical experience in Nothing Is True and Everything Is Possible. As follows from this experience,  the capitalist society of the spectacle, unlike Debord’s conceptualization,  is not opposed to the communist social order but directly grows from it. Post-Soviet TV viewers remember and even nostalgically long for Soviet media where ideological images constantly produced their own spectacle,  perhaps not as attractive as the capitalist one, but still capable of fulfilling its main function: “By means of spectacle the ruling order discourses endlessly upon itself in an uninterrupted monologue of self-praise” (Debord 1995, 19). As to the “hyperreality of simulacra”,  it appears in Pomerantsev’s book  not only as a result of capitalist market forces (images that sell better, dominate), but as a horizon in which public demand for captivating (or entertaining, or horrifying) images and the political and economic interests of the ruling elite meet and happily fuse with each other. As follows from Nothing Is True…, the “hyperreality of simulacra” in its totality can be most successfully achieved not by capitalism alone, but by the blend of capitalism with post-soviet authoritarianism, accomplished through the  homogenization of the information flow.

    Back in the early 2000s, the prominent Russian sociologists Lev Gudkov and Boris Dubin, defined Russian society as “the society of TV viewers”. The society of TV-viewers had formed on the ruins of Soviet ideocracy, i.e. the society with a single official ideology which served either as an ally or as an opponent to multiple others non-official ones.  In this new cultural realm. political doctrines were replaced by entertainment which seemed to be apolitical, yet, (surprise, surprise!) were quite political indeed.  For example, in the 2000s appeared numerous TV series about heroic, charming and, yes,  suffering officers of the Cheka/NKVD/KGB: they were entertaining and even captivating, but eventually they have produced the figure of the representative of this organization as the epitome of the national destiny – who defends the motherland, takes the hit from his (always his!) native organization,  successfully overcomes the difficulties (temporary of courses) and triumphs over enemies (see Lipovetsky 2014).  In the scholars’ opinion, the mass dependence of Russian society on TV images signified the process opposite to the formation of the civil society: “Today’s social process of Russian ‘massovization’… is directed against differentiation and relies on the most conservative groups of the society” (Gudkov and Dubin 2001, 44).  The scholars argued that while promoting negative identification – through the figures of enemies and demonized “others”— television offered uplifting “participatory rituals of power” that substituted for actual politics while feeding the longing for national grandeur, heroic history and symbolic superiority.

    However, in the 1990s, the post-Soviet mediaspace was a battlefield of various competing discourses – liberal, neo-liberal, nationalist, nostalgic, statists, libertarian, etc. During the 2000s-2010s the full spectrum of these discourses gradually narrowed down toward cultural neo-traditionalism and political neo-conservatism (focalized on lost imperial glory, “Russia raising itself from its knees”, collapse of the USSR as “the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the century”, etc.). Pomerantsev observes the completion of this process in the TV-orchestrated nationalist mass hysteria accompanying the Crimean affair and invasion of Ukraine in  2014: “… the Kremlin has finally mastered the art of fusing reality TV and authoritarianism to keep the great 140-million strong population entertained, distracted, constantly exposed to geopolitical nightmare that if repeated enough times can become infectious” (273)

    Without any competing media  (no more than 5% of the Russian population gets its news from internet), the homogenized narrative of post-Soviet TV not only shapes the opinions of the vast majority of Russian population – the notorious 85% that (allegedly) wholeheartedly support all of Putin’s initiatives.  The TV narrative becomes an ultimate reality symbolically superseding immediate everyday experience. In other words, the television offers neither a simulation of reality, nor a distortion of truth, but a parallel, and more real, world.

    Baudrillard wrote about “the desert of the real” (Natoli and Hutcheon 1993, 343), indicating that his hyperreality of simulacra was inseparable from the “metaphysical despair” evoked by “the idea that images concealed nothing at all” (345). On the contrary, Pomerantsev’s non-fictional characters, TV producers and “political technologists” feel no despair whatsoever, rather they enjoy their power over the “real” and celebrate the disappearance and malleability of any and all imaginable truth. In the formulation of Gleb Pavlovsky, a Soviet-time dissident, who became a leading “political technologist” of  “the Putin system” (although  eventually he was expelled from the circle of the Kremlin viziers):  “The main difference between propaganda in the USSR and the new Russia […] is that in Soviet times the concept of truth was important. Even if they were lying they took care to prove what they were doing was ‘the truth.’ Now no one even tries proving the ‘truth.’ You can just say anything. Create realities” (Pomerantsev and Weiss 2015, 9).

