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  • Adin Lears–Bitcoin Vitalism and the Elixir of Life

    Adin Lears–Bitcoin Vitalism and the Elixir of Life

    This text will be included in a forthcoming special b2o issue titled “Critique as Care”, edited by Jonathan Nichols and Norberto Gomez, and published in honor of our b2o and b2 colleague and friend, the late David Golumbia.

    Bitcoin Vitalism and the Elixir of Life

    Adin E. Lears

    At the 2021 Bitcoin convention in Miami, Michael Saylor, CEO of the business intelligence company MicroStrategy, lauded Bitcoin as a form of energy:

    Bitcoin is a system for collecting, channeling, and storing energy in the most efficient way we’ve ever invented. It is storing potential energy to stay alive. You have fat on your body? If I cut you off from food for ninety days, you’d still be alive…When you’re putting energy into Bitcoin, you’re storing fat. Fat is organic energy. Bitcoin is monetary energy (Saylor qtd. Stephenson 2022: 33).[1]

    Saylor seems to imagine Bitcoin here as an energy that is economic as well as biophysical: it is an energy that supports the condition of being alive. He seems to confuse the actual and the metaphorical, taking a metaphor—Bitcoin as energy—and treating it as an actuality—Bitcoin is life-energy. In doing so, he conflates the domains of the economic and the physical in a way that would seem to correlate material wealth with greater strength and longevity. There is a kind of vitalism to this thinking, which can be characterized as a belief that the foundations and processes of life are dependent on a force beyond the physical realm. What that force is—God? Money?—remains unclear.

    Saylor’s vitalist and specifically physio-economic thought is the logical extension of a rationale for cryptocurrency writ large. Proponents of crypto believe that the US dollar has been devalued at the whim of an establishment of banking “elites,” effectively breaking down the strength and vigor of the US economic system. Saylor—and other proponents—believe Bitcoin offers a better, stronger alternative. It is a means of bringing economic control, autonomy, and “sovereignty” back to the people. Ultimately, as I will show, proponents like the economist Saifedean Ammous believe that this will bring about a social and cultural revitalization, improving the quality of art, ending war, and even restoring nutrients to the soil.

    Tracing the ideologies of Bitcoin back to the formation of the John Birch Society in the 1960s, David Golumbia (2016: 14-16) has detailed how such an emphasis on freedom and individual sovereignty—among other techno-utopian promises—evinces a form of cyberlibertarianism particular to the alt-right. Here I find early quickenings of such vitalism in another techno- utopian pursuit driven by a desire for both economic and physical vigor: the alchemy of the European middle ages. Since its inception among ancient natural philosophers, alchemy sought to purify and vivify matter, turning base metal into gold and restoring youth with the elixir of life. Through the European middle ages, alchemical pursuits were often informed by the promise of alchemical knowledge as a means of restoring the perfection humans had lost as a result of the biblical Fall. For many of its proponents, Bitcoin offers a similar means of eluding the constraints of government and banking “elites” and revivifying a “fallen” culture. As Elizabeth Povinelli (2016: 20) reminds us, a spirit of vitalism undergirds capitalism writ large in its impulse to see in all things a volatile potential to create profit. Bitcoin’s vitalism literalizes this perspective, yoking an animist language of material communalism with processes of economic and social exploitation and extraction. Attending to this long history of economic vitalism allows us to look past the rationalist logic favored by proponents of Bitcoin to identify its quasi-mystical appeal.

    Medieval Alchemy and the Elixir of Life

    In recent decades, alchemy’s vitalism has been a vexed subject among historians of science, many of whom have sought to rescue alchemy from the realm of occult esotericism by accentuating its concern with physical materials, processes, and transformations. Indeed, the influence of early alchemical theories and practices on modern chemistry and pharmacology has been well-established (DeVun 2009; Chang 2011). Yet, as scholars like Leah DeVun (2009: 102-105) and Zachary Matus (2017: 7-14) have demonstrated, alchemy’s spirituality and materialism are mutually imbricated: its theology underpins its understanding of the material world and material practices drive its spiritual aims. It is hardly necessary to keep these two realms separate in the study of medieval alchemy. This is especially true in the realm of alchemy’s metaphors, which frequently draw from religious imagery and ideas in the process of describing alchemical materials and processes. As DeVun (2009; 102-28) argues, such spiritual metaphors reveal the complexly theological basis that underpins much medieval alchemy and, moreover, serve at least two rhetorical aims: first, to render abstract scientific processes in more widely comprehensible terms and second, to imbue alchemical programs with the heft of the spiritual, even revelatory. As we will see, in articulating the meaning and value of Bitcoin, its proponents walk a similar line, melding “hard” science with the spiritual affects and feelings of religious belief.

    Medieval alchemy was, in a fundamental sense, a life science. It drew from Aristotelian natural philosophy and other intellectual traditions, seeking to create an elixir or “Philosophers’ Stone” that would purify metal and prolong human life. Medieval natural philosophers drew on the ideas of Arabic naturalists, who posited a “medicine” that would heal metals, turning them from base metal into gold and silver (DeVun 2009: 84). The original aim of alchemy was this transmutation of metal; the Arabic word al-iksīr, from which the word elixir derives, originally referred only to the perfection of metals (Matus 2017: 40-41). Yet medieval thinkers like the thirteenth-century English philosopher and Franciscan friar Roger Bacon (d. 1292), perhaps influenced by earlier Chinese Taoist ideas about the prolongation of human life, combined the aim of purifying or tempering metal with treating the human body (DeVun 2009: 84).

    The relationship between the purification of metal to gold and the prolongation of human life was not a metaphor: the same alchemical principles governed each one. For early alchemists who sought to turn base metal into gold, all metallic matter was constituted by “primary qualities”—hot, dry, wet, or cold—which could be transformed through alchemy, along with the metal’s appearance. The primary quality of tin, for example, was dry. But this quality could be transformed into the heat attributed to gold or the cold attributed to silver, through the elixir. In this way, alchemy was believed to transform both the constitutive substance and the superficial appearance of metal. Yet these primary qualities—hot, dry, cold, and wet—constituted not only metal but elemental matter—fire, earth, air, and water. And these elements, in turn, comprised the humoral matter that made up the human body: yellow bile, black bile, blood, and phlegm. This material correspondence between matter and the human body enabled medieval thinkers to extend the logic of the elixir from the purification of metal to the prolongation of human life (Matus 2017: 40-41). Bacon, for example, held that all material substances, including both metals and flesh, were composed of elemental humors (Newman 1997: 319-23). The goal of alchemy was to encourage a state of what Bacon called “equal complexion”: to temper matter—metallic or fleshly—so that all of its elemental qualities or humors were in perfect balance (Newman 1997: 328-32).

    Bacon’s theory of alchemical medicine offers a useful example of medieval alchemy’s techno utopianism: its aim to improve the state of the physical body, and also the value of the immaterial soul. The elixir had the capacity for moral as well as physical improvement. Bacon’s ideas on the possibility of achieving “equal complexion,” and with it the perfection of the body and soul, were grounded in biblical accounts of both prelapsarian corporeality and Pauline accounts of the resurrection of the body. In his Opus Majus, Bacon wrote:

    For this condition [of immortality] will exist in our bodies after the resurrection. For an equality of elements in those bodies excludes corruption forever. For this equality is the ultimate end of the natural matter in mixed bodies, because it is the noblest state, and therefore in it the appetite of matter would cease, and would desire nothing beyond. The body of Adam did not possess elements in full equality, and therefore the contrary elements in him acted and were acted on, and consequently there was waste, and he required nourishment. For this reason, he was commanded not to eat the fruit of life. But since the elements in him approached equality, there was very little waste in him; and hence he was fit for immortality, which he could have secured if he had eaten always the fruit of the tree of life. For this fruit is thought to have elements approaching equality; and therefore it was able to continue incorruption in Adam, which would have happened if he had not sinned (DeVun 2009: 85-86).

    Bacon stresses that the equal complexion of the resurrected body can be achieved on earth. He reasons that Adam’s prelapsarian body was subject to humoral imbalance that could be adjusted and equalized by consuming from the tree of life; if Adam had not sinned, consuming the tree of life might have sustained him forever. Significantly, Bacon equates alchemical “equal medicine” with the fruit of the tree of life: both possess material elements in perfect balance and both have the capacity to transfer this perfection to the body of Adam (Matus 2017: 44-46; Newman 1997: 325; DeVun 2009: 85-86). Here and across his corpus of work, Bacon stresses a direct relationship between sin and the physical body: sin caused the body to deteriorate and lose its life force; purification from sin could make the human body more vigorous and extend life. His aim was to use alchemy to turn the human body to a more pure state: a natural balance of equal complexion that approached immortality. In comparing the therapeutic effects of the alchemical elixir to the effects of the resurrection, Bacon reveals his aim to promote the perfection of heaven on earth (DeVun 2009: 86).

    Indeed, for Bacon, alchemy was not simply a potent medicine. It also offered a means of converting the physical complexions and corresponding morals of non-Christians. In outlining alchemy’s purpose in this endeavor, Bacon drew on the purported advice from Aristotle to Alexander the Great presented in the pseudo-Aristotelian text the Secret of Secrets. Because various regions had their own complexions, which in turn influenced the physiology and morals of the people who dwelled there, the Secrets-author reasoned that changing the landscape would influence the bodies and minds of the inhabitants, “pacifying” them into submission. In the absence of details supplied in the Secret of Secrets, Bacon offered his alchemical elixir as a means of accomplishing this change in landscape, physiology, and moral make-up (Matus 2017: 49-52).

    Bacon was not alone in his desire to draw the perfection of heaven into the earthly realm. Writing several decades after Bacon, the early fourteenth-century French Franciscan alchemist John of Rupicessa (b. 1310) elaborated on the alchemical theory of Bacon to articulate a “quintessence” that might extend life (DeVun 2009: 81-89). Rupicessa’s alchemical quintessence was based on a “fifth element,” drawn in part from Aristotelian and Stoic conceptions of the pneuma, or vital spirit pervading all things, which Rupicessa understood as a manifestation of heaven on earth (DeVun 2009: 67). Whereas the primary qualities of the four earthly elements were fixed—fire is hot and dry and cannot become cold or moist—Rupicessa held that the fifth element could shift in its quality when it is necessary, making it “strong against all opposing things” (DeVun 2009: 66). It was a kind of universal cure, adding any “quality” needed to balance the humoral complexion.

    Like his predecessor, Roger Bacon, Rupicessa’s description of the process of the creation and operations of the quintessence sought the restoration of spiritual purity. He extended this ideal, by additionally emphasizing that such purification could be achieved through a distinctly human ingenuity.  Describing the quintessence, Rupicessa wrote:

    [T]hrough the virtue which God contributed to ornamented nature and subjected to human magisterium, man is able to cure the inconveniences of old age—which impeded the works of the Evangelical life too much among the ancient men of the gospel—and to restore the loss of youth and to recover the pristine powers and to have them again….This is what all who have worked to seek the thing created for the use of humans desire, to be able to protect the corruptible body from putrefaction and to conserve it without diminution so that it may be conserved, if it is possible, in perpetuity. This is the thing that all desire naturally: never to be corrupted, nor to die” (DeVun 2009: 65).

    Though he does not frame the operation of the quintessence in terms of the biblical Fall, as Bacon does, Rupicessa’s account here nevertheless evinces a similar desire to “restore” and “recover” a “pristine power” that has been lost. Significantly, Rupicessa’s account emphasizes human exceptionalism as a foundation for scientific ingenuity. Nature has “virtue” (virtutem)—an early term for vital power or force. But this natural force is ultimately “subjected” to “human magisterium.” Such an emphasis on human power over nature implicitly recalls the prelapsarian condition of Genesis, in which God created Adam in his own image, giving him dominion over all other creatures (Genesis 1:26).

    Rupicessa’s emphasis on restoring purity through human control over nature extends into his account of the materials of the quintessence. For Rupicessa, the quintessence should be made of:

    something which is in itself incorruptible (if it exists in eternity), and which always makes anything that comes into unity with it uncorrupted, most of all flesh, something which nurses the virtue and spirit of life and augments and restores it; something which digests all rawness, and reduces all that has been digested to equality, and which removes from anything all excess of any quality and restores to it any lost quality (DeVun 2009: 66).

    The elusive “something” Rupicessa seeks is a substance that is entirely original and sovereign; it is incorruptible “in itself,” i.e. through its own force or power, and not through something added. Its originary power allows it to exert a force that influences any matter it comes in contact with, including corruptible human flesh. Using a viscerally material metaphor of digestion, Rupicessa describes the work of the quintessence as a process of breaking human flesh down to an essence and adding back what has been lost. The originality of this substance—its purity and self-sufficiency—gestures to the ways that Rupicessa’s ideals of purity inform a related standard of sovereignty. His quintessence, in short, sought a substance of such purity and sovereign force that it could transfer such qualities to the human body and soul, restoring some of the perfection lost in the Fall.

    Indeed, Rupicessa’s ideal of human sovereignty is particularly evident in his rationale for the quintessence, which emerged from the theory that humans suffered three kinds of death: natural death, violent death, and “death [that] arrives sooner than the end predetermined by God.” Medicine was fruitless against the first two. But the last kind was “because of too much regeneration and dissolution, or through too much austere abstinence or despair, or through negligence in avoiding danger of death, one kills oneself” (DeVun 2009: 64-65). In other words: Rupicessa’s third form of death was due to human error and failure to avoid danger. His quintessence sought to address this last kind of death. By acknowledging that some, not all, deaths could be prevented, Rupicessa maintained that supreme power lay in the hands of God. At the same time, he suggests a kind of human culpability for certain illness, corruption, and death, a premise undergirded by a belief in human free will. Medieval theologies of the Fall understood the postlapsarian condition as a state of spiritual slavery, defined by the sinful violation of divine law (Wyatt 2009: 248-49). Nevertheless, unlike animals, humans could exercise free will, enabling them to attain a certain freedom, even in their sinful lapsed state (Shannon 2013: 135-41; Davis 2016: 158-60).  By situating his quintessence as a remedy for “bad” human choices, Rupicessa reinforces the theology of the Fall as a crucial cornerstone of his alchemical theory. Eschewing foundational religious ideals of poverty, humility, and charity, such theory weaves the alchemical pursuit of longevity with a desire for a sovereign self-sufficiency and control.

    Indeed, such individualism informed Rupicessa’s political program for the quintessence.  As DeVun has shown, Rupicessa’s “apocalyptic alchemy” was informed and made urgent by a millenarian mindset that predicted the imminent arrival of the Antichrist (DeVun 2009: 57). His quintessence promised to bolster the strength of the institutional Church at multiple levels. The alchemical production of precious metals could be used to buy necessities for Christians, and therefore contribute to funding the Church’s war against the Antichrist (DeVun 2009: 58). At the same time, alchemy’s medicinal uses could help to heal the bodily injuries resulting from that war; stronger human bodies would in turn mean longer-lived evangelizing, more powerful adversaries for the Antichrist and allies for the Church (DeVun 2009: 61-62). In this way, Rupicessa’s religious beliefs and ideals were fundamental to his alchemical theories and aims. Attending to the convergence of spiritual and material registers in medieval alchemy can amplify its emphasis on physical and moral purification, as well as human ingenuity and mastery over the natural world—all ideas that also emerge in the vitalism that undergirds much contemporary discourse on Bitcoin.

    Bitcoin Vitalism

    As Golumbia (2016: 14-16) has shown, the conspiratorial affects and cyberlibertarian ideals around Bitcoin arguably found their origins in the paranoid economic theory popularized by the John Birch Society, whose founder Robert Welch was among the first to give voice to notions of economic control by government and banking elites. Welch’s essay, “The Truth in Time” (1966) framed social welfare programs—many of them emerging directly from the New Deal—as a means of reducing the responsibility and thus autonomy of individual citizens while building the authority and reach of the federal government. Other John Birch Society publications outlined how the US Federal Reserve has devalued the US dollar while maintaining sole control over the issuance of bank notes. Bitcoin’s emergence as a “decentralized” or “distributed” economic system responds in part to this paranoia about government control over banking. The software does not exist in a single physical location, nor is it hosted by a single company like Amazon or Google. It is, instead, networked across multiple machines. For these reasons, proponents of Bitcoin have lauded it as a form of “distributed authority” which places economic power back in the hands of ordinary people rather than banking elites. Yet, as Golumbia shows, this idea of distributed authority masks a commitment to the sovereign individuality of Bitcoin’s users, who remain free from government regulation and interference (Golumbia 2016: 27-32; 2024: 281-96).

    These alt-right impulses toward freedom and individual sovereignty masked in an anti-authority, even quasi-communalist ethos are evident in Bitcoin’s vitalist currents. In his book, The Bitcoin Standard (2018: 75-76), the economist Saifdean Ammous argued that, as a sound money system less subject to the fluctuations in value emerging from fiat-systems, Bitcoin could cultivate the low time preference that he believes is essential for a flourishing human culture. For Ammous, those with low time preference are more apt to think about the future; they are more likely to delay gratification and invest, thereby yielding higher returns on their investments. In contrast, those with a high time preference tend to live in the moment, seeking instant gratification. For Ammous, this is the prevailing economic atmosphere today, a form of Keynesian economics centered on “a creed of consumption and spending to satisfy immediate wants.” He continues:

     By constantly expanding the money supply, central banks’ monetary policy makes saving and investment less attractive and thus it encourages people to save less and invest less while consuming more. The real impact of this is the widespread culture of conspicuous consumption, where people live their lives to buy ever-larger quantities of crap they do not need…The financial decisions of people also reflect on all other aspects of their personality, engendering a high time preference in all aspects of life: depreciating currency causes less saving, more borrowing, more short-termism in economic production and in artistic and cultural endeavors, and perhaps most damagingly, the depletion of the soil of its nutrients, leading to ever-lower levels of nutrients in food (141).

    The baggy environmentalism of this passage—Ammous loosely links overconsumption of resources to depletion of nutrients in the earth’s soil, without explaining the relationship—amplifies a vitalist current in Ammous’s thinking: as a sound money system, Bitcoin can repair cultural and environmental devitalization.[2] More pointedly, the logic of the passage moves seamlessly from economic value to cultural value to organic value: an inability or failure to accumulate wealth dilutes cultural production to cheap “crap,” which in turn diminishes nutrients from the soil. Humans are not living up to our full potential, Ammous implies. Our civilization is watered down and as a result, the environment around us is failing to support our basic needs. We may not even be fully human anymore, since, as Ammous makes clear in an earlier passage, animals have a higher time preference than humans (74).

    Indeed, Ammous’s logic of devolution implies a desire to return to a more pure, vigorous, and human state of being, proposing that Bitcoin offers a means for such a return. He writes at length on the “artistic flourishing” of Europe under systems of sound money, juxtaposing the work of Bach and Beethoven with the “animalistic noises” produced in contemporary recording studios, which turn a profit by “selling to man the titillation of his basest instincts.” A prior  “golden era” produced music that “spoke to man’s soul and awakened him to think of higher callings than the mundane grind of daily life.” In contrast, “today’s musical noises speak to man’s most base animalistic instincts, distracting him from the realities of life by inviting him to indulge in immediate sensory pleasures (99).” Similarly, Michelangelo spent four years painting the Sistine Chapel, eating very little in order to perfect his craft. Modern art—Ammous has a particular disdain for Rothko—could have been made in several hours by “a bored six-year-old” (100). Today’s art is animalistic and childish, a devolution from the mature vigor of the past. With tremendous self-control, the great artists of prior centuries eschewed base materialism, holding their minds on the higher spiritual realm of beauty and “refined tast[e]” (101). For Ammous, Bitcoin approaches a social ethic, through which human culture can return to a thriving and peaceful state—his discussion of sound money and individual freedom makes a claim that unsound money creates the conditions for “perpetual war” (145-49). Yet it is a vision not of mutual aid, but of individual self-sufficiency. The purity implied in his logic of devolution—the “return” to material potency in both high value cultural production and greater health—underscores Ammous’s claim that sound money generates the individual freedom and self-governance that undergirds an idealized golden age of high culture.

    There is a fascistic impulse to these ideals of purity and self-governance—one that becomes apparent as we consider the strange aesthetics and materialism that emerges in the use of another blockchain technology: non-fungible tokens (NFTs), a digital identifier recorded on blockchain, which typically compiles visual and audio digital files into a kind of collage of digital art. As Arne De Boever (2021) has shown, NFTs enact a strange transfiguration of value that reinforces a fetishistic affirmation of the sovereign individual, even as it purports to distribute authority. With their emphasis on the creation of art in a digital space through copies of previously existing works, NFTs have been lauded as a more “democratic” art form, unmoored from categories like authorship, ownership, and value that tie art to the market. Yet, as De Boever argues, NFTs reinforce the very categories of authenticity, creativity, and eternal value they seem to refute, buttressing an “aesthetic exceptionalism” that accentuates the singular, even transcendent qualities of the work of art and the artist. The value of NFTs is so exceptional, in fact, that the material work of art does not matter. Rather than physical objects of art, buyers of NFTs receive “cultic objects”—a token, a certificate, even a clump of hair—to signify their ownership. Such objects refer obsessively to the gross materiality of the human body. Buyers of work by the NFT artist known as Beeple, whose art sold for a record $69,346,250 at Christies in 2021, receive a small token with a cloth, which can be used to clean the token, or “to clean yourself up after blasting a hot load in yer pants.” De Boever calls this “alt-right materialis[m]” a kind of trolling assertion of excess and often sexualized materiality to mask the immateriality of the NFT. The vitalist currents that circulate through Bitcoin discourse are another example of such alt-right materialism. Though such gross tokens are a far cry from the high culture promised by Ammous, both ultimately reinforce individual sovereignty through ideals of aesthetic exceptionalism. And they hide their immaterial nature with a persistent emphasis on matter: the stuff of the human body and the living earth.

