Category: The b2o Review

The b2o Review is a non-peer reviewed publication, published and edited by the boundary 2 editorial collective and specific topic editors, featuring book reviews, interventions, videos, and collaborative projects.  

  • Lionel Ruffel  — A Dangerous Book (On The Invisible Committee, The Coming Insurrection)

    Lionel Ruffel — A Dangerous Book (On The Invisible Committee, The Coming Insurrection)

    by Lionel Ruffel

    Translated from the French by Claire Finch and Jackson B. Smith

    We are watching a man on a screen. He displays all the characteristics of a vigorous, conservative, republican, married, paternal, naturally born-to-lead American. He’s white, his name is Glenn Beck, he has a baby face and a crew cut, and he’s wearing the mandatory uniform — a red tie with white stars, a striped shirt, and a dark suit. He leans his elbows on the table, using them to emphasize all of his gestures. It’s like we’re at his house and he’s talking to us in private. He’s speaking to us so casually that it even feels a little like water cooler gossip, but don’t let that fool you: what he’s about to tell us is serious. We’re watching Fox News; it’s July 1st, 2009. He starts with the typical idiotic conspiracy theories. But then, less than a minute into the show, something happens, and suddenly we’re confronted with the unexpected, the incredible, the weird: he holds up a small book, yes, you heard me correctly, a book. And he not only holds it up, he flips through it, turning a few pages without reading them, and we can tell right away that he hasn’t read the book and that this doesn’t matter. He hasn’t read it yet, because he just got it, but he’s been waiting for it for a long time. “It is a brand new book,” he tells us, and he looks at us, knowingly, “it is a dangerous book,” and he looks at us threateningly, “it is called The Coming Insurrection,” and here he takes his time, exaggerating each syllable. He holds up the book again, making sure to repeat the title two times, and the second is even more terrifying than the first. “It is written by the Invisible Committee.” Now he looks utterly aghast, because, as he’s speaking, at this very moment, “it calls for a violent revolution.” He gives a little automatic smile, a knowing smile, when he tells his viewers that this Invisible Committee is an anonymous group—and he emphasizes anonymous—and they come from France, of course, although he doesn’t actually say “of course,” we can hear it anyway.

    *

    What makes a book dangerous? So dangerous that a celebrity commentator of a major conservative American television network would devote so much energy to it. So dangerous that the French state imprisoned nine people and flung open what became known as the so-called “Tarnac” case, getting wrapped up in another one of those judiciary true-crime fiascos that it does so well. The combination of the two, the celebrity commentator and the French state, thus gave the book a double recognition the likes of which no French book has received in a very long time. We can’t help but think about similar cases that came before, even though they already seem like they happened so long ago: Guyotat, Genet; or the cases that happened even longer ago: Baudelaire, Flaubert. I recall those cases of literary trials, because the so-called “Tarnac” case, and here comes my hypothesis, is fundamentally a literary trial, even though we’re using it as a false pretext to debate terrorism in our courts. Each of these literary trials thus reveals an anxiety that corresponds to its period, an anxiety about the production of literature and the production of truth. When we talk about the 19th century, we often mistakenly bring up morality, but it was actually all about putting realism on trial. When we talk about the 1960s, we discuss morality and politics, but the true source of anxiety was the hordes of young educated people and readers, let’s call it “democratization.” With the Tarnac case, we talk about terrorism, but it’s a trial that pulls us back to the question that Kant famously asked in 1790: “What is a book?” And it’s true, after all: What is a book? What is a book that Glenn Beck waves at us on a television set? What is a book when we’re reading its unauthorized translations in the middle of a coffee shop? What is a book that leads to the arrest of nine people? These questions are not at all insignificant, because their answer depends on how we think about the collective body, about politics, and about democracy.

    I might be moving too fast, and if you aren’t already familiar with the case, I can quickly go over its main cadences. The starting point was nothing out of the ordinary: a book, called The Coming Insurrection, and some criminal intrigue: someone sabotaged several train lines. The two are linked by a series of readers: the police, the legal system, and the political world, which I’ll call “bovaryan” because…ok, let’s put it in the most simplistic terms, they have a tendency to confuse what is real with what is fiction. The book in question, The Coming Insurrection, the one that worried Glenn Beck so much before he even read it, thus became the sole evidence in a trial by media, and an important one, as its principal actors were the then-Minister of the Interior and the still-acting head of the SNCF (the French National Railway Corporation), and it was broadcast during primetime on the most-viewed private national French television channel. And the book continued to act as evidence in a protean, constantly shifting legal trial that lasted for ten years, until the French Supreme Court finally dismissed the false charges of terrorism. But even now, we can’t help but feel that it will never truly end.

    So if there was no real legal basis for the case, what was it actually about? In my opinion, it was about the following: that the book has no official author, except for an invisible collective. And it is this fact that calls into question the entire modern structure of literature. What is a book? What is a book without an author? Without visibility? Without rights of ownership? How can we use such a book? Can a book be evidence? Because the modern structure of “the literary” is none other than the modern structure of ownership, or put differently, capitalism’s raison d’être. These are the actual questions that the Tarnac case poses. And they are the fundamental literary questions of the new millennium.

    *

    If we’re talking about the actual nature of the book, there is another imaginary collective—a collective that is a sort of cousin of the Invisible Committee, that definitely shares some of its authors, it is a collective that is truly literary—I’m talking about the Tiqqun collective, which was making itself heard, and emphatically, well before The Coming Insurrection and the start of the Tarnac case. In November of 1999, they sent a letter to Eric Hazan, the director of the publishing house La Fabrique, which would later publish the Invisible Committee in France. Here’s what they wrote. “Dear Eric, You will find enclosed the new version, largely augmented and divided into sections, of Men-machines, Directions for Use. Despite its appearance, it does not behave like a book, but like a publishing virus.” It’s 1999, the internet’s prehistoric period, before social networks, before blogs, before there was even Myspace. In this prehistoric universe, the 20th century’s nineties, viruses play the starring roles, inhabiting our dreams and our nightmares, they embody a threat, of course, but also a source of liberation; they’re a bit, if you want to think of it this way, like an equivalent to today’s Dark Net. But our imaginary pertaining to the virus is also part of the history of the book, and of literature. For since the sixteenth century, since the Bible materially came to be a printed book, since the development of what historian Benedict Anderson termed Print Capitalism, we have been thinking about the book as an organism, as a healthy or “good” body. And we did this because we were scared of this organism’s other side, which we had since begun to see and to dread. A side that might line up with what Tiqqun calls viruses. Of course, in the 16th century the term virus was not yet in use, but the threat is already there. It’s the threat of what’s underground and disquieting. The fanatic Glenn Beck might even say that it’s devilish. We can already use the word virus in this context because in these early modern times, with the advent of a new technology, the organism could circulate, it could spread, and we didn’t know how to stop it because it was almost beyond all control. We needed a concept to organize all of this. Let’s name it then: It has to do with the book, but not just any book, because there are as many concepts of books as there are concepts of the world. It has to do with the modern version of the book, which is an institution as much as it is an ideology.

    It’s in this sense that we can understand the following sentence: “The book is a dead form, in so far as it was holding its reader in the same fraudulent completeness, in the same esoteric arrogance as the classic Subject in front of his peers, no less than the classic figure of ‘Man’.” The book, the subject, and Man, connected in the same network. The Tiqqun writers could say that they are referring implicitly to a text which solidified the modern imaginary of the book, in two pages that are as enlightening as, a priori, they are problematic. A heroic text, as it were. Released more than two hundred years earlier, in 1790. Kant is the author, it is called “What is a book?” and it is part of his work The Science of Right. It is a fascinating text.

    It’s not that Kant revolutionizes everything by himself; he draws from a century of shared reflection. But he condenses and crystallizes. He produces a doctrine of rights intended to put an end to the anarchic situation. Of course he does not want things to go back to the way they were before print capitalism, but he is not at all happy with the way that things are going. It’s all looking too much like the fire that Glenn Beck loves to broadcast at us. Kant’s strategy is impressive in that he disguises his doctrine of rights, wrapping it in an entirely new symbolic architecture, one on which rights will eventually depend. We could say that he produces a fiction dressed up in the attributes of the obvious. For the obvious has already been there for three centuries in Europe at the time when Kant is writing: it is the obviousness of a major technological and capitalist mutation, brought about in large part by the invention of the mechanical press. But, as the historian Roger Chartier has shown, debates that attempt to seize this obviousness are contradictory, dense and disordered. While the mutation has undoubtedly already taken place, Kant is simply intervening with his text to end a debate by proposing a unitary symbolic architecture. He thus asks two questions, which become the two parts of a single legislative text, because they are two sides of the same coin, which is print capitalism. Was ist Geld? Was ist ein Buch? What is money? What is a book? At the end of the eighteenth century, no two questions are more decisive, and they maintain their importance as we move into the beginning of the 21st century. Let’s listen to our hero, here’s what he has to say: “A book is a writing which contains a discourse addressed by someone to the public, through visible signs of speech. It is a matter of indifference to the present considerations whether it is written by a pen or imprinted by types, and on few or many pages.”

    You and I, as regrettably materialist as we are, could have responded to the same question with something simpler, something like “a book is an object,” an object that I can hold up in a television studio, for example, in order to say “This is a dangerous book.” At least we could start here, before moving on to something more complex. But that’s exactly what Kant wants to avoid, his entire project is to extract the book from its materiality, and to make it into an abstraction: “It is a matter of indifference to the present considerations whether it is written by pen or imprinted by types, and on few or many pages.” A matter of indifference, therefore, to materiality, which the text only mentions in the phrase “through visible signs of speech,” and we can all agree that that is extremely abstract; as well as an indifference to length, an indifference to action, and a dissimulation of the rupture that the introduction of printing produced; a dissimulation, therefore, of capitalism’s arrival into print. Or rather our hero feigns indifference for he has a hidden agenda: he hopes to cover the book up with another notion, that of speech (“Rede”). An idea that is so central that Kant describes the very person who employs speech, the speaker, as barely anything more than a “someone” (“jemand”). Not yet an author, that will come later, but Kant is logical, first he needs to render abstract the very idea of the author, in order to convert it into what Michel Foucault will later call a function. What is striking here is that he quickly imposes another idea, one that is essential to the creation of the concept of the author: the public.

    Here the text does something truly new, as up until this point “the public” referred to only two things: a political entity or the people in attendance at a performance. This new public organized around the book is a strange thing; it is connected to this person, the “someone,” and we still have no idea who this could be. Kant is getting to that. “He who speaks to the public in his own name is the author. He who addresses the writing to the public in the name of the author is the publisher.” Kant certainly knows how to save some of the best things for last. He said “someone” because he had a surprise in mind. “Someone” is not one but two people, both of whom assume speech: the author, but also the publisher who speaks for the author, who is in fact this text’s great conceptual innovation. Or to put it more precisely, Kant invented a symbolic triangle to stand in for the book, a triangle composed of three conceptual figures that were entirely new at the time: the author, the publisher (“Verleger”), and the public. And their relationship was also entirely new, because none of the three could exist without the others, and it is here that we see Kant’s main conceptual invention.

    It is significant, because it is an innovation that assumes a unity that stands in opposition to the proliferation of texts, of authorities, and of viruses. The author, the publisher, the public, and the book. We know that until the eighteenth century, literary works in particular were seen as miscellaneous collections that grouped several authors’ contributions together into a single object. One that we could plunder, copy, dismantle, take over. It was rare to associate one author with a text and a book. And if occasionally this did happen, either accidentally or intentionally, then it was vertiginous, like in Don Quixote where the prescience as to what a modern book would be comes from a combination of its obsessive fear, its distancing, its critique. A book was made of multiplicity; a book was a multiplicity that sometimes turned viral. But with Kant, with the move into modernity, with the move away from a caste-based society, in which the political subject is just one specimen of the larger multiplicity, and into a class-based society, in which the political subject is capable of fabricating its own destiny, it was necessary to suppress this proliferation and to impose a unity. So that multiplicity could become profitable, in the economic sense of the term. For the stakes are as much economic as they are philosophical, as it was necessary to transform the book into capitalism’s perfect object. “When a publisher does this with the permission or authority of the author, the act is in accordance with right, and he is the rightful publisher; but if this is done without such permission or authority, that is contrary to right, and the publisher is a counterfeiter or unlawful publisher. The whole of a set of copies of the original document is called an edition.” It’s easier if we read the sentence backwards. Our target is the “set of copies,” now attributable to a sole beneficiary, or more like two beneficiaries, a producer, also known as an author, and the economic agent who enhances the production’s value. We often say that Kant aimed to establish a system of literary ownership, and it’s true, as long as we do not confuse literary ownership with author’s rights. We have a tendency to be blinded by author’s rights, which conceal the rights of yet another agent, the economic agent, the editor. Who nonetheless is never just an economic actor. All of this is, in fact, derived from a certain authority, and an authorization. The economic agent is not just the intermediary in the new symbolic construction around the book, but he is also an agent of authority, because he guarantees authorization. We owe him for the magical transaction that transforms writers into authors and manuscripts into books. He authorizes, he is the author of other authors, the author of authority. Keeping in mind that authority in the context of literature is the expression of a single individuality that brings together a multiplicity. The economic agent is thus much more than we thought: he is a symbolic agent. He is the guardian of capitalism’s magical power, or of the fetishism of merchandise, if you will. And because the book is going to become capitalism’s most fetishized object, the publisher is going to become the book’s head magician.

    Do you think I’m exaggerating? Here is Kant again: “A writing is […] a discourse addressed in a particular form to the public”; “and the author may be said to speak publicly by means of his publisher. The publisher, again, speaks by the aid of the printer as his workman (operarius)” and here we need to distinguish between “means” and “aid,” where “aid” refers to the mechanical operation of what has become an entirely immaterial process, “yet not in his own name, for otherwise he would be the author, but in the name of the author; and he is only entitled to do so in virtue of a mandate given him to that effect by the author. Now the unauthorized printer and publisher speaks by an assumed authority in his publication; in the name indeed of the author, but without a mandate to that effect (gerit se mandatarium absque mandato). Consequently, such an unauthorized publication is a wrong committed upon the authorized and only lawful publisher,” and here it is, we understand it now, this “a wrong committed upon” is precisely where the danger is located because dangerous books are above all those that have committed this terrible wrong, “as it amounts to a pilfering of the profits which the latter was entitled and able to draw from the use of his proper right (furtum usus).” A wrong committed against profits, against the very nature of capitalism.

    The book is simultaneously material and immaterial; its two-sided nature is the same as that of capitalism, which invests objects with magical qualities by fetishizing them. But thanks to the idea of authority, the book occupies a position at the very top of the hierarchy of merchandise. The book constitutes a separate universe, one that is entirely distinct from action, one without an exterior, its own island of intensity. Following this text’s publication, a debate began among German philosophers who detected a flaw in Kant’s reasoning. How can you determine the owner of a speech? Could ownership be based on the ideas that a speech develops? No, the philosophers will say, ideas belong to everyone; an authorized speech is characterized only by its format. Its “format,” which means style, or the expression of an individual genius. Here we come full circle: the magical unity of this object that is already no longer an object is based on the most immaterial act of appropriation possible, that of style, of individual expression.

    *

    Now we have a better understanding of Tiqqun and the Tarnac case. We understand why it’s really a literary trial about the very nature of books, which unfolds in the middle of a period that endlessly declares its own crisis. Because a large part of the trial revolved around a question that seems, nonetheless, unfounded: Are you the authors of this book? We also have a better understanding of the irony expressed by a letter to the editor that begins like this, “Despite its appearance it does not behave like a book, but like a publishing virus.” We’re not really talking about moderates and we know it: “The book is a dead form, in so far as it was holding its reader in the same fraudulent completeness, in the same esoteric arrogance as the classic Subject in front of his peers, no less than the classic figure of ‘Man’.” The structure built on unity and completeness trembles, this structure which associates subject, man, and the individual; as Tiqqun’s authors tell us, this structure which is not classic but modern will not hold if its ultimate symbol, the book, loses its identity as a dense block, enclosed, locked, and utopic… if the book opens, instead, to propagation. What follows in the letter is no less suggestive: “The end of institution always perceives itself like the end of an illusion,” rightly characterizing the book as an imaginary institution that is nothing less than the establishing force of the imaginary. “And indeed, it is also the content of truth that causes this outdated thing to be determined a delusion, which then appears as such. So that beyond their character of ending, the great books have never ceased to be those which succeeded in creating a community; in other words, the Book has always had its existence outside of the self, an idea which was only completely accepted fairly recently.”

    And here we arrive at the center of what Glenn Beck was so worried about, these weird communities of readers who meet in order to translate The Coming Insurrection or to read it out loud in a coffee shop. These communities that might have, why not?, read the passage in The Coming Insurrection that potentially inspired the sabotage of the train lines, a passage that talks about flows of communication.[1] There are no more clear borders, and this is terrible for Glenn Beck and those like him. By the way, he talks about borders in his sermon, you know the ones, the borders that nice New York liberals want to abolish. The modern book (its enclosed nature as Tiqqun’s writers put it; this stable, institutional and closed site, as Jacques Derrida writes), was designed to be a border between an inside and an outside, between the body and the mind. Within a reality that was a parallelepiped and symbolically triangular, the book formed a world that belonged to it alone, a world that was perfectly symmetrical, where communication, which had become abstract, was a process that took place between an author and a public, with the publisher as its intermediary. According to Tiqqun’s writers, in fact, reality, this cannot hold any longer. It is not the book itself that can no longer hold, but a certain configuration of the book, one that must be reprogrammed. “You are well placed to ascertain that the end of the Book does not signify its brutal disappearance from the social circulation, but on the contrary, its absolute proliferation […] In this phase there are indeed still books, but they are only there to shelter the corrosive effects of PUBLISHING VIRUSES. The publishing virus exposes the principle of incompleteness, the fundamental insufficiency that is in the foundation of the published work. With the most explicit mentions, with the most crudely convenient indications – address, contact, etc.—it increases itself in the sense of realizing the community that it lacks, the virtual community made up of its real-life readers. It suddenly puts the reader in such a position that his withdrawal may no longer be tenable, a position where the withdrawal of the reader can no longer be neutral.” The authors of Tiqqun bring out the big word, community, to tell us something: the book was neutralized during modernity in order to found a community of citizen-consumers of representative democracy. Tiqqun wants to detach the book from this neutralization, to rediscover the savagery characteristic of the end of the eighteenth century.

    *

    And they succeed in doing this, even before they launch their ships full of explosives, their lead bricks aimed at literature’s soft parts, I mean their three books, The Coming Insurrection, To Our Friends, and Now. In the end maybe Glenn Beck does have the kind of understanding that strikes in dazzling and temporary intuitions. But as he hadn’t read the book yet when he did his broadcast, he couldn’t possibly have known that one of the book’s most scandalous possibilities is the association of the ideal identifier of a literary style, which is to say the idealized expression of a coherent unit, with an imaginary and collective authorship. As if from now on community were possible. This is what makes The Coming Insurrection a dangerous book.

    But it wasn’t so visible, when this savagery, this malfunctioning of the modern book, its absolute proliferation became more and more obvious near the beginning of the twenty-first century, as though it was a question of an increasingly natural environment in which we were evolving. Something in the spread of texts and data changed. Like at the end of our hero’s eighteenth century, remember when anarchy reigned, they published anything and everything, translated hastily, borrowed and copied: books become dangerous, they are real viruses that contaminate the sick bodies of traditional monarchies. Books emerge from the body of books, reach public spaces, digital environments, panic-stricken minds.

    I don’t know what you’ll think about this but I recently read a statistic which I found far-fetched but also extremely significant. There may be more people who have published something in the twenty years surrounding the new millennium than there have been people published in the entire history of humanity. The fantasmatic bubble of the modern book, that which we owe to Kant, has burst. But, needless to say, the book has survived as it has for the past three thousand years. And it will continue to. In this new millennium, it is less autotelic, it is being reconfigured outside of itself, it is spreading, it is coming back to what it is, a temporary capturing of data, of memories, of imaginaries, of fictions, open to all possible uses. A capturing, a treatment, a production of flows, in a world that is no longer what it was, and that hardly disguises itself in different clothes, state, nation, democracy, but not what brings us together, from European post-democracies to illiberal democracies, from authoritarian regimes to populist democracies, this is what the Invisible Committee stated in To Our Friends, their second book, that used a slogan from the movement against CPE, a proposed liberalization of labor laws targeting young people in 2006: “It’s through flows that this world is maintained. Block everything!” It’s so beautiful that it is hard to believe, especially when we remember the passage from The Coming Insurrection that set off the so-called “Tarnac” case.

    Reread the footnote from before: “The technical infrastructure of the metropolis is vulnerable”… The police state wasn’t mistaken when it isolated this passage of the book to get its operations off the ground. The Invisible Committee took hold of the message and shifted the heart of its political analysis from the question of insurrection to the question of flows. “Power is Logistic, Block Everything!” is the title of one chapter in To Our Friends, but this idea comes back all the time, for example here: “There is no world government; what there is instead is a worldwide network of local apparatuses of government, that is, a global, reticular, counterinsurgency machinery.” From one book to another, our political gaze is shifted from the question of democracy to the question of what literary theorist Yves Citton calls mediocracy. Mediocracy or taking over the power of flows, their orientation, their management. Democracies are perhaps nothing more than stories told by mediocracies and fictions are perhaps nothing more than the production of flows. Mediocracy and mythocracy are predicated on each other. And let’s say it, this thing isn’t even new, which doesn’t make it any less interesting. Whenever the Invisible Committee brings up contemporary metropoles, one could just as easily go back 5000 years to when the first cities came into existence, and with them the first writings, and the first totalizing fictions (religions, economies, politics, arts) because the urban world is by nature mediocracy, management of flows, of data, externalization of a memory, quantification, and fictionalization of exchanges in order to produce ties and to maintain order. The whole paradox of literature is that it uses these same tools, that it is exactly pharmakon, poison and antidote. Literary history doesn’t stop telling it to us, telling this story of literary fiction that can save us from fictions of power, but that functions with the same data. One finds it in One Thousand and One Nights, in The Decameron, in Don Quixote. Each one of these works brings to mind a particular moment of mediocracy in which literary fictions are presented as counterfictions. But how do things stand when the mass of flows, of data, is no longer the means by which regimes function but the very heart of governance? How do things stand when media and fiction are developed to such a point that there no longer seem to be any exteriorities?

    What happened next proved it. We have found nothing better for this than books, or rather than literature, whether it appears in the guise of books, of publishing viruses or mutant ancient matter. We have found nothing better than counterfictions because, across from them, fiction reigns, whether it feeds itself with the flows of high-speed trains, notes from intelligence agencies or news broadcasts. The so-called “Tarnac” case states code names like hardboiled fiction titles, far-left, anarcho-autonomists, terrorists, interior enemies, these code names soon become government techniques. They invade news broadcasts, mainstream press and bewitch it. But across from them, the look-outs are watching closely. This time, they are called Tiqqun or the Invisible Committee, and their fiction is no less effective. They begin by interrupting flows, then they state their counterfiction, they say that the insurrection is coming, that they are countless and that they do not take the form of a body, but of a virus. Poison versus virus, that’s the equation that is the basis for literary fiction and that justifies it. Power is panic-stricken and reacts violently because nothing terrifies it more than publishing viruses that are opposed to the poison that it instills. Nothing makes it panic more than this multiplicity. In ten years, the look-outs have let go of nothing, in one thousand and one nights of instruction they will have made the fiction of these contemporary Shâriyâr visible and will have made fools of them.

    That’s where we were. At the beginning of the twenty-first century, the flows were out of control and it was up to us to invest the dangerousness of books and of literary fictions, at times to stop them and to capture them, at times to spread them. To have stated that, and stated it in a book, is what sent nine young people to prison, without any valid motive.

    _____

    Lionel Ruffel is the author of Brouhaha: Worlds of the Contemporary (Trans. Raymond MacKenzie. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2018).

    Notes

    [1] “The technical infrastructure of the metropolis is vulnerable. Its flows amount to more than the transportation of people and commodities. Information and energy circulates via wire networks, fibers and channels, and these can be attacked. Nowadays sabotaging the social machine with any real effect involves reappropriating and reinventing the ways of interrupting its networks. How can a TGV line or an electrical network be rendered useless? How does one find the weak points in computer networks, or scramble radio waves and fill screens with white noise?”

  • Myka Tucker-Abramson — Make Literary Criticism Great Again (Review of David Alworth’s Site Reading: Fiction, Art, Social Form)

    Myka Tucker-Abramson — Make Literary Criticism Great Again (Review of David Alworth’s Site Reading: Fiction, Art, Social Form)

    David Alworth, Site Reading: Fiction, Art, Social Form (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2018)

    by Myka Tucker-Abramson[i]

    David Alworth’s Site Reading: Fiction, Art, Social Form (2015) is an illuminating product of the reading debates that have erupted since Bruno Latour unilaterally declared the exhaustion of critique and the non-existence of society. It is, as Lee Konstantinou aptly notes, the first book (and certainly the first book on US literature) that “practices the new mode of reading it also proposes” (2018: 1). Where most anti-critique theorists simply criticise critique whilst proscribing other modes of reading, Alworth’s book actually enacts his. And he has been lavishly praised for doing so. Site Reading has been called “bracing and beautiful” (Konstantinou 1) and “ingenious” (Davidson 2017: np), celebrated for providing “ontological solutions” to a fundamental “fear of the other […and] the future of the West” (Raw 2017:183), and heralded as telling “the genuinely exciting story not only of postwar American fiction but also of a young scholar coming to claim a voice of his own” (Fleissner 2016: np). But while Alworth’s attempt to both proscribe and perform a New Materialist literary criticism does make Site Reading an important book, its importance lies neither in its “ingenuity” or the “exciting” event of a Harvard professor finding his scholarly voice. Rather, the book’s importance is as a case study for why academics at elite universities are excited about this post-critical turn and why the rest of us should be deeply concerned.

    “Site reading,” as a new mode of reading, draws together Latourian “sociology,” “environmental criticism,” and new “textual-materialist approaches” (2015: 2) in order to answer the question: “How does literary fiction theorize social experience?” (2). Alworth argues that it does so by “transposing real sites into narrative settings and thereby rendering them operative, as figures in and of collective life” (2). Site Reading thus claims to be theorising (or perhaps simply appreciating the theorisation that the novels are already doing? It’s not quite clear given the book’s New Materialist claims that novels seem perfectly capable of theorising all on their own) the new form of sociality or collectivity that the novel, and this new way of reading the novel, reveals. I will return later to this question of what kind of new mode of collectivity such a reading generates, but first we need to lay out Alworth’s argument.

    At the heart of Site Reading are four basic claims. First, that Latour’s vision of the social – which he defines as “not a constituted setting or container where anything can be situated, but a ‘process of assembling’ whereby persons, things, texts, ideas, images and another entities (all of which are considered actor or actants) form contingent and volatile networks of association” (3) – is vastly superior to the Durkheimian understanding of the social as a form of totality, “the supreme class under which all other classes must be subsumed” (Durkeim qtd on p3) and thus that Latour should be the model of sociology we use in literary studies. Second, that in fact literary fiction already does the kind of sociology Latour advocates for and so we have much to learn from novels. Third, that literature does this Latourian sociology through its engagement with “sites,” a term that Alworth draws from the confluence of Michel Foucault’s assertion in the heterotopias lecture of 1967 that “our epoch is one in which space takes for us the form of relations among sites” (qtd. on 22) and Robert Smithson’s claim in Artforum that “the unknown areas of sites can best be explored by artists” (22). And fourth, that this process is easier to see if we read literary texts through and alongside artistic texts because of the way that site-specific artworks, specifically the US ones produced in the 1960s, 70s, and 80s, is so explicit in its embeddedness with sites.

    It’s worth noting given the reception of Alworth’s book that most of these moves – reading literature as sociology, focusing on location or sites, and reading across art and literature – are not new. They are the standard fare of literary criticism. And this means that the stakes of the book’s repetitive claims to newness rest almost entirely on Alworth’s distinction between Durkheimian and Latourian sociology. Alworth belabors this distinction because, he claims, this distinction amounts to nothing less than a paradigm shift in literary studies. Most notably, he argues that Durkheim’s notion of the social “has been widely (if implicitly) accepted within literary studies” (3) and has even formed the basis for the form of reading that now gets called critique. As proof of this, Alworth cites Frederic Jameson’s placement of Durkheim’s definition of society as a totality as the second epigraph to Political Unconscious. In Alworth’s account, Jameson reads literary texts as “socially symbolic acts” (3-4), that are ultimately subsumed by the totality of the Durkheimian social, and thus, presumably because of Jameson’s popularity, this kind of sociological thinking has become the unconscious operation that critique-based modes of literary criticism carry out. There are serious questions to be asked about this very peculiar elision of Jameson with Durkheim, and Alworth’s lack of direct engagement with Jameson, given that Durkheim plays a quite minor and often antagonistic role in Political Unconscious.[ii] There are also serious questions about his claim that Durkheim of all people is the sociological unconscious of all Jameson-inspired literary criticism. However, we need to accept this premise if we are to engage with Alworth’s argument so we will do so—at least for now.

    The experiment of Site Reading is thus to ask what literary studies (or at least post-war US literary studies –questions of scale or periodisation are never really dealt with) looks like when read via a Latourian mode of sociology in which “there is no such thing as society” (4)? What new form of sociality or collectivity will emerge? Alworth terms this new sociology “Supermarket Sociology” and whilst it is largely derived from Latour who illustrates his Actor Network Theory through the example of a supermarket, it also takes the literariness of Latour’s method. Thus, Alworth’s “supermarket sociology” comes equally from novels (namely Don DeLillo’s White Noise) and artwork (especially that of Andy Warhol), and the supermarket itself, which he ultimately argues might also be “the origin of postmodernism” (38). Here we catch a glimpse of what might be new about Alworth’s methodology: Alworth identifies the origin of social science methodologies in literary artefacts, at the same time that those literary and cultural artefacts are themselves shown to be generated at and even authored by sites themselves, which are in turn theorised by sociologists.

    Having established the book’s Ouroborusian ethos and methodology in Chapter 1, Alworth organizes the rest of the book around four sites: dumps, ruins, roads, and asylums. Each of those sites, he argues, is key to understanding post-war US politics and culture, and each serves as a laboratory where he can test his new sociological-literary methodology. Each chapter presents a crowded assemblage of predominantly white and hyper-masculine novels, artworks, and spaces. For instance, in the chapter on “dumps,” William Burroughs’s Naked Lunch is put into conversation with Don DeLillo’s Underworld, John Dos Passos’s The Garbage Man, the work of the criminally underappreciated artist Mierle Laderman Ukeles, and the philosophy of Maurice Merleau-Ponty; the chapter on “roads” brings together Jack Kerouac’s On the Road and Joan Didion’s Play It as It Lays with Robert Creeley’s poem “I know a Man,” the Merry Pranksters, the work of Tom Wolfe, the photographs of Robert Frank, Ed Ruscha, the crushed-car sculptures of John Chamberlain, the art writing of Michael Fried and Robert Smithson, and the urban activism and writings of Ralph Nader and Jane Jacobs. By far one of the most exciting aspects of Alworth’s experiments are the encounters, or even collectivities, that emerge between these texts. As well, these pairings and the connections he draws across them draw our attention to the rich world of objects and sites underpinning post-war American fiction – from the kotex and washing machines of the dump to the camera, brief-case, chain link, and phonograph in the asylum.

    However, what is less immediately evident is exactly how Alworth is de- or re-materialising post-war American fiction through the figure of the site or why he is so keen to draw a distinction between traditional categories such as space or place. How exactly is Alworth’s new materialism, which locates the origins of postmodern in the supermarket, or minimalism’s origins in “road trip” (91) different from the kind of “old” materialist work carried out by Henri Lefebvre, David Harvey or Kristin Ross in their work on Paris? From Neil Smith’s work on New York? Eric Avilla’s work on suburbanising post-war Los Angeles? Or even Jameson’s engagement with the Bonaventure hotel in downtown LA? Aren’t all of those critics committed to thinking spatially and materially about culture, sociality, ideology, and collectivity?

    I use urban examples deliberately because one of the notable things about Alworth’s sites is that they are predominantly connected to post-war processes of urbanization and suburbanization. Yet the city or urban space is inexplicably absent in his account of the site. This is particularly important given that the vast majority of his sites are located in New York City (and to a lesser extent Los Angeles) between the end of World War II and the foreclosure of what Joshua Freeman calls “Working-Class New York” with the fiscal crisis and financial takeover of the city in 1975 (often read as one of the originary moments of neoliberalism [Harvey 2005: 44-8]). What is the relationship between sites and the urban? Or for that matter, the national or the international, given the book’s completely untheorized US-focus? And why, for Alworth, is Site Reading distinct from work on what Kanishka Goondewardena terms the “urban sensorium,” that is work that theorises the crucial role that “urban space” plays in “media[ing] space and produc[ing] hegemony while aestheticizing politics” (2005: 46)? This is particularly curious given the historical relationship between situationism, psychogeography, urban studies (especially Lefebvre) and site-specific art work. Because Alworth never seriously engages with these thinkers aside from an epigraph by Lefebvre (a somewhat bewildering choice given the book’s critique of society as a meaningful category), a casual reference or two to Ross, and a few lines of Benjamin (which are filtered through other scholars), there is no explicit answer.[iii]

    I suspect Alworth’s response would be that, as with Jameson, these authors’ Marxism means they subscribe to a kind of Durkheimian social totality and thus social determinism. But given Jameson’s own critique of Durkheim’s “conservative […] positivism” (288) and his fundamentally dialectical methodology, which emphasizes that Totality, the Real, or History (and thus the “social”) are always immanent, in flux, and ultimately changeable, this is not a satisfying answer. Instead, I think we have to, as Alworth himself recommends (via his second favourite sociologist, Irving Goffman), use an “inductive” (134) methodology to ascertain the actual nature of Alworth’s disagreement with Jameson and his Marxist ilk.