    At the same time, as one can see from the example with the offer received by Pomerantsev from the Ostankino boss, this system recognizes truth and even effectively employs discourses that might be uncomfortable for the dominant ideology. Yet, here these elements of credibility are instrumentalized as mere means for the performance of reality, a performance that neither its producers nor its consumers seem to judge by its truthfulness. Here, some other criteria matter more.  In the post-Soviet hyperreality of simulacra truth is triumphantly defied; it has been openly manipulated through the process of constant constructions, negations, and reconstruction in front of the viewer’s eyes.  This is why emphasis falls onto the flamboyance and virtuosity of the (reality) performance, be it the Olympics or the public burning of tons of imported cheese from countries sanctioning Russia. This may be the Achilles heel of contemporary Russian politics.  If performance supersedes reality, then invisible economic sanctions on Russian leadership are much less painful than a boycott of, say, the Football World Championship of 2018.

    “Postmodern Dictatorship”?

    Curiously, the vision of the malleable TV-dominated- reality in Pomerantsev’s book deeply resonates with Generation ‘P’ (Homo Zapiens in American version, Babylon  in British) by Viktor Pelevin, one of the most famous Russian postmodernist novels, published in 1999. The novel appeared before Putin was known to the broad public, and was initially perceived as a summation of  the Yeltsin period. Yet, it proved to be an prescient account of the ideological shifts in Putin’s decade. Even on a surface level, the novel presents a shrewd political forecast for the 2000s. In Generation P, a graduate from the Literary Institute  trained to translate poetry from languages he does not know, a character without features but with a “pile of cynicism,” Vavilen Tatarsky, becomes a copywriter, first for commercial advertisements, later for political ones,  eventually rising from mediocrity to become the supreme ruler of the media, the living god secretly ruling post-Soviet Russia. This plotline retroactively reads as a parody of Vladimir Putin’s ascent to the role of the “national leader”. With an uncanny acuity of foresight, Pelevin imagines the transformation of a non-entity into the “face of the nation”, in a diapason from the elimination of the “well-known businessman and political figure Boris Berezovsky” (2002,  249) – another character of Nothing Is True and Everything Is Possible — to a new cultural mainstream instigating nationalist nostalgia for the Soviet empire and novel and familiar forms of class hatred.  Pelevin even anticipated Russia’s newly-found desire to lead the reactionaries of the world (Pomerantsev and Weiss write about this in their memorandum)– in his commercial for Coca Cola Tatarsky appears as the frontrunner for the “congress of radical fundamentalists from all of the world’s major confessions” (2002, 249).

    In Generation P, a gangster commissions Vavilen to produce a Russian national idea: “Write me a Russian idea about five pages long. And a short version one page long. And lay it out like real life, without any fancy gibberish […] So’s they won’t think all we’ve done in Russia is heist the money and put up a steel door. So’s they can feel the same kind of spirit like in ’45 at Stalingrad, you get me?” (Pelevin 2002, 138) This request, albeit expressed in slightly different terms punctuates a wide spectrum of cultural debates about the national idea in Russia of the 1990s and 2000s, reflected in Pomerantsev’s book as well. However, when asked in 2008 if Russia had found its national idea in Putin, Pelevin responded affirmatively: “That’s precisely what Putin is” (Rotkirch 2008, 82). Following this logic, one may argue that although Vavilen failed to accomplish the task assigned him, his creator did not. Like Putin, Vavilen is a manifestation of Russia’s new national idea. He just isn’t sure what that truly is, since it is hyperreal and he himself created it.

    But let us pause for a second and ask whether the fusion of postmodernism and authoritarianism is possible at all? For Pomerantsev they are compatible.  He respectfully cites the Russian oligarch Oleg Deripaska saying: “This isn’t a country in transition but some sort of postmodern dictatorship that uses the language and institutions of democratic capitalism for authoritarian elites” (50). In 2011, Pomerantsev published in The London Review of Books the article “Putin’s Rasputin” that now reads as a seed from which the book was born (slightly altered, this text would be included into Nothing Is True…). The article describes Vladislav Surkov, a former deputy head of the President’s administration, Putin’s aid and vice-premier, the inventor of the concept of Russian “sovereign democracy” and builder of the United Russia Party;  currently one of the chief coordinators of both the “hybrid war” in Ukraine and its orchestrated representation in the Russian media.  In Surkov, who is also known as a novelist and song-writer, Pomerantsev sees (with good reason) the main designer of contemporary Russia’s political and societal system. Surkov, he contends, has fused authoritarianism with postmodernism, creating a completely new political system, which Pomerantsev tentatively defines as “postmodern authoritarianism”:

    Newly translated postmodernist texts give philosophical weight to the Surkovian power model. [Jean-] François Lyotard, the French theoretician of postmodernism, began to be translated in Russia only towards the end of the 1990s, at exactly the time Surkov joined the government. The author of Almost Zero [a postmodernist novel allegedly written by Surkov] loves to invoke such Lyotardian concepts as the breakdown of grand cultural narratives and the fragmentation of truth: ideas that still sound quite fresh in Russia. […] In an echo of socialism’s fate in the early 20th century, Russia has adopted a fashionable, supposedly liberational Western intellectual movement and transformed it into an instrument of oppression. (Pomerantsev 2011)

    This description continues in the book:

    Surkov likes to invoke the new postmodern texts just translated into Russian,  the breakdown of grand narratives, the impossibility of truth, how everything is only ‘simulacrum’ and ‘simulacra’… and then in the next moment he says how he despises relativism and lives conservatism, before quoting Allen Ginsberg’s ‘Sunflower Sutra’ in English and by heart […] Surkov’s genius has been to tear those associations apart,  to marry authoritarianism and modern art, to use the language of rights and representation to validate tyranny, to recut and paste democratic capitalism until it means the reverse of its original purpose. (87-88)

    Although, this way of reasoning seems to be a little naïve  (one man’s cultural convictions cannot be directly reproduced by the entire country or just Moscow) the question remains: how can one so easily marry postmodernism and authoritarianism? Similarities between what Pomerantsev depicts in his non-fiction and postmodernist theoretical models, as well as Russian postmodernist fiction are too obvious to be ignored.

    It should be noted that Russian postmodernism has been radically different from the model described by Fredric Jameson as the “cultural logic of late capitalism”. Although participants of late Soviet underground culture, had very fragmented, if any knowledge of Western theory,  their works embodied Lyotarian “incredulity towards grand narratives” in scandalously transgressive and liberating forms of  the counterculture, which had been subverting both Soviet official and intelligentsia’s hegemonies (see in more detail Lipovetsky 1999, 2008). Although acknowledged in the 1990s, postmodernist writers and artists like Dmitrii Prigov, Vladimir Sorokin, Lev Rubinshtein and their colleagues by underground circles by and large,  have preserved their critical position towards neo-traditionalist and neo-conservative ideologies and cultural trends.

    Notably, Vladimir Sorokin in 2006 wrote a postmodernist dystopian novel The Day of the Oprichinik (translated into English in 2011), in which, as readers and critics admit almost unanimously, predicted, outlined and exaggerated the actual features of the grotesque political climate of the 2010s. Lev Rubinshtein, the experimental poet famous for “the index cards poetry”, in the 2000s has become one of the most brilliant and influential political essayist of the anti-Putin camp. Dmitrii Prigov, one of the founding fathers of Moscow Conceptualism, also published political columns critical of the new conformism and nostalgia for the lost grand narratives. Most importantly, he has directly influenced protest art of the new generation: before his untimely death in 2007 he collaborated with the group Voina (War) famous for its radical political performances. The founder of Voina, Oleg Vorotnikov, called Prigov the inspiration for the group’s creation and activities, and the former member of Voina and spokesperson  for Pussy Riot, Nadezhda Tolokonnikova, repeatedly mentions Prigov as a deep influence, exposing her to contemporary, i.e., postmodernist, art and culture (see, for example, Volchek 2012).

    Although Pomerantsev does not write about these figures (he only briefly mentions Voina’s actions and “the great tricksters of the Monstration movement”[149]), it is with apparent tenderness that he describes the conceptualist artist Vladislav Mamyshev-Monro whose impersonations of various cultural and political celebrities, including “the President”, were at first perceived as a part of the culture of simulation but turned out to be its subversion incompatible with the new political freeze:  “Vladik himself was dead. He was found floating in a pool in Bali. Death by heart attack. Right at the end an oligarch acquaintance had made him an offer to come over to the Kremlin side and star in a series of paintings in which he would dress up and appear in a photo shoot that portrayed the new protest leaders sodomizing. Vladik had refused” (278).