    The vitalism and alt-right materialism that is implicit in Ammous’s purist vision of Bitcoin becomes far more explicit in Michael Saylor’s insistent assertion that Bitcoin is energy. In an interview with Robert Breedlove, the influencer and host of the Bitcoin-promoting “What is Money?” podcast, Saylor compares Bitcoin to other digitally networked systems like Apple, Google, and Facebook. Once they reach a certain point of economic development, these corporations are “fires that have been unleashed into society…and the effect is exothermal.”[3] He goes on:

    We have the collapse, the dematerialization of some product or service or virtue or some ineffable quality, be it friendship, or mobile devices, or information. It’s collapsing into a lower energy state. And as it collapses into a lower-energy state, huge amounts of energy in the form of profit, cash flow, and value, get given off….Facebook can improve the way you communicate to your loved ones overnight for a nickel…[W]hen you have these massive dematerializations of value and they get on a network with a network effect, it’s almost like… a crystallizing structure: you’ve got an amorphous substance and as it crystalizes we go from steam to water to ice. It collapses, it gives off energy. [Bitcoin] is that first digital monetary system: it’s collapsing into a much more efficient form; it’s giving off energy. And that just brings us back to the entire subject of how important is energy to the human race.

    Saylor moves freely between descriptive and analogical modes here with a rhetorical style suitable to a venue promoting itself as “a podcast about Wisdom, Intelligence and Meaning” and “one of the most powerful philosophy podcasts in the world.” The effect is to muddle the relationship between the literal and the metaphorical, so that the analogy of Bitcoin as geothermal energy lends a vital physicality to an abstract monetary process: Bitcoin “gives off energy.” This confusion of the literal and the metaphorical is a rhetorical extension of the alt-right materialism that DeBoever identifies in NFT tokens. Just as the gross and often sexualized materiality of the token stands in for the fact that there is no material piece of art, Saylor’s Bitcoin vitalism occludes the immateriality of the currency. The stakes are higher with Saylor, however. The cultic fetish objects that stand in for NFTs make no claim they will help extend life (indeed, while their common references to masturbatory climax suggest virility, it also implies an expense of life force). For Saylor, Bitcoin can make a claim to such longevity.

    The animating energy Saylor attributes to Bitcoin suffuses it with agency: later in his interview with Breedlove, Saylor describes how monetary energy “leaps from gold to Bitcoin” and “leaps from fiat to Bitcoin.” Humans can harness this energy for their own ends. Saylor explains “Money is the highest form of energy that human beings can channel. So if I went back through time, human beings as a species prosper by channeling energy. When we mastered fire, we channeled chemical energy. When we mastered missiles, we channeled kinetic energy…” Adopting Bitcoin is the next phase in human technological development necessary to prosper as a species. Like Frankenstein’s monster, the paradigmatic “creature” or “created thing” animated through the genius of human ingenuity, Bitcoin has come alive. And Saylor seeks to harness its life force.

    Indeed, Saylor inadvertently places himself within a Shelleyan historical and literary genealogy of animated technology, invoking the corporation as a creature. In an interview with the Austrian podcaster and Bitcoin enthusiast Robin Seyr, Saylor responds to a question Seyr poses about what a future might look like under a Bitcoin standard:

    I think, if you look at economic creatures, the classic economic creature in modern society is the corporation. The average life expectancy of the corporation is something like ten years…The number of corporations that are more than a hundred years old [trails off]. What percentage of people live to be more than a hundred, like .1 percent or .01 percent? What percent of corporations live to be more than a hundred, .0001 percent. Well, what if I told you I could make your company live forever?

    In his comparison between the corporation and the “creature,” and in his attention to the lifespan of the corporation, Saylor’s response amplifies the etymological root of “corporation” in the post-classical Latin corporare: “to form into a body.” In doing so, it frames Bitcoin as a kind of vital medicine that can heal and protect the corporation, extending its lifespan to previously unseen proportions. Significantly, Saylor moves back and forth between corporate endurance and human longevity. His explicit claim is that the animating force of Bitcoin can invigorate corporations, making them “live forever.” But submerged within his response is the implicit claim that such economic energy might extend the human lifespan as well.

    The logistics of Bitcoin’s capacity to improve human lifespan are unclear, beyond the simple fact that a currency perceived to build wealth might also offer more resources to live longer—better food, exercise, and healthcare, to name a few. But Saylor never substantively acknowledges the effects of economic imparity. He asks vaguely, “What’s the difference between perfect money and imperfect money?” And responds “Perfect money is economic immortality. Imperfect money is: we all have a short, brutal life.” He juxtaposes “people living in skyscrapers on the 80th floor” with “people in Africa living in mud huts.” His answers set aside any concern for the ways Bitcoin might offer practical material improvement for economic imbalances, nor does he make any attempt to understand the culturally-specific context of such conditions, in Africa or elsewhere. Instead, he is animated by a zealous drive for human improvement. Bitcoin as a new phase in human development, one in which science has realized aims that had previously been consigned to the realm of thought alone—the domain of art and religion:

    Projecting economic energy through time and space has really been more of an aspirational fantasy…or an art than it was ever a science or engineering discipline. Bitcoin takes something from the artistic and from the religious and from the political domain and it moves it into the engineering domain where now there is actually a precise way to move capital…How will the world change? Profoundly [shrug]. I can create an AI that can live in cyberspace capitalized by Bitcoin that will live forever, that will have economic immortality that is completely sovereign from a company, a person, a country. That AI could, in theory split itself…spawn ten million more AIs that are all sovereign. It’s a life form….I could endow a university or nonprofit with Bitcoin that could conceivably last a thousand years without anybody working for it….I can create a company with a likely life expectancy of one hundred or five hundred or a thousand years.

    Here is Saylor’s clearest turn to rhetorical alt-right materialism. By proposing that Bitcoin will materialize what has previously been consigned to the realms of art and religion, he makes literal the ideas that have dwelled in the domain of imaginative speculation and spiritual faith, sealing them with the certainty of science. In doing so, he proposes a future out of science fiction itself, one in which a new and sovereign life form is capable of spawning itself into an infinite number of other sovereign beings: a chilling vision of sovereignty on steroids.

    Conclusion

    I have argued that attending to the ways science and technology was—and is—imbricated with certain religious and spiritual affects amplifies the political ideals—freedom, individualism, sovereignty—behind both. Without drawing a direct line of influence between medieval alchemy and contemporary Bitcoin, I have shown how they are similar techno-utopian projects, seeking to use advances in science and technology to “perfect” society, or to bring about a utopian ideal. What is clear from the alchemical theory of Bacon and Rupicessa is that the purifying impulses of medieval alchemy could be used in the service of assuring Christian dominion: a totalizing project demanding the power of the one—the sovereign individual, nation, or faith—over the rest. Bitcoin poses a similar threat.

    Alchemy was a contested subject and practice in the middle ages. Some of its critics saw it as a form of counterfeiting: if false gold entered economic circulation it could lead real gold to lose its value in the marketplace. Others took a more theological view, asserting that alchemy was a dangerous improvement on God’s creation by hubristic scientists too focused on earthly power and authority (Newman 2004: 34-114; Principe 2012: 59-60). In his under-appreciated Canterbury tale, The Canon’s Yeoman’s Tale, Geoffrey Chaucer (d. 1400), offered a powerful critique of the wasting effects of alchemical labor in fruitless pursuit of the Philosophers’ Stone. The tale is, in part, a fictional autobiography or confession from the perspective of an apprentice alchemist on the verge of shucking the ideals of mastery that have been hammered into him by a domineering master alchemist (Lears 2024). In one passage, the Yeoman describes how

    He [the Philosophers’ Stone] hath ymaad us [the alchemists] spenden muchel good,

    For sorwe of which almoost we wexen wood,

    But that good hope crepeth in oure herte,

    Supposynge evere though we sore smerte,

    To be releeved by hym afterward.

    Swich supposyng and hope is sharp and hard;

    I warne yow wel, it is to seken evere.

    That future temps hath maad men to dissevere,

    In trust therof, from al that evere they hadde (Chaucer 2008: 274).

    The passage vividly attests to the “sharp” and “hard” feeling of hope as the yeomen alchemists invest both their money and their bodies in the pursuit of the Philosophers’ Stone. Such desperate labor has affected them both physically and spiritually in their loss of “good”—both material goods and the more abstract quality that comprises what is good about them. The allure of “future temps”—of some promise of wealth or happiness—has resulted in the laborers’ separation from “al that ever they hadde.”

    Chaucer wrote in a time of great social and civil unrest, as England was still recovering from the ravages of the plague and the economic and social transformations it had wrought. The enchanted promise of gold is keenly alive in the Yeoman’s tale; and Chaucer is sensitive to it. He acknowledges both alchemy’s promise of happiness and the ways that the pursuit of such happiness creates the very conditions the Yeoman seeks to escape: the feelings of a life dulled by work, of being used up. The mystical promise of medieval alchemy was a very real and human response to the material conditions of living in the European middle ages. As Zachary Matus has argued, alchemy was an extension of the emphasis on embodied and affective experience that suffused late-medieval religiosity (Matus 2017: 8-9). The blood of the suffering and dying body of Christ was a reminder of one’s own fleshly vulnerability and, for many alchemists, a potent symbol of the everlasting life they sought through the elixir (DeVun 2009: 116-27).

    Behind the rationalist quasi-logic of Bitcoin is a similar mystical appeal. At the time of writing this essay, the Crypto platform Kraken was running an ad during Premier League soccer coverage, comparing Bitcoin to “digital gold” and promising that “it can never be counterfeited,” and that “no one can decide to just print more or shut it down.” The ad concludes with the image of a hand holding a golden ball of light, currents of buzzing electricity coursing from it, against the claim: “it puts the power back in all our hands.” In our current moment, as market-oriented government, economic, and healthcare institutions bear down upon us, foreclosing our capacity to thrive, who wouldn’t want such autonomy—for themselves and for everyone? The ad promises both.

    The appeal of Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies and blockchain-based technologies has weathered a host of controversies since Bitcoin’s inauguration in 2009. Its ascendancy appears to be all but assured, particularly after the 2024 election of Donald Trump. David Golumbia’s critiques of the alt-right origins and ideals of Bitcoin offer a powerful and real model of critique as care. Attending to the mystical aspects of Bitcoin’s appeal is, I hope, an extension of this impulse—one that seeks to identify not only the dangers of Bitcoin and its misleading rhetoric, but also to look deeper, probing the dangerously wounded spirit at its core.

    I thank the editors and guest editors at b2o for including me in this special issue on “Critique as Care” in honor of my friend and colleague David Golumbia. Special thanks must go to the memory of David himself, who first made me believe I might have something to say about Bitcoin and alchemy. This essay is for him.

    Adin E. Lears is the author of World of Echo: Noise and Knowing in Late-Medieval England (Cornell, 2020) as well as articles and essays on medieval embodiment and poetics and their implications for thinking about contemporary life. Her current book project offers a premodern history of life force and its social and literary effects in post-plague England. She is an Associate Professor at Virginia Commonwealth University.

    References

    Ammous, Saifedean. 2018. The Bitcoin Standard: The Decentralized Alternative to Central Banking. Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley and Sons.

    Breedlove, Robert. “Michael Saylor: Bitcoin, Energy, and Humanity.” Swan Bitcoin. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=07nAJvGoU9g&t=160s (accessed February 25, 2025).

    ____. “Robert Breedlove.” https://www.youtube.com/@RobertBreedlove22 (accessed February 25, 2025).

    Chang, Ku-Ming. 2011. “Alchemy as Studies of Life and Matter: Reconsidering the Place of Vitalism in Early Modern Chymistry.” Isis 102, no. 2: 322-29.

    Chaucer, Geoffrey. 2008. “The Canon’s Yeoman’s Tale” in The Riverside Chaucer, gen. ed. Larry D. Benson, 3rd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 272-81.

    Davis, Rebecca. 2016. Piers Plowman and the Books of Nature. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    De Boever, Arne. 2021. “The End of Art (Once Again).” boundary 2https://www.boundary2.org/2021/03/arne-de-boever-the-end-of-art-once-again/ (accessed February 25, 2025).

    DeVun, Leah. 2009. Prophesy, Alchemy, and the End of Time: John of Rupicessa in the Late Middle Ages. New York: Columbia University Press.

    Golumbia, David. 2016. The Politics of Bitcoin: Software as Right-Wing Extremism. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

    ____, 2024. Cyberlibertarianism: The Right-Wing Politics of Digital Technology (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

    Huestis, Samuel. 2023. “Cryptocurrency’s Energy Consumption Problem.” Rocky Mountain Institute. https://rmi.org/cryptocurrencys-energy-consumption-problem/ (accessed February 25, 2025).

    Kraken Crypto Exchange. “See What Bitcoin Can Be.” https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=W4YkblM3McM (accessed February 25, 2025).

    Lears, Adin E. 2024. “Corruption, Consumption, and Chaucer’s Reenchantment of Craft in the Canon’s Yeoman’s Tale.” Studies in the Age of Chaucer 46: 37-65

    Matus, Zachary. 2017. Franciscans and the Elixir of Life: Religion and Science in the Late Middle Ages. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.

    Middle English Dictionary, s.v. “god n.2,” https://quod.lib.umich.edu/m/middle-english-dictionary/dictionary/MED18946/track?counter=4&search_id=173783 (accessed February 25, 2025).

    Newman, William R. 1997. “An Overview of Roger Bacon’s Alchemy.” In Roger Bacon and the Sciences: Commemorative Essays, edited by Jeremiah Hackett, 317-36. Leiden, NL: Brill.

    ____.  2004. Promethean Ambitions: Alchemy and the Quest to Perfect Nature. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

    Oxford English Dictionary, s.v. “creature (n.),” December 2024, https://doi.org/10.1093/OED/8061309761.

    Oxford English Dictionary, s.v. “corporation (n.),” December 2024, https://doi.org/10.1093/OED/1200365536.

    Povinelli, Elizabeth. 2016. Geontologies: A Requiem to Late Capitalism. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.

    Principe, Lawrence M. 2012. The Secrets of Alchemy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

    Seyr, Robin. “Michael Saylor: ‘Bitcoin is Economic Immortality’.” https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=A60jVnAIX40 (accessed February 25, 2025).

    Shannon, Laurie. 2013. The Accommodated Animal: Cosmopolity in Shakespeare. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

    Stephenson, Will. 2022. “Cryptonomicon: Among the Bitcoin Maximalists.” Harpers Magazine 344, no. 2062: 25-34.

    Wyatt, David. 2009. Slaves and Warriors in Medieval Britain and Ireland, 800-1200. Leiden, NL: Brill. 

    1 There is, of course, an irony to the idea that Bitcoin might be a boon to the environment. Energy consumption is a leading cause of the current climate crisis and in 2023, Bitcoin alone (setting aside other cryptocurrencies) was estimated to consume 127 terawatt hours per year; more than many developed nations (Huestis 2023).

    2 Quotations from Saylor have been lightly edited for clarity and to avoid repetition.

  • Michelle Chihara–Return of the Repressed: Oceanwide’s Angeleno Ghost City

    Michelle Chihara–Return of the Repressed: Oceanwide’s Angeleno Ghost City

    This article is part of the b2o: an online journal Special Issue “The Gordian Knot of Finance”

    Return of the Repressed: Oceanwide’s Angeleno Ghost City

    Michelle Chihara

    In the early 2000s, the American press became fascinated with Chinese “ghost cities.” Images of darkened condo towers in new but empty districts appeared across the media, from Al Jazeera to CNN.  In Ordos, at the edge of the Gobi desert, a modernist museum like a flattened Lego egg sat surrounded by canyons of silent skyscrapers. Tianducheng was a faithful mini-recreation of the city of Paris, France, complete with flower boxes and Tour Eiffel, that stood eerily quiet. Other extravagant developments were never finished or occupied, from Chenggong to Guangzhou.[1]

    China’s unprecedented boom cycle had provoked a building frenzy far beyond what the economy could absorb. When the bubble burst, thousands of newly middle-class Chinese investors lost their savings and never received the homes they had been promised. The results looked post-apocalyptic. Trampled banners in deserted ballrooms and parkways gathered dust, among row upon row of echoing McMansions, with vines crawling up the unused walls.

    Across the press, and in Chinese official discourse itself, the ghost city trope “supplied a charged new metaphor through which to report on China’s property sector” (Woodworth 2017, 1273). The idea never gained a precise sociopolitical definition. It was always a phrase that served as a lightning rod for controversy and debate, even as it gained currency within China itself. The state worried about ghost cities, as it sought to balance its command-and-control policies with the actions taken by Chinese families now free to use real estate—in the proud US tradition—as both shelter and primary investment strategy (Ibid.).

    Most of the journalists writing for North American audiences assumed that ghost cities were the problems of a planned economy not our own. Some economic papers on the topic also functioned on the premise that authoritarian capitalism and its failure to respond to market signals were to blame for “government subsidized overbuilding.”[2] Both presumed that the ghosts were exotic and foreign, fallout from misguided policies. But the realities of the global economy have brought these specters back to haunt the West.

    One critic calls London’s architectural trend of catering to the needs of empty luxury dwellings the necrotecture of the global super-rich (Atkinson 2019). Dubai and South Korea have ghost cities; the website Vacant New York tracks empty commercial and residential properties; historic chateaux listed as short-term luxury rentals on AirBnB dot the French countryside amongst the overcrowded and under-funded banlieues. To many Marxist critics, this is garden-variety over-accumulation. These are simply the busts at the end of the boom cycles, they’re endemic to capitalism, authoritarian or liberal. And it’s true that, like the original ghost towns of frontier California, the Ordos Municipality was built on speculative mining profits.

    Even if they’re not new, however, the dynamics that created ghost cities in China persist and metastasize. If anything, they’re getting more severe. The Western coverage of China may have been laden with the ironies of Orientalist clichés, and yet, the aesthetics were a transnational means of involving the public. Ghost cities give democratic stakeholders a way to see the severity of the problem, a way to grasp the local consequences of finance’s Gordian knot, in all its international interconnectedness.

    ***

    In downtown Los Angeles, about a year ago, base jumpers and graffiti artists claimed an abandoned development as their own by filming viral videos from inside the empty towers. On Instagram, one video is captioned “the calm before the storm.” It opens with a wide shot, drone footage set to hip hop.

    Two young men stand at the top of an unfinished building. On iron girders high above the city, they swim in golden sunset light. As they move catlike across the bare beams, they look deliberate but impossibly relaxed. They control the swoop of their cameras with their thumbs.

    In the next beat, they base jump. A series of five narrow rectangular parachutes glides down, flashes popping off all around. But if the silks spiraling between the graffitied towers were the main attraction, the preamble at sunset best captures the lonely dangerous beauty of the act.

    Every floor of these unfinished high-rises–on every level, in every window–was tagged by a graffiti crew. Leaving a mark on the buildings became, through online subcultures, a sine qua non of street self-branding. The aesthetic additions to the abandoned towers, at the heart of the city, brought press attention and sparked global interest. The police stationed themselves around the perimeter, parked at every corner of the lot, to shut it all down.[3]

    Most of the public discussion at the time centered on whether or not the graffiti was art. Should taxpayers should be responsible for the clean-up and police patrols? But in February, the Los Angeles Times’ last article about the empty buildings called them a “Capital Fail”(Miranda 2024). Of the many journalistic articles about the towers, this one, in the Arts and Culture section, came the closest to articulating what the ghost towers in eye of the storm truly represented: The fact that land use in global cities, including in the heart of urban America, is being driven by the opaque needs of international capital.

    ***

    The original project in the heart of downtown L.A. was built by a Chinese company called Oceanwide (now Tonghai), through a funding mechanism known as the EB-5 visa program. This program has been inviting foreign investment into the US since the 1990s, giving predominantly Chinese and sometimes Indian people a way to transform their home currencies into dollars, while essentially purchasing green cards. If they invest a certain amount, they receive a financial path to permanent residency and citizenship. The program is a highly-contested set of rules, subject to multiple news investigations and Senate hearings, with detractors labeling it “Citizenship-for-Sale.”[4] EB-5 investments have raised persistent concerns about fraud and money laundering.[5] And yet, despite recent controversies around Trump’s son-in-law Jared Kushner using the program to finance part of a deal in New York, the program was recently renewed (Hackman and Putzier 2022; Democracy Forward 2022). EB-5 was originally supposed to create American jobs in rural areas or districts with high unemployment. The evidence suggests that it has, instead, primarily served the needs of international real estate developers.

    Oceanwide is down the block from the Metropolis, another EB-5 project created by some of the same players. The Metropolis was completed, and it includes a finished boutique hotel with requisite rooftop pool and spa, plus luxury condos. The developer sold the complex at a loss in 2022 (TRD staff 2022). The owners have had trouble filling the sparkling columns. It’s not so much a ghost city as a glass zombie.

    Commercial vacancy rates are at a record high in downtown Los Angeles, and EB-5 investments have contributed to a glut of overly-vacant luxury units, in an area desperately in need of affordable housing.[6] Some of the Oceanwide contractors are now suing to get paid. The property was named in an FBI warrant targeting the corrupt city councilman, Jose Huizar, who is serving time for fraud related (of course) to real estate development and a bribery scheme with yet another Chinese developer.[7] The results, in other words, for the city, are an aesthetically interesting mess. And as with the scandals around the mayor of New York taking bribes from Turkey, local politics have become inseparable from the demands of far-flung developers.