    And I think we can posit a couple of disagreements. While all of the “old ‘materialist’” scholars I mentioned previously focus on place or space, their interest is ultimately not in space itself, which they are all careful to emphasize is not absolute but rather determined or “produced” by “actual process of capital accumulation” (Smith 2008: 113). For these thinkers, sites can never be examined in isolation, but rather are always connected to the interlinked processes of colonialism and the formation of the world market. This means spatial thinking still upholds the centrality of the human and human action. As Neil Smith bluntly puts it, “there can be no apology for […] anthropomorphism […]: with the development of capitalism, human society has put itself at the centre of nature” (8).

    For Alworth, by contrast, (as with much of what is alternately called new materialism, or object-oriented ontology), anthropomorphism is one of the big failings of traditional sociology. Thus he wants to refigure sites and objects as independent actors, or actants, that are able to act upon the world, shaping societies and even authoring texts. In his reading of Smithson’s nonsite art work, for instance, he argues that “the site itself has already performed some measure of authorial labor, furnishing source materials (i.e., ‘the physical, raw reality’) as well as a certain logic that the artist, as ‘geologic agent’ is excavating and presenting” (104). One claim Alworth makes repeatedly is that society is constructed by the “flux of interactions between humans and nonhumans” (33), and that the sociology these novels and artworks do is one of theorising this flux. Thus, Site Readings is organised around these reorientations from a sociology based on social struggle to one based on the scandal of the nonhuman—consider, for example, his reading of John Updike’s short story “A&P” which narrates a psychosexual conflict when three girls walk into an A&P wearing nothing but bathing suits. But, Alworth argues, “The scandal of these girls […] is not their premature sexuality but their unwitting seizure of a display technology intended to ensure that nonhumans are always constituted as the objects of human attention” (40). Similarly, in his chapter on dumps he argues that the real shock of Naked Lunch isn’t its obscenity, but its refiguring of the “the social as rather than in a dump” (69, emphasis in original).

    But this then leads to a further question. If this decentering of the human is the main intervention of Alworth’s book, then why isn’t Alworth engaging in a conversation with the vast and diverse body of indigenous scholarship, which like the urban geographers mentioned above, is also resolutely place-based, but (like Alworth) breaks down the relationship between human and nonhuman actors? We can think, for example, of Kim TallBear’s work which “pushes back” against “scientific narratives of indigenous American genetic ‘origins’ by emphasizing “their emergence as particular cultural and language groups in social and cultural relation with nonhumans of all kinds – land formations, nonhuman animals, plants, and the elements in very particular places – their ‘homelands’ or ‘traditional territories’ for example” (2007: 186). Or we can think of what Glen Coulthard terms “grounded normativity” (2014: 53) to describe the “forms of knowledge” produced by Indigenous peoples out of “Indigenous struggles against capitalist imperialism” that are not only oriented around “struggles not only for land, but also deeply informed by what the land as a mode of reciprocal relationship (which is itself informed by place-based practices and associated form of knowledge) ought to teach us about living our lives in relation to one another and our surroundings in a respectful, nondominating and nonexploitative” (60). Where the social and geographic thinkers mentioned above all make at least a cameo in Site Reading, no indigenous scholarship is present. This is striking given the obvious resonances. It also means that again we have to be somewhat speculative in our articulation of how Alworth’s book differs from already existing work.

    Here too we can make a few inferences. First, whilst Alworth is interested in nonhuman actors, he does not seem to be particularly interested in land or nature. Sites are as much an alternative category to nature as they are to place, space or the urban. One thing that is striking about Alworth’s choice of sites, in fact, is that they are all human-built constructions. In fact, his sites are mostly forms of fixed capital designed and built at the moment of the US’s radical reorganisation of its own urban space and (as Alworth himself shows in his readings of Tangier in Burroughs and Malta in Pynchon) soon the world’s as it attained global hegemony. This leads to something of a conundrum in Alworth’s work: he wants to emphasize the relationship between human and nonhuman actors, but he wants to focus almost entirely on the relationship between humans and the things and spaces that humans have constructed under very specific historical circumstances.

    Second is that, as with theorists of the urban sensorium, much indigenous theory insists on something like totality in its focus on interconnection and systematicity, one that often returns to questions of capitalism and colonialism. Alworth, in contrast, wholly rejects totality and in fact one of the promises of the “site” is that it can be lifted up from its larger world and studied in isolation. Ultimately, what seems to differentiate “sites” from spaces, places, or nature, then, is that sites can be extricated from the social, political, and ideological processes that produced them. Read thusly, Alworth’s meaning of “site” is more rooted in the thinking of Irving Goffman (Alworth’s other favourite sociologist), who as Mark McGurl explains pays attention to the local stripped of its determinants or “historical consciousness” (2010: 334), than the 1970s site/nonsite artists. More specifically, Alworth’s understanding of a site can best be understood as an iteration of Goffman’s idea of that “total institution” (130), which Alworth takes up and defines as a “place of residence and work where a large number of like-situated individuals, cut off from the wider society for an appreciable period of time, together lead an enclosed, formally administered round of life” (qtd in 182).

    Indeed, throughout Site Reading, ruins, dumps, roads, and asylums are transformed into isolated, unique spaces that, while occasionally intersecting with larger social or political questions, can ultimately be extricated or separated from such questions and repurposed or resignified through individual acts of resistance. This isn’t to say these sites are entirely stripped of context: Alworth doesn’t think that context stinks. The road is mentioned alongside the Interstate Highway Act, the asylum is rooted in problems of segregation, and the ruins of Malta are tethered to the violence of World War II and the problem of how to rebuild. But while brushing up against these contexts, the sites themselves can ultimately moult these contexts to reveal broader, ontological “truths” about the nature of sites, human-nonhuman relations, or sociality.

    In that vision of extractable sites, we can finally grasp one of the key ways that Alworth breaks away from Jameson. For Jameson, famously, “history is what hurts” (102). In Alexander Galloway’s wonderful gloss,

    History hurts because history is full of the violence of capitalism, or what Jameson described as ‘the scars and marks of social fragmentation and monadization, and of the gradual separation of the public from the private’ and ‘the atomization of all hitherto existing forms of community or collective life.’  History hurts because of unemployment, proletarianization, and ‘pauperism.’  History hurts whenever material necessity wins out over social collectivity. (2016: 129)

    In his sites, Alworth has created a history and geography that doesn’t have to hurt. Sites after all are spaces where it doesn’t even make sense to speak of a distinction between social collectivity and material necessity both because the collective is ultimately between the individual and his or her materials and because sites themselves can be isolated and extracted from any kind of necessity. This is one of the promises and seductions of Alworth’s sites: that they are enclaves, isolated spots that allow us to escape the nightmare of history and geography. Thus, at every turn the book attempts to achieve isolation in the face of the horror of interconnection.

    Alworth’s operation is staged most explicitly in his reading of Naked Lunch. The chapter opens with a retreat from Tangier as the site of Naked Lunch to “the small room in the Villa Muniria where its author sat at his typewriter” (54) and ends with a description of the potential pitfall of Latour’s “actant” vision: namely “a junk world where no ontological distinctions matter because everything is destined to become a single degraded substance, call it abdicated flesh, rotten ectoplasm, or putrid lymph” (72). Most of the chapters open with some fearful vision of this “single degraded substance” – the mass of objects in the supermarket which so often end up as a putrid mass at the dump or the bomb-blasted sites that compose the ruins section – before offering a containment strategy, a “shoring up” (120) against this chaos. We can see this containment in Alworth’s focus on the equally hermetic space of the car in the Roads chapter and in the refiguring of the section on Ruins into a study of bomb shelters and the megaliths of Hagar Quim.

    Perhaps the most fleshed out example of this “shoring up” is in the only not exclusively white chapter, on the “Asylum,” in which Alworth refigures the manhole where Ralph Ellison’s Invisible Man concludes as a “site of refuge from” (127) both the the national “system of constitutionally sanctioned segregation” (146-7) and the “pathogen[esis]” of Harlem (139) – a questionable term given the history of urban planners deploying the public health language of “pathogenesis” in order to justify the displacement and gentrification of black and Puerto Rican neighborhoods (Corburn 2009: 27). In Alworth’s account, the narrator achieves this diminished suffering by replacing the troubled community with a community of objects, both by “tapping into the electrical grid” (146) and by “tinker[ing] with objects and fantasiz[ing] about acquiring more” (143). The site of diminished suffering, then, is one that is free of others, a site in which communities of people are replaced with the community between a man and his possessions.

    This passage is important because it provides a roadmap to Alworth’s own methodology: the identification and celebration of “sites of diminished suffering” that swap out the social for the object which is really the commodity. But this strategy comes at a cost. While Ellison’s subterranean hole may offer an escape against the national problem of segregation, it is also a site of escape from Harlem itself and the actual communities and fraught collectivities therein (the communist party, the black nationalists, the rioters, and so forth). Not only does Alworth’s solution replicate the Cold War strategy of buying off and privatizing certain facets of the (largely white) working-class with the promise of private, individualized spaces and a dizzying array of goods while criminalizing and neglecting the (largely racialized) rest, but Alworth’s levelling equation of Ellison’s critique of nation-wide segregation with his critique of Harlem and specific movements therein is precisely the problem with this methodology. It flattens out very uneven histories and makes questions of power or social sedimentation illegible. And this finally brings us closer to understanding the new form of collectivity that Alworth is after: one between a man and his objects, and thus one free of social antagonism, conflict, and the messiness of actual collectivity and sociality.

    For Jameson, by contrast, collectivity is a necessarily political and antagonistic project; collectivity by its very nature emerges “as a result of the struggle between groups or classes” (1982: 289). All forms of collectivity, Jameson writes, are first and foremost expressions of some kind of “class consciousness” (290-1). And while this may not be ideal, he argues, “in a fragmented social life – that is, essentially in all class societies – the political thrust of the struggle of all groups against each other can never be immediately universal but must always necessarily be focused on the call enemy” (290). It is ultimately this struggle that Alworth seeks to escape. In his luscious descriptions of supermarkets and dumps, asylums and roads, Alworth seeks to rewrite these sites – sites of some of the most pitched, collective battles over the meaning of US global power – into spaces of evenness free of social strife, or at least into space where strife is resolvable. This is a collectivity that seeks to imagine the recent past as already in this Utopian or classless society and thus one that is free of desire or demand, which is to say free of politics. But in a society that isn’t classless and that is wrenched with racial, gendered, and classed antagonisms, such a projection can only end up serving the most reactionary and conservative of politics.

    Peculiarly, Alworth seems aware of, and averse to, this result. Throughout the book he wrestles with this problem of isolationism, concluding somewhat remarkably with a denunciation of it in his coda, “Site Unseen.” In this coda, Alworth turns to Cormac McCarthy’s The Road, which he reads as imagining another kind of site/enclave: the bunker. Alworth is at his most powerful in this coda where he argues that the fantasy the bunker fulfills is to allow the “the two main characters [to] inhabit the fantasy of a preapocalyptic ordinary. Their interactions bespeak a kind of subdued pleasure” (150). Their desire for this “preapocalyptic ordinary,” Alworth rightfully reads as symptomatic of a contemporary desire for the same, something that Alworth, here if not in the rest of the book, roundly rejects. “In such a world,” he argues, “the bunker can provide only false recuperation, until the potentially redemptive moment of the Rapture, as the scene’s final simile suggests by likening its ‘faintly lit hatchway’ to ‘a grave yawning at judgment day in some old apocalyptic painting’” (152). This seems to be the moment when Alworth “comes to claim his voice,” to return to Fleissner’s glowing review, by recognizing the fatal flaw in his own book, that his sites are ultimately a literary criticism from the position of the bunker, an attempt to “inhabit the fantasy of a preapocalyptic ordinary” (150). Its “potentially redemptive” focus on the site is necessarily false, because it is based on willful blindness to the world in which these books were written and the world in which he writes, something that becomes most evident if we turn to what is ultimately the most important “site” in the whole book: the twinned sites of the fictional room in Emma Donoghue’s Room and Alworth’s own classroom.

    The introduction focuses on Room’s main character, Jack, as a model of the kind of human/non-human collectivity Alworth imagines. “It is easy,” Alworth writes, “to say that this utterly traumatized subject looks to objects, the only objects he has ever known, for stability amid stress and chaos, but there is more to Donoghue’s project […] As Jack familiarizes himself with Outside Space, he defamiliarizes our world for us, spotlighting its conventionality and artificiality” (9). Alworth is absolutely right to note that “Jack’s Room constitutes a social dystopia that nonetheless registers as a structuralist utopia” (10). But what I’m interested in here is the indirect link that Alworth draws between the Jack and his mother’s room in Room and the imagined or ontological classroom with which Site Reading opens. Alworth describes the classroom, which comes to frame the book, thusly:

    The class appears to be an ordinary social unit, composed of people and their internalized protocols of behavior, and this unit appears to be acting out its own protocols in this setting (the setting of the classroom) through a discussion of narrative setting. But then, much to the chagrin of a certain student, something happens. As the instructor is introducing the novel, a loud ringtone interrupts her remarks, and suddenly everybody looks away from the Powerpoint. (4)

    Alworth’s classroom is, like all his sites, buzzing with the relationships between human and nonhuman actors. And this he argues isn’t a bad thing at all. The disruptions of cellphone rings – the chagrin of all of us in the classroom– is in fact “central to the pedagogical enterprise” (5). This, for Alworth, exemplifies his claim that “it makes no sense to distinguish the class (as a social unit) from the material environment of the class” (5). Of course Alworth’s choice of the class is important because while Alworth can see the space of the class as equally important to the social unit of the class, there is a class that remains absent: the class structure underpinning both the built environment and social unit of the class. This is presumably a class at Harvard, after all.

    While Alworth can think about space and technology, like Jack in Room, Alworth cannot or will not think about the Outside Space of his (class)room. He doesn’t ask if the classroom is at an Ivy League university, a state university, at a community college, or perhaps even at a for-profit university like the University of Phoenix. He doesn’t ask about who the students are – whether they’re relatively privileged students whose parents are able to pay, whether they’re crippled by debt or working multiple jobs; whether they’re mature students; UPS workers taking night classes at 3am, – or about the conditions of the teacher – is (s)he tenured, permanent, precarious, working across multiple campuses, waking at 3am to teach workers at night school – or about the city or state or country, or world that that learning takes place in. He doesn’t ask if #metoo has entered his classroom or #whyismysyllabussowhite; if the classroom is at Harvard, whether the students have joined striking dining workers; or how students are responding to the newly unveiled plaque revealing the centrality of slave money to its founding, or how any of these experiences might shape the students or teacher’s relationship to literature, history, or theory. He doesn’t ask who is calling or what the phone is being used for or what the processes are that made the phone. Object, sites, and social units all appear without a history, fully formed and autonomous within an isolated site.

    Thus we are able to arrive at sentences like this: “On those serendipitous afternoons, when the discussion of literary art assumes a kind of urgency and tacks in a surprising and challenging direction, the social network can feel quite immediate and intimate: just the teacher and the students thinking together with the text” (5). But when is it ever “just the teacher and student thinking together with the text”? When is the classroom ever free of its larger pressures? This is ultimately what Alworth wants from Latour and Goffman: a “site” stripped of its determining factors. Thus, when Alworth claims that Durkheimian society is too deterministic, it is difficult not to read this as a form of willful blindness, both to the forces that shape a text and more immediately to the academic system for which he labours.

    And yet, again, Alworth does smuggle such histories into his book, particularly if we consider the second text about a violent and troubled man who builds a bunker that Alworth (via Donoghue) brings into the introduction: namely Robinson Crusoe. Alworth somewhat improbably reads Ian Watt’s well known claim in Rise of the Novel that Defoe “‘annihilated the relationships of the traditional social order’” and in its place constructed “‘a network of personal relationships on a new and conscious pattern’” (qtd in 9) as referring to his protagonist’s “interactions with human others, nonhuman animals, and even material things” (9). For Watt, Robinson Crusoe is a parable of the development of “homo economicus” and “puritan individualism” (1967: 74, emphasis in original) alongside the development of capitalism, but also registers the conditions of the parable: specifically, the “fortunate decease of all the other potential stockholders” and his “looting” of tools from the shipwreck (87) and more generally, the extraction of “gold, slaves, and tropical products” from the colonies “on which the future progress of capitalism depended” (67). And indeed, if we consider the violence that led to Jack’s birth, Room’s operation is not so very different. Alworth, however, pushes this context to the side, arguing that whilst “by the end of the novel, long after he has discovered the cannibals and enslaved Friday, Crusoe certainly envisions himself as an emperor surrounded by subjects and treasures [….] his arduous journey to that point occasions one of literary history’s most searching mediations on social ontology” (9). Just like The Road’s protagonists in the bunker, hidden away from the world, Alworth’s “social” ontology refuses to engage with the social itself. This also suggests that Alworth’s imagined classroom with its harmonious collectivity between human and nonhuman actors is, like Crusoe’s Island, dependant on an erasure of the conditions of violence, enclosure, enslavement, and theft that underpin the University (and especially the elite university) system.

    We can now begin to understand what Jord(ana) Rosenberg means in their stunning reading of the new materialisms or “ontological turn” (2014: np), when they argue that “the urge towards objects comports itself in a very particular fashion, one that will be familiar to scholars of colonialism and settler-colonialism, and that calls to mind any number of New-World-style fantasies about locations unmediated by social order” (np). For Rosenberg, this new form of ontology enacts: “a primitivist fantasy that hinges on the violent erasure of the social: the conjuring of a realm – an ‘ancestral realm’ – that exists in the present, but in parallax to historical time […and] a terra nullius of the theoretical landscape […that] mediate a dual intensification specific to the present: that of neoliberal forms of settler colonialism and financialized capital accumulation” (np). Read alongside Rosenberg, the seemingly disparate elisions and erasures in Alworth’s argument that I have been tracing come into relief. His erasure of the history of objects, his erasure of indigenous forms of scholarship that deal with questions of animate and inanimate objects; his erasure of social antagonisms implicit in the history of these objects, his overwhelmingly white archive, and his erasure of the conditions of the academic system he labors under all emerge as a unified and cohesive strategy to violently “wrench matter free of the social, of mediation, of relation” (np).

    But Alworth’s book also helps to illustrate Rosenberg’s argument by laying bare the ideology of the ontological. Rosenberg argues that the lure of this ontological turn provides a “line of flight […] a way out of capitalist logics and repetitions” (np). What Alworth reveals is one form of fantasy this line of flight takes: isolationism. But this isolationism doesn’t get us out of the material conditions of neoliberal, financialised, and global capitalism, but only embeds us more deeply within them. And if there is any doubt about the intrinsic connection between these neoliberal forms of settler colonialism and financialisation on the one hand and the ideology of isolationism on the other, we need only turn to the new fantasy of populist political isolationism that Donald Trump has evoked through the US-Mexico wall, the increased policing of its borders through policies like the Muslim ban, and its detention of migrants and especially migrant children, all of which serve to promote the fantasy that the US can cast off globalisation, history, and even ecological limits and return to some prelapsarian state of isolated, yet all-powerful greatness.

    In what ultimately turns out to be Alworth’s most important contribution, then, Site Reading provides us with an answer to the question of what exactly these new materialisms do: they conjure a literature and a literary history that doesn’t hurt, and in doing so, promise to make literary criticism great again.

    WORKS CITED

    Alworth, David. 2015. Site Reading: Fiction, Art, Social Form. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

    Brennan, Timothy. 2010. “Running and Dodging: The Rhetoric of Doubleness in Contemporary Theory.” New Literary History, 41.2, 277-299.

    Coulthard, Glen. 2014. Red Skin, White Masks: Rejecting the Colonial Politics of Recognition. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

    Corburn, Jason. 2009. Toward the Healthy City: People, Places, and the Politics of Urbna Planning. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

    Davidson, Michael. 2017 “From Classroom to Asylum.” Novel: A Forum on Fiction, 50.1, 123-127.

    Fleissner, Jennifer. 2016. “Jennifer L. Fleissner reviews Site Reading.” Critical Inquiry. https://criticalinquiry.uchicago.edu/jennifer_l._fleissner_reviews_site_reading/

    Freeman, Joshua. 2001. Working-Class New York: Life and Labor Since World War II. New York: The New Press.

    Galloway, Alexander. 2016. “History is What Hurts: On Old Materialism.” Social Text 34.2, 125-141.

    Goonewardena, Kanishka. 2005 “The Urban Sensorium: Space, Ideology, and the Aestheticization of Politics.” Antipode 37, 46-71.

    Harvey, David. 2005. A Brief History of Neoliberalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Jameson, Fredric. 1982. Political Unconscious: Narrative as Socially Symbolic Act. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press,

    Konstantinou, Lee. 2018. “Review of Site Reading.” ALH Online Review, Series XIV. https://academic.oup.com/DocumentLibrary/ALH/Online%20Review%20Series%2014/14Lee%20Konstantinou.pdf

    McGurl, Mark. 2010. “Ordinary Doom: Literary Studies in the Waste Land of the Present.” New Literary History 41.2, 329-349.

    Raw, Lawrence. 2017. “Review.” Journal of American Culture 40.2, 183-4.

    Rosenberg, Jordana. 2014. “The Molecularization of Sexuality: On Some Primitivisms of the Present.” Theory & Event 17.2.

    Smith, Neil. 2008. Uneven Development: Nature, Capital, and the Production of Space. Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press.

    TallBear, Kim. 2017. “Beyond the Life/Not-Life Binary: A Feminist-Indigenous Reading of Cryopreservation, Interspecies Thinking, and the New Materialism” in Cryopolitics: Frozen Life in a Melting World, edited by Radin, Joanna and Emma Kowal, 179-202. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

    Watts, Ian. 1967. The Rise of the Novel. London: Lowe & Brydon.

    [i] Thanks to Molly Geidel, Nicole Aschoff, and Arne DeBoever for the conversations and feedback that helped shape this review.

    [ii] In fact, Alworth’s engagement with Jameson is limited to this comment about the Durkheim passage quoted above: “While this passage encapsulates precisely what Latour rejects, the notion of society as a sui generis totality that ‘includes all things,’ it also forms part of the second epigraph to one of the most influential works of literary criticism, Fredric Jameson’s The Political Unconscious: Narrative as a Socially Symbolic Act (1981). The latter, as Best and Marcus explain, ‘popularized symptomatic reading among U.S. literary critics,’ establishing the protocols for a certain method of historicism that remains important to this day” (3). Alworth in other words doesn’t actually read or engage with Jameson or any of the US literary critics who engage with him. Instead he flattens all of Jameson’s work, not to mention all of the US criticism that engages with Jameson into a bad reading of Durkheim based solely on an epigraph and a single comment by two other critics.

    [iii] In this, Alworth’s work is underpinned by one of the key “theoretical gestures” (280) that Timothy Brennan has identified as marking this new literary sociology: namely a retreat from the dialogic in which a statement is “always an engagement with the thought of others” (282, emphasis in original). As Brennan explains, contemporary theory has been marked by a strange tendency in which “Although its arguments are fierce and unyielding, and although it views its opponents as implacable enemies, it never argues with them by identifying a counterauthority against which new evidence of reasoning has to be offered. Instead, it associates conceptual depth and gravity with the disembodied utterance” (282).  

     

  • Nasrin Olla — Metamorphic Humanity (Review of Achille Mbembe’s Critique of Black Reason)

    Nasrin Olla — Metamorphic Humanity (Review of Achille Mbembe’s Critique of Black Reason)

    Achille Mbembe, Critique of Black Reason, trans. Laurent Dubois (Durham: Duke University Press, 2017).

    by Nasrin Olla

    This review has been peer-reviewed by the b2o editorial board.

    I

    While the human has always been the unstable and troubled ground of humanistic inquiry, one can’t help feeling that in our neoliberal and digital age, the very tectonics of that ground are shifting. Everywhere one looks, objects of technology are becoming phantom limbs of the human body, producing sensations of attachment, whilst remaining detachable. Alongside these spectral appendages, neoliberal forms of reason do much to encourage students, citizens, and workers to think of themselves not simply as producers of capital, but as human-capital. Today, we are faced with multiple scenes in which the human and non-human meet at a vanishing point. What forms of historical memory emerge at such a vanishing point? What modes of reading and critical attention does such a metamorphic humanity demand of us? Contemporary critical theory has provided a plethora of terms and concepts—posthuman, transhuman, cyborg, non-human agent, vibrant matter—in an attempt to answer these questions. Joining these debates, Achille Mbembe’s Critique of Black Reason, translated from the French by Laurent Dubois, offers an alternative genealogy of this current predicament.

    “In a world set on objectifying everybody and every living thing in the name of profit,” writes Mbembe in a recent article entitled, ‘The Age of Humanism is Ending,’ “the erasure of the political by capital is the real threat. The transformation of the political into business raises the risk of the elimination of the very possibility of politics. Whether civilization can give rise at all to any form of political life is the problem of the 21st century” (Mbembe 2015). First published in France in 2013, Critique of Black Reason is an insightful and poetic reflection on this problem of political life in our neoliberal times. Best known to an anglophone audience as the author of On the Postcolony and the essay “Necropolitics,” Mbembe sets out an ambitious project of thinking through what it means to share the world, to live alongside one an-other, and to be in-common, in the midst of a world that increasingly understands all forms of relation through a market orientated metric.

    Over the last twelve years, the pathbreaking work of Wendy Brown, Michel Feher, and David Harvey has charted the emergence of neoliberal forms of reason as they undo the basic tenets of Western democracy and reduce all forms of value to an economic metric.[i] This work has been indispensable in providing a language to trace the emergence of that new formation of the human  that Michel Foucault aptly dubbed homo oeconomicus. Much of this work has tried to illustrate what is new about neoliberalism. Harvey, through a Marxist analysis, has focused on the political-economic development of a global neoliberal order. While Brown and Feher, leaning on a Foucaultian apparatus, have conceived of neoliberalism as a political rationality which insidiously expands into all quarters of life. In an attempt to illustrate the way neoliberalism is distinct and novel in its corrosive tactics, Brown, Harvey, and Feher’s work has tended to pay far less attention to the way neoliberalism borrows from the oppressive racialized tactics of the 20th century. What does neoliberalism co-opt from the logics of racism, colonialism, and slavery? What continuities exist between the tactics of race thinking, and neoliberal reason? How is racism today bolstered by a neoliberal agenda?[ii] It is precisely such questions that animate Critique of Black Reason.

    In the opening pages of Critique of Black Reason, Mbembe describes the way neoliberalism, with its digital technologies, extends and supplements the borders of the human. Mbembe argues that neoliberal forms of reason give rise to a reality in which there is “little distinction remaining between psychic reflexes and technological reflexes,” and where the “subject is plastic and perpetually called on to reconfigure itself in relation to the artifacts of the age” (Mbembe 2017a: 3-4). He describes our era as one in which the human is not simply a producer of things, code, or machines, but emerges as a “human-thing, human-machine, human-code,” effectively a “human-in-flux” (4). But if in the age of the digital and neoliberal we find that the human is undergoing a transformation (becoming something other) we need not think that this process is unprecedented. Rather, Mbembe argues, this transformation is prefigured and haunted by the history of slavery and colonialism, through which black bodies vacillated between a commodity-form and a human being.

    This history began with the Atlantic slave trade, but did not end there. Mbembe argues that the slave trade produced black humanity as “human-merchandise, human-metal, and human-money” (180). For Mbembe, this experience of fluctuating between a human and an object is the defining feature of black life in the modern world. He describes the black body as “…the only human in the modern order whose skin has been transformed into the form and spirit of merchandise—the living crypt of capital” (6). Mbembe’s attention to the dehumanizing capacity of race is in sync with Alexander Weheliye’s recent argument, in Habeas Viscus: Racializing Assemblages, Biopolitics, and Black Feminist Theories of the Human, that race is not well understood as a “biological or cultural classification,” but as “a set of sociopolitical processes that discipline humanity into full humans, not-quite-humans, and nonhumans” (4). Mbembe’s book provides an original contribution to debates around post-humanism, bio-politics, and neoliberalism by foregrounding “the gesture of race that, notably in the case of people of African origin, consists of dissolving human beings into things, objects, and merchandise,” (Mbembe 2017a:11) and suggesting that contemporary regimes of power, which reconfigure the human and the nonhuman, resemble this history in which blackness was placed in the zone of the infrahuman.

    Today, Mbembe argues we are faced with an extension of a condition which modernity reserved for black bodies. Provocatively, Mbembe terms this contemporary induction of wider humanity into the living crypt of capital: the “becoming black of the world” (7). For Mbembe, the becoming black of the world is not a dead end. On the contrary, it occasions a return to and reexamination of black life in modernity in order to ask: how did black life survive a history of objectification and death-in-life? What forms of imaginative escape and creative reversal did it develop? And in what ways are critiques of race thinking and colonialism particularly useful in our neoliberal times?

    For Mbembe, ours is a moment in which animism, neoliberalism, and capitalism are merging. Animism, the projection of life onto inanimate objects, is everywhere present in an age of digital technologies. For example, when digital technologies are endowed with human like qualities: voices, faces, and genders. Or in the world of augmented reality gaming where gamers follow, chase, and trace life-like digital projections in the physical world. Animism is also present in corporate culture: where we find corporations seeking to redefine themselves as persons in order to access rights traditionally reserved for human-persons.[iii] Alongside the rise of animism, we find that in neoliberal culture humans are increasingly objectified. The neoliberal subject thinks of herself as a kind of micro-corporation, and increasingly values herself in terms traditionally reserved for inanimate entities (such as market-oriented metrics, numerical ratings etc.). The neoliberal subject, Mbembe argues, must turn herself “into viable merchandise” that can be “put up for sale” (4). Lastly, Mbembe suggests, ours is an era in which capitalism does not simply exploit workers, but abandons them. Capital does not need workers to function: increasingly their labour can be replaced by artificial forms of intelligence, and digitized platforms. Such abandoned subjects are condemned to live their lives in the short-run and must constantly adapt to the demands of a changing market place.

    In Critique of Black Reason Mbembe reads this contemporary metamorphosis of the human alongside black diasporic history, asking: Is the animism of our times comparable to the necromantic animism of colonial domination? In what ways does the so called ‘primitive’ animism of pre-colonial African cultures (which animated the lifeless as a form of survival, escape, and self-invention) relate to contemporary forms of animism? In what ways does the expulsion of the black (le nègre) from the category of the human prefigure the dehumanization of abandoned subjects today? How does the metamorphic figure of the slave haunt our neoliberal era?

    Readers looking for one answer to these questions will be disappointed. The book does not proceed by offering a set of problems and a corresponding set of easy solutions. Rather, in Critique of Black Reason, Mbembe offers us a set of maps through which we might locate our present moment. On the one hand, Mbembe maps the fantasies, delusions, desires, and unreason that have propelled centuries of racism and, on the other hand, the alternative approaches to life, death, and being-in-common that emerge from traditions of anti-racist critique. The aim of these maps is not to produce an account of ‘what actually happened in the past,’ nor do they aim to produce a history of ideas. Rather, Mbembe focuses on those moments in the past that bear some resemblance to our present moment: those forms of power, modes of subjectivity, and practices of critique that might offer us ways of naming and escaping our present. Some readers will no doubt interpret Mbembe’s relation to the past as presentist, and in some senses this is true. Critique of Black Reason is not a book that accepts traditional demarcations between the present and the past. Rather, Mbembe pays attention to those parts of the past that will not be buried, and that are constantly resurrected in our present moment. The epigraph that opens the book, taken from Aimé Césaire’s Discourse on Colonialism, well describes the ghostly history that Mbembe returns too: “These heads of men, these collections of ears, these burned houses, these Gothic invasions, this steaming blood, these cities that evaporate at the edge of the sword, are not to be so easily disposed of” (1). Mbembe’s writing attempts to delve into the darkest moments of the past in order to see the present in a different light;[iv] thus he describes his writing as “a sort of reminiscence, half solar and half lunar, half day and half night” (8).[v]

    Each chapter offers a set of historical situations and a set of concepts that navigate these settings. Concepts are not hierarchically presented but are horizontally interlinked. As the reader moves through the book, it becomes clear that the book does not start or end with one definitive conceptual framework or historical example, but creates constellations of multiple settings and concepts. In his excellent translator’s introduction, Laurent Dubois describes this writing style as cartographic: “What Mbembe offers us here is a cartography in two senses: a map of a terrain sedimented by centuries of history, and an invitation to find ourselves within this terrain so that we might choose a path through it—and perhaps even beyond it” (ix). The effect of this cartographical method is that in the end, Mbembe does not provide the reader with any final political orientation. Rather, he encourages readers to look for “resonances and interferences” between historically situated modes of thought, and pick our own paths through the deep complexity of our present moment (Mbembe 2015).