    These examples, although admittedly brief, nevertheless complicate and problematize the picture of “postmodern dictatorship” painted by Pomerantsev. Minimally, they testify to the fact that postmodernism hosts dissimilar and even conflicting organisms, that postmodernist culture since the 1980s has been evolving in various directions, some of which lead to Surkov while others lead to Pussy Riot. An informative parallel might be made to Boris Groys’s conceptualization of Stalinism and its cultural manifestation Socialist Realism. In The Total Art of Stalinism (original title: Gesamtkunstwerk Stalin) Groys argued that Stalinism  adopted avant-garde aesthetic methods and substituted the avant-gardist demiurge with the state (and Stalin as  its personification): “… Socialist realism candidly formulates the principle and strategy of its mimesis: although it advocates a strictly ‘objective’, ‘adequate’ rendering of  external reality,  at the same time it stages or produces this reality. More precisely, it takes reality that has already been produced by Stalin and the party, thereby shifting the creative act onto reality itself, just as the  avant-garde had demanded” (1992, 55). Groys’s argument has been criticized by historians of Socialist Realism pointing to the antagonism between Socialist Realism and the avant-garde and its reliance on much more populist and traditionalist discourses (see for example, Dobrenko 1997). However, the very logic of the transformation of a liberatory aesthetics into sociocultural authoritarianism seems to be relevant to contemporary Russia. Despite Benjamin’s maxim, politics has been aestheticized since ancient times, but when the state acts as an artist, repression becomes inevitable.

    Although historical parallels can help to contour the phenomenon, by default they are never accurate. This is why, I believe that in the cultural situation described by Pomerantsev, we are dealing with something different: with the postmodernist redressing of a far more long-standing cultural and political phenomenon, which tends to change clothing every new epoch, and Nothing Is True… excels in describing its current Russian outfit.

    From the History of Cynicism

    Throughout his entire book, using very dissimilar examples, Pomerantsev demonstrates the functioning of one and the same cultural (political/social/psychological) mechanism: the coexistence of mutually exclusive ideologies/beliefs/discourses in one and the same mind/space/institution.  More accurately, it is not their co-existence, but the painless and almost artistic shifting from one side to the opposite; a process which never stops and is never is reflected upon as a problem.

    Consider just a few examples from Nothing Is True:

    About Moscow’s new architecture: “A new office center on the other side of the river from the Kremlin starts with a Roman portico, then morphs into medieval ramparts with spikes and gold-glass reflective windows, all topped with turrets and Stalin-era spires. The effect is at first amusing, then disturbing. It’s like talking to the victim of a multiple personality disorder.” (124).

    About politics of “a new type of authoritarianism”: “The Kremlin’s idea is to own all forms of political discourse, to not let any independent movement develop outside its walls. Its Moscow can feel like an oligarchy in the morning and a democracy in the afternoon, a monarchy for dinner and a totalitarian state by bedtime” (79).

    About new “spiritual gurus”: “Surkov had gathered together all political models to create a grand pastiche, or Moscow’s architecture tried to fill all styles of buildings onto one, Vissarion [a popular new “prophet”] had created a collage of all religions” (210)

    About media producers:

    The producers who work at the Ostankino channels might all be liberals in the private lives, holiday in Tuscany, and be completely European in their tastes. When I ask how they marry their professional and personal lives, they look at me as if I were a fool and answer: ‘Over the last twenty years we’ve lived through a communism,  we never believed in, democracy and defaults and mafia state and oligarchy, and we’ve realized they are illusions, that everything is PR.’ ‘Everything is PR’ has become the favorite phrase of the new Russia; my Moscow peers are filled with a sense that they are both cynical and enlightened. […] ‘Can’t you see your own governments are just as bad as ours?’ they ask me. I try to protest – but they just smile and pity me. To believe in something and stand by it in this world is derided, the ability to be a shape-shifter celebrated… conformism raised to the level of aesthetic act. (87)

    And once again about them:

    For when I talk to many of my old  colleagues who are still working in the ranks of Russian media or in state corporations, they might laugh off all the Holy Russia stuff as so much PR (because everything is PR!), but their triumphant cynicism in turn means they can be made to feel there are conspiracies everywhere; because if nothing is true and all motives are corrupt and no one is to be trusted, doesn’t it mean that some dark hand must be behind everything? (273)

    About social psychology:

    Before I used to think the two worlds were in conflict, but the truth is a symbiosis. It’s almost as if you are encouraged to have one identity one moment and the opposite one the next. So you’re always split into little bits, and can never quite commit to changing things […] But there is great comfort in these splits too: you can leave all your guilt with your ‘public’ self. That wasn’t you stealing that budget/making that propaganda show/bending your knee to the President, just a role you were playing: you’re a good person really. It’s not much about denial. It’s not even about suppressing dark secrets. You can see everything you do, all your sins. You just reorganize your emotional life so as not to care. (234)

    Indeed, “conformism raised to the level of aesthetic act” is a great definition of cynicism. Furthermore, the post-Soviet complex illuminated by Pomerantsev, deeply resonates with a brilliant description of the  modern cynic from Peter Sloterdijk’s famous book Critique of Cynical Reason:

    … the present-day servant of the system can very well do with the right hand what the left hand never allowed. By day, colonizer, at night, colonized; by occupation, valorizer and administrator, during leisure time, valorized and administered; officially a cynical functionary, privately a sensitive soul; at office a giver of orders, ideologically a discussant; outwardly a follower of the reality principle, inwardly a subject oriented towards pleasure; functionally an agent of capital, intentionally a democrat; with respect to the system a functionary of reification, with respect to Lebenswelt  (lifeworld), someone who achieves self-realization; objectively a strategist of destruction, subjectively a pacifist; basically someone who triggers catastrophes, in one’s own view, innocence personified <…> This mixture is our moral status quo.’ (1987, 113)

    Obviously, there is nothing specifically post-Soviet in this description. According to Sloterdijk, “a universal diffuse cynicism” (1987, 3) is the widespread cultural response to the heavy burden of modernity. He defines cynicism as “enlightened false consciousness” as opposed to Marx’s famous definition of ideology. Sloterdijk argues that cynicism offers the modern subject a strategy of pseudo-socialization to reconcile individual interest with social demands by the splitting their personality into unstable and equally false and authentic social masks. The constant switching of these masks is the strategy of cynical accommodation to modernity.  There is nothing specifically postmodern in this strategy either. Sloterdijk traces a genealogy of cynicism from ancient Greece to the twentieth century.

    However, he almost completely excludes the Soviet experience from his “cabinet of cynics.” Slavoj Zizek, probably, was the first to apply Sloterdijk’s concept to Stalinism. In The Plague of Fantasies  he argued that the Stalinist henchmen far exceeded the cynicism of their Nazi colleagues,  “The paranoiac Nazis really believed in the Jewish conspiracy, while the perverted Stalinists actively organized/ invented ‘counterrevolutionary conspiracies’ as a pre-emptive strikes. The greatest surprise for the Stalinist investigator was to discover that the subject accused of being a German or American spy really was a spy: in Stalinism proper,  confessions counted only as far as they were false and extorted … “(1997, 58). And in the book Did Somebody Say Totalitarianism? even in more detail he argued that in the Soviet political system “a cynical attitude towards the official ideology was what the regime really wanted – the greatest catastrophe for the regime would have been for its own ideology to be taken seriously, and realized by its subjects.” (2001, 92).

    On the other hand, as historians of Soviet civilization have demonstrated,  the authorities’ cynicism generated matching cynical methods of adaptation among ordinary Soviet citizens, the “broad masses” and intelligentsia alike (although, of course, it would be wrong to generalize and imagine all Soviet people as seasoned cynics). Oleg Kharkhordin in his The Collective and the Individual in Russia: A Study of Practices, which deals with the Soviet purges and the origins of the Soviet subjectivity writes about the results of this process: “Their double-faced life is not a painful split forced upon their heretofore unitary self; on the contrary, this split is normal for them because they originate as individuals by the means of split. […] One of the steps in this long development was individual perfection of the mechanism for constant switching between the intimate and the official, a curious kind of unofficial self-training, a process that comes later that the initial stage of dissimilation conceived as ‘closing off’ (pritvorstvo) and one that we may more aptly call dissimilation as ‘changing faces’ (litsemerie) – and, we might add, as its summation – cynicism”  (1998, 275, 278).  In her book Tear off the Masks! Identity and Imposture in Twentieth Century Russia, Sheila Fitzpatrick, the well-known social historian of Stalinism makes no reference to Sloterdijk, but uses many documents from the 1920s and 1930s to demonstrate the constantly shifting logic of class discrimination and how it compelled the average person to manipulate their own identity, Sloterdijk-style, rewriting the autobiography and seeking a place in the official and unofficial systems of social relations.

    The heyday of Soviet cynicism falls onto the post-Stalin period of late socialism when, according to Alexey Yurchak, the author of the seminal study Everything Was Forever, Until It Was No More: The Last Soviet Generation, ideological beliefs frayed into pure rituals, participation in which demonstrated one’s loyalty to the regime and secured social success without embodying true belief.  Pomerantsev in his book directly establishes the link between the late Soviet cynicism and today’s cultural reality:

    Whenever I ask my Russian bosses, the older TV producers and media types who run the system, what it was like growing up in the late Soviet Union, whether they believed in the communist ideology that surrounded them, they always laugh at me.

    ‘Don’t be silly,’ most answer.

    ‘So you were dissidents? You believed in finishing the USSR?”