    During China’s boom, unsurprisingly, the economy provided Chinese investors with myriad methods of circulating their funds into global dollars, like EB-5. But this isn’t exactly what Xi Jinping wanted. Since 2016 or 2017, Jinping has been cracking down on capital controls. By 2020 and 2021, the Chinese state was locked in a game of chicken with its own real estate giant, Evergrande. The Communist Party had generally worked to backstop problems in its economy, to stop them from spreading. But in the face of $300 billion debts and the need to slow overheating markets, Evergrande was ultimately forced to back down, all the way down, into liquidation (Wu and Steinberg 2017; Saeedy and Feng 2024). You can now see some of Evergrande’s ghost cities being demolished online.

    The CCP wanted to water its local economy with more of its own funds, it wanted investors to spur growth at home. It also wanted to discourage high-risk, high-reward speculation. These goals are sometimes at odds.

    Money created quickly is fast money. It carries a certain momentum when it goes looking for high rates of return. It needs appreciating asset classes in which to park itself. Much of the capital that has fled China has gone against the wishes of the CCP, but not all, and not all fast money can technically be counted as fraud.

    Money laundering, in the original sense, meant hiding the criminal source of profits by routing the funds through legitimate businesses. But much of the fast money coming out of China falls into more of a grey area, within systems that obscure all profit sources equally. Drug cartels, Eastern European oligarchs, crooked Malaysian prime ministers, American tech entrepreneurs, and middle-class Chinese investor—they all share the same access to financial anonymity.

    Capital flees into dark money, increasingly out of reach of the regulations of any one nation. As soon as Chinese developers amass a certain level of capital, they become international players. Once fortunes reach a certain size, they enter a space in some ways above and between Wall Street and The City, above and between the laws on the books in any one center of global finance—what one financial journalist calls Moneyland (Bullough 2019a).

    The US national security state does sometimes lash out against truly illicit money, with tools largely provided by the Patriot Act. The Department of Justice has powerful allies and works with NGOs like Global Financial Integrity. And at the same time, the US is the fastest growing tax haven in the world (Bullough 2019; Bullough 2019b). It has brought the race to the bottom of the deregulation barrel back to its own shores. While the US is the home base for the most powerful shadow banks and hedge funds, capital flows with no restrictions across borders, hunting for the next loophole or program that might provide an edge or an arbitrage opportunity. The aftermath of the 2008 crisis has only entrenched the dynamics that knit high-end real estate developers across the globe into one unstable, highly speculative market.

    Many middle-class Chinese investors have lost out through the EB-5 program, alongside Angeleno taxpayers. But the needs of finance’s big dogs never jibed with the needs of regular people. International capital pushes funds into luxury building trends that don’t take their cues from local markets. The result is almost never good local jobs, the erstwhile promise of EB-5. It’s empty towers in the midst of a housing crisis, as the tent cities continue to rise around the tagged and abandoned monuments to indifferent global wealth.[8]

    ***

    The drone footage at sunset—with the bright painted letters popping against a tangerine sky and the young people dangling their legs off sky-high rafters—was created by young street artists and influencers. They were looking to create value, for themselves, on the social media platforms owned by corporate America. They incidentally aestheticized faultlines in the global regime. But the images haunted the public and drew audiences because they expose a tear in the fabric of the city.

    The display of daring by the base jumpers invites comparison with an iconic 1932 photograph of iron workers in New York City. The New York Herald-Tribune’s black-and-white image of “Lunch Atop A Skyscraper” similarly captured the public’s attention. In that moment, workers on a beam 850 feet in the air—eating and smoking— sat in for the aspiration and hopes of a generation of immigrants. Their bravado became the symbol of the skyscraper itself, an incarnation of the zeitgeist.

    Today, the young men on the girders with their drones are the dystopic version, Miracle on 34th Street reshot as Blade Runner. Romanticizing the bravery of the Irish laborers in the ‘30s validated their role in the emerging financial order, just before the New Deal. The 21st century ghost towers in L.A. are more counter-cultural, more cyberpunk than daily news, more dystopic carnival than imagined community.

    At the same time, the taggers and base jumpers created a kind of impromptu and spontaneously vibrant public space. They acted as a reminder that in the wake of hollowed-out cultural institutions, in search of least a certain density of weak ties, people will take back the city center. The aesthetic is the only way for the public to engage, on the ground, with the consequences of dark global finance.

    ***

    In moneyland, it’s almost impossible for local municipalities like Los Angeles to hold developers accountable. The concrete construction of the Oceanwide towers means the luxury units can’t be remodeled into smaller apartments. Even demolishing the towers represents an extraordinary expense in a dense urban context.

    Corporate partnerships that span both countries, and currency-sterilization in a dollar-based global economy, are pulling China and the US deeper into an increasingly complex relationship. Conflict has been growing around everything from the Belt and Road program to China’s push to control resources in Africa to the data and IP policies of social media giant TikTok. International security concerns and trade wars, state capitalism and crony capitalism and the gray areas in-between, all are increasingly enmeshed. Local interests are increasingly pit against the needs of capital, with no resolution in sight, as the temperature rises (Loughlin and Grimsditch 2021; Ip 2024).

    There are coalition groups like the Hedge Clippers (as in, they clip the excess growth of hedge funds) trying to address issues like the carried interest tax loophole, a boring-sounding but multi-billion dollar glitch that lets hedge funds avoid massive amounts of taxation. Organizations like LAANE and SAJE, here in Los Angeles, are doing the long slow work of organizing community stakeholders across sectors. These groups seek to hold big, international money locally and democratically accountable. Aesthetics will always play a part in that organizing work.

    Ghost cities may once have seemed exotic and foreign. But the street artist Nick Sozonov’s drone shots of Oceanwide bring the trope home and give local audiences purchase on the topic. Attention spans now move at the speed of TikTok. It’s hard to keep people focused on the details of financial loopholes, they keep slipping away behind a cat meme. But art reminds us that when we look in the mirror, the empty towers are still there, looming right behind us.

    Michelle Chihara is Associate Professor of English at Whittier College, where she teaches media studies, contemporary American literature, and journalism. Recent peer-reviewed publications include chapters in Money and American Literature and Los Angeles, A Literary History, both forthcoming in Cambridge University Press (2025. Other essays have appeared in Post45: Contemporaries, Politics/Letters, Bloomberg, n+1 and Avidly.org. She was formerly the section editor for Econ & Finance at The Los Angeles Review of Books, where she also served as Editor-in-Chief. Her current book project is a journalistic trade book about behavioral economics, working title Behave! The science of influence in American culture.

    References

    Atkinson, Rowland. 2019. “NECROTECTURE: Lifeless Dwellings and London’s Super-Rich.” INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF URBAN AND REGIONAL RESEARCH 43 (1): 2–13. https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2427.12707.

    “BASE Jumper Leaps from Graffitied Towers in Downtown L.A.” 2024. KTLA News at 5. KTLA. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=x9dEFqbgX-Q.

    Bullough, Oliver. 2019a. Moneyland. New York: NY: St. Martin’s Press.

    ———. 2019b. “The Great American Tax Haven: Why the Super-Rich Love South Dakota.” The Guardian, November 14, 2019, sec. World news. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/nov/14/the-great-american-tax-haven-why-the-super-rich-love-south-dakota-trust-laws.

    Chan, Melissa. 2009. “China’s Empty City.” Al Jazeera, November 09, 2009. YouTube https://youtu.be/0h7V3Twb-Qk?si=1p3oQJcXuaBSuBcB

    Chung, Stephy. 2016. “Abandoned Architectural Marvels in China’s Largest Ghost Town.” CNN, November 21, 2016. https://www.cnn.com/style/article/china-ordos-ghost-town/index.html.

    Democracy Forward. 2017. “Uncovering Kushner’s Involvement in Renewing Visa Program,” 2017. https://democracyforward.org/lawsuits/uncovering-kushners-involvement-in-renewing-visa-program/.

    Hackman, Michelle, and Konrad Putzier. 2022. “Congress Set to Revive EB-5 Program Giving Green Cards to Foreign Investors.” The Wall Street Journal, March 9, 2022. https://www.wsj.com/articles/congress-set-to-revive-eb-5-program-giving-green-cards-to-foreign-investors-11646861559.

    “Hearing on ‘Citizenship for Sale: Oversight of the EB-5 Investor Visa Program’ before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary on June 19, 2018 | USCIS.” 2018. June 19, 2018. https://www.uscis.gov/tools/resources-for-congress/testimonies/hearing-on-citizenship-for-sale-oversight-of-the-eb-5-investor-visa-program-before-the-senate.

    Huang, Josie. 2017. “As DTLA Vacancies Rise, Landlords Increase Breaks on Rent, Parking | LAist,” September 15, 2017. https://laist.com/news/kpcc-archive/in-high-vacancy-dtla-landlords-offer-move-in-speci.

    Ip, Greg. 2024. “America Is Sliding Toward Chinese-Style Capitalism.” The Wall Street Journal, March 21, 2024. https://www.wsj.com/economy/america-is-sliding-toward-chinese-style-capitalism-fff67df4.

    “L.A. Joins Ranks of Cities with ‘ghost Towers’ with Graffiti-Covered Oceanwide Plaza.” 2024. Los Angeles Times. February 10, 2024. https://www.latimes.com/entertainment-arts/newsletter/2024-02-10/la-oceanwide-plaza-essential-arts-arts-culture.

    Lloyd, Annie. 2017. “Downtown L.A. Vacancy Rate Highest In 17 Years | LAist.” LAist, September 16, 2017. https://laist.com/news/downtown-la-vacancy-rate-highest-in.

    Loughlin, Neil, and Mark Grimsditch. 2021. “How Local Political Economy Dynamics Are Shaping the Belt and Road Initiative.” Third World Quarterly 42 (10): 2334–52.

    “Newly-Discovered EB-5 Scam Highlights Fraud, National Security Weaknesses, Need for Long-Term Reform.” 2017. https://www.grassley.senate.gov/news/news-releases/newly-discovered-eb-5-scam-highlights-fraud-national-security-weaknesses-need.

    “Our Latest Report: Housing Shortage on the Rise in LA – The Angeleno Project.” 2023. https://theangelenoproject.org/the-hard-facts/.

    Saeedy, Alexander, and Rebecca Feng. 2024. “Evergrande Was Once China’s Biggest Property Developer. Now, It Has Been Ordered to Liquidate. – WSJ.” The Wall Street Journal, January 20, 2024. https://www.wsj.com/articles/evergrande-faces-imminent-liquidation-after-talks-with-top-creditors-break-down-4af5f657.

    TRD staff. 2022. “Greenland Sells Metropolis Apartment Tower for $504 Million.” The Real Deal, November 9, 2022. https://therealdeal.com/la/2022/11/09/greenland-sells-metropolis-apartment-tower-for-500m/.

    Witthaus, Jack. 2023. “Downtown in Distress: Los Angeles Signals Why Nation’s Office Space Headaches Could Last for Years.” CoStar, March 19, 2023. https://www.costar.com/article/531623023/downtown-in-distress-los-angeles-signals-why-nations-office-space-headaches-could-last-for-years.

    Wu, Jane, and Julie Steinberg. 2017. “Big Chinese Deals Stall on Capital-Outflows Clampdown.” The Wall Street Journal, January 27, 2017. https://www.wsj.com/articles/big-chinese-deals-stall-on-capital-outflows-clampdown-1485563072?mod=article_inline.

    Zahniser, David, Emily Alpert Reyes, and Joel Rubin. 2019. “FBI Corruption Probe Goes beyond L.A. Councilman Jose Huizar to Include Other City Hall Figures.” Los Angeles Times, January 12, 2019, sec. California. https://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-huizar-warrant-20190112-story.html.

    [1] Al Jazeera (Chan, 2009) and CNN (Chung, 2016) are just two of many examples.

    [2] See Ghost Cities of China website at MIT (http://ghostcities.mit.edu/)

    [3] This was widely covered in the news, but see (“BASE Jumper Leaps from Graffitied Towers in Downtown L.A.” 2024)

    [4] See (“Hearing on ‘Citizenship for Sale: Oversight of the EB-5 Investor Visa Program’ before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary on June 19, 2018 | USCIS” 2018)

    [5] See (“Newly-Discovered EB-5 Scam Highlights Fraud, National Security Weaknesses, Need for Long-Term Reform” 2017)

    [6] See (Witthaus 2023), (Huang 2017) (Lloyd 2017)and (LA CAN) and (SAJE) reports.

    [7] See LA Times article for a link to the federal warrant (Zahniser, Reyes, and Rubin 2019)

    [8] (“Our Latest Report: Housing Shortage on the Rise in LA – The Angeleno Project” 2023)

  • Janet Roitman–Teleological Limits: Value Creation on Financial Platforms

    Janet Roitman–Teleological Limits: Value Creation on Financial Platforms

    This article is part of the b2o: an online journal Special Issue “The Gordian Knot of Finance”.

    Teleological Limits:  Value Creation on Financial Platforms

    Janet Roitman

    There is a widespread but unspoken, bedrock assumption: finance is always already effective. It therefore seems, from the durable perspective of that foundational premise, impossible to untie the Gordian knot of finance.[1] One response to the challenge of the Gordian knot is to forgo attempts to loosen it and instead find the fissures in the rope – the fault-lines of change. The fault-line approach admits to the profound structuring effects of financial practices, financial devices, and financial institutions. But it raises the question of the very notion of “financial power.”

    To address that question of power, we need to consider the following questions: What are the limits of finance? How are specific financial practices expressed in heterogeneous terms? How are they instantiated in diverse ways – and thereby create fault-lines, generating the grounds for what Arjun Appadurai (1986) called paths and diversions?

    The Limits of Finance

    While establishing the limits to finance might be a metaphysical endeavor insofar as it seems to imply that we can define the essence  of finance, some scholars have documented the limits to processes of financialization, or the limits to efforts to extend financial institutions, services, and products both geographically and to new consumer markets (Christophers 2015; Davis and Walsh 2017; Mader 2018, Engelen 2008; Bernards 2019a, 2019b). These limits are both empirical and analytical.

    First, as Brett Christophers has argued, the intensification of financialization in an increasing number of domains (i.e. the financialization of “everyday life”) is not inexorable. Attempts to generate financial assets have resulted in particular responses.  For instance, Christophers (2010 and 2015: 194-5) examines limits to the financialization of land – perhaps the Ur-asset – which is instantiated through recourse to cash economies and other exit options.  And, while land might be the asset of original capitalist sin, we can observe something similar more recently established asset classes, based on data sets, for instance, which one might deem the forefront of capitalist transgression. In those instances, as well, we see the limits: in Sub-Saharan Africa, for example, although the implementation of national digital identities and thereby automated taxation would seem to close the door to exit options, it has incited an overwhelming return to the anonymity of cash (and cryptocurrencies).

    Second, there are analytical limits to finance, which is not a totalizing institution nor expressed in a seamless logic. Similarly, financialization is not a totalizing, seamless practice. This doesn’t mean that it is possible to locate the “outside” of finance; that would assume a bird’s-eye view – a God perspective or absolute truth vision – from which to do that. What we encounter here is precisely the problem of immanence: financial objects and financial practices are constantly produced as constituent elements of socio-technical networks, which we can observe in terms of particular epistemologies, but not know as ontological entities (cf. Latour 2003).

    But, even in spite of the empirical and analytical limits to finance noted above, we nonetheless typically posit finance as a totalizing concept and assume its teleology – that it achieves its endpoint, that it ties and always tightens into a Gordian knot.

    However – and this is where we get to the knot’s internal fissures -, finance signifies heterogeneous terrain.  When we refer to finance, are we referring to investment banks, asset management firms, central banks, pension funds, stock markets, bond markets, capital markets, consumer credit markets, sovereign wealth funds? When we refer to finance, are we referring to the operations of finance, which includes pricing, trading, hedging, intermediation, accounting, computation, modeling, automation, etcetera?  Or are we referring to the practice of finance – also an expansive terrain, since we’d have to account for the myriad instantiations of financial practice in the world today (China, India, Singapore, United Arab Emirates, South Africa).

    Despite this heterogeneity and these open-ended questions, we seem to assume that “finance” is a unified system and that it has a particular unidirectional logic which is always already effective. It seems that – while we evidently took heed of the critique of the teleology of developmentalist thinking – articulated in the 1980s, but harking back to the critique of 1950s modernization theory – we reproduce developmentalist logic with regard to finance and financialization.

    Kinks and Fissures in the Gordian Knot

    To illustrate my point about the limits to finance and the political significance of its expression in specific financial practices expressed in heterogeneous terms, I’ll walk through a scenario. And I’ll do so with reference to a place considered the most subjugated by global finance: Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA).  My illustration refers to infrastructures of emergent financial technology (fintech) platforms across the continent.

    Financial platforms are perhaps best defined as infrastructures for the extension of financial technologies. Fintech platforms are the basis for modes of intermediation in commercial banking and retail payments through non-bank payment rails – that is, through financial entities that don’t have banking licenses.  And they’re increasingly – if not gingerly – becoming a means to manage the historical subjugation of non-convertible currencies.

    How does that work? In SSA, payments and transfers between different African states are international operations involving international currency exchanges. This is because African currencies are non-convertible: they are “soft” currencies, not openly traded on the forex market. Due to the non-convertibility constraint, transfers both into and across Africa are the most expensive in the world, especially when they transmit through legacy systems like commercial banks or Western Union. On average, the cost of an international transfer of $200 is 7.9 %, compared to the world average of 6.9%. And, amazingly, the costliest transfers are between African neighbors. For instance, a $200 remittance transfer from Tanzania to Uganda costs 39.1% (World Bank/KNOMAD 2023: 43). Because most cross-border payments and transfers are international currency operations, settlement involves buying and selling dollars and clearing through non-African banks. In 2017, only about 12% of intra-African payments were cleared within the continent. This obligation to route settlement through overseas banks adds an estimated $5 billion a year to the cost of intra-African currency transactions (Wellisz 2022: 47). When we add to this the fact that African sovereigns are constrained to the Eurobond markets for debt issuance (see Gabor 2021), we can say that this schematic description is evidence of the structural power of global finance.

    The combination of US dollar hegemony and currency hierarchy, along with the abiding centrality of neocolonial banking institutions that service the commodities sectors (oil, mining) but not retail banking, creates a tight Gordian knot that speaks to the problem of financial sovereignty in contemporary currency regimes.  And since it’s extremely unlikely that global banking institutions will adopt the South African rand or the Nigerian naira as a reserve currency, it’s very likely that resistance can only come from within, per Michel Foucault (1978).

    It’s worth digressing to note that while Foucault didn’t focus on cutting the Gordian Knot, he did lament that we “still have not cut off the king’s head,” a reference to our monolithic and monological conception of power. We might wonder whether such a conception of power as sovereignty is perhaps reproduced in our approaches to finance either as an always already effective teleology; or, in the terms that have dominated recent debates in political economy, as an effective infrastructural power.  The latter approach illustrates – convincingly – the effects of infrastructures that participate in processes of politico-economic subordination, such as what I just described with regard to currency subordination in SSA (Braun 2018, Braun and Gabor 2020, Rethel 2010, Hardie 2012, amongst others). This work maintains that infrastructural power translates into the power of financial agents. Though there are real merits to this research, the conclusion is somewhat tautological: by virtue of infrastructural power, agents exercise power. But, more importantly, those living in SSA (consumers, but also financial sector actors) focus on the extent to which there are fault-lines in the operations of infrastructures, which is a worthy view.

    New Modes of Intermediation: Mobile Money and the Float

    One sector which has exhibited the potential to generate fault lines is the non-bank payments and mobile money sector. Mobile money sounds like some kind of monopoly money, but the value of transactions in the global mobile money sector for 2022 totaled a massive 1.26 trillion USD, about half the GDP of France. In SSA, mobile money platforms and non-bank payment service providers are the overwhelming services of choice for payments and money transfer operations. This is true for both international and intra-African transactions.

    Again, the scale of this should not be underestimated: in 2022, the African continent hosted 763 million registered mobile money accounts (of the 1.6 billion global accounts).  There were 218 million monthly active accounts (more than half the global amount); and the continent represented $32 billion of the global $1.26 trillion transaction value (GSMA 2023a). Sub-Saharan Africa is the “global epicentre of mobile money” (GSMA 2023b), which involves peer-to-peer and business-to-business transactions as well as $1.3 billion in international remittances processed per month for that same year.

    Mobile money is a financial service provided by the mobile network operators/mobile money issuers. It’s a money transfer tool. Because mobile network operators don’t have banking licenses and hence can’t take deposits, they create subsidiaries, which are licensed nonbank entities. Through these nonbank subsidiaries, the telecoms establish a trust account with a partner bank, where the fiat money equivalent to the e-value of customer base digital wallets is held.  This is ‘the float,’ which is one of the primary forms of value generated by the mobile money financial platform. It’s a liquidity pool generated by the e-money/fiat money interface. And it’s significant: the mobile money transaction float value in Ghana alone in April 2023 totaled over $1 billion (Bank of Ghana 2024: 13).

    In commercial banking, regulations stipulate that floats be held as liquid assets, or in accounts that are classified as current accounts, typically earning 0% interest. In the fintech sector, this has been a blind spot. In the US and Europe, fintech and big tech firms pay customers zero interest to digital wallets and yet collect interest on the float held by banks (Carstens 2019). In SSA, there has been conflict over the attribution of interest accrued to these funds held in commercial bank custodian accts, which involves debate over the status of digital wallet accounts. Regulations have been implemented that prescribe profit-sharing arrangements, most of which entail returning interest to digital wallet holders.

    This contestation and consequent redistribution indicates how digital platforms represent new modes of intermediation that tighten the Gordian knot of finance through the extension of financial institutions and associated markets and yet generate fault lines, which fray the strands of that knot (for elaboration, cf. Roitman forthcoming). Apart from minor instances of revenue sharing, liquidity pools are also increasingly used for treasury and foreign currency management. And this practice is increasingly seen as a means to circumvent – if not eliminate – the costs of soft-currency subjugation.