    Throughout the book, the influence of Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari’s work is present.[vi] Indeed, Mbembe’s cartographical style is reminiscent of Deleuze and Guattari’s call in A Thousand Plateaus to: “Make a map, not a tracing” (12).[vii] For Deleuze and Guattari, a tracing is a ready-made shape or structure that explains a desire or gives meaning to an object; a tracing tends to privilege one master concept or example and reproduce it onto the world. In contrast, a map aims to be open, and to move in more than one direction simultaneously. To make a map is to connect different forms of thinking and frameworks in order to allow several stories, examples, and concepts to interact non-hierarchically. Mapping is also an attempt to encourage the reader to participate in the process of working through problems, concepts, and examples. To create a map is always to invite readers to find themselves, their own worlds, and situated knowledge within the authors account. Hence Rosi Braidotti, following this Deleuzian impulse, has argued that cartographic modes of analysis require the participation of the reader by asking, “Do we live in the same world? in the same time-zones? How do you account for the kind of world you are living in?” (6).[viii] Unlike colonial practices of mapping—which privileged opposition and enclosure—this kind of mapping aims to foster collaborative, open-ended and dynamic forms of alliance.

    Like Deleuze and Guattari, Mbembe embraces both the open and invitational character of the rhizomatic map. And yet for Mbembe, the project of mapping is a not a way to escape Freudian dogma or the root-like structure of Western philosophy. Rather, it is a way to speak to the specificity of our present moment—to its “possibilities” and “present dangers” (Mbembe 2017a:1)—in a way that remobilizes the idea of a collective and shared future. Neoliberalism, Mbembe argues, can be identified through its “dispossession of the future” (5).[ix] In the era of neoliberalism, everything happens in the short-run and little attention is paid to what kind of future we collectively wish to create. Little attention is paid to what kind of world we want collectively to inhabit. Whether in relation to climate change or the refugee crisis, neoliberalism disavows the idea of collective responsibility, instead advancing a politics of enmity and separation.[x] Elsewhere, Mbembe has called this relation to the future a “negative messianism” that “feels no need to search for or to bring about some form of community” (Mbembe 2017b). The task of critical thought today, Mbembe argues, is to find ways to revitalize the idea of a collective future, a sense of shared responsibility for the world, and a practice of co-produced knowledge about the world.[xi] Cartography—in so far as it invites the reader to locate herself in a shared past, a present we must collaboratively name, and a future that remains open—becomes the experimental analytics of such collectivity.

    One potential drawback of Mbembe’s style of writing is that it often gives rise to hyperbolic statements. For example, Mbembe writes that the potential fusion of capitalism and animism leads to “very distinct possibility that human beings will be transformed into animate things made up of coded digital data” (Mbembe 2017a:5). Such dramatic prose elides the fact that the human has never been the stable ground of any humanism and therefore, we need not be alarmed by the idea of human beings in flux. As Spinoza teaches us, we have always already been in a fluctuating and interdependent relation to the natural and inanimate world. Therefore, the question today should not be is the human in crisis? Or will the human be made into something inanimate? Rather, the question is what insidious forms of power are working today to dehumanize specific populations? How does this relate to the generalized animism of our digital and neoliberal age? We could ask similar questions about the idea that today blackness is being generalized. Are there not still forms of racism for which black bodies are the privileged subject? Do contemporary forms of white supremacy not differ from generalized forms of animistic objectification? Some of this subtlety gets lost in Mbembe’s far-reaching analysis.

    On the other hand, this criticism is partially assuaged by recognizing that Critique of Black Reason does not offer us a framework that symptomatically represents or reproduces phenomena in the world. It offers us a map. As Deleuze and Guattari argue, maps do not attempt to reproduce the world on the page; rather they attempt to construct a platform that might lead to new ways of experiencing, feeling, and sensing the world. On my reading, the perspective of the becoming black of the world is not an overarching or unmovable regime of power, but an invitation constructed through hyperbole: to think about the important place that African history has in our world today. To think about the way traditions of global black criticism offer us alternative conceptions of the human. To think collectively about how we name our era and how we can foster multiple paths toward creating a shared future in the One World we inhabit. Depth is not the strength of this book. Neither is slowness. This is a book which speeds time up, which connects up large geographies, and searches for alliance among diverse thinkers. It sketches, locates, marks, and invites insights. Such a strategy leaves the burden on the reader to pay attention, engage, find points of alliance, and points of dissonance.

    II

    One of the crucial interventions of Mbembe’s study is to reread the central themes of the African American archive from the “other side of the Atlantic” (Mbembe 2018). Mbembe aims to map new paths and avenues for African American thought from the perspective of the Congo, Cameroon, Nigeria, South Africa, and Martinique. Over the last two decades, debates in black studies in the US have been dominated by the themes of social death and the liminal figure of the slave. In Critique of Black Reason, Mbembe attempts to shift this emphasis away from the paradigm of social death and towards questions of life, a humanism-to-come, and One World composed of a thousand parts. Mbembe hopes to make an intervention into African American thought through his conception of black reason, which paves the way toward an afro-futuristic humanism. Part of the difficulty of reading Critique of Black Reason is that its central terms—black reason and critique—are buried within the book rather than clearly defined. It is therefore helpful to offer a textual reading of these two terms as well as to offer an analysis of the contribution Mbembe makes to scholarly debates on racism and afro-humanism in our contemporary era.

    In Critique of Black Reason, Mbembe offers a map—which spans the fifteenth to the twenty-first centuries—of the fictive dimensions of racial difference. The book asks: who is the elusive subject that the term “black” refers to? What precisely does this term aspire to tell us about this subject? What kind of unity does the term “black” suppose? Mbembe argues that racial distinctions can only ever possess an illusionary unity. Of black identity he writes, “I mean to question the fiction of unity that it carries within it” (Mbembe 2017a: 25). However, Mbembe’s aim is not to rehash circular debates around the essentialism of identity categories; Critique of Black Reason is, rather, an exploration of race as the phantasmagoria of modernity. More precisely, Mbembe is interested in the entanglement of fiction and truth, life and death, madness and sanity, reason and unreason, which racialized forms of difference (what he calls “black reason”) inaugurate.

    The voice that echoes off every page of this book is that of Frantz Fanon.[xii] In The Wretched of the Earth, Fanon wrote: “Because it is a systematized negation of the other, a frenzied determination to deny the other any attribute of humanity, colonialism forces the colonized to constantly ask the question: Who am I in reality?” (Fanon 2004: 182). For Fanon, colonialism produced a kind of unreality because it constantly made the colonized question their statues as human-beings. Echoing this Fanonian insight, Mbembe argues that race is not a biological or empirical fact, but a “structure of the imagination;” and racism consists “most of all in substituting what is with something else, another reality” (Mbembe 2017a: 32). Like Fanon, Mbembe is interested in the “sensory life” (106) of race that works to mask and unmask subjects; he writes of race as a mask made up of a “massive coating of nonsense, lies, and fantasies” (39)—simultaneously “material and phantasmic” (2). The central term in this book, “black reason,” is exemplary of this Fanonian influence.

    So, what is black reason? For Mbembe, black reason is not some essential form of reason that can be attributed to people of a certain race; rather, it is the reason that created race. What, Mbembe asks, does race do? What is the logic—the black reason—that propels racial distinctions? Broadly conceived, “black reason” is a term that names the process by which Western modernity produced Africa and its populations in a negative capacity—as a world outside, a world apart, or the klossonos of the world—in order to constitute itself positively (53-61). More specifically, black reason names a “complicated network” (10) of discourses, modes of governance, forms of subjection, and fantasies that used a racialized arithmetic to divide humanity—to separate out populations of similar beings (humanity-in-general) and populations made up of beings who were not “human like all others” (black-humanity) (85).

    Mbembe provides many examples of the ways in which people of African descent have been excluded from the category of the human. This exclusion is accompanied by hysterical and fantastic images of Africa and its populations as a primitive people who have fallen out of time and history—essentially, a socially dead people. For example, when Hegel wrote of Africa he did not simply refer to a mappable geographical location, but to an unhistorical place populated by a “humanity staggering through life, confusing becoming-human and becoming-animal” (12). Mbembe writes:

    The notion of race made it possible to represent non-European human groups as trapped in a lesser form of being. They were impoverished reflections of the ideal man, separated from him by an insurmountable temporal divide, a difference nearly impossible to overcome. To talk of them was, most of all, to point to an absence—the absence of the same—or, rather, to a second presence, that of monsters and fossils (17).

    When one speaks of Africa, Mbembe argues, one gives up responsibility, and the relation between words and things begin to deteriorate. We enter a symbolic realm that is governed by delirium, hysteria, and phantasy. Hegel’s Reason in History marks the high point of a “gregarious phase of Western thinking” in which “grasping ideas became gradually detached from the effort to know deeply and intimately” (17). For Mbembe, this crisis of meaning-making is not simply a relic of a bygone age, rather it finds its way into our contemporary imaginary: “Still today, as soon as the subject of Blacks and Africa is raised, words do not necessarily represent things” (13).

    In Critique of Black Reason, Mbembe is not simply interested in the fact that black life is historically seen as non-human; he is interested in the form of power that constitutes this non-human status. What kind of (un)reason allows Hegel to imagine Africans as “human entities incapable of ridding themselves definitively of the animal presence which they were mixed”(17)? To explore this question, Mbembe dwells on the dark magic of modernity—its ability to transmogrify human beings into human-objects, human-animals, or transform a geographical location into a heart of darkness, a non-place—which, he argues haunts black life today. For Mbembe, it is this dark magic of modernity—which distorts reality and produces regimes of fantasy—that penetrates the postcolony.

    For example, Mbembe argues that colonial-era statues and monuments in the postcolony “perform” the function of “entrapment” through a practice of necromancy (126). These statues and monuments work, on a daily basis, to resurrect or conjure up those who had terrorized and “threatened Blacks with the sword and with death” (128). Mbembe writes:

    The presence of the lugubrious dead in the public arena is meant to ensure that both murder and cruelty, which the dead personify, continue to haunt the memories of the ex-colonized to saturate their imaginary and the spaces of their lives (128).

    Through a practice of necromancy and geomancy, the colonizer lives on and continues to haunt the ex-colonized. This means that the ex-colonized cannot think “clearly” (128) because they are constantly accosted by this unyielding spectral presence. Mbembe calls this a funerary power which is propelled through a circulation of taking life and resurrecting the dead.

    This analysis of the funerary power of colonial statues is uncannily prescient. Two years after the French edition of Critique of Black Reason was published a wave of demonstrations swept through South African university campuses protesting the presence of colonial-era statues. The protests were sparked by a group of students at the University of Cape Town who demanded the removal of a prominently placed statue of the colonial mining magnet Cecil John Rhodes. In South Africa, these protests produced much public debate. Some asked: are colonial remnants not a part of South Africa’s divided history? Should they not be left standing in order to be learnt from? If we remove these statues are we denying and repressing South Africa’s painful past? (In the United States a somewhat similar debate has emerged in relation to confederate flags. What do these flags represent? Are they a harmless part of Southern history?) The power of Mbembe’s attention to the magical and enchanting dimensions of racial domination is vivid in relation to these debates.

    Mbembe argues that colonial power aimed to dominating both the living and the dead or the animate and the inanimate. Therefore, we must never underestimate the capacity of those ‘mute things,’ which the colonizer left behind, to enchant the public arena. Colonial era statues are ritualistic: they aim to remind the colonized that the colonizer is a subject who not only conquered all forms of life, but who also “outruns death” (126). These statutes “envelop the subjugated” (127) by appearing in victorious garb at the entrance of government buildings, in the walkways of public gardens, or the foot of institutions of learning. They are placed prominently in order to make the colonized feel uneasy, out of place, and inhibited in the public arena. Mbembe’s language of enchantment, alchemy, and magic allows us to see that these statues are not passive features of the built environment. Nor are they simply commemorative remnants of a traumatic past. Rather, they are spatial actors who work to haunt, disturb, and confuse those they encounter.

    Significantly, all these moments in which black life is trapped in the unending circuit of death-in-life—whether through Hegel’s dreams of primitive Africans or the necromancy of colonial-era statues—are examples of black reason. In short, black reason is the fictional economy that facilitates this oppressive circulation of death and life: a logic that partitions the world, and closes off the category of the human, using race as its modus operandi.

    This conception of black reason sets up the central dilemma that Mbembe wishes to tackle. Namely, what resources can be found in the capacious corpus of black criticism that can offer a critique of black reason? Which critiques are successful and which simply reproduce the violent logics of black reason? Importantly, for Mbembe, “the work of race” is fundamentally “the very negation of the idea of the common, or of a common humanity” (54). Hence the question that faces black criticism is how to foster a form of belonging, and being-in-common that is not founded upon the ejection of black life from humanity. Significantly, what do we do with race—that form of difference that has through-out history been used to banish life to a space of crisis and a death-in-life—in such a project? It is in answering this question that Mbembe introduces his conception of a humanism-to-come.

    Black reason, Mbembe argues, is the fictional economy that produces, and uses race to divide humanity into humans and non-humans. It is a logic that produces the word ‘black’ in an attempt to wound, dehumanize, and objectify. Some strands of black thought (such as: Pan-Africanism, Negritude, and those writers who affirmed “a so-called politics of Africanity”) tried to reverse the racist telos of black reason by arguing that African people have their own histories and cultures which constitute a distinct, but not inferior humanity (88). These forms of criticism closed themselves off from the rest of humanity, because they failed to critique the false partition of black humanity from humanity-in-general. On Mbembe’s account, to claim that blackness is a sign of ontological, cultural, or national distinction is an inversion and not a critique of black reason. Against these modes of writing, Mbembe argues that African and black identities have never been distinct or unique, rather these identities were always “nourished” by multiple “ethnic, geographic, and linguistic differences” (95). Therefore the name ‘black’ ought to be reclaimed not as a retreat from humanity, but as a call to a future-to-come in which black people are part of a common humanity composed of a thousand parts.

    Mbembe’s conception of black reason suggests that racial distinctions are historical and contingent.[xiii] And that it is not race (or blackness) but the idea of a common humanity that ought to be the basis of revolutionary thinking today. Indeed, throughout Critique of Black Reason Mbembe affirms those modes of black criticism which look forward to, and desire a world without racial difference. For example, in his reading of Césaire’s work he asks: why does Césaire use the word black and not simply human being? He argues that for Césaire the word ‘black’ is not connected to the “idolatry of race,” (159) but is “the ultimate metaphor” for a humanism-to-come that would include black people not as black, but as human (159). Similarly, he writes of Glissant’s thought as consistently affirming the idea that all races and cultures share One World which is made up of “a thousand parts. Of everyone. Of all worlds” (180). And he writes of Nelson Mandela as ultimately “seeking an idea that in the end was quite simple: how to live free from race and the domination that results from it” (172). Indeed, Mbembe affirms those “strands” of black criticism in which “difference is only one facet of a larger project” (183). Within these modes of thought the word “black” is not used with the “goal of finding solace within it,” but as a way of “clouding the term in order to gain distance from it” (173).[xiv]

    Thus far, I have traced the development of black reason as it turns into a critique of black reason in order to illustrate Mbembe’s four major interventions into African American thought. The first is to centralize the archive of Africa and the Caribbean. The second is to provide a historical (and not an ontological or national) reading of race. The third is to couple the practice of critique with the creation of a future. The fourth, finally, is to reinvigorate the idea of a humanism-to-come which would reject the hierarchical division between humans and non-humans. Thus, Mbembe writes: “The path is clear: on the basis of a critique of the past, we must create a future that is inseparable from notions of justice, dignity, and the in-common” (177). In a general sense, Mbembe aims to shift the emphasis away from blackness as a form of social death, toward blackness as a prophetic call for a new humanism that would be grounded in ideas of a shared world, an expanding horizon of the possible, and a shared future.

    I would argue that while this intervention is compelling—particularly, in so far as it attempts to expand the archive, terms, and conceptual apparatus of the middle passage paradigm that has dominated US based black studies—Mbembe risks overlooking complicated debates around positionality and placement of ‘blackness’ by refusing to directly engage with the archive of contemporary African American thought. For example, the work of Saidiya Hartman, Fred Moten, Jared Sexton, and Frank Wilderson has emphasized the way the figure of the slave continues to haunt black life. In different ways, each has argued that lived experience of black populations continue to be shaped by the oppressive structures of slavery. Hartman in Lose Your Mother argues that if “slavery persists as an issue in the political life of black America” is it not because of an obsessive or melancholic relation to the past, but because “black lives are still imperiled and devalued by a racial calculus and a political arithmetic” that was “entrenched centuries ago” (6). Black people live in what Hartman calls the “afterlife of slavery” which is made up of “skewed life chances, limited access to health and education, premature death, incarceration, and impoverishment” (6). On this account, to be ‘black’ is to constantly negotiate dehumanizing forces, and to live under the constant threat of death. If the ‘future’ is not a category that is emphasized in these accounts it is because the legacy of slavery structures the present in ways that are not easy to overcome.

    Moreover, Moten, Sexton, and Wilderson have argued that black subjection (in so far as it excludes black subjects from the category if the ‘human’) troubles the categories which traditionally humanistic discourses have taken for granted. For example, Moten (following Nahum Dimitri Chandler) has argued that the subaltern condition of blackness is well understood as a “paraontological” force which resists, and disrupts traditional demarcations between: the subject and the object, or the outside and inside, or the ugly and the beautiful (Moten 2008). Similarly, Sexton writes of blackness as a “paralogical” force which allows us to think “differently about space, time, being, existence” (Sexton 2017). Importantly, for these theorists—whether we call them Afro-optimists or Afro-pessimists—blackness works to put in question traditional conceptions of the body, the human, humanism, the present, the past, critique, and judgment. In this sense, blackness fugitively escapes and exceeds the terms and categories of modernity’s humanist discourse. Thus Wilderson writes, “the explanatory power of Humanist discourse, is bankrupt in the face of the Black. It is inadequate and inessential to, as well as parasitic on, the ensemble of questions which the dead but sentient thing, the Black, struggles to articulate in a world of living subjects” (55).

    On Mbembe’s reading, the name ‘black’ ought to be re-claimed not as something that stands besides or on the side of (para-) the human, humanity, logic, or ontology. Nor should it signify a form of being that is always already facing death. For Mbembe, seeing blackness as apart from humanity-in-general or the name for a socially dead population is to be blinded by the logic of black reason, which we must attempt to move beyond. Successful critiques of black reason are those that move through the history of racism propelled by “hope of escaping the world as it has been,” and desire to be “reborn into life, to lead the festival once again” (Mbembe 2017a:173). The name ‘black’ in such a project prophetically calls on a new humanism, which would embrace difference as the basis of what is common among humanity. How does such prophetic conception of the name ‘black’ relate to the lived experience of the after-life of slavery? How do we negotiate the desire for a future beyond the idolatry of race, and the desire to bear witness to the ongoing legacies of slavery, and colonialism? What is the relation between a futuristic humanism-to-come, and the critiques of humanistic discourse that theorists such as Moten, Wilderson, and Sexton have offered? By avoiding these questions Mbembe has produced a conception of a humanism-to-come which stands in a clearly critical, but also vague relation to the important work of theorists such a Hartman, Moten, Sexton, and Wilderson.

    The lack of engagement with contemporary African American thought is not the only weakness of Mbembe’s archival practice. In the public discussions of this book that have taken place over the last few months—both in South Africa and the United States—readers have wondered what this book would have looked like if the tradition of critique which it explored had included the voices of black women. Indeed, despite Critique of Black Reason’s far-reaching scope, the archive of black criticism relied on is almost entirely masculine: Fanon, Glissant, Césaire, Garvey, Mandela, Tutuola, Tansi, Baldwin. Given that the scope of this project is so large (a critique of the racist logic that undergirds the modern order) the reader is left wondering what blind-spots this book reproduces through its archival bias.

    Despite these criticisms, the strength of Critique of Black Reason‘s indirect intervention lies in the language of enchantment, dreamworlds, necromancy, and alchemy which the book develops. In Critique of Black Reason, the workings of racism are described not in sociological or historical terms, but as a form of enchantment which closes off the category of the human. In a similar way, anti-racist critique is described as a prophetic incantation, and a search for a world-to-come within this world. This mapping of competing phantasmagoric worlds opens up multiple questions, and suggests multiple paths to rethinking the legacy of decolonial, and abolitionist thought in our contemporary world. Moreover, I have suggested that Mbembe does not sufficiently address the critiques of humanism which contemporary African America thought has produced, but this does not mean that he resorts to any traditional conception of the human (or humanism). On the contrary, one of the powerful interventions of Critique of Back Reason is the way it shows how the human has been re-enchanted, and re-made through African aesthetic traditions. In these traditions, the human is thought of in several different forms, and is always a subject in process. In order to explore this non-traditional conception of the human, I will offer a reading of the central chapter of this book, “Requiem for the Slave,” in which the reader is introduced to the idea of a metamorphic human.

    III

    In Critique of Black Reason, several kinds of metamorphic subjectivities are mapped. At the start of the book, Mbembe maps the metamorphic subject of our digital and neoliberal world. This subject is one who must constantly transform herself in order to remain competitive and valuable; moreover, this is a subject who must constantly negotiate the ever blurring boundary between things and persons or the animate and the inanimate. He goes on to show the way in which this contemporary subject is prefigured by the human-in-flux—”at once outside and within the human” (135)—that slavery, colonialism, and race thinking (black reason) produced. The metamorphic power of neoliberalism, and black reason are both aimed at destructively trapping the human in a space between death and life. How do we resist such morphing? How do we critique the necromantic power of such transmogrification? In the second half of the book, Mbembe aims to answer these questions by mapping another mode of metamorphosis, which blurs the boundary between the animate and the inanimate, as a mode of survival, and an affirmation of life. By turning to experimental African literature, Mbembe explores the immanent modes of critique which re-inscribed tradition using the resources of dreams, fantasies, and orphic knowledge; and resisted death by reclaiming the powers of necromancy, enchantment, animism, and metamorphosis.

    The quintessential example of this mode of critique is found in the experimental aesthetics of the Congolese writer Sony Labou Tansi and the Nigerian writer Amos Tutuola. Both authors create fictional worlds that linger between life and death. In the case of Tutuola’s literature, this liminal space is expressed through the figure of the ghost; in Lansi’s literature it is explored through the creation of what he calls “rag-humans,” which are neither alive nor dead, but exist in a half-world and live a half-life (134). These fictional worlds explore the capacity of racism to turn people into human-things, human-animals, or ghosts whose liminal status prevents them from fully joining the world of the living or the dead. Both these authors critique this liminal space by creating unexpected relations among life, loss, and death. Tansi and Tutuola, Mbembe argues, bear witness to the destructive transformations of black reason by embodying and reversing its cannibalistic logic for their own means. Like the schizophrenic subject in the work of Deleuze and Guattari this literature produces a critique of black reason by scrambling “all the codes” (148).

    In these literary landscapes, characters leap through the realms of death and life. They constantly transform themselves—into animals or inanimate objects or different people—in order to preserve life. For example, Tansi’s experimental novel Life and a Half opens with a scene of torture in which what he calls a rag-father is being eaten alive by a character referred to as the Provincial Guide. The rag-father’s body is torn asunder and his organs are strewn all over the room, but he does not die. The Provincial Guide repeatedly asks: “Now, what are you waiting for?” And the rag-father repeatedly answers: “I do not want to die this death” (6). In Tansi’s universe, even at the moment where the human is in some sense already dead, there is a kind of agency, and a resilient desire for life. This desire for life is present even if it can only be articulated as a desire for another kind of death. And so, the rag-human transforms himself into a being who dies a thousand deaths, because he will not accept the unwanted death offered to him. In a similar way, in Tutuola’s literary landscapes we find people who are constantly chased by death. In order to escape death, they transform themselves into animals or other humans. Sometimes these transformations lead to death anyways. However, these transformations are always aimed at survival. One transforms oneself, morphs into something else and enchants the world, in order to continue living and to resist an unwanted, and pre-mature death. What Mbembe tries to offer here is another way of remembering the slave, not only as that human who was always already dead, but also as that metamorphic human who danced with death, in order to resurrect the lifeless a thousand times over.

    The colossal violence of black reason is its capacity to turn life into a death-in-life. To banish certain subjects into a liminal state in which life can no longer be affirmed, but must be lived out as, what Tansi called, a half-life. What fascinates Mbembe about black critique is its capacity to celebrate “the ineradicability of life” in defiance of this “long life-denying history” (Mbembe 2005). For Mbembe, this defense of and desire for life is the force behind the thought of Édouard Glissant, Aimé Césaire, Nelson Mandela, Marcus Garvey, and Frantz Fanon. These traditions of critique aim to bring back to life dead subjects, deserted spaces, and barren languages:

    The durability of the world depends on our capacity to reanimate beings and things that seem lifeless—the dead man, turned to dust by the desiccated economy; an order poor in worldliness that traffics in bodies and life. The world will not survive unless humanity devotes itself to the task of sustaining what can be called the reservoirs of life. The refusal to perish may yet turn us into historical beings and make it possible for the world to be a world. But our vocation to survive depends on making the desire for life the cornerstone of a new way of thinking about politics and culture. (Mbembe 2017a:181)

    If racist logic is powerful because of its ability to harness the power of metamorphosis as a form of entrapment and social death, then in critiques of black reason this power of metamorphosis is immanently reclaimed and turned into a life-affirming force. Fanon’s work, Mbembe tells us, was propelled by the conviction that every human being—no matter how much violence they have undergone—has “something indomitable and fundamentally intangible that no domination” can “eliminate” (170). Throughout his work, Mbembe argues, Fanon tried to create modes of thought and practice through which this ineffable resilience “could be reanimated and brought back to life” (170). For this reason, Mbembe calls Fanon’s thought a “metamorphic thought” (162).

    For Mbembe, black identity is not exceptional or distinct (black subjects are human like all others), but if there is a characteristic that is historically original or innovative about black life, it is the capacity to survive the dehumanization of racist imaginaries by learning to morph, transform, and enchant hegemonic traditions; to produced immanent forms of critique by delving into the depths of black reason’s “nocturnal economy” (130) in order to rework and transform its logic from within. In this sense, what Mbembe offers as a humanism-to-come is not grounded in a traditional understanding of the human. It is grounded in an archive of black criticism that uses “play, leisure, spectacle, and the principle of metamorphosis” in order to produce several modalities of being human, and approaches to life (176). In the end then, Critique of Black Reason seeks to remind readers that while social death is a paradigm that dominates the history of racism there is also a hidden tradition of metamorphic critique that moves through death in order to affirm life.

    Throughout the book, Mbembe’s writing is marked by a double gesture: simultaneously he maps the racist forms of reason that produce modes of death-in-life and unveils the traditions of critique that rise up to immanently deconstruct such racism. For example, we will recall that in the opening pages of this book he argued that today we are faced with the looming perspective of the becoming black of the world. Mbembe offers us this phrase in an attempt to map the dangers that emerge from the potential consolidation of neoliberalism, capitalism, and animism; to show the way this fusion borrows much from the logics of racism and colonialism. It is also an attempt to suggest that as we think through, resist, and critique these contemporary forces of dehumanization we can fruitfully borrow much from metamorphic anti-racist modes of critique. In other words, in so far as our neoliberal-animistic culture inherits and expands the cannibalistic logics of race thinking it also (potentially) makes itself vulnerable to those critiques of black reason that—in another time—creatively resisted similar forms of depredation.

    This much is implied in Mbembe’s use of the word becoming. In A Thousand Plateaus, Deleuze and Guattari explain the idea of becoming by using the example of a wasp and an orchid. They argue that the wasp and the orchid are not well understood as two different types or categories of things. When the wasp flies around the orchid, moving pollen from one flower to the next, it becomes categorically indissociable from the orchid. Therefore, we should therefore think of them in symbiotic, but not equivalent relation: “a becoming-wasp of the orchid and a becoming-orchid of the wasp”(10). In a similar way, Mbembe seems to suggest that the looming threat of the ‘becoming black of the world’ is always already coupled with a counter or minor, but not equivalent perspective which we might call the becoming world of the black. This perspective is one in which the search for a common world, and the desire for life which animated critiques of black reason becomes a universal, and generalizable project. On my reading, the aim of this book is to make such a liminal perspective available. And it is only by recognizing this implicit perspective that we can interpret the otherwise unexplained optimism that runs through this book and is encapsulated in the opening sentence: “I envision this book as a river with many tributaries, since history and all things flow toward us now” (1, emphasis mine).

    WORKS CITED

    Braidotti, Rosi. 2002. Metamorphoses: Towards a Materialist Theory of Becoming. Cambridge: Polity Press.

    Brown, Wendy. 2015. Undoing the Demos: Neoliberalism’s Stealth Revolution. Cambridge & London: Zone Books.

    ————————. “What kind of world do you want to live in?” Academe Blog. May 15, 2018. https://academeblog.org/2018/05/15/what-kind-of-world-do-you-want-to-live-in/.

    Deleuze, Gilles and Guattari, Félix. 1987. A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia. Translated by Brian Massumi. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

    Fanon, Frantz. 1986. Black Skin, White Masks. Translated by Charles Lam Markmann, with forwards by Ziauddin Sardar and Homi K. Bhabha. London: Pluto Press.

    Fanon, Frantz. 2004. The Wretched of the Earth. Translated by Richard Philcox, with commentary by Jean-Paul Sartre and Homi K. Bhabha. New York: Grove Press.

    Flately, Jonathan. 2008. Affective Mapping: Melancholia and the Politics of Modernism. Boston: Harvard University Press.

    Feher, Michel. 2009. Self-Appreciation; or, The Aspirations of Human Capital.” Public Culture, no. 21: 21-41.

    Goldberg, Theo David. 2008. The Threat of Race: Reflections on Racial Neoliberalism. Malden: Wiley-Blackwell.

    Hartman, Saidiya. 2008. Lose Your Mother: A Journey Along the Atlantic Slave Route. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.

    Harvey, David. 2007. A Brief History of Neoliberalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Massumi, Brian. 1992. A User’s Guide to Capitalism and Schizophrenia: Deviations from Deleuze and Guattari. Cambridge: MIT Press.

    Marriott, David. 2018. “The becoming-black of the world? On Achille Mbembe’s Critique of Black Reason.” Radical Philosophy, no.2.02: 61-71.

    Mbembe, Achille. 2001. On the Postcolony. Translated by A. M. Berrett, Murray Last, Achille Mbembe, Steven Rendall and Janet Roitman. Berkeley: University of California Press.

    ______________. 2005. “Variations on the Beautiful in the Congolese World of Sounds.” Politique Africaine, no. 100: 69-91.

    ______________.”Africa and the Future: An Interview with Achille Mbembe.” Africa is a Country. March 2013. https://africasacountry.com/2013/11/africa-and-the-future-an-interview-with-achille-mbembe/

    ______________. 2015. “The value of Africa’s aesthetics.” Mail & Guardian, May 15, 2015. https://mg.co.za/article/2015-05-14-the-value-of-africas-aesthetics.

    ______________. 2016a. “The Age of Humanism is Ending.” Mail & Guardian, December 22, 2016. https://mg.co.za/article/2016-12-22-00-the-age-of-humanism-is-ending/.

    ______________. 2016b. “The society of enmity.” Radical Philosophy, no. 200: 23-35.

    ______________. 2017a. Critique of Black Reason. Translated by Laurent Dubois. Durham: Duke University Press.

    ______________. 2017b. “Negative messianism marks our times.” Mail & Guardian, February 3, 2017.

    ______________. 2018. “Conversation: Achille Mbembe and David Theo Goldberg on Critique of Black Reason.” Theory, Culture, and Society, July 3, 2018. https://www.theoryculturesociety.org/conversation-achille-mbembe-and-david-theo-goldberg-on-critique-of-black-reason/

    Moten, Fred. 2008. “Black Op.” PMLA, vol. 123, no. 5: 1743-1747.

    Sexton, Jared. 2017. “On Black Negativity, or the Affirmation of Nothing.” Interviewed by Daniel Colucciello Barber, Society + Space, September 18th, 2017. http://societyandspace.org/2017/09/18/on-black-negativity-or-the-affirmation-of-nothing/

    __________. 2011 “The Social Life of Social Death: On Afro-Pessimism and Black Optimism,” InTensions Journal no. 5:1-47.

    Tansi, Sony. 2011. Life and a Half: A Novel. Translated by Alison Dunby. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

    Weheliye, Alexander. 2014. Habeas Viscus: Racializing Assemblages, Biopolitics, and Black Feminist Theories of the Human. Durham: Duke University Press.