    ‘No. It’s not like that. You just speak several languages at the same time. There’s like several you’s.’ (233-4)

    Having recognized the genealogical connection between late Soviet cynicism and the present day triumph of cynicism of Russia’s elites, Pomerantsev offers the following diagnosis: “Seen from this perspective, the great drama of Russia is not the ‘transition’ between communism and capitalism, between one fervently held set of beliefs and another, but that during the final decades of the USSR no  one believed in communism and yet carried on living as if they did, and now they can only create a society of simulations” (234).

    It sounds very logical but a little too straightforward to be accurate.  Besides, this logic fails to explain the internal shift that has resulted in the current state of affairs. What Pomerantsev disregards is the subversive power of cynicism, its insidiousness. In the late Soviet period, what may be defined as cynicism, or a cynical split in multiple I’s, was also responsible for numerous practices and discourses that Yurchak unites by the term “living vnye”:

    … the meaning of this term, at least in many cases, is closer to a condition of being simultaneously inside and outside of some context” (2006, 128) – here the system of Soviet ideas, expectations, scenarios, etc. The system of “vnye” discourses and milieus, in the scholar’s opinion, explains the sudden collapse of the invincible Soviet system: “although the system’s collapse had been unimaginable before it began, it appeared unsurprising when it happened. (1)

    Furthermore, Soviet culture, since the 1920s and until the 80s, has been creating a whole rogue’s gallery of attractive and winning cynics and non-conformists, brilliantly defeating the system. This cultural trope spectacularly manifested the “power of the powerless” to use Vaclav Havel’s famous formulation. Literary and cinematic works about such characters enjoyed cult status, while belonging to official and non-official culture alike, from personages like Ostap Bender from Ilf and Petrov’s diptych of satirical novels The Twelve Chairs (1928) and The Golden Calf (1932) – both the subjects of multiple films,  and the suite of demons accompanying the Devil Woland in Mikhail Bulgakov’s famous novel The Master and Margarita (written mainly in the 1930s, first published in 1966) to the authors and characters of Russian postmodernism, including the aforementioned Moscow to the End of the Line with its philosophizing trickster in the center, to Dmitrii Prigov, who had been constructing his cultural personality as a trickster’s ploy, throughout his entire career.

    In my book Charms of the Cynical Reason (Lipovetsky 2011), I argue that the figure of the trickster in Soviet culture played a dual role. On the one hand, s/he provided cultural legitimacy to Soviet cynicism, even lending it the aura of artistry. The cynical split- or multi-personality may have been essential to survive and endure enforced participation in the grey economy and society. But, as a rule, this was accompanied by feelings of guilt and shame, compounded by the official Soviet rhetoric which demonized bourgeois conformism and interest in material comfort. The charming and versatile Soviet tricksters removed the feelings of guilt that Soviet readers and spectators might experience, turning the battle for survival into a jolly game exposing contradictions between official Soviet rhetoric and mundane survival.

    On the other hand, in full correspondence to Sloterdijk’s thesis that “Cynicism can only be stemmed by kynicism, not by morality” (194), the artistic and non-pragmatic trickster playfully mocked and demolished widespread cynical discourses and practices. By the term “kynicism” the philosopher defines non-pragmatic, scandalous and artistic aspects of cynicism – exactly those that the Soviet tricksters embodied.  Thus, the lineage coming from Soviet tricksters finds its direct continuation in Sorokin’s scandalizing use of scatological and cannibalistic motifs in his writings. Voina’s cynical performances include such “cynical” acts as stuffing a frozen chicken up a vagina or simulating the lynching of immigrants in a supermarket. Pussy Riot with their punk-prayer in the main Moscow cathedral appear to be true  heirs to this tradition, adding new edges of political, religious, and gender critique to the trickster’s subversion.

    Thus, the “genius” of the Putin/Surkov system lies in the balancing of conformity and subversion associated with refurbished and even glamorized late Soviet cynicism.  Yet, neither Surkov, nor Pomerantsev realize that a balance based on cynicism is unstable precisely due to the self-subversive nature of the latter.  This balance was disturbed in 2011 by the excessive cynicism of Putin and Medvedev’s “switcheroo” that generated a wave of protests lasting until May 6,  2012 (the day prior to Putin’s third inauguration), when a rally at Bolotnaya Square was brutally dispersed by the police.  Notably, this protest movement was distinguished by a very peculiar – cynical or tricksterish –brand of humor. For example, when the President compared the white ribbons of the protestors with condoms, the crowd  responded by proudly carrying a huge, ten-meter long condom at the next protest. Pussy Riot’s punk prayer  requesting the Mather of God to force Putin away,  appeared as an inseparable part of this movement.[3]