    To do this, the liquidity pool generated by the non bank financial service providers (the float) is used to solve nonconvertible currency and liquidity constraints. Increasing numbers of pan-African payments companies enable interoperable cross-border and domestic digital payments. Their services include payments and settlement, as well as foreign exchange and treasury management across multiple countries and currencies. These firms are effective alternatives to the international correspondent banking system, which is costly and is a vestige of colonial banking and currency regimes.

    These platforms are cognizant and often explicit about the political stakes of their services. At a digital finance sector industry conference held in 2022, the CEO of “ABC Finance” [pseudonym] underscored a central problem: no one will hold African currency in the national banking systems across the continent. Because the vast majority of government and corporate bonds are denominated in dollars, African central banks are mandated to support the value of their respective currencies, which means rationing dollars and other hard currencies. ABC’s response is to become the largest non-bank foreign exchange broker in Africa: it buys and sells currencies using its own balance sheet. In other words, it sells balance sheet liquidity and offers wholesale foreign exchange (sometimes using crypto stablecoins). Hence the CEO characterizes ABC’s financial platform as a means to “deconnect Africa from the US dollar.”

    That wild aspiration aside, we have seen a recent, though very modest, decrease in the share of US currency usage in payments clearing, which dropped from 50% in 2013 to 45% in 2017.  During the same time, the use of the British pound decreased from 6.2% to 4.6%. These declines result from the increased usage of regional currencies (e.g. West African franc) and the South African rand (SWIFT 2018). [Note that figures reported by SWIFT don’t account for the use of cryptocurrencies]. We can also note an increase in intra-African trade that relies on regional payment platforms, facilitated by emerging solutions to real-time multi-currency clearing across the continent. A key element in the advancement of this trend is the development of payment systems denominated in local currencies. Thus, for example, existing regional payment systems – such as the East African Payments System (EAPS), the Southern African Development Community’s Real Time Gross Settlement System (SADC-RTGS), and STAR-UEMOA, the Automated Transfer and Settlement System led out by the Central Bank of West African States – are currently formulating plans to operationalize interconnections between their organizations with the aim to establish a pan-African settlement platform.

    Importantly, these aren’t just private market-based ventures. In 2021, the Pan-African Payment & Settlement System (PAPSS) was established with the explicit mission to enhance financial sovereignty. PAPSS is a cross-border, financial market infrastructure that enables real-time gross settlement through participating central banks.  It aims to reduce the need for banks to source hard currencies to support transactions between two African parties. It serves commercial banks, payment service providers, and fintech firms; and it provides an alternative to the high-cost transactions that transpire through correspondent banks located outside of the continent. Also, as an aside, it is devised to generate the conditions for local currency lending instead of dollar financing, or the development of local currency bond markets (see Gabor 2021). Ultimately PAPSS displaces the role of non-African intermediaries, such as the European-based SWIFT system. In that sense, it’s a concrete response to hard currency subjugation and an effort to “free foreign exchange in Africa” (Wellisz 2022).

    ***

    Is the freeing of foreign exchange in African transpiring through processes of financialization?  Yes. But these are equally concrete practices that serve to loosen the Gordian Knot, or to generate fault lines in existing financial infrastructures. In other words, what I’ve described herein could be subsumed into the “logics of finance” arguments – the extension of the tentacles of financial institutions into the Dark Continent. But Africans, like the Chinese or those living on the Indian subcontinent and in the Middle East, have always had finance. In Sub-Saharan Africa, finance existed from the days of the great Ashanti gold empire through to today’s interoperable mobile money platforms. In that sense, finance hasn’t “come to” Africa.  And, like everywhere, those living on the continent are subjected to financial practices and institutions as much as they create kinks in the Gordian knot through appropriation and transgression.

    Janet Roitman is a professor at RMIT University. She is founder/director of the Platform Economies Research Network (PERN) and an Associate Investigator with ARC Centre of Excellence for Automated Decision-making and Society (ADM+S). Her research focuses on digital financial technologies and emergent forms of value. She is the author of Fiscal Disobedience: An Anthropology of Economic Regulation in Central Africa (Princeton University Press) and Anti-Crisis (Duke University Press). She sits on the editorial boards of The Journal of Cultural EconomyFinance & SocietyPlatforms & Society, and Cultural Anthropology. Prior to joining RMIT, Janet was a University Professor at The New School in New York. Her research has received support from the Ford Foundation, The MacArthur Foundation, The US Institute of Peace, Agence française du developpement, The American Council of Learned Societies, The Institute for Public Knowledge, and The National Science Foundation.

    References

    Appadurai, A. 1986. The Social Life of Things. Cambridge University Press.

    Bank of Ghana. 2024. Summary of Economic and Financial Data. May 2024: www.bog.gov.gh

    Bernards, N. 2019a. The Poverty of Fintech? Psychometrics, Credit Infrastructures, and the Limits of Financialization. Review of International Political Economy, 26(5), 815–838.

    _____. 2019b. Tracing Mutations of Neoliberal Development Governance: ‘Fintech’, Failure and the Politics of Marketization. Environment and Planning A: Economy and Space, 51(7), 1442–1459.

    Braun, B. 2018. Central banking and the infrastructural power of finance: The case of ECB Support for repo and securitization markets. Socio-Economic Review 107. 515.

    Braun, B., & Gabor, D. 2020. Central Banking, Shadow Banking, and Infrastructural Power. In P. Mader, D. Mertens, & N. van der Zwan (Eds.), The Routledge International Handbook of Financialization. Routledge, 241-252.

    Carstens, A. 2019. Big Tech in Finance and New Challenges for Public Policy. SUERF Policy Note, 54, 1–12.

    Christophers, B. 2010. On Voodoo Economics: Theorizing Relations of Property, Value and Contemporary Capitalism. Transactions of the British Geographers 35: 94-108.

    _____. 2015. The Limits to Financialization. Dialogues in Human Geography, 5(2), 183–200.

    Davis, A., & Walsh, C. 2017. Distinguishing Financialization from Neoliberalism. Theory, Culture & Society, 34(5–6), 27–51.

    Engelen, E. 2008. The Case for Financialization. Competition & Change, 12(2), 111–119.

    Foucault, M. 1978. The History of Sexuality. Vol. I (trans. R. Hurley). New York: Random House.

    Gabor, D. 2021. The Liquidity and Sustainability Facility for African Sovereign Bonds: Who Benefits? (Eurodad Report):https://www.eurodad.org/the_liquidity_and_sustainability_facility_for_african_sovereign_bonds_who_benefits

    GSMA. 2023a. The State of the Industry Report on Mobile Money 2023. GSM Association.

    GSMA. 2023b. State of the Mobile Money Industry in Sub-Saharan Africa 2023. GSM Association.

    Hardie, I. 2012. Financialization and Government Borrowing Capacity in Emerging Markets. Palgrave Macmillan.

    Latour, B. 2003. The Promises of Constructivism. In, D.Ihde and E. Selinger, eds. Chasing Technoscience.  Indiana University Press: 27-46.

    Mader, P. 2018. Contesting Financial Inclusion: Debate: Contesting Financial Inclusion. Development and Change, 49(2), 461–483.

    Rethel, L. 2010. Financialisation and the Malaysian Political Economy. Globalizations, 7(4), 489–506.

    Roitman, J. forthcoming. Financial Platforms: Beyond the North-South Divide. in Westermeier, C., Campbell-Verduyn, M., Brandl, B. eds. Cambridge Global Companion to Financial Infrastructure. Cambridge University.

    SWIFT. 2018. African Payments: Insights into African Transaction Flows. White Paper.

    Wellisz, C. (2022). Freeing Foreign Exchange in Africa. IMF Finance & Development. https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/fandd/issues/2022/09/Digital-Journeys-Africa-freeing-foreign-exchange-wellisz

    World Bank/KNOMAD. 2023. Migration and Development Brief 39, December.

    [1] This contribution is based on research supported by the US National Science Foundation. It also benefitted from discussions at the “Cutting the Gordian Knot of Finance” Symposium, University of Sydney, 4-5 April 2024.

  • Dick Bryan–Functionalism, Token Economies, and Money Design

    Dick Bryan–Functionalism, Token Economies, and Money Design

    This article is part of the b2o: an online journal Special Issue “The Gordian Knot of Finance”

    Functionalism, Token Economies, and Money Design: Slipping Past the Gordian Knot of Finance

    Dick Bryan

    It’s quite standard for orthodox explanations of money to go immediately to its three core functions: means of exchange, store of value and unit of account. Such a functionalist definition of money does not define what money is; just what its ideal social roles are.

    The emergence of privately issued tokens, sometimes referred to as ‘crypto’, presents a significant challenge to functionalist framings of money. The concern here is not some holistic defense or critique of ‘crypto’, for there are so many tokens (the current estimation is 2.5 million[1]) and each has its own objective, its own protocol, and its own credibility. Some are best understood as creative and reliable record-keeping and trading infrastructure, others are best understood as memes or cultural expressions. Their quality and viability is variable. Instead, my concern is to explore the challenge to mainstream functionalist definitions of money, and ultimately to capitalist formalism, that come with the emergence of privately issued tokens.

    Perhaps they point to the Gordian knot of finance as a specifically capitalist knot, and the solution is to build ways to go around it; not to try and unpick it.

    Functionalism

    The theoretical foundation of a functionalist approach is the proposition that the institutions that make up society, be they education, religion, family of the economy, all perform a purpose that maintains society as a stable system of norms and values. So, when money is defined by its functions, it is by reference to its ability to maintain social stability. For Durkheim, often credited with being the father of functionalism, a shortage of functional norms resulted in the growth of anomie and could over time even lead to the breakdown of social order and stability. We see, then, that a functionalist account of money immediately, embeds a conservative agenda that systematically delimits what gets called ‘money’. When we see the current Gordian knot, the appeal of anomie, at least in relation to money and financial design, starts to grow.

    Before we move to alternatives to functionalism, it is important to see how functionalism systematically shuts down innovations in money and finance. Although the functionalist definition of money makes no explicit reference to the state, it has been clear for the last hundred years or so that money tied to the state – chartalist money relying on the state’s reputation, capacity for enforcement and underwriting capacities – represents the contemporary money standard. Functionalism is therefore tied to the capacities of the state, and alternatives without comparable governmental affiliations, be they crypto-based or other, become defined outside the category of money.

    There are many examples where the state’s role is invoked as the delineator of ‘money’ and ‘non-money’. Are community or local currencies, such as Sardex or the Bristol pound, money? Generally, they are not defined as money; they get called ‘complementary’ currencies in that they are used to substitute for ‘real’ money in particular and limited contexts. They are seen by money conservatives to lack in any of three domains: a) they are only local (national scale is inserted into the functionalist criteria as an implicit condition of being ‘money’); b) many are digital (and so are currently thought of as existing outside of state financial regulation) and c) they are not recognized by the state as ‘legal tender’ (so they cannot be used in monetary relations with the state).

    Does a token have to be stable in order to be money? The conventional answer is emphatically ‘yes’. Indeed, the claim is that state money is not just stable; it defines stability. A prominent argument is that bitcoin can’t be money because it is not a stable store of value; it is often called a ‘volatile speculative asset’.  Leaving aside the fact that for many lengthy parts of the last 15 years – since bitcoin’s initial appearance – bitcoin has been by far a better store of wealth than bank deposits, why does volatility preclude something being a store of value? It may be considered a volatile store of value, but why is there the condition that money must be ‘stable’? If people are actually using the asset to store wealth, its volatility per se cannot be a constraint on its moneyness. Indeed, the question could eventually be posed as to whether bitcoin is volatile with respect to the US dollar, or whether it is the dollar that is volatile with respect to bitcoin?

    There are further twists here, for connection to the state does not in fact always guarantee money’s stability. The Zimbabwean dollar, for example, has had an average annual inflation rate of over 600 percent per year over the past 20 years, reaching a peak rate in the global Financial Crisis in the billions, and at various times in that duration the government has ceased issuing dollars, letting other national currencies be used instead. Yet the Zimbabwean dollar is still called ‘money’, even though it clearly lacks money functionality, because of its connection to the state, though it is certainly not ‘functional’ for Zimbabwean society.[2]

    Money or ‘moneyness’

    Functionalism uses secondary criteria, such as state, scale, and stability, to create a binary differentiation of ‘real’ money from its various digital and local contenders. Yet in the practices of financial markets, the issue is really one of degrees and dimensions of ‘moneyness’, where the condition of moneyness is not legal tender, scale, or stability, but liquidity. Liquidity itself once meant how close to cash an asset is, so economics could define degrees of liquidity that start with cash-as-money (‘cash is king’) followed by a series of asset classes defined on the basis of their distance from cash: money in the bank is a bit less liquid, term deposits even less liquid, etc., on up to treasury bonds. This was the basis of definitions of money supply associated with central banks’ adherence in the 1980s to ‘monetarism’(i.e. measures such as M1 (money in circulation) and M2 (M1 plus savings deposits and mutual funds, etc.) that once dominated debates about monetary policy). The problem that became apparent was that these different measures started moving at different rates, leaving central banks unsure as to which version of ‘money supply’ they should be targeting. Yet this framing of money and liquidity remains dominant.

    The other meaning of liquidity is how readily an asset can be sold at its ‘full’ price (the narrowness of the bid-ask spread); that is, whether instant sale requires a significant price discount or sale at full price takes significant time. This alternative definition is important, for as financial markets and communication technology develop, liquidity can be found outside of conventionally-defined ‘money’. One aspect of this is that cash, once the liquidity benchmark, has itself become less liquid – increasingly vendors refuse to handle cash, and various central banks have raised the possibility of fees for use of cash, to cover the costs of its provision. The other aspect is that certain financial markets, especially financial derivative markets, have such high turnover that their bid-ask spread is negligible: any asset can be converted to any other asset almost instantly and without the need to discount from the current price. Assets in these markets appear to have a degree of moneyness. Crypto markets are also achieving these liquidity conditions, particularly the largest tokens.

    The point here is that derivatives and crypto tokens have moneyness in that they meet certain attributes of money. In the official functional binary, they are deemed ‘non-money’, but they are actually breaking down the coherence of that binary. Derivatives are designed to bridge financial categories, for example, between money and commodities (derivatives are themselves produced in financial houses, as commodities to be sold) and between debt and equity (total return swaps or convertible bonds have attributes of each financial claim). Similarly, crypto tokens are part financial assets, part money, and they can substitute for money in certain settings. The desire by central banks to exclude them from the definition of money has a clear state policy pragmatism: if their issuance cannot be controlled by central banks they are deemed outside the domain of stabilizing monetary policy – it is simpler to define them as ‘not money’. Yet central banks themselves are starting to introduce digital money, recognizing the virtues of blockchain technology to offer fast, verifiable transactions. With shifts in crypto ledger verification systems from proof of work to proof of stake, the energy costs of blockchain transactions are now lower than the costs of conventional financial clearing houses.

    Functionalism may save us from ambiguity about money, giving greater apparent clarity to definition, but it does so by simply taxonomically precluding ‘real’ financial developments that are breaking down that clarity, so forcing that definition of money towards incoherence. This doesn’t, of itself, make privately-issued tokens either usable or coherent, but it must open the space where their potential role is addressed more openly.

    Unit of account

    The unit of account function of money is probably the least discussed, as it seems to be a passive function. Most explanations point to it as the unit in which records (accounts, ledgers) are kept, and immediately slip to the nomination of a national currency as the form of the unit of account (the baht is Thailand’s unit of account; the birr is Ethiopia’s, etc.).

    Several critical issues slide by in this framing. First is the connection of the unit of account to the naming of a national currency. The baht is not a ‘function’ of money, it is a unit of denomination of (a particular) money, and that denomination is an insufficient condition for being a unit of account. What matters, when we think of the production and sale of a cup of coffee for $4, is not that it is denominated in dollars (a somewhat trivial insight), but that it ‘scores’ a 4, while a sandwich may score 3 times higher, and a bottle of water half.  Economic and accounting practices and conventions specify the processes by which these relative scores are attributed, and money simply offers the units in which they are expressed.

    J.M. Keynes, in his 1930 A Treatise on Money, using the term “money of account” rather than “unit of account”, contended that money of account is the “primary concept” of a theory of money.

    Perhaps we may elucidate the distinction between money and money of account by saying that the money of account is the description or title and money is the thing that answers to the description. Now if the same thing always answered to the same description, the distinction would have no practical interest, but if the thing can change, whilst the description remains the same, the distinction can be highly significant. (emphasis in original) (Keynes, 1930: 3)

    Keynes went on to the illustration that debt denominated in gold equal to the weight of the king varies with who is appointed king. But the point applies also to Zimbabwe: money (the thing) is changing in ways unrelated to the description. It is apparent, then, that popular depictions of the unit of account tacitly rely on precisely the functionalist presumption that ‘the same thing always answers to the same description’, such that the money thing and the unit of account can indeed stand in for each other.

    However, if things financial, economic, and social are not stable, then this presumed passive function of money itself becomes volatile. A functionalist approach does not want to engage the possibility of disparity, and it will try to ignore emerging volatility until it expresses itself as a monetary crisis. Such volatility can have various origins. It can stem from a rapid buildup of assets on the books of central banks and raise the question of whether the underwriting of financial market stability is infinitely sustainable. Another challenge could be a looming failure of accounting conventions, for instance the inability to account for the value of intellectual capital, which makes up the predominant value of the world’s big tech companies, and hence the incongruity of  these companies’ share prices remaining so exceptionally high relative to company earnings.[3] Another expression of failure, ‘external’ to current accounting would be the incapacity to deliver modes of measuring and recording that depict the real costs of environmental damage.

    A further assumption in the functionalist depiction of a unit of account is the notion that there should be just one unit: just one way to attribute value, for a value monologic is functional to social stability. Two related issues arise here.

    First, two countries with different currencies may well share a unit of account. Britain and the United States have different currencies, but they adopt basically – though certainly not completely – the same ways of measuring (accounting conventions; state levies and bounties). Indeed, it is only because they have this shared base that shifts in exchange rates can give information about ‘the economy’ rather than just about the money thing itself. Put simply, focusing on different currency denominations as different units of account exaggerates state autonomy and diminishes the underlying level of globality in economic processes.

    Second, we should challenge the functionalist premise that a singular unit of account is itself an expression of social stability and consider whether it is actually a statement of power, asserting the hegemony of one discourse of value over all others. Specifically, the (single) unit of account in capitalist countries reflects capitalist modes of calculation and the rule of the conditions of profit. The coffee scores 4 and the sandwich 12 because these are the profitable number of dollar units at which these goods are supplied to the market. Corporate assets are, by convention, valued according to the expected future capacity to deliver profit (which is why the extraordinary valuations of the tech giants is such a transgression of coherence).

    For most progressive political movements, challenging the unit of account is out of reach, so politics becomes the process of demanding the state modify the power of the rule of profit: to tax polluters and to subsidize the living standards of the poor, etc. One of the potential virtues of ‘crypto’ token systems, as privately issued ‘money’, is that they could trigger challenges to the state’s unit of account: a new ‘money’ could provide the space for new criteria for measuring the values of goods and of assets and liabilities.

    At the base of all tokens are accounting practices: recording transfers on a reliable ledger. So defining a unit of account – or the protocol by which units of account will be socially defined and enacted – is one of their genesis design questions. The problem is, however, that most leading crypto designers are not seeing this potential. Bitcoin embeds no alternative ‘views’ on the unit of account, so it operates just as an aspiring contender with state monies, utilizing their units of account. Stablecoins, managed to maintain parity with the dollar, are heavily invested in treasury bonds as collateral, so they too operate within the units of account of state money.

    Other crypto designers are rather entranced by the deceptive simplicity of Hayek’s libertarian economics, and his advocacy of private money competing with state money for popular use resonates with their deeper politics. But Hayek is by no means challenging the capitalist unit of account: indeed his challenge is to the propensity of states to meddle with the profit-based unit of account by ‘distorting’ market signals. We may consider whether we find here an economic basis for the alliance of libertarianism and authoritarianism that is so visible in political life right now.

    To move away from a capitalist economic framework, we must start by challenging functionalist definitions of money and seek disruptive, but creative, reframings of what money can become. One such project, with which I am involved, uses financial technology and distributed ledgers to create postcapitalist protocol, designing the conditions of an economy with multiple, coexisting units of account and allowing members of a network to express which value criteria they wish to endorse. Perhaps some will support capitalist profit criteria, but others will support investments and outputs with environmental and social criteria embedded in their value propositions and ledger systems. The challenge is how to keep these multiple value systems coexisting and determined in distributed, not centralized, processes, and preclude collapse to a monologic. I invite you to read our recent book Protocols for Postcapitalist Expression (Bryan, Lopez and Virtanen 2023)[4] which seeks to build protocol to meet those challenges.

    Dick Bryan is emeritus Professor in Political Economy at the University of Sydney where he has worked on the digitization of financial assets and its relation to financial risk. He is also Chief Economist at the Economic Space Agency, a digital ledger organization building the protocol for a postcapitalist economic network.

    References

    Bryan, D. Lopez, J. and Virtanen, A. 2023 Protocols for Postcapitalist Expression. London: Minor Compositions.

    Keynes, J.M. 1930 A Treatise on Money. London: Macmillan.

    [1] This compares with 180 national currencies and 334 million joint stock companies (companies listed on stock exchanges. In 2024, 5,300 new tokens are launched each day.  See  https://www.coingecko.com/research/publications/how-many-cryptocurrencies-are-there?utm_source=newsletter&utm_campaign=Data%2BVisualization&utm_medium=email

    [2] A similar, though less extreme case could be made regarding the currencies of ​​Turkey and Argentina

    [3] See, for example, https://www.ft.com/content/308541a8-5f14-42c8-9b7d-e314059dadb4.