    Wilderson, Frank. 2010. Red, White & Black: Cinema and the Structure of U.S. Antagonisms Durham: Duke University Press.

    Notes

    My thanks to Bilkish Vahed, Cathy Caruth, and Christopher Newfield for generously commenting on this essay.

    [i] See Brown 2015, Harvey 2007, and Feher 2009.

    [ii] David Theo Goldberg has recently argued that today we need to mold “a critical analytics” which might enable us to comprehend “racially driven neoliberalisms and neoliberally fueled racism” (viii). Such a suggestion is in sync with Mbembe’s project in Critique of Black Reason.

    [iii] See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.

    [iv] “Critique,” Mbembe writes in a recent preface to On the Postcolony, “is witnessing as well as endless vigilance, interrogation and anticipation. A proper critique requires us first to dwell in the chaos of the night in order precisely to better break through into the dazzling light of the day” (Mbembe 2005).

    [v] Although I have not discussed it here the influence of music, particularly Congolese music of the 1980’s, on Mbembe’s style of writing is significant. Mbembe writes: “The emotional sublimity of the Congolese musical ­imagination taught me how indispensable it was to think with the bodily senses, to write with the musicality of one’s own flesh” (Mbembe 2015). For an extended reading of Congolese music see Mbembe 2005.

    [vi] See especially chapter three (92-102) and chapter five (143-150) of Critique of Black Reason where Deleuze and Guattari’s conception of becoming, itinerant identity, and schizophrenic subjectivity are referenced in key moments.

    [vii] For an exploration of mapping see Flately 2008. Flately writes of Deleuze and Guattari’s project of mapping: “The revisable, rhizomatic affective map not only gives us a view of a terrain shared with others in the present but also traces the paths, resting places, dead ends, and detours we might share with those who came before us” (7).

    [viii] Brain Massumi puts it succinctly: “The question is not, Is it true? But, Does it work? What new thoughts does it make possible to think? What new emotions does it make possible to feel? What new sensations  and perceptions does it open in the body?” (1992, 8).

    [ix] See Mbembe 2013 where he says of his work at WISER in Johannesburg: “The time of the market, especially under the current capitalist conditions, is a time that is very fragmented and the time of consumption is really a time of the instant. So we wanted to recapture that category of the future and see to what extent it could be remobilized in the attempt at critiquing the present, and reopening up a space not only for imagination, but also for the politics of possibility.”

    [x] See Mbembe 2016b for a discussion the role of separation contemporary politics.

    [xi] This argument is in sync Wendy Brown’s recent suggestion that the question that stands at the center of political life today, “What kind of world do we want to live in?” (Brown, 2018) is simple in its formulation, but profound in its burden.

    [xii] As Laurent Dubois notes in the translator’s introduction to Critique of Black Reason: “…the greatest guide throughout is Frantz Fanon, whose writings Mbembe has engaged with throughout much of his work. Fanon’s “situated thinking, born of a lived experience that was always in progress, unstable, and changing,” provided a model of critical thought that was “aimed at smashing, puncturing, and transforming” colonialism and racism. His was always a “metamorphic thought,” and as such an ever-present and ever-relevant guide through the ruins of the present.” (xiii)

    [xiii] In a conversation with David Theo Goldberg, Mbembe says: “As a matter of fact, to speak about modernity is to confront the fact of capitalism. And there is hardly any way in which we can think about capitalism without having to account for racial slavery and its aftermath. I wanted to explore this genealogy of modernity that places racial capitalism at its heart as the cauldron in which the idea of Black, of blackness, was produced. I wanted to take seriously the idea that Black, or blackness, is not so much a matter of ontology as it is a matter of historicity or even contingency. I also wanted to contest those lineages of blackness that use memories of trauma to develop discourses of blackness as ontology” (Mbembe, 2018).

    [xiv] David Marriott in a recent essay on Critique of Black Reason has argued that the conception of black reason and a humanism-to-come are inconsistent or mismatched. If black reason is a realm of magic, enchantment, necromancy, then how can it so seamlessly be tamed by a well reasoned humanistic intervention? Marriott asks, how can blackness both name “a primordial difference within the human” and be overcome through a rational and all inclusive form of humanism? (67) On my reading, some of these questions would clarified if Mbembe engaged with contemporary African American thought.

  • David Fieni — Review of Abdelkébir Khatibi’s “Class Warrior – Taoist Style”

    David Fieni — Review of Abdelkébir Khatibi’s “Class Warrior – Taoist Style”

    Abdelkébir Khatibi

    Class Warrior – Taoist Style, translated by Matt Reeck (Wesleyan University Press, 2017).

    by David Fieni

    This essay has been peer-reviewed by the b2o editorial collective. 

    The improbable mash-up of Marxism and Taoism announced by the title of Abdelkébir Khatibi’s long poem from 1976, Class Warrior – Taoist Style, unfolds in language both brash and opaque, promising a kind of free verse handbook for militants interested in experimenting with new ways of combining action and creation, praxis and poièsis.  The book’s forty sections perform a détournement of the rhetorical techniques of Lao Tzu’s Tao Te Ching while simultaneously re-purposing and deforming both Taoist and Marxist thought and discourse.  And yet while on the surface Khatibi seems to offer a poetic manifesto doubling as a sapiential treatise (and tripling as a tactical guide for revolutionaries), the text also tempts us with a retreat into the space of literary singularity.  Such a reading of the poem could appear to provide evidence of Winnifred Woodhull’s claim that “a subversive poetics has gradually replaced work for change in the political field,” how for Khatibi and many others writing in French since the end of the 1960s, “poetic language has come to be associated with an ‘other’ politics radically divorced from social institutions and from material relations of domination” (x).  The challenge of locating the political in Khatibi’s poem lies in the difficulty of reading it in the context of the author’s poetics of singularity without letting what at first glance appears to be a dehistoricized deconstructionism have the last word.

    Perhaps more than any other postcolonial intellectual of his generation, Khatibi brought together the impulses of decolonization and deconstruction, while problematizing both.  Born in 1938 in El Jadida, Morocco, Khatibi came of age during the nationalist fight against the French Protectorate (1953-1956), studied sociology at the Sorbonne, where he wrote his thesis, Le Roman Maghrebin (1968), then returned to Morocco, where he directed the Institut de sociologie before joining the Centre de recherches scientifiques in Rabat in 1973.  He published in a wide range of genres, including novels, poetry, plays, and essays on art, culture, politics, philosophy, and literature.  His “thinking friendship” with Jacques Derrida culminated with the dialogue that grew out of Derrida’s The Monolingualism of the Other (1996).[1]  Khatibi viewed deconstruction as a decolonizing force targeting both “Western metaphysics” and the metaphysical tradition in Arab and Islamic thought.  He remains an important, if often overlooked, practitioner and theorist of deconstruction, even as he often challenged its half-hidden abstractions with lived practices taken from Moroccan life.  The publication of Class Warrior provides an occasion to revisit a major theme that runs throughout Khatibi’s work: how can the postcolonial writer remain at once creative, critical and committed?

    Khatibi’s thinking about decolonization is remarkable for the unflinching critical acumen he brought to the task.  He begins “Pensée-autre” (“Other-Thinking”), the opening essay of 1983’s Maghreb Pluriel, by acknowledging Fanon’s call to look for “something else” outside “the European game,” but instantly interrogates what he understands as “the right to difference” at the root of this call:

    The innermost depths of our being, struck down and tormented by the so-called Western will to power, hallucinated by humiliation, by brutal and brutalizing domination, can under no circumstances be absorbed by the naïve declaration of a right to difference, as if this “right” was not already inherent to the law of life, that is, to insoluble violence, to the insurrection against one’s own alienation.  (Khatibi 1983: 11)

    Class Warrior — Taoist Style sets into poetic form the “insurrection” of “insoluble” differences transecting personal and collective experience.  Even as the language of political struggle pervades the poem, Khatibi opens the work with a warning against empty political language:

    history is a word
    ideology a word
    the unconscious a word
    words are like dares
    in the mouths of the ignorant

    or each sign regenerates
    an undeniable freshness
    don’t get lost in your own thinking
    don’t disappear into that of others

    test the blood of your thinking
    because in answer to your question
    you will find only quavering targets
    action shapes words
    like the arc consumes the crystalline arrow. (1)[2]

    This first section highlights the importance of the context of an utterance (“the mouths of the ignorant”), distinguishes signs from thinking, urges equilibrium between one’s own thought-worlds and those of others, and asserts the formative force of action relative to language in an image that conceives of the speech act as an act of war (“action shapes words / like the arc consumes the crystalline arrow”).  Subsequent sections introduce the set pieces of the poem’s political vocabulary and set them in motion: “the class warrior” is a “sovereign orphan” (2) who engages “the class enemy” in a revolution both violent and erotic.  “While laughing,” Khatibi tells the reader, “prepare the act of very great violence” (9).  The class war is planetary in scope: “if all oppressed peoples took up arms / they would dance proudly on the class enemy” (20).

    The class warfare described in Khatibi’s poem entails a “radical divestment” (21) on the part of the class warrior (désappropriation tranchante) in the act of revolutionary self-fashioning.  At the same time, the text warns against the kind of annihilation of cultural resources that imperialism, colonialism, nationalism, and capitalism alike have sought to accomplish:

    how to fight without losing ourselves?
    know this:
    now that action germinates in every body
    and your body is changing directions
    fling yourself toward the class enemy
    and over and over display your fiery ardor
    over and over draw the enemy in before pouncing. (38)

    The question asked at the beginning of the above passage will find an answer thirty-three years later from Édouard Glissant.  To the question, “how to fight without losing ourselves?” Glissant will reply with his poetics of relation, affirming “I can change through exchanging with the Other without losing or distorting myself” (Diawara).  A question about fighting becomes one about transformation, yet in Khatibi the class warrior’s battle is ultimately about the radical opening of the self to difference and otherness, even if he prefers the language of violence to that of “exchange.”  These lines join difference and identity (as “two words to point to the same knot” (35)) to the “ardor” of the activated revolutionary body.  This is as close as the poem gets to delivering on the unique tactical advice promised by the title, as the class warrior engages the class enemy through a series of choreographed movements alternating between advance and retreat.[3]  In 1971’s La Mémoire Tatouée, Khatibi describes his own participation in anti-colonial battles in similar fashion: “In El Jadida, I improvised myself mobile protestor, changing neighborhoods, without a fixed plan: the labyrinth of streets provided the key to whoever could zigzag between the assault and our underground forces” (96).  The mobilized body lives the space of the Moroccan city as a new language as “the city was reinventing itself as a new syntax” (96).[4]  Just as the city at war became a language, the language of Class Warrior becomes a space of combat.

    One important way that the manner of “class warfare” reveals itself in the poem occurs in the ways that Khatibi’s poetics of erasure, divestment, and self-disappropriation subvert the supposed content of the poem’s truth claims.  Section eighteen opens with the declaration that first draws then erases the image of a border in the mind of the reader:

    the border between two countries is invisible
    that’s how I can merge with your language without losing myself. (18)

    To affirm the invisible nature of the border, Khatibi must first inscribe its imaginary existence in language.  It is not simply that national borders do not exist in some utopian realm of the poetic imagination, but rather that in the act of erasing the border the poem produces a gesture of signification, which in its vibratory symmetry, exceeds its monolingual signifieds, thereby opening a space where languages and beings may merge without being entirely erased.  The next lines return the reader to the sound of words, and thus to the affective violence of style and manner:

    stick to the wild sound of the word “barbarous”

    you will know the difference of difference
    that your whirling jubilation will bring you
    learn the language of the other
    so that the language of your veins will be distilled

    nothing can surpass the word “barbarous”
    turned into a sword to fight sand

    confront the rapidity of my language and learn. (18)

    The poem here substitutes the supposed wildness of the barbarous person with the “wild sound of the word ‘barbarous.’”  By focusing on the sound of the word itself, Khatibi replaces the act of hearing the other without comprehending the root of this word, and instead exploits the sound substance of the signifier itself in order to hijack the direction of the violence that this word has for so long conveyed.  This tactic of linguistic “terrorism”[5] becomes the class warrior’s ultimate weapon, “a sword to fight sand.”  The final line of the section returns the reader to the speed and agility of the poem’s gestural style, its “shapeshifting calligraphy” (3).  Khatibi’s poetics are on full display here, as writing and erasure, sound and silencing, stasis and motion cancel each other out in the creation of a kind of sculpted static that only signifies in the interstices of the poem’s various semiotic modes.

    As translator Matt Reeck has pointed out, Khatibi begins his idiosyncratic use of the term “class warrior” in La Mémoire Tatouée, where Khatibi mentions his desire to “abolish all tribes” (Khatibi 1971: 21) and become “a class warrior in the tribe of words” (191).[6]  While Reeck identifies the poem’s “Marxist vocabulary” as its “most noticeable lexical feature” (140), his view of the poem follows a line of argument put forward by Marc Gontard, one of Khatibi’s first scholarly critics, that would make of Class Warrior something like a kind of self-help book for personal transformation.  For his part, Gontard focuses on Khatibi’s use and deformation of the rhetorical devices in the Tao Te Ching without so much as once mentioning Marx or Marxism.  According to Gontard, “The class warrior ‘in the Taoist style’ erects an implacable enemy of all orthodoxies.  For him, ‘the great revolution has no heroes,’ and his action leads him to oppose all received ideas, established norms, and totalitarian knowledge” (89).  To be sure, there is much in the poem, and in statements that Khatibi himself has made about his work, to encourage a reading of the poem as an articulation of a kind of “permanent critique” on a personal level.  This critique is made possible not by the author’s privileged membership in a Republic of Letters, but rather in what he calls the “tribe of words.”  Class Warrior – Taoist Style would then teach a specific kind of combat against a rather idiosyncratically defined “class enemy”: a combat that takes place within the social world of language, and where the “class enemy” would be anyone belonging to a group that defines itself as orthodox and self-identical.

    The second section of the poem sketches out the moving figure of the class warrior for the reader, declaring that

    the orphan
    is the class warrior
    the sovereign orphan. (2)

    Reeck’s euphonious translation veers ever so slightly away from an important subtlety in the French, which tells us that the class warrior is “sovereignly orphan” — souverainement orphelin.  The difference between adjective and adverb is the difference between ontology and manner: the class warrior’s orphan-hood is not essentially sovereign, but rather something he performs in a sovereign manner, that is, in a style that imitates the self-contained autonomy at the heart of sovereignty.  In the following lines, the poem itself imitates the rhetorical style of the Tao Te Ching, by first asking a question, and then instead of answering it, presenting the problem to which the orphan would be the solution:

    what does “orphan” mean to us?
    every hierarchy presupposes
    a father a mother and a third
    every politics
    a master a slave and a third

     Khatibi posits the figure of the orphan as a remainder of the violent processes of both Freudian Oedipal normativity and a Hegelian/Marxian dialectical overcoming.  The “sovereignly orphan” class warrior is a product of revolutionary Oedipal violence that cuts him off from all tribes based on filiation, blood, and self-identity.  This is why, in the next line, Khatibi tells readers that “the historical person is a disgrace” (2).  Writing in the context of the 1970s, after the promises of national independence and Arab and Pan-African unity had begun to lose their luster, in the midst of the Moroccan années de plomb, which saw many of Khatibi’s friends and fellow writers imprisoned and tortured for taking political stands, Class Warrior grapples with the problem of neo-colonial mimicry in a supposedly decolonizing world.  “Can you disfigure the class enemy,” the very next lines ask, “without taking on his likeness? (2).  Khatibi aims to decolonize the very concept of class struggle, in a postcolonial world where the “class enemy” has changed appearance while still maintaining the relational class antagonism of a nationalist neoliberal elite.

    The class warrior performs her sovereign autonomy without being defined by it, while at the same time guarding against being consumed by the class enemy, who is, according to the poem, the one consumed by sovereignty:

    sovereignty burns
    the class enemy
    Like a straw dog (2).[7]

    Here Khatibi alludes to the sacrificial straw dogs in the Tao Te Ching, which function in the ancient Chinese text as signifiers that only represent the object of ritual sacrifice.  Lao Tzu writes:

    Heaven and earth are Inhumane:
    they use the ten thousand things like straw dogs.
    And the sage too is Inhumane:
    he uses the hundred-fold people like straw dogs. (37)

    Whereas the Tao Te Ching aligns all of creation (“the ten thousand things”) as signifiers to be consumed, Khatibi specifies the class enemy, which he defines in terms of signifiers arranged as binary pairs:

    inside outside
    nearby far away
    visible invisible
    capital work
    this is the class enemy (3)

    Khatibi’s tactical advice on how to win the war against the class enemy begins with a re-ordering of how one thinks and signifies, which will lead to a radical shift in praxis, and, ultimately, to a transfiguration of the body, which opens dialogue with the previously unthinkable.

    how to defeat the class enemy?
    change your thought categories
    and you will change your actions
    change your actions
    and you will raise up your body
    raise up your body
    and you will talk with the unthinkable

    politics is sensual
    a shapeshifting calligraphy. (3)

    The first three sections of the poem thus stage a fable of the class warrior combatting the class enemy in a way that joins language to action, action to the body, and the body to thought, all of it sketched out in the fluid calligraphic gestures of a phantom hand writing with disappearing ink.

    Despite the many ways that the poem deforms Marxist thought, Khatibi’s fable remains faithful to a Marxist understanding of class in the sense that “class” for the class warrior is a fluid and changeable relation, and not a static universal category, as it is for the class enemy.  Specifically, for Marx, class described the relation between people, labor, and the means of production.  In a letter from 1852, Marx affirmed what he thought was new in his analysis of class, namely “that the existence of classes is only bound up with particular historical phases in the development of production” (Marx 1978: 220).  While there is some validity to the argument that Khatibi’s work often appears to lack clear historical and geographical grounding (Woodhull xviii), one should also reproach critics who fail to situate the development of Khatibi’s output in the historical conditions of its production.  At the precise center of the poem, Khatibi addresses the historical nature of the class warrior’s being and provides what appears to be the poem’s most tangible reference to historical events.  The section begins with a question about the exploitation of one’s past by others and oneself, which Khatibi terms “the usury of your historical being.”  He asks:

    how to defeat the usury of your historical being?
    mobile ungraspable
    you will confront the enemy while timing your breath

    in appearing
    take on the suppleness of the dancing reed (21)

    Again, the enemy here would be the very conceptualization of class itself, and with it, categorical thought, understood as a fixed, rigid, and abstract essence, and the correct tactical advice for fighting this enemy would involve the agility and suppleness of the calligraphic gesture.

    The next nine lines of the poem present a test case for locating the concrete historical and political circumstances of the composition of Class Warrior in relation to which the fluid poetics of the poem emerged:

    prisoner
    cast off your personal fears
    practice the asceticism of non-action

    after the torture
    demystify the torturers

    O suicide
    go back to fight the class enemy
    or hit the open road
    always nuance your aggression

     Read within the context of the poem alone, these lines might at first suggest that the “prisoner” being addressed is the person unable to escape from the confines of rigid thinking, who has become so indebted to the past by the “usury” of her “historical being,” that she has become subject to torture and sees suicide as the only escape.  The historical context, however, adumbrates these lines with the grim reality of the imprisonment, torture, and suicide of a generation of Moroccan activists, artists, and writers.[8]  While it is impossible not to think of Khatibi’s colleagues, such as Abdelatif Laâbi, who were in the middle of long stints in prison at the time that Khatibi was writing Class Warrior, it is nonetheless difficult to untangle the multiple threads of capture knotted in the single word “prisoner.”  Perhaps the most sympathetic reading would have Khatibi offering poetic support and solidarity to his incarcerated friends, urging them to see the hollowness of the torturer’s performance of sovereignty, and encouraging the dead to rise, find freedom, and continue the fight against the class enemy in the spirit of Taoist non-action.

    While attention to historical context remains imperative for all reading, authorial intention can never be the only horizon delimiting reception of a text.  Whereas Khatibi’s avowed politics remain one particular force that shapes our understanding of Class Warrior, this is certainly a text that signifies well beyond the poet’s intentions, beyond his commitment to a political program or engagement with social institutions.  What is more important for potential readers today, I would argue, is the apparatus of the poem and its use for life, the text understood as a resource for resistance, transformation, and liberation from all forms of domination based on fixed categories of thought, including notions of identity deriving from normative configurations of race, ethnicity, religion, nation, and social class.  Can we only know the use-value of a poem by seeing the poet’s credentials as a militant?  On the contrary, the experience of reading tells us that each reader creates a new context of reception, engaging the war of categories, words, thoughts, action, bodies, the knot of identity and difference as we continue to “stretch” Marx for decolonial critique.[9]

    The above comments are not intended as an apology for what some critics have seen as Khatibi’s failure to properly champion the cause of women’s writing in Morocco, or his disillusionment with the increasingly militant turn that the journal Souffles took in the late 1960s.[10]  It is the prerogative of criticism to examine contradictions that obtain when the text and the world are held up to each other.  A careful reading of this poem, however, shows how, in a first move, Class Warrior might seem to seduce the reader to withdraw into a revolution that would be exclusively poetic, but then, in a second move, the text exceeds its own status as a purely literary document.  In the “Preface Letter” he provides for Gontard’s book, Khatibi includes a telling confession that can help readers locate both the political in the text and better understand the relation between politics and style in the poem:

    I don’t believe in any literature of liberation.  The writing incarnated in an obdurate experience, moves toward the impossible, silence and erasure.  And this is precisely where subversion is at work, a subversion one cannot announce ahead of time, nor give the force of law.  Maghrebian or not, the writer (whosoever bears or risks bearing this title), if he extricates himself from all supposedly “committed” aesthetic and artistic postures, immediately finds himself confronted by the unnamable.  Perhaps then he will be able to listen to the voice of others and of the absolute outside, perhaps he will speak, he will write without assistance, without salvation and without gods. (Khatibi 1981: 9).

    Khatibi stakes out an adamantly secular position here, in the idiosyncratically Saidian sense of a “secular criticism.”[11]  His critique of “supposedly ‘committed’ aesthetic and artistic postures” and his affirmation of a politics of listening to the “absolute outside” elucidate the opening lines of Class Warrior: “history is a word / ideology a word / the unconscious a word” (1).  In lieu of hollow ideological repetitions, Khatibi aims for the unthinkable, the unnamable, and the impossible, and he does so in the spirit of detranscendentalized, anticolonial revolt inspired by Marxist thinking.  As he phrases it in a different section of the poem, “stick to an impossible mode of production” (37).  Khatibi replaces a “literature of liberation” with the search for an unforeseeable “subversion” that may effervesce within the established systems and structures of language, thought, and society.

    This refusal of any facile, triumphalist poetics of “liberation” echoes throughout Class Warrior.  “I heard it said / that dream science cures your illness / I heard that and I balled my fists // knowledge will never cure your irremediable distemper” (28).  Here we have a poetics that resonates with Khatibi’s decision to stay in Morocco and work within the system, as opposed to seeking “liberation” in France or elsewhere, as so many writers and thinkers of his generation had done.  The taoist manner adopted by the class warrior would certainly seem to be a function of Khatibi’s life in Morocco under the oppressive regime of Hassan II, as the poet sought out ways to fight with agility, suppleness, and nuance without fleeing.

    The publication of Class Warrior — Taoist Style in English is part of a resurgence of interest in francophone Moroccan writers, and Khatibi in particular in the Anglophone world.  Alongside Olivia C. Harrison and Teresa Villa-Ignacio’s 2016 anthology, Souffles-Anfas (Stanford), Donald Nicholson-Smith’s monumental In Praise of Defeat, an 800-plus page collection of poems by Abdellatif Laâbi, Peter Thompson’s 2016 translation of Khatibi’s Tattooed Memory (L’Harmattan), and Burcu Yalim’s forthcoming translation of Khatibi’s Plural Maghreb (Bloomsbury), Reeck’s Class Warrior – Taoist Style provide readers of English important points of contact with the difficult, powerful, and generative work of Khatibi and other major Moroccan writers of his generation.  Nonetheless, new questions emerge with the translation into English of work that actively sought to terrorize, deform, and destabilize the French language and divest it of its capacity to commit “historical usury” against its users.  What happens to the virtual intertextuality of Arabic and “Berber” languages that animate the syntactical and rhetorical gestures of Moroccan literature in French (along with other signifying practices) when the Francophone text enters into the system of Global English?  And what new combinations of praxis and poièsis might Khatibi in English give rise to?

    References

    Diawara, Manthia.  2009.  Édouard Glissant: One World in Relation.  K’a Yéléma Productions, 48 min.

    Fanon, Frantz.  2004. The Wretched of the Earth. Translated by Richard Philcox; introductions by Jean-Paul Sartre and Homi K. Bhabha. n.p.: New York: Grove Press.

    Fieni, David.  2013.  “Introduction: Désappropriation de soi et poétique de l’intersigne chez Khatibi.”  Expression Maghrébines 12, no. 1 : 1-17.

    Gontard, Marc.  1981.  La Violence du Texte : Études sur la littérature marocaine de langue française. Paris: L’Harmattan.

    Gourgouris, Stathis.  2013.  Lessons in Secular Criticism.  New York: Fordham University Press.

    Khatibi, Abdelkébir. 2017.  Class Warrior – Taoist Style. Translated by Matt Reeck.  Middletown, Connecticut: Wesleyan University Press.

    —.  2007.  Jacques Derrida, en effet.  Drawings by Valerio Adami.  Neuilly-sur-Seine: Al Manar.

    —.  1999.  La Langue de l’autre.  New York: Mains secrètes.

    —. 1971.  La Mémoire Tatouée: Autobiographie d’un Décolonisé.  Paris: Les lettres nouvelles.

    —.  1976.  Lutteur de Classe à la Manière Taoiste.  Paris: Éditions Sindbad.

    —.  1983.  Maghreb Pluriel.  Paris : Denoël.  Unpublished translation by Olivia C. Harrison.

    —.  1981.  “Préface-Lettre.”  Preface to La Violence du Texte : Études sur la littérature marocaine de langue française, by Marc Gontard, Paris: L’Harmattan.

    Laâbi, Abdellatif.  2016. “Contemporary Maghrebi Literature and Francophonie.”  In Souffles-Anfas: A Critical Anthology from the Moroccan Journal of Culture and Politics. Edited by Olivia C. Harrison and Teresa Villa-Ignacio.  Stanford, California: Stanford University Press.

    Lao Tzu.  2015. Tao Te Ching. Translated by David Hinton.  Berkeley: Counterpoint. Accessed April 26, 2018. ProQuest Ebook Central.

    Marx, Karl.  1978. “Class Struggle and Mode of Production.”  The Marx-Engels Reader, edited by Robert C. Tucker. 2D ed. New York: Norton.

    Mufti, Aamir. “Critical Secularism: A Reintroduction for Perilous Times.” boundary 2 31, no. 2 (2004): 1-9. https://muse.jhu.edu/ (accessed May 1, 2018).

    Reeck, Matt. 2017. “Poetics of the Orphan in Abdelkébir Khatibi’s Early Work.” Journal of French and Francophone Philosophy – Revue de la philosophie française et de langue française, 25, no. 1: 132-149.

    Said, Edward.  1983.  The World, the Text, and the Critic.  Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

    Slyomovics, Susan. 2005.  The Performance of Human Rights in Morocco. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.

    Woodhull, Winifred.  1993.  Transfigurations of the Maghreb: Feminism, Decolonization, and Literature.  Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota Press.

    Notes

    [1] See especially Khatibi’s Jacques Derrida, en effet (2007) and La Langue de l’autre (1999).

    [2] For simplified reference in both the English and French editions, numbered references to Class Warrior – Taoist Style refer to the section number, not to the page number.

    [3] Compare this passage in Khatibi to the following passage from the Tao Te Ching:

    There was once a saying among those who wielded armies:

    I’d much rather be a guest than a host,
    much rather retreat a foot than advance an inch.

    This is called marching without marching,
    rolling up sleeves without baring arms,
    raising swords without brandishing weapons,
    entering battle without facing an enemy. (108)

    [4] For more on Khatibi’s singular understanding of “syntax,” see my introduction to a special issue on Khatibi, “Désappropriation de soi et poétique de l’intersigne chez Khatibi” (2013).

    [5] The term comes from Laâbi, who used it in a 1970 issues of Souffles: “This is why Maghrebi or Negro-African literature of French expression is nothing short of a terrorist literature, i.e., a literature that on all levels (syntactic, phonetic, morphological, graphical, symbolic, etc.) shatters the original logic of the French language” (28).

    [6]  Reeck discusses this on p. 140 in “Poetics of the Orphan in Abdelkébir Khatibi’s Early Work” (2017).

    [7] I have amended Reeck’s translation here, which mistakenly substitutes “class warrior” where the text should read “class enemy.”

    [8] See Slymovics (2005) for her important and brilliant account of the imprisonment, torture, and trials during the “years of lead.”

    [9] The reference is to Fanon’s well-known claim, in The Wretched of the Earth, that “a Marxist analysis should always be slightly stretched when it comes to addressing the colonial issue” (5).

    [10] See Woodhull, pp. xx-xiv.

    [11] I am of course thinking of Edward Said’s introduction to The World, the Text, and the Critic, as well as the work of Mufti (2004) and Gourgouris (2013).

  • Sandra Ponzanesi – Review of Paulo Lemos and Bruce Robbins’s “Cosmopolitanisms”

    Sandra Ponzanesi – Review of Paulo Lemos and Bruce Robbins’s “Cosmopolitanisms”

    Cosmopolitanism(s) Interrupted

    Horta, Paulo Lemos and Robbins, Bruce. eds. 2017. Cosmopolitanisms. New York: New York University Press.

    reviewed by Sandra Ponzanesi

    This edited volume reignites many of the incessant debates on cosmopolitanism, its origin, development, and raison d’être, not only from difference disciplinary traditions and “world views” but also from different points in time. The volume is a revisitation of cosmopolitanism, offering a new take on many of the ongoing debates and querelles, while also making headway by reorienting the field of cosmopolitan studies as such. The vibrancy of the field is shown by the list of influential critics in this volume, who do not take the notion of cosmopolitanism for granted but engage with it from positions that are both critical and creative. These engagements show how the notion or the ideal of cosmopolitanism is far from being obsolete but on the contrary demands, now more than ever, a deep critical engagement. While critics continue to retain the assumption that cosmopolitanism’s appeal lies in its universal principles, there is a sense that “The Times They Are A-Changin’” as Bob Dylan would put it[1], and therefore new realities call for new paradigms. The accelerated process of globalization has allowed many of cosmopolitanism’s aspirations to come true (increased international mobility of people and markets, waning borders, and an increase in supranational institutions). Yet the total deregulation and decentralization brought about by globalization and the associated backlash bring the very principles of cosmopolitanism into disarray by challenging the very notion of commonality and shared values, with a resurgence of new, localized identities, nationalism, and ethnic strife. Therefore, even though the world is becoming increasingly interconnected and shaped by global forces, this does not mean that the world has become more cosmopolitan. On the contrary, the challenge of cosmopolitanism remains as prominent as ever, because as Spivak has phrased it in other contexts, cosmopolitanism is “what one cannot not want” (Spivak 1999: 110). To dispense with cosmopolitanism would mean to relinquish our ideal of a common humanity and with it the principle of human rights and an ethical responsibility to fellow citizens. Cosmopolitanism, as a notion, has accompanied Western civilization from the very beginning. Yet the term and its meaning have shifted and been transformed through time and context, showing a resilience unmatched by other intellectual paradigms. From the Stoics to cosmopolitanism in the age of the Anthropocene and cyberspace, the term has evolved, retaining a flexibility as well as a foundational necessity to continue to exist.