    Troubled by these reactions, the regime responded in an increasingly aggressive and conservative way: from imprisoning Pussy Riot and the participants of peaceful demonstrations, to homophobic laws, from the introduction of elements of censorship to the discrediting, persecution, and  simply assassination of prominent liberal politicians, from the  elevation of the  Russian Orthodox Church as the ultimate authority in culture and morality, to the promotion of  a filtered “heroic history” as opposed to “negative representations” of the Russian and Soviet past;  from rabid anti-Americanism to the general promotion of anti-liberal sentiment, etc.  Spurred by the Ukrainian revolution, this trend in 2014 transformed into the active implementation of imperialist dreams, along with a nationalist and anti-Western media frenzy,  and a paranoid quest for enemies both foreign and domestic.

    All these tendencies clearly match Umberto Eco’s well-known criteria of Ur-Fascism. First and foremost, the cult of tradition (the infamous “spiritual bonds” about which Putin and his cronies like to speak so much), the  rejection of modernism (in this case, postmodernism  – as exemplified not only by the persecution of Pussy Riot, but also by pogroms of exhibitions of contemporary art, or the scandal around an experimental production of Wagner’s Tannhäuser in Novosibirsk); the macho cult of action for action’s sake (in a diapason from Putin;s naked torso to the Sochi Olympics as the main even in contemporary Russian history); “popular elitism” along with contempt for parliamentary democracy and liberalism (“Gayrope”!);  and of course,  nationalism enhanced by “the obsession with a plot, possibly an international one” (Eco 1995, 7).

    However, Eco did not mention that fascism can be born from an excess of cynicism turning on itself. This transition has been most illuminatingly described by Sloterdijk, when he discusses the birth of Nazism from the joyfully cynical atmosphere of the Weimar republic. He argues that fascism positions itself as the enemy of ambivalence, histrionics and deception, supposedly overcoming the cynical components of culture.  It does so through the promotion of a radically primitive and reductionist conservative mythology, which is presented as a modern tool capable of releasing modernity from its controversial and demoralizing effects.

    However, as the philosopher demonstrates, fascism also represent the highest manifestations of cynical culture.  First, according to Sloterdijk, Nazi mythology originates from the same philosophical premises as cynical culture: “In their approach, they are all chaotologists.  They all assume the precedence of the unordered, the hypercomplex, the meaningless, and that which demands too much of us.  Cynical semantics … can do nothing other than to charge order to the account of cultural caprice or the coercion toward a system” (399).  Second, in totalitarian culture, theatricality becomes a crucial weapon of political warfare through the orchestrated representation of the leader and the aesthetics of mass political spectacles. The performance of the power’s transcendental status, which is guaranteed by messianic ideology, as well as by spectacles of national unity that cover up constant, “tactical” ideological shifts, struggles within the upper echelons of power, the appropriation of “alien” ideological doctrines and practices etc., is no less important here.

    Pomerantsev’s  analysis deeply correlates with these observations. Russian media generously uses the word “fascists” typically applying it to the Ukrainian authorities and sometimes to Western countries, yet they use this word as an empty signifier, a universal label for everything “alien” and dangerous.  Pomerantsev never uses this word, yet, Nothing Is True…  compellingly documents the rise of fascism in Post-Soviet Russia (however postmodern it might be).

    Pomerantsev’s book is about fascism of a new kind, which existing political radars fail to detect and thus overlook, which is able to mimic western discourse, while thoroughly opposing it.  This fascism is armed with the “hyperreality of simulacra” (instead of mere theater) and promotes its “traditional values” with an openly cynical smirk. It also effectively transforms the cynical negation of truth into a foundation for a new political paranoia, and masterfully adopts a liberal rhetoric when needed. In Pomerantsev’s words:  “This is a new type of Kremlin propaganda, less about arguing against the West with a counter-model as in the Cold War, more about slipping inside its language to play and taunt it from inside” (57).

    Only on the surface does this new fascism resemble Stalinism or late Soviet culture, in fact, it is a new phenomenon: unlike them, it is deeply embedded in capitalist economic, media and cultural regimes. It is no longer based on a clear ideology, but to use Pomerantsev’s incisive formula, on “the culture of zero gravity”, it  successfully utilizes capitalist mechanisms and liberal rhetoric,  donning fashionable masks, including postmodern ones. Pomerantsev’s book warns the Western world that a monster has arisen within its own global cultural discourse.  This monster rises in contemporary Russia, but it can rise elsewhere: this is why Pomerantsev and Weiss call Russia “an avant-garde of malevolent globalization”.  At the very least, this means that the country and its current situation deserves very close and very well informed attention and that those resisting this new fascism within Russia, in culture, politics, or society, deserve the whole-hearted support and understanding of the rest of the world.