    [4] See https://postcapitalist.agency/

  • Amin Samman–Capital of Lies

    Amin Samman–Capital of Lies

    This article is part of the b2o: an online journal Special Issue “The Gordian Knot of Finance”

    Capital of Lies

    Amin Samman

    What metaphors should we use to talk about finance? There are many provocative formulations to choose between. A relentless machine, processing everything in its path; a bulimic stomach, spitting out all that it chews up; a central nervous system, sensing and sending messages for capital; a firm hand that has a chokehold on policymaking; a giant squid sucking on the face of humanity.[1] Each of these opens up a different way of thinking about the power of financial mechanisms. But what happens when thought itself is imagined as integral to financial power? What role do “mechanisms of the mind” play in maintaining the rule of finance? Neither political science nor political economy is well-equipped to answer this question. The philosophical and literary discourse on nihilism gives us a language much richer in possibility. There are lies and there is the lie. The lie keeps us coming back for more, generating yet more lies. It never pays to unmask the lie. Lies are more lucrative. Perhaps this is why public policymakers persist in imagining and administering the world in financial terms.

    ***

    What is “the lie”? The lie is not the same as lying as we normally understand it. Lying is something we do with words. One lies when one intentionally deceives others with words. The lie entails something else—namely, deceiving ourselves about the status of words and of thought. Words are not things; concepts are not reflections of entities or worldly configurations; symbolic systems are not the expression of a cosmic mechanics. All of these things—words, concepts, theories—are ultimately metaphors. This was Nietzsche’s point. “Truth” is an effect achieved through the repetition of metaphors. Nietzsche makes this case in a posthumously published essay called “On Truth and Lie in an Extra-Moral Sense”:

    What, then, is truth? A mobile army of metaphors, metonyms, and anthropomorphisms—in short, a sum of human relations, which have been enhanced, transposed, and embellished poetically and rhetorically, and which after long use seem firm, canonical, and obligatory to a people; truths are illusions about which one has forgotten that this is what they are; metaphors that are worn out and without sensuous power […] (Nietzsche 1976: 46-47)

    There are two important points to draw from this commentary. First, if truth is nothing but worn-out metaphors, then the lie is that these metaphors are something else: classifications, descriptions, windows onto the structure of the world. We tend to forget that metaphors are none of these things. And this is why forgetting is a form of lying. We lie to ourselves when we imagine that there is something rather than nothing at the bottom of our words. This amounts to a psychology of denial, repression, or self-deception. The second point, which Nietzsche immediately goes on to make himself, relates to a group dynamic. To be truthful means to employ the usual metaphors, “to lie according to a fixed convention” (47), to lie with the herd.

    These points correspond to the opposing poles of Western nihilism. On one side, an emptiness at the bottom of words that haunts existence (the problem of religious nihilism), on the other, a social formation that turns this condition into a plastic cage (the nihilistic condition of postmodernity). This duality provides a potentially valuable perspective on financial power. During the heyday of neoliberalism, it was common to hear about the power of financial ideas, ideologies, and imaginaries. This was the case with neo-Gramscian political economy and constructivist political science, for example, which sought to explain our enduring attachment to the neoliberal-financial worldview.[2] But these theoretical projects failed to reach their goal because they did not go far enough. They did not follow their suspicions about discursive framing and sloganeering through to their logical conclusions. And for good reason: any attempt to get to the bottom of words can only end in self-sabotage.

    Theoretical projects sabotage themselves by wearing out their metaphors and hardening into an edifice of interlocking concepts. An economy of ideas, interests, and institutions coagulates around a founding lie, be that rational choice or historical necessity. This is self-deception playing out at the level of theory. But it is also the consequence of a more basic self-deception. We want to lie to ourselves.

    ***

    What makes the lie so appealing, so lucrative? Cioran had an answer. Though influenced by Nietzsche and often compared to him by critics, Cioran was suspicious of even the most sensuous illusions. Hence the exquisitely wrought but dark vision he paints, in The Temptation to Exist, of lies piling up on top of one another.

    everything which keeps us from self-dissolution, every lie which protects us against our unbreatheable certitudes is religious […] We last only as long as our fictions. When we see through them, our capital of lies, our religious holdings collapse. To exist is equivalent to an act of faith, a protest against the truth, an interminable prayer […] (Cioran 1968: 221)

    Cioran’s metaphors mix here to startling effect. The lie appears as a religious craving to cover over the absence of truth, and existence, in turn, assumes the form of a financial challenge: to manage one’s religious holdings, to accumulate a capital of lies, ultimately, to “profit by one’s share of unreality” (210).

    There are two ways of bringing this idea to bear on financial society. The first entails using it to think through the technical operations of finance. Joseph Vogl (2022: 105) has recently done something like this, describing the financial sector as an elaborate arrangement of “profitable truth game[s].” Valuations and therefore fortunes emerge “from opinions mirroring opinions about opinions” (34), giving us a society heavily invested in “value ghosts” and “referential illusions” (103). This point should by now be relatively uncontroversial. The second route, yet to be adequately explored, runs in the opposite direction. It entails thinking about the entire financial system as a gigantic decorative fantasy, a Baroque structure whose primary purpose is to “obscure the truth of the absence of the truth” (Pefanis 1991: 114). It is not the only such structure, but it appears to be among the more captivating, the more transfixing, of our time.

    A concrete example: In March 2024, the Financial Times reported a global stock market rally driven by the boom in Artificial Intelligence (Steer et al. 2024). It is easy to think about this as an outcome of the financial process, the product of its temporal mechanisms and the way these spiral into an ecstasy of speculation (see, for example, Szepanski 2024). But we can also think about it as a “façade to the void” (Cioran 1975: 48). And this façade will not survive too much scrutiny. As it happens, the markets never threaten this kind of scrutiny. They are too busy linking one thing to the next to worry about the absent foundations of finance or value. Meanwhile, the rule makers find themselves in a different situation. They must do exactly the same as market traders, only without appearing to do anything of the sort. Baudrillard wrote about this delicate balancing act in Forget Foucault:

    the secret of the great politicians was to know that power does not exist […] To know that it is only a perspectival space of simulation […] and that if power seduces, it is precisely […] because it is simulacrum and because it undergoes a metamorphosis into signs and is invented on the basis of signs. This secret […] also belongs to the great bankers, who know that money is nothing, that money does not exist […] Power is truly sovereign when it grasps this secret and confronts itself with that very challenge. When it ceases to do so and pretends to find a truth, a substance, or a representation […] then it loses its sovereignty […] it dies also when it fails to recognize … itself as a void […] (Baudrillard 1987: 58-59, emphasis in original)

    The business of finance thrives on runaway lies. The politics of finance consists in a carefully renovated façade that maintains the illusion of truth. These are important points that the critique of finance has yet to fully grasp.[3]

    ***

    Why can’t we just unmask the lie and get on with it? This is key to the hegemony of finance and our seeming inability to break free from its spell. The cultural turn in political economy led to the naïve belief that this was a simple matter of mobilizing competing ideas and countervailing ideologies. If only we could swap out one discourse for another, we could win a whole new world. It was a cul-de-sac and this kind of theory had next to nothing to do with the demise of neoliberalism, which was already on its own reincarnation cycle. Constructivism and neo-Gramscianism may no longer be in vogue, but the underlying impulse has migrated to the fringes of economic theory, where it blends legal scholarship with policy activism. The entire Modern Monetary Theory project should be understood as a political attempt to implement the theory of economic constructivism.

    Perhaps the best example, at least the most revealing, is the Mint the Coin movement. Founded in 2011 against a backdrop of mounting fiscal crisis, it proposes to harness the fictitious character of money by minting a trillion-dollar coin and paying off US government debt in one fell swoop. Scott Ferguson speaks about this kind of measure as rekindling and partaking in the plenitude of the holy fisc. Money is a “boundless center of abstraction” (Ferguson 2018: 167), he says, and if only we were able to embrace this, we could enjoy a world of limitless generosity and care. The problem is we remain wedded to “cruel fiction[s]” (3) like finite money, unsustainable debts, and so on. Ferguson is far too optimistic about our ability to do without fictions.

    Consider the following model, which appears in a 1994 essay by Mark Taylor called “Discrediting God”:

    The currency of psychological investment is the libidinal current whose flow is regulated by the constantly shifting difference between credit and debit. Though seeming to tend toward equilibrium, the psychic economy can only operate if books do not balance. When the positive and the negative or pluses and minuses cancel each other, we reach the null point where eros becomes thanatos and being becomes non-being. (Taylor 1994: 604, emphasis in original)

    He continues:

    While the establishment and maintenance of equilibrium might appear to be the aim of economic systems, the achievement of this purpose would result in the annihilation of the structure. (617)

    Libidinal economists like Deleuze and Guattari would tell you that none of this is metaphorical. That may well have been the key to their success, but only because libidinal economy itself is nothing more than the circulation and exchange of metaphors (Bennett 2016). And in this case, Taylor’s model provides an interesting metaphor for our relationship to metaphysical fictions. Imagine belief in terms of credit and disbelief in terms of debt. One can disbelieve some things and believe others, one can disbelieve everything and believe nothing, one can even believe everything and disbelieve nothing. But the books cannot be allowed to balance. One cannot reach the point where belief and non-belief neutralize each other. One needs to keep moving, keep believing and disbelieving.

    The next question is how to allocate one’s credulity, how to manage one’s portfolio of lies. Going all in on disbelief is to court metaphysical bankruptcy. Not for the faint of heart. The other extreme—total credulity—is the way to delirium. A decadent pursuit that normally requires a considerable outlay of resources. The normal thing to do is to maintain a more balanced portfolio; to use the usual metaphors, to lie and to believe according to fixed convention, to go with the herd.

    Modern Monetary Theory (MMT) now appears in a new light. MMT identifies a number of cruel economic fictions. It then presents the world with a theoretical fiction of its own, albeit one that alleges to do away such things. But the MMT project, at least in its current form, is doomed to fail for two reasons. First, because it underestimates the psychological value of our fictions. We know this because it sets out to rob us of our most important fiction: namely, that we live in a “real” economy composed of something other than illusions. Second, because it overestimates the political value of unmasking our fictions. If the art of power is keeping its emptiness a secret, then MMT commits the mortal sin of exposing the secret. Instead of renovating the façade of power, it draws attention to the void beneath.

    The implications of this stretch beyond the political fate of MMT. Indeed, the case of MMT suggests a much broader lesson about the interplay between heterodoxy and the lie in public policy. Lying against the herd is one thing, but at least one can accumulate a capital of lies amongst a group of new believers. Unmasking the lie in order to harness the fictitious quality of economic order is much more treacherous. If one’s capital of lies were to evaporate, if one’s religious holdings were to collapse, what would happen to one’s constituency of believers? It would disappear. In short, the psycho-political arithmetic of unmasking the lie is all wrong. The only way to make it add up is to tell more lies. This raises some extremely thorny questions about duplicity and politics. Would not the most effective platform for MMT be to lie in order to acquire the status of a truth, instead of try in vain to unmask the lies of public finance? In which case, would it not then have to choose between power and transparency?

    ***

    All this comes back around to the riddle of what sets or keeps the financial world in motion. The only satisfactory way to approach this question is through an unusual metaphor, a metaphor that we still remember to be a metaphor. And this metaphor, which likens lies to capital and existence to a portfolio of lies, opens up a new perspective on the value of orthodoxy. The image of an economic world consisting of all the usual metaphors masquerading as truths offers a considerable degree of consolation, a significant metaphysical return on psychic investment, enabling everyone to get on with the business of managing their capital of lies. It is no wonder, then, that economic policymakers cannot or will not trade in the market worldview for anything else, especially not the idea that we can choose any worldview we want. The psychic payoff attached to the idea of market rule is of greater political value than the one attached to various efforts to harness the fictitious quality of economic order. That is why policy discourse struggles to part ways with economic and financial orthodoxy.

    Amin Samman is Reader in International Political Economy at City, University of London, and author of History in Financial Times (Stanford University Press, 2019). He is Editor-in-Chief of the journal Finance and Society, as well as Director of the Finance and Society Network. He is currently completing a book manuscript with the working title Currency of Nihilism.

    References

    Abdelal, Rawi, Mark Blyth, and Craig Parsons, eds. 2010. Constructing the International Economy. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

    Baudrillard, Jean. 1987. Forget Foucault. Translated by Philip Beitchman, Lee Hildreth, and Mark Polizzotti. New York: Semiotext(e).

    Bennett, David. 2016. Currency of Desire: Libidinal Economy, Psychoanalysis and Sexual Revolution. London: Lawrence & Wishart.

    Best, Jacqueline, and Matthew Paterson, eds. 2010. Cultural Political Economy. London: Routledge.

    Cioran, E. M. 1968. The Temptation to Exist. Translated by Richard Howard. Chicago, IL: Quadrangle Books.

    Cioran, E. M. 1975. A Short History of Decay. Translated by Richard Howard. New York: Viking Press.

    Crockett, Andrew. 2011. “What Financial System for the Twenty-First Century?” In Per Jacobsson Lecture, 3–25. Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund.

    De Boever, Arne. 2018. Finance Fictions: Realism and Psychosis in a Time of Economic Crisis. Bronx, NY: Fordham University Press.

    Deleuze, Gilles, and Félix Guattari. 1983. Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia. Translated by Robert Hurley, Mark Seem, and Helen R. Lane. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

    Ferguson, Scott. 2018. Declarations of Dependence: Money, Aesthetics, and the Politics of Care. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press.

    Konings, Martijn. 2015. “What is Constructivism For?” Progress in Political Economy, February 18. https://www.ppesydney.net/what-is-constructivism-for/.

    Konings, Martijn. 2024. “Symposium: Cutting the Gordian Knot of Finance.” Finance and Society Network. https://financeandsocietynetwork.org/gordian-knot-symposium

    Nietzsche, Friedrich. 1976. “On Truth and Lie in An Extra-Moral Sense.” In The Portable Nietzsche, edited and translated by Walter Kaufmann, 42–47. London: Penguin.

    Pefanis, Julian. 1991. Heterology and the Postmodern: Bataille, Baudrillard, and Lyotard. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.

    Steer, George, Harriet Clarfelt, Kate Duguid, and Stephanie Stacey. 2024. “AI Boom Drives Global Stock Markets To Best First Quarter In 5 Years.” Financial Times, March 29. https://www.ft.com/content/1f471c88-d49f-4a52-8619-cc5c0c506008

    Szepanski, Achim. 2024. Capitalism in the Age of Catastrophe. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

    Taibbi, Matt. 2010. “The Great American Bubble Machine.” Rolling Stone, April 5. https://www.rollingstone.com/politics/politics-news/the-great-american-bubble-machine-195229/.

    Taylor, Mark C. 1994. “Discrediting God.” Journal of the American Academy of Religion 62, no. 2: 603–23.

    Vighi, Fabio. 2016. “Capitalist Bulimia: Lacan on Marx and Crisis.” Crisis and Critique 3, no. 3: 415–32.

    Vogl, Joseph. 2022. Capital and Ressentiment: A Brief Theory of the Present. Translated by Neil Solomon. Cambridge: Polity.

     

    Notes

    [1] These formulations echo Deleuze and Guattari 1983, Vighi 2016, Crockett 2011, Konings 2024, and Taibbi 2010, respectively.

    [2] The interested reader should consult Abdelal et al. 2010 or Best and Paterson 2010 for the particulars. Konings 2015 provides one of the few sane commentaries on this development.

    [3] There are of course notable exceptions. See, for example, De Boever 2018.

  • Stefan Eich–Democracy and the Political Limits of Monetary Politics

    Stefan Eich–Democracy and the Political Limits of Monetary Politics

    This article is part of the b2o: an online journal Special Issue “The Gordian Knot of Finance”

    Democracy and the Political Limits of Monetary Politics

    Stefan Eich

    There are by now two deeply familiar stories about the nature and origin of money. One is the well-worn standard economic story that used to dominate economics textbooks, and still does to a surprising extent. In this Commercial Origin Story, money emerges out of commerce and becomes more efficient over time. Over the past decade this account has, rightly, been heavily criticized, in particular by anthropologists (Graeber 2011).

    In its stead, a different narrative has emerged: the Chartalist Origin Story, which has by now in an important sense become the new orthodoxy. Here money emerges not from commerce but essentially from the force of taxation. It is essentially a token that states create and then force subjects to pay taxes with it. This second story helpfully brings the state into the picture, but to a surprising extent the two accounts nonetheless mirror each other more than they can themselves admit.

    Both tend to be introduced as origin stories. Both are “just so” conjectural histories that make sweeping generalizations. Crucially, both lack an actual political theory of money. Politics and the state are of course marginal at best in the commercial account. But even in the chartalist account, which purports to overcome this impasse, politics appears as an undifferentiated mass of tax power. All too often, the modern state is simply presumed and not itself historicized or theorized. What is missing is an actual account of political struggle and with that a historically attuned theory of the modern state.

    This matters all the more because how we describe the workings of the monetary system, and how we situate it in relation to the modern state has vast ramifications for debates about how to craft better monetary institutions and how to democratize money. Instead of ever more elaborate origin stories we need accounts of the actual political workings of money.

    That includes better accounts of the ways in which money inevitably raises complex questions of power, that render it suspended between trust and violence (Aglietta and Orléan 2002). Translated into political theory, this means that money is an institution of collective belief with rich performative, communicative and temporal dimensions. Money appears in all these aspects as a fragile project of political language and trust, with the coercive powers of the state always on the horizon, creating unique promises and challenges for democratic politics. As such, money is a “constitutional project” (Desan 2017), albeit of a peculiar kind.

    Acknowledging these wider social forces at the same time highlights the temporal nature of money as a form of collective belief—perhaps even faith—about the future. As Keynes (1936: 294) famously put it, money is first and foremost an institutional embodiment of temporality. As the unit of account in which credit claims are articulated and recorded, money embodies and refracts clashing collective beliefs about the future. Money is in this sense not only the battlefield of clashing expectations about the future, but also embodies clashing ideas of the very conception of “the future”.

    This framing allows us to build on the most promising credit theories of money but to also appreciate that credit (or debt) is usually accepted because of a combination of trust and force. All this amply illustrates the ways in which money is not merely a neutral economic technology but always entangled in questions of power and clashing conceptions of the future. It is moreover a site of manifold political struggles in which certain expectations about the future can easily become self-fulfilling.

    In the economic sociology literature this power has recently come to be denoted as an instance of “infrastructural power” (Mann 1984; Braun 2018; Braun and Gabor et al 2020; Wansleben 2023). But there is a crucial ambiguity in how the concept of monetary infrastructural power has been taken up, namely whether we are dealing here with the power of the state or of financial markets—whether infrastructural power is primarily public or private. As Krippner (2024) has recently perceptively remarked, shared invocations of the term easily obscure significant disagreements. Whereas many locate central banks as genuine agents at the heart of this infrastructural power, others (Braun and Gabor, for example, but also Krippner herself) stress instead the dependencies of central banks on financial market imperatives. In short, on their reading it is not the state that wields infrastructural power, but the first movers are instead financial market actors. Gabor (2021) has captured the underlying paradox by describing the ways in which central banks seem today more powerful than ever and are yet at the same time without genuine political agency.

    Governing Hybridity

    While money is thus deeply political, that politics cannot be reduced to a sovereign will or decision. Rather, modern money is a complex hybrid that is both private and public, always economic and political at once. Money and banking are never purely private but they are tethered to the state and its central bank—and banks are fundamentally unlike other companies. But this also means, inversely, that even the state’s capacity to steer money creation is embedded in a capitalist frame of value. Here, Keynes’s understanding of money of account meets Marx’s value theory. To adapt Marx’s quip about historical agency from the Eighteenth Brumaire (Marx 1978: 595): states make money but they do not always do so as they please.

    It is possible to theorize that hybridity in a number of different ways, as perhaps the original act of privatization, as a public-private partnership, as a finance franchise, and so on. But in all these approaches, the underlying relationship of mutual dependence—financial, political, and strategic—needs to stand at the very heart of any account of the contemporary financial and monetary system. States, central banks and societies at large are dependent on the banking system as a payment system, as a tool of credit creation and provision, but also as a transmission channel for monetary policy. Today that interdependence can easily feel like a form of blackmail in which banks are able to leverage their own systemic significance. But it is worth remembering that banks also need the state—and the safe assets created by the state—at least as much as the state needs finance. This relationship of interdependence poses a set of undertheorized political questions, but also points to underexplored openings for strategic action.

    In addition to the hybridity of the system there is another political dimension that can get lost in the infrastructural account. To speak of infrastructural power easily suggests a misleading impression of concrete solidity, an image of monetary systems as highways. But money is more peculiar than a simple road. It is, to use Adam Smith’s image of paper money, a “wagon-way through the air” (Smith 1981: 321). And its levitation is ultimately a product of our beliefs and expectations. Money has a profoundly reflexive dimension that operates at the level of the collective imagination. In the realm of money, beliefs matter irrespectively of whether they are true or false. Any political theory of money has to take into account this reflexive logic. The central political question that emerges thus is: how to govern the hybridity of modern money, with the interdependence between state and finance that it continuously recreates, but also with its peculiarly reflexive character?

    Political Limits of Monetary Politics

    The point of insisting that money is always already political is thus not to suggest that it is perfectly malleable. To be sure, we develop critiques of social constructions to escape the ways in which these constructions hold us captive. That does mean piercing the veil of naturalizations in order to demythologize. But just because something is constructed does not mean it can be reshaped at will. The point therefore cannot simply be to re-assert state control. Instead, we need to recognize that state control is already part of the hybrid system yet in ways that easily frustrate notions of democratic control. In some sense this was Marx’s profound point: even if a state were to take over the monetary system but would leave the underlying structures of production untouched, it would be unable to escape the capitalist value concept. Even its ideal money would become commodified.