    It was with Kant’s Toward Perpetual Peace (1999 [1795]) that it reached its most authoritative moment, with the birth of modern nation-states and the moral dilemma of keeping peace, in part to promote effective transnational trade. Cosmopolitanism became a comrade in arms of capitalism, and the many paradoxes of its affirmation constituted by colonialism, imperialism, and slavery, where the mobility of the elites went hand in hand with the forced uprooting and exploitation of others. Cosmopolitanism has, moreover, often been linked only to the mobility of the elites and privileged, who, through education or financial means, were able to cross borders, languages, and political systems. Kant’s moral ideal of cosmopolitanism was a given for the happy few. The idea of the Grand Tour and Sentimental Journey was not open to lower-class and uneducated people. With the decline of the aristocracy and the rise of the enterprising bourgeoisie in the wake of industrialization, the notion of cosmopolitanism underwent a shift, becoming more embroiled with new technologies of communication (the telegraph, fax, and phone) and faster and more accessible forms of transportation (trains, cars, planes). This more emancipatory cosmopolitanism started to emerge as an intrinsic aspect of modernity, a modernity that hardly had room for vernacular forms and alternative ideas of culture Appadurai, 1996). In the light of these many transitions, this volume proposes a provocation by courting cosmopolitanisms in the plural rather than offering a single notion of cosmopolitanism. To speak of multiple cosmopolitanisms could seem like a contradiction in terms. But is it really? Cosmopolitanism as a way of thinking, feeling, and acting beyond one’s own particular community has been seen as a universalism of a Western particular. In their introduction to the special issue on “Cosmopolitanism” that appeared in Public Culture in 2000, the guest editors—Carol A. Breckenridge, Dipesh Chakrabarty, Homi K. Bhabha, and Sheldon Pollock—focus on the critique of cosmopolitanism’s Eurocentric bias, debating how most cosmopolitan formations are interconnected with forms of coercion or inequality, such as slavery, colonization, and imperialism. So for them the question is whether it is possible to have a cosmopolitanism, with its promise of universal knowledge, that also foregrounds a noncoercive and egalitarian politics. They open with a disorienting idea of what “cosmopolitanism” is or might be, precluding any normative fixing:

    “For one thing, cosmopolitanism is not some known entity existing in the world, with a clear genealogy from the Stoics to Immanuel Kant, that simply awaits more detailed description at the hands of scholarship. We are not exactly certain what it is, and figuring out why this is so and what cosmopolitanism may be raises difficult conceptual issues. As a practice, too, cosmopolitanism is yet to come, something awaiting realization.” (Breckenridge et al. 2000: 577)

    After that open-ended consideration, the guest editors nevertheless circle around a possible misapprehension about the use and abuse of the term: “Cosmopolitans today are often the victims of modernity, failed by capitalism’s upward mobility, and bereft of those comforts and customs of national belonging. Refugees, peoples of the diaspora, and migrants and exiles represent the spirit of the cosmopolitical community.” (Breckenridge et al. 2000: 582) The guest editors of Public Culture thus move skillfully to the use of cosmopolitanisms in the plural by subscribing to the “other” forms of cosmopolitanisms that have remained in the shadow or have been cast as “unauthorized forms of cosmopolitanism.” These refer to manifestations of cosmopolitanism among people at the margin of histories who are part of minoritarian constellations, although they might not be so minoritarian in terms of numbers:

    “…cosmopolitanism must give way to the plurality of modes and histories—not necessarily shared in degree or in concept regionally, nationally, or internationally—that comprise cosmopolitan practice and history. We propose therefore that cosmopolitanism be considered in the plural, as cosmopolitanisms” (Breckenridge et al. 2000: 577).

    It is an invitation to look at cosmopolitanism beyond the binarism of the local versus global, but also to look for cosmopolitanism outside the dominant schemata, from the Stoics to Kant, that would limit the way we look at and understand what cosmopolitanism can be about. By embracing a look at cultures across space and time, and how they engage with feeling and acting beyond the nation, a new array of possibilities might emerge that are not prefabricated or constrained by Western paradigms. That is also how Paul Gilroy’s notion of conviviality emerged, inspired by Spain’s multicultural Moorish culture of coexistence and cohabitation (convivencia) (Gilroy 2004), steering away from multiculturalism without abandoning the aspiration of cosmopolitanism. The guest editors of Public Culture conclude that we should first radically rewrite the history of cosmopolitanism and redraw its map by thinking “outside the box of European intellectual history” (Breckenridge et al. 2000: 586), and secondly rethink the range of practices that might allow for new and alternative theorizations.

    The volume edited by Bruce Robbins and Paulo Lemos Horta rises to this challenge by embracing cosmopolitanisms in the plural, not as a fashionable label but as the fruit of decades-long engagement with the field. Bruce Robbins has written extensively on cosmopolitanism from different entry points, taking stock of the idea of cosmopolitanism in deep time too, therefore venturing outside the paradigm of European history (2016); his latest book The Beneficiary deals with cosmopolitanism from the viewpoint of inequality and is a sequel to Perpetual War: Cosmopolitanism from the Viewpoint of Violence (2012). His previously co-edited volume Cosmopolitics. Thinking and Feeling Beyond the Nation (Robbins and Cheah 1998) makes a point in not wanting to disentangle the culturalist approaches to cosmopolitanism from its political relevance, and claims the resurgence of cosmopolitanism as a viable alternative political project. Besides the double introduction by the editors themselves, with Robbins responsible for Part I on “Actually Existing Cosmopolitanism” and Pheng Cheah producing Part II on “The Cosmopolitical-Today,” Cosmopolitics contains contributions that are still cutting-edge today. This includes the two full-length chapters by Robbins and Cheah themselves and chapters by contributors such as Gayatri Spivak, Benedict Anderson, Etienne Balibar, James Clifford, and Anthony Appiah, who also wrote the afterword for the later Cosmopolitanisms.

    In his own chapter “Comparative Cosmopolitanisms” (already used in the plural in 1998 before the special issue of Public Culture), Robbins brings forward the institutional entanglements and explores the possibility of “comparative cosmopolitanisms” that seek to reconcile a self-conscious academic professionalism with a worldly and political engagement. The book emerged at the height of the debate about multiculturalism as merely particularistic and investing in cosmopolitanism as striving towards mutual common ground, extending political practice beyond national borders and including non-citizens as equally valid members of the cosmopolitan polity. Robbins is aware of the risks of cosmopolitanism in restricting the space of others, especially in the case of what are termed diasporic actions that impact on local politics, and of the dangers of falling outside the security of nation-state regulation. Yet he does not give up on the possibilities that international alliances can offer or the potential of actually existing cosmopolitanisms. This is in light of what he phrased as the existence of inevitable paradoxes and contradictions within the field, which nonetheless has not exhausted its purpose. As Robbins writes:

    “If we agree that there is ‘no easy generalization,’ don’t we want to retain the right to difficult generalization?” (Robbins 1998: 251)

    The question remains whether in the attempt to safeguard cosmopolitanism, other insurrections that traditionally may not fall under the aegis of cosmopolitanism, such as transnationalism, diasporic formations, and postcolonial alliances, might be overlooked or unwillingly appropriated by cosmopolitanism’s historically and theoretically dominant discourse. Yet, it is in the acknowledging of these new intersections between cosmopolitanism and the above mentioned insurrections that Robbins charts the ‘difficult generalization.’

    Paul Lemos Horta is a scholar of world literature and has worked at length on cultural productions beyond their point of origin, including the cross-cultural collaborations that influenced The Thousand and One Nights and its reception. In his book, Marvellous Thieves: Secret Authors of the Arabian Nights (2017) Horta reports on a number of conversations between Europeans documenting the tales and their interlocutors. In this volume, Horta offers a very fine reading of Richard Burton, the British explorer, as a cosmopolitan or counter-cosmopolitan in the light of Anthony Appiah’s engagement with the explorer and translator. In Appiah’s eyes, Burton is a cosmopolitan who seeks to engage with difference but he is also a counter-cosmopolitan because he cannot escape the prejudices of his British upbringing. Horta remarks at the end that it might be wrong to attribute Burton’s cosmopolitanism only to his exposure to other cultures and attribute his counter-cosmopolitanism only to his inescapable Englishness. Rather, Horta suggests, we should take Burton’s counter-cosmopolitan biases as part of his self-fashioning as a cosmopolitan. Aware of the long genealogy of the term, Horta and Robbins prefer to engage in their volume with the “new cosmopolitanism” that emerged after the 1990s. As Pnina Werbner notes, the theories of cosmopolitanism after the 1990s, including those by Breckenridge et al. and Cheah and Robbins, have sought to go beyond an interpretation of cosmopolitanism as only universal, open, and above all “Western” in order to include local, rooted, and historically and geographically situated dimensions, “vernacular cosmopolitanism,” and local, cultural, and rooted proximities, foregrounding the role of urban space and connectivity of both difference and diversity, and the role of diasporic groups in leading to a rethinking of the universalism of cosmopolitanism. This implies also inserting a new definition of cosmopolitanism from below by incorporating a more “metaphoric designation” that includes various groups of migrants: “expatriates, expellees, political refugees, alien residents, immigrants, and ethnic and racial minorities tout court” (Safran 1991: 83). Certain geopolitical transformations, such as mass migration, and waves of refugees and asylum seekers—a consequence of the colonial expansion—and the post-Socialist reconfiguration of nation-states, meant that the study of diasporas and cosmopolitan identities had to take into consideration both historical and cultural specificities. These configurations mark the move towards “a nomadic turn in which the very parameters of specific historical moments are embodied and … are scattered and regrouped in new points of becoming” (Evans-Braziel and Mannur 2008: 3). This volume joins and enriches an existing debate from which new, provincialized conceptualizations of cosmopolitanism have emerged, such as “critical cosmopolitanism” (Rabinow 1986), “postcolonial cosmopolitanism” (Parry 1991), “rooted cosmopolitanism” (Cohen 1992; Ackerman 1994), “nomadic subjects” (Braidotti 1994), “discrepant cosmopolitanism” (Clifford 1992), “vernacular cosmopolitanism” (Bhabha 1996; Beckenbridge et all, 2000; Werbner 2006; Gunew 2012), “patriotic cosmopolitanism” (Appiah 1998), “border cosmopolitanism” (Mignolo 2000), “planetary cosmopolitanism” (Spivak 1999; Gilroy 2004), “banal cosmopolitanism” (Beck 2002), “subaltern cosmopolitanism” and “cosmopolitan legality” (De Sousa Santos and Rodríguez-Garavito 2005), “indigenous cosmopolitanism” (Goodale 2006; Forte 2010), “emancipatory cosmopolitanism” (Pieterse 2006), “ordinary cosmopolitanism” (Kendall, Woodward, and Skrbis 2007), “postcolonial cosmopolitanism” (Bhambra 2011; Baban 2016), “Cosmopolitan Europe” (Hall 2003; Pichler 2009; Ponzanesi 2018), “libidinal cosmopolitanism” (Boston 2016), and “accidental cosmopolitanism’ (Titley 2005).

    Is the multiplication into various inflections of “cosmopolitanism” (Horta and Robbins 2017) not an undermining of the very notion of cosmopolitanism itself and an attempt to save the concept from its Eurocentric origin? For the editors, the triumph of the descriptive plural over the normative singular opens up as many questions as it answers (Horta and Robbins 2017: 1). The plural is a celebration of the particulars, but also a way out of the positive/negative, center/periphery, normative/descriptive binarism. It is not simply the celebration of a cosmopolitanism from below, but the awareness that we are now capable of perceiving emotional attachment to distant others in ways that were not possible in the past. The editors mention Luc Boltanski in their introduction, referring to a new idea of common humanity, which makes distant suffering, or the attachment to distant people, possible through new features of modern humanitarianism. According to Lilie Chouliaraki, whose work has elaborated on Boltanski with reference to media and spectatorship, “the representation of proximity/distance to the scene of suffering” is therefore part of “the analytics of mediation” or The Spectatorship of Suffering—as one of her books is titled (2006: 8). The reading of Chouliaraki is relevant to the shift in notions of cosmopolitanism theorized in the 1990s and more recently as it implies significant changes in the structure of feeling and thinking beyond the nation as allowed by new technologies and digital media culture. This new form of universalism is very much defined by and through mediated encounters between different places and “worlds”. Chouliaraki rightly states that “the question of solidarity (…) cannot be examined separately from the communicative structure that has made this discourse available to us in the first place” (2013: 15). It is through these encounters with mediated suffering that we share a sense of common humanity (as proposed in Boltanski 1999 and Sontag 2003). Through empathy with unfortunate others, we can also scrutinize how these cosmopolitan imaginaries are circulated. The rise of digital technology and social media complements more traditional forms of communication, leading to enhanced possibilities to forge bonds of solidarity between different worlds (including through fundraising and humanitarian campaigns).

    Chouliariaki’s The Ironic Spectator: Solidarity in an Age of Post-Humanitarianism (2013) builds on her previous work on the mediatization of distant suffering, and states that forms of solidarity have changed substantially in recent decades in tandem with the shifts in media, technology, markets, and politics. Solidarity, she states, is not based on pity with distant Others any more (as Boltanski had argued), rather it is based on self-fulfillment, a self-oriented morality that centers around doing good to Others based upon “how I feel” (2-3). As Christensen and Jansson write, the moral and post-humanitarian subject of cosmopolitanism emerges as a narcissistic agent that is self-benefitting, and acts in order to just fulfil their own self-gratifying vision rather than acting and engaging politically (Christensen and Jansson 2015: 4) Though this volume does not engage with media perspectives on cosmopolitanism, there is an engagement with cosmopolitanism as an unfinished business that remains, as Robert Young writes in his contribution to this volume, between national sovereignty and cosmopolitanism. “Can the nation-state […] stretch itself to protect the mobile, migratory, multiply-loyal subjects that nationalism has excluded but that are now so characteristic of our time? It is only in such embodiments, Young suggests, that the cosmopolitan idea truly exists—if indeed cosmopolitanism exists today as such an idea rather than a pressing series of unanswered and perhaps unanswerable questions” (13). Robert Young asks “How can we translate the cosmopolitan idea into a transformative reality?” (140). “The question presupposes that, even if we seek to describe its actually existing shapes and spaces, cosmopolitanism remains for us a strenuous aspiration” (16). James Clifford’s idea of discrepant cosmopolitanism, mentioned above and discussed in Robbins and Cheah’s Cosmopolitics, foregrounds the notion of cosmopolitanism not as a form of elitism but as applicable also to the servants, maids, guides, and translators who accompanied educated travelers and explorers as they moved through cosmopolitan hubs.

    Cosmopolitanism was not only for gentlemen travelers, but it applied also to the people of color who were the servants of those travelers, who had their own specific cosmopolitan viewpoints. Even the organized coercion of people produces “cosmopolitan workers.” This challenges the notion that certain classes of people are cosmopolitan (travelers) while the rest of us are local (natives). Questions of power aside, “they” and “we” can no longer be divided into local and cosmopolitan. (Clifford 1992: 107-8) For the poor, the experience of cosmopolitanism can be at times more an experience of loss than of luxury but it can also refer to more popular forms of cosmopolitanism, such as the cosmopolitanism encountered in the Brazilian favelas, that can account for a more vibrant and innovative articulation of cosmopolitanism from below. This cosmopolitanism of the poor as theorized by Silviano Santiago in the context of Afro-Brazilian culture is a way of subscribing to the multiple(s) contained in the notion of cosmopolitanism(s), a form of resistance to mainstream culture as well as the reality of the postmodern megapolises that are serviced by those poor ethnic and socially marginalized groups. But the culture of the poor finds expression in other cosmopolitanisms and transnational cultural forms too, such as Kizomba, an African word meaning an encounter of identities, which is now becoming a dance hype around the world. Originating in Angola, it was transmitted through slavery and black culture to Brazil to transfer further in modern times from the global south to the north, where many Kizomba festivals abound. Kizomba has moved away from its roots in a history of trauma and suffering to become a celebration of multicultural consumption (Kabir 2013). Cosmopolitanisms is full of complex negotiations between what the term cosmopolitanism has meant in its overused history and the obligations it has for its future aspiration. As Robbins points out in his chapter on “George Orwell, Cosmopolitanism, and Global Justice,” cosmopolitanism is still pretty much about our obligations to others, not only in “emotional” terms, by suffering with them, but also as an economic recognition of the need for a redistribution between rich and poor (the rich having clearly benefitted from the poor in material, symbolic, and ideological ways) if we think global justice means pushing for a more equitable distribution of the world’s material resources. The question Robbins poses is a central one: “…is it possible to see the new cosmopolitanism as also a redistributive cosmopolitanism?” (43). The waning of the nation-state and the rise of transnational neoliberal models has also meant the collapse of the welfare state (at least for those countries that actually had one) and with it the erosion of national solidarity and, in tandem, international solidarity. This connects to David A. Hollinger and his “Cosmopolitanism and the Problem of Solidarity,” which goes beyond that of the color divide. For Achille Mbembe, “Afropolitanism” is the cosmopolitan awareness of African origin, which rejects the essentialist and nativist discourse of Negritude and Pan-Africanism. Afropolitanism is also not just about being in the diaspora and a classy African citizen of the world (see figures such as Teju Cole or Chimamanda Ngozi Adichie, Taiye Selasi or No Violet Bulawayo, often included in the new generation of glossy representatives of the African “identity” in the diaspora); it is more about a poetic and aesthetic that implies the multitudes of belonging without necessarily doing away with the politics of oppression and the violence inflicted on their continent and their people. But Afropolitanism or “Afropolitism” is more about Africans outside of Africa, who experience several “worlds” and develop a new transnational culture that draws on multiple legacies and rewrites African modernity. This is further elaborated by Emma Dabiri in her “The Problems and Pitfalls of Afropolitanism” in which she lays out her reservations about the term and the various debates and responses to the embracing or rejection of the new fandom. Though empowering and clearly celebratory, the term, which seems to have been used for the first time in 2005 by Taiye Selasi, reeks of neoliberal ideology. In this chapter, Dabiri distances herself from Achille Mbembe’s position on Afropolitanism, which according to him is a way of renouncing pernicious racialized thinking in favor of more fluid and interconnected identities (along the lines of Gilroy’s Black Atlantic and his rejection of “black race” as a unifying code) (Gilroy 1993). Mbembe is also critical of the idea of African tradition, as such a mythology reminds us of Fanon’s warning against the pitfalls of nationalism. Yet Dabiri’s reservations about the consumeristic nature of Afropolitanism, seen as a boutique for African commodities packaged in intellectual attire, remain. The Afropolitan class (or elite class) replicates so many of the clichés and privileges associated with old European notions of cosmopolitanism; furthermore, how does it contribute to the improvement of conditions on the African continent and the salvaging from the rapacious operations of the IMF and World Bank? This is of course the warning that Ellis Cashmore gave in his book The Black Cultural Industry (1997): the commodification of hip-hop and rap has not meant financial revenues for either the black groups or their surroundings, but primarily income for the record labels, often controlled by white people. Moreover, the consumption of “black music” has not automatically fostered cultural integration or understanding among different groups but, as Cashmore writes, has created a cordon sanitaire around the dangers and risks of blackness by consuming, at a safe distance, some of its products and spirit (Cashmore 1997). This is also Paul Gilroy’s position. He has argued that commodification has destroyed what was wonderful about black culture to the advantage of corporate interests, though he stills see the contradictions and potentiality of music as a unique transmitter of cultures across diaspora (Gilroy 1993, 2011).

    If, for Dabiri, Afropolitanism is too glossy, polite, and compromised by its associations with big business and capitalism, and too much a digestible narrative of Africa rising that the West is willing to promote and embrace, we should not forget that Afropolitanism is not homogenous in itself, and following the adoption of the plural in cosmopolitanisms, we might dare to address it in its plural form, Afropolitanisms. Even though it may not be an alternative to Adichie’s “danger of a single story” and is too close to African narratives of Afro-pessimism and poverty porn, it is also something that should not be denied the power of resistance and criticism just because of its “stylistic” embracement of a “hipster” African experience. As I argued elsewhere, the postcolonial cultural industry is not just about the fashionability of Third World culture on sale. It is also a way of striking back by at times “formally” abiding by the rules of the marketplace while undermining the very system from within (Ponzanesi, 2014). It would be unfair to disregard the impact of writers such as Chimamanda Adichie and her critique of Western visions of race and African identities as merely cool and trivial because of her great popularity and success among Western readers. This would lead the debate back to the diatribe between Wole Soyinka (who won the Nobel Prize in Literature in 1986) and Chinweizu, who claimed that Soyinka had won not as a true representative of the African continent but because he had applied enough “Africanesque patina and inlays to satisfy Western tourist taste for exotica” (in Gibbs and Lindfors 1993: 346). The decision to give the first Nobel Prize in Literature for an African writer to Soyinka rather than the much older Senghor, father of the Negritude movement, was interpreted as the Swedish Academy’s preference for a postcolonial, avant-gardist and therefore globally more palatable writer over the old, anti-colonial, black nationalist, and francophone writer. Besides reflecting the competition between two linguistic centers, Paris and London, this was also due to the anti-colonial struggle’s loss of traction in the new era of rampant globalization. The debate between Mbembe and Dabiri has wider implications not only for the idea of Afropolitanism but also for the recent uprising in South Africa with the Rhodes Must Fall movement. Monuments of European heritage were attacked and libraries were burned as all knowledge stemming from the West and from the Empire was seen as ideologically tainted and oppressive. However, as Achille Mbembe responded (2016), to burn Western books is not a way to decolonize the university and start all over with a clean slate. He notes that history is not the same as memory and that we cannot just erase history; we should engage with memory as a way of putting history to rest, especially histories of suffering, trauma, and victimization (Mbembe 2016: 30). I believe that this current take on cosmopolitanism, from the global south, can contribute to a revamping of the term, not for purely intellectual and academic practices, but to initiate new economic mobilities that would have otherwise not been possible. In his contribution, “Accra’s Cosmopolitan Constellations,” Ato Quayson brings the world to Africa, and in a way reverses the claim of Afropolitanism as Africans being diasporic in the world. Here instead, the cities in the global south are shown as not only the new metropolises, but also the places where new forms of cosmopolitanism(s) take place and materialize through an urban scriptural economy: billboards, posters, advertisements contributing to a mixing of oral and written imported traditions, now hybridized and shaped anew. What Quayson argues is that Accra has always been a place of transnational connections, and the interconnectedness to global cultures has been going on for a very long time. He claims that “The world of Facebook, Twitter, and Gollywood is but one instalment of this continuing transnationalism” and that despite the usual claims of Africa as the underbelly of the world, people in Africa have the same “capacity for reimagining the world as do people born in Mississauga, or New Jersey, or Bromley or Leiden” (219). Talking about the Afro-Brazilian returnees from Bahia to Accra (Tabon) in the nineteenth century, as a group of Africans from the faraway lands of enslavement, the process of settling into their new homeland was far from smooth, underlining the fact that even in Africa ethnicity and multiraciality can give rise to xenophobia and conflict. If this still makes cosmopolitanism a requisite of the middle classes and transnational groups, then cosmopolitanism has little impact on a local level. However, if cosmopolitanism becomes a choice among the many identities available, some of which are deeply ethnic, then it can be considered part of constellations that are already intrinsic to African culture and future imaginations. The quizzical afterword by Anthony Appiah shows this through a personal anecdote. Appiah’s complex extended family is an example of a globally interconnected world. Appiah’s notion of cosmopolitanism remains anchored in the idea of dialogue and conversation across cultures, in order to reach if not agreement at least fair conditions for disagreement. Appiah’s notion of cosmopolitan cohabitation is something we cannot escape. In addition to the invocation of cohabitation and conversation as the only way forward to rescue cosmopolitanism, I would invoke the figuration of connections as also raised by Craig Calhoun in his chapter on “A Cosmopolitanism of Connections.” “We have heard many times that we now live in an interconnected world, but what does that mean exactly? That we all have Wi-Fi? That we all live in a platform society? That we all watch the same Netflix series? That we live in a borderless world?” As Calhoun writes: “We are connected but incompletely” (198). We have responsibilities because of these connections, which affect us and others, and are not just marked by abstract similarities. The specificities for these interactions vary according to the individual, cultural context, and historical period, so connections are not abstract figurations. Therefore, cosmopolitanism is not only about the easy mobility of the privileged, or the forced mobility of the disadvantaged, but about specific webs of connections that position us in the world, and function at different scales, from the local to the global. And because of digital connectivity we can navigate different worlds at the same time, belong to different constituencies without renouncing either the local, or the national or even the global. It is in the hypertextual embrace of multiple paths that cosmopolitanisms might offer new opportunities for thinking and feeling beyond methodological nationalisms.

     

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    Skrbis, Zlakto and Ian Woodward. 2007. “The Ambivalence of Ordinary Cosmopolitanism: Investigating the Limits of Cosmopolitan Openness.” Sociological Review 55, no. 4: 730–47.

    Sontag, Susan. 2003. Regarding the Pain of Others. New York: Picador.

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    [1] Bob Dylan, “The Times They Are A-Changin’” (1964).

  • Mark Lipovetsky – A Culture of Zero Gravity (Review of Pomerantsev, Nothing Is True and Everything Is Possible: The Surreal Heart of the New Russia)

    Mark Lipovetsky – A Culture of Zero Gravity (Review of Pomerantsev, Nothing Is True and Everything Is Possible: The Surreal Heart of the New Russia)

    Peter Pomerantsev, Nothing Is True and Everything Is Possible: The Surreal Heart of the New Russia (First edition, London: Faber & Faber, 2014. Revised edition, New York: PublicAffairs, 2015)

    reviewed by Mark Lipovetsky

    This essay has been peer-reviewed by the boundary 2 editorial collective. 

    Peter Pomerantsev’s book Nothing Is True and Everything Is Possible: Adventures in Modern Russia offers a chain of seemingly disparate but conceptually tied, stories – about  the Kremlin ideologue Vladislav Surkov,  the former “king maker” and oligarch Boris Berezovsky, post-soviet TV networks, Moscow night clubs, the suicides of top models’, new religious sects, the victims of business wars between different branches of power, former gangsters-cum-TV producers, Western expats, the Night Wolves (an organization of bikers which has become an avant-garde of Putin’s supporters), and many other truly exciting subjects. Through these stories, written with a sharp, sometimes satirical pen,  Pomerantsev presents modern Russian as a specific type of cultural organism rather than  a projection of Putin’s or anybody else’s political manipulations and propaganda.

    Pomerantsev clearly rejects a stereotype shared by many contemporary political commentators but harkening back to Soviet times: a reduction of the entire society to the whims of its leaders (sometimes confronted only by a small group of brave and wise dissidents). Although Nothing Is True and Everything Is Possible portrays such “political technologists” as Surkov and depicts several figures of contemporary dissent, Pomerantsev clearly tries to deconstruct this cliche and deliver a much more complex vision. Notably, Putin is rarely mentioned in the book; he is designated simply as “the President,” which suggests that his personality is less important than his position within the system.

    Pomerantsev’s book methodically dismantles the myth about “the return of the Soviet” in recent years – the myth shared by many, within and outside Russia alike. While demonstrating the continuity between the late Soviet modus vivendi, the political compromises of the 1990s, and today’s radical changes, Pomerantsev consistently argues that we have to deal with a completely new kind of the political discourse, within which recognizably Soviet elements play a very different role and disguise rather than reveal what is actually happening.

    The third widespread stereotype that is splendidly absent in Pomerantsev’s book is the discourse on “the Russians’ love of the strong hand,” Russia’s innate gravitation to authoritarian regimes and leaders, and, most notoriously the alleged lack of a democratic tradition in Russia.  Unlike numerous publications about contemporary Russia, these Orientalizing and profoundly essentialist labels never appear in Nothing Is True and Everything Is Possible.[1] For Pomerantsev, Russia is not a backwards and isolated player looking up at the perfect Western world; on the contrary, his book directly leads to an opposite conclusion: “Today’s Kremlin might perhaps be best viewed as an avant-garde of malevolent globalization. The methods it pursues will be taken up by others, and […] the West has no institutional or analytical tools to deal with it” (Pomerantsev and Weiss 2015, 7).

    This quotation is borrowed from a special report, “The Menace of Unreality: How the Kremlin Weaponizes Information, Culture and Money,”  written by Pomerantsev together with Michael Weiss for Mikhail Khodorkovsky’s Institute of Modern Russia. The authors of the report ask: “How does one fight a system that embraces Tupac and Instagram but compares Obama to a monkey and deems the Internet a CIA invention? That censors online information but provides a happy platform to the founder of WikiLeaks, a self-styled purveyor of total ‘transparency’? That purports to disdain corporate greed and celebrates Occupy Wall Street while presiding over an economy as corrupt as Nigeria’s? That casts an Anschluss of a neighboring country using the grammar of both blood-and-soil nationalism and anti-fascism?” (Pomerantsev and Weiss 2015, 5).

    The report works with ideas which have been brewing in Nothing Is True and Everything Is Possible. Yet, this lively and observant book is less about politics per se, and more about culture as an effective form of politics. The reader of Pomerantsev’s book eventually cannot help but realize that Russia’s political turns and twists are born in night clubs and at parties, rather than in Kremlin offices,  that “the President,” despite his unconcealed hatred for western-style democracy, is indeed truly democratic, since his thoughts and acts are synchronized with the desires of the majority of the Russian people (many of his supporters are well-educated, well-travelled representatives of the newly-born middle class);  that in a society dependent on TV broadcasting – and the Russia depicted in the book is exactly such a society –the distance between the cultural and political phenomena is minimal, if existing at all. Although the first edition of the book appeared before Russia’s political turn of 2014, Pomerantsev only had to add a few pages to the 2015 version to reflect the new political reality after the annexation of Crimea. These pages do not stand out but look quite natural, since in the main body of Nothing Is True… Pomerantsev managed to pinpoint exactly those processes and tendencies that made the insanity possible.

    Freedom from stereotypes coupled with Pomerantsev’s spectacular ability to present complex ideas through vivid snapshots, makes his book fertile ground for the discussion of much broader subjects. First and foremost, Nothing Is True and Everything Is Possible raises questions about the role of cynicism in Soviet and post-Soviet culture and politics, as well as about the relation between cynicism, authoritarianism  and postmodernism in both the Russian and global contexts. I will try to present a “dialogical” reading of Pomerantsev’s book, sometimes problematizing its concepts, sometimes expanding on them, sometimes applying them to the material beyond the book’s content. It is a truly rare occasion when a journalistic reportage provokes historical and theoretical questions, which proves that Nothing Is True and Everything Is Possible is a phenomenon out of the ordinary.

     “Reality Show Russia”

    Petr Pomerantsev was born in Kiev in 1977. In 1978 his father, the well-known poet and journalist Igor’ Pomerantsev, emigrated with his family from the USSR and began working as a broadcaster, first at the BBC Radio Russian Service and from 1987 and until present at Radio Liberty. Pomerantsev Jr. recollects in his Newsweek article how he enjoyed playing in the hallways of the BBC Bush House in London (see Pomerantsev 2011a). The BBC Russian service was one of the most vibrant centers of anti-Soviet intellectual activity, so it is safe to assume (and the book confirms this impression) that the author of Nothing Is True and Everything Is Possible  has absorbed the ethos of late Soviet dissidents. This ethos might have served as a repellent in Russia of the 2000s, a country enraptured with nostalgic myths about Soviet imperial might and the stability of the Brezhnev era along with growing demonization of the Yeltsin period of democratic reforms, which strangely resonated with the rapidly increasing number of former and current officers of FSB (the KGB successor) taking up prestigious political, economic and media offices…

    In 2001, after graduating from Edinburgh University and some job experience at British TV, Pomerantsev decides to try himself in Russia – where he stays until 2010, working as a producer at the popular Russian entertainment TV channel TNT. Stays, because, as he explains,  Moscow in these years “was full of vitality and madness and incredibly exciting”; it was “a place to be” (Castle 2015). Along with the increasing monopolization of political, economic, and media power in the hands of the FSB-centered clique,  the 2000s was a period of a noticeable economic growth, when Russia’s cities became cleaner and safer, when ordinary people started to travel abroad on a regular basis, when one could hardly find a Russian-made car within a thick stream of urban vehicles, when restaurants flourished, book sales were on the rise and theatres were full every night … In short, when the economic reforms of the accursed Yeltsin years in combination with the skyrocketing oil and gas prices stated to bring long-awaited fruits (see Iasin 2005).

    While in Moscow Pomerantsev produced reality shows, documentaries, and generally had to bring the “western” style to the “news-free” – i.e., supposedly apolitical – broadcasts of the TNT channel. Nothing Is True and Everything Is Possible is in many ways a memoir about these years on Russian TV. The reality show was one of the genres Pomerantsev produced, so the metaphor of Russian politics as a reality show holds a central places in his book; the first part of the book is entitled: “Reality Show Russia”.

    One of Pomerantsev’s first discoveries associated with these – relatively free and diverse – years, concerns the blurring of the borderline between fact and fiction, between a staged show and the news, especially on  the Russian national channels united by the term “Ostankino” (the major TV studio in Moscow).  As a TV news anchor from Ostankino explained to him, a young foreigner, speaking fluent Russian and working on Russian TV: “Politics has got to feel like … like a movie!” (6)[2]. Pomeranstev’s explains how this motto works in practice: “… the new Kremlin won’t make the same mistake the old Soviet Union did: it will never let TV become dull… Twenty-first century Ostankino mixes show business and propaganda, ratings with authoritarianism […] Sitting in that smoky room,  I had the sense that reality was somehow malleable, that I was with Prospero who could project any existence they wanted onto post-Soviet Russia” (7).  However, his own career on a Russian entertainment channel serves as an illuminating example of the limits of “Prospero”’s power. Pomerantsev describes how he had been producing a reality show about people meeting and losing each other at the airport. Intentionally, he tried to avoid staged and scripted situations, seeking interesting characters and stories instead of sentimental effects. The result was quite predictable:  “The ratings for Hello-Goodbye had sucked. Part of the problem was that the audience wouldn’t believe the stories in the show were real. After so many years of fake reality, it was hard to convince them this was genuine” (73). Furthermore, when Pomerantsev made several documentaries addressing societal conflicts and problems, they all were rejected by the channel on the premise that its viewers did not want to see anything negative.