    Notes

    [1] Tellingly in The New York Times  review of Pomerantsev’s book, Miriam Elder noticed the absence of Putin, but nevertheless reduced stories of its diverse characters to the cliché: “they’re characters playing parts in the Kremlin’s script” (Elder 2014). It is little wonder that the reviewer chastises Pomerantsev for not writing about “Russia’s long and tortured history with authoritarianism”, i.e., Russia’s alleged authoritarian “habit”.

    [2] For all quotations from Pomerantsev’s book, I am using the 2015 edition.

    [3] Ilya Gerasimov in his brilliant analysis of a popular rock singer Sergei Shnurov, who has been considered an epitome of post-Soviet cynicism, shows how his songs of 2012-14 have transformed cynicism into a self-critical discourse (see Gerasimov 2014).

    Works Cited

    • Stephen Castle 2015. “A Russian TV Insider Describes a Modern Propaganda Machine.” The New York Times, February 13, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/14/world/europe/russian-tv-insider-says-putin-is-running-the-show-in-ukraine.html
    • Guy Debord 1995. The Society of the Spectacle, transl. by Donald Nicholson-Smith (New York: Zone Books).
    • Masha Gessen 2014. Words Will Break Cement: The Passion of Pussy Riot (New York: Riverhead Books).
    • Lev Gudkov and Boris Dubin 2001.  “Obshchestvo telezritelei: massy i massovye kommunikatsii v Rossii kontsa 1990-kh, “ Monirtoring obshchestvennogo mneniia,  2 (52),  March-April: 31-44.
    • Miriam Elder 2014. “Nothing Is True and Everything Is Possible by Petr Pomerantsev. The New York Times, November 25, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/30/books/review/nothing-is-true-and-everything-is-possible-by-peter-pomerantsev.html?_r=0
    • Umberto Eco 1995. “Ur-Fascism,” The New York Review of Books,  June 22, http://www.pegc.us/archive/Articles/eco_ur-fascism.pdf
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    • Oleg Kharkhordin 1999. The Collective and the Individual in Russia: A Study of Practices. (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press).
    • Mark Lipovetsky 1999.  Russian Postmodernist Fiction: Dialogue with Chaos (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe).
    • Mark Lipovetsky 2008.  Paralogies:  Transformations of the (Post)Modernist Discourse in Russian Culture of the 1920s-2000s (Moscow: Novoe Literaturnoe Obozrenie).
    • Mark Lipovetsky 2011. Charms of the Cynical Reason: The Transformations of the Trickster Trope in Soviet and Post-Soviet Culture (Boston: Academic Studies Press).
    • Mark Lipovetsky 2014. “Breaking Cover: How the KGB became Russia’s favorite TV heroes?”  The Calvert Journal,  April 30, http://calvertjournal.com/comment/show/2433/the-rise-of-kgb-television-series
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    • Petr Pomerantsev 2011a. “The BBC’s Foreign Language Cuts Are Britain’s Loss.” Newsweek, April 3. http://www.newsweek.com/bbcs-foreign-language-cuts-are-britains-loss-66439
    • Petr Pomerantsev and Michael Weiss 2015. “The Menace of Unreality: How the Kremlin Weaponizes Information, Culture and Money.” A Special Report presented by The Interpreter, a project of the Institute of Modern Russia. http://www.interpretermag.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/PW-31.pdf
    • Kristina Rotkirch 2008. Contemporary Russian Fiction: A Short List. Russian Authors Interviewed by Kristina Rotkirch, ed. by Anna Ljunggren, transl. by Charles Rougle (Evanston: Northwestern University Press).
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    • Dmitrii Volchek 2012. “Iskusstvo, pobezhdaiushchee strakh,” Radio Svoboda, May 16, www.svoboda.mobi/a/__/24583384.html
    • Slavoj Žižek 1997. The Plague of Fantasies (London, New York: Verso).
    • Slavoj Žižek 2001. Did Somebody Say Totalitarianism? Five Interventions in the (Mis)Use of a Notion (London, New York: Verso).

    Mark Lipovetsky is Professor of Russian Studies at the University of Colorado-Boulder. He is the author of more than a hundred of articles and eight books. Among his monographs are Paralogies: Transformation of (Post)modernist Discourse in Russian Culture of the 1920s-2000s (2008) and Charms of Cynical Reason: The Transformations of the Trickster Trope in Soviet and Post-Soviet Culture (2011).