    My point is thus not simply to underwrite nominalist claims of monetary malleability but to locate more precisely the scope for and limits to monetary politics. To posit the political construction of an institution does not imply an effortless ability to cash out the democratic promise of said institution. Nowhere is this more evident than in the realm of money, and yet it is precisely this fundamental political problem that has gotten lost in the monetary standoff between the orthodoxy and chartalism. These limits, though very real, are neither external “economic” limits, nor are they static or fixed. Instead, they arise from the fact that the construction process is not transparent to itself. Foregrounding the constructedness of money does not do away with constraints but offers us a different way of understanding the problem by emphasizing that the limits and binds are internal to the politics of money.

    Monetary Democratization

    And yet I remain convinced that this critique leaves considerable space for articulating substantial political demands for the democratization (the gerund matters here) of money even under contemporary conditions. That does not mean that our chains are merely imaginary but rather that democratic politics requires struggling within a system whose horizon of realization we can never reach (Taylor 2019). Here it is easy to fall into two traps that mirror each other.

    The first trap is that of misrepresenting and downplaying the scale and scope of the kinds of political interventions that are available in the realm of monetary power even under capitalism—a mistake that characterizes some parts of the Marxist tradition, though as I have argued elsewhere Marx’s own position is more interesting (Eich 2022: 105-138). The state is not simply restricted to setting the unit of account, but it can and does constantly, if largely invisibly, intervene in the process of credit creation and allocation. There are of course clear limits to a state’s ability to force citizens—let alone foreign investors—to accept its own tokens. But even within the confines of contemporary central banking there are nonetheless discretionary decisions of enormous scope with vast stakes that are all entirely compatible with the existing relations of value. The power of central banks extends to their ability to reject or accept pleas for convertibility of different forms of private monies from the bottom of the money pyramid into fiat monies at the top. Whose credit claims are converted, which assets central banks buy and hold on their balance sheets, and who can count on an emergency liquidity injection are all decisions that fall under the broad heading of monetary politics and the answers to these questions are fundamentally underdetermined by the forces of capital alone.

    But it would inversely also be a mistake to misrepresent and downplay the challenges that nonetheless remain for any state seeking to wield monetary power under capitalism. Modern Monetary Theory (MMT), which has done an enormous service in highlighting the actual workings of the monetary system, can sometimes be guilty of supposing that once the spell has been broken, states will somehow be liberated to wield fiscal power as they please. But not only is the state’s capacity to steer money creation still ensnared in the capitalist value form, there are also various internal political struggles over the public finances that pit defenders of fiscal and monetary orthodoxy against any attempt of reform. The underlying divergences in political and economic interests are real and they run right through any account of monetary power and the politics of credit creation. The real task in the face of these two traps must be to develop a more complex picture of monetary power that is aware of these internal limitations and that nonetheless asks what it would mean to insist on the democratization of these forces.

    We can productively relate this framing back to debates on the constitutional dimension of monetary systems (Desan 2017). Constitutions are institutional expressions of the paradoxical attempt to channel and arrest political change. If they lack workable ways of amendment, constitutions can become suffocatingly conservative as dead hands of the past. And yet constitutions can also be designed in more democratic ways or can change in more democratic directions. So just as constructedness does not equate to malleability, so does constitutionalization not equate to democratization. The question for us is then whether the monetary constitution is so self-referentially shielded against external intervention as to frustrate any attempted amendments? Or are there ways in which one could at least begin to democratize the monetary constitution?

    What would it mean to democratize a monetary system under contemporary capitalism and all the constraints internal to the peculiar kind of money that it produces and demands? How we spell out a vision of democratizing money varies according to how we conceptualize the constraints of the construction process but also what we take democracy to consist of. As an initial starting point, it helps to loosely distinguish between three strands of democratic theorizing: those that place emphasis on representative institutions, those that stress deliberation, and those that focus on contestation. The most persuasive theories of democracy tend to combine all three strands, not least because these seem to be interdependent in important ways. If approached through the first lens of representative (usually legislative) institutions, the politics of central banking largely appears as a problem of democratic delegation and how to make such delegated power more accountable. But greater democratic accountability of central banks would in turn arguably require more robust structures of both deliberation and contestation, namely institutionalized and non-institutionalized channels for demanding justifications and challenging power. Democratic deliberation requires a form of contestation, just as contestation often—though not necessarily—has a deliberative dimension.

    What ties these three aspects of representation, deliberation, and contestation together for me is, however, not a fixed ideal of institutionalized rule but instead an acceptance and indeed embrace of indeterminacy and uncertainty as the true features of democratic life. As Claude Lefort (1988) insisted, democracy is necessarily open-ended and unfinished. The objective of my argument about democratizing money is thus emphatically not to offer an institutional blueprint but instead to make, in a Lefortian spirit, a meta-democratic point, one that is less interested in issuing policy recommendations or institutional fixes and rather insists that grappling with questions of monetary power requires bringing monetary politics back into public debate and opening it up to the indeterminacy of open-ended, democratic contestation and critique. At that point we would be touching on the element of greatest discomfort and anti-democratic suspicion among central bankers who are raised on the idea that uncertainty is poison for financial markets. The question of uncertainty might then be the most concentrated moment of real tension between financial capitalism and democratic politics.

    We can no longer sidestep this question. Ever new kinds of uncertainty, from climate to geopolitical risks, intrude into monetary policymaking. Both feed the “uncomfortable knowledge” (Best 2022) of central bankers concerning the depth of their own ignorance which they can neither ignore nor ever fully acknowledge. Moreover, excluding questions of monetary governance and credit creation from democratic life and democratic debate will have pernicious consequences not just for monetary policy and our monetary systems but also threaten the health of democracy itself.  Bracketing questions of monetary design from democratic decision making  and leaving crucial policy decisions—who gets to create money, where credit flows, and who gets bailed out—in the hands of unaccountable private actors or unelected technocrats will inevitably hollow out the democratic self-understanding that we are ultimately engaged in an experiment of self-rule. Democracies would thus do well to develop better avenues for articulating the underlying political questions and the inevitable encounter with uncertainty they entail.

    Conclusion

    Capital rules supreme, and yet—as Walter Bagehot (1873: 20) already put it—“[m]oney will not manage itself.” All monetary systems need governance. That inevitably raises political questions of who gets to decide who governs and based on what values. The hybridity of the system constrains the political responses that are possible, but it nonetheless also affords political openings. Money is always already political, even where it appears in the guise of a privatized anti-politics; but at the same time, to say that something is political cannot be reduced to the possibility of shaping things at will. This allows us to move beyond the misleading choice between the “depoliticization” versus the “re-politicization” of money and central banking. Monetary depoliticization is itself necessarily a mirage that obscures the ways in which what might appear as depoliticization is much better understood as itself a political project of de-democratization. This does not necessarily disqualify calls for the “depoliticization” of money, but the underlying values and goals have to be articulated and defended in the language of democratic politics. Inversely, calls to “politicize” money are empty—even potentially reckless, given the current popularity of this idea on the extreme right—if they fail to articulate what kind of politics is meant to be injected. Is the objective to bundle money power in one hand or instead to open it up to democratic decision-making?

    Just as we need to escape the misleading binary between the politicization and depoliticization of money, so we must transcend artificially narrow debates that reduce questions of democratizing monetary power to the nominal status of central banks. Central banks can only ever be as democratic as the monetary system through which they govern and on which they depend. Overcoming our current impasse thus requires that we ask a more fundamental question than simply whether we are for or against central bank independence. We ought to ask instead: independence from what? While “independent” central banks are shielded against democratic politics, they are entirely dependent on commercial banks for credit creation and for the transmission of interest rates. Any such central bank, even if it were to be directly elected or guided by a democratic deliberative body, will necessarily find itself in a reactive position of subservience. A genuinely independent central bank is entirely compatible with greater democratic accountability precisely by shielding it both against the executive and by making it more independent from financial markets.

    The central task must thus be to create the democratic spaces in which open debate about these questions can actually take place. That means on one level to better understand the hybrid interdependence of finance and the state in the realm of capitalist money, including any strategic openings afforded by that interdependence. But it also means to look beyond the current, deeply flawed system in order to develop alternative demands for what a more egalitarian financial and monetary system could look like that actually serves as a peculiarly reflexive piece of public infrastructure.

    Stefan Eich is Assistant Professor of Government at Georgetown University. He is the author of The Currency of Politics: The Political Theory of Money from Aristotle to Keynes (Princeton University Press, 2022), which was awarded the 2023 APSA Foundations of Political Theory Best First Book Prize.

    References

    Aglietta, Michel and Orléan, André. 2002. La monnaie entre violence et confiance. Paris: Odile Jacob.

    Bagehot, Walter. 1873. Lombard Street: A Description of the Money Market. London: Henry S. King.

    Braun, Benjamin. 2018. “Central banking and the infrastructural power of finance.” Socio-Economic Review, 18, no. 2: 395–418.

    Braun, Benjamin and Gabor, Daniela. 2020. “Central banking, shadow banking, and infrastructural power.” In: Mader, P., Mertens, D., and van der Zwan, N. (eds.), The Routledge International Handbook of Financialization. London: Routledge: 241–52.

    Desan, Christine. 2017. “The Constitutional Approach to Money,” in Nina Bandelj, Frederick F. Wherry, and Viviana A. Zelizer, eds., Money Talks: Explaining How Money Really Works. Princeton: Princeton University Press: 109–30.

    Eich, Stefan. 2022. The Currency of Politics. The Political Theory of Money from Aristotle to Keynes. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

    Gabor, Daniela. 2021. Revolution without Revolutionaries. Berlin: Finanzwende and Heinrich-Böll Foundation.

    Graeber, David. 2011. Debt. The First 5,000 Years. New York: Melville House.

    Keynes, John Maynard. 1936. The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money. London: Macmillan.

    Krippner, Greta. 2024. “Leviathan financialized?,” Finance & Society 10, Issue 1: 59–64.

    Lefort, Claude. 1988. Democracy and Political Theory. Translated by David Macey. Cambridge: Polity.

    Mann, Michael. 1984. “The autonomous power of the state: Its origins, mechanisms, and results” European Journal of Sociology, 25, no. 2: 185–213.

    Marx, Karl. 1978. “The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte [1852].” Robert C. Tucker (ed.), The Marx-Engels Reader. New York: W.W. Norton: 594-617.

    Smith, Adam. 1981. An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations [1776]. Indianapolis: Liberty Classics.

    Taylor, Astra. 2019. Democracy May Not Exist But We’ll Miss it When It’s Gone. London and New York: Verso.

    Wansleben, Leon. 2023. The Rise of Central Banks: State Power in Financial Capitalism. Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press.

  • Martijn Konings–The Modern Money Tangle: An Introduction

    Martijn Konings–The Modern Money Tangle: An Introduction

    This article is part of the b2o: an online journal Special Issue “The Gordian Knot of Finance”

    The Modern Money Tangle: An Introduction

    Martijn Konings

    It is increasingly evident that the existing economic policy paradigm is a recipe for ongoing economic stagnation, political polarization, and ecological degradation. But this growing awareness often seems peculiarly inconsequential, incapable of driving even minor shifts in the most conspicuously harmful policy settings, including governments’ enormous subsidies for fossil fuel extraction and the near-perfect exemption of extreme private wealth from taxation. Even as electoral systems have become almost as volatile as the stock market, it seems that, when it comes to economic policy, the political center holds, inexplicably.

    We tend to call that paradigm “neoliberalism”. The epithet was first used by academics. But, as during the decade following the Global Financial Crisis wider communities of observers found themselves increasingly puzzled by the immunity of economic policy to feedback from social and ecological systems, the label became used more widely (Slobodian 2018, Monbiot and Hutchinson 2024). The problem, by this account, consists in politicians’ and policymakers’ unexamined belief in an expanded role for market mechanisms as the obvious solution to any and all social problems. Moreover, that erroneous belief is self-reinforcing, as the persistence or worsening of social problems is only ever taken to mean that not enough market efficiency has yet been applied.

    In the social sciences themselves, neoliberalism has become a contested concept. A general definition – neoliberalism as the reformulation of a classic liberalism in response to the rise and crisis of Keynesianism – is unlikely to encounter many objections. But the critical force of the neoliberalism concept is premised on a more specific claim – namely, the ability to capture the diminishing role of the state and the expansion of the market. It is not at all clear, however, that such a shift in society’s center of gravity, from public to private, has taken place. The very period during which the concept of neoliberalism established itself as a common descriptor was also the era of “quantitative easing” (asset purchases by the central bank) and “macroprudential regulation” (concerning itself not just with the health of individual firms but with macro-level stability) during which Western governments took on an unprecedented level of responsibility for maintaining the balance sheets of large financial institutions (Tooze 2018, Petrou 2021). Entirely contrary to what the neoliberal schema would suggest, the functioning of government institutions has become deeply entangled with the expanded reproduction of private wealth (Konings 2025).

    Supported by the significant historical and conceptual nuance that recent scholarship has provided, some have argued that the neoliberalism concept can accommodate such developments. But such qualifications undercut the critical thrust of neoliberalism as an off-the-shelf diagnosis of our current predicament. Others have gone further in questioning the suitability of traditional categories of state and market for capturing structures of power and exploitation that appear simultaneously archaic and futuristic. Neoliberalism, from such a perspective, may simply have buckled under the weight of its own contradictions, and we are now seeing a transition to a very different kind of society – neo-feudalism or technofeudalism (Dean 2020, Varoufakis 2024). Such takes align with the self-image of many Silicon Valley billionaires, who often see themselves less as capitalist entrepreneurs than as the founders of new dynastic bloodlines. But treating such heroic or nihilistic self-stylings as reliable guides to current transformations rather than publicly lived mental health struggles may well be a symptom of what Stathis Gourgouris (2019: 144) understands as social theory’s own “monarchical desire”.

    A more helpful angle has been advanced by Modern Monetary Theory (MMT), a perspective that understands economic value as a public construct and found considerable traction by pointing out that such public capacities for value creation had been appropriated by the property-owning class (Wray 2015, Kelton 2020). Taking a leaf from the Marxist book of dialectical historical change, MMT authors propose liberating the machinery of public value creation from the pernicious regime of property relations that it has been made to serve and instead to press it into serving “the birth of the people’s economy”, in the words of Stephanie Kelton (2020). If governments can afford to bail out banks, they can fund programs with actual social value.

    MMT precursor Abba Lerner (1943, 1947) viewed his perspective on money as a public token as nothing more than a rigorous statement of the assumptions underpinning Keynes’ General Theory. Keynes himself had tried to make his work acceptable to establishment opinion by concentrating primarily on the role of fiscal policy, leaving the overarching financial structure of the capitalist economy go unquestioned. Even during the heyday of Keynesian hegemony, attempts to wield the public purse were always constrained by the fact that control over monetary policy settings was firmly in the hands of central banks (Major 2014, Feinig 2022). That was a key institutional precondition for the rise of neoliberal inflation targeting. But the absurdity of putting monetary decision-making beyond democratic control became fully evident following the Global Financial Crisis, when central banks made permanent an extensive range of subsidies and guarantees for the holders of financial assets, while governments tightened the public purse strings by cutting social programs.

    In this context, arguments that had long been dismissed as crank theory were able to bypass the censure of mainstream economics and find purchase in the public sphere. The vicious response of mainstream economics to the popularity of MMT has done more to underscore than to refute the salience of its provocation – that there exist no actual economic reasons why we can’t repurpose the institutions of the bailout state, away from the gratuitous subsidization of private wealth accumulation and towards shared prosperity.

    Finance, MMT understands, holds no secret: it’s just a ledger of society’s transactions and commitments. And if these records are in principle as transparent as any other system of accounts, then what is there to prevent the public and its representatives from taking charge and correcting the perverse misallocations embedded in the current system? According to MMT, the main obstacle here is the flawed, arch-neoliberal idea that governments, like private households, need to “balance the books”. Politicians who operate under the pernicious influence of neoliberal ideology do not recognize that governments are sovereign institutions issuing their own currency and are not subject to the same discipline as households. Adding insult to injury, the principle of public austerity is always readily suspended when banks need bailouts – and invariably reinstated again once the danger of system-level meltdown has passed.

    MMT has adopted a very literal reading of neoliberalism, imagining that the force of its ideological obfuscations is the main obstacle to repurposing the mechanisms of quantitative easing for the advancement of the people. In reality, the problem runs deeper. The public underwriting of private balance sheets has a long history. From the mid-twentieth century it served as a key instrument for governments to manage the contradictions of welfare capitalism. During the 1970s, neoliberal ideas of fiscal and monetary austerity became influential not because of their ideological strength, but because they provided a way to manage the inflationary pressure produced by risk socialization. That permitted the routinization of bailout and backstop policies, which culminated in the intravenous liquidity drip-feed that large banks enjoy at present.

    That arrangement also has deeper social and political roots than it is typically credited with. Government subsidization of asset values is a major factor responsible for the rise of the “1%”, but it has also underpinned a broader reconstruction of middle-class politics, away from wage expectations to capital gains (Adkins, Cooper and Konings 2020). The nineties represented the high point of this asset-focused middle-class politics, when rising home and stock prices delivered benefits widely enough to give credence to the promise of inclusive wealth.

    The trickle-down effect has now come to a halt, but that fact does not by itself undo the ideological or institutional structure of the backstop state. The allocation of public resources has become intertwined with the private wealth accumulation in an endless number of ways that are not easily unwound. The idea that governments can do things themselves, without having to put in place complex financing constructions to mobilize private capital and incentivize the doing of said thing by others, has become so incomprehensible in the bourgeois public sphere that there simply no longer exists a straightforward channel for translating social priorities into public spending priorities. What binds the machinery of policymaking to the power of finance is not a set of discrete ties but rather something akin to a Gordian knot.

    How to undo, loosen, transform, or bypass that knot? The recent past offers some clues. Since the Covid crisis, modern money has powerfully expressed both its public and its private character. When emergency struck, governments were instantly capable of doing all the things that politicians and experts routinely advise are just not possible. By expanding the safety net beyond the financial too-big-to-fail establishment, they orchestrated a “quantitative easing for the people”, in the words of Frances Coppola (2019). The world’s most powerful central banker, Federal Reserve chairman Jerome Powell, conceded that there were no real technical limits to the possibility of getting money in the hands of people who needed it (Pelley 2020). Almost overnight, MMT went from indie darling to mainstream pop star. “Is this what winning looks like?”, the New York Times wondered (Smialek 2022). Many declared the end of the neoliberal model.

    But before too long, inflation surged, and discourses insisting on strict limits to the use of public money and credit returned to prominence. The discipline thus meted out has been extremely uneven. Central banks across the world have increased interest rates to slow down growth and employment, but for bankers and asset owners the edifice of quantitative easing and liquidity support remains firmly locked in place. Treasuries have similarly tightened the purse strings, swiftly undoing the broadened financial safety nets and undertaking deep cuts in social programs and public education even as they continue to increase spending on the military and corporate tax breaks.

    MMTers and other progressives have not failed to call out the hypocrisy, and neoliberal nostrums about the importance of balanced budgets no longer enjoy the same intellectual authority that they once did. But it often seems as if that hardly matters – that the sheer exhaustion of neoliberalism as an intellectual paradigm merely serves to make a mockery of the idea that policy could change in a material way. We can all see that the emperor is not wearing anything, and yet we’re in the midst of a powerful restoration of economic orthodoxy, relentlessly socializing the risk of the largest players while inflicting tight monetary and fiscal policy settings on the rest of the population.

    MMTers have allied with other heterodox economists to rebut mainstream arguments for deflationary policy (Weber and Wasner 2023). Inflationary pressures, they argue, had their origins in specific events such as supply-chain disruptions, and should be addressed by targeting those sources – not by carpet-bombing the economic system at large. Such arguments invoke a long history of Keynesian supply-side thinking that aims to undercut inflationary pressures in ways that do not require the central bank or the treasury to deploy their crude instruments of general deflation. The last time such a progressive supply-side agenda had made waves was during the nineties, when Democrats positioned such ideas as an alternative to Reagan’s right-wing supply-side agenda. Then, they became allied to spurious claims about a new economy and ended up providing ideological cover for Clinton’s embrace of fiscal austerity. This time, such ideas synced with the Biden’s administration’s interest in a more active industrial policy meant to counter the economic stagnation that had become evident during the previous decade and to tighten the strategic connections between key economic sectors and America’s geopolitical interests.

    While the recentering of the national interest has allowed Keynesian ideas to enjoy greater influence, it has also reinforced the blind spot that has historically plagued that paradigm and that MMT had sought to correct. Even as fiscal and regulatory policy have become fully yoked to the needs of financial assets holders for minimum returns – a dependence that Daniela Gabor (2021) has referred to as the Wall Street consensus, dominated by an asset manager complex that demands comprehensive derisking for any and all projects it invests in, what fell by the wayside with the rise of Bidenomics is a critical focus on the economy’s financial infrastructure as an object of democratic decision-making.

    Indeed, the Biden administration has been eager to disavow any interest in in challenging the autonomy of the Federal Reserve – one of its preferred ways to signal that there are “adults in the room” who take advice from experts. In this way, it has left the field open to the far right, which intuits much more readily that the advocates of independent central banking are false prophets, and it has made greater political control over monetary policy one of the key points of its blueprints for a more fascist future such as Project 2025. A progressive agenda that fails to engage that terrain, on which are situated the monetary drivers of the escalating concentration of asset wealth, will be unable find much sustained traction.