    Yet, this is only half of the picture. In the second half of the book, Pomerantsev  describes how he received a very tempting invitation to the federal First Channel. The head of programming, the best-selling author of self-help books (this is an important detail in the context of the book) offered him the chance “to helm a historical drama-documentary… With a real, big, mini-movie budget for actors and reconstructions and set designers… The sort of thing you make when you’re right at the top of the TV tree in the West…” (226). And the story was great: “about a Second World War admiral who defied Stalin’s orders and started the attack on the Germans, while the Kremlin was still in denial about Hitler’s intentions and hoped for peace. The admiral was later purged and largely forgotten. It’s a good story. It’s a really good story. It’s a dream project” (227). Most importantly, it was a true story that obviously defied  the newly-rediscovered admiration for Stalin’s politics in Russia’s public and media discourse (these days Putin even speaks highly about the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact). Yet, eventually Pomerantsev decided to decline this generous offer: “… I realise that though my film might be clean, it could easily be put next to some Second World War hymn praising Stalin and the President as his newest incarnation.  Would my film be the ‘good’ programme that validates everything I don’t want to be a part of? The one that wins trust, for that trust to be manipulated in the next moment?” (231). In other words: “In a world that really has been turned on its head, truth is a moment of falsehood,” as Guy Debord writes in The Society of the Spectacle (1995, 14).

    This is a very important realization, not only as the turning point in Pomerantsev’s Russian odyssey, but also as an insight into the logic of the Russian “society of spectacle”, itself resonant with Baudrillard’s almost forgotten concept of the “hyperreality of simulacra”.  What seemed to be an almost grotesque philosophic hyperbole, appears to be Pomerantsev’s and his colleagues’ practical experience in Nothing Is True and Everything Is Possible. As follows from this experience,  the capitalist society of the spectacle, unlike Debord’s conceptualization,  is not opposed to the communist social order but directly grows from it. Post-Soviet TV viewers remember and even nostalgically long for Soviet media where ideological images constantly produced their own spectacle,  perhaps not as attractive as the capitalist one, but still capable of fulfilling its main function: “By means of spectacle the ruling order discourses endlessly upon itself in an uninterrupted monologue of self-praise” (Debord 1995, 19). As to the “hyperreality of simulacra”,  it appears in Pomerantsev’s book  not only as a result of capitalist market forces (images that sell better, dominate), but as a horizon in which public demand for captivating (or entertaining, or horrifying) images and the political and economic interests of the ruling elite meet and happily fuse with each other. As follows from Nothing Is True…, the “hyperreality of simulacra” in its totality can be most successfully achieved not by capitalism alone, but by the blend of capitalism with post-soviet authoritarianism, accomplished through the  homogenization of the information flow.

    Back in the early 2000s, the prominent Russian sociologists Lev Gudkov and Boris Dubin, defined Russian society as “the society of TV viewers”. The society of TV-viewers had formed on the ruins of Soviet ideocracy, i.e. the society with a single official ideology which served either as an ally or as an opponent to multiple others non-official ones.  In this new cultural realm. political doctrines were replaced by entertainment which seemed to be apolitical, yet, (surprise, surprise!) were quite political indeed.  For example, in the 2000s appeared numerous TV series about heroic, charming and, yes,  suffering officers of the Cheka/NKVD/KGB: they were entertaining and even captivating, but eventually they have produced the figure of the representative of this organization as the epitome of the national destiny – who defends the motherland, takes the hit from his (always his!) native organization,  successfully overcomes the difficulties (temporary of courses) and triumphs over enemies (see Lipovetsky 2014).  In the scholars’ opinion, the mass dependence of Russian society on TV images signified the process opposite to the formation of the civil society: “Today’s social process of Russian ‘massovization’… is directed against differentiation and relies on the most conservative groups of the society” (Gudkov and Dubin 2001, 44).  The scholars argued that while promoting negative identification – through the figures of enemies and demonized “others”— television offered uplifting “participatory rituals of power” that substituted for actual politics while feeding the longing for national grandeur, heroic history and symbolic superiority.

    However, in the 1990s, the post-Soviet mediaspace was a battlefield of various competing discourses – liberal, neo-liberal, nationalist, nostalgic, statists, libertarian, etc. During the 2000s-2010s the full spectrum of these discourses gradually narrowed down toward cultural neo-traditionalism and political neo-conservatism (focalized on lost imperial glory, “Russia raising itself from its knees”, collapse of the USSR as “the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the century”, etc.). Pomerantsev observes the completion of this process in the TV-orchestrated nationalist mass hysteria accompanying the Crimean affair and invasion of Ukraine in  2014: “… the Kremlin has finally mastered the art of fusing reality TV and authoritarianism to keep the great 140-million strong population entertained, distracted, constantly exposed to geopolitical nightmare that if repeated enough times can become infectious” (273)

    Without any competing media  (no more than 5% of the Russian population gets its news from internet), the homogenized narrative of post-Soviet TV not only shapes the opinions of the vast majority of Russian population – the notorious 85% that (allegedly) wholeheartedly support all of Putin’s initiatives.  The TV narrative becomes an ultimate reality symbolically superseding immediate everyday experience. In other words, the television offers neither a simulation of reality, nor a distortion of truth, but a parallel, and more real, world.

    Baudrillard wrote about “the desert of the real” (Natoli and Hutcheon 1993, 343), indicating that his hyperreality of simulacra was inseparable from the “metaphysical despair” evoked by “the idea that images concealed nothing at all” (345). On the contrary, Pomerantsev’s non-fictional characters, TV producers and “political technologists” feel no despair whatsoever, rather they enjoy their power over the “real” and celebrate the disappearance and malleability of any and all imaginable truth. In the formulation of Gleb Pavlovsky, a Soviet-time dissident, who became a leading “political technologist” of  “the Putin system” (although  eventually he was expelled from the circle of the Kremlin viziers):  “The main difference between propaganda in the USSR and the new Russia […] is that in Soviet times the concept of truth was important. Even if they were lying they took care to prove what they were doing was ‘the truth.’ Now no one even tries proving the ‘truth.’ You can just say anything. Create realities” (Pomerantsev and Weiss 2015, 9).

    At the same time, as one can see from the example with the offer received by Pomerantsev from the Ostankino boss, this system recognizes truth and even effectively employs discourses that might be uncomfortable for the dominant ideology. Yet, here these elements of credibility are instrumentalized as mere means for the performance of reality, a performance that neither its producers nor its consumers seem to judge by its truthfulness. Here, some other criteria matter more.  In the post-Soviet hyperreality of simulacra truth is triumphantly defied; it has been openly manipulated through the process of constant constructions, negations, and reconstruction in front of the viewer’s eyes.  This is why emphasis falls onto the flamboyance and virtuosity of the (reality) performance, be it the Olympics or the public burning of tons of imported cheese from countries sanctioning Russia. This may be the Achilles heel of contemporary Russian politics.  If performance supersedes reality, then invisible economic sanctions on Russian leadership are much less painful than a boycott of, say, the Football World Championship of 2018.

    “Postmodern Dictatorship”?

    Curiously, the vision of the malleable TV-dominated- reality in Pomerantsev’s book deeply resonates with Generation ‘P’ (Homo Zapiens in American version, Babylon  in British) by Viktor Pelevin, one of the most famous Russian postmodernist novels, published in 1999. The novel appeared before Putin was known to the broad public, and was initially perceived as a summation of  the Yeltsin period. Yet, it proved to be an prescient account of the ideological shifts in Putin’s decade. Even on a surface level, the novel presents a shrewd political forecast for the 2000s. In Generation P, a graduate from the Literary Institute  trained to translate poetry from languages he does not know, a character without features but with a “pile of cynicism,” Vavilen Tatarsky, becomes a copywriter, first for commercial advertisements, later for political ones,  eventually rising from mediocrity to become the supreme ruler of the media, the living god secretly ruling post-Soviet Russia. This plotline retroactively reads as a parody of Vladimir Putin’s ascent to the role of the “national leader”. With an uncanny acuity of foresight, Pelevin imagines the transformation of a non-entity into the “face of the nation”, in a diapason from the elimination of the “well-known businessman and political figure Boris Berezovsky” (2002,  249) – another character of Nothing Is True and Everything Is Possible — to a new cultural mainstream instigating nationalist nostalgia for the Soviet empire and novel and familiar forms of class hatred.  Pelevin even anticipated Russia’s newly-found desire to lead the reactionaries of the world (Pomerantsev and Weiss write about this in their memorandum)– in his commercial for Coca Cola Tatarsky appears as the frontrunner for the “congress of radical fundamentalists from all of the world’s major confessions” (2002, 249).

    In Generation P, a gangster commissions Vavilen to produce a Russian national idea: “Write me a Russian idea about five pages long. And a short version one page long. And lay it out like real life, without any fancy gibberish […] So’s they won’t think all we’ve done in Russia is heist the money and put up a steel door. So’s they can feel the same kind of spirit like in ’45 at Stalingrad, you get me?” (Pelevin 2002, 138) This request, albeit expressed in slightly different terms punctuates a wide spectrum of cultural debates about the national idea in Russia of the 1990s and 2000s, reflected in Pomerantsev’s book as well. However, when asked in 2008 if Russia had found its national idea in Putin, Pelevin responded affirmatively: “That’s precisely what Putin is” (Rotkirch 2008, 82). Following this logic, one may argue that although Vavilen failed to accomplish the task assigned him, his creator did not. Like Putin, Vavilen is a manifestation of Russia’s new national idea. He just isn’t sure what that truly is, since it is hyperreal and he himself created it.

    But let us pause for a second and ask whether the fusion of postmodernism and authoritarianism is possible at all? For Pomerantsev they are compatible.  He respectfully cites the Russian oligarch Oleg Deripaska saying: “This isn’t a country in transition but some sort of postmodern dictatorship that uses the language and institutions of democratic capitalism for authoritarian elites” (50). In 2011, Pomerantsev published in The London Review of Books the article “Putin’s Rasputin” that now reads as a seed from which the book was born (slightly altered, this text would be included into Nothing Is True…). The article describes Vladislav Surkov, a former deputy head of the President’s administration, Putin’s aid and vice-premier, the inventor of the concept of Russian “sovereign democracy” and builder of the United Russia Party;  currently one of the chief coordinators of both the “hybrid war” in Ukraine and its orchestrated representation in the Russian media.  In Surkov, who is also known as a novelist and song-writer, Pomerantsev sees (with good reason) the main designer of contemporary Russia’s political and societal system. Surkov, he contends, has fused authoritarianism with postmodernism, creating a completely new political system, which Pomerantsev tentatively defines as “postmodern authoritarianism”:

    Newly translated postmodernist texts give philosophical weight to the Surkovian power model. [Jean-] François Lyotard, the French theoretician of postmodernism, began to be translated in Russia only towards the end of the 1990s, at exactly the time Surkov joined the government. The author of Almost Zero [a postmodernist novel allegedly written by Surkov] loves to invoke such Lyotardian concepts as the breakdown of grand cultural narratives and the fragmentation of truth: ideas that still sound quite fresh in Russia. […] In an echo of socialism’s fate in the early 20th century, Russia has adopted a fashionable, supposedly liberational Western intellectual movement and transformed it into an instrument of oppression. (Pomerantsev 2011)

    This description continues in the book:

    Surkov likes to invoke the new postmodern texts just translated into Russian,  the breakdown of grand narratives, the impossibility of truth, how everything is only ‘simulacrum’ and ‘simulacra’… and then in the next moment he says how he despises relativism and lives conservatism, before quoting Allen Ginsberg’s ‘Sunflower Sutra’ in English and by heart […] Surkov’s genius has been to tear those associations apart,  to marry authoritarianism and modern art, to use the language of rights and representation to validate tyranny, to recut and paste democratic capitalism until it means the reverse of its original purpose. (87-88)

    Although, this way of reasoning seems to be a little naïve  (one man’s cultural convictions cannot be directly reproduced by the entire country or just Moscow) the question remains: how can one so easily marry postmodernism and authoritarianism? Similarities between what Pomerantsev depicts in his non-fiction and postmodernist theoretical models, as well as Russian postmodernist fiction are too obvious to be ignored.

    It should be noted that Russian postmodernism has been radically different from the model described by Fredric Jameson as the “cultural logic of late capitalism”. Although participants of late Soviet underground culture, had very fragmented, if any knowledge of Western theory,  their works embodied Lyotarian “incredulity towards grand narratives” in scandalously transgressive and liberating forms of  the counterculture, which had been subverting both Soviet official and intelligentsia’s hegemonies (see in more detail Lipovetsky 1999, 2008). Although acknowledged in the 1990s, postmodernist writers and artists like Dmitrii Prigov, Vladimir Sorokin, Lev Rubinshtein and their colleagues by underground circles by and large,  have preserved their critical position towards neo-traditionalist and neo-conservative ideologies and cultural trends.

    Notably, Vladimir Sorokin in 2006 wrote a postmodernist dystopian novel The Day of the Oprichinik (translated into English in 2011), in which, as readers and critics admit almost unanimously, predicted, outlined and exaggerated the actual features of the grotesque political climate of the 2010s. Lev Rubinshtein, the experimental poet famous for “the index cards poetry”, in the 2000s has become one of the most brilliant and influential political essayist of the anti-Putin camp. Dmitrii Prigov, one of the founding fathers of Moscow Conceptualism, also published political columns critical of the new conformism and nostalgia for the lost grand narratives. Most importantly, he has directly influenced protest art of the new generation: before his untimely death in 2007 he collaborated with the group Voina (War) famous for its radical political performances. The founder of Voina, Oleg Vorotnikov, called Prigov the inspiration for the group’s creation and activities, and the former member of Voina and spokesperson  for Pussy Riot, Nadezhda Tolokonnikova, repeatedly mentions Prigov as a deep influence, exposing her to contemporary, i.e., postmodernist, art and culture (see, for example, Volchek 2012).

    Although Pomerantsev does not write about these figures (he only briefly mentions Voina’s actions and “the great tricksters of the Monstration movement”[149]), it is with apparent tenderness that he describes the conceptualist artist Vladislav Mamyshev-Monro whose impersonations of various cultural and political celebrities, including “the President”, were at first perceived as a part of the culture of simulation but turned out to be its subversion incompatible with the new political freeze:  “Vladik himself was dead. He was found floating in a pool in Bali. Death by heart attack. Right at the end an oligarch acquaintance had made him an offer to come over to the Kremlin side and star in a series of paintings in which he would dress up and appear in a photo shoot that portrayed the new protest leaders sodomizing. Vladik had refused” (278).

    These examples, although admittedly brief, nevertheless complicate and problematize the picture of “postmodern dictatorship” painted by Pomerantsev. Minimally, they testify to the fact that postmodernism hosts dissimilar and even conflicting organisms, that postmodernist culture since the 1980s has been evolving in various directions, some of which lead to Surkov while others lead to Pussy Riot. An informative parallel might be made to Boris Groys’s conceptualization of Stalinism and its cultural manifestation Socialist Realism. In The Total Art of Stalinism (original title: Gesamtkunstwerk Stalin) Groys argued that Stalinism  adopted avant-garde aesthetic methods and substituted the avant-gardist demiurge with the state (and Stalin as  its personification): “… Socialist realism candidly formulates the principle and strategy of its mimesis: although it advocates a strictly ‘objective’, ‘adequate’ rendering of  external reality,  at the same time it stages or produces this reality. More precisely, it takes reality that has already been produced by Stalin and the party, thereby shifting the creative act onto reality itself, just as the  avant-garde had demanded” (1992, 55). Groys’s argument has been criticized by historians of Socialist Realism pointing to the antagonism between Socialist Realism and the avant-garde and its reliance on much more populist and traditionalist discourses (see for example, Dobrenko 1997). However, the very logic of the transformation of a liberatory aesthetics into sociocultural authoritarianism seems to be relevant to contemporary Russia. Despite Benjamin’s maxim, politics has been aestheticized since ancient times, but when the state acts as an artist, repression becomes inevitable.

    Although historical parallels can help to contour the phenomenon, by default they are never accurate. This is why, I believe that in the cultural situation described by Pomerantsev, we are dealing with something different: with the postmodernist redressing of a far more long-standing cultural and political phenomenon, which tends to change clothing every new epoch, and Nothing Is True… excels in describing its current Russian outfit.

    From the History of Cynicism

    Throughout his entire book, using very dissimilar examples, Pomerantsev demonstrates the functioning of one and the same cultural (political/social/psychological) mechanism: the coexistence of mutually exclusive ideologies/beliefs/discourses in one and the same mind/space/institution.  More accurately, it is not their co-existence, but the painless and almost artistic shifting from one side to the opposite; a process which never stops and is never is reflected upon as a problem.

    Consider just a few examples from Nothing Is True:

    About Moscow’s new architecture: “A new office center on the other side of the river from the Kremlin starts with a Roman portico, then morphs into medieval ramparts with spikes and gold-glass reflective windows, all topped with turrets and Stalin-era spires. The effect is at first amusing, then disturbing. It’s like talking to the victim of a multiple personality disorder.” (124).

    About politics of “a new type of authoritarianism”: “The Kremlin’s idea is to own all forms of political discourse, to not let any independent movement develop outside its walls. Its Moscow can feel like an oligarchy in the morning and a democracy in the afternoon, a monarchy for dinner and a totalitarian state by bedtime” (79).

    About new “spiritual gurus”: “Surkov had gathered together all political models to create a grand pastiche, or Moscow’s architecture tried to fill all styles of buildings onto one, Vissarion [a popular new “prophet”] had created a collage of all religions” (210)

    About media producers:

    The producers who work at the Ostankino channels might all be liberals in the private lives, holiday in Tuscany, and be completely European in their tastes. When I ask how they marry their professional and personal lives, they look at me as if I were a fool and answer: ‘Over the last twenty years we’ve lived through a communism,  we never believed in, democracy and defaults and mafia state and oligarchy, and we’ve realized they are illusions, that everything is PR.’ ‘Everything is PR’ has become the favorite phrase of the new Russia; my Moscow peers are filled with a sense that they are both cynical and enlightened. […] ‘Can’t you see your own governments are just as bad as ours?’ they ask me. I try to protest – but they just smile and pity me. To believe in something and stand by it in this world is derided, the ability to be a shape-shifter celebrated… conformism raised to the level of aesthetic act. (87)

    And once again about them:

    For when I talk to many of my old  colleagues who are still working in the ranks of Russian media or in state corporations, they might laugh off all the Holy Russia stuff as so much PR (because everything is PR!), but their triumphant cynicism in turn means they can be made to feel there are conspiracies everywhere; because if nothing is true and all motives are corrupt and no one is to be trusted, doesn’t it mean that some dark hand must be behind everything? (273)

    About social psychology:

    Before I used to think the two worlds were in conflict, but the truth is a symbiosis. It’s almost as if you are encouraged to have one identity one moment and the opposite one the next. So you’re always split into little bits, and can never quite commit to changing things […] But there is great comfort in these splits too: you can leave all your guilt with your ‘public’ self. That wasn’t you stealing that budget/making that propaganda show/bending your knee to the President, just a role you were playing: you’re a good person really. It’s not much about denial. It’s not even about suppressing dark secrets. You can see everything you do, all your sins. You just reorganize your emotional life so as not to care. (234)

    Indeed, “conformism raised to the level of aesthetic act” is a great definition of cynicism. Furthermore, the post-Soviet complex illuminated by Pomerantsev, deeply resonates with a brilliant description of the  modern cynic from Peter Sloterdijk’s famous book Critique of Cynical Reason:

    … the present-day servant of the system can very well do with the right hand what the left hand never allowed. By day, colonizer, at night, colonized; by occupation, valorizer and administrator, during leisure time, valorized and administered; officially a cynical functionary, privately a sensitive soul; at office a giver of orders, ideologically a discussant; outwardly a follower of the reality principle, inwardly a subject oriented towards pleasure; functionally an agent of capital, intentionally a democrat; with respect to the system a functionary of reification, with respect to Lebenswelt  (lifeworld), someone who achieves self-realization; objectively a strategist of destruction, subjectively a pacifist; basically someone who triggers catastrophes, in one’s own view, innocence personified <…> This mixture is our moral status quo.’ (1987, 113)

    Obviously, there is nothing specifically post-Soviet in this description. According to Sloterdijk, “a universal diffuse cynicism” (1987, 3) is the widespread cultural response to the heavy burden of modernity. He defines cynicism as “enlightened false consciousness” as opposed to Marx’s famous definition of ideology. Sloterdijk argues that cynicism offers the modern subject a strategy of pseudo-socialization to reconcile individual interest with social demands by the splitting their personality into unstable and equally false and authentic social masks. The constant switching of these masks is the strategy of cynical accommodation to modernity.  There is nothing specifically postmodern in this strategy either. Sloterdijk traces a genealogy of cynicism from ancient Greece to the twentieth century.

    However, he almost completely excludes the Soviet experience from his “cabinet of cynics.” Slavoj Zizek, probably, was the first to apply Sloterdijk’s concept to Stalinism. In The Plague of Fantasies  he argued that the Stalinist henchmen far exceeded the cynicism of their Nazi colleagues,  “The paranoiac Nazis really believed in the Jewish conspiracy, while the perverted Stalinists actively organized/ invented ‘counterrevolutionary conspiracies’ as a pre-emptive strikes. The greatest surprise for the Stalinist investigator was to discover that the subject accused of being a German or American spy really was a spy: in Stalinism proper,  confessions counted only as far as they were false and extorted … “(1997, 58). And in the book Did Somebody Say Totalitarianism? even in more detail he argued that in the Soviet political system “a cynical attitude towards the official ideology was what the regime really wanted – the greatest catastrophe for the regime would have been for its own ideology to be taken seriously, and realized by its subjects.” (2001, 92).

    On the other hand, as historians of Soviet civilization have demonstrated,  the authorities’ cynicism generated matching cynical methods of adaptation among ordinary Soviet citizens, the “broad masses” and intelligentsia alike (although, of course, it would be wrong to generalize and imagine all Soviet people as seasoned cynics). Oleg Kharkhordin in his The Collective and the Individual in Russia: A Study of Practices, which deals with the Soviet purges and the origins of the Soviet subjectivity writes about the results of this process: “Their double-faced life is not a painful split forced upon their heretofore unitary self; on the contrary, this split is normal for them because they originate as individuals by the means of split. […] One of the steps in this long development was individual perfection of the mechanism for constant switching between the intimate and the official, a curious kind of unofficial self-training, a process that comes later that the initial stage of dissimilation conceived as ‘closing off’ (pritvorstvo) and one that we may more aptly call dissimilation as ‘changing faces’ (litsemerie) – and, we might add, as its summation – cynicism”  (1998, 275, 278).  In her book Tear off the Masks! Identity and Imposture in Twentieth Century Russia, Sheila Fitzpatrick, the well-known social historian of Stalinism makes no reference to Sloterdijk, but uses many documents from the 1920s and 1930s to demonstrate the constantly shifting logic of class discrimination and how it compelled the average person to manipulate their own identity, Sloterdijk-style, rewriting the autobiography and seeking a place in the official and unofficial systems of social relations.

    The heyday of Soviet cynicism falls onto the post-Stalin period of late socialism when, according to Alexey Yurchak, the author of the seminal study Everything Was Forever, Until It Was No More: The Last Soviet Generation, ideological beliefs frayed into pure rituals, participation in which demonstrated one’s loyalty to the regime and secured social success without embodying true belief.  Pomerantsev in his book directly establishes the link between the late Soviet cynicism and today’s cultural reality:

    Whenever I ask my Russian bosses, the older TV producers and media types who run the system, what it was like growing up in the late Soviet Union, whether they believed in the communist ideology that surrounded them, they always laugh at me.

    ‘Don’t be silly,’ most answer.

    ‘So you were dissidents? You believed in finishing the USSR?”

    ‘No. It’s not like that. You just speak several languages at the same time. There’s like several you’s.’ (233-4)

    Having recognized the genealogical connection between late Soviet cynicism and the present day triumph of cynicism of Russia’s elites, Pomerantsev offers the following diagnosis: “Seen from this perspective, the great drama of Russia is not the ‘transition’ between communism and capitalism, between one fervently held set of beliefs and another, but that during the final decades of the USSR no  one believed in communism and yet carried on living as if they did, and now they can only create a society of simulations” (234).

    It sounds very logical but a little too straightforward to be accurate.  Besides, this logic fails to explain the internal shift that has resulted in the current state of affairs. What Pomerantsev disregards is the subversive power of cynicism, its insidiousness. In the late Soviet period, what may be defined as cynicism, or a cynical split in multiple I’s, was also responsible for numerous practices and discourses that Yurchak unites by the term “living vnye”:

    … the meaning of this term, at least in many cases, is closer to a condition of being simultaneously inside and outside of some context” (2006, 128) – here the system of Soviet ideas, expectations, scenarios, etc. The system of “vnye” discourses and milieus, in the scholar’s opinion, explains the sudden collapse of the invincible Soviet system: “although the system’s collapse had been unimaginable before it began, it appeared unsurprising when it happened. (1)

    Furthermore, Soviet culture, since the 1920s and until the 80s, has been creating a whole rogue’s gallery of attractive and winning cynics and non-conformists, brilliantly defeating the system. This cultural trope spectacularly manifested the “power of the powerless” to use Vaclav Havel’s famous formulation. Literary and cinematic works about such characters enjoyed cult status, while belonging to official and non-official culture alike, from personages like Ostap Bender from Ilf and Petrov’s diptych of satirical novels The Twelve Chairs (1928) and The Golden Calf (1932) – both the subjects of multiple films,  and the suite of demons accompanying the Devil Woland in Mikhail Bulgakov’s famous novel The Master and Margarita (written mainly in the 1930s, first published in 1966) to the authors and characters of Russian postmodernism, including the aforementioned Moscow to the End of the Line with its philosophizing trickster in the center, to Dmitrii Prigov, who had been constructing his cultural personality as a trickster’s ploy, throughout his entire career.

    In my book Charms of the Cynical Reason (Lipovetsky 2011), I argue that the figure of the trickster in Soviet culture played a dual role. On the one hand, s/he provided cultural legitimacy to Soviet cynicism, even lending it the aura of artistry. The cynical split- or multi-personality may have been essential to survive and endure enforced participation in the grey economy and society. But, as a rule, this was accompanied by feelings of guilt and shame, compounded by the official Soviet rhetoric which demonized bourgeois conformism and interest in material comfort. The charming and versatile Soviet tricksters removed the feelings of guilt that Soviet readers and spectators might experience, turning the battle for survival into a jolly game exposing contradictions between official Soviet rhetoric and mundane survival.

    On the other hand, in full correspondence to Sloterdijk’s thesis that “Cynicism can only be stemmed by kynicism, not by morality” (194), the artistic and non-pragmatic trickster playfully mocked and demolished widespread cynical discourses and practices. By the term “kynicism” the philosopher defines non-pragmatic, scandalous and artistic aspects of cynicism – exactly those that the Soviet tricksters embodied.  Thus, the lineage coming from Soviet tricksters finds its direct continuation in Sorokin’s scandalizing use of scatological and cannibalistic motifs in his writings. Voina’s cynical performances include such “cynical” acts as stuffing a frozen chicken up a vagina or simulating the lynching of immigrants in a supermarket. Pussy Riot with their punk-prayer in the main Moscow cathedral appear to be true  heirs to this tradition, adding new edges of political, religious, and gender critique to the trickster’s subversion.

    Thus, the “genius” of the Putin/Surkov system lies in the balancing of conformity and subversion associated with refurbished and even glamorized late Soviet cynicism.  Yet, neither Surkov, nor Pomerantsev realize that a balance based on cynicism is unstable precisely due to the self-subversive nature of the latter.  This balance was disturbed in 2011 by the excessive cynicism of Putin and Medvedev’s “switcheroo” that generated a wave of protests lasting until May 6,  2012 (the day prior to Putin’s third inauguration), when a rally at Bolotnaya Square was brutally dispersed by the police.  Notably, this protest movement was distinguished by a very peculiar – cynical or tricksterish –brand of humor. For example, when the President compared the white ribbons of the protestors with condoms, the crowd  responded by proudly carrying a huge, ten-meter long condom at the next protest. Pussy Riot’s punk prayer  requesting the Mather of God to force Putin away,  appeared as an inseparable part of this movement.[3]

    Troubled by these reactions, the regime responded in an increasingly aggressive and conservative way: from imprisoning Pussy Riot and the participants of peaceful demonstrations, to homophobic laws, from the introduction of elements of censorship to the discrediting, persecution, and  simply assassination of prominent liberal politicians, from the  elevation of the  Russian Orthodox Church as the ultimate authority in culture and morality, to the promotion of  a filtered “heroic history” as opposed to “negative representations” of the Russian and Soviet past;  from rabid anti-Americanism to the general promotion of anti-liberal sentiment, etc.  Spurred by the Ukrainian revolution, this trend in 2014 transformed into the active implementation of imperialist dreams, along with a nationalist and anti-Western media frenzy,  and a paranoid quest for enemies both foreign and domestic.

    All these tendencies clearly match Umberto Eco’s well-known criteria of Ur-Fascism. First and foremost, the cult of tradition (the infamous “spiritual bonds” about which Putin and his cronies like to speak so much), the  rejection of modernism (in this case, postmodernism  – as exemplified not only by the persecution of Pussy Riot, but also by pogroms of exhibitions of contemporary art, or the scandal around an experimental production of Wagner’s Tannhäuser in Novosibirsk); the macho cult of action for action’s sake (in a diapason from Putin;s naked torso to the Sochi Olympics as the main even in contemporary Russian history); “popular elitism” along with contempt for parliamentary democracy and liberalism (“Gayrope”!);  and of course,  nationalism enhanced by “the obsession with a plot, possibly an international one” (Eco 1995, 7).

    However, Eco did not mention that fascism can be born from an excess of cynicism turning on itself. This transition has been most illuminatingly described by Sloterdijk, when he discusses the birth of Nazism from the joyfully cynical atmosphere of the Weimar republic. He argues that fascism positions itself as the enemy of ambivalence, histrionics and deception, supposedly overcoming the cynical components of culture.  It does so through the promotion of a radically primitive and reductionist conservative mythology, which is presented as a modern tool capable of releasing modernity from its controversial and demoralizing effects.

    However, as the philosopher demonstrates, fascism also represent the highest manifestations of cynical culture.  First, according to Sloterdijk, Nazi mythology originates from the same philosophical premises as cynical culture: “In their approach, they are all chaotologists.  They all assume the precedence of the unordered, the hypercomplex, the meaningless, and that which demands too much of us.  Cynical semantics … can do nothing other than to charge order to the account of cultural caprice or the coercion toward a system” (399).  Second, in totalitarian culture, theatricality becomes a crucial weapon of political warfare through the orchestrated representation of the leader and the aesthetics of mass political spectacles. The performance of the power’s transcendental status, which is guaranteed by messianic ideology, as well as by spectacles of national unity that cover up constant, “tactical” ideological shifts, struggles within the upper echelons of power, the appropriation of “alien” ideological doctrines and practices etc., is no less important here.

    Pomerantsev’s  analysis deeply correlates with these observations. Russian media generously uses the word “fascists” typically applying it to the Ukrainian authorities and sometimes to Western countries, yet they use this word as an empty signifier, a universal label for everything “alien” and dangerous.  Pomerantsev never uses this word, yet, Nothing Is True…  compellingly documents the rise of fascism in Post-Soviet Russia (however postmodern it might be).

    Pomerantsev’s book is about fascism of a new kind, which existing political radars fail to detect and thus overlook, which is able to mimic western discourse, while thoroughly opposing it.  This fascism is armed with the “hyperreality of simulacra” (instead of mere theater) and promotes its “traditional values” with an openly cynical smirk. It also effectively transforms the cynical negation of truth into a foundation for a new political paranoia, and masterfully adopts a liberal rhetoric when needed. In Pomerantsev’s words:  “This is a new type of Kremlin propaganda, less about arguing against the West with a counter-model as in the Cold War, more about slipping inside its language to play and taunt it from inside” (57).

    Only on the surface does this new fascism resemble Stalinism or late Soviet culture, in fact, it is a new phenomenon: unlike them, it is deeply embedded in capitalist economic, media and cultural regimes. It is no longer based on a clear ideology, but to use Pomerantsev’s incisive formula, on “the culture of zero gravity”, it  successfully utilizes capitalist mechanisms and liberal rhetoric,  donning fashionable masks, including postmodern ones. Pomerantsev’s book warns the Western world that a monster has arisen within its own global cultural discourse.  This monster rises in contemporary Russia, but it can rise elsewhere: this is why Pomerantsev and Weiss call Russia “an avant-garde of malevolent globalization”.  At the very least, this means that the country and its current situation deserves very close and very well informed attention and that those resisting this new fascism within Russia, in culture, politics, or society, deserve the whole-hearted support and understanding of the rest of the world.

    Notes

    [1] Tellingly in The New York Times  review of Pomerantsev’s book, Miriam Elder noticed the absence of Putin, but nevertheless reduced stories of its diverse characters to the cliché: “they’re characters playing parts in the Kremlin’s script” (Elder 2014). It is little wonder that the reviewer chastises Pomerantsev for not writing about “Russia’s long and tortured history with authoritarianism”, i.e., Russia’s alleged authoritarian “habit”.

    [2] For all quotations from Pomerantsev’s book, I am using the 2015 edition.

    [3] Ilya Gerasimov in his brilliant analysis of a popular rock singer Sergei Shnurov, who has been considered an epitome of post-Soviet cynicism, shows how his songs of 2012-14 have transformed cynicism into a self-critical discourse (see Gerasimov 2014).

    Works Cited

    • Stephen Castle 2015. “A Russian TV Insider Describes a Modern Propaganda Machine.” The New York Times, February 13, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/14/world/europe/russian-tv-insider-says-putin-is-running-the-show-in-ukraine.html
    • Guy Debord 1995. The Society of the Spectacle, transl. by Donald Nicholson-Smith (New York: Zone Books).
    • Masha Gessen 2014. Words Will Break Cement: The Passion of Pussy Riot (New York: Riverhead Books).
    • Lev Gudkov and Boris Dubin 2001.  “Obshchestvo telezritelei: massy i massovye kommunikatsii v Rossii kontsa 1990-kh, “ Monirtoring obshchestvennogo mneniia,  2 (52),  March-April: 31-44.
    • Miriam Elder 2014. “Nothing Is True and Everything Is Possible by Petr Pomerantsev. The New York Times, November 25, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/30/books/review/nothing-is-true-and-everything-is-possible-by-peter-pomerantsev.html?_r=0
    • Umberto Eco 1995. “Ur-Fascism,” The New York Review of Books,  June 22, http://www.pegc.us/archive/Articles/eco_ur-fascism.pdf
    • Evgeny Dobrenko 1997. The Making of the State Reader: Social and Aesthetic Contexts of the Reception of Soviet Literature (Stanford: Stanford University Press).
    • Sheila Fitzpatrick 2005. Tear Off the Masks!: Identity and Imposture in Twentieth-Century Russia (Princeton: Princeton University Press).
    • Ilya Gerasimov 2014. “Lirika epokhi tsinicheskogo razuma,” http://net.abimperio.net/node/3353
    • Evgenii Iasin 2005. Prizhivetsia li demokratiia v Rossii. Moscow: Novoe izdatel’stvo.
    • Nadia Kalachova 2014. “Piter Pomerantsev: ‘Zapad legko verit v to, chto Ukrainy ne sushchestvuet’.” LB.ua, April 1.  http://www.interpretermag.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/PW-31.pdf
    • Oleg Kharkhordin 1999. The Collective and the Individual in Russia: A Study of Practices. (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press).
    • Mark Lipovetsky 1999.  Russian Postmodernist Fiction: Dialogue with Chaos (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe).
    • Mark Lipovetsky 2008.  Paralogies:  Transformations of the (Post)Modernist Discourse in Russian Culture of the 1920s-2000s (Moscow: Novoe Literaturnoe Obozrenie).
    • Mark Lipovetsky 2011. Charms of the Cynical Reason: The Transformations of the Trickster Trope in Soviet and Post-Soviet Culture (Boston: Academic Studies Press).
    • Mark Lipovetsky 2014. “Breaking Cover: How the KGB became Russia’s favorite TV heroes?”  The Calvert Journal,  April 30, http://calvertjournal.com/comment/show/2433/the-rise-of-kgb-television-series
    • Joseph Natoli and Linda Hutcheon 1993. A Postmodern Reader (New York: State University of New York).
    • Viktor Pelevin 2002. Homo Zapiens, transl. by Andrew Bromfield (New York and London: Viking).
    • Petr Pomerantsev 2011. “Putin’s Rasputin.” London Review of Books.  October (30:20), http://www.lrb.co.uk/v33/n20/peter-pomerantsev/putins-rasputin
    • Petr Pomerantsev 2011a. “The BBC’s Foreign Language Cuts Are Britain’s Loss.” Newsweek, April 3. http://www.newsweek.com/bbcs-foreign-language-cuts-are-britains-loss-66439
    • Petr Pomerantsev and Michael Weiss 2015. “The Menace of Unreality: How the Kremlin Weaponizes Information, Culture and Money.” A Special Report presented by The Interpreter, a project of the Institute of Modern Russia. http://www.interpretermag.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/PW-31.pdf
    • Kristina Rotkirch 2008. Contemporary Russian Fiction: A Short List. Russian Authors Interviewed by Kristina Rotkirch, ed. by Anna Ljunggren, transl. by Charles Rougle (Evanston: Northwestern University Press).
    • Peter Sloterdijk 1987. Critique of Critical Reason, trans. Michael Eldred (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press).
    • Dmitrii Volchek 2012. “Iskusstvo, pobezhdaiushchee strakh,” Radio Svoboda, May 16, www.svoboda.mobi/a/__/24583384.html
    • Slavoj Žižek 1997. The Plague of Fantasies (London, New York: Verso).
    • Slavoj Žižek 2001. Did Somebody Say Totalitarianism? Five Interventions in the (Mis)Use of a Notion (London, New York: Verso).

    Mark Lipovetsky is Professor of Russian Studies at the University of Colorado-Boulder. He is the author of more than a hundred of articles and eight books. Among his monographs are Paralogies: Transformation of (Post)modernist Discourse in Russian Culture of the 1920s-2000s (2008) and Charms of Cynical Reason: The Transformations of the Trickster Trope in Soviet and Post-Soviet Culture (2011).

  • David Tomkins – Assuming Control: Spielberg Rewires Ready Player One

    David Tomkins – Assuming Control: Spielberg Rewires Ready Player One

    by David Tomkins

    I.

    Ernest Cline’s bestselling novel Ready Player One (2011) envisions a future ravaged by war, climate change, famine, and disease in which most lived experience takes place in an immense multi-player virtual reality game called the OASIS. Created by James Halliday, an emotionally stunted recluse obsessed with 1980s pop culture, the OASIS promises relief from real world suffering by way of a computer-generated alternative reality overflowing with ‘80s pop culture references. Cline’s novel follows teenager Wade Watts on an adventure to locate the digital “Easter egg” that Halliday buried deep within the OASIS shortly before his death. Those seeking the egg must use three hidden keys (made of copper, jade, and crystal, respectively) to open secret gates wherein players face challenges ranging from expertly playing the arcade game Joust to flawlessly reenacting scenes from Monty Python and the Holy Grail. The first person to find the egg will inherit Halliday’s fortune, gain controlling stock in his company Gregarious Solutions, and assume control of Halliday’s virtual homage to the ‘80s, the OASIS.

    Rich in the ‘80s nostalgia saturating popular entertainment in recent years, and with a particular reverence for Steven Spielberg’s ‘80s corpus, Cline’s novel attracted legions of readers upon publication and became an instant best seller.[1] The signing of Spielberg to direct and produce the film version of Ready Player One underscored the treatment of Spielberg’s films in the novel as quasi-sacred texts, and generated a kind of closed feedback loop between textual and visual object.[2] Shortly before the film went into production, Cline told Syfy.com that it was “still hard for [him] … to wrap [his] … head around Steven Spielberg directing this movie,” in part, because the director showed himself to be such a huge fan of Cline’s novel, arriving at pre-production meetings with a paperback copy of Ready Player One containing dozens of notes regarding moments he wanted to include in the film.[3]

    But none of these moments, it turns out, included references to Spielberg’s earlier films. In fact, Spielberg made it a point to remove such references from the story. In 2016, Spielberg told Collider.com that he decided to make Ready Player One because it “brought [him] back to the ‘80s” and let him “do anything [he wanted] … except for with [his] own movies.”[4] “Except for the DeLorean and a couple of other things that I had something to do with,” [5] Spielberg added, “I cut a lot of my own references out [of the film].”[6] One can read Spielberg’s decision simply as an attempt to avoid self-flattery—a view Spielberg appears keen to popularize in interviews.[7] But equally compelling is the idea that Spielberg felt at odds with the version of himself celebrated in Cline’s novel, that of the marketable and broadly appealing director of block-busters like Jaws, E.T., and Raiders of the Lost Ark—in other words, the Spielberg of the ‘80s. Over the last twenty-five years, Spielberg has largely moved away from pulp genres toward a nominally more “serious,” socially conscious direction as a filmmaker (recent family-friendly films such as The BFG and The Adventures of Tintin notwithstanding). Ready Player One, however, a science fiction movie about teenage underdogs coming of age, sits comfortably among the films of Spielberg’s early canon—the deeply sentimental, widely appealing family-oriented films generally understood to have shaped the landscape of contemporary Hollywood.

    The tension between early and late Spielberg in Ready Player One is among the driving forces shaping the director’s adaption of Cline’s novel. By removing most references to himself from the film, Spielberg not only rewrites an important aspect of the source material, he rewrites American cinematic history of the last 40 years. Jaws, Close Encounters, E.T., the Indiana Jones films—these works are in certain ways synonymous with ‘80s pop culture. And yet, in making a movie about ‘80s nostalgia, Spielberg begins by pointing this nostalgia away from its most famous and influential director. This self-effacing act, which effectively erases the Spielberg of the ‘80s from the film, and by extension from the era it commemorates, belies the humility animating Spielberg’s public comments on self-reference. Spielberg saturates Ready Player One—as Halliday does the OASIS—with a meticulously crafted self-image, and what’s more, affords himself total control over the medium wherein (and from which) that image is projected. Spielberg paradoxically rewrites popular memory as a reflection of his own preoccupations, making Ready Player One a film in which the future the audience is asked to escape into is defined by Spielberg’s rewriting of the cinematic past.

    Central to Spielberg’s project of recasting ‘80s nostalgia in Ready Player One is an attempt to recuperate figures of corporate or governmental power—entities unlikely to have faired well in his ‘80s work. From the corrupt Mayor Vaughn in Jaws, to the pitiless government scientists in Close Encounters and E.T., to the bureaucrats who snatch Indy’s prize at the end of Raiders of the Lost Ark, figures in elite institutional positions typically pose a threat in early Spielberg. What’s more, in E.T., as well as Spielberg-produced films like The Goonies, these figures commit acts that compel young characters to take heroic, rebellious action. But in portraying Halliday as a meek, loveable nerd in Ready Player One, Spielberg introduces something new to the classic Spielbergian playbook that has implications not only for how we understand Spielberg’s ‘80s films, but also for how Ready Player One situates itself vis-à-vis contemporary pop culture. In Cline’s novel, Halliday comes across as a trickster figure in the mold of Willy Wonka—so much so that one of the first rumors to emerge about Spielberg’s adaptation of Ready Player One was that the director had coaxed Gene Wilder out of retirement to perform the role. Not only did that rumor turn out to be baseless, but the characterization of Halliday in Spielberg’s film neutralizes the faintly sinister underpinnings of Cline’s portrayal, replacing them with a goofy innocence, and an insistence—informed as much by contemporary celebrity worship as by Spielberg’s own status as an elder statesman of Hollywood—that the audience sympathize with, rather than despise, the all-powerful multi-billionaire.

    Halliday’s vast corporate empire, his incalculable wealth, the extraordinary political and cultural power he undoubtedly wields as the creator of an entertainment technology juggernaut—none of these things factor into Spielberg’s portrayal. Rather, Spielberg’s film compels us to pity Halliday, to see him as someone who has suffered, someone whose genius has denied him the kind of emotional life that we, the audience, take for granted (or that Spielberg wants us to take for granted, as the rich emotional interiority he imagines is itself a construct). Given that both Halliday (in Cline’s novel and Spielberg’s film) and Spielberg (in the real world) share global renown as authors of popular entertainment, it’s unsurprising that Spielberg would sympathize with the character. After all, the name Spielberg, whether cited in a production or directorial capacity, or as a generic descriptor (“Spielbergian”), suggests  “a mélange of mass appeal, sentiment and inchoate childlike wonder”—a description one could easily imagine applied to the OASIS.[8] But what is surprising is that Spielberg redeploys the sentimentality of his early work in Ready Player One to affirm the vertical social organization and imperialist ideology those films, at least on the surface, appear to attack.

    The truth-to-power ethos of Spielberg’s ‘80s corpus is enlisted in Ready Player One to sentimentalize the corporate overlord’s yearning to protect his product and control his legacy. Similar to how the rebel struggle against the evil empire in George Lucas’s Star Wars films ultimately reinforces another corporate empire (Lucasfilm), Spielberg’s early rebellions—which were never all that “radical” to begin with, given Spielberg’s fondness for traditional hetero-normative social structures—fold in on themselves in Ready Player One, readjusted to serve the film’s confirmation of neoliberal ideology and corporate sovereignty. What looks superficially in Ready Player One like a toning down of Spielberg and a celebration of Cline is in fact Spielberg through and through, but with the ironic upshot being the recuperation of institutional and corporate power, the affirmation of existing class structures, and a recasting of the heroic rebellions one finds in Spielberg’s early work as far more conservative.

    Unlike Spielberg’s film, Cline’s novel focuses a great deal on Halliday’s astonishing wealth, and it’s clear that for “gunters”—characters like Wade in search of Halliday’s egg—the acquisition of Halliday’s wealth is easily as important as gaining control of the OASIS. Wade, like most characters in Cline’s novel, is dirt poor: he, like millions of others, lives in a broken down mobile home stacked, along with dozens of others, hundreds of feet high. The world Cline describes is one of abject poverty: while the vast majority of people have next to nothing, Halliday, and a handful of corporate overlords like him, possess all the wealth, and wield all the power. This is not to overstate Cline’s interest in class in Ready Player One; indeed, he spends precious little time exploring the penurious world outside Halliday’s OASIS. Like his characters, it’s clear that Cline can’t wait to get back to the OASIS. But in Spielberg’s film, the at-best perfunctory acknowledgement of class dynamics seen in Cline’s novel is utterly ignored. Instead, Spielberg asks us to empathize with Halliday, maybe even to identify with him as much as—if not more than—we do with Wade.

    Rather than encouraging us to revile the corporate overlord responsible for impoverishing the world and controlling the lives of the story’s youthful heroes, Ready Player One stands out among Spielberg’s oeuvre (and recent Hollywood films generally) for the way it recasts the “innocent” teenager Spielberg marketed so effectively as an implicit bulwark against oppressive powers in the ‘80s as a figure sympathetic to the dominant, unassailable corporate forces of the future.[9] Whereas in Cline’s novel Wade suggests using his newfound wealth to “feed everyone on the planet,” and to “make the world a better place,” Spielberg glosses over Wade’s windfall entirely, focusing instead on what Wade’s acquisition of the OASIS allows him to take away from—rather than give to—the powerless masses. In effect, the wayward teenagers of Spielberg’s corpus mature into a kind of “ghost in the machine” of capital.

    The control Spielberg wishes to exert—over audiences, the film, the ‘80s—is perhaps most evident in the final moments of Ready Player One. As the film draws to a close, main character Wade speaks of disengaging from the OASIS to delight in the sensory and emotional experiences accessible only in the real world. In the novel, Cline similarly concludes with Wade revealing that “for the first time in as long as [he] could remember, [he] … had absolutely no desire to log back in to the OASIS”.[10] But in Spielberg’s hands, Wade’s newfound ambivalence about the OASIS has broader implications, as Wade, who ultimately wins control of the OASIS, sets limits on its availability, effectively forcing the tech-addled masses of 2045 to accept, as Wade now does, that “people need to spend more time in the real world.”[11]

    However, the restrictions that Wade—and by extension Spielberg—puts in place fail to do this; rather, they reveal the film’s great irony: that Spielberg asks audiences to discover an empathetic, authentic reality in the context of a simulated world that he, Spielberg, creates (and, it is implied, that he alone could create). By adding to Wade’s character a strong inclination toward hetero-normative romantic connection in the real world, and by directing Wade to downgrade public access to the OASIS so that its millions of users may find “real” love, Spielberg invites his audience to seek out and prioritize “authentic” humanity in contrast to that offered in the OASIS. But Spielberg does so by positing as authentic a simulation of human connection, which he then presents as the corrective not only to the film’s characters’ obsession with technology, but also to that of contemporary western society. In doing so, Spielberg attempts to situate himself apart from peddlers of artificiality like Halliday (with whom he nevertheless clearly identifies). But instead he succeeds, despite his lifelong preoccupation with celebrating and stirring human connections and emotions, in becoming the master generator of simulacra. Ultimately the film’s viewers find themselves absorbed into the position of the creator of the OASIS, so that the absence of specific references to Spielberg’s early films conceals a remaking of the entire world of the film in Spielberg’s image.

    II.

    In the film’s final scene, Spielberg assembles numerous sentimental cues to soften Wade’s mandate that users henceforth limit their time in the OASIS, thus making his demands appear more altruistic than draconian. As the camera pans across what appears to be Wade’s spacious new apartment (a significant step up from the cramped trailer he lived in previously), we see Wade and his recently acquired girlfriend Samantha sharing a kiss as he explains in a voice-over his plans for the OASIS, and as the ‘80s pop of Hall and Oates’s “You Make My Dreams Come True” gradually dominates the soundtrack. While neither the voice-over nor the establishment of the romantic couple are particularly common tropes among Spielberg’s endings overall, the collision of familial sentimentality and budding romance we see in Ready Player One nevertheless recalls several of Spielberg’s endings from the late ‘70s and early ‘80s in films like Close Encounters, E.T., and Indiana Jones and the Temple of Doom.[12]

    In anticipation of this highly sentimental ending, the film drastically accelerates the pace of the pair’s relationship: in the novel, they don’t meet in the real world until the last few pages, and their relationship—at least as far as Samantha is concerned—seems at best a work in progress. But Spielberg brings Wade and Samantha together in the real world halfway through the film, and makes their romantic connection a central concern. In doing so, and in explicitly depicting them in the final shot as a romantic couple, Spielberg creates contextual support for the argument he clearly wishes to make: that real world romance, rather than virtual game play, makes “dreams come true.” But even if this is so for Wade and Samantha, there’s little evidence to suggest that OASIS addicts around the world have had a similar experience. The suggestion, of course, is that they will—once they’re forced to.

    Not only do Wade’s new rules for the OASIS disregard the social upheaval that the narrative all but ensures would take place, they also aggressively elide the anti-social foundation upon which the OASIS was conceived. In an earlier scene, Halliday reveals that he created “the OASIS, because [he] … never felt at home in the real world,” adding that he “just didn’t know how to connect with the people there.” Whether simulations of Atari 2600 games like Adventure or of movie characters like Freddie Kruger, the contents of the OASIS are not only replicas, they’re replicas of replicas—virtual manifestations of Halliday’s adolescent obsessions placed in a world of his own making, and for his own pleasure. One “wins” in the OASIS by collecting virtual inventories of Halliday’s replicas, and gains social significance—in and outside the OASIS—according to what (and how much) one has collected.

    Despite cautioning Wade to avoid “getting lost” in the OASIS and revealing that, for him, the real world is “still the only place where you can get a decent meal,”[13] Halliday stops short of amending the central function of the OASIS as a replacement of, rather than supplement to, human interaction in the real world. Meanwhile, Wade’s parting words in the film limiting access to the OASIS point spectators toward an artificial reality of Spielberg’s making that is deeply invested in hiding its own artifice, and that punctuates a series of rewritings that remove Spielberg references from the film while simultaneously saturating it with his presence. At the same time, Spielberg ensures that the spectator’s sense of the ‘80s conforms to his own preoccupations, which themselves took hold in the context of the increasingly aggressive corporatization of the film industry that took place during this period. Consequently, the nostalgic universe generated in the film offers no exit from Spielberg, despite the absence of his name from the proceedings.

    The film rehearses this paradox once again in its treatment of Halliday’s end, which differs significantly from that of the novel. Arguably Spielberg attempts to secure his controlling presence—both in the film, and of cinematic history—by leaving ambiguous the fate of the OASIS’s creator. Although in both the book and the movie Halliday’s avatar Anorak appears to congratulate Wade (known as Parzival in the OASIS) on acquiring the egg, Cline describes an elaborate transfer of powers the film all but ignores. Upon taking Anorak’s hand, Wade looks down at his own avatar to discover that he now wears Anorak’s “obsidian black robes” and, according to his virtual display, possesses “a list of spells, inherent powers, and magic items that seemed to scroll on forever.”[14] Halliday, now appearing as he often did in the real world with “worn jeans and a faded Space Invaders T-shirt” comments, “Your avatar is immortal and all-powerful.”[15] Moments later Cline writes:

    Then Halliday began to disappear. He smiled and waved good-bye as his avatar slowly faded out of existence … Then he was completely gone.[16]

    Under Spielberg’s direction, this scene—and in particular Halliday’s exit—play out very differently. While we are made aware of Wade’s victory, his avatar’s appearance remains unchanged and there’s no mention of Wade gaining all-powerful immortality. And whereas Cline explicitly refers to the image of Halliday that Wade encounters as an avatar—and therefore a program presumably set to appear for the benefit of game’s victor—the film goes out of its way to establish that this image of Halliday is nothing of the sort. When Wade asks if Halliday is truly dead, the image responds in the affirmative; when asked if he’s an avatar, the image replies no, and doesn’t respond at all to Wade’s final question, “what are you?” Instead Halliday’s image, accompanied by another image of his childhood self, walks silently through a doorway to an adjacent room and closes the door.

    Rather than supplanting himself with a younger overlord and “fading out of existence” as he does in the novel, Spielberg’s Halliday remains part of the world he created, hesitant to relinquish full control. Closing the door behind him may signify an exit, but it doesn’t preclude the possibility of a return, especially given that neither he nor Wade locks the door. In place of closure, Halliday’s departure, along with his acknowledgement that he’s neither real nor simulation, suggests a more permanent arrangement whereby Halliday remains the animating essence within the OASIS. Halliday cannot “fade out of existence” in the OASIS because he effectively is the OASIS—its memory, its imagination, the means through which its simulations come to life. Whereas in the novel, Anorak’s transferal of power to Wade/Parzival suggests an acquisition of unadulterated control, the film proposes an alternative scenario in which Halliday’s creative powers are not fully transferable. In order for the OASIS to function, the film implies, Halliday must somehow remain within it as a kind of guiding force—a consciousness that animates the technological world Halliday created.

    By replacing the simulation of Halliday that Wade encounters at the end of the novel with a mysterious deity figure taking up permanent residence inside the OASIS, Spielberg betrays a level of affection for the multi-billionaire world builder reminiscent of his treatment of the John Hammond character in Jurassic Park (1993). In that film, Spielberg spares the life of the deadly park’s obscenely wealthy creator and CEO—portrayed with jolly insouciance by Richard Attenborough—despite being ripped to pieces by dinosaurs in Michael Crichton’s novel of the same name. In Ready Player One Spielberg ups the ante, allowing the world builder and corporate overlord to ascend to godly status, therefore ensuring that while the OASIS exists, so will its creator Halliday.

    III.

    In contrast to the clear-cut usurpation of the eccentric billionaire by the indigent but tenderhearted teenager seen in Cline’s novel, the movie version of Ready Player One asks audiences to accept a more opaque distribution of controlling interests. While on the one hand the film presents the OASIS as a site of emotional suppression wherein users—following Halliday’s example—favor artificial stimulation over real world emotional connection, it also insists viewers recognize that Halliday created the OASIS in response to real world emotional trauma. The film uses this trauma to neutralize the class distinctions between Wade and Halliday that the novel highlights, and asks spectators to view both characters through a lens of universalized emotional vulnerability. The film then uses this conception of emotional trauma to encourage spectators to sympathize and identify with the corporate billionaire, welcome his transcendence into technological deification, and accept Wade not as a usurper but as an administrator of Halliday’s corporate vision.

    But by magnifying the role social anxiety and fear of human intimacy played in creating the OASIS, the film also sets up the OASIS itself as, ultimately, a site of redemption rather than emotional suppression. Nowhere is this reworking of the OASIS more striking than during Wade’s attempt to complete Halliday’s second challenge. In a total overhaul of the novel, Wade (as Parzival) seeks clues unlocking the whereabouts of the Jade Key by visiting Halliday’s Journals, a virtual reference library located inside the OASIS. In the novel, gunters carefully study a digital text known as Anorak’s Almanac, an encyclopedia of ‘70s and ‘80s pop culture memorabilia compiled by Halliday and named after his avatar. The film replaces the almanac with a “physical” archive holding various pop culture artifacts of importance to Halliday, as well as memories of actual events in Halliday’s life. Crucially, like everything else in the OASIS, the contents of Halliday’s Journals are simulations created by Halliday based on his own memories.

    These memories appear as images carefully re-imagined for cinematic display: gunters watch Halliday’s “memory movies” via a large rectangular screen through which (or on which) the images themselves appear (or are projected) as a kind of three-dimensional hologram. Looking at the screen is to look into the environment in which the events occurred, as if looking through a wall. In the memory containing Halliday’s one and only reference to Karen Underwood—his one-time date, and the future wife of his former business partner Ogden Morrow—Halliday approaches what is essentially the “fourth wall” and, while not necessarily “breaking” it, peers knowingly into the void, signaling to gunters—and thus to spectators—that recognizing the significance of this “leap not taken” regarding his unrealized affection for Karen is crucial to completing the second challenge. Spielberg latches on to Halliday’s failure with Karen, making this missed romantic opportunity the site of significant lifelong emotional trauma, and the de facto cause of Halliday’s retreat into creating and living in the OASIS.

    Halliday’s archive also contains all of his favorite ‘80s movies, which appear as immersive environments that gunters may explore. Upon learning that Halliday, on his one and only date with Karen, took her to see Stanley Kubrick’s 1980 adaptation of Stephen King’s novel The Shining (1980), Wade (again, as Parzival) and his comrades (and the film’s audience) enter the lobby of the Overlook Hotel exactly as it appears in Kubrick’s film. The ensuing sequence is particularly revelatory in that we witness the camera gleefully roaming the interiors of Kubrick’s Overlook Hotel. Spielberg clearly delights in this scene, in the same way that Halliday, in Cline’s novel, relishes simulating the cinematic worlds of War Games and Monty Python and the Holy Grail. But in those cases, OASIS players must adopt one of the film’s characters as an avatar in order to show reverence by reciting dialogue and participating in scenes. In Cline’s novel, Halliday is interested in using reenactment to measure the depth of players’ devotion to Halliday’s favorite films.

    In Spielberg’s adaptation, however, Parzival enters Halliday’s simulation of The Shining not as part of the story, but as a spectator. In one sense, Spielberg’s Halliday opens cinema up to players, enabling them to remain “themselves” while interacting with cinematic environments to discover clues leading to the jade key and therefore victory in Halliday’s second challenge. The theory of spectatorship that the film seems to advance during this sequence insists that the real pleasure of cinema lies not in the passive watching of it, but in its imaginative regeneration and exploration. The spectator’s imagination has the ability to call up a cinematic memory, and to stage one’s own stories or scenes in the environments recalled there. To connect with a film is to hold it in one’s memory in such a way that in can be explored repeatedly, and in different ways.

    But while this conception of spectatorship appears to give viewers the ability to make cinema broadly their own, in fact, with Spielberg’s inhabiting of The Shining, we witness a specific transmutation of Kubrick’s text into an entry in Spielberg’s own corpus. In The Shining, Kubrick crushes those aspects of Stephen King’s narrative that would have importance for Spielberg, namely King’s interest in family trauma and intergenerational conflict. For Kubrick, the family is a scene of a pure violence that infects and corrodes the human capacity for empathy and rationality, thereby forcing violent action recursively back on itself. Kubrick’s film is clearly anti-Spielbergian in this sense, and yet in his replay of The Shining in Ready Player One, Spielberg does his own violence to Kubrick’s vision, taking control of the simulacrum and re-producing The Shining as a site of redemption, whereas in Kubrick it’s certainly not.

    After a series of gags that play some of Kubrick’s most haunting images—the twin sisters, the torrent of blood, the decaying women in room 237—for laughs, Wade finds himself in the ballroom of the hotel. Once there, the simulation of Kubrick’s film gives way to a new setting completely unique to Halliday’s imagination, wherein dozens of decomposing zombies dance in pairs, with a simulation of Halliday’s never-to-be love, Karen Underwood, being passed from zombie to zombie. To win the challenge, a player must figuratively make the “leap” that confounded Halliday, using small, suspended platforms, as well as zombie shoulders and heads, to make his way to Karen, whom he must then ask to dance. This challenge reveals to players, and to the audience, Halliday’s emotional vulnerability, highlighting his regret, and foreshadowing the lesson Spielberg imposes on viewers at the film’s end: namely, that audiences should see Halliday’s story as a cautionary tale warning against using technology to repress the need to connect with other human beings.

    Spielberg begins his adaption of Cline’s novel with another radical revision, substituting an action set piece—a car race—for an elaborate two-tier challenge wherein Wade must best a Dungeons and Dragons character playing the classic arcade game Joust and later recite dialogue from the ‘80s movie War Games starring Mathew Broderick. After several failed attempts, Wade discovers that in order to win the race he must travel backwards, a move clearly highlighting the film’s nostalgic turn to the ‘80s. Although this sequence features the film’s most overt reference to Spielberg’s ‘80s corpus in the form of Wade’s car, a replica of Marty McFly’s DeLorean from the Spielberg-produced film Back to the Future, more significant is the extremity of the challenge’s revision, and the fact that nothing within the film or Cline’s novel suggests that a big action spectacle with lots of fast cars might be at all in keeping with Halliday’s ‘80s pop culture preoccupations.

    More likely, given the affinity Spielberg shows throughout the film for redressing Halliday’s world in his own image, is that this sequence pays homage to Spielberg’s friend (and fellow Hollywood elder) George Lucas, whose own early corpus was defined, in part, not only by his film American Graffiti, but by his trademark directorial note, “faster and more intense”—a note this sequence in Ready Player One takes to heart. With this scene and the others mentioned previously, Ready Player One recasts “classic Spielberg” by shifting emphasis away from teenage innocents and toward corporate overlords with whom the story’s young heroes are complicit in the project of subjugation. What emerges is the supremacy and permanence of the corporate overlord whom Spielberg both identifies with and wishes to remake in his own image in such a way that the overlord’s world becomes a site for the Spielbergian values of homecoming and redemption rather than emotional repression aided by escape into simulacra. The irony being that the world of homecoming and redemption he offers is itself nothing other than cinema’s simulation.

    Bibliography

    Breznican, Anthony. “Steven Spielberg Vowed to Leave His Own Movies Out of ‘Ready Player One’—His Crew Vowed Otherwise.” Ew.com, March 22, 2018, http://ew.com/movies/2018/03/22/ready-player-one-steven-spielberg-references/.

    Cabin, Chris. “’Ready Player One’: Steven Spielberg Says He’s Avoiding References to His Own Movies.” Collider.com, June 22, 2016, http://collider.com/ready-player-one-steven-spielberg-easter-eggs/.

    Cline, Ernest. Ready Player One. Broadway Books: New York, 2011.

    Hunter, I.Q. “Spielberg and Adaptation.” A Companion to Steven Spielberg. Ed. Nigel Morris. Wiley Blackwell: West Sussex, 2017. 212-226.

    Kramer, Peter. “Spielberg and Kubrick.” A Companion to Steven Spielberg. Ed. Nigel Morris. Wiley Blackwell: West Sussex, 2017. 195-211.

    Nealon, Jeffrey T. Post-Postmodernism or, The Cultural Logic of Just-in-Time Capitalism. Stanford, CA: Stanford UP, 2012.

    Russell, James. “Producing the Spielberg ‘Brand.’” A Companion to Steven Spielberg. Ed. Nigel Morris. Wiley Blackwell: West Sussex, 2017. 45-57.

    Spielberg, Steven, Dir. Ready Player One. 2018.

    Walker, Michael. “Steven Spielberg and the Rhetoric of an Ending.” A Companion to Steven Spielberg. Ed. Nigel Morris. Wiley Blackwell: West Sussex, 2017. 137-158.

    Watkins, Denny. “Ernest Cline Geeks Out About Spielberg Adapting ‘Ready Player One.’” Syfy.com, May 2, 2016, http://www.syfy.com/syfywire/ernest-cline-geeks-out-about-spielberg-adapting-ready-player-one.

    Vinyard, Papa, “Be Ready for ‘Ready Player One’ in December 2017.” Ain’t it Cool News, August 6, 2015, http://www.aintitcool.com/node/72613.

    Notes

    [1] From remakes (The Karate Kid, Clash of the Titans) and sequels (Tron: Legacy, Wall Street: Money Never Sleeps) to original TV shows drawing on ‘80s cultural influences (Stranger Things, The Americans), ‘80s nostalgia has been exceedingly popular for the better part of a decade. Addressing the current ubiquity of the ‘80s, Jeffery T. Nealon argues that “it’s not so much that the ‘80s are back culturally, but that they never went anywhere economically,” adding, “the economic truisms of the ‘80s remain a kind of sound track for today, the relentless beat playing behind the eye candy of our new corporate world” (Post-Postmodernism).

    [2] When it was announced that Spielberg would adapt Ready Player One, entertainment journalists rejoiced, describing the move as a “return to ‘blockbuster filmmaking’” for Spielberg that would give Cline’s story both “street cred and … mainstream appeal” (Vinyard, “Be Ready for ‘Ready Player One’”).

    [3] Watkins, “Ernest Cline Geeks Out”

    [4] Cabin, “‘Steven Spielberg Says”

    [5] In both the novel and film, Wade’s avatar, known as Parzival in the OASIS, drives a simulation of the DeLorean featured in the Back to the Future films, which Spielberg produced.

    [6] Cabin, “Steven Spielberg Says”

    [7] Spielberg remarked in 2016 that, “[he] was very happy to see there was enough without [him] that made the ‘80s a great time to grow up” (Cabin, “Spielberg Says”), and in a 2018 interview with Ew.com Spielberg insisted, “I didn’t corner the ‘80s market … there’s plenty to go around” (Breznican, “Steven Spielberg Vowed”).

    [8] Russell, “Producing the Spielberg ‘Brand.’”

    [9] While it’s true, in both the novel and the film, that prohibiting corporatist Nolan Sorrento from acquiring the OASIS is a priority for Wade, what motivates him is not antipathy to capitalist enterprise, but rather the desire to preserve the “pure” capitalist vision of the OASIS’s corporate creator, Halliday. Averse to Sorrento’s plans to further monetize the OASIS by opening up the platform to infinite numbers of advertisers, Wade simply prefers Halliday’s more controlled brand of corporatism, which appears rooted in what Nealon would describe as “the dictates of ‘80s management theory (individualism, excellence, downsizing)” (5, Post-Postmodernism). The film likewise shares an affinity for heavily centralized, individualized, and downsized corporate control.

    [10] Cline, Ready Player One, 372.

    [11] Spielberg, Ready Player One.

    [12] Walker, “Rhetoric of an Ending,” 144-145, 149-150.

    [13] Spielberg, Ready Player One

    [14] Cline, Ready Player One, 363.

    [15] Cline, Ready Player One, 363.

    [16] Cline, Ready Player One, 364.

  • Dermot Ryan – In Defense of Principles: A Response to Joseph North

    Dermot Ryan – In Defense of Principles: A Response to Joseph North

    by Dermot Ryan

    This essay is part of a dossier on Joseph North’s Literary Criticism: A Concise Political History. Dermot Ryan reviewed North’s volume in January 2018. North responded here. This essay is Ryan’s reply to North’s response. 

    I am grateful to b2o: An Online Journal for providing a venue where Joseph North and I can discuss Literary Criticism: A Concise Political History (2017), North’s account of the history and future of literary studies. Like North, I consider disciplinary histories invaluable: not only to account for where we stand as a discipline and how we got here, but also to discern and propose new directions for our field. I share with him an interest in how we relate institutional and disciplinary histories to other historical narratives. For instance, I too am exercised by the question of how we might relate recent changes in universities generally (and in literature departments particularly) to the latest phase of capitalism analyzed by commentators under the moniker of neoliberalism. That said, I reviewed Literary Criticism because I think that its history of our discipline is flawed: it offers an inaccurate account that relies on a reductive historiographical model. Moreover, I am concerned that North’s account and the historical assumptions that undergird it do not serve the kind of left politics that North and I would appear to share.

    North’s response to my review reminded me that schoolboy errors (whether in the form of inadequate citation, vague attribution, or sloppy quotations) should be avoided as avidly in book reviews as in the books they are reviewing. North concludes his response by stating that he hopes for “critiques that engage with the arguments [he] actually make[s] – critiques that then offer, in response to those arguments, a rigorous and principled defense of the existing paradigm.” While I suspect that North was more concerned with discrediting me as a reader than engaging me as an interlocutor, I will take him at his word. Rather than get into the weeds (or in this case, the footnotes) with North, I will use this response to reengage with his book’s arguments. But I will disappoint North in one respect. I will not defend the “existing paradigm” because the paradigm as it is described by North is one hardly worth defending. Who would champion a straw man? Instead, I will take this opportunity to highlight my disagreements with him about how literary texts work, what literary scholars do, and how we tell the history of our discipline.

    Conscious of North’s claim that I have misunderstood and misrepresented his main argument, let me briefly restate it here. Literary Criticism: A Concise Political History is “an introduction to the lost ‘critical’ paradigm in literary studies, as well as an overview of the historicist/contextualist paradigm that has replaced it” (3). Since the discipline’s inception, North argues, the field’s central axis of dispute has been between critics and scholars, the key distinction being that the former treated the study of literature as an opportunity to intervene in culture, while the latter treated it as a means by which to analyze it (1-2). At some point in the late 1970s or early 1980s, North argues, the literary scholarship became the dominant mode (2). Since this “scholarly turn,” the majority of practitioners in the field have tended to “treat literary texts chiefly as opportunities for cultural and historical analysis,” replacing critical approaches, which tended to “treat literary texts as a means of cultivating readers’ aesthetic sensibilities” (2). While criticism developed close reading as “a tool with which to cultivate readers’ aesthetic sensibilities in something approaching a materialist sense” with the goal of more general cultural and political change, close reading under the historicist/contextualist paradigm entails a “focus on small units of text for the purposes of understanding what the text has to teach us about histories and cultures” (105-6).

    I want to pause here to note that in North’s schema, both paradigms and their attendant reading methods deploy the literary text as an instrument: the critic uses it as a means of fostering “new ranges of sensibility, new modes of subjectivity, new capacities for experience” (6); the scholar uses it as a means of analyzing history and culture. Neither approaches literary texts as ends in themselves. North never entertains the idea that the role of literary criticism and scholarship might be to figure out the way a text works—not as an instrument to facilitate the development of a reader’s aesthetic sensibility, not as evidence of the culture within which they were written and read (7)—but as a material event in its own right, whose constitutive powers we need to analyze. North thinks that the work of critics and scholars has been to figure out how to make a literary text work, not to figure out how it is working.

    For the sake of brevity, I will focus on his characterization of the ways scholars historicize. According to North, the majority of today’s scholars treat literary texts chiefly “as opportunities for producing knowledge about the cultural contexts in which they were written and read” (7). “In contrast to the nonspecialist reader,” North claims, “the majority of today’s literary scholarship is most interested in Woolf for what she can teach us about her time and place” (7). I genuinely don’t recognize these as descriptions of what literary scholars do. Rather than treat literary texts as records of a historical moment, historically-informed scholarship of any value makes visible the ways texts produce new values and meanings, new affects, new uses of language, new worlds, new practices, new ways of seeing, and new subjectivities. Scholars historicize in order to better see the complex and historically variable way a text, a genre, or a mode works. For instance, Kurt Heinzelman and Raymond Williams don’t analyze country house poetry as a more or less accurate record of the rural worlds they purport to represent. Rather, their work shows the manner in which the genre and its conventions make the notion of the country count by using the country to articulate new values or ratify existing ones, to produce actions, to foster and reproduce social relationships.

    Now obviously texts don’t read themselves. Texts get cooked up in and react with the bodies and minds of readers. Readers encounter texts in historically and geographically variable ways. Texts remain culturally active by being connected with other texts and mobilized in different ways, and these types of renewals will often involve educational institutions and disciplinary formations. So, literary historians also consider the history of a text’s reception: the concrete and historically variable ways it has been received and produced as a culturally active text. Indeed, we could think of North’s book as contributing to this work. Far from being in any tension with the kind of aesthetic education North is advocating, this kind of historically informed scholarship is a prerequisite to a robust and sensitive encounter with a text’s full complexity. When North characterizes the purpose of historical scholarship of the last thirsty years, he fails to acknowledge the necessary and multifaceted ways scholars historicize literary texts for the purpose of reading them better.

    Having noted the manner in which North characterizes the majority of today’s literary scholarship, I want to turn to his historical account of the demise of criticism and the rise to dominance of scholarship. As I describe at some length in my review, North proposes an alternative tripartite historical narrative to the “pre- and post-Theory” narrative that he believes characterizes most accounts of literary studies. In his model, three periods in the history of literary criticism—I.A. Richards and his incipiently materialist account of the aesthetic; the New Critical project which replaced the materialist with an idealist aesthetic; and the current historicist/contextualist paradigm—map onto three moments in the history of capitalism (a crisis in capitalism between the wars; a Keynesian period of relative stability; and our moment in which the establishment of a neoliberal order followed the crisis of Keynesianism). North summarizes this insight in the following manner:

    When we track these three lines of thinking as they develop through the century, treating them as central to the discipline, something rather surprising emerges: it begins to look as though the history of literary studies since the 1920s falls roughly into three periods—three periods that match rather closely those of what I have called the “new periodization.” (14)

    In my review, I had some fun at North’s expense for his coining of the phrase the “new periodization.” North correctly points out that his coinage designates the division of the twentieth century into three periods, a division proposed by scholars across many disciplines, and not his own proposal for periodizing literary studies. Fair enough. As his response indicates, his book does propose a new way of periodizing the history of literary studies, one that maps his three periods in literary studies onto the aforementioned moments in the history of global capitalism. And North is silent on my critique of his model, which I think I am right in concluding posits that shifts in the social order determine shifts in the discipline. I read evidence of this “base/superstructure” historiographical model in his book’s claim that the “two paradigms of ‘criticism’ and ‘scholarship’ both serv[ed] real superstructural functions within Keynesianism” (17). Or again when he asks “what would one expect to find except that the history of the disciplines marches more or less in step with the underlying transformations of the social order?” (17). And finally, I see proof of a base/superstructure model in this formulation: “on a larger scale the discipline has stepped out its fundamental movement from paradigm to paradigm in close synchronization with the broader advance of the social order itself from phase to phase. This has always of course been the historical materialist line in theory, but to my mind it has not often been taken seriously enough on the ground” (196).

    Those of us on the ground might respond that the “historical materialist line” has itself a history, and North’s model of a set of cultural practices shifting from paradigm to paradigm in synchronization with the broader advance of the social order is just one version of Marxist historiography, one that has been subjected to a robust critique by Williams and many others. When North quarantines literary studies outside “the social order” and then claims that this field is determined by “the broader advance of [that] social order,” the constellation of social and material practices that actually constitute the field become epiphenomenal and cannot be investigated as active elements in a larger material social process. Nor can we recognize that these practices possess their own dynamics; dynamics that extend far beyond the ability to speed up, slow down, resist, or accommodate the “underlying transformations in the social order” (17). Let me be clear here that I am not proposing anything like “the relative autonomy” of universities understood as part of the social order’s superstructure with respect to the base. Universities are not only integral parts of the knowledge economy; they are also central to the reproduction of capital’s value-producing commodity: skilled and disciplined labor power. Rather, I am suggesting that all models of determination that identify and prioritize a reified “social order” and then confine whole bodies of social and material practice to a superstructure will always account for changes in those social and material practices by reference to dynamics in another realm (the economy; the social order).

    There are real hegemonic struggles taking place over a wide range of social and material practices in universities: we might consider the manner in which the extension of “learning outcomes” disciplines not only students but also faculty; or the increasing role of assessment in driving educational priorities; or the role student debt plays in producing a submissive labor force; or the ways in which the outsourcing of literacy instruction to graduate and adjunct labor is restructuring the political economy of the humanities; or the impact true cost accounting and data-driven decision making is having on the curricula of majors within the humanities. Each item in this list can be investigated as an instance of neoliberalism, defined as the shifting of the state and public institutions from sites of social provision to sites of monetization, surveillance, and control. At a disciplinary level, we could discuss the manner in which big data, digital humanities, the cognitive turn, the science/humanities partnerships undertaken by the environmental humanities, the discourse of the anthropocene, and big history might become sites of neoliberal revenue generation or cost sharing. But you wouldn’t gain insight into any of these practices and their potential to be recoded according to the logic of neoliberalism by prioritizing the transformation of a social order outside the political economy of the university. On the contrary, North’s approach leads to abstract “bird’s eye” formulations like the following:

    Williams’ sweeping critique of the project of “criticism” and of the associated categories of “literature” and the “aesthetic,” which at least in its early stages had been directed at a genuine target to the right, was turned to quite different ends when it was taken up in the very different environment of the United States in the 1980s and 1990s, at a moment when neoliberal forces within the university were systematically favoring the scholarly over the critical model of literary studies. In this newly professionalized and scientized context, the scholarly model of intellectual inquiry—intellectual work as knowledge-production, now usually conceived of within the discipline as the production of historical knowledge—was simply assumed to constitute the central task of literary study (99/100).

    I am not persuaded by North’s suggestion that neoliberalism favors scholarship because it treats “intellectual work as knowledge production” and that “in this newly professionalized and scientized context,” scholarship as knowledge production “was simply assumed to constitute the central task of literary study.”

    In my review, I objected to this claim by North on the grounds that critics and scholars alike have held that the production of knowledge is the central task of literary study since the discipline’s foundation. In his response, North takes exception to this part of my argument, pointing out that his opening chapter acknowledges as much. North adds that his “claim is certainly not that the neoliberal period saw the birth of literary scholarship” (a claim I never suggested he was making), but “that the neoliberal period saw the death of literary criticism.” Rather than clarify his argument, North uses his response as an opportunity to suggest I didn’t read the “first few pages of the first chapter” of his book. He spurns the opportunity to explain why neoliberal forces would favor the knowledge produced by scholars when we both agree that the commitment to professionalism and the scientific model of knowledge stretches back to the origin of the discipline and when we both accept that critics successfully argued that close reading was a method that produced new knowledge. This being the case, how did the demise of literary criticism impact neoliberalism’s elevation of scholarship? Was criticism somehow holding the disciplinary commitment to intellectual work as knowledge production in check (even as it claimed it was itself a kind of knowledge production)? If both scholars and critics framed the mission of literary studies as the production of knowledge, what was new about the knowledge production of the “historicist/contextualist” paradigm? Because he has chosen to impugn my abilities as a reader rather than clarify his own position, I will offer my own interpretation. I would suggest that the “historical materialist line,” as North understands it, requires that scholarship is dominant because it performs some kind of superstructural function. After all, the historicist/contextualist paradigm has been “pushed into position by more general political, economic, and institutional forces of a much harsher kind” (20). Why was this paradigm pushed into this dominant position? The only explanation I can find in North’s book is that the scholarship produced under the auspices of the historicist/contextualist paradigm “fits hand in glove with the model of specialized knowledge production that the thoroughly scientized neoliberal university assumes as the default” (188). In short, the “scientized neoliberal university” privileges “specialized knowledge production.” If North has a more persuasive reason for why neoliberal forces favor scholarship, he did not use his response to enlighten me.

    North claims that I have fundamentally misunderstood what he describes as “a fairly simple argument.” As I draw my own response to a close—having restated North’s position and my concern with it—I have a sinking feeling that North will remain unpersuaded of the fact that I understand his account and, as a result, won’t consider my objections to it. At this stage, if North and I disagree so fundamentally about the argument his book actually makes, I can only invite interested parties to read his book and decide for themselves.

     

  • Joseph North – Still Hoping: A Response to Dermot Ryan

    Joseph North – Still Hoping: A Response to Dermot Ryan

    by Joseph North

    This essay is part of a dossier on Joseph North’s Literary Criticism: A Concise Political History. Dermot Ryan reviewed North’s volume in January 2018. This essay is North’s response to Ryan’s review. b2o also published Ryan’s reply to this response. 

    I am not a big believer in the wisdom of responding to negative reviews – what is to be gained?  perhaps very little – but Dermot Ryan’s recent account of my book Literary Criticism: A Concise Political History is based on a number of misreadings that seem to me worth trying to clear up (Ryan 2018, North 2017).

    Ryan’s primary claim is that I am a kind of throwback to the bad old days of mid-century humanism – a revenant of the “old-school model of criticism,” as he puts it.  Accordingly, he goes on to charge me with anti-feminism, dismissiveness towards both queer theory and postcolonial studies, and even a kind of antipathy or indifference to union drives.  But this is odd.  To mention just one reason: a reader who judged Literary Criticism: A Concise Political History by Ryan’s review would get little sense of the fact that majority of the living figures celebrated by the book are feminists and/or queer theorists.[1]  In my wilder utopian moments, I had thought that no-one who really read the book (still less anyone who knows my politics!) could have mistaken it for anything except an attempt to radicalize – specifically, to radicalize by mobilizing – the discipline’s existing commitments to feminism, queer theory, and the critique of empire (just to stick with Ryan’s chosen examples; in the book I am concerned also with others, anti-capitalism being perhaps the central case).  At any rate, it seems to me that I am an odd target at which to level these kinds of charges.

    But I ought to check my starry-eyed optimism here, for really the charges Ryan levels at me are not so surprising – in fact, I addressed them in the first few pages of the book itself, a fact to which I shall return at the end of this piece.  For now, let me simply note that in order to make the book resemble a proper target for this kind of critique, Ryan has to twist it into some very odd shapes.  Take, for instance, the charge that Ryan offers as a “stand in” for many of the other charges: the charge that the book is somehow anti-feminist.  I take this charge to heart, not least because I was a feminist before I was any other sort of radical.  It is a serious charge (at least among leftists), and one that ought not to be made lightly.  Ryan makes it as follows:

    The following swipe at feminism must stand in for a long list of North’s leading questions directed at the legacy of feminist, queer, and postcolonial criticism: ‘To what extent were second-wave feminist critiques of the welfare state likely to secure basic structural changes, and to what extent were they working to replace a material politics with a mere politics of recognition, thereby serving, albeit often inadvertently, as the hand-maidens of neoliberalism?’ (58). In a historical narrative that repeatedly understands literary studies as being reshaped by economic forces outside the academy, feminist scholars are accorded a striking degree of agency here as midwives of the new neoliberal order. North’s choice of hand-maiden to characterize the work of his feminist colleagues is particularly unwelcome.

    Let me begin by wholeheartedly endorsing Ryan’s general position here: he is encountering what he takes to be an instance of haughty dismissiveness toward the achievements of feminist criticism – in effect, an instance of misogyny – and he is resolved to call it out and critique it.  This seems to me a good thing.  He winces especially at that “particularly unwelcome” term “hand-maiden,” which he reads as a snide attack on the work of my “feminist colleagues.”  All this goes to show my deeper conservatism, or at least the implicit conservatism of my argument: thus, for Ryan, my “swipe at feminism” “stands in for a long list” of swipes at other progressive forces within the discipline.  Having read me in this way, he quite naturally concludes that I am “wrong in ways that are damaging to the discipline and give ammunition to reactionary forces within and beyond it.”  Excellent.  It’s no fun to be the target, of course, but Ryan is firing his big guns for all the right reasons here, and I can certainly cheer for that.

    But let us go back and read the line that Ryan identifies as my “swipe at feminism”:

    To what extent were second-wave feminist critiques of the welfare state likely to secure basic structural changes, and to what extent were they working to replace a material politics with a mere politics of recognition, thereby serving, albeit often inadvertently, as the hand-maidens of neoliberalism?  

    There are two differences between Ryan’s version of the line and the line I wrote.  First, the original version includes a footnote that Ryan does not seem to have noticed.  That footnote – as some readers surely have guessed already – is to the work of the prominent Marxist/Feminist Nancy Fraser, and specifically to her book Fortunes of Feminism, in which she articulates the most well-known version of the argument to which my line refers (Fraser 2013a).  Now, I hasten to add that my single-sentence summary of her work here is not as precise as it could be, and indeed I would re-write this sentence today.  But even taking this into account, I had thought the reference to Fraser unmistakable, most obviously because of the footnote, but also because I had thought that the argument itself, with that key term “politics of recognition,” was well-known to anyone familiar with contemporary debates within left and marxist feminism.

    The second difference: in the original text there are scare quotes around the phrase “hand-maidens of neoliberalism,” whereas in Ryan’s version, the phrase is simply run into the text.    Now, I do not think that Ryan has omitted the scare quotes on purpose – that would be a serious charge.  It is surely an innocent oversight.  But, after all, the omission is not ideal, especially since this is the very phrase that Ryan calls out as “particularly unfortunate,” and reads as an act of misogynistic aggression on my part.  Once one has noticed the quotation marks, one perhaps begins to wonder why they are there.  Why did I place the offending phrase in scare quotes?  Is the term “hand-maidens” really my “particularly unfortunate” way of taking a tone-deaf “swipe” at the work of my “feminist colleagues?”  Is it even mine?  At this point I hope that at least a couple of readers are nodding with recognition, as it were, since the phrase is in fact a reference to Nancy Fraser’s 2013 article “How Feminism Became Capitalism’s Handmaiden – And How to Reclaim It,” which I had thought fairly well-known, at least among those who follow debates within feminism on the left, precisely because of the provocativeness of the term “handmaiden” (Fraser 2013b).  Admittedly, this reference might be thought obscure, and perhaps I was wrong in assuming that readers would catch it (though again, I would have thought the scare quotes would cause a reviewer at least to pause before calling out this particular phrase).  But surely even a reviewer who had missed the reference, and had failed to recognize the argument itself, and had also overlooked the fact that many of the most important feminist arguments in recent history have been critiques of the “second wave,” would nevertheless think to read the footnote to Fraser before rushing to the conclusion that this line represents a “swipe at feminism” on my part?  In any event, the argument that Ryan calls out, in a peer-reviewed article, as a telling example of my supposed “anti-feminism” is in fact a feminist argument, and a rather famous one.  It’s at times like this that I find myself oddly pleased that Ryan thinks my work is “exactly wrong,” since he is reading it exactly backwards.  We could find ourselves in a kind of broad agreement if only he would stop reading me upside-down.

    This would seem to me a fairly egregious example of misreading by anyone’s lights.  Is it an isolated case?  Of course I am uniquely placed to be oversensitive here, but it seems to me that it is not an isolated case.  In fact, Ryan does this often.  Despite my fairly loud (I had thought perhaps even obnoxiously loud) declarations of radical intent, his conviction that I am a closet reactionary is so strong that he repeatedly misreads my summaries of others’ views as if they were my views, and then objects to them.  Take, for example, his main objection to my tone:

    North complacently opines that “actual political struggle—the kind that involve a group, or class ‘forcing’ its way into something—does not take place within the world of scholarship” (88). Here as elsewhere, North’s discussion of the efforts by marginalized groups to challenge the academy’s exclusionary culture is not aided by his clubby tone, which comes off as privileged, tweedy, and smug.

    Again, I can endorse Ryan’s general position here: I, too, would want to argue against anyone who claimed that “actual political struggle—the kind that involve a group, or class ‘forcing’ its way into something—does not take place within the world of scholarship.”  Inconveniently, though, I was in fact arguing against that claim in the very line Ryan quotes.  The line is drawn from my account of some of the problematic assumptions that seem to me to underpin Greenblatt and Gallagher’s Practicing New Historicism – assumptions that I subject to a fairly blunt critique.  In passing, I’ll note that I keep being confronted by scholars who want to defend Greenblatt and Gallagher on this score (or else defend New Historicism more generally, minus those two): many people in the discipline (particularly of a certain generation) seem to think that I was too critical of them here, or else simply too blunt.  But to my knowledge Ryan is the first to misread me as endorsing the very view that I critique so bluntly, and he is certainly the first to critique me for “complacently opining” it.

    The specific examples Ryan cites here are all, I believe, based on demonstrable misreadings.  Another case: when summarizing my account of the discipline’s history, Ryan writes that North “labels his own version rather grandly as ‘the new periodization.’” As it happened, I didn’t label my own work “the new periodization,” and I believe that this is fairly obvious on the page (the whole discussion is on pp12-14, for those who want to check).  Where it originally appears, the phrase refers not to some great innovation on my part, but to a view now held by many scholars across many disciplines, the view being that the 20th century ought to be considered a three-period century, rather than a two-period century, as was once widely assumed.  I cite Piketty as an example of a prominent scholar who takes roughly this view, but I am really talking about a view held much more widely.  In any event, on this point my own contribution, such as it is, is simply to show how the history of Anglo-American literary studies fits into a larger puzzle put together by others; there is certainly no question of my labeling my own work “the new periodization” in this “grand” manner.

    Ryan also has an odd tendency to critique me (and in such strident terms!) for neglecting to say things that in fact I say quite clearly.  His language suggests that he places quite a lot of confidence in the following observation:

    One example can stand synecdochically for a series of unpersuasive historical claims and moves. According to North, during the eighties and nineties, neoliberal forces within the university systematically favored the scholarly over the critical model of literary studies. In this “professionalized and scientized context, the scholarly model of intellectual inquiry—intellectual work as knowledge production” became the central task of literary study (100). It’s a compelling story. And it’s completely inaccurate. Literary Studies has benefited enormously from the disciplinary histories of Gerald Graff, Louis Menand, Chris Baldick, Bill Readings and many others. […] North references many of these scholars. But, having read them, he should know that the disciplinary commitment to professionalism and the scientific model of knowledge production in literary studies predates neoliberalism. It stretches back to the origin of English as a discipline. […] No matter. Let’s return to North’s convenient morality play.

    If this claim truly “stands synecdochically” for many of my “unpersuasive historical claims and moves,” then I think I am in pretty good shape, for Ryan’s historical observations here easily could have been lifted directly from the first chapter of my book.  For of course the “disciplinary commitment to professionalism and the scientific model of knowledge production in literary studies predates neoliberalism.”  Who would deny it?  Not me.  Literary scholarship has involved a “commitment to professionalism and the scientific model of knowledge production” at least since the fin de siècle.  I began the first chapter of the book by pointing out precisely this, and I even made the point by referring to two of the scholars Ryan mentions, Graff and Baldick (though I set them alongside Guillory, rather than Menand or Readings).  Moreover, the rest of my argument simply assumes the truth of this, because, well, it’s so obvious: thus, throughout the book, my claim is certainly not that the neoliberal period saw the birth of literary scholarship –  that would be a very silly claim indeed.  Rather my claim, in part, is that the neoliberal period saw the death of literary criticism, for a certain important meaning of that phrase. That is quite a different thing.

    I could go on, but let me instead draw to a close by making a single more general point.  Before making it, I would like to emphasize once again that, in my optimism, I still think that Ryan and I could be in sympathy with one another here – pretty much all of his critiques of my work seem to me decent in principle.  Nevertheless, those critiques seem to me quite misplaced; he is engaging with something, I am certain, but it is not me.  At this point I am going to risk going a step further by observing that all the claims we have seen Ryan making so far are not just false, but trivially false, by which I mean that they are false in such a way that they could easily be dispelled by, say, reading a footnote, or noticing some quotation marks, or reading a line in relation to its immediate context, or reading the first few pages of the first chapter – not even familiarity with recent debates within feminism would be required.  Why is a professional reader who is intelligent, principled, and well-informed, as Ryan clearly is, nevertheless lapsing repeatedly into trivial misreadings when confronted by what is, after all, a fairly simple argument?  The answer, I think, is that he has begun with such a strong set of assumptions about what I must have written, that it has often prevented him from reading what I actually wrote.

    What is this troubling set of assumptions, and where does it come from?  People who quote themselves quickly become tiresome, but I’ll risk doing so just once to close.  In the introduction to the book, I wrote:

    Over the last three decades, the discipline has tended to assume that any attack on the historicist/contextualist paradigm must originate in cultural conservatism, particularly if the offending party makes use of such terms as “criticism,” “aesthetic,” “sensibility,” and similar.  This assumption has allowed much to pass for progressivism, even for radicalism, that under other circumstances would have been seen much more clearly for what it was.  (4)

    Ryan’s argument strikes me as a good example of just this kind: hearing that I have doubts about the usual historicist/contextualist priorities, he has assumed that my argument must be such as to “give ammunition to reactionary forces,” and he has thus proceeded to condemn it on that basis.  Now, in a way it is pleasing to see someone coming out with precisely the critique I had expected, since it gives me an opportunity to show how much in the book has to be misread, or simply elided, in order to make that critique sound plausible.  But what one really hopes for are critiques that manage to get past those old assumptions – critiques that engage with the arguments I actually make – critiques that then offer, in response to those arguments, a rigorous and principled defense of the existing paradigm.  I’m still hoping.

    Joseph North is an assistant professor of English at Yale University.  He is the author of Literary Criticism: A Concise Political History (2018).

    References

    Fraser, Nancy. 2013a.  Fortunes of Feminism: From State-Managed Capitalism to Neoliberal Crisis.  London: Verso.

    Fraser, Nancy. 2013b. “How Feminism Became Capitalism’s Handmaiden – And How to Reclaim It.”  The Guardian, October 14.

    North, Joseph. 2017. Literary Criticism: A Concise Political History. Cambridge: Harvard

    Roth, Marco. 2017. “Tokens of Ruined Method: Does Literary Studies Have a Future?” n+1, no. 29: 179-189.

    Ryan, Dermot. 2018. “Review of Joseph North’s Literary Criticism: A Concise Political History. boundary 2 online, January 29.

    [1] In passing, I’ll note that readers don’t have to take my word for this: in lieu of reading the book itself, they can simply consult other reviews of it, many of which have pointed out precisely this.  Thus Marco Roth at n+1: “The catalog of critics covered in [the final, most positive chapter, is] almost exclusively female or queer: the late Eve Sedgwick, Isobel Armstrong […], Lauren Berlant, and D. A. Miller” (Roth 2017).

  • Kenneth Gross – Review of Angus Fletcher’s “The Topological Imagination: Edges, Spheres, and Islands”

    Kenneth Gross – Review of Angus Fletcher’s “The Topological Imagination: Edges, Spheres, and Islands”

    by Kenneth Gross

    This essay has been peer-reviewed by the boundary 2 editorial collective. 

    Angus Fletcher. The Topological Imagination:  Edges, Spheres, and Islands. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2016.

    The Topological Imagination:  Edges, Spheres, and Islands appeared in April of 2016, just half a year before Angus Fletcher’s death.  Topology is, in his view, principally “a theory of edges”—the edge being, like the horizon, something the mind invents and plays with, translates, dissolves, and hardens, rather than something merely found in nature.  Like all of Fletcher’s books, starting with Allegory:  The Theory of a Symbolic Mode (1964), this last book is centrally about the shape of our imagining, in this case our imagining of the earth and our own life on earth, the radicality of our place here.  It is in this “an essay in praise of the most unusual sphere ever imagined,” as he says at the close.  He means the earth, of course, but also our minds of earth, our earthly minds.  Indeed, the book asks us to re-imagine our imagining, to see better its shapes and stakes.  Fletcher wants to consider how the imagination takes in the nature of change and stability in change, also the imagination’s ambitions toward wholeness.  He wants to educate our imaginations in the need to embrace adaptive, emergent patterns of thought that yet honor the “bass note” of terrestrial existence, our ties to diurnal cycles.   It is, he writes, about “diurnal thinking,” a redeemed journalism such as he finds in the poetry of Walt Whitman, master of waveforms and lists, the “middle voice.”

    The book is complex, often daunting in its compression and rapid leaps of association.  Old preoccupations come into play throughout:  Giambattista Vico on the primitive poetry that shapes law, history, and culture (forms shaped as much by fear as desire); Samuel Taylor Coleridge on the haunted nature of thresholds and crossing thresholds; I. A. Richards (Fletcher’s cherished thesis advisor at Harvard) on the “disparity action” of metaphor, its way of marking strange difference as much as similarity.  You also can see the book’s continuities with the account of horizons and the nature of descriptive poetry that Fletcher develops in A New Theory for American Poetry (2004), especially in his analyses of John Clare—the feeling Clare gives us, as John Ashbery puts in “For John Clare,” “that the sky may be at the back of someone’s mind.”  The Topological Imagination also shows an ever-deepening engagement with scientific and mathematical thought.  Fletcher dwells at length, for instance, on the eighteenth century mathematician Leopold Euler’s invention of “the edge,” basic to his founding of what was only later named “topology”—that branch of mathematics which studies shape and place, particularly (as opposed to geometry) those aspects of natural or made form which survive despite that form’s being bent, deformed, or stretched.  Playing out these pre-occupations, Fletcher explores Rachel Carson’s dark reflections about life and death at the shoreline, the living edge between sea and land.  He further considers the quantum theorist David Bohm’s work on the “implicate order” of the physical and mental world, on James Lovelock’s controversial “Gaia hypothesis,” on Vladimir Ivanovich Vernadsky’s posit of the “biosphere.”

    There are also many instances of what Kenneth Burke calls “representative anecdotes.”  At one point, to illustrate the mysterious yet pragmatic implications of topology, Fletcher describes what it meant when astronauts on the damaged Apollo 13 were challenged with making (or re-making), out of the few available materials, a shaped tool by which to breathe in their capsuled environment circling the terrestrial sphere.   (The sculpturally arranged rolls of duct tape on the book-cover allude this event.)  Looking to his own life, Fletcher makes vivid what is involved in the policing of borders, and the misunderstanding, madness, and even comedy this can provoke on all sides, in a story of driving back and forth into the Eastern Bloc, during a trip to an academic conference in Russia in the 1960s.

    Trying to cross or build bridges between realms of thought too often separated, the book broods on what it means for us “to be inside a world that is also inside us,” a situation that marks for Fletcher “the mysterious dimensionality of our existence.”  The Topological Imagination is a book that includes a complex meditation on the many boundaries, edges, cuts, walls, thresholds, and horizons that shape our experience.  Fiercely skeptical as it is, the book also asks us to take seriously a model for a kind of idealism that doesn’t slander time, or the life of earth, by banking on violent, rigid models of truth, narrowly framed (and hence destructive) explanations or maps of cause.