    MMT has shown us where we need to look – where to direct our attention and bring the struggle. But its wish to beat mainstream economics at its own scientistic game, by advancing objectively better policies rooted in superior expertise, prevents it from recognizing what an effective political engagement might involve. The contributions to this forum resist the temptation to imagine alternatives as if any are readily available. Instead, they examine modern money as a complex tangle, composed of an endless range of dynamically evolving strategies and alliances that straddle any divide between public and private. The financial knot is tighter in some places than in others, but neither orthodox economics nor MMT gets the pattern into sufficiently sharp focus to see the openings and fissures.

    In that sense, we should perhaps consider ourselves as occupying the mental space that Keynes did after he completed A Treatise on Money (Keynes 1930), which catalogued the extraordinary expansion of liquid financial instruments during the early twentieth century but had left him uncertain about the meaning of all this. When several years later he wrote the General Theory, his mind was on the day’s most pressing questions, above all the dramatic collapse in output and employment that had occurred during the previous years. While he recognized that such volatility could only occur in a monetary economy, he nonetheless considered it justifiable to let finance drop “into the background” (Keynes 1936: vii). Lerner viewed that as an infelicitous move, sensing correctly that it kept open the door to the restoration of an economic orthodoxy eager to sacrifice human livelihoods at the abstract altar of financial property. The contributions presented here (presented first at a symposium on the Gordian knot of finance held at the University of Sydney, generously sponsored by the Hewlett Foundation), take a step back and linger with the more open-ended curiosity that drove Keynes’ earlier engagement with the institutional logic of financial claims. How has the knot of modern money been tied?

    Stefan Eich’s contribution examines money’s constitutive duality, the fact that it is public and private at the same time. He draws attention to the structural similarity of perspectives that think of the financial system as either primarily public or primarily private, and, engaging with MMT as well as other strands of “chartalist” theory, he argues that money is best seen as a constitutional project. The fact that money is at its core both public and private means that political openings always exist, even if those are never opportunities to reconstruct the financial structure from scratch.

    Amin Samman asks what it is about the financial system that makes it so resistant to rational public policy intervention. To this end, he draws attention to the role of fictions in the functioning of finance – when speculative projections fail, the response is not sober reflection but a feverish acceleration of their production, eventuating in the installation of the lie as the modus operandi of capital. More earnest, truth-observant policymakers occupy a structurally impossible position, on the one hand interfacing with the delirious virtuality of capitalist finance and on the other attempting to be responsive to rational criticisms.

    Dick Bryan argues that a preoccupation with how to undo or cut the Gordian knot may be misplaced. For each bit of loosening we achieve, capital has tricks up its sleeve to tighten its grip. Instead of focusing too much on the knot itself, we might think of ways to slip past it by designing financial connections that may not instantly become entangled in existing networks and their power concentrations. Challenging any clear-cut distinction between money and asset, he argues that crypto currencies could be designed to play that role.

    Janet Roitman takes a different look at the image of the Gordian knot as a global imperial structure, and she asks whether it in fact attributes too much efficacy to the power of finance. While acknowledging the strength of the international currency hierarchy, she shows that dynamics challenging the dollar system arise from within the dynamic of capitalism itself. New financial technologies are instruments of economic competition, and in that capacity, they offer new opportunities for exploitation but inevitably also for the loosening of constraints, however limited or compromised such emancipation may be.

    While Roitman turns our attention to the fissures in the global financial knot, Michelle Chihara concludes the forum by pointing out a major kink in the heartland of modern money. She argues that, for all our fascination with the ghost towns that the bursting of the Chinese real estate bubble produced, vacant property is a key aspect of the functioning of contemporary global capitalism. The jarring combination of vacant apartments serving as subsidized storage for transnational wealth on the one hand and a rapidly growing population of homeless and underhoused on the other, is giving rise to new forms of protest, reminding us that the grip of money is rooted in the compliances of everyday life.

    Taken together, the contributions collected here shed light on different aspects of the tangle of promises, claims and commitments that constitute modern money. Such a perspective militates against the promise of a neatly executed, wholesale policy shift to reorient the economic system, but that does not entail a hard Hayekian anti-constructivism as the only alternative. MMT might be likened to a subject of psychoanalysis that, upon realizing that the world holds no deep secret, declares itself cured – but, when venturing back out, finds that its relationship to that world has undergone little practical change. It still has to do the work of deconstructing, transforming, or otherwise navigating the actual web of fictions, promises, lies, and obfuscations that it has built. In few areas of life is such thoughtful deconstruction more imperative than in our relationship to modern money, which is structured by so many layers of miseducation and misapprehension that transforming its practical operation is necessarily as much about revising our understanding as it is about getting our hands on the institutional machinery of its creation.

    Martijn Konings is Professor of Political Economy and Social Theory at the University of Sydney. He is the author of The Emotional Logic of Capitalism (Stanford University Press, 2015), Neoliberalism (with Damien Cahill, Polity, 2017) Capital and Time (Stanford University Press, 2018), The Asset Economy (with Lisa Adkins and Melinda Cooper, Polity, 2020), and The Bailout State: Why Governments Rescue Banks, Not People (Polity, 2025).

    References

    Adkins, Lisa, Melinda Cooper and Martijn Konings. 2020. The Asset Economy, Polity.

    Brown, Wendy. 2015. Undoing the Demos: Neoliberalism’s Stealth Revolution, Zone.

    Coppola, Frances. 2019. The Case For People’s Quantitative Easing, Polity.

    Dean, Jodi. 2020. “Neofeudalism: The End of Capitalism?”, Los Angeles Review of Books, May 12.

    Feinig Jakob. 2022. Moral Economies of Money: Politics and the Monetary Constitution of Society, Stanford University Press.

    Gabor, Daniela. 2021. “The Wall Street Consensus”, Development and Change, 52(3).

    Gourgouris, Stathis. 2018. The Perils of the One, Columbia University Press.

    Kelton, Stephanie. 2020 The Deficit Myth: Modern Monetary Theory and the Birth of the People’s Economy, PublicAffairs, 2020.

    Konings, Martijn. 2025. The Bailout State: Why Governments Rescue Banks, Not People, Polity.

    Lerner, Abba P. 1943. “Functional Finance and the Federal Debt”, Social Research, 10(1).

    Lerner, Abba P. 1947. “Money as a Creature of the State”, American Economic Review, 37(2).

    Keynes, John Maynard. 1930. A Treatise on Money, Cambridge University Press.

    Keynes, John Maynard. 1936. The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money, Harcourt, Brace and Company.

    Major, Aaron. 2014. Architects of Austerity: International Finance and the Politics of Growth, Stanford University Press.

    Monbiot, George and Peter Hutchison. 2024. Invisible Doctrine: The Secret History of Neoliberalism, Crown.

    Pelley, Scott. 2018. “Federal Reserve Chairman Jerome Powell on the coronavirus-ravaged economy”, CBS News, May 18.

    Petrou, Karen. 2021. Engine of Inequality: The Fed and the Future of Wealth in America, Wiley.

    Slobodian, Quinn. 2018. Globalists: The End of Empire and the Birth of Neoliberalism, Harvard University Press.

    Smialek, Jeanna. 2022. “Is This What Winning Looks Like?”, New York Times, February 7.

    Tooze, Adam. 2018. Crashed: How a Decade of Financial Crises Changed the World, Viking.

    Varoufakis, Yanis. 2024. Technofeudalism: What Killed Capitalism, Melville House, 2024.

    Weber, Isabella M. and Evan Wasner. 2023. “Sellers’ Inflation, Profits and Conflict: Why Can Large Firms Hike Prices in an Emergency?”, Review of Keynesian Economics, 11(2), 2023.

    Wray, L. Randall. 2015. Modern Money Theory: A Primer on Macroeconomics for Sovereign Monetary Systems, Palgrave Macmillan.

  • Karen Pinkus–Selected Cantos of the Inferno

    Karen Pinkus–Selected Cantos of the Inferno

    Selected Cantos of the Inferno

    Karen Pinkus

     

    A good bit more than halfway through my life I stood

    On a precipice looking down with dread

    When came my guide, with wiry hair, the very sage Ms. Atwood.

     

    “I’ll take you ‘round to see how certain souls are fairing

    In hopes to cheer you up a bit,” she offered.

    This, plus Xanax and some wine will make a pleasant pairing.

     

    ******

     

    We came upon a meadow that seemed verdant from afar.

    On close inspection, drought-fueled wildfires simmered

    And yet, small dogs were frolicking among the ashy chars.

     

    “Behold the plain of virtuous re-pugs,” Margaret indicated.

    “Being of that sort, they will forever chase their croppéd tails

    But will not suffer the tortures of others much worse fated.”

     

    “And who’s that silver-coated fox who yaps intrepidly?” I wonder.

    “That’s Liz Cheney. She sniffs and seeks her dad but finds him not

    For he resides where it is much, much more hot.”

     

    *****

     

    Next, we sailed upon a sea of men forever treading water.

    Bezos and Sir Keir I recognized among the many bobbing heads.

    “They did what they had to,” said my guide, “to find themselves safe harbor.”

     

    They can’t be blamed, I thought. And yet they might have spoken up

    instead of normalizing the approaching storm

    or diplomatic niceties continuing to perform.

     

    On the shore were others who, fearing they’d be uninvited to the party

    made pilgrimage to Sea-on-Lake and now are forced to dance without a spine–

    a monstruous ballet by some demonic Balanchine.

     

    Then we descended to a circle filled with men and women doomed

    to gaseous blustery emissions from both ends

    Hypocrites–the pose of twisted pretzels they assumed.

     

    My guide suggested I might speak to anyone I’d pick.

    A toothy smile popped right up: “Hiya! I’m Haley, Nick.

    Please. Bend me as you wish,” came from one or the other orifice.

     

    “And what’s that head contorted tight within a closet?”

    “That’s Lady Lindsay G, who has a place reserved forever more.

    Secret lover of boyish pages, he railed at ‘light shoes’ on the senate floor.”

     

    *****

     

    Descending, we approached one strung by hand and feet

    To what might seem a cross but was in fact an X

    Then suddenly came a driverless car bearing a T, to break his neck.

     

    “Decipher, please, these cabalistic forms,” I begged my guide.

    “That’s Mr. Musk,” she said. “And having squandered billions for his pride

    he’ll spend the rest of days in agony with bloody gashes on his side.”

     

    And all around a hideous cabinet of curiosities:

    There’s Marco, Oz and Putin’s Tulsi

    All sentenced to unending bending of the knees.

     

    And then—behold!—a bloated baby with red MAGA hat

    and skin so thin it appeared like saran wrap.

    His crimes so many, he’s bound forever to his sweaty avocat.

     

    The molten heat caused dye to fall into eyes of Rudy G.

    He’d stay forever blinded as he clung on in desperation

    covering his orange life raft with his vile perspiration.

     

    I naturally I supposed we’d reached rock bottom, and yet

    My guide elucidated: “These two are not as far down as you’d expect,

    Given their rather low intellect.”

     

    “The hottest places are still to come,” she pointed.

    “Reserved for those entrusted with the public good

    Who acted as they pleased, as tyrants self-anointed.”

     

    Swimming in a sea of shit, parasites came up for breaths of air.

    First gestated in the skull of one called RFK

    They seemed to grow more numerous each minute of each day.

     

    “That slimy worm who dons a robe is Justice Thomas,” my guide spoke.

    “a sycophant in life, in death reduced perpetually

    to choke on a can of pubic hair-infested Coke.”

     

    “And those mucked up white-shoed feet, to whom do they belong?”

    “Another justice, Sam Alito, destined to hang upside down

    Like the flag he claimed his wife had flown.”

     

    And farther still two Steves were heard in pain to howl:

    One, a Miller grew a new foreskin every day

    Only to have a fiendish mohel cut it repeatedly away.

     

    The other, Bannon, writhed and bellowed,

    As he conjured up conspiracies and lies

    consuming his own flesh along with larval flies.

     

    *****

     

    After this, I need a real vacation and may seek refuge in another nation.

    “Might I inquire, my kind guide, about residency in your Canadia?”

    “It’s no Paradiso,” said she. “At best a purgatory ‘til the end of this administration.”

     

    Karen Pinkus is a writer and professor emerita of Italian and Comparative Literature. She lives in New York City.

  • William Clare Roberts—Three Varieties of Misunderstanding

    William Clare Roberts—Three Varieties of Misunderstanding

    This essay is published in response to Jensen Suther’s “Marxism as Idealism? Response to Roberts’s ‘Ideology and Self-Emancipation’.”

    Three Varieties of Misunderstanding

    William Clare Roberts

    Every author struggles against three varieties of misunderstanding. There are some misunderstandings for which authors themselves are culpable from lack of due care in writing. There are other misunderstandings for which readers are culpable from lack of due care in reading. Finally, though, there are misunderstandings for which no one is culpable, misunderstandings that arise from the conceptual impasses inherent in a given field of discourse or the ambiguities and treacheries of the common ground.

    I find all three kinds of misunderstandings in Jensen Suther’s response to my essay. I should have been more careful in how I discussed the relationships among the theories I survey so as to avoid the impression that mine is an idealist dialectic in which Habermas is contained already in Lukács and Althusser redeems Marx. Suther should have been more careful in how he characterized my development of the Lenin-Gramsci-Althusser tradition of ideology theory, so as to avoid the false claim that it amounts to “a form of institutional determinism.” Most crucially, Suther’s essay gives voice to a collective misunderstanding concerning freedom, a misunderstanding that conflates freedom as a political and social condition with freedom as self-determining agency. My response here will address each of these three misunderstandings in turn.

    Mea culpa

    According to Suther, I claim that Adorno and Horkheimer inherit Lukács’s account of false consciousness, and that Habermas’s theory of communicative rationality is merely a development of this inheritance. As a consequence, according to Suther, I make out Habermas to be the “endpoint” of a developmental story that leads from Destutt de Tracy’s project of ideology through Lukács and the early Frankfurt School. I can certainly see where Suther is getting this picture from my essay. I do say that the Frankfurt School “turned Lukács’s theory … into a generic theoretical practice of ideology critique,” and that Lukács inspired the Frankfurt School’s “conception of false consciousness as normative error,” which “finally petered out in the Habermasian notion of performative contradiction.”

    Suther also thinks that I portray Gramsci and Althusser as “the true inheritors of the Marxist project of the critique of ideology.” Again, I can see why Suther would take this impression away from my essay. I emphasize Gramsci as an alternative to Lukács, and tie the Sardinian Marxist’s understanding of ideology to his careful interpretive reading of Marx.

    However, I did not intend and do not believe either of these inheritance claims. The Frankfurt School’s reception of Lukács is decidedly partial and one-sided, and Habermas is only one possible resolution of the theoretical multivalence of Adorno and Horkheimer’s work. I certainly do not believe that Habermas is the logical telos of Lukács’s work. Nor do I believe that Gramsci is straightforwardly continuing the critique of “the German Ideology” texts, nor that Althusser’s theory continues Gramsci’s. Althusser’s account of ideology is discontinuous with Marx and Engels’s dismissive attacks on the ideologists. Indeed, Althusser and Therborn are not engaged in – do not even supply support for – a critique of ideology.

    I think responsibility for these misapprehensions lies with the manner in which I presented my argument. My goal was to identify the problems that both motivated and emerged from decisive mutations in the conception of voluntary servitude and ideology. However, because I identified and analyzed those problems as they appeared in the texts of the authors I examined – with only an occasional nod to the political context – my presentation took on the physiognomy of an idealist dialectic. Each author or cluster of authors seems to respond to the one before, inverting, negating, or recombining the elements of their predecessor’s theory. The reader understandably forms the impression that the history of ideology theory is a single argument developing across the centuries, with the failings of each theory corrected by its successor, at the cost of some new fatal error. The comprehension of the past leads to the sanctification of the present, with the Gramsci-Althusser-Therborn theory standing in the place reserved for Absolute Knowing.

    This impression is contrary to my actual beliefs and argument. I meant it when I wrote that the history I tell is one of “reasonable local interventions half-remembered and misappropriated, inserted into new contexts, and mutating further with every reinsertion.” Although I follow one set of branching paths in my essay, there are other paths not explored, some of which I am confident have not even been broken yet. What I find promising in Gramsci-Althusser-Therborn is not a redemption of everything lost on those winding paths, but a set of analytical tools for articulating ideologies with configurations of social power.

    Sua culpa

    In order to grasp the utility of those tools, however, one must clear away some confusion that Suther has introduced into the discussion. Suther believes that my account is a form of “institutional determinism” according to which human actions are reduced to “effects of dispositional regularities, which are themselves functions of structure.” He admits that I am “sensitive” to this danger and that I try to meet it by claiming that there are many, competing ideologies. However, Suther rejoins that, “given the basic understanding of the relationship between agent and structure, the pluralization of ideology would just entail more possibilities for being functionalized, not fewer. Social change would still not depend on the actions of agents qua agents […] but depend rather on the ‘chemical’ interaction among institutions which interpellate their members.”

    This is confusion entirely of Suther’s own making. He is foisting his own “understanding of the relationship between agent and structure” onto me, and then accusing me of being trapped in the aporias of his understanding, despite my explicit rebuttal of both structuralism and functionalism. He assumes that structure and ideology are opposed to agency, that structure and ideology are dominating, and that agency is the source of “social change.” All of this is foreign to the framework I am outlining in my essay.

    Agency is not opposed to structure or to ideology. Ideology elicits agency, and structure is comprised of action. Suther realizes that social change depends on human action, but doesn’t seem to grasp that social stasis depends on human action to exactly the same extent. Agency is not specially keyed to change, rupture, or emancipation. The enslaved are agents, too. So are cops. So is your conservative uncle who buys the same jeans and polo shirts he’s been wearing for thirty years.

    Suther is here trying to force me – together with Gramsci, Althusser, and Therborn – back into the mode of ideology critique, and back into the model according to which social structures are the outcomes of alienated human activity that have slipped from our control and now dominate us as something external.

    Long paragraphs of Suther’s response are therefore devoted to expounding matters about which we are in agreement and defending positions that I never attacked. I am accused of “assimilating the space of reasons to the space of causes” when that distinction is crucial to my account; it is precisely because ideology comprises “the space of reasons, the terrain where agency happens,” that ideology is not a set of “dispositional regularities” or other causal determinations, acting on us from outside. I am accused of rejecting “normative self-governance” and “the idea that norms are self-determined.” I would challenge Suther to indicate where I perform these rejections, as I cannot seem to locate any such rejections in my essay.

    Suther writes, “The space of reasons is precisely not just a structure of interdependently defined roles but the normative process of mutual struggle to determine how we live.” I completely agree. I only want to add one simple point: that is the field of ideology! “We can maintain ourselves as animals,” Suther notes, “only through initiation into the social space of reasons.” Yes, I agree, we are the ideological animal. It is tempting to go through sections II and III of Suther’s response in this manner, quoting him back to himself in agreement, and then adding “and that’s ideology!” at every juncture. I will stop though, my point hopefully being made.

    Sua sponte

    Underlying Suther’s confused accusation of determinism – and helping to motivate it, I think – is a misunderstanding that is not Suther’s per se, but is embedded in the conceptual heritage that we all use to try to think through our situation. We have inherited a word, freedom, that we use to name both one of our highest political aspirations and a basic aspect of human being – that we act “on our own.” This encourages us to think there must be some continuity between the two, that political freedom must realize or perfect our freedom to act.

    This is a mistake. To be politically free one must enjoy a common social status and the institutions that protect that status. But this does not enhance or magnify our ability to act in any metaphysical sense. Individuals are equally norm-directed, and their acts are equally undertaken on the basis of reasons, regardless of the social and political institutions under which they live. (Note that I am not saying that these norms and reasons are equally good regardless of the social and political institutions that encode them; bad reasons motivate action, however, in the same way as good reasons.)

    Reflecting the inherited confusion of political freedom with the freedom to act, Suther’s response conflates these two senses while not noticing that my essay tries to distinguish between the two. I reserve the word “freedom” for political freedom, and use “agency” to name the capacity to act in the space of reasons. The collision between these two ways of talking about freedom litters Suther’s response with glittering shards of incomprehension.

    “The space of reasons,” Suther claims, “is unintelligible except as a realm of freedom.” I agree – but only if we are clear that “freedom” here means agency. The space of reasons is not necessarily a space free from domination, however, and hence is not necessarily a realm of political freedom. The social fact that cops have the legal power to arrest and detain, and have broad latitude to use deadly force, is a reason to avoid them and to be cautious around them. Especially if you are a member of a marginalized or racialized group, who cannot be reasonably confident that the legal system will protect you from the police power; hence, this power is dominating, compromising your political freedom. Nonetheless, it operates entirely within the space of reasons: what you know about the norms governing actions in your society gives you reasons to act according to your own norms of caution and deference. Even coercion and direct threats operate within the space of reasons; as Hegel rightly notes, you must let yourself be coerced.

    Once we appreciate the fact that people are equally agentic – hence, equally “free” in the terms of “Hegel’s logical-metaphysical account of willing” – in every form of human society, we are forced to look elsewhere for guidance for our political aspirations and struggles. I propose looking to universal and equal freedom from domination for this guidance. Suther objects that this is a purely instrumental conception of freedom, which reduces freedom to “a mere means to the fulfillment of my actual end, my satisfaction of my contingent interests.” This objection, however, rests on the same substitution of agency for political freedom.

    Enjoying political freedom does not dictate to people what their actual ends must be – the whole point of being politically free is that you are free to live your life – but this does not at all entail that our agency is indifferent to the ends we choose for ourselves or the norms of action we adhere to. (Every author who writes about autonomy or self-determination recognizes that we can undertake practices that undermine our own agency; drug use and addiction are the favorite cases.) Nor does it entail that our commonly-enjoyed political freedom is indifferent to the ends people pursue. Some ends can only be pursued either by having or by seeking dominating power over others.

    Suther is incredulous. He asks, “what is to prevent my ends from including dealing heroin, polygamy, or anti-Black propagandizing?” Well, can you deal heroin, marry multiple women, or carry on racist propaganda without making others subject to a power they cannot control? If not, then my conception of political freedom certainly rules out the pursuit of those ends. If those ends can be pursued without using or accruing dominating power, however, then, while they might be ethical failings,[1] they do not rise to the level of being threats to anyone’s freedom. Kwame Ture’s distinction is a good guide: “If a white man wants to lynch me, that’s his problem. If he’s got the power to lynch me, that’s my problem.” What people want may very well pose a problem for their own happiness and flourishing; what they have the power to do, on the other hand, is the question for politics.

    But Suther is still not satisfied. Isn’t my conception of freedom “indifferent to content”? Don’t we have to rule out “obviously abhorrent, historically obsolete practices like slavery, vassalage, indentured servitude, and so on”? Once we do that, isn’t it obvious that “our interest must lie in mutually justifiable practices, that is, practices in which we mutually regard ourselves as the authors”? Every Rawlsian liberal will be nodding along at this point. I, however, want to be more cautious.

    Freedom from domination certainly rules out slavery, vassalage, indentured servitude, and so on, since those are all forms of domination. However, they are not ruled out as historically obsolete, since obsolescence does nothing to prevent them from persisting or returning. Only social relations and political institutions – arrangements of power – that make them impossible can prevent them. And we cannot be so sure that “our interest” excludes them, either, since they have very clearly served the interests of some wherever they have existed – that is precisely why they existed. Preventing them from recurring requires making sure that no one develops a powerful enough interest in making them recur.

    What’s more, mutually regarding one another as the authors of our social practices is far too capacious to serve as a criterion for picking out decent political institutions and practices. The dominant love nothing more than regarding the dominated as the authors of the social practices of domination. Israeli spokespeople, both paid and volunteer, will proclaim at great length that the Palestinians have brought everything on themselves, that the only way to stop the slaughter is to surrender completely, that the institutions of Gaza and the government of Hamas reflect the will and the voluntary action of the people of Gaza, and that, therefore, all Gazans must be held responsible for the – often imaginary – deeds of Hamas.

    This is not exceptional. The powerful intone breathless encomia to the moral agency and responsibility of those they enjoy power over. Police officers tell us that someone they shot created a dangerous situation and was responsible for their choices and for the outcome. Politicians tell voters we are obligated to vote for them, regardless of the substance of their campaigns, since we are otherwise choosing the worse. The poor are responsible for their poverty. The sick are responsible for their illness. The downtrodden, excluded, and oppressed – why do they make it so easy by being so unlikable? And to this monotonous chorus, the metaphysics of agency chimes in with its aria: “because you must always act on the basis of reasons, you are responsible for your actions and beliefs and called to account, asked to provide not exculpations but justifications.” Never mind that, in the empirically given world of grossly palpable human beings, there are some who – lucky duckies! – are never actually, legally and corporeally, called to account for their actions and beliefs, despite having immense power to compel others relentlessly to explain and justify themselves. Metaphysical responsibility is spread evenly over all of us. Empirical responsibility is not, but falls instead upon individuals and groups in inverse ratio to their social power.

    Generally, I think any account of freedom that leans on the metaphysics of agency will, for just that reason, perform this same counterpoint echo of the ideology of the dominant. It will tell the individual worker that their “immediate interest cannot be satisfied on its own terms” – i.e., that they are irrational for trying to earn a higher wage or to save up for a down payment on a house – and that their true interest lies in the good of all. It will tell workers who are organizing a union that “‘a fair day’s wage for a fair day’s work’ is structurally impossible under capitalist conditions” – the obvious implication being that cynicism and cheating are the only options available.[2] Selflessness or crime – being the devoted servant or the guilty enemy – are the only options available. Descended from the metaphysical realm into the world of power relations, the agent’s self-legislating freedom can comprehend only innocence or guilt.

    Political freedom is ethically indeterminate – Suther is right about that. Political freedom does not prescribe ends for people or societies. But metaphysical freedom – agency – is politically indeterminate. It does not differentiate domination from non-domination. It proscribes direct violence, which turns its targets from agents into patients – and which, conveniently, is often the only recourse of the powerless. But it cannot provide agents on the ground with any criteria for differentiating enabling from dominating forms of power. Because it focuses on rules and their enactment, it cannot see unexercised power at all, or tell us anything about its effects. For this reason, Hegel can provide us with a rich phenomenology of human existence, but he cannot guide us at all in our projects of emancipation.

    Don’t take my word for it. Hegel told us himself that philosophy always comes too late to tell us what to do. Maybe we should listen to him on this point.

    [1] Or they might not. Why should we be aghast at someone supplying opiates for medical and recreational purposes, or engaging in polyamory, where neither of these exploit or impose relations of domination?

    [2] Far from arguing what Suther attributes to him, Marx argues that “a fair day’s wage for a fair day’s labor” is the immanent norm of the capitalist system and the standard of justice for both worker and capitalist. Wages are not exchanged for labor, however, but for labor-power. And this exchange takes place, on average, as an exchange of equivalents. The problem with the capitalist mode of production is not that it makes a fair exchange impossible, but that it pumps labor out of workers, using them up, under the cover of a fair exchange.

  • Christian Thorne Interviews Oded Nir–Searching for the Universal in Israel/Palestine

    Christian Thorne Interviews Oded Nir–Searching for the Universal in Israel/Palestine

    Searching for the Universal in Israel/Palestine

    An Interview with Oded Nir

    Christian Thorne: You are on record as saying that you wished Marxists had more to say about Israel/Palestine. It is your sense, I think, that we would understand events better if we factored in the place of Israel in the world system; considered the requirements of capital in the region; and understood the configurations of class in the country, sometimes across the Israeli-Palestinian divide. Your writing sometimes gives the impression that most of the work on this front is still in front of us — that Marxist thinking about Israel/Palestine has mostly failed to appear. Can I ask you even so where you think we should start? What are Marxism’s most enduring insights into Israel/Palestine, going back to the 1940s or, if you prefer, to the 1880s? What, in particular, do Marxists have to add to the “settler colonial” paradigm, which is well represented in discussions of Israel, including in the Palestine solidarity movement in Europe and North America? The question, of course, will pop if I put it the other way round: What do we miss when we talk only about “settler colonialism”?

    Oded Nir: Yes, I do think that Marxism can add much to the way we understand Israel/Palestine, not just in adding another dimension to it, but in fundamentally defining the horizon of a political commitment to Palestinian liberation in particular, and its relationship to global struggles for emancipation more generally. And I want to say right from the start that what I have to say won’t solve any problems, but just modify how we perceive these problems.

    Let’s get straight to the heart of the disagreement between the settler colonialism paradigm and Marxism. One would think that the difference between a Marxist and a non-Marxist leftist position would be in the answer to this question: does capitalism drive horrible oppression and cruelty? Or is capitalist exploitation just a secondary dimension, one area  among others where colonial oppression is expressed? Unfortunately, much of the writing on Palestine/Israel that touches on economic issues falls on one of these sides, or on a third option: not choosing at all, seeing a little bit of both at work.

    But this way of posing the problem should be rejected, since it allows us to provide only bad solutions to it: if we say capitalism is the driver of Palestinian oppression, we are in danger of reducing colonial violence to a side effect of capitalist development; and if we think that (colonial) abuse of power is behind everything, we are in danger of falling into a flat moralism, into seeing ourselves as choosing what is righteous, while others choose evil. The problem here is that the wrong life cannot be lived rightly, as Adorno puts it: flat moralizing fails to take into account the way we are, materially, part of the bad world, and the way it exerts pressures on what we (and others) can and cannot do.

    To head off one objection: I’m not preaching cynicism here–Adorno didn’t mean we should just shrug off suffering, because life is bad anyway. I think we must remain sensitive to suffering, and fight for it to end. But it does mean that, unfortunately, given the wrongness of the world, any act in it is tainted with this wrongness, necessarily depends on it, and can lead to its reproduction: existing social forces make this result highly likely. So the horizon of any action must always also contain its own negation–weirdly, this means that I should act now in a way that aims to eliminate the possibility of this very act in future generations.

    So I have a weird and seemingly non-Marxist way to proceed from this: to say that Palestine/Israel today names not a scientific problem, not a problem to be solved by study and rigorous analysis, but a problem of narrative and of ideology. The debate between settler-colonialism and Marxism is a debate between two kinds of materialism, two ways of understanding material forces at work. In this debate, materialism is the only game in town. And the dominance of materialism is not limited to activists and “radical” thinkers: mainstream media today is full of analyses of material power relations. So, to my mind, the really excluded possibility is that of materialism’s opposite, which we used to call idealism. There is a great tradition–one that includes figures such as Mao, Mahdi Amel, and Fredric Jameson–that insists that Marxism is not a set of positive statements or a stable methodology; Marxism, rather, has to be reinvented in new historical situations–to do the same thing, you have to do something different. I think that today, when materialism is itself a dominant ideology, Marxism has to take up the opposite pole, to have an uncompromising idealist kernel. This way—and only this way—will it take on a position that is truly repressed almost everywhere.

    And I would say that what idealism comes down to, in this case, is narrative. You mention previous Marxist positions on Palestine/Israel and their enduring insights. So I want to briefly say how some of these were transformative, not in their contributions to knowledge, which were undoubtedly significant, but in the way they completely reconfigured how one understood the condition and aims of emancipatory struggle. One example that I like, from Jewish-Israeli circles, took place in the 1970s and ‘80s, around the coming into being of Matzpen (a group that broke off from the Israeli communist party) and, say, Tamar Gozansky’s The Development of Capitalism in Palestine, which came out in the mid-1980s, right before the wave of what is known as Post-Zionism. The situation of socialist struggle in Israel at that point was not very good: it had been completely neutralized by state institutions that, at least until the late 1970s, promoted a calcified and toothless version of the discourse of class struggle. And so what the communist interventions of Matzpen and Gozansky did, was to discover class antagonism anew, precisely by mediating it through the analyses of the British-colonial, Zionist, and later Israeli oppression of Palestinians.

    In its moment, this was a monumental shift, one that not only reinvented Israeli socialism, but later became a way to revitalize the entire Israeli left. So we saw the birth of the 1990s peace process, which was the name for an   entire utopian program, of which what we know as Post Zionism was merely the intellectual wing. What is important for me is to emphasize that this was a shift in narrative and ideology–the coming into being of a new language through which to imagine a (contradictory or self-negating) path to liberation.

    Thorne: Your framing the issue in terms of narrative raises all sorts of fresh considerations. Can you summarize us for that older story about class, the one that was dominant when the Labor Party enjoyed a near monopoly on power in Israel? And can you help us see how the story told by Matzpen and Tamar Gozansky was different?

    Nir: To answer this question, I think it would be best to turn to literature. I’m thinking in particular about the genre called Zionist realism that flourished in the early 20th century, and that is today usually mocked by critics for being mere propaganda. There is one short story that narrates the experiences of a Jewish immigrant to Palestine, who joins a group of other Jews in working the land for a Jewish land owner. The worker, who isn’t accustomed to physical labor, is in a state of excitement throughout the story: he sees every physical chore he completes as part of a historical Act, a form of direct participation in the making of a new Jewish history. But as the story progresses, you hear that the Jewish workers are competing with much more skilled Palestinian labor: our character sees Palestinian workers being driven off the land in the beginning, and they emerge marginally throughout the story in his thoughts.

    But the story ends when the job is complete, at which point the Jewish workers are themselves driven off the land, and the narrator is completely shocked: his sense of being inseparable from history-in-the-making, from working the land, completely crumbles. This of course recalls the Palestinian workers who had already been driven away. There’s no “moral” to the story–it ends with the workers’ separation from the product of their work.

    What I like about this very simple allegory is that it is able to hold together what are radically incompatible meanings: on the one hand, the revolutionary kernel of early Zionism, the attempt to make history within given conditions; on the other, the betrayal, uncompromisingly rendered, of this very attempt: intentional history-making turns into unintentional history-making; existing conditions turn your emancipatory intention not only against the Palestinian other, whom you have left out, but also against your own liberation.

    This is the tragedy of the Labor Party in a nutshell, one that was much better recorded and conceptualized in literature than in actual political discussions: the story I’ve mentioned captured this process as it’ was taking place. It is the turning of the code of class antagonism from holding a revolutionary truth, one that potentially leads to a radically different world, into a hegemonic ideology, one that is used to oppress both Palestinians and Jews. For us, it’s clear which side won. But in the moment, one completely loses the feeling of history-in-the-making if one doesn’t acknowledge the potential for social transformation, the possibility of making something new–the utopian impulse that these workers embody, the deep undecidability that makes that moment ripe for intervention. This is exactly why Israeli socialists in the 1970s found themselves without a language: class discourse had become a tool of oppression, a code through which Israelis gained entry to the dominant classes! This is what the Labor Party had devolved to, since 1948.

    This was the background to the interventions of Matzpen and later Gozansky. It is as if someone–the state–stole the language through which you can express the fact of oppression. On the one hand, you have class antagonism in Israel without a symbolic code in which to express it. On the other hand, there are those completely excluded from the hegemonic code: Palestinians, and Mizrahi Jews, discriminated against by the Jewish-European hegemony. What Matzpen and Gozansky did may seem simple and obvious to us, but it was not so obvious at the time: to affirm symbolically the oppression of these excluded groups and the need to fight it. It’s important to mention that reversing this exclusion is not an easy thing to do in practice. This is where ideas about uneven development are important: when one considers that such exclusions are what makes capitalist social relations possible–that in the context of Israel in the 1970s, the oppression of Palestinians, Mizrahi Jews, women, and LGBTQ+ were not accidental, but a necessary part of the capitalist structure—then you see how radical such demands can be: they threaten to undo capitalism as a whole, and radically transform how society is structured.

    This is what made the interventions by Matzpen and later Gozansky so important. Not only were the struggles they helped conceptualize important and righteous in their own right; they were the basis for a new universal struggle, a new way through which to come together to–potentially–transform the structure of the whole of society. At the end, of course, that didn’t happen. But that the potential for radical transformation was there should not be overlooked. One of the most important tasks is to see how and why these revolutionary efforts failed: this is a crucial part of re-narrating our present historically.

    Thorne: I’m interested in the phrase “new universal struggle.” You’ve written elsewhere that the history of Zionist and Israeli Marxism can be tracked by its serially transformed understandings of the universal. So let’s say that socialism is a universalist politics, but that any such politics can’t help but pass through the particular. A universalism comes into the world only when it is demanded by particular groups and housed in particular institutions. And in that case, the question becomes: Which particularities do we think can demand the universal most plausibly and realize it most amply? And your sense is that Zionist and Israeli Marxism has proposed over time different candidates for this role, different particulars to serve as bearer of the universal: first, the Israeli nation broadly; then, the Israeli working class more specifically; finally, as of the 1980s, the Palestinians as the excluded term. Am I hearing you right? If I am, I’m wondering what you think the status of the universal is now? Are the Palestinians still the bearer of the universal in the region? Gozansky’s work, after all, dates back to the 1980s and would seem to belong to the moment of the peace process and post-Zionism. But if the peace process is itself now a historical artifact, its very failure decades in the past, then what has been the fate of that particular universalism?

    Nir: Yes, I think that’s completely right: universal struggle is often mediated by what is a particular struggle, and that is something many current defenders of universality take up. The recent example of Black Lives Matter is a case in point: it mediated universality, while seeming particular; the “all lives matter” response to it from the Right was the truly particular, exclusionary, position, even if it seems universal at first sight.

    But things get more complicated once you realize that a particularity can be at one moment the historical mediator of universal change, but lose that universality in the next moment. This was true of the 1848 moment in the European bourgeois revolution–when the universal values turned from revolutionary weapon to an apology for the bourgeoisie’s social dominance. And it was equally true of Zionism’s failed revolution: from a particularism that had a universal aspect, it turned into an exclusionary, oppressive ideology. And I think the only other moment in Israeli history when a new universal-particularity came to be was that of the late 1970s and early ‘80s that I have been describing, in which the excluded Palestinians became the particular bearer of a potential universal transformation.

    But there are always false starts and wrong times that complicate the picture. In 1948, after the formal establishment of the state of Israel, one of the Zionist leaders surprisingly quit his post and joined a socialist party that insisted, against state leadership, that class struggle must still be waged in the newly established state, against its new authorities. That position unfortunately failed to become a significant political force. Efforts to create Zionist-Palestinian cooperation were almost nonexistent at that time: such efforts had become too fraught and were considered impossible. There is no point in criticizing such impossibility: for instance, socialism in the US was for many years an unthinkable option, even if there was no logical impossibility. In 1948, the sense that Zionism had ceased being an emancipatory ideology, that it was rapidly becoming a repressive ideology, had all kinds of similar effects: some prominent figures in the labor movement suddenly turned to the extreme Right, to Jewish ultra-nationalism. This was a response to the same historical dilemma, the same reification of Zionism into the opposite of liberation.

    The problem of false starts is interesting in several respects. It is easy to see the 1970s and ‘80s in Israel as a moment of formation of a new universal struggle, because we immediately recognize the demand for Palestinian liberation as a just one. But being morally right is not a historical criterion. False starts demonstrate that the political success of universality-in-particularity is not evident in the moment that it is first asserted. It is only from a later perspective that we can narrate it as such. And one can go a step further, and argue that it is the future that causes it to be universal, in a strong sense: it’s not only that we don’t know in advance which position will be successful, it’s that the possibility of narrating its success or failure is determined by the future.

    Such future causation is a result of how we think of the excluded particular. In any notion of universality that isn’t bloodless, the effort to include the excluded isn’t just a matter of busting down an arbitrary fence, of allowing someone, some group, to take part in a system that otherwise remains the same. No: what makes the inclusion of such particulars a universal demand is that including them would require a radical transformation of the social whole into which it is to be included, down to its basic structure.

    So false starts are important because they help us see, I think, that voluntarism or contingency are not the opposites of historical determination or causality, but necessary parts of it. To remain uncompromisingly loyal to subjective agency, to our freedom to act and respond in a way not determined in advance by circumstances, we must acknowledge that such contingency is only authentic if it eventually disappears: the future dissolves it into necessity and determination, into the necessary condition for the moment in which we live; or, if it fails to produce change, into something completely extraneous to the current moment. This is for me what false starts demonstrate.

    To come back to our moment: if you see, as I do, our moment as one of radical and unavoidable transition, then ethics, or belief, shimmer and come to the fore. No amount of fact checking or archival work or algorithmic position-play can take the place of the purely subjective intervention that we need–precisely because only the future can tell a false start from the successful universal struggle. Truth now is a matter of acting on one’s belief, in the strongest sense there is. This is also what makes this moment so anxiety-inducing, at least for me: no received wisdom–no matter how righteous–can save us from the need to decide and act. And, of course, I’m not saying that we shouldn’t take facts into consideration, that we shouldn’t learn from the past or that we should be purely impulsive. But I am saying that subjective intervention, one whose meaning is not decided in advance, is unavoidable. And that’s scary: are we wrong? Are we doing the right thing? Nothing can settle that question for now, even if it will eventually have an answer.

    The same thing holds in the case of Palestine/Israel. There are multiple contexts here, each requiring a different intervention. I already posed the question of what narrative work the Palestinian struggle does for us, here in the US–that’s one important context for intervention. It is not for me to talk about the internal Palestinian context, but it plainly requires careful attention. In Israel, it is clear that the Palestinian cause does not function, in Israel, as it did in the 1980s, as a particularity mediating universal struggle. I think we need in this context to distinguish between two positions that used to be fused together: one has to do with Israeli-Palestinian peace, collaboration and reconciliation; the other has to do with uncompromising support for Palestinian liberation, at all costs. While the latter has become the banner of some on the left, the former has virtually disappeared: the very word “peace” projects powerlessness, naiveté, and incoherence; it seems irrevocably nostalgic, a fool’s errand. Palestinian/Israeli collaboration is very strained, becoming almost impossible (this is affecting academic collaborations, too). There is a strong impulse to separate activists and intellectuals into different groups according to their nationality and ethnicity, in a manner that unfortunately comes close to a leftist version of symbolic segregation.

    If you see the situation this way, then, for me, the excluded particularity, what mediates universality, is the possibility of peace and collaboration. Yes, this is not an identity category, so it seems to violate the principle of particularity-mediating-universality. But one shouldn’t reify how particularity appears in the world. Sometimes, universality is mediated through … universality! Or at least through some more general term that becomes visible when you enlarge the field of vision. This is why I like to think about particularity in terms of items in a series, rather than only in terms of identity categories. Peace, or collaboration, can be such an excluded item. So, for me, this is the particular that right now mediates universality in Israel, and maybe in Palestine/Israel. Think about the initial gesture of the project of peacemaking in the 1980s-90s–it can be reduced to the statement: we are not pursuing Israeli-Palestinian peace effectively, we need to find a better way to pursue it. I think we need a similar gesture today: expressing support for the two-state solution has degenerated into ineffectual lip-service–it doesn’t promote any actual project of transformation. So how do we pursue peace more effectively? What are the institutions that we need to do it? What went wrong last time? All of these questions need to be answered, earnestly, with an eye to the reinvention of this project. One beginning of an answer, I think, is if we take peace to name a project that now mediates not only relations between two states, but within the state of Israel too: it has to be a class project, in addition to an ethnic-national project. It is closer to a one-state solution than to the two-state one. But I’m already getting here into details that belong elsewhere.

    Oded Nir is the author of Signatures of Struggle, a 2018 book on “the figuration of collectivity in Israeli fiction.” He has edited volumes on Marxist approaches to Israel/Palestine and on the literatures of the capitalist periphery. He teaches courses on Israeli culture and literature at Queens